bpf: Support stack arguments for BPF functions and kfuncs
Yonghong Song
reviewerv6 cover bpf: Support stack arguments for BPF functions and kfuncs
Currently, bpf function calls and kfunc's are limited by 5 reg-level parameters. For function calls with more than 5 parameters, developers can use always inlining or pass a struct pointer after packing more parameters in that struct although it may have some inconvenience. But there is no workaround for kfunc if more than 5 parameters is needed.
This patch set lifts the 5-argument limit by introducing stack-based argument passing for BPF functions and kfunc's, coordinated with compiler support in LLVM [1]. The compiler emits loads/stores through a new bpf register r11 (BPF_REG_PARAMS) to pass arguments beyond the 5th, keeping the stack arg area separate from the r10-based program stack. The current maximum number of arguments is capped at MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS (12), which is sufficient for the vast majority of use cases.
All kfunc/bpf-function arguments are caller saved, including stack arguments. For register arguments (r1-r5), the verifier already marks them as clobbered after each call. For stack arguments, the verifier invalidates all outgoing stack arg slots immediately after a call, requiring the compiler to re-store them before any subsequent call. This follows the native calling convention where all function parameters are caller saved.
The x86_64 JIT translates r11-relative accesses to RBP-relative native instructions. Each function's stack allocation is extended by 'max_outgoing' bytes to hold the outgoing arg area below the callee-saved registers. This makes implementation easier as the r10 can be reused for stack argument access. At both BPF-to-BPF and kfunc calls, outgoing args are pushed onto the expected calling convention locations directly. The incoming parameters can directly get the value from caller.
To support kfunc stack arguments, before doing any stack arguments, existing codes are refactored/modified to use bpf_reg_state as much as possible instead of using regno, and to pass a non-negative argno, encoded to support both registers and stack arguments, as a single variable.
Global subprogs with >5 args are not yet supported. Only x86_64 is supported for now.
For the rest of patches, patches 1-4 make changes to make it easy for future stack arguments for kfuncs. Patches 5-8 supports bpf-to-bpf stack arguments. Patch 9 rejects interpreter for stack arguments. Patch 10 rejects subprogs if tailcall reachable. Patch 11 adds stack argument support for kfuncs. Patch 12 enables stack arguments for x86_64 and Patch 13 implements the x86_64 JIT. Patches 14-16 are some test cases.
[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/189060
Note:
- The patch set is on top of the following commit:
eb0d6d97c27c Merge tag 'bpf-fixes' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf
- This patch set requires latest llvm23 compiler. It is possible that a build
failure may appear:
/home/yhs/work/bpf-next/scripts/mod/modpost.c:59:13: error: variable 'extra_warn' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-global]
59 | static bool extra_warn;
| ^
1 error generated.
In this case, the following hack can workaround the build issue:
--- a/Makefile
+++ b/Makefile
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ KERNELDOC = $(srctree)/tools/docs/kernel-doc
export KERNELDOC
KBUILD_USERHOSTCFLAGS := -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes \
- -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -std=gnu11
+ -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -std=gnu11 -Wno-unused-but-set-global
KBUILD_USERCFLAGS := $(KBUILD_USERHOSTCFLAGS) $(USERCFLAGS)
KBUILD_USERLDFLAGS := $(USERLDFLAGS)Changelogs:
v5 -> v6:
- v5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Do stack arguments invalidation after bpf function or kfunc all. This is to following native achitecture calling convention.
- Fix some r11 related issues in const_fold, liveness and insn checking.
- Fix a few places for precision marking for stack arguments. All these cases have const value and mark them as precise.
- Unconditionally copy some incoming/outgoing stat.
- Fix a missing tailcall case with main prog having tailcall and there is no other subprog's.
- Add and fix tests as suggested in v5.
- Reorder some patches, e.g., preparing stack arguments in bpf functions, disabling JIT, before allowing proper r11 usage.
v4 -> v5:
- v4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Use r11 instead of r12, llvm also updated with r11.
- Change int type 'reg_or_arg' to u32 'argno' where 'argno' encodes to support both bpf registers and stack arguments.
- Track per-state bitmask 'out_stack_arg_mask' for r11 based stores, so at any particular call, it knows what stores are available. This is important since stores may be in different basic block.
- Previously after each call, all store slots are invalidated. This patches disabled such invalidation.
- Ensure r11 reg only appearing in allowed insns. Also avoid r11 for reg tracking purpose.
- Make stack_arg_regs more similar to regular reg's (struct bpf_reg_state *)..
- Reorder r11 based stores from 'arg6:off:-24, arg7:off:-16, arg8:off:-8" to "arg6:off:-8, arg7:off:-16, arg8:off:-24".
- Add a few more tests, including e.g., two callee's with different number of stack arguments, shared r11-stores in different branches, etc.
v3 -> v4:
- v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Refactor/Modify codes to make it easier for later kfunc stack argument support
- Invalidate outgoing slots immediately after the call to prevent reuse
- Fix interaction between stack argument PTR_TO_STACK and dead slot poisoning
- Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable
- Disable private stack if stack argument is used
- Allocate outgoing stack argument region after callee saved registers, and this simplifies the JITed code a lot.
v2 -> v3:
- v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Fix selftest stack_arg_gap_at_minus8().
- Fix a few 'UTF-8' issues.
v1 -> v2:
- v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Add stack_arg_safe() to do pruning for stack arguments.
- Fix an issue with KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE. Since a faked register is used, added verification log to indicate the start and end of such faked register usage.
- For x86_64 JIT, copying incoming parameter values directly from caller's stack.
- Add test cases with stack arguments e.g. mem, mem+size, dynptr, iter, etc.
Yonghong Song (17):
bpf: Remove unused parameter from check_map_kptr_access()
bpf: Refactor to avoid redundant calculation of bpf_reg_state
bpf: Refactor to handle memory and size together
bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
bpf: Introduce bpf register BPF_REG_PARAMS
bpf: Reuse MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS for maximum number of arguments
bpf: Support stack arguments for bpf functions
bpf: Reject stack arguments in non-JITed programs
bpf: Track r11 registers in const_fold and liveness
bpf: Prepare architecture JIT support for stack arguments
bpf: Enable r11 based insns
bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls
bpf: Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable bpf,x86: Implement JIT support for stack arguments selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF function stack arguments selftests/bpf: Add tests for stack argument validation selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for stack argument validation
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 154 +- include/linux/bpf.h | 7 + include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 29 +- include/linux/filter.h | 6 +- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 20 +- kernel/bpf/const_fold.c | 14 +- kernel/bpf/core.c | 11 +- kernel/bpf/fixups.c | 28 +- kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 14 +- kernel/bpf/states.c | 41 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 1233 ++++++++++++----- .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_nf.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cb_refs.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ctx_rewrite.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kfunc_call.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c | 139 ++ .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg_fail.c | 10 + .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c | 2 + .../selftests/bpf/progs/cgrp_kfunc_failure.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c | 10 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/file_reader_fail.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/irq.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_state_safety.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod_seq.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/percpu_alloc_fail.c | 4 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree_fail.c | 6 +- .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg.c | 254 ++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_fail.c | 124 ++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_kfunc.c | 164 +++ .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_kfunc_failure.c | 18 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_work_fail.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_nf_fail.c | 8 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c | 2 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_param_nullable.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bits_iter.c | 4 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_bpf_fastcall.c | 24 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_may_goto_1.c | 12 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_sdiv.c | 64 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c | 433 ++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c | 8 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/wq_failures.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c | 73 + .../bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h | 26 + tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 14 +- 52 files changed, 2533 insertions(+), 561 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg_fail.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_fail.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_kfunc.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 1/17 bpf: Remove unused parameter from check_map_kptr_access()
The parameter 'regno' in check_map_kptr_access() is unused. Remove it.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +2 -2
@@ -4719,7 +4719,7 @@ static int mark_uptr_ld_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,return 0 ; } -static int check_map_kptr_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 regno, +static int check_map_kptr_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int value_regno,int insn_idx,struct btf_field *kptr_field) {
@@ -6366,7 +6366,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn kptr_field =btf_record_find (reg->map_ptr->record, off + reg->var_off.value,BPF_KPTR |BPF_UPTR );if (kptr_field) { - err =check_map_kptr_access (env, regno, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field); + err =check_map_kptr_access (env, value_regno, insn_idx, kptr_field); }else if (t ==BPF_READ && value_regno >=0 ) {struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 2/17 bpf: Refactor to avoid redundant calculation of bpf_reg_state
In reply to Yonghong SongIn many cases, once a bpf_reg_state is defined, it can pass to callee's. Otherwise, callee will need to get bpf_reg_state again based on regno. More importantly, this is needed for later stack arguments for kfuncs since the register state for stack arguments does not have a corresponding regno. So it makes sense to pass reg state for callee's.
The following is the only change to avoid compilation warning:
static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
const struct bpf_insn *insn,
- const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
+ struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg)
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 213 ++++++++++++++++++------------------------ 1 file changed, 93 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +93 -120
@@ -3938,13 +3938,13 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,static int check_stack_write_var_off (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,/* func where register points to */ struct bpf_func_state *state, -int ptr_regno,int off,int size, +struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,int off,int size,int value_regno,int insn_idx) {struct bpf_func_state *cur;/* state of the current function */ int min_off, max_off;int i, err; -struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg =NULL , *value_reg =NULL ; +struct bpf_reg_state *value_reg =NULL ;struct bpf_insn *insn = &env->prog->insnsi[insn_idx];bool writing_zero = false;/* set if the fact that we're writing a zero is used to let any
@@ -3953,7 +3953,6 @@ static int check_stack_write_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,bool zero_used = false; cur = env->cur_state->frame[env->cur_state->curframe]; - ptr_reg = &cur->regs[ptr_regno]; min_off = ptr_reg->smin_value + off; max_off = ptr_reg->smax_value + off + size;if (value_regno >=0 )
@@ -4250,7 +4249,7 @@ enum bpf_access_src { ACCESS_HELPER = 2, /* the access is performed by a helper */ }; -static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +static int check_stack_range_initialized(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int regno, int off, int access_size, bool zero_size_allowed, enum bpf_access_type type,
@@ -4274,18 +4273,16 @@ static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)* offset; for a fixed offset check_stack_read_fixed_off should be used * instead. */ -static int check_stack_read_var_off (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +static int check_stack_read_var_off (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int ptr_regno,int off,int size,int dst_regno) { -/* The state of the source register. */ -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, ptr_regno);struct bpf_func_state *ptr_state =bpf_func (env, reg);int err;int min_off, max_off;/* Note that we pass a NULL meta, so raw access will not be permitted. */ - err =check_stack_range_initialized (env, ptr_regno, off, size, + err =check_stack_range_initialized (env, reg, ptr_regno, off, size, false,BPF_READ ,NULL );if (err)return err;
@@ -4307,10 +4304,9 @@ static int check_stack_read_var_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,* can be -1, meaning that the read value is not going to a register. */ static int check_stack_read (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, -int ptr_regno,int off,int size, +struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int ptr_regno,int off,int size,int dst_regno) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, ptr_regno);struct bpf_func_state *state =bpf_func (env, reg);int err;/* Some accesses are only permitted with a static offset. */
@@ -4346,7 +4342,7 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,* than fixed offset ones. Note that dst_regno >= 0 on this * branch. */ - err =check_stack_read_var_off (env, ptr_regno, off, size, + err =check_stack_read_var_off (env, reg, ptr_regno, off, size, dst_regno); }return err;
@@ -4363,10 +4359,9 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,* The caller must ensure that the offset falls within the maximum stack size. */ static int check_stack_write (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, -int ptr_regno,int off,int size, +struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int off,int size,int value_regno,int insn_idx) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, ptr_regno);struct bpf_func_state *state =bpf_func (env, reg);int err;
@@ -4379,16 +4374,15 @@ static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,* than fixed offset ones. */ err =check_stack_write_var_off (env, state, - ptr_regno, off, size, + reg, off, size, value_regno, insn_idx); }return err; } -static int check_map_access_type (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 regno, +static int check_map_access_type (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u32 regno,int off,int size,enum bpf_access_type type) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, regno);struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;u32 cap =bpf_map_flags_to_cap (map);
@@ -4408,17 +4402,15 @@ static int check_map_access_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, }/* check read/write into memory region (e.g., map value, ringbuf sample, etc) */ -static int __check_mem_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int regno, +static int __check_mem_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,int off,int size,u32 mem_size,bool zero_size_allowed) {bool size_ok = size >0 || (size ==0 && zero_size_allowed); -struct bpf_reg_state *reg;if (off >=0 && size_ok && (u64 )off + size <= mem_size)return 0 ; - reg = &cur_regs (env)[regno];switch (reg->type) {case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY : verbose(env, "invalid access to map key, key_size=%d off=%d size=%d\n",
@@ -4448,13 +4440,10 @@ static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, }/* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */ -static int check_mem_region_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 regno, +static int check_mem_region_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u32 regno,int off,int size,u32 mem_size,bool zero_size_allowed) { -struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; -struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; -struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];int err;/* We may have adjusted the register pointing to memory region, so we
@@ -4475,7 +4464,7 @@ static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, regno);return -EACCES ; } - err =__check_mem_access (env, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, + err =__check_mem_access (env, reg, regno, reg->smin_value + off, size, mem_size, zero_size_allowed);if (err) { verbose(env, "R%d min value is outside of the allowed memory range\n",
@@ -4492,7 +4481,7 @@ static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, regno);return -EACCES ; } - err =__check_mem_access (env, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, + err =__check_mem_access (env, reg, regno, reg->umax_value + off, size, mem_size, zero_size_allowed);if (err) { verbose(env, "R%d max value is outside of the allowed memory range\n",
@@ -4796,19 +4785,16 @@ static u32 map_mem_size(const struct bpf_map *map) }/* check read/write into a map element with possible variable offset */ -static int check_map_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 regno, +static int check_map_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u32 regno,int off,int size,bool zero_size_allowed,enum bpf_access_src src) { -struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state; -struct bpf_func_state *state = vstate->frame[vstate->curframe]; -struct bpf_reg_state *reg = &state->regs[regno];struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;u32 mem_size =map_mem_size (map);struct btf_record *rec;int err, i; - err =check_mem_region_access (env, regno, off, size, mem_size, zero_size_allowed); + err =check_mem_region_access (env, reg, regno, off, size, mem_size, zero_size_allowed);if (err)return err;
@@ -4904,10 +4890,9 @@ static bool may_access_direct_pkt_data(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } } -static int check_packet_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 regno,int off, +static int check_packet_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u32 regno,int off,int size,bool zero_size_allowed) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, regno);int err;if (reg->range <0 ) {
@@ -4915,7 +4900,7 @@ static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,return -EINVAL ; } - err =check_mem_region_access (env, regno, off, size, reg->range, zero_size_allowed); + err =check_mem_region_access (env, reg, regno, off, size, reg->range, zero_size_allowed);if (err)return err;
@@ -4970,7 +4955,7 @@ static int __check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, int ofreturn -EACCES ; } -static int check_ctx_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int insn_idx,u32 regno, +static int check_ctx_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int insn_idx,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u32 regno,int off,int access_size,enum bpf_access_type t,struct bpf_insn_access_aux *info) {
@@ -4980,12 +4965,10 @@ static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn*/ bool var_off_ok =is_var_ctx_off_allowed (env->prog);bool fixed_off_ok = !env->ops->convert_ctx_access; -struct bpf_reg_state *regs =cur_regs (env); -struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;int err;if (var_off_ok) - err =check_mem_region_access (env, regno, off, access_size,U16_MAX , false); + err =check_mem_region_access (env, reg, regno, off, access_size,U16_MAX , false);else err =__check_ptr_off_reg (env, reg, regno, fixed_off_ok);if (err)
@@ -5011,10 +4994,9 @@ static int check_flow_keys_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int off, }static int check_sock_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int insn_idx, -u32 regno,int off,int size, +struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u32 regno,int off,int size,enum bpf_access_type t) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, regno);struct bpf_insn_access_aux info = {};bool valid;
@@ -5977,12 +5959,11 @@ static bool type_is_trusted_or_null(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, }static int check_ptr_to_btf_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, -struct bpf_reg_state *regs, +struct bpf_reg_state *regs,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,int off,int size,enum bpf_access_type atype,int value_regno) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;const struct btf_type *t =btf_type_by_id (reg->btf, reg->btf_id);const char *tname =btf_name_by_offset (reg->btf, t->name_off);const char *field_name =NULL ;
@@ -6134,12 +6115,11 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, }static int check_ptr_to_map_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, -struct bpf_reg_state *regs, +struct bpf_reg_state *regs,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,int off,int size,enum bpf_access_type atype,int value_regno) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;struct bpf_reg_state map_reg;enum bpf_type_flag flag =0 ;
@@ -6228,11 +6208,10 @@ static int check_stack_slot_within_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,* 'off' includes `regno->offset`, but not its dynamic part (if any). */ static int check_stack_access_within_bounds ( -struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,int off,int access_size,enum bpf_access_type type) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, regno);struct bpf_func_state *state =bpf_func (env, reg);s64 min_off, max_off;int err;
@@ -6320,12 +6299,11 @@ static void add_scalar_to_reg(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg, s64 val)* if t==write && value_regno==-1, some unknown value is stored into memory * if t==read && value_regno==-1, don't care what we read from memory */ -static int check_mem_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int insn_idx,u32 regno, +static int check_mem_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int insn_idx,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u32 regno,int off,int bpf_size,enum bpf_access_type t,int value_regno,bool strict_alignment_once,bool is_ldsx) {struct bpf_reg_state *regs =cur_regs (env); -struct bpf_reg_state *reg = regs + regno;int size, err =0 ; size =bpf_size_to_bytes (bpf_size);
@@ -6342,7 +6320,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regnreturn -EACCES ; } - err =check_mem_region_access (env, regno, off, size, + err =check_mem_region_access (env, reg, regno, off, size, reg->map_ptr->key_size, false);if (err)return err;
@@ -6356,10 +6334,10 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regnverbose (env,"R%d leaks addr into map\n" , value_regno);return -EACCES ; } - err =check_map_access_type (env, regno, off, size, t); + err =check_map_access_type (env, reg, regno, off, size, t);if (err)return err; - err =check_map_access (env, regno, off, size, false,ACCESS_DIRECT ); + err =check_map_access (env, reg, regno, off, size, false,ACCESS_DIRECT );if (err)return err;if (tnum_is_const (reg->var_off))
@@ -6428,7 +6406,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn* instructions, hence no need to check bounds in that case. */ if (!rdonly_untrusted) - err =check_mem_region_access (env, regno, off, size, + err =check_mem_region_access (env, reg, regno, off, size, reg->mem_size, false);if (!err && value_regno >=0 && (t ==BPF_READ || rdonly_mem))mark_reg_unknown (env, regs, value_regno);
@@ -6446,7 +6424,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regnreturn -EACCES ; } - err =check_ctx_access (env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t, &info); + err =check_ctx_access (env, insn_idx, reg, regno, off, size, t, &info);if (!err && t ==BPF_READ && value_regno >=0 ) {/* ctx access returns either a scalar, or a * PTR_TO_PACKET[_META,_END]. In the latter
@@ -6483,15 +6461,15 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn }else if (reg->type ==PTR_TO_STACK ) {/* Basic bounds checks. */ - err =check_stack_access_within_bounds (env, regno, off, size, t); + err =check_stack_access_within_bounds (env, reg, regno, off, size, t);if (err)return err;if (t ==BPF_READ ) - err =check_stack_read (env, regno, off, size, + err =check_stack_read (env, reg, regno, off, size, value_regno);else - err =check_stack_write (env, regno, off, size, + err =check_stack_write (env, reg, off, size, value_regno, insn_idx); }else if (reg_is_pkt_pointer (reg)) {if (t ==BPF_WRITE && !may_access_direct_pkt_data (env,NULL , t)) {
@@ -6504,7 +6482,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn value_regno);return -EACCES ; } - err =check_packet_access (env, regno, off, size, false); + err =check_packet_access (env, reg, regno, off, size, false);if (!err && t ==BPF_READ && value_regno >=0 )mark_reg_unknown (env, regs, value_regno); }else if (reg->type ==PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS ) {
@@ -6524,7 +6502,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));return -EACCES ; } - err =check_sock_access (env, insn_idx, regno, off, size, t); + err =check_sock_access (env, insn_idx, reg, regno, off, size, t);if (!err && value_regno >=0 )mark_reg_unknown (env, regs, value_regno); }else if (reg->type ==PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER ) {
@@ -6533,10 +6511,10 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regnmark_reg_unknown (env, regs, value_regno); }else if (base_type (reg->type) ==PTR_TO_BTF_ID && !type_may_be_null (reg->type)) { - err =check_ptr_to_btf_access (env, regs, regno, off, size, t, + err =check_ptr_to_btf_access (env, regs, reg, regno, off, size, t, value_regno); }else if (reg->type ==CONST_PTR_TO_MAP ) { - err =check_ptr_to_map_access (env, regs, regno, off, size, t, + err =check_ptr_to_map_access (env, regs, reg, regno, off, size, t, value_regno); }else if (base_type (reg->type) ==PTR_TO_BUF && !type_may_be_null (reg->type)) {
@@ -6605,7 +6583,7 @@ static int check_load_mem(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,/* Check if (src_reg + off) is readable. The state of dst_reg will be * updated by this call. */ - err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off, + err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, regs + insn->src_reg, insn->src_reg, insn->off,BPF_SIZE (insn->code),BPF_READ , insn->dst_reg, strict_alignment_once, is_ldsx); err = err ?: save_aux_ptr_type(env, src_reg_type,
@@ -6635,7 +6613,7 @@ static int check_store_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;/* Check if (dst_reg + off) is writeable. */ - err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, + err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, regs + insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,BPF_SIZE (insn->code),BPF_WRITE , insn->src_reg, strict_alignment_once, false); err = err ?:save_aux_ptr_type (env, dst_reg_type, false);
@@ -6646,6 +6624,7 @@ static int check_store_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,static int check_atomic_rmw (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_insn *insn) { +struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg;int load_reg;int err;
@@ -6707,13 +6686,15 @@ static int check_atomic_rmw(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, load_reg =-1 ; } + dst_reg =cur_regs (env) + insn->dst_reg; +/* Check whether we can read the memory, with second call for fetch * case to simulate the register fill. */ - err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, + err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, dst_reg, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,BPF_SIZE (insn->code),BPF_READ ,-1 , true, false);if (!err && load_reg >=0 ) - err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, + err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, dst_reg, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,BPF_SIZE (insn->code),BPF_READ , load_reg, true, false);if (err)
@@ -6725,7 +6706,7 @@ static int check_atomic_rmw(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return err; }/* Check whether we can write into the same memory. */ - err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off, + err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, dst_reg, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,BPF_SIZE (insn->code),BPF_WRITE ,-1 , true, false);if (err)return err;
@@ -6814,11 +6795,10 @@ static int check_atomic(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn)* read offsets are marked as read. */ static int check_stack_range_initialized ( -struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int regno,int off, +struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,int off,int access_size,bool zero_size_allowed,enum bpf_access_type type,struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, regno);struct bpf_func_state *state =bpf_func (env, reg);int err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi;/* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are
@@ -6840,7 +6820,7 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(return -EACCES ; } - err =check_stack_access_within_bounds (env, regno, off, access_size, type); + err =check_stack_access_within_bounds (env, reg, regno, off, access_size, type);if (err)return err;
@@ -6971,7 +6951,7 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,switch (base_type (reg->type)) {case PTR_TO_PACKET :case PTR_TO_PACKET_META : -return check_packet_access (env, regno,0 , access_size, +return check_packet_access (env, reg, regno,0 , access_size, zero_size_allowed);case PTR_TO_MAP_KEY :if (access_type ==BPF_WRITE ) {
@@ -6979,12 +6959,12 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, reg_type_str(env, reg->type));return -EACCES ; } -return check_mem_region_access (env, regno,0 , access_size, +return check_mem_region_access (env, reg, regno,0 , access_size, reg->map_ptr->key_size, false);case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE : -if (check_map_access_type (env, regno,0 , access_size, access_type)) +if (check_map_access_type (env, reg, regno,0 , access_size, access_type))return -EACCES ; -return check_map_access (env, regno,0 , access_size, +return check_map_access (env, reg, regno,0 , access_size, zero_size_allowed,ACCESS_HELPER );case PTR_TO_MEM :if (type_is_rdonly_mem (reg->type)) {
@@ -6994,7 +6974,7 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,return -EACCES ; } } -return check_mem_region_access (env, regno,0 , +return check_mem_region_access (env, reg, regno,0 , access_size, reg->mem_size, zero_size_allowed);case PTR_TO_BUF :
@@ -7014,16 +6994,16 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, max_access);case PTR_TO_STACK :return check_stack_range_initialized ( - env, + env, reg, regno,0 , access_size, zero_size_allowed, access_type, meta);case PTR_TO_BTF_ID : -return check_ptr_to_btf_access (env, regs, regno,0 , +return check_ptr_to_btf_access (env, regs, reg, regno,0 , access_size,BPF_READ ,-1 );case PTR_TO_CTX :/* Only permit reading or writing syscall context using helper calls. */ if (is_var_ctx_off_allowed (env->prog)) { -int err =check_mem_region_access (env, regno,0 , access_size,U16_MAX , +int err =check_mem_region_access (env, reg, regno,0 , access_size,U16_MAX , zero_size_allowed);if (err)return err;
@@ -7186,11 +7166,10 @@ enum {* env->cur_state->active_locks remembers which map value element or allocated * object got locked and clears it after bpf_spin_unlock. */ -static int process_spin_lock (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int regno,int flags) +static int process_spin_lock (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,int flags) {bool is_lock = flags &PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK , is_res_lock = flags &PROCESS_RES_LOCK ;const char *lock_str = is_res_lock ?"bpf_res_spin" :"bpf_spin" ; -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, regno);struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;bool is_const =tnum_is_const (reg->var_off);bool is_irq = flags &PROCESS_LOCK_IRQ ;
@@ -7303,11 +7282,10 @@ static int process_spin_lock(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int flags) }/* Check if @regno is a pointer to a specific field in a map value */ -static int check_map_field_pointer (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 regno, +static int check_map_field_pointer (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u32 regno,enum btf_field_type field_type,struct bpf_map_desc *map_desc) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, regno);bool is_const =tnum_is_const (reg->var_off);struct bpf_map *map = reg->map_ptr;u64 val = reg->var_off.value;
@@ -7357,26 +7335,26 @@ static int check_map_field_pointer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,return 0 ; } -static int process_timer_func (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int regno, +static int process_timer_func (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,struct bpf_map_desc *map) {if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT )) {verbose (env,"bpf_timer cannot be used for PREEMPT_RT.\n" );return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -return check_map_field_pointer (env, regno,BPF_TIMER , map); +return check_map_field_pointer (env, reg, regno,BPF_TIMER , map); } -static int process_timer_helper (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int regno, +static int process_timer_helper (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) { -return process_timer_func (env, regno, &meta->map); +return process_timer_func (env, reg, regno, &meta->map); } -static int process_timer_kfunc (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int regno, +static int process_timer_kfunc (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) { -return process_timer_func (env, regno, &meta->map); +return process_timer_func (env, reg, regno, &meta->map); } static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,
@@ -7452,10 +7430,9 @@ static int process_kptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,* Helpers which do not mutate the bpf_dynptr set MEM_RDONLY in their argument * type, and declare it as 'const struct bpf_dynptr *' in their prototype. */ -static int process_dynptr_func (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int regno,int insn_idx, +static int process_dynptr_func (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,int insn_idx,enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,int clone_ref_obj_id) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, regno);int err;if (reg->type !=PTR_TO_STACK && reg->type !=CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR ) {
@@ -7498,7 +7475,7 @@ static int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn/* we write BPF_DW bits (8 bytes) at a time */ for (i =0 ; i <BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE ; i +=8 ) { - err =check_mem_access (env, insn_idx, regno, + err =check_mem_access (env, insn_idx, reg, regno, i,BPF_DW ,BPF_WRITE ,-1 , false, false);if (err)return err;
@@ -7568,10 +7545,9 @@ static bool is_kfunc_arg_iter(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, int arg_idx,return btf_param_match_suffix (meta->btf, arg,"__iter" ); } -static int process_iter_arg (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int regno,int insn_idx, +static int process_iter_arg (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,int insn_idx,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, regno);const struct btf_type *t;int spi, err, i, nr_slots, btf_id;
@@ -7603,7 +7579,7 @@ static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, int insn_id }for (i =0 ; i < nr_slots *8 ; i +=BPF_REG_SIZE ) { - err =check_mem_access (env, insn_idx, regno, + err =check_mem_access (env, insn_idx, reg, regno, i,BPF_DW ,BPF_WRITE ,-1 , false, false);if (err)return err;
@@ -8042,12 +8018,11 @@ static const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible_reg_types[__BPF_ARG_TYPE_MAX] = { [ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR] = &dynptr_types, }; -static int check_reg_type (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,u32 regno, +static int check_reg_type (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u32 regno,enum bpf_arg_type arg_type,const u32 *arg_btf_id,struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, regno);enum bpf_reg_type expected, type = reg->type;const struct bpf_reg_types *compatible;int i, j, err;
@@ -8390,7 +8365,7 @@ static int check_reg_const_str(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return -EACCES ; } - err =check_map_access (env, regno,0 , + err =check_map_access (env, reg, regno,0 , map->value_size - reg->var_off.value, false,ACCESS_HELPER );if (err)
@@ -8526,7 +8501,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, base_type(arg_type) == ARG_PTR_TO_SPIN_LOCK) arg_btf_id = fn->arg_btf_id[arg]; - err =check_reg_type (env, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta); + err =check_reg_type (env, reg, regno, arg_type, arg_btf_id, meta);if (err)return err;
@@ -8664,11 +8639,11 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,return -EACCES ; }if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_lock) { - err =process_spin_lock (env, regno,PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK ); + err =process_spin_lock (env, reg, regno,PROCESS_SPIN_LOCK );if (err)return err; }else if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_spin_unlock) { - err =process_spin_lock (env, regno,0 ); + err =process_spin_lock (env, reg, regno,0 );if (err)return err; }else {
@@ -8677,7 +8652,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, }break ;case ARG_PTR_TO_TIMER : - err =process_timer_helper (env, regno, meta); + err =process_timer_helper (env, reg, regno, meta);if (err)return err;break ;
@@ -8712,7 +8687,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, true, meta);break ;case ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR : - err =process_dynptr_func (env, regno, insn_idx, arg_type,0 ); + err =process_dynptr_func (env, reg, regno, insn_idx, arg_type,0 );if (err)return err;break ;
@@ -9371,7 +9346,7 @@ static int btf_check_func_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog,if (ret)return ret; - ret =process_dynptr_func (env, regno,-1 , arg->arg_type,0 ); + ret =process_dynptr_func (env, reg, regno,-1 , arg->arg_type,0 );if (ret)return ret; }else if (base_type (arg->arg_type) ==ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID ) {
@@ -9382,7 +9357,7 @@ static int btf_check_func_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog,continue ;memset (&meta,0 ,sizeof (meta));/* leave func_id as zero */ - err =check_reg_type (env, regno, arg->arg_type, &arg->btf_id, &meta); + err =check_reg_type (env, reg, regno, arg->arg_type, &arg->btf_id, &meta); err = err ?:check_func_arg_reg_off (env, reg, regno, arg->arg_type);if (err)return err;
@@ -10340,18 +10315,18 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insnif (err)return err; + regs =cur_regs (env); +/* Mark slots with STACK_MISC in case of raw mode, stack offset * is inferred from register state. */ for (i =0 ; i < meta.access_size; i++) { - err =check_mem_access (env, insn_idx, meta.regno, i,BPF_B , + err =check_mem_access (env, insn_idx, regs + meta.regno, meta.regno, i,BPF_B ,BPF_WRITE ,-1 , false, false);if (err)return err; } - regs =cur_regs (env); -if (meta.release_regno) { err = -EINVAL ;if (arg_type_is_dynptr (fn->arg_type[meta.release_regno -BPF_REG_1 ])) {
@@ -11355,11 +11330,10 @@ get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta, const struct btf_type *t, const struct btf_type *ref_t, const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args, - int argno, int nargs) + int argno, int nargs, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) { u32 regno = argno + 1;struct bpf_reg_state *regs =cur_regs (env); -struct bpf_reg_state *reg = ®s[regno];bool arg_mem_size = false; if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] ||
@@ -11526,10 +11500,9 @@ static int process_kf_arg_ptr_to_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return 0 ; } -static int process_irq_flag (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int regno, +static int process_irq_flag (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta) { -struct bpf_reg_state *reg =reg_state (env, regno);int err, kfunc_class =IRQ_NATIVE_KFUNC ;bool irq_save;
@@ -11554,7 +11527,7 @@ static int process_irq_flag(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,return -EINVAL ; } - err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, regno,0 ,BPF_DW ,BPF_WRITE ,-1 , false, false); + err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, reg, regno,0 ,BPF_DW ,BPF_WRITE ,-1 , false, false);if (err)return err;
@@ -12142,7 +12115,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ ref_t =btf_type_skip_modifiers (btf, t->type, &ref_id); ref_tname =btf_name_by_offset (btf, ref_t->name_off); - kf_arg_type =get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type (env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs); + kf_arg_type =get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type (env, meta, t, ref_t, ref_tname, args, i, nargs, reg);if (kf_arg_type <0 )return kf_arg_type;
@@ -12307,7 +12280,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ } } - ret =process_dynptr_func (env, regno, insn_idx, dynptr_arg_type, clone_ref_obj_id); + ret =process_dynptr_func (env, reg, regno, insn_idx, dynptr_arg_type, clone_ref_obj_id);if (ret <0 )return ret;
@@ -12332,7 +12305,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_return -EINVAL ; } } - ret =process_iter_arg (env, regno, insn_idx, meta); + ret =process_iter_arg (env, reg, regno, insn_idx, meta);if (ret <0 )return ret;break ;
@@ -12509,7 +12482,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_verbose (env,"arg#%d doesn't point to a map value\n" , i);return -EINVAL ; } - ret =check_map_field_pointer (env, regno,BPF_WORKQUEUE , &meta->map); + ret =check_map_field_pointer (env, reg, regno,BPF_WORKQUEUE , &meta->map);if (ret <0 )return ret;break ;
@@ -12518,7 +12491,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_verbose (env,"arg#%d doesn't point to a map value\n" , i);return -EINVAL ; } - ret =process_timer_kfunc (env, regno, meta); + ret =process_timer_kfunc (env, reg, regno, meta);if (ret <0 )return ret;break ;
@@ -12527,7 +12500,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_verbose (env,"arg#%d doesn't point to a map value\n" , i);return -EINVAL ; } - ret =check_map_field_pointer (env, regno,BPF_TASK_WORK , &meta->map); + ret =check_map_field_pointer (env, reg, regno,BPF_TASK_WORK , &meta->map);if (ret <0 )return ret;break ;
@@ -12536,7 +12509,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_verbose (env,"arg#%d doesn't point to an irq flag on stack\n" , i);return -EINVAL ; } - ret =process_irq_flag (env, regno, meta); + ret =process_irq_flag (env, reg, regno, meta);if (ret <0 )return ret;break ;
@@ -12557,7 +12530,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave] || meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_unlock_irqrestore]) flags |=PROCESS_LOCK_IRQ ; - ret =process_spin_lock (env, regno, flags); + ret =process_spin_lock (env, reg, regno, flags);if (ret <0 )return ret;break ;
@@ -13691,7 +13664,7 @@ static int check_stack_access_for_ptr_arithmetic(static int sanitize_check_bounds (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,const struct bpf_insn *insn, -const struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) +struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg) {u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
@@ -13708,7 +13681,7 @@ static int sanitize_check_bounds(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return -EACCES ;break ;case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE : -if (check_map_access (env, dst,0 ,1 , false,ACCESS_HELPER )) { +if (check_map_access (env, dst_reg, dst,0 ,1 , false,ACCESS_HELPER )) {verbose (env,"R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, " "prohibited for !root\n" , dst);return -EACCES ;
@@ -17594,7 +17567,7 @@ static int do_check_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool *do_print_state) dst_reg_type =cur_regs (env)[insn->dst_reg].type; - err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, + err =check_mem_access (env, env->insn_idx,cur_regs (env) + insn->dst_reg, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,BPF_SIZE (insn->code),BPF_WRITE ,-1 , false, false);if (err)
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 3/17 bpf: Refactor to handle memory and size together
In reply to Yonghong SongSimilar to the previous patch, try to pass bpf_reg_state from caller to callee. Both mem_reg and size_reg are passed to helper functions. This is important for stack arguments as they may be beyond registers 1-5.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +30 -29
@@ -6940,12 +6940,12 @@ static int check_stack_range_initialized(return 0 ; } -static int check_helper_mem_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int regno, +static int check_helper_mem_access (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg,int regno,int access_size,enum bpf_access_type access_type,bool zero_size_allowed,struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) { -struct bpf_reg_state *regs =cur_regs (env), *reg = ®s[regno]; +struct bpf_reg_state *regs =cur_regs (env);u32 *max_access;switch (base_type (reg->type)) {
@@ -7028,15 +7028,17 @@ static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno,/* verify arguments to helpers or kfuncs consisting of a pointer and an access * size. * -* @regno is the register containing the access size. regno-1 is the register -* containing the pointer. +* @mem_regno is the register containing the pointer, mem_regno+1 is the register +* containing the access size. */ static int check_mem_size_reg (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, -struct bpf_reg_state *reg,u32 regno, +struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg, +struct bpf_reg_state *size_reg,u32 mem_regno,enum bpf_access_type access_type,bool zero_size_allowed,struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta) { +int size_regno = mem_regno +1 ;int err;/* This is used to refine r0 return value bounds for helpers
@@ -7047,37 +7049,37 @@ static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,* out. Only upper bounds can be learned because retval is an * int type and negative retvals are allowed. */ - meta->msize_max_value = reg->umax_value; + meta->msize_max_value = size_reg->umax_value;/* The register is SCALAR_VALUE; the access check happens using * its boundaries. For unprivileged variable accesses, disable * raw mode so that the program is required to initialize all * the memory that the helper could just partially fill up. */ -if (!tnum_is_const (reg->var_off)) +if (!tnum_is_const (size_reg->var_off)) meta =NULL ; -if (reg->smin_value <0 ) { +if (size_reg->smin_value <0 ) {verbose (env,"R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned or 'var &= const'\n" , - regno); + size_regno);return -EACCES ; } -if (reg->umin_value ==0 && !zero_size_allowed) { +if (size_reg->umin_value ==0 && !zero_size_allowed) {verbose (env,"R%d invalid zero-sized read: u64=[%lld,%lld]\n" , - regno, reg->umin_value, reg->umax_value); + size_regno, size_reg->umin_value, size_reg->umax_value);return -EACCES ; } -if (reg->umax_value >=BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ ) { +if (size_reg->umax_value >=BPF_MAX_VAR_SIZ ) {verbose (env,"R%d unbounded memory access, use 'var &= const' or 'if (var < const)'\n" , - regno); + size_regno);return -EACCES ; } - err =check_helper_mem_access (env, regno -1 , reg->umax_value, + err =check_helper_mem_access (env, mem_reg, mem_regno, size_reg->umax_value, access_type, zero_size_allowed, meta);if (!err) - err =mark_chain_precision (env, regno); + err =mark_chain_precision (env, size_regno);return err; }
@@ -7102,8 +7104,8 @@ static int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regint size =base_type (reg->type) ==PTR_TO_STACK ? -(int )mem_size : mem_size; - err =check_helper_mem_access (env, regno, size,BPF_READ , true,NULL ); - err = err ?:check_helper_mem_access (env, regno, size,BPF_WRITE , true,NULL ); + err =check_helper_mem_access (env, reg, regno, size,BPF_READ , true,NULL ); + err = err ?:check_helper_mem_access (env, reg, regno, size,BPF_WRITE , true,NULL );if (may_be_null) *reg = saved_reg;
@@ -7111,16 +7113,15 @@ static int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *regreturn err; } -static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *reg, -u32 regno) +static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg, +struct bpf_reg_state *size_reg,u32 mem_regno) { -struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg = &cur_regs (env)[regno -1 ];bool may_be_null =type_may_be_null (mem_reg->type);struct bpf_reg_state saved_reg;struct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;int err; -WARN_ON_ONCE (regno <BPF_REG_2 || regno >BPF_REG_5 ); +WARN_ON_ONCE (mem_regno >BPF_REG_4 );memset (&meta,0 ,sizeof (meta));
@@ -7129,8 +7130,8 @@ static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_regmark_ptr_not_null_reg (mem_reg); } - err =check_mem_size_reg (env, reg, regno,BPF_READ , true, &meta); - err = err ?:check_mem_size_reg (env, reg, regno,BPF_WRITE , true, &meta); + err =check_mem_size_reg (env, mem_reg, size_reg, mem_regno,BPF_READ , true, &meta); + err = err ?:check_mem_size_reg (env, mem_reg, size_reg, mem_regno,BPF_WRITE , true, &meta);if (may_be_null) *mem_reg = saved_reg;
@@ -8594,7 +8595,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,return -EFAULT ; } key_size = meta->map.ptr->key_size; - err =check_helper_mem_access (env, regno, key_size,BPF_READ , false,NULL ); + err =check_helper_mem_access (env, reg, regno, key_size,BPF_READ , false,NULL );if (err)return err;if (can_elide_value_nullness (meta->map.ptr->map_type)) {
@@ -8621,7 +8622,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,return -EFAULT ; } meta->raw_mode = arg_type &MEM_UNINIT ; - err =check_helper_mem_access (env, regno, meta->map.ptr->value_size, + err =check_helper_mem_access (env, reg, regno, meta->map.ptr->value_size, arg_type &MEM_WRITE ?BPF_WRITE :BPF_READ , false, meta);break ;
@@ -8665,7 +8666,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,*/ meta->raw_mode = arg_type &MEM_UNINIT ;if (arg_type &MEM_FIXED_SIZE ) { - err =check_helper_mem_access (env, regno, fn->arg_size[arg], + err =check_helper_mem_access (env, reg, regno, fn->arg_size[arg], arg_type &MEM_WRITE ?BPF_WRITE :BPF_READ , false, meta);if (err)
@@ -8675,13 +8676,13 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, }break ;case ARG_CONST_SIZE : - err =check_mem_size_reg (env, reg, regno, + err =check_mem_size_reg (env,reg_state (env, regno -1 ), reg, regno -1 , fn->arg_type[arg -1 ] &MEM_WRITE ?BPF_WRITE :BPF_READ , false, meta);break ;case ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO : - err =check_mem_size_reg (env, reg, regno, + err =check_mem_size_reg (env,reg_state (env, regno -1 ), reg, regno -1 , fn->arg_type[arg -1 ] &MEM_WRITE ?BPF_WRITE :BPF_READ , true, meta);
@@ -12415,7 +12416,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_const struct btf_param *size_arg = &args[i +1 ];if (!bpf_register_is_null (buff_reg) || !is_kfunc_arg_nullable (meta->btf, buff_arg)) { - ret =check_kfunc_mem_size_reg (env, size_reg, regno +1 ); + ret =check_kfunc_mem_size_reg (env, buff_reg, size_reg, regno);if (ret <0 ) {verbose (env,"arg#%d arg#%d memory, len pair leads to invalid memory access\n" , i, i +1 );return ret;
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v6 03/17] bpf: Refactor to handle memory and size together
Quoted 2 lines · Yonghong Song
+ * @mem_regno is the register containing the pointer, mem_regno+1 is the register
+ * containing the access size.
wrong comment. should probably say that size_reg is the register that contains size.
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg · line 7124
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +1
-1-WARN_ON_ONCE (regno <BPF_REG_2 || regno >BPF_REG_5 ); +WARN_ON_ONCE (mem_regno >BPF_REG_4 );
this warn is too late here. Can be removed.
Quoted 42 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5
-5memset (&meta,0 ,sizeof (meta));@@ -7129,8 +7130,8 @@ static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_regmark_ptr_not_null_reg (mem_reg); } - err =check_mem_size_reg (env, reg, regno,BPF_READ , true, &meta); - err = err ?:check_mem_size_reg (env, reg, regno,BPF_WRITE , true, &meta); + err =check_mem_size_reg (env, mem_reg, size_reg, mem_regno,BPF_READ , true, &meta); + err = err ?:check_mem_size_reg (env, mem_reg, size_reg, mem_regno,BPF_WRITE , true, &meta);if (may_be_null) *mem_reg = saved_reg;@@ -8594,7 +8595,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,return -EFAULT ; } key_size = meta->map.ptr->key_size; - err =check_helper_mem_access (env, regno, key_size,BPF_READ , false,NULL ); + err =check_helper_mem_access (env, reg, regno, key_size,BPF_READ , false,NULL );if (err)return err;if (can_elide_value_nullness (meta->map.ptr->map_type)) {@@ -8621,7 +8622,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,return -EFAULT ; } meta->raw_mode = arg_type &MEM_UNINIT ; - err =check_helper_mem_access (env, regno, meta->map.ptr->value_size, + err =check_helper_mem_access (env, reg, regno, meta->map.ptr->value_size, arg_type &MEM_WRITE ?BPF_WRITE :BPF_READ , false, meta);break ;@@ -8665,7 +8666,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,*/ meta->raw_mode = arg_type &MEM_UNINIT ;if (arg_type &MEM_FIXED_SIZE ) { - err =check_helper_mem_access (env, regno, fn->arg_size[arg], + err =check_helper_mem_access (env, reg, regno, fn->arg_size[arg], arg_type &MEM_WRITE ?BPF_WRITE :BPF_READ , false, meta);if (err)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, · line 8679
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +1
-1@@ -8675,13 +8676,13 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, }break ;case ARG_CONST_SIZE : - err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, + err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg_state(env, regno - 1), reg, regno - 1,
or moved here.
I would just remove it.
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 03/17] bpf: Refactor to handle memory and size together
Quoted 51 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 2 lines · Yonghong Song
+ * @mem_regno is the register containing the pointer, mem_regno+1 is the register
+ * containing the access size.wrong comment. should probably say that
size_regis the register that contains size.kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg · line 7124
Quoted 3 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +1
-1-WARN_ON_ONCE (regno <BPF_REG_2 || regno >BPF_REG_5 ); +WARN_ON_ONCE (mem_regno >BPF_REG_4 );this warn is too late here. Can be removed.
Quoted 41 lines
memset(&meta, 0, sizeof(meta));kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5
-5@@ -7129,8 +7130,8 @@ static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_regmark_ptr_not_null_reg (mem_reg); } - err =check_mem_size_reg (env, reg, regno,BPF_READ , true, &meta); - err = err ?:check_mem_size_reg (env, reg, regno,BPF_WRITE , true, &meta); + err =check_mem_size_reg (env, mem_reg, size_reg, mem_regno,BPF_READ , true, &meta); + err = err ?:check_mem_size_reg (env, mem_reg, size_reg, mem_regno,BPF_WRITE , true, &meta);if (may_be_null) *mem_reg = saved_reg;@@ -8594,7 +8595,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,return -EFAULT ; } key_size = meta->map.ptr->key_size; - err =check_helper_mem_access (env, regno, key_size,BPF_READ , false,NULL ); + err =check_helper_mem_access (env, reg, regno, key_size,BPF_READ , false,NULL );if (err)return err;if (can_elide_value_nullness (meta->map.ptr->map_type)) {@@ -8621,7 +8622,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,return -EFAULT ; } meta->raw_mode = arg_type &MEM_UNINIT ; - err =check_helper_mem_access (env, regno, meta->map.ptr->value_size, + err =check_helper_mem_access (env, reg, regno, meta->map.ptr->value_size, arg_type &MEM_WRITE ?BPF_WRITE :BPF_READ , false, meta);break ;@@ -8665,7 +8666,7 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,*/ meta->raw_mode = arg_type &MEM_UNINIT ;if (arg_type &MEM_FIXED_SIZE ) { - err =check_helper_mem_access (env, regno, fn->arg_size[arg], + err =check_helper_mem_access (env, reg, regno, fn->arg_size[arg], arg_type &MEM_WRITE ?BPF_WRITE :BPF_READ , false, meta);if (err)
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, · line 8679
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +1
-1@@ -8675,13 +8676,13 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, }break ;case ARG_CONST_SIZE : - err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg, regno, + err = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg_state(env, regno - 1), reg, regno - 1,or moved here.
I would just remove it.
I checked logic and it seems this warn should not really happen. So removing it sound a good idea.
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 4/17 bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
In reply to Yonghong SongThis change prepares verifier log reporting for upcoming kfunc stack argument support.
Today verifier log code mostly assumes that an argument can be described directly by a register number. That works for arguments passed in R1 to R5, but it does not work once kfunc arguments can also be passed on the stack.
Introduce an internal argno representation such that register-passed arguments keep using their real register numbers, while stack-passed arguments use an encoded value above a dedicated base. reg_arg_name() converts this representation into either R%d or *(R11-off) when emitting verifier logs. If a particular argno is corresponding to a stack argument, print *(R11-off). Otherwise, print R%d. Here R11 presents the base of stack arguments.
This keeps existing logs readable for register arguments and allows the same log sites to handle future stack arguments without open-coding special cases.
Update selftests accordingly.
--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 649 ++++++++++-------- .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_nf.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cb_refs.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kfunc_call.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cgrp_kfunc_failure.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c | 10 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/file_reader_fail.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/irq.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_state_safety.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod_seq.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/percpu_alloc_fail.c | 4 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree_fail.c | 6 +- .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_kfunc_failure.c | 18 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_work_fail.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_nf_fail.c | 8 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c | 2 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_param_nullable.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bits_iter.c | 4 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c | 8 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/wq_failures.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 14 +- 30 files changed, 474 insertions(+), 374 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +1 -0
@@ -913,6 +913,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {* e.g., in reg_type_str() to generate reg_type string */ char tmp_str_buf[TMP_STR_BUF_LEN ]; +char tmp_reg_arg_name_buf[32 ];struct bpf_insn insn_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_insn epilogue_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_scc_callchain callchain_buf;
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +374 -275
1,731 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_nf.c +11 -11
@@ -11,18 +11,18 @@ struct {const char *prog_name;const char *err_msg; } test_bpf_nf_fail_tests[] = { - { "alloc_release", "kernel function bpf_ct_release args#0 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn but" }, - { "insert_insert", "kernel function bpf_ct_insert_entry args#0 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn___init but" }, - { "lookup_insert", "kernel function bpf_ct_insert_entry args#0 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn___init but" }, - { "set_timeout_after_insert", "kernel function bpf_ct_set_timeout args#0 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn___init but" }, - { "set_status_after_insert", "kernel function bpf_ct_set_status args#0 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn___init but" }, - { "change_timeout_after_alloc", "kernel function bpf_ct_change_timeout args#0 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn but" }, - { "change_status_after_alloc", "kernel function bpf_ct_change_status args#0 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn but" }, + { "alloc_release", "kernel function bpf_ct_release R1 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn but" }, + { "insert_insert", "kernel function bpf_ct_insert_entry R1 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn___init but" }, + { "lookup_insert", "kernel function bpf_ct_insert_entry R1 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn___init but" }, + { "set_timeout_after_insert", "kernel function bpf_ct_set_timeout R1 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn___init but" }, + { "set_status_after_insert", "kernel function bpf_ct_set_status R1 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn___init but" }, + { "change_timeout_after_alloc", "kernel function bpf_ct_change_timeout R1 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn but" }, + { "change_status_after_alloc", "kernel function bpf_ct_change_status R1 expected pointer to STRUCT nf_conn but" }, { "write_not_allowlisted_field", "no write support to nf_conn at off" }, - { "lookup_null_bpf_tuple", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg1" }, - { "lookup_null_bpf_opts", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg3" }, - { "xdp_lookup_null_bpf_tuple", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg1" }, - { "xdp_lookup_null_bpf_opts", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg3" }, + { "lookup_null_bpf_tuple", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R2" }, + { "lookup_null_bpf_opts", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R4" }, + { "xdp_lookup_null_bpf_tuple", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R2" }, + { "xdp_lookup_null_bpf_opts", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R4" }, }; enum {
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cb_refs.c +1 -1
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ struct {const char *err_msg; } cb_refs_tests[] = { { "underflow_prog", "must point to scalar, or struct with scalar" }, - { "leak_prog", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper arg2" }, + { "leak_prog", "Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper R2" }, { "nested_cb", "Unreleased reference id=4 alloc_insn=2" }, /* alloc_insn=2{4,5} */ { "non_cb_transfer_ref", "Unreleased reference id=4 alloc_insn=1" }, /* alloc_insn=1{1,2} */ };
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kfunc_call.c +1 -1
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static struct kfunc_test_params kfunc_tests[] = {TC_FAIL (kfunc_call_test_get_mem_fail_oob,0 ,"min value is outside of the allowed memory range" ),TC_FAIL (kfunc_call_test_get_mem_fail_not_const,0 ,"is not a const" ),TC_FAIL (kfunc_call_test_mem_acquire_fail,0 ,"acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID" ), -TC_FAIL (kfunc_call_test_pointer_arg_type_mismatch,0 ,"arg#0 expected pointer to ctx, but got scalar" ), +TC_FAIL (kfunc_call_test_pointer_arg_type_mismatch,0 ,"R1 expected pointer to ctx, but got scalar" ),/* success cases */ TC_TEST(kfunc_call_test1, 12),
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c +2 -2
@@ -81,8 +81,8 @@ static struct { { "direct_write_node", "direct access to bpf_list_node is disallowed" }, { "use_after_unlock_push_front", "invalid mem access 'scalar'" }, { "use_after_unlock_push_back", "invalid mem access 'scalar'" }, - { "double_push_front", "arg#1 expected pointer to allocated object" }, - { "double_push_back", "arg#1 expected pointer to allocated object" }, + { "double_push_front", "R2 expected pointer to allocated object" }, + { "double_push_back", "R2 expected pointer to allocated object" }, { "no_node_value_type", "bpf_list_node not found at offset=0" }, { "incorrect_value_type","operation on bpf_list_head expects arg#1 bpf_list_node at offset=48 in struct foo, "
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cgrp_kfunc_failure.c +7 -7
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static struct __cgrps_kfunc_map_value *insert_lookup_cgrp(struct cgroup *cgrp) } SEC("tp_btf/cgroup_mkdir") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_acquire_untrusted, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path) {struct cgroup *acquired;
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_acquire_untrusted, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path } SEC("tp_btf/cgroup_mkdir") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_acquire_no_null_check, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path) {struct cgroup *acquired;
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_acquire_no_null_check, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char * } SEC("tp_btf/cgroup_mkdir") -__failure __msg("arg#0 pointer type STRUCT cgroup must point") +__failure __msg("R1 pointer type STRUCT cgroup must point") int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_acquire_fp, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path) {struct cgroup *acquired, *stack_cgrp = (struct cgroup *)&path;
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_acquire_trusted_walked, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char } SEC("tp_btf/cgroup_mkdir") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_acquire_null, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path) {struct cgroup *acquired;
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_rcu_get_release, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path) } SEC("tp_btf/cgroup_mkdir") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_release_untrusted, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path) {struct __cgrps_kfunc_map_value *v;
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_release_untrusted, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path } SEC("tp_btf/cgroup_mkdir") -__failure __msg("arg#0 pointer type STRUCT cgroup must point") +__failure __msg("R1 pointer type STRUCT cgroup must point") int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_release_fp, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path) {struct cgroup *acquired = (struct cgroup *)&path;
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_release_fp, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path) } SEC("tp_btf/cgroup_mkdir") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(cgrp_kfunc_release_null, struct cgroup *cgrp, const char *path) {struct __cgrps_kfunc_map_value local, *v;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c +5 -5
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_alloc_no_release, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(test_alloc_double_release, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct bpf_cpumask *cpumask;
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_acquire_wrong_cpumask, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_fla } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("bpf_cpumask_set_cpu args#1 expected pointer to STRUCT bpf_cpumask") +__failure __msg("bpf_cpumask_set_cpu R2 expected pointer to STRUCT bpf_cpumask") int BPF_PROG(test_mutate_cpumask, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {/* Can't set the CPU of a non-struct bpf_cpumask. */
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_insert_remove_no_release, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_ } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(test_cpumask_null, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {/* NULL passed to kfunc. */
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_global_mask_out_of_rcu, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_fl } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("NULL pointer passed to trusted arg1") +__failure __msg("NULL pointer passed to trusted R2") int BPF_PROG(test_global_mask_no_null_check, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct bpf_cpumask *local, *prev;
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_global_mask_no_null_check, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper arg2") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper R2") int BPF_PROG(test_global_mask_rcu_no_null_check, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct bpf_cpumask *prev, *curr;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c +11 -11
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int ringbuf_release_uninit_dynptr(void *ctx)/* A dynptr can't be used after it has been invalidated */ SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #2") +__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as R3")int use_after_invalid (void *ctx) {struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ int invalid_helper2(void *ctx)/* A bpf_dynptr is invalidated if it's been written into */ SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #0") +__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as R1")int invalid_write1 (void *ctx) {struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
@@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@ int invalid_slice_rdwr_rdonly(struct __sk_buff *skb)/* bpf_dynptr_adjust can only be called on initialized dynptrs */ SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #0") +__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as R1")int dynptr_adjust_invalid (void *ctx) {struct bpf_dynptr ptr = {};
@@ -1655,7 +1655,7 @@ int dynptr_adjust_invalid(void *ctx)/* bpf_dynptr_is_null can only be called on initialized dynptrs */ SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #0") +__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as R1")int dynptr_is_null_invalid (void *ctx) {struct bpf_dynptr ptr = {};
@@ -1668,7 +1668,7 @@ int dynptr_is_null_invalid(void *ctx)/* bpf_dynptr_is_rdonly can only be called on initialized dynptrs */ SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #0") +__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as R1")int dynptr_is_rdonly_invalid (void *ctx) {struct bpf_dynptr ptr = {};
@@ -1681,7 +1681,7 @@ int dynptr_is_rdonly_invalid(void *ctx)/* bpf_dynptr_size can only be called on initialized dynptrs */ SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #0") +__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as R1")int dynptr_size_invalid (void *ctx) {struct bpf_dynptr ptr = {};
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ int dynptr_size_invalid(void *ctx)/* Only initialized dynptrs can be cloned */ SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #0") +__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as R1")int clone_invalid1 (void *ctx) {struct bpf_dynptr ptr1 = {};
@@ -1728,7 +1728,7 @@ int clone_invalid2(struct xdp_md *xdp)/* Invalidating a dynptr should invalidate its clones */ SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #2") +__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as R3")int clone_invalidate1 (void *ctx) {struct bpf_dynptr clone;
@@ -1749,7 +1749,7 @@ int clone_invalidate1(void *ctx)/* Invalidating a dynptr should invalidate its parent */ SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #2") +__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as R3")int clone_invalidate2 (void *ctx) {struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
@@ -1770,7 +1770,7 @@ int clone_invalidate2(void *ctx)/* Invalidating a dynptr should invalidate its siblings */ SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #2") +__failure __msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as R3")int clone_invalidate3 (void *ctx) {struct bpf_dynptr ptr;
@@ -1981,7 +1981,7 @@ __noinline long global_call_bpf_dynptr(const struct bpf_dynptr *dynptr) } SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("arg#0 expected pointer to stack or const struct bpf_dynptr") +__failure __msg("R1 expected pointer to stack or const struct bpf_dynptr") int test_dynptr_reg_type(void *ctx) {struct task_struct *current =NULL ;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/file_reader_fail.c +2 -2
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ int on_nanosleep_unreleased_ref(void *ctx) SEC("xdp") __failure -__msg("Expected a dynptr of type file as arg #0") +__msg("Expected a dynptr of type file as R1")int xdp_wrong_dynptr_type (struct xdp_md *xdp) {struct bpf_dynptr dynptr;
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ int xdp_wrong_dynptr_type(struct xdp_md *xdp) SEC("xdp") __failure -__msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as arg #0") +__msg("Expected an initialized dynptr as R1")int xdp_no_dynptr_type (struct xdp_md *xdp) {struct bpf_dynptr dynptr;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/irq.c +2 -2
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ struct bpf_res_spin_lock lockA __hidden SEC(".data.A"); struct bpf_res_spin_lock lockB __hidden SEC(".data.B"); SEC("?tc") -__failure __msg("arg#0 doesn't point to an irq flag on stack") +__failure __msg("R1 doesn't point to an irq flag on stack") int irq_save_bad_arg(struct __sk_buff *ctx) {bpf_local_irq_save (&global_flags);
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ int irq_save_bad_arg(struct __sk_buff *ctx) } SEC("?tc") -__failure __msg("arg#0 doesn't point to an irq flag on stack") +__failure __msg("R1 doesn't point to an irq flag on stack") int irq_restore_bad_arg(struct __sk_buff *ctx) {bpf_local_irq_restore (&global_flags);
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c +3 -3
@@ -1605,7 +1605,7 @@ int iter_subprog_check_stacksafe(const void *ctx)struct bpf_iter_num global_it; SEC("raw_tp") -__failure __msg("arg#0 expected pointer to an iterator on stack") +__failure __msg("R1 expected pointer to an iterator on stack") int iter_new_bad_arg(const void *ctx) {bpf_iter_num_new (&global_it,0 ,1 );
@@ -1613,7 +1613,7 @@ int iter_new_bad_arg(const void *ctx) } SEC("raw_tp") -__failure __msg("arg#0 expected pointer to an iterator on stack") +__failure __msg("R1 expected pointer to an iterator on stack") int iter_next_bad_arg(const void *ctx) {bpf_iter_num_next (&global_it);
@@ -1621,7 +1621,7 @@ int iter_next_bad_arg(const void *ctx) } SEC("raw_tp") -__failure __msg("arg#0 expected pointer to an iterator on stack") +__failure __msg("R1 expected pointer to an iterator on stack") int iter_destroy_bad_arg(const void *ctx) {bpf_iter_num_destroy (&global_it);
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters_state_safety.c +7 -7
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int create_and_forget_to_destroy_fail(void *ctx) } SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as arg #0") +__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as R1") int destroy_without_creating_fail(void *ctx) {/* init with zeros to stop verifier complaining about uninit stack */
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ int destroy_without_creating_fail(void *ctx) } SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as arg #0") +__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as R1") int compromise_iter_w_direct_write_fail(void *ctx) {struct bpf_iter_num iter;
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ int compromise_iter_w_direct_write_and_skip_destroy_fail(void *ctx) } SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as arg #0") +__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as R1") int compromise_iter_w_helper_write_fail(void *ctx) {struct bpf_iter_num iter;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int valid_stack_reuse(void *ctx) } SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("expected uninitialized iter_num as arg #0") +__failure __msg("expected uninitialized iter_num as R1") int double_create_fail(void *ctx) {struct bpf_iter_num iter;
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ int double_create_fail(void *ctx) } SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as arg #0") +__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as R1") int double_destroy_fail(void *ctx) {struct bpf_iter_num iter;
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ int double_destroy_fail(void *ctx) } SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as arg #0") +__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as R1") int next_without_new_fail(void *ctx) {struct bpf_iter_num iter;
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ int next_without_new_fail(void *ctx) } SEC("?raw_tp") -__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as arg #0") +__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_num as R1") int next_after_destroy_fail(void *ctx) {struct bpf_iter_num iter;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod.c +2 -2
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ int iter_next_trusted(const void *ctx) } SEC("raw_tp/sys_enter") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int iter_next_trusted_or_null(const void *ctx) {struct task_struct *cur_task =bpf_get_current_task_btf ();
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ int iter_next_rcu(const void *ctx) } SEC("raw_tp/sys_enter") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int iter_next_rcu_or_null(const void *ctx) {struct task_struct *cur_task =bpf_get_current_task_btf ();
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod_seq.c +2 -2
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int testmod_seq_truncated(const void *ctx) SEC("?raw_tp") __failure -__msg("expected an initialized iter_testmod_seq as arg #1") +__msg("expected an initialized iter_testmod_seq as R2")int testmod_seq_getter_before_bad (const void *ctx) {struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq it;
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ int testmod_seq_getter_before_bad(const void *ctx) SEC("?raw_tp") __failure -__msg("expected an initialized iter_testmod_seq as arg #1") +__msg("expected an initialized iter_testmod_seq as R2")int testmod_seq_getter_after_bad (const void *ctx) {struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq it;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c +1 -1
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ int kptr_xchg_ref_state(struct __sk_buff *ctx) } SEC("?tc") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper arg2") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to helper R2") int kptr_xchg_possibly_null(struct __sk_buff *ctx) {struct prog_test_ref_kfunc *p;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/percpu_alloc_fail.c +2 -2
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_array_map_3) } SEC("?fentry.s/bpf_fentry_test1") -__failure __msg("arg#0 expected for bpf_percpu_obj_drop()") +__failure __msg("R1 expected for bpf_percpu_obj_drop()") int BPF_PROG(test_array_map_4) { struct val_t __percpu_kptr *p;
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(test_array_map_4) } SEC("?fentry.s/bpf_fentry_test1") -__failure __msg("arg#0 expected for bpf_obj_drop()") +__failure __msg("R1 expected for bpf_obj_drop()") int BPF_PROG(test_array_map_5) {struct val_t *p;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree_fail.c +3 -3
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ long rbtree_api_remove_no_drop(void *ctx) } SEC("?tc") -__failure __msg("arg#1 expected pointer to allocated object") +__failure __msg("R2 expected pointer to allocated object") long rbtree_api_add_to_multiple_trees(void *ctx) {struct node_data *n;
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ long rbtree_api_add_to_multiple_trees(void *ctx) } SEC("?tc") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg1") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R2") long rbtree_api_use_unchecked_remove_retval(void *ctx) {struct bpf_rb_node *res;
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ long add_with_cb(bool (cb)(struct bpf_rb_node *a, const struct bpf_rb_node *b)) } SEC("?tc") -__failure __msg("arg#1 expected pointer to allocated object") +__failure __msg("R2 expected pointer to allocated object") long rbtree_api_add_bad_cb_bad_fn_call_add(void *ctx) {return add_with_cb (less__bad_fn_call_add);
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c +1 -1
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ long rbtree_refcounted_node_ref_escapes(void *ctx) } SEC("?tc") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") long refcount_acquire_maybe_null(void *ctx) {struct node_acquire *n, *m;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c +1 -1
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ int stream_vprintk_scalar_arg(void *ctx) } SEC("syscall") -__failure __msg("arg#1 doesn't point to a const string") +__failure __msg("R2 doesn't point to a const string") int stream_vprintk_string_arg(void *ctx) {bpf_stream_vprintk (BPF_STDOUT , ctx,NULL ,0 );
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/task_kfunc_failure.c +9 -9
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ static struct __tasks_kfunc_map_value *insert_lookup_task(struct task_struct *ta } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_acquire_untrusted, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct task_struct *acquired;
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_acquire_untrusted, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_f } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("arg#0 pointer type STRUCT task_struct must point") +__failure __msg("R1 pointer type STRUCT task_struct must point") int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_acquire_fp, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct task_struct *acquired, *stack_task = (struct task_struct *)&clone_flags;
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_acquire_unsafe_kretprobe_rcu, struct task_struct *task, } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_acquire_null, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct task_struct *acquired;
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_xchg_unreleased, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_fla } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_acquire_release_no_null_check, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct task_struct *acquired;
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_acquire_release_no_null_check, struct task_struct *task, } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_release_untrusted, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct __tasks_kfunc_map_value *v;
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_release_untrusted, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_f } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("arg#0 pointer type STRUCT task_struct must point") +__failure __msg("R1 pointer type STRUCT task_struct must point") int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_release_fp, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct task_struct *acquired = (struct task_struct *)&clone_flags;
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_release_fp, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_release_null, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct __tasks_kfunc_map_value local, *v;
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_release_unacquired, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_ } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_from_pid_no_null_check, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct task_struct *acquired;
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_from_pid_no_null_check, struct task_struct *task, u64 cl } SEC("tp_btf/task_newtask") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(task_kfunc_from_vpid_no_null_check, struct task_struct *task, u64 clone_flags) {struct task_struct *acquired;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/task_work_fail.c +3 -3
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ int mismatch_map(struct pt_regs *args) } SEC("perf_event") -__failure __msg("arg#1 doesn't point to a map value") +__failure __msg("R2 doesn't point to a map value") int no_map_task_work(struct pt_regs *args) {struct task_struct *task;
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int no_map_task_work(struct pt_regs *args) } SEC("perf_event") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg1") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R2") int task_work_null(struct pt_regs *args) {struct task_struct *task;
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@ int task_work_null(struct pt_regs *args) } SEC("perf_event") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg2") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R3") int map_null(struct pt_regs *args) {struct elem *work;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_nf_fail.c +4 -4
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ int change_status_after_alloc(struct __sk_buff *ctx) } SEC("?tc") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg1") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R2") int lookup_null_bpf_tuple(struct __sk_buff *ctx) {struct bpf_ct_opts___local opts = {};
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ int lookup_null_bpf_tuple(struct __sk_buff *ctx) } SEC("?tc") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg3") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R4") int lookup_null_bpf_opts(struct __sk_buff *ctx) {struct bpf_sock_tuple tup = {};
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ int lookup_null_bpf_opts(struct __sk_buff *ctx) } SEC("?xdp") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg1") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R2") int xdp_lookup_null_bpf_tuple(struct xdp_md *ctx) {struct bpf_ct_opts___local opts = {};
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int xdp_lookup_null_bpf_tuple(struct xdp_md *ctx) } SEC("?xdp") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg3") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R4") int xdp_lookup_null_bpf_opts(struct xdp_md *ctx) {struct bpf_sock_tuple tup = {};
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c +1 -1
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(not_valid_dynptr, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, } SEC("?lsm.s/bpf") -__failure __msg("arg#0 expected pointer to stack or const struct bpf_dynptr") +__failure __msg("R1 expected pointer to stack or const struct bpf_dynptr") int BPF_PROG(not_ptr_to_stack, int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size, bool kernel) {static struct bpf_dynptr val;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_kfunc_param_nullable.c +1 -1
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ int kfunc_dynptr_nullable_test2(struct __sk_buff *skb) } SEC("tc") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int kfunc_dynptr_nullable_test3(struct __sk_buff *skb) {struct bpf_dynptr data;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bits_iter.c +2 -2
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(no_destroy, struct bpf_iter_meta *meta, struct cgroup *cgrp) SEC("iter/cgroup") __description("uninitialized iter in ->next()") -__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_bits as arg #0") +__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_bits as R1") int BPF_PROG(next_uninit, struct bpf_iter_meta *meta, struct cgroup *cgrp) {struct bpf_iter_bits it = {};
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(next_uninit, struct bpf_iter_meta *meta, struct cgroup *cgrp) SEC("iter/cgroup") __description("uninitialized iter in ->destroy()") -__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_bits as arg #0") +__failure __msg("expected an initialized iter_bits as R1") int BPF_PROG(destroy_uninit, struct bpf_iter_meta *meta, struct cgroup *cgrp) {struct bpf_iter_bits it = {};
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c +3 -3
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ l0_%=: r0 = 0; \ SEC("lsm.s/bpf") __description("reference tracking: release user key reference without check") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") __naked void user_key_reference_without_check(void) { asm volatile (" \
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ __naked void user_key_reference_without_check(void) SEC("lsm.s/bpf") __description("reference tracking: release system key reference without check") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") __naked void system_key_reference_without_check(void) { asm volatile (" \
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ __naked void system_key_reference_without_check(void) SEC("lsm.s/bpf") __description("reference tracking: release with NULL key pointer") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") __naked void release_with_null_key_pointer(void) { asm volatile (" \
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c +4 -4
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@static char buf[PATH_MAX ]; SEC("lsm.s/file_open") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(get_task_exe_file_kfunc_null) {struct file *acquired;
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(get_task_exe_file_kfunc_null) } SEC("lsm.s/inode_getxattr") -__failure __msg("arg#0 pointer type STRUCT task_struct must point to scalar, or struct with scalar") +__failure __msg("R1 pointer type STRUCT task_struct must point to scalar, or struct with scalar") int BPF_PROG(get_task_exe_file_kfunc_fp) {u64 x;
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(put_file_kfunc_unacquired, struct file *file) } SEC("lsm.s/file_open") -__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0") +__failure __msg("Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1") int BPF_PROG(path_d_path_kfunc_null) {/* Can't pass NULL value to bpf_path_d_path() kfunc. */
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int BPF_PROG(path_d_path_kfunc_untrusted_from_current) } SEC("lsm.s/file_open") -__failure __msg("kernel function bpf_path_d_path args#0 expected pointer to STRUCT path but R1 has a pointer to STRUCT file") +__failure __msg("kernel function bpf_path_d_path R1 expected pointer to STRUCT path but R1 has a pointer to STRUCT file") int BPF_PROG(path_d_path_kfunc_type_mismatch, struct file *file) {bpf_path_d_path ((struct path *)&file->f_task_work, buf,sizeof (buf));
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/wq_failures.c +1 -1
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ __failure* is a correct bpf_wq pointer. */ __msg(": (85) call bpf_wq_set_callback#") /* anchor message */ -__msg("arg#0 doesn't point to a map value") +__msg("R1 doesn't point to a map value")long test_wrong_wq_pointer (void *ctx) {int key =0 ;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c +7 -7
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ }, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, .result = REJECT, - .errstr = "arg#0 pointer type STRUCT prog_test_fail1 must point to scalar", + .errstr = "R1 pointer type STRUCT prog_test_fail1 must point to scalar", .fixup_kfunc_btf_id = { { "bpf_kfunc_call_test_fail1", 2 }, },
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ }, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, .result = REJECT, - .errstr = "max struct nesting depth exceeded\narg#0 pointer type STRUCT prog_test_fail2", + .errstr = "max struct nesting depth exceeded\nR1 pointer type STRUCT prog_test_fail2", .fixup_kfunc_btf_id = { { "bpf_kfunc_call_test_fail2", 2 }, },
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ }, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, .result = REJECT, - .errstr = "arg#0 pointer type STRUCT prog_test_fail3 must point to scalar", + .errstr = "R1 pointer type STRUCT prog_test_fail3 must point to scalar", .fixup_kfunc_btf_id = { { "bpf_kfunc_call_test_fail3", 2 }, },
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ }, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, .result = REJECT, - .errstr = "arg#0 expected pointer to ctx, but got fp", + .errstr = "R1 expected pointer to ctx, but got fp", .fixup_kfunc_btf_id = { { "bpf_kfunc_call_test_pass_ctx", 2 }, },
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ }, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, .result = REJECT, - .errstr = "arg#0 pointer type UNKNOWN must point to scalar", + .errstr = "R1 pointer type UNKNOWN must point to scalar", .fixup_kfunc_btf_id = { { "bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_fail1", 2 }, },
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ }, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, .result = REJECT, - .errstr = "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted arg0", + .errstr = "Possibly NULL pointer passed to trusted R1", .fixup_kfunc_btf_id = { { "bpf_kfunc_call_test_acquire", 3 }, { "bpf_kfunc_call_test_release", 5 },
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ }, .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, .result = REJECT, - .errstr = "kernel function bpf_kfunc_call_memb1_release args#0 expected pointer", + .errstr = "kernel function bpf_kfunc_call_memb1_release R1 expected pointer", .fixup_kfunc_btf_id = { { "bpf_kfunc_call_memb_acquire", 1 }, { "bpf_kfunc_call_memb1_release", 5 },
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v6 04/17] bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
Quoted 61 lines · Yonghong Song
This change prepares verifier log reporting for upcoming kfunc stack argument support.
Today verifier log code mostly assumes that an argument can be described directly by a register number. That works for arguments passed in
R1toR5, but it does not work once kfunc arguments can also be passed on the stack.Introduce an internal
argnorepresentation such that register-passed arguments keep using their real register numbers, while stack-passed arguments use an encoded value above a dedicated base.reg_arg_name()converts this representation into eitherR%dor*(R11-off)when emitting verifier logs. If a particularargnois corresponding to a stack argument, print*(R11-off). Otherwise, printR%d. Here R11 presents the base of stack arguments.This keeps existing logs readable for register arguments and allows the same log sites to handle future stack arguments without open-coding special cases.
Update selftests accordingly.
Signed-off-by Yonghong Song <[email protected]>--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 649 ++++++++++-------- .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_nf.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cb_refs.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kfunc_call.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cgrp_kfunc_failure.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c | 10 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/file_reader_fail.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/irq.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_state_safety.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod_seq.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/percpu_alloc_fail.c | 4 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree_fail.c | 6 +- .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_kfunc_failure.c | 18 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_work_fail.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_nf_fail.c | 8 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c | 2 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_param_nullable.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bits_iter.c | 4 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c | 8 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/wq_failures.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 14 +- 30 files changed, 474 insertions(+), 374 deletions(-)include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h struct bpf_verifier_env { · line 916
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +1
-0@@ -913,6 +913,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {* e.g., in reg_type_str() to generate reg_type string */ char tmp_str_buf[TMP_STR_BUF_LEN ]; +char tmp_reg_arg_name_buf[32 ];
the name is too long.
Just tmp_arg_name ?
Quoted 33 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0struct bpf_insn insn_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_insn epilogue_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_scc_callchain callchain_buf;kernel/bpf/verifier.c +22
-0@@ -1751,6 +1751,55 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return &elem->st; } +/* +* Unified argument number encoding for verifier log messages. +* Register args (arg_idx 0-4) use their register number (R1-R5). +* Stack args (arg_idx 5+) are encoded as STACK_ARGNO_BASE + arg_idx +* to avoid collision with register numbers. reg_arg_name() decodes +* this back to a human-readable string like "*(R11-8)" for logs. +*/ +#define STACK_ARGNO_BASE 100 + +static bool is_stack_argno (int argno) +{ +return argno >=STACK_ARGNO_BASE ; +} + +static u32 make_argno (u32 arg_idx) +{ +if (arg_idx <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) +return BPF_REG_1 + arg_idx; +return STACK_ARGNO_BASE + arg_idx; +} + +static u32 arg_idx_from_argno (int argno)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 1785
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10
-0+{ +if (is_stack_argno (argno)) +return argno -STACK_ARGNO_BASE ; +return argno -BPF_REG_1 ; +} + +static int next_argno (int argno) +{ +return make_argno (arg_idx_from_argno (argno) +1 ); +}
I don't like this +1, -1 dance all around. Makes the whole thing hard to follow.
Keep argno starting at 1. So old regno == argno.
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *re · line 8215
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +3
-2/* Check if local kptr in src arg matches kptr in dst arg */ -if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && regno ==BPF_REG_2 ) { -if (map_kptr_match_type (env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) +if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && + !is_stack_argno (argno) && argno ==BPF_REG_2 ) { +if (map_kptr_match_type (env, meta->kptr_field, reg, argno))
And then this argno == BPF_REG_2 will look fine.
With argno base 0 the above looks broken.
Also is_stack_argno() looks like defensive programming. remove it.
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 04/17] bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
Quoted 57 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 56 lines · Yonghong Song
This change prepares verifier log reporting for upcoming kfunc stack argument support.
Today verifier log code mostly assumes that an argument can be described directly by a register number. That works for arguments passed in
R1toR5, but it does not work once kfunc arguments can also be passed on the stack.Introduce an internal
argnorepresentation such that register-passed arguments keep using their real register numbers, while stack-passed arguments use an encoded value above a dedicated base.reg_arg_name()converts this representation into eitherR%dor*(R11-off)when emitting verifier logs. If a particularargnois corresponding to a stack argument, print*(R11-off). Otherwise, printR%d. Here R11 presents the base of stack arguments.This keeps existing logs readable for register arguments and allows the same log sites to handle future stack arguments without open-coding special cases.
Update selftests accordingly.
Signed-off-by Yonghong Song <[email protected]>--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 649 ++++++++++-------- .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_nf.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cb_refs.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kfunc_call.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cgrp_kfunc_failure.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c | 10 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/file_reader_fail.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/irq.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_state_safety.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod_seq.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/percpu_alloc_fail.c | 4 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree_fail.c | 6 +- .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_kfunc_failure.c | 18 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_work_fail.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_nf_fail.c | 8 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c | 2 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_param_nullable.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bits_iter.c | 4 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c | 8 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/wq_failures.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 14 +- 30 files changed, 474 insertions(+), 374 deletions(-)
Quoted 11 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h struct bpf_verifier_env { · line 916
Quoted 9 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +1
-0@@ -913,6 +913,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {* e.g., in reg_type_str() to generate reg_type string */ char tmp_str_buf[TMP_STR_BUF_LEN ]; +char tmp_reg_arg_name_buf[32 ];the name is too long.
Justtmp_arg_name?
Okay.
Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 39 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0struct bpf_insn insn_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_insn epilogue_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_scc_callchain callchain_buf;kernel/bpf/verifier.c +27
-0@@ -1751,6 +1751,55 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return &elem->st; } +/* +* Unified argument number encoding for verifier log messages. +* Register args (arg_idx 0-4) use their register number (R1-R5). +* Stack args (arg_idx 5+) are encoded as STACK_ARGNO_BASE + arg_idx +* to avoid collision with register numbers. reg_arg_name() decodes +* this back to a human-readable string like "*(R11-8)" for logs. +*/ +#define STACK_ARGNO_BASE 100 + +static bool is_stack_argno (int argno) +{ +return argno >=STACK_ARGNO_BASE ; +} + +static u32 make_argno (u32 arg_idx) +{ +if (arg_idx <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) +return BPF_REG_1 + arg_idx; +return STACK_ARGNO_BASE + arg_idx; +} + +static u32 arg_idx_from_argno (int argno) +{ +if (is_stack_argno (argno)) +return argno -STACK_ARGNO_BASE ; +return argno -BPF_REG_1 ; +}
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 1785
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5
-0+ +static int next_argno (int argno) +{ +return make_argno (arg_idx_from_argno (argno) +1 ); +}I don't like this +1, -1 dance all around. Makes the whole thing hard to follow.
Keep argno starting at 1. So old regno == argno.
Sure. Will try to simplify things...
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *re · line 8215
Quoted 7 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +3
-2/* Check if local kptr in src arg matches kptr in dst arg */ -if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && regno ==BPF_REG_2 ) { -if (map_kptr_match_type (env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) +if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && + !is_stack_argno (argno) && argno ==BPF_REG_2 ) { +if (map_kptr_match_type (env, meta->kptr_field, reg, argno))And then this argno ==
BPF_REG_2will look fine.
With argno base 0 the above looks broken.
Alsois_stack_argno()looks like defensive programming. remove it.
Okay.
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 04/17] bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
In reply to Alexei StarovoitovQuoted 107 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 61 lines · Yonghong Song
This change prepares verifier log reporting for upcoming kfunc stack argument support.
Today verifier log code mostly assumes that an argument can be described directly by a register number. That works for arguments passed in
R1toR5, but it does not work once kfunc arguments can also be passed on the stack.Introduce an internal
argnorepresentation such that register-passed arguments keep using their real register numbers, while stack-passed arguments use an encoded value above a dedicated base.reg_arg_name()converts this representation into eitherR%dor*(R11-off)when emitting verifier logs. If a particularargnois corresponding to a stack argument, print*(R11-off). Otherwise, printR%d. Here R11 presents the base of stack arguments.This keeps existing logs readable for register arguments and allows the same log sites to handle future stack arguments without open-coding special cases.
Update selftests accordingly.
Signed-off-by Yonghong Song <[email protected]>--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 649 ++++++++++-------- .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_nf.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cb_refs.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kfunc_call.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cgrp_kfunc_failure.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c | 10 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/file_reader_fail.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/irq.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_state_safety.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod_seq.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/percpu_alloc_fail.c | 4 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree_fail.c | 6 +- .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_kfunc_failure.c | 18 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_work_fail.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_nf_fail.c | 8 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c | 2 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_param_nullable.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bits_iter.c | 4 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c | 8 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/wq_failures.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 14 +- 30 files changed, 474 insertions(+), 374 deletions(-)include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0include/linux/bpf_verifier.h struct bpf_verifier_env { · line 916
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +1
-0@@ -913,6 +913,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {* e.g., in reg_type_str() to generate reg_type string */ char tmp_str_buf[TMP_STR_BUF_LEN ]; +char tmp_reg_arg_name_buf[32 ];the name is too long.
Justtmp_arg_name?Quoted 38 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0struct bpf_insn insn_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_insn epilogue_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_scc_callchain callchain_buf;kernel/bpf/verifier.c +27
-0@@ -1751,6 +1751,55 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return &elem->st; } +/* +* Unified argument number encoding for verifier log messages. +* Register args (arg_idx 0-4) use their register number (R1-R5). +* Stack args (arg_idx 5+) are encoded as STACK_ARGNO_BASE + arg_idx +* to avoid collision with register numbers. reg_arg_name() decodes +* this back to a human-readable string like "*(R11-8)" for logs. +*/ +#define STACK_ARGNO_BASE 100 + +static bool is_stack_argno (int argno) +{ +return argno >=STACK_ARGNO_BASE ; +} + +static u32 make_argno (u32 arg_idx) +{ +if (arg_idx <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) +return BPF_REG_1 + arg_idx; +return STACK_ARGNO_BASE + arg_idx; +} + +static u32 arg_idx_from_argno (int argno) +{ +if (is_stack_argno (argno)) +return argno -STACK_ARGNO_BASE ; +return argno -BPF_REG_1 ; +}
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 1785
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5
-0+ +static int next_argno (int argno) +{ +return make_argno (arg_idx_from_argno (argno) +1 ); +}I don't like this +1, -1 dance all around. Makes the whole thing hard to follow.
Keep argno starting at 1. So old regno == argno.
The above make_argno() returns an argno having regno == argno for regno 1-5.
I think we do not need next_argno(). It is a special case for KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE. We can do something like make_argno(i) and maek_argno(i + 1) for current and next argno.
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_reg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *re · line 8215
Quoted 7 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +3
-2/* Check if local kptr in src arg matches kptr in dst arg */ -if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && regno ==BPF_REG_2 ) { -if (map_kptr_match_type (env, meta->kptr_field, reg, regno)) +if (meta->func_id == BPF_FUNC_kptr_xchg && + !is_stack_argno (argno) && argno ==BPF_REG_2 ) { +if (map_kptr_match_type (env, meta->kptr_field, reg, argno))And then this argno ==
BPF_REG_2will look fine.
With argno base 0 the above looks broken.
Alsois_stack_argno()looks like defensive programming. remove it.
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v6 04/17] bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
Quoted 120 lines · Yonghong Song
Quoted 107 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 61 lines · Yonghong Song
This change prepares verifier log reporting for upcoming kfunc stack argument support.
Today verifier log code mostly assumes that an argument can be described directly by a register number. That works for arguments passed in
R1toR5, but it does not work once kfunc arguments can also be passed on the stack.Introduce an internal
argnorepresentation such that register-passed arguments keep using their real register numbers, while stack-passed arguments use an encoded value above a dedicated base.reg_arg_name()converts this representation into eitherR%dor*(R11-off)when emitting verifier logs. If a particularargnois corresponding to a stack argument, print*(R11-off). Otherwise, printR%d. Here R11 presents the base of stack arguments.This keeps existing logs readable for register arguments and allows the same log sites to handle future stack arguments without open-coding special cases.
Update selftests accordingly.
Signed-off-by Yonghong Song <[email protected]>--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 649 ++++++++++-------- .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_nf.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cb_refs.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kfunc_call.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cgrp_kfunc_failure.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c | 10 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/file_reader_fail.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/irq.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_state_safety.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod_seq.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/percpu_alloc_fail.c | 4 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree_fail.c | 6 +- .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_kfunc_failure.c | 18 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_work_fail.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_nf_fail.c | 8 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c | 2 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_param_nullable.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bits_iter.c | 4 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c | 8 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/wq_failures.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 14 +- 30 files changed, 474 insertions(+), 374 deletions(-)include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0include/linux/bpf_verifier.h struct bpf_verifier_env { · line 916
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +1
-0@@ -913,6 +913,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {* e.g., in reg_type_str() to generate reg_type string */ char tmp_str_buf[TMP_STR_BUF_LEN ]; +char tmp_reg_arg_name_buf[32 ];the name is too long.
Justtmp_arg_name?Quoted 38 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0struct bpf_insn insn_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_insn epilogue_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_scc_callchain callchain_buf;kernel/bpf/verifier.c +27
-0@@ -1751,6 +1751,55 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return &elem->st; } +/* +* Unified argument number encoding for verifier log messages. +* Register args (arg_idx 0-4) use their register number (R1-R5). +* Stack args (arg_idx 5+) are encoded as STACK_ARGNO_BASE + arg_idx +* to avoid collision with register numbers. reg_arg_name() decodes +* this back to a human-readable string like "*(R11-8)" for logs. +*/ +#define STACK_ARGNO_BASE 100 + +static bool is_stack_argno (int argno) +{ +return argno >=STACK_ARGNO_BASE ; +} + +static u32 make_argno (u32 arg_idx) +{ +if (arg_idx <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) +return BPF_REG_1 + arg_idx; +return STACK_ARGNO_BASE + arg_idx; +} + +static u32 arg_idx_from_argno (int argno) +{ +if (is_stack_argno (argno)) +return argno -STACK_ARGNO_BASE ; +return argno -BPF_REG_1 ; +}Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 1785
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5
-0+ +static int next_argno (int argno) +{ +return make_argno (arg_idx_from_argno (argno) +1 ); +}I don't like this +1, -1 dance all around. Makes the whole thing hard to follow.
Keep argno starting at 1. So old regno == argno.
Quoted 2 lines
The above
make_argno()returns an argno having regno == argno for regno 1-5.
No. It doesn't.
it does:
+static u32 make_argno(u32 arg_idx)
+{
+ if (arg_idx < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS)
+ return BPF_REG_1 + arg_idx;
so for argno == 0 it returns 1 and that's my objection. Make argno starting at 1.
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 04/17] bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
Quoted 130 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 118 lines · Yonghong Song
Quoted 107 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 61 lines · Yonghong Song
This change prepares verifier log reporting for upcoming kfunc stack argument support.
Today verifier log code mostly assumes that an argument can be described directly by a register number. That works for arguments passed in
R1toR5, but it does not work once kfunc arguments can also be passed on the stack.Introduce an internal
argnorepresentation such that register-passed arguments keep using their real register numbers, while stack-passed arguments use an encoded value above a dedicated base.reg_arg_name()converts this representation into eitherR%dor*(R11-off)when emitting verifier logs. If a particularargnois corresponding to a stack argument, print*(R11-off). Otherwise, printR%d. Here R11 presents the base of stack arguments.This keeps existing logs readable for register arguments and allows the same log sites to handle future stack arguments without open-coding special cases.
Update selftests accordingly.
Signed-off-by Yonghong Song <[email protected]>--- include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 649 ++++++++++-------- .../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/bpf_nf.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/cb_refs.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/kfunc_call.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/linked_list.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cgrp_kfunc_failure.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/cpumask_failure.c | 10 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/dynptr_fail.c | 22 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/file_reader_fail.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/irq.c | 4 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_state_safety.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/iters_testmod_seq.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/percpu_alloc_fail.c | 4 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/rbtree_fail.c | 6 +- .../bpf/progs/refcounted_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stream_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_kfunc_failure.c | 18 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/task_work_fail.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_bpf_nf_fail.c | 8 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_dynptr_param.c | 2 +- .../bpf/progs/test_kfunc_param_nullable.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bits_iter.c | 4 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_ref_tracking.c | 6 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_vfs_reject.c | 8 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/wq_failures.c | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/calls.c | 14 +- 30 files changed, 474 insertions(+), 374 deletions(-)include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0include/linux/bpf_verifier.h struct bpf_verifier_env { · line 916
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +1
-0@@ -913,6 +913,7 @@ struct bpf_verifier_env {* e.g., in reg_type_str() to generate reg_type string */ char tmp_str_buf[TMP_STR_BUF_LEN ]; +char tmp_reg_arg_name_buf[32 ];the name is too long.
Justtmp_arg_name?Quoted 38 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0struct bpf_insn insn_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_insn epilogue_buf[INSN_BUF_SIZE ];struct bpf_scc_callchain callchain_buf;kernel/bpf/verifier.c +27
-0@@ -1751,6 +1751,55 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return &elem->st; } +/* +* Unified argument number encoding for verifier log messages. +* Register args (arg_idx 0-4) use their register number (R1-R5). +* Stack args (arg_idx 5+) are encoded as STACK_ARGNO_BASE + arg_idx +* to avoid collision with register numbers. reg_arg_name() decodes +* this back to a human-readable string like "*(R11-8)" for logs. +*/ +#define STACK_ARGNO_BASE 100 + +static bool is_stack_argno (int argno) +{ +return argno >=STACK_ARGNO_BASE ; +} + +static u32 make_argno (u32 arg_idx) +{ +if (arg_idx <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) +return BPF_REG_1 + arg_idx; +return STACK_ARGNO_BASE + arg_idx; +} + +static u32 arg_idx_from_argno (int argno) +{ +if (is_stack_argno (argno)) +return argno -STACK_ARGNO_BASE ; +return argno -BPF_REG_1 ; +}Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 1785
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5
-0+ +static int next_argno (int argno) +{ +return make_argno (arg_idx_from_argno (argno) +1 ); +}I don't like this +1, -1 dance all around. Makes the whole thing hard to follow.
Keep argno starting at 1. So old regno == argno.Quoted 2 lines
The above
make_argno()returns an argno having regno == argno for regno 1-5.No. It doesn't.
it does:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4
-0+static u32 make_argno (u32 arg_idx) +{ +if (arg_idx <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) +return BPF_REG_1 + arg_idx;
Quoted 2 lines
so for argno == 0 it returns 1 and that's my objection. Make argno starting at 1.
Okay. Will do.
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v6 04/17] bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
Quoted 8 lines · Yonghong Song
Quoted 8 lines
it does:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4
-0+static u32 make_argno (u32 arg_idx) +{ +if (arg_idx <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) +return BPF_REG_1 + arg_idx;
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
so for argno == 0 it returns 1 and that's my objection. Make argno starting at 1.
Okay. Will do.
To move things forward please resend the first 6 patches only. So we can make sure that they're in a good shape and land them first.
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 04/17] bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
Quoted 8 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 7 lines · Yonghong Song
Quoted 7 lines
it does:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4
-0+static u32 make_argno (u32 arg_idx) +{ +if (arg_idx <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) +return BPF_REG_1 + arg_idx;
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
so for argno == 0 it returns 1 and that's my objection. Make argno starting at 1.
Okay. Will do.
To move things forward please resend the first 6 patches only. So we can make sure that they're in a good shape and land them first.
Good point. Will do.
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 04/17] bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
In reply to Alexei StarovoitovQuoted 8 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 7 lines · Yonghong Song
Quoted 7 lines
it does:
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4
-0+static u32 make_argno (u32 arg_idx) +{ +if (arg_idx <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) +return BPF_REG_1 + arg_idx;
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
so for argno == 0 it returns 1 and that's my objection. Make argno starting at 1.
Okay. Will do.
To move things forward please resend the first 6 patches only. So we can make sure that they're in a good shape and land them first.
Just send out the preparation patch set:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
For one patch: bpf: Fix tail_call_reachable leak
AI commented multiple times for this. So I implemented this. You can decide whether this is important or not.
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 5/17 bpf: Introduce bpf register BPF_REG_PARAMS
In reply to Yonghong SongIntroduce BPF_REG_PARAMS as a dedicated BPF register for stack argument accesses. It occupies the BPF register number 11 (R11), which is used as the base pointer for the stack argument area, keeping it separate from the R10-based (BPF_REG_FP) program stack.
The kernel-internal hidden register BPF_REG_AX previously occupied slot 11 (MAX_BPF_REG). With BPF_REG_PARAMS taking that slot, BPF_REG_AX moves to slot 12 and MAX_BPF_EXT_REG increases accordingly.
--- include/linux/filter.h | 5 +- kernel/bpf/core.c | 4 +- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ctx_rewrite.c | 14 ++-- .../bpf/progs/verifier_bpf_fastcall.c | 24 +++---- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_may_goto_1.c | 12 ++-- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_sdiv.c | 64 +++++++++---------- 6 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
include/linux/filter.h +3 -2
@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ struct ctl_table_header;#define BPF_REG_H BPF_REG_9/* hlen, callee-saved */ /* Kernel hidden auxiliary/helper register. */ -#define BPF_REG_AX MAX_BPF_REG -#define MAX_BPF_EXT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 1) +#define BPF_REG_PARAMS MAX_BPF_REG +#define BPF_REG_AX (MAX_BPF_REG + 1) +#define MAX_BPF_EXT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 2)#define MAX_BPF_JIT_REG MAX_BPF_EXT_REG/* unused opcode to mark special call to bpf_tail_call() helper */
kernel/bpf/core.c +2 -2
@@ -1299,8 +1299,8 @@ static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from,u32 imm_rnd =get_random_u32 ();s16 off; -BUILD_BUG_ON (BPF_REG_AX +1 !=MAX_BPF_JIT_REG ); -BUILD_BUG_ON (MAX_BPF_REG +1 !=MAX_BPF_JIT_REG ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (BPF_REG_PARAMS +2 !=MAX_BPF_JIT_REG ); +BUILD_BUG_ON (BPF_REG_AX +1 !=MAX_BPF_JIT_REG );/* Constraints on AX register: *
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/ctx_rewrite.c +7 -7
@@ -69,19 +69,19 @@ static struct test_case test_cases[] = { #if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__aarch64__) { N(SCHED_CLS, struct __sk_buff, tstamp), - .read = "r11 = *(u8 *)($ctx + sk_buff::__mono_tc_offset);" - "if w11 & 0x4 goto pc+1;" + .read = "r12 = *(u8 *)($ctx + sk_buff::__mono_tc_offset);" + "if w12 & 0x4 goto pc+1;" "goto pc+4;" - "if w11 & 0x3 goto pc+1;" + "if w12 & 0x3 goto pc+1;" "goto pc+2;" "$dst = 0;" "goto pc+1;" "$dst = *(u64 *)($ctx + sk_buff::tstamp);", - .write = "r11 = *(u8 *)($ctx + sk_buff::__mono_tc_offset);" - "if w11 & 0x4 goto pc+1;" + .write = "r12 = *(u8 *)($ctx + sk_buff::__mono_tc_offset);" + "if w12 & 0x4 goto pc+1;" "goto pc+2;" - "w11 &= -4;" - "*(u8 *)($ctx + sk_buff::__mono_tc_offset) = r11;" + "w12 &= -4;" + "*(u8 *)($ctx + sk_buff::__mono_tc_offset) = r12;" "*(u64 *)($ctx + sk_buff::tstamp) = $src;", }, #endif
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bpf_fastcall.c +12 -12
@@ -630,13 +630,13 @@ __xlated("...") __xlated("4: r0 = &(void __percpu *)(r0)")__xlated ("..." ) /* may_goto expansion starts */ -__xlated("6: r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -24)") -__xlated("7: if r11 == 0x0 goto pc+6") -__xlated("8: r11 -= 1") -__xlated("9: if r11 != 0x0 goto pc+2") -__xlated("10: r11 = -24") +__xlated("6: r12 = *(u64 *)(r10 -24)") +__xlated("7: if r12 == 0x0 goto pc+6") +__xlated("8: r12 -= 1") +__xlated("9: if r12 != 0x0 goto pc+2") +__xlated("10: r12 = -24") __xlated("11: call unknown") -__xlated ("12: *(u64 *)(r10 -24) = r11" ) +__xlated ("12: *(u64 *)(r10 -24) = r12" ) /* may_goto expansion ends */ __xlated("13: *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1")__xlated ("14: exit" )
@@ -668,13 +668,13 @@ __xlated("1: *(u64 *)(r10 -16) =") __xlated("2: r1 = 1")__xlated ("3: call bpf_get_smp_processor_id" ) /* may_goto expansion starts */ -__xlated("4: r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -24)") -__xlated("5: if r11 == 0x0 goto pc+6") -__xlated("6: r11 -= 1") -__xlated("7: if r11 != 0x0 goto pc+2") -__xlated("8: r11 = -24") +__xlated("4: r12 = *(u64 *)(r10 -24)") +__xlated("5: if r12 == 0x0 goto pc+6") +__xlated("6: r12 -= 1") +__xlated("7: if r12 != 0x0 goto pc+2") +__xlated("8: r12 = -24") __xlated("9: call unknown") -__xlated ("10: *(u64 *)(r10 -24) = r11" ) +__xlated ("10: *(u64 *)(r10 -24) = r12" ) /* may_goto expansion ends */ __xlated("11: *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = r1")__xlated ("12: exit" )
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_may_goto_1.c +6 -6
@@ -81,13 +81,13 @@ __arch_s390x __arch_arm64 __xlated("0: *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = 65535") __xlated("1: *(u64 *)(r10 -8) = 0") -__xlated("2: r11 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)") -__xlated("3: if r11 == 0x0 goto pc+6") -__xlated("4: r11 -= 1") -__xlated("5: if r11 != 0x0 goto pc+2") -__xlated("6: r11 = -16") +__xlated("2: r12 = *(u64 *)(r10 -16)") +__xlated("3: if r12 == 0x0 goto pc+6") +__xlated("4: r12 -= 1") +__xlated("5: if r12 != 0x0 goto pc+2") +__xlated("6: r12 = -16") __xlated("7: call unknown") -__xlated("8: *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r11") +__xlated("8: *(u64 *)(r10 -16) = r12") __xlated("9: r0 = 1") __xlated("10: r0 = 2")__xlated ("11: exit" )
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_sdiv.c +32 -32
112 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 05/17] bpf: Introduce bpf register BPF_REG_PARAMS
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s): - [Critical] Unvalidated BPF_REG_PARAMS instructions cause silent register aliasing and arbitrary kernel memory corruption on architectures lacking…
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [Critical] Unvalidated BPF_REG_PARAMS instructions cause silent register aliasing and arbitrary kernel memory corruption on architectures lacking stack argument support. --
commit 9b78142c31c81cff58a84123ee2833f9b935c211
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
bpf: Introduce bpf register BPF_REG_PARAMS
This commit introduces BPF_REG_PARAMS as a dedicated BPF register for stack argument accesses, occupying BPF register number 11 (R11). It shifts the kernel-internal hidden register BPF_REG_AX to slot 12.
include/linux/filter.h struct ctl_table_header; · line 61
Quoted 11 lines
include/linux/filter.h +1
-2@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ struct ctl_table_header;#define BPF_REG_H BPF_REG_9/* hlen, callee-saved */ /* Kernel hidden auxiliary/helper register. */ -#define BPF_REG_AX MAX_BPF_REG -#define MAX_BPF_EXT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 1) +#define BPF_REG_PARAMS MAX_BPF_REG
Does the introduction of BPF_REG_PARAMS without JIT-support validation allow architectures lacking stack argument support (like ARM64, RISC-V, s390x) to inadvertently use uninitialized JIT register mappings?
If the verifier doesn't gate BPF_REG_PARAMS usage behind a check like bpf_jit_supports_stack_args(), could a crafted program trigger silent register aliasing?
For example, if a program sets BPF_REG_1 to an arbitrary kernel address and executes BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_PARAMS, BPF_REG_2, -8), the verifier may allow it as a safe outgoing stack argument write. When the ARM64 JIT compiles the instruction, it looks up index 11. If that index is uninitialized and defaults to 0, it would emit a store using x0 (which is BPF_REG_1) as the base pointer (e.g., STR x1, [x0, #-8]).
Could this write an arbitrary value into a controlled kernel address and bypass verifier memory safety guarantees?
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/filter.h +2
-0+#define BPF_REG_AX (MAX_BPF_REG + 1) +#define MAX_BPF_EXT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 2)#define MAX_BPF_JIT_REG MAX_BPF_EXT_REG
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=5
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 05/17] bpf: Introduce bpf register BPF_REG_PARAMS
Quoted 20 lines · On 4/19/26 10:06 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [Critical] UnvalidatedBPF_REG_PARAMSinstructions cause silent register aliasing and arbitrary kernel memory corruption on architectures lacking stack argument support. --commit
9b78142c31c81cff58a84123ee2833f9b935c211
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>bpf: Introduce bpf register
BPF_REG_PARAMSThis commit introduces
BPF_REG_PARAMSas a dedicated BPF register for stack argument accesses, occupying BPF register number 11 (R11). It shifts the kernel-internal hidden registerBPF_REG_AXto slot 12.Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/filter.h +0
-0@@ -58,8 +58,9 @@ struct ctl_table_header;#define BPF_REG_H BPF_REG_9/* hlen, callee-saved */
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/filter.h struct ctl_table_header; · line 61
Quoted 4 lines
include/linux/filter.h +1
-2/* Kernel hidden auxiliary/helper register. */ -#define BPF_REG_AX MAX_BPF_REG -#define MAX_BPF_EXT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 1) +#define BPF_REG_PARAMS MAX_BPF_REGDoes the introduction of
BPF_REG_PARAMSwithout JIT-support validation allow architectures lacking stack argument support (like ARM64, RISC-V, s390x) to inadvertently use uninitialized JIT register mappings?
See patch 'bpf: Enable r11 based insns'. r11 based insns will be rejected earlier in check_and_resolve_insns(). And before this patch, bpf function support is done, jit support is disabled,
so we are fine.
Quoted 4 lines
If the verifier doesn't gate
BPF_REG_PARAMSusage behind a check likebpf_jit_supports_stack_args(), could a crafted program trigger silent register aliasing?
This is not an issue. All potential r11 related issues are resolved (as far as I know) before "bpf: Enable r11 based insns".
Quoted 14 lines
For example, if a program sets
BPF_REG_1to an arbitrary kernel address and executesBPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_PARAMS, BPF_REG_2, -8), the verifier may allow it as a safe outgoing stack argument write. When the ARM64 JIT compiles the instruction, it looks up index 11. If that index is uninitialized and defaults to 0, it would emit a store using x0 (which isBPF_REG_1) as the base pointer (e.g., STR x1, [x0, #-8]).Could this write an arbitrary value into a controlled kernel address and bypass verifier memory safety guarantees?
Quoted 3 lines
include/linux/filter.h +2
-0+#define BPF_REG_AX (MAX_BPF_REG + 1) +#define MAX_BPF_EXT_REG (MAX_BPF_REG + 2)#define MAX_BPF_JIT_REG MAX_BPF_EXT_REG
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 6/17 bpf: Reuse MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS for maximum number of arguments
In reply to Yonghong SongCurrently, MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS is used for tracepoint related progs where the number of parameters cannot exceed MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS.
Here, MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS is reused to set a limit of the number of arguments for bpf functions and kfunc's. The current value for MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS is 12 which should be sufficient for majority of bpf functions and kfunc's.
--- include/linux/bpf.h | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
include/linux/bpf.h +5 -0
@@ -1151,6 +1151,11 @@ struct bpf_prog_offload {/* The longest tracepoint has 12 args. * See include/trace/bpf_probe.h +* +* Also reuse this macro for maximum number of arguments a BPF function +* or a kfunc can have. Args 1-5 are passed in registers, args 6-12 via +* stack arg slots. The JIT may map some stack arg slots to registers based +* on the native calling convention (e.g., arg 6 to R9 on x86-64). */ #define MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS 12
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 7/17 bpf: Support stack arguments for bpf functions
In reply to Yonghong SongCurrently BPF functions (subprogs) are limited to 5 register arguments. With [1], the compiler can emit code that passes additional arguments via a dedicated stack area through bpf register BPF_REG_PARAMS (r11), introduced in the previous patch.
The compiler uses positive r11 offsets for incoming (callee-side) args and negative r11 offsets for outgoing (caller-side) args, following the x86_64/arm64 calling convention direction. There is an 8-byte gap at offset 0 separating the two regions:
Incoming (callee reads): r11+8 (arg6), r11+16 (arg7), ...
Outgoing (caller writes): r11-8 (arg6), r11-16 (arg7), ...
The following is an example to show how stack arguments are saved and transferred between caller and callee:
int foo(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6, int a7) {
...
bar(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8);
...
}Caller (foo) Callee (bar) ============ ============ Incoming (positive offsets): Incoming (positive offsets):
r11+8: [incoming arg 6] r11+8: [incoming arg 6] <-+
r11+16: [incoming arg 7] r11+16: [incoming arg 7] <-|+
r11+24: [incoming arg 8] <-||+
Outgoing (negative offsets): ||| r11-8: [outgoing arg 6 to bar] -------->-------------------------+||
r11-16: [outgoing arg 7 to bar] -------->--------------------------+|
r11-24: [outgoing arg 8 to bar] -------->---------------------------+
If the bpf function has more than one call:
int foo(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6, int a7) {
...
bar1(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8);
...
bar2(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9);
...
}Caller (foo) Callee (bar2) ============ ============== Incoming (positive offsets): Incoming (positive offsets):
r11+8: [incoming arg 6] r11+8: [incoming arg 6] <+
r11+16: [incoming arg 7] r11+16: [incoming arg 7] <|+
r11+24: [incoming arg 8] <||+
Outgoing for bar2 (negative offsets): r11+32: [incoming arg 9] <|||+
r11-8: [outgoing arg 6] ---->----------->-------------------------+|||
r11-16: [outgoing arg 7] ---->----------->--------------------------+||
r11-24: [outgoing arg 8] ---->----------->---------------------------+|r11-32: [outgoing arg 9] ---->----------->----------------------------+
The verifier tracks stack arguments separately from the regular r10 stack. The stack_arg_regs are stored in bpf_func_state. This separation keeps the stack arg area from interfering with the normal stack and frame pointer (r10) bookkeeping. Similar to stacksafe(), introduce stack_arg_safe() to do pruning check.
A per-state bitmask out_stack_arg_mask tracks which outgoing stack arg slots have been written on the current path. Each bit corresponds to an outgoing slot index (bit 0 = r11-8 = arg6, bit 1 = r11-16 = arg7, etc.). At a call site, the verifier checks that all slots required by the callee have their corresponding mask bits set. This enables precise per-path tracking: if one branch of a conditional writes arg6 but another does not, the mask correctly reflects the difference and the verifier rejects the uninitialized path. The mask is included in stack_arg_safe() so that states with different sets of initialized slots are not incorrectly pruned together.
Outgoing stack arg slots are invalidated after a call. This follows native architecture calling convention where all function parameters are caller saved. The following are a few examples.
Example 1:
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r6;
*(u64 *)(r11 - 16) = r7;
call bar1; // arg6 = r6, arg7 = r7
call bar2; // expected with 2 stack arguments, failed
Example 2:
To fix the Example 1:
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r6;
*(u64 *)(r11 - 16) = r7;
call bar1; // arg6 = r6, arg7 = r7
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r8;
*(u64 *)(r11 - 16) = r9;
call bar2; // arg6 = r8, arg7 = r9
Example 3:
The compiler can hoist the shared stack arg stores above the branch:
*(u64 *)(r11 - 16) = r7;
...
if cond goto else;
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r8;
call bar1; // arg6 = r8, arg7 = r7
goto end; else:
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r9;
call bar2; // arg6 = r9, arg7 = r7
end:
Example 4:
Within a loop:
loop:
*(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r6; // arg6, before loop
call bar; // reuses arg6 each iteration
if ... goto loop;A separate max_out_stack_arg_depth field in bpf_subprog_info tracks the deepest outgoing offset actually written. This intends to reject programs that write to offsets beyond what any callee expects.
Callback functions with stack arguments need kernel setup parameter types (including stack parameters) properly and then callback function can retrieve such information for verification purpose.
Global subprogs with >5 args are not yet supported.
[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/189060
--- include/linux/bpf.h | 2 + include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 28 +++- kernel/bpf/btf.c | 14 +- kernel/bpf/fixups.c | 22 ++- kernel/bpf/states.c | 41 +++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 295 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 6 files changed, 390 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
include/linux/bpf.h +2 -0
@@ -1669,6 +1669,8 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {u32 max_pkt_offset;u32 max_tp_access;u32 stack_depth; +u16 incoming_stack_arg_depth; +u16 stack_arg_depth;/* both incoming and max outgoing of stack arguments */ u32 id;u32 func_cnt;/* used by non-func prog as the number of func progs */ u32 real_func_cnt;/* includes hidden progs, only used for JIT and freeing progs */
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +26 -2
@@ -372,6 +372,11 @@ struct bpf_func_state {* `stack`. allocated_stack is always a multiple of BPF_REG_SIZE. */ int allocated_stack; + +u16 stack_arg_depth;/* Size of incoming + max outgoing stack args in bytes. */ +u16 incoming_stack_arg_depth;/* Size of incoming stack args in bytes. */ +u16 out_stack_arg_mask;/* Bitmask of outgoing stack arg slots that have been written. */ +struct bpf_reg_state *stack_arg_regs;/* On-stack arguments */ };#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8
@@ -508,6 +513,17 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state { iter < frame->allocated_stack /BPF_REG_SIZE ; \ iter++, reg = bpf_get_spilled_reg(iter, frame, mask)) +#define bpf_get_spilled_stack_arg (slot, frame, mask) \ + ((((slot) < frame->stack_arg_depth / BPF_REG_SIZE) && \ + (frame->stack_arg_regs[slot].type != NOT_INIT)) \ + ? &frame->stack_arg_regs[slot] : NULL) + +/* Iterate over 'frame', setting 'reg' to either NULL or a spilled stack arg. */ +#define bpf_for_each_spilled_stack_arg (iter, frame, reg, mask) \ + for (iter = 0, reg = bpf_get_spilled_stack_arg(iter, frame, mask); \ + iter < frame->stack_arg_depth / BPF_REG_SIZE; \ + iter++, reg = bpf_get_spilled_stack_arg(iter, frame, mask)) +#define bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask (__vst, __state, __reg, __mask, __expr) \ ({ \ struct bpf_verifier_state *___vstate = __vst; \
@@ -525,6 +541,11 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state {continue ; \ (void )(__expr); \ } \ + bpf_for_each_spilled_stack_arg(___j, __state, __reg, __mask) { \ +if (!__reg) \ +continue ; \ + (void )(__expr); \ + } \ } \ })
@@ -739,10 +760,13 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info { bool keep_fastcall_stack: 1; bool changes_pkt_data: 1; bool might_sleep: 1; - u8 arg_cnt:3; + u8 arg_cnt:4;enum priv_stack_mode priv_stack_mode; -struct bpf_subprog_arg_info args[MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ]; +struct bpf_subprog_arg_info args[MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS ]; +u16 incoming_stack_arg_depth; +u16 outgoing_stack_arg_depth; +u16 max_out_stack_arg_depth; };struct bpf_verifier_env ;
kernel/bpf/btf.c +10 -4
@@ -7887,13 +7887,19 @@ int btf_prepare_func_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) } args = (const struct btf_param *)(t +1 ); nargs =btf_type_vlen (t); -if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) { -if (!is_global) -return -EINVAL ; -bpf_log (log,"Global function %s() with %d > %d args. Buggy compiler.\n" , +if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS ) { +bpf_log (log,"Function %s() with %d > %d args not supported.\n" , + tname, nargs,MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (is_global && nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) { +bpf_log (log,"Global function %s() with %d > %d args not supported.\n" , tname, nargs,MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS );return -EINVAL ; } +if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) + sub->incoming_stack_arg_depth = (nargs -MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) *BPF_REG_SIZE ; +/* check that function is void or returns int, exception cb also requires this */ t =btf_type_by_id (btf, t->type);while (btf_type_is_modifier (t))
kernel/bpf/fixups.c +19 -3
@@ -1123,6 +1123,9 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) func[i]->aux->name[0 ] ='F' ; func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; + func[i]->aux->incoming_stack_arg_depth = env->subprog_info[i].incoming_stack_arg_depth; + func[i]->aux->stack_arg_depth = env->subprog_info[i].incoming_stack_arg_depth + + env->subprog_info[i].outgoing_stack_arg_depth;if (env->subprog_info[i].priv_stack_mode ==PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE ) func[i]->aux->jits_use_priv_stack = true;
@@ -1301,8 +1304,10 @@ int bpf_jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)struct bpf_insn_aux_data *orig_insn_aux;u32 *orig_subprog_starts; -if (env->subprog_cnt <=1 ) +if (env->subprog_cnt <=1 ) { + env->prog->aux->stack_arg_depth = env->subprog_info[0 ].outgoing_stack_arg_depth;return 0 ; + } prog = orig_prog = env->prog;if (bpf_prog_need_blind (prog)) {
@@ -1378,9 +1383,20 @@ int bpf_fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;bool has_kfunc_call =bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call (prog); -int i, depth; +int depth;#endif -int err =0 ; +int i, err =0 ; + +for (i =0 ; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { +struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = &env->subprog_info[i]; + +if (subprog->max_out_stack_arg_depth > subprog->outgoing_stack_arg_depth) { +verbose (env, +"func#%d writes stack arg slot at depth %u, but calls only require %u bytes\n" , + i, subprog->max_out_stack_arg_depth, subprog->outgoing_stack_arg_depth); +return -EINVAL ; + } + }if (env->prog->jit_requested && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded (env->prog->aux)) {
kernel/bpf/states.c +41 -0
53 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +292 -3
413 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 07/17] bpf: Support stack arguments for bpf functions
Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s): - [Critical] Missing precision tracking for stack arguments (`BPF_REG_PARAMS` / `r11`) leads to incorrect verifier state pruning and arbitrary…
Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s):
- [Critical] Missing precision tracking for stack arguments (BPF_REG_PARAMS / r11) leads to incorrect verifier state pruning and arbitrary out-of-bounds memory access.
- [Medium] BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT (freplace) programs are incorrectly rejected when targeting static subprograms with more than 5 arguments.
- [Low] stack_arg_safe() strictly compares stack_arg_depth, preventing safe paths from being pruned and leading to state explosion.
--
commit 0c58d1bb907c4a6a387f1afd22baae9d43e95a55
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Subject: bpf: Support stack arguments for bpf functions
This commit introduces support for passing more than 5 arguments to BPF subprograms by using a dedicated stack area accessed via register r11. It tracks these stack arguments separately from the regular stack to ensure proper verification and pruning.
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/states.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/states.c +6
-0@@ -838,6 +838,44 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,return true; } +/* +* Compare stack arg slots between old and current states. +* Outgoing stack args are path-local state and must agree for pruning. +*/ +static bool stack_arg_safe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, + struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap,
kernel/bpf/states.c static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, · line 856
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/states.c +10
-0+ enum exact_level exact) +{ +int i, nslots; + +if (old->incoming_stack_arg_depth != cur->incoming_stack_arg_depth) +return false; + +/* Compare both incoming and outgoing stack arg slots. */ +if (old->stack_arg_depth != cur->stack_arg_depth) +return false;
Does this strict comparison of stack_arg_depth prevent safe paths from being pruned?
Since stack_arg_depth tracks the allocated capacity rather than the active outgoing arguments tracked by out_stack_arg_mask, two branches that call subprograms with different stack argument requirements might end up with permanently different stack_arg_depth values.
Could this unnecessarily increase verification complexity by failing to prune functionally equivalent states?
[ ... ]
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4
-0+static int check_stack_arg_write (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_func_state *state, +int off,int value_regno) +{ +int max_stack_arg_regs =MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS -MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ;
[ ... ]
Quoted 12 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +12
-0+ state->out_stack_arg_mask |=BIT (idx); +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Read a value from the incoming stack arg area. +* off is a positive offset from r11 (e.g. +8 for arg6, +16 for arg7). +* Callers ensure off > 0, 8-byte aligned, and size is BPF_REG_SIZE. +*/ +static int check_stack_arg_read (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_func_state *state, +int off,int dst_regno) +{
[ ... ]
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 4590
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +6
-0+if (is_spillable_regtype (arg->type)) +copy_register_state (&cur->regs[dst_regno], arg); +else +mark_reg_unknown (env, cur->regs, dst_regno); +return 0 ; +}
Should check_stack_arg_read() and check_stack_arg_write() call bpf_push_jmp_history() with the INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS flag?
When the callee uses a stack argument in a context requiring precision, backtracking is initiated. Because the INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS flag is missing, backtrack_insn() might silently return 0. This clears the destination register without propagating the precision requirement to the stack slot.
Could this cause the verifier to incorrectly prune execution paths containing different, potentially unsafe scalar values, allowing programs to bypass verifier bounds checks and perform arbitrary out-of-bounds accesses? Note that the subsequent patch that tracks r11 registers in const_fold and liveness does not address this backtracking logic.
[ ... ]
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) · line 19102
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +1
-1@@ -18808,7 +19097,7 @@ static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) goto out; } } -for (i =BPF_REG_1 ; i <= sub->arg_cnt; i++) { +for (i =BPF_REG_1 ; i <=min_t (u32, sub->arg_cnt,MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ); i++) { arg = &sub->args[i -BPF_REG_1 ]; reg = ®s[i];
For freplace programs targeting static subprograms with more than 5 arguments, do we need to initialize state->frame[0]->incoming_stack_arg_depth here or allocate stack_arg_regs?
Currently it seems to only initialize arguments up to MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS. If incoming_stack_arg_depth remains 0, an EXT program attempting to read its 6th argument via BPF_REG_PARAMS would fail verification in check_stack_arg_read() with -EACCES.
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=7
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 07/17] bpf: Support stack arguments for bpf functions
Quoted 45 lines · On 4/19/26 12:15 PM, [email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s):
- [Critical] Missing precision tracking for stack arguments (BPF_REG_PARAMS/r11) leads to incorrect verifier state pruning and arbitrary out-of-bounds memory access.
- [Medium]BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT(freplace) programs are incorrectly rejected when targeting static subprograms with more than 5 arguments.
- [Low]stack_arg_safe()strictly comparesstack_arg_depth, preventing safe paths from being pruned and leading to state explosion.
--commit
0c58d1bb907c4a6a387f1afd22baae9d43e95a55
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
Subject: bpf: Support stack arguments for bpf functionsThis commit introduces support for passing more than 5 arguments to BPF subprograms by using a dedicated stack area accessed via register r11. It tracks these stack arguments separately from the regular stack to ensure proper verification and pruning.
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/states.c +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/states.c +6
-0@@ -838,6 +838,44 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,return true; } +/* +* Compare stack arg slots between old and current states. +* Outgoing stack args are path-local state and must agree for pruning. +*/ +static bool stack_arg_safe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, + struct bpf_func_state *cur, struct bpf_idmap *idmap,kernel/bpf/states.c static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, · line 856
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/states.c +10
-0+ enum exact_level exact) +{ +int i, nslots; + +if (old->incoming_stack_arg_depth != cur->incoming_stack_arg_depth) +return false; + +/* Compare both incoming and outgoing stack arg slots. */ +if (old->stack_arg_depth != cur->stack_arg_depth) +return false;Does this strict comparison of
stack_arg_depthprevent safe paths from being pruned?
Quoted 7 lines
Since
stack_arg_depthtracks the allocated capacity rather than the active outgoing arguments tracked byout_stack_arg_mask, two branches that call subprograms with different stack argument requirements might end up with permanently differentstack_arg_depthvalues.Could this unnecessarily increase verification complexity by failing to prune functionally equivalent states?
You are right. We should not compare stack_arg_depth, which is not tracking arguments. The out_stack_arg_mask is the correct way to do comparison.
Quoted 40 lines
[ ... ]
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4
-0+static int check_stack_arg_write (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_func_state *state, +int off,int value_regno) +{ +int max_stack_arg_regs =MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS -MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ;[ ... ]
Quoted 12 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +12
-0+ state->out_stack_arg_mask |=BIT (idx); +return 0 ; +} + +/* +* Read a value from the incoming stack arg area. +* off is a positive offset from r11 (e.g. +8 for arg6, +16 for arg7). +* Callers ensure off > 0, 8-byte aligned, and size is BPF_REG_SIZE. +*/ +static int check_stack_arg_read (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_func_state *state, +int off,int dst_regno) +{[ ... ]
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_stack_write(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 4590
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +6
-0+if (is_spillable_regtype (arg->type)) +copy_register_state (&cur->regs[dst_regno], arg); +else +mark_reg_unknown (env, cur->regs, dst_regno); +return 0 ; +}Should
check_stack_arg_read()andcheck_stack_arg_write()callbpf_push_jmp_history()with theINSN_F_STACK_ACCESSflag?When the callee uses a stack argument in a context requiring precision, backtracking is initiated. Because the
INSN_F_STACK_ACCESSflag is missing,backtrack_insn()might silently return 0. This clears the destination register without propagating the precision requirement to the stack slot.
Quoted 6 lines
Could this cause the verifier to incorrectly prune execution paths containing different, potentially unsafe scalar values, allowing programs to bypass verifier bounds checks and perform arbitrary out-of-bounds accesses? Note that the subsequent patch that tracks r11 registers in
const_foldand liveness does not address this backtracking logic.
Yes, you are right. I will think of how to get backtracking work for check_stack_arg_read() and check_stack_arg_write().
Quoted 14 lines
[ ... ]
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) · line 19102
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +1
-1@@ -18808,7 +19097,7 @@ static int do_check_common(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) goto out; } } -for (i =BPF_REG_1 ; i <= sub->arg_cnt; i++) { +for (i =BPF_REG_1 ; i <=min_t (u32, sub->arg_cnt,MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ); i++) { arg = &sub->args[i -BPF_REG_1 ]; reg = ®s[i];For freplace programs targeting static subprograms with more than 5 arguments, do we need to initialize state->frame[0]->incoming_stack_arg_depth here or allocate
stack_arg_regs?
Quoted 4 lines
Currently it seems to only initialize arguments up to
MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS. Ifincoming_stack_arg_depthremains 0, an EXT program attempting to read its 6th argument viaBPF_REG_PARAMSwould fail verification incheck_stack_arg_read()with-EACCES.
For freplace, considering the patch set is always very big, I would like to delay this. I will add a check for freplace. If it has more than 5 parameters, will cause verification failure.
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v6 07/17] bpf: Support stack arguments for bpf functions
In reply to Yonghong SongQuoted 11 lines · Yonghong Song
Currently BPF functions (subprogs) are limited to 5 register arguments. With [1], the compiler can emit code that passes additional arguments via a dedicated stack area through bpf register
BPF_REG_PARAMS(r11), introduced in the previous patch.The compiler uses positive r11 offsets for incoming (callee-side) args and negative r11 offsets for outgoing (caller-side) args, following the x86_64/arm64 calling convention direction. There is an 8-byte gap at offset 0 separating the two regions:
Incoming (callee reads): r11+8 (arg6), r11+16 (arg7), ...
Outgoing (caller writes): r11-8 (arg6), r11-16 (arg7), ...
This part looks clean now.
Quoted 10 lines
A per-state bitmask
out_stack_arg_masktracks which outgoing stack arg slots have been written on the current path. Each bit corresponds to an outgoing slot index (bit 0 = r11-8 = arg6, bit 1 = r11-16 = arg7, etc.). At a call site, the verifier checks that all slots required by the callee have their corresponding mask bits set. This enables precise per-path tracking: if one branch of a conditional writes arg6 but another does not, the mask correctly reflects the difference and the verifier rejects the uninitialized path. The mask is included instack_arg_safe()so that states with different sets of initialized slots are not incorrectly pruned together.
But this part I don't understand.
why do you need this bitmask?
Even when they're written out of order stack_arg_depth is all you need. Then compare old->stack_arg_regs vs cur->stack_arg_regs.
If one is not written its state will be NOT_INIT.
so
*(u64 *)(r11 - 16) = r7;
// without *(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r6;
call bar1; // arg6 = r6, arg7 = r7
will fail the verification.
include/linux/bpf.h struct bpf_prog_aux { · line 1673
Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/bpf.h +2
-0@@ -1669,6 +1669,8 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {u32 max_pkt_offset;u32 max_tp_access;u32 stack_depth; +u16 incoming_stack_arg_depth; +u16 stack_arg_depth;/* both incoming and max outgoing of stack arguments */
these two are ok. I'm assuming you don't want JIT to recompute them.
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/bpf.h +0
-0u32 id;u32 func_cnt;/* used by non-func prog as the number of func progs */ u32 real_func_cnt;/* includes hidden progs, only used for JIT and freeing progs */ include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h struct bpf_func_state { · line 377
Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +3
-0@@ -372,6 +372,11 @@ struct bpf_func_state {* `stack`. allocated_stack is always a multiple of BPF_REG_SIZE. */ int allocated_stack; + +u16 stack_arg_depth;/* Size of incoming + max outgoing stack args in bytes. */ +u16 incoming_stack_arg_depth;/* Size of incoming stack args in bytes. */
but incoming_stack_arg_depth looks odd.
Callee should be accessing caller's stack_arg_depth and caller's stack_arg_regs.
Quoted 38 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +18
-0+u16 out_stack_arg_mask;/* Bitmask of outgoing stack arg slots that have been written. */ +struct bpf_reg_state *stack_arg_regs;/* On-stack arguments */ };#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8@@ -508,6 +513,17 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state { iter < frame->allocated_stack /BPF_REG_SIZE ; \ iter++, reg = bpf_get_spilled_reg(iter, frame, mask)) +#define bpf_get_spilled_stack_arg (slot, frame, mask) \ + ((((slot) < frame->stack_arg_depth / BPF_REG_SIZE) && \ + (frame->stack_arg_regs[slot].type != NOT_INIT)) \ + ? &frame->stack_arg_regs[slot] : NULL) + +/* Iterate over 'frame', setting 'reg' to either NULL or a spilled stack arg. */ +#define bpf_for_each_spilled_stack_arg (iter, frame, reg, mask) \ + for (iter = 0, reg = bpf_get_spilled_stack_arg(iter, frame, mask); \ + iter < frame->stack_arg_depth / BPF_REG_SIZE; \ + iter++, reg = bpf_get_spilled_stack_arg(iter, frame, mask)) +#define bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask (__vst, __state, __reg, __mask, __expr) \ ({ \ struct bpf_verifier_state *___vstate = __vst; \@@ -525,6 +541,11 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state {continue ; \ (void )(__expr); \ } \ + bpf_for_each_spilled_stack_arg(___j, __state, __reg, __mask) { \ +if (!__reg) \ +continue ; \ + (void )(__expr); \ + } \ } \ })@@ -739,10 +760,13 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info { bool keep_fastcall_stack: 1; bool changes_pkt_data: 1;
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h struct bpf_subprog_info { · line 769
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +5
-2bool might_sleep: 1; - u8 arg_cnt:3; + u8 arg_cnt:4;enum priv_stack_mode priv_stack_mode; -struct bpf_subprog_arg_info args[MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ]; +struct bpf_subprog_arg_info args[MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS ]; +u16 incoming_stack_arg_depth; +u16 outgoing_stack_arg_depth; +u16 max_out_stack_arg_depth;
but you already have them in prog_aux?! another copy in bpf_subprog_info?! Remove one of them. JIT only need one set.
Quoted 97 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0};struct bpf_verifier_env ;kernel/bpf/btf.c +10
-4@@ -7887,13 +7887,19 @@ int btf_prepare_func_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) } args = (const struct btf_param *)(t +1 ); nargs =btf_type_vlen (t); -if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) { -if (!is_global) -return -EINVAL ; -bpf_log (log,"Global function %s() with %d > %d args. Buggy compiler.\n" , +if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS ) { +bpf_log (log,"Function %s() with %d > %d args not supported.\n" , + tname, nargs,MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (is_global && nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) { +bpf_log (log,"Global function %s() with %d > %d args not supported.\n" , tname, nargs,MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS );return -EINVAL ; } +if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) + sub->incoming_stack_arg_depth = (nargs -MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) *BPF_REG_SIZE ; +/* check that function is void or returns int, exception cb also requires this */ t =btf_type_by_id (btf, t->type);while (btf_type_is_modifier (t))kernel/bpf/fixups.c +19
-3@@ -1123,6 +1123,9 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) func[i]->aux->name[0 ] ='F' ; func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; + func[i]->aux->incoming_stack_arg_depth = env->subprog_info[i].incoming_stack_arg_depth; + func[i]->aux->stack_arg_depth = env->subprog_info[i].incoming_stack_arg_depth + + env->subprog_info[i].outgoing_stack_arg_depth;if (env->subprog_info[i].priv_stack_mode ==PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE ) func[i]->aux->jits_use_priv_stack = true;@@ -1301,8 +1304,10 @@ int bpf_jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)struct bpf_insn_aux_data *orig_insn_aux;u32 *orig_subprog_starts; -if (env->subprog_cnt <=1 ) +if (env->subprog_cnt <=1 ) { + env->prog->aux->stack_arg_depth = env->subprog_info[0 ].outgoing_stack_arg_depth;return 0 ; + } prog = orig_prog = env->prog;if (bpf_prog_need_blind (prog)) {@@ -1378,9 +1383,20 @@ int bpf_fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;bool has_kfunc_call =bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call (prog); -int i, depth; +int depth;#endif -int err =0 ; +int i, err =0 ; + +for (i =0 ; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { +struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = &env->subprog_info[i]; + +if (subprog->max_out_stack_arg_depth > subprog->outgoing_stack_arg_depth) { +verbose (env, +"func#%d writes stack arg slot at depth %u, but calls only require %u bytes\n" , + i, subprog->max_out_stack_arg_depth, subprog->outgoing_stack_arg_depth); +return -EINVAL ; + } + }if (env->prog->jit_requested && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded (env->prog->aux)) {kernel/bpf/states.c +9
-0@@ -838,6 +838,44 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,return true; } +/* +* Compare stack arg slots between old and current states. +* Outgoing stack args are path-local state and must agree for pruning. +*/ +static bool stack_arg_safe (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_func_state *old, +struct bpf_func_state *cur,struct bpf_idmap *idmap, +enum exact_level exact) +{ +int i, nslots;
kernel/bpf/states.c static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, · line 859
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/states.c +10
-0+ +if (old->incoming_stack_arg_depth != cur->incoming_stack_arg_depth) +return false; + +/* Compare both incoming and outgoing stack arg slots. */ +if (old->stack_arg_depth != cur->stack_arg_depth) +return false; + +if (old->out_stack_arg_mask != cur->out_stack_arg_mask) +return false;
shouldn't be neccessary.
Quoted 37 lines
kernel/bpf/states.c +22
-0+ + nslots = old->stack_arg_depth /BPF_REG_SIZE ; +for (i =0 ; i < nslots; i++) { +struct bpf_reg_state *old_arg = &old->stack_arg_regs[i]; +struct bpf_reg_state *cur_arg = &cur->stack_arg_regs[i]; + +if (old_arg->type ==NOT_INIT && cur_arg->type ==NOT_INIT ) +continue ; + +if (exact ==EXACT && old_arg->type != cur_arg->type) +return false; + +if (!regsafe (env, old_arg, cur_arg, idmap, exact)) +return false; + } + +return true; +} +static bool refsafe (struct bpf_verifier_state *old,struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,struct bpf_idmap *idmap) {@@ -929,6 +967,9 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_statif (!stacksafe (env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch, exact))return false; +if (!stack_arg_safe (env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch, exact)) +return false; +return true; }kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_st · line 1349
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7
-0@@ -1340,6 +1340,20 @@ static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_streturn -ENOMEM ; dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack; + +/* copy stack args state */ + n = src->stack_arg_depth /BPF_REG_SIZE ; +if (n) { + dst->stack_arg_regs =copy_array (dst->stack_arg_regs, src->stack_arg_regs, n, +sizeof (struct bpf_reg_state ), +GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT );
copy is unnecessary.
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 4263
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7
-0@@ -4220,6 +4254,13 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, }if (type ==STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)continue ; +/* +* Cross-frame reads may hit slots poisoned by dead code elimination. +* Static liveness can't track indirect references through pointers, +* so allow the read conservatively. +*/ +if (type ==STACK_POISON && reg_state != state) +continue ;
wait what? Is this a real issue? Are you saying you have a test prog that passes FP derived pointers in arg 6, 7 and arg_tracking cannot detect it? Then it should be added properly in arg_tracking.
This hack to allow reading poisoned slots is not ok.
This is a serious issue.
pw-bot: cr
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 07/17] bpf: Support stack arguments for bpf functions
Quoted 34 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 11 lines · Yonghong Song
Currently BPF functions (subprogs) are limited to 5 register arguments. With [1], the compiler can emit code that passes additional arguments via a dedicated stack area through bpf register
BPF_REG_PARAMS(r11), introduced in the previous patch.The compiler uses positive r11 offsets for incoming (callee-side) args and negative r11 offsets for outgoing (caller-side) args, following the x86_64/arm64 calling convention direction. There is an 8-byte gap at offset 0 separating the two regions:
Incoming (callee reads): r11+8 (arg6), r11+16 (arg7), ... Outgoing (caller writes): r11-8 (arg6), r11-16 (arg7), ...This part looks clean now.
Quoted 10 lines
A per-state bitmask
out_stack_arg_masktracks which outgoing stack arg slots have been written on the current path. Each bit corresponds to an outgoing slot index (bit 0 = r11-8 = arg6, bit 1 = r11-16 = arg7, etc.). At a call site, the verifier checks that all slots required by the callee have their corresponding mask bits set. This enables precise per-path tracking: if one branch of a conditional writes arg6 but another does not, the mask correctly reflects the difference and the verifier rejects the uninitialized path. The mask is included instack_arg_safe()so that states with different sets of initialized slots are not incorrectly pruned together.But this part I don't understand.
why do you need this bitmask?
Even when they're written out of orderstack_arg_depthis all you need. Then compareold->stack_arg_regsvscur->stack_arg_regs.
If one is not written its state will beNOT_INIT.
so
*(u64 *)(r11 - 16) = r7;
// without *(u64 *)(r11 - 8) = r6;
call bar1; // arg6 = r6, arg7 = r7
Quoted 1 line
will fail the verification.
I added bitmask to make it easy for early comparison for pruning since maintenance of bitmask is light. But I think this probably not necessary. Will remove.
Quoted 25 lines
include/linux/bpf.h struct bpf_prog_aux { · line 1673
Quoted 7 lines
include/linux/bpf.h +2
-0@@ -1669,6 +1669,8 @@ struct bpf_prog_aux {u32 max_pkt_offset;u32 max_tp_access;u32 stack_depth; +u16 incoming_stack_arg_depth; +u16 stack_arg_depth;/* both incoming and max outgoing of stack arguments */ these two are ok. I'm assuming you don't want JIT to recompute them.
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/bpf.h +0
-0u32 id;u32 func_cnt;/* used by non-func prog as the number of func progs */ u32 real_func_cnt;/* includes hidden progs, only used for JIT and freeing progs */ include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0include/linux/bpf_verifier.h struct bpf_func_state { · line 377
Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +3
-0@@ -372,6 +372,11 @@ struct bpf_func_state {* `stack`. allocated_stack is always a multiple of BPF_REG_SIZE. */ int allocated_stack; + +u16 stack_arg_depth;/* Size of incoming + max outgoing stack args in bytes. */ +u16 incoming_stack_arg_depth;/* Size of incoming stack args in bytes. */ but
incoming_stack_arg_depthlooks odd.
Quoted 2 lines
Callee should be accessing caller's
stack_arg_depthand caller'sstack_arg_regs.
Okay. Will reduce local caching and get the value from the caller.
Quoted 43 lines
Quoted 43 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +19
-1+u16 out_stack_arg_mask;/* Bitmask of outgoing stack arg slots that have been written. */ +struct bpf_reg_state *stack_arg_regs;/* On-stack arguments */ };#define MAX_CALL_FRAMES 8@@ -508,6 +513,17 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state { iter < frame->allocated_stack /BPF_REG_SIZE ; \ iter++, reg = bpf_get_spilled_reg(iter, frame, mask)) +#define bpf_get_spilled_stack_arg (slot, frame, mask) \ + ((((slot) < frame->stack_arg_depth / BPF_REG_SIZE) && \ + (frame->stack_arg_regs[slot].type != NOT_INIT)) \ + ? &frame->stack_arg_regs[slot] : NULL) + +/* Iterate over 'frame', setting 'reg' to either NULL or a spilled stack arg. */ +#define bpf_for_each_spilled_stack_arg (iter, frame, reg, mask) \ + for (iter = 0, reg = bpf_get_spilled_stack_arg(iter, frame, mask); \ + iter < frame->stack_arg_depth / BPF_REG_SIZE; \ + iter++, reg = bpf_get_spilled_stack_arg(iter, frame, mask)) +#define bpf_for_each_reg_in_vstate_mask (__vst, __state, __reg, __mask, __expr) \ ({ \ struct bpf_verifier_state *___vstate = __vst; \@@ -525,6 +541,11 @@ struct bpf_verifier_state {continue ; \ (void )(__expr); \ } \ + bpf_for_each_spilled_stack_arg(___j, __state, __reg, __mask) { \ +if (!__reg) \ +continue ; \ + (void )(__expr); \ + } \ } \ })@@ -739,10 +760,13 @@ struct bpf_subprog_info { bool keep_fastcall_stack: 1; bool changes_pkt_data: 1; bool might_sleep: 1; - u8 arg_cnt:3; + u8 arg_cnt:4;
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h struct bpf_subprog_info { · line 769
Quoted 6 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +4
-1enum priv_stack_mode priv_stack_mode; -struct bpf_subprog_arg_info args[MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ]; +struct bpf_subprog_arg_info args[MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS ]; +u16 incoming_stack_arg_depth; +u16 outgoing_stack_arg_depth; +u16 max_out_stack_arg_depth;but you already have them in
prog_aux?! another copy inbpf_subprog_info?! Remove one of them. JIT only need one set.
Okay.
Quoted 101 lines
Quoted 101 lines
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h +0
-0};struct bpf_verifier_env ;kernel/bpf/btf.c +10
-4@@ -7887,13 +7887,19 @@ int btf_prepare_func_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) } args = (const struct btf_param *)(t +1 ); nargs =btf_type_vlen (t); -if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) { -if (!is_global) -return -EINVAL ; -bpf_log (log,"Global function %s() with %d > %d args. Buggy compiler.\n" , +if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS ) { +bpf_log (log,"Function %s() with %d > %d args not supported.\n" , + tname, nargs,MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (is_global && nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) { +bpf_log (log,"Global function %s() with %d > %d args not supported.\n" , tname, nargs,MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS );return -EINVAL ; } +if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) + sub->incoming_stack_arg_depth = (nargs -MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) *BPF_REG_SIZE ; +/* check that function is void or returns int, exception cb also requires this */ t =btf_type_by_id (btf, t->type);while (btf_type_is_modifier (t))kernel/bpf/fixups.c +19
-3@@ -1123,6 +1123,9 @@ static int jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) func[i]->aux->name[0 ] ='F' ; func[i]->aux->stack_depth = env->subprog_info[i].stack_depth; + func[i]->aux->incoming_stack_arg_depth = env->subprog_info[i].incoming_stack_arg_depth; + func[i]->aux->stack_arg_depth = env->subprog_info[i].incoming_stack_arg_depth + + env->subprog_info[i].outgoing_stack_arg_depth;if (env->subprog_info[i].priv_stack_mode ==PRIV_STACK_ADAPTIVE ) func[i]->aux->jits_use_priv_stack = true;@@ -1301,8 +1304,10 @@ int bpf_jit_subprogs(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)struct bpf_insn_aux_data *orig_insn_aux;u32 *orig_subprog_starts; -if (env->subprog_cnt <=1 ) +if (env->subprog_cnt <=1 ) { + env->prog->aux->stack_arg_depth = env->subprog_info[0 ].outgoing_stack_arg_depth;return 0 ; + } prog = orig_prog = env->prog;if (bpf_prog_need_blind (prog)) {@@ -1378,9 +1383,20 @@ int bpf_fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)struct bpf_prog *prog = env->prog;struct bpf_insn *insn = prog->insnsi;bool has_kfunc_call =bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call (prog); -int i, depth; +int depth;#endif -int err =0 ; +int i, err =0 ; + +for (i =0 ; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { +struct bpf_subprog_info *subprog = &env->subprog_info[i]; + +if (subprog->max_out_stack_arg_depth > subprog->outgoing_stack_arg_depth) { +verbose (env, +"func#%d writes stack arg slot at depth %u, but calls only require %u bytes\n" , + i, subprog->max_out_stack_arg_depth, subprog->outgoing_stack_arg_depth); +return -EINVAL ; + } + }if (env->prog->jit_requested && !bpf_prog_is_offloaded (env->prog->aux)) {kernel/bpf/states.c +12
-0@@ -838,6 +838,44 @@ static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old,return true; } +/* +* Compare stack arg slots between old and current states. +* Outgoing stack args are path-local state and must agree for pruning. +*/ +static bool stack_arg_safe (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,struct bpf_func_state *old, +struct bpf_func_state *cur,struct bpf_idmap *idmap, +enum exact_level exact) +{ +int i, nslots; + +if (old->incoming_stack_arg_depth != cur->incoming_stack_arg_depth) +return false;
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/states.c static bool stacksafe(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_state *old, · line 859
Quoted 7 lines
kernel/bpf/states.c +7
-0+ +/* Compare both incoming and outgoing stack arg slots. */ +if (old->stack_arg_depth != cur->stack_arg_depth) +return false; + +if (old->out_stack_arg_mask != cur->out_stack_arg_mask) +return false;shouldn't be neccessary.
Okay.
Quoted 40 lines
Quoted 40 lines
kernel/bpf/states.c +22
-0+ + nslots = old->stack_arg_depth /BPF_REG_SIZE ; +for (i =0 ; i < nslots; i++) { +struct bpf_reg_state *old_arg = &old->stack_arg_regs[i]; +struct bpf_reg_state *cur_arg = &cur->stack_arg_regs[i]; + +if (old_arg->type ==NOT_INIT && cur_arg->type ==NOT_INIT ) +continue ; + +if (exact ==EXACT && old_arg->type != cur_arg->type) +return false; + +if (!regsafe (env, old_arg, cur_arg, idmap, exact)) +return false; + } + +return true; +} +static bool refsafe (struct bpf_verifier_state *old,struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,struct bpf_idmap *idmap) {@@ -929,6 +967,9 @@ static bool func_states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_func_statif (!stacksafe (env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch, exact))return false; +if (!stack_arg_safe (env, old, cur, &env->idmap_scratch, exact)) +return false; +return true; }kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0@@ -1340,6 +1340,20 @@ static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_streturn -ENOMEM ;
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int copy_stack_state(struct bpf_func_state *dst, const struct bpf_func_st · line 1349
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7
-0dst->allocated_stack = src->allocated_stack; + +/* copy stack args state */ + n = src->stack_arg_depth /BPF_REG_SIZE ; +if (n) { + dst->stack_arg_regs =copy_array (dst->stack_arg_regs, src->stack_arg_regs, n, +sizeof (struct bpf_reg_state ), +GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT );copy is unnecessary.
Okay.
Quoted 17 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 4263
Quoted 12 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7
-0@@ -4220,6 +4254,13 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, }if (type ==STACK_INVALID && env->allow_uninit_stack)continue ; +/* +* Cross-frame reads may hit slots poisoned by dead code elimination. +* Static liveness can't track indirect references through pointers, +* so allow the read conservatively. +*/ +if (type ==STACK_POISON && reg_state != state) +continue ;wait what? Is this a real issue? Are you saying you have a test prog that passes FP derived pointers in arg 6, 7 and
arg_trackingcannot detect it? Then it should be added properly inarg_tracking.
This hack to allow reading poisoned slots is not ok.
This is a serious issue.
Okay. The reason is that callee is not getting the proper state from caller. I will do proper implementation here.
Quoted 2 lines
pw-bot: cr
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 8/17 bpf: Reject stack arguments in non-JITed programs
In reply to Yonghong SongThe interpreter does not understand the bpf register r11 (BPF_REG_PARAMS) used for stack argument addressing. So reject interpreter usage if stack arguments are used either in the main program or any subprogram.
--- kernel/bpf/core.c | 2 +- kernel/bpf/fixups.c | 6 ++++++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/core.c +1 -1
@@ -2599,7 +2599,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *__bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct goto finalize;if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON ) || -bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call (fp)) +bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call (fp) || fp->aux->stack_arg_depth) jit_needed = true;if (!bpf_prog_select_interpreter (fp))
kernel/bpf/fixups.c +6 -0
@@ -1411,6 +1411,12 @@ int bpf_fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)verbose (env,"calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n" );return -EINVAL ; } +for (i =0 ; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { +if (env->subprog_info[i].incoming_stack_arg_depth) { +verbose (env,"stack args are not supported in non-JITed programs\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + }if (env->subprog_cnt >1 && env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable) {/* When JIT fails the progs with bpf2bpf calls and tail_calls * have to be rejected, since interpreter doesn't support them yet.
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 08/17] bpf: Reject stack arguments in non-JITed programs
Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s): - [High] The loop in `bpf_fixup_call_args()` incorrectly rejects main BPF programs with >5 arguments in their BTF signature when JIT is disabled, even…
Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s):
- [High] The loop in bpf_fixup_call_args() incorrectly rejects main BPF programs with >5 arguments in their BTF signature when JIT is disabled, even though main programs do not actually use stack arguments.
- [High] Standalone global functions with stack arguments can incorrectly fall back to the interpreter if JIT compilation fails, leading to a kernel panic.
--
commit f56b0fedf39a845476910805e073f6b2d3a4ad82
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
bpf: Reject stack arguments in non-JITed programs
The interpreter does not understand the bpf register r11 (BPF_REG_PARAMS) used for stack argument addressing. So reject interpreter usage if stack arguments are used either in the main program or any subprogram.
kernel/bpf/core.c struct bpf_prog *__bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct · line 2603
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/bpf/core.c +1
-1@@ -2599,7 +2599,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *__bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct goto finalize;if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON ) || -bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call (fp)) +bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call (fp) || fp->aux->stack_arg_depth) jit_needed = true;
When loading a standalone global function (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) with >5 arguments, bpf_jit_subprogs() sets fp->aux->stack_arg_depth to 0 (the outgoing_stack_arg_depth). If JIT is requested, bpf_fixup_call_args() will exit early, bypassing the newly added loop that checks incoming_stack_arg_depth.
Because fp->aux->stack_arg_depth has been cleared to 0, jit_needed evaluates to false here.
If JIT compilation subsequently fails (e.g., due to memory limits or unsupported instructions), does the kernel silently fall back to the interpreter instead of rejecting the program?
If executed, the interpreter encounters instructions utilizing BPF_REG_PARAMS (r11, mapped to regs[11]), which is initialized to 0 in the interpreter's stack frame. Could dereferencing this register to read stack arguments result in a NULL pointer dereference and cause a kernel panic?
kernel/bpf/fixups.c int bpf_fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) · line 1415
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/fixups.c +2
-0@@ -1411,6 +1411,12 @@ int bpf_fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)verbose (env,"calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n" );return -EINVAL ; } +for (i =0 ; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { +if (env->subprog_info[i].incoming_stack_arg_depth) {
When verifying the main BPF program (i = 0), if the provided BTF signature has >5 arguments, the verifier sets env->subprog_info[0].incoming_stack_arg_depth > 0.
Although the verifier subsequently realizes this signature doesn't match the expected single ctx argument and marks the BTF info as unreliable, it never clears the incoming_stack_arg_depth.
Because this loop starts at i = 0 and unconditionally checks incoming_stack_arg_depth, will it reject the entire program if JIT is disabled (e.g., via sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_enable=0), even though main programs do not actually use stack arguments?
Does this break backwards compatibility for existing valid BPF programs with 6+ argument BTF signatures that used to load successfully?
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/fixups.c +4
-0+verbose (env,"stack args are not supported in non-JITed programs\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=8
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 08/17] bpf: Reject stack arguments in non-JITed programs
Quoted 31 lines · On 4/19/26 11:21 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s):
- [High] The loop inbpf_fixup_call_args()incorrectly rejects main BPF programs with >5 arguments in their BTF signature when JIT is disabled, even though main programs do not actually use stack arguments.
- [High] Standalone global functions with stack arguments can incorrectly fall back to the interpreter if JIT compilation fails, leading to a kernel panic.
--commit
f56b0fedf39a845476910805e073f6b2d3a4ad82
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>bpf: Reject stack arguments in non-JITed programs
The interpreter does not understand the bpf register r11 (
BPF_REG_PARAMS) used for stack argument addressing. So reject interpreter usage if stack arguments are used either in the main program or any subprogram.kernel/bpf/core.c struct bpf_prog *__bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct · line 2603
Quoted 11 lines
kernel/bpf/core.c +1
-1@@ -2599,7 +2599,7 @@ struct bpf_prog *__bpf_prog_select_runtime(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct goto finalize;if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON ) || -bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call (fp)) +bpf_prog_has_kfunc_call (fp) || fp->aux->stack_arg_depth) jit_needed = true;When loading a standalone global function (
env->subprog_cnt<= 1) with >5 arguments,bpf_jit_subprogs()setsfp->aux->stack_arg_depthto 0 (theoutgoing_stack_arg_depth). If JIT is requested,bpf_fixup_call_args()will exit early, bypassing the newly added loop that checksincoming_stack_arg_depth.
Quoted 2 lines
Because
fp->aux->stack_arg_depthhas been cleared to 0,jit_neededevaluates to false here.
I think the below change should fix the problem.
- if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1)
+ if (env->subprog_cnt <= 1) {
+ env->prog->aux->stack_arg_depth = env->subprog_info[0].outgoing_stack_arg_depth
+ + env->subprog_info[0].incoming_stack_arg_depth;
return 0;+ }
In the above scenaio, env->prog->aux->stack_arg_depth will not be 0, so jit_needed evaluates to true.
Quoted 10 lines
If JIT compilation subsequently fails (e.g., due to memory limits or unsupported instructions), does the kernel silently fall back to the interpreter instead of rejecting the program?
If executed, the interpreter encounters instructions utilizing
BPF_REG_PARAMS(r11, mapped to regs[11]), which is initialized to 0 in the interpreter's stack frame. Could dereferencing this register to read stack arguments result in a NULL pointer dereference and cause a kernel panic?
Quoted 13 lines
kernel/bpf/fixups.c int bpf_fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env) · line 1415
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/fixups.c +2
-0@@ -1411,6 +1411,12 @@ int bpf_fixup_call_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)verbose (env,"calling kernel functions are not allowed in non-JITed programs\n" );return -EINVAL ; } +for (i =0 ; i < env->subprog_cnt; i++) { +if (env->subprog_info[i].incoming_stack_arg_depth) {When verifying the main BPF program (i = 0), if the provided BTF signature has >5 arguments, the verifier sets env->subprog_info[0].incoming_stack_arg_depth > 0.
We can ignore i = 0. The first subprog is the main prog, we can skip it.
Quoted 17 lines
Although the verifier subsequently realizes this signature doesn't match the expected single ctx argument and marks the BTF info as unreliable, it never clears the
incoming_stack_arg_depth.Because this loop starts at i = 0 and unconditionally checks
incoming_stack_arg_depth, will it reject the entire program if JIT is disabled (e.g., via sysctl net.core.bpf_jit_enable=0), even though main programs do not actually use stack arguments?Does this break backwards compatibility for existing valid BPF programs with 6+ argument BTF signatures that used to load successfully?
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/fixups.c +4
-0+verbose (env,"stack args are not supported in non-JITed programs\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } + }
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 9/17 bpf: Track r11 registers in const_fold and liveness
In reply to Yonghong SongSince BPF_REG_PARAMS (r11) is beyond MAX_BPF_REG (r11), using it as an array index into the register tracking arrays in const_fold.c and liveness.c could cause out-of-bounds accesses.
When dst_reg is BPF_REG_PARAMS (BPF_ST/BPF_STX storing to the stack arg area), no tracked register state changes, so an early return is sufficient.
When src_reg is BPF_REG_PARAMS (BPF_LDX loading from the stack arg area), dst_reg is a normal register that gets overwritten. Simply returning early would leave dst_reg with stale state from a prior path, which could cause incorrect constant folding or liveness analysis. Mark dst_reg as unknown/none before returning to prevent this.
--- kernel/bpf/const_fold.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- kernel/bpf/liveness.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/const_fold.c +12 -2
@@ -51,13 +51,23 @@ static void const_reg_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct const_arg_info * struct bpf_insn *insn, struct bpf_insn *insns, int idx) { struct const_arg_info unknown = { .state = CONST_ARG_UNKNOWN, .val = 0 }; -struct const_arg_info *dst = &ci_out[insn->dst_reg]; -struct const_arg_info *src = &ci_out[insn->src_reg]; +struct const_arg_info *dst, *src;u8 class =BPF_CLASS (insn->code);u8 mode =BPF_MODE (insn->code);u8 opcode =BPF_OP (insn->code) |BPF_SRC (insn->code);int r; +/* Stack arguments using BPF_REG_PARAMS are outside the tracked register set. */ +if (insn->dst_reg >=MAX_BPF_REG ) +return ; +if (insn->src_reg >=MAX_BPF_REG ) { +if (class ==BPF_LDX ) + ci_out[insn->dst_reg] = unknown; +return ; + } + + dst = &ci_out[insn->dst_reg]; + src = &ci_out[insn->src_reg];switch (class) {case BPF_ALU :case BPF_ALU64 :
kernel/bpf/liveness.c +12 -2
@@ -1068,11 +1068,21 @@ static void arg_track_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,int depth = instance->depth;u8 class =BPF_CLASS (insn->code);u8 code =BPF_OP (insn->code); -struct arg_track *dst = &at_out[insn->dst_reg]; -struct arg_track *src = &at_out[insn->src_reg]; +struct arg_track *dst, *src;struct arg_track none = { .frame =ARG_NONE };int r; +/* Stack arguments using BPF_REG_PARAMS are outside the tracked register set. */ +if (insn->dst_reg >=MAX_BPF_REG ) +return ; +if (insn->src_reg >=MAX_BPF_REG ) { +if (class ==BPF_LDX ) + at_out[insn->dst_reg] = none; +return ; + } + + dst = &at_out[insn->dst_reg]; + src = &at_out[insn->src_reg];if (class ==BPF_ALU64 &&BPF_SRC (insn->code) ==BPF_K ) {if (code ==BPF_MOV ) { *dst = none;
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 09/17] bpf: Track r11 registers in const_fold and liveness
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] The stack arguments feature is entirely blocked because BPF_REG_PARAMS is unconditionally rejected…
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] The stack arguments feature is entirely blocked because BPF_REG_PARAMS is unconditionally rejected during initial instruction sanity checks.
- [Medium] State tracking corruption due to early returns skipping register invalidation for BPF_REG_PARAMS
- [Medium] Out-of-bounds access in verifier register checks when using BPF_REG_PARAMS in unsupported instructions
--
--- Patch [9]: [PATCH bpf-next v6 09/17] bpf: Track r11 registers in const_fold and liveness --- commit 9af64f45f038d2b8f7990714d3dc13da2d1fbc25
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
bpf: Track r11 registers in const_fold and liveness
This commit adds early returns in the register tracking arrays for const_fold.c and liveness.c when instructions use BPF_REG_PARAMS (r11). It aims to prevent out-of-bounds accesses and invalidates the destination register for BPF_LDX instructions to avoid leaving stale states.
Quoted 14 lines
kernel/bpf/const_fold.c +1
-2@@ -51,13 +51,23 @@ static void const_reg_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct const_arg_info * struct bpf_insn *insn, struct bpf_insn *insns, int idx) { struct const_arg_info unknown = { .state = CONST_ARG_UNKNOWN, .val = 0 }; -struct const_arg_info *dst = &ci_out[insn->dst_reg]; -struct const_arg_info *src = &ci_out[insn->src_reg]; +struct const_arg_info *dst, *src;u8 class =BPF_CLASS (insn->code);u8 mode =BPF_MODE (insn->code);u8 opcode =BPF_OP (insn->code) |BPF_SRC (insn->code);
kernel/bpf/const_fold.c static void const_reg_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct const_arg_info * · line 67
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/const_fold.c +8
-0int r; +/* Stack arguments using BPF_REG_PARAMS are outside the tracked register set. */ +if (insn->dst_reg >=MAX_BPF_REG ) +return ; +if (insn->src_reg >=MAX_BPF_REG ) { +if (class ==BPF_LDX ) + ci_out[insn->dst_reg] = unknown; +return ; + }
[Severity: Medium]
If an ALU or atomic instruction uses BPF_REG_PARAMS (r11) as a source or destination register, is it possible that this early return skips clearing the destination register state?
If an ALU instruction uses r11, it looks like the destination register's tracking state is not invalidated, retaining its previous, potentially stale constant state. Similarly, an atomic store (BPF_STX) to r11 could return early without invalidating R0 for BPF_CMPXCHG.
Could this lead to dead branch elimination errors or forged pointers?
Quoted 12 lines
kernel/bpf/liveness.c +1
-2@@ -1068,11 +1068,21 @@ static void arg_track_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,int depth = instance->depth;u8 class =BPF_CLASS (insn->code);u8 code =BPF_OP (insn->code); -struct arg_track *dst = &at_out[insn->dst_reg]; -struct arg_track *src = &at_out[insn->src_reg]; +struct arg_track *dst, *src;struct arg_track none = { .frame =ARG_NONE };
kernel/bpf/liveness.c static void arg_track_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, · line 1082
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/liveness.c +8
-0int r; +/* Stack arguments using BPF_REG_PARAMS are outside the tracked register set. */ +if (insn->dst_reg >=MAX_BPF_REG ) +return ; +if (insn->src_reg >=MAX_BPF_REG ) { +if (class ==BPF_LDX ) + at_out[insn->dst_reg] = none; +return ; + }
[Severity: Medium]
Looking at this similar early return, could it skip updating the liveness tracking for ALU and atomic instructions that use BPF_REG_PARAMS?
While reviewing this feature, I also noticed a couple of related issues in kernel/bpf/verifier.c:
[Severity: Medium]
In kernel/bpf/verifier.c:__check_reg_arg():
reg = ®s[regno];
When an ALU, JMP, or ATOMIC instruction uses BPF_REG_PARAMS (r11) as a register operand, it appears this might access the regs array with an index of 11. Since the verifier's regs array is sized exactly MAX_BPF_REG (11 elements, indices 0-10), could this lead to an out-of-bounds access?
[Severity: High]
In kernel/bpf/verifier.c:check_and_resolve_insns():
if (insn->dst_reg >= MAX_BPF_REG) {
verbose(env, "R%d is invalid\n", insn->dst_reg);
return -EINVAL;
}Is BPF_REG_PARAMS unintentionally being rejected during the initial sanity checks here?
Since BPF_REG_PARAMS is defined as MAX_BPF_REG (11), any instruction referencing r11 seems to be immediately rejected with "R11 is invalid" before core verification begins. Should this bounds check be updated to accommodate the new register?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=9
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 10/17 bpf: Prepare architecture JIT support for stack arguments
In reply to Yonghong SongAdd bpf_jit_supports_stack_args() as a weak function defaulting to false. Architectures that implement JIT support for stack arguments override it to return true.
Reject BPF functions and kfuncs with more than 5 parameters at verification time if the architecture does not support stack arguments.
--- include/linux/filter.h | 1 + kernel/bpf/btf.c | 8 +++++++- kernel/bpf/core.c | 5 +++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 5 +++++ 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/filter.h +1 -0
@@ -1163,6 +1163,7 @@ bool bpf_jit_inlines_helper_call(s32 imm);bool bpf_jit_supports_subprog_tailcalls (void );bool bpf_jit_supports_percpu_insn (void );bool bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call (void ); +bool bpf_jit_supports_stack_args (void );bool bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call (void );bool bpf_jit_supports_exceptions (void );bool bpf_jit_supports_ptr_xchg (void );
kernel/bpf/btf.c +7 -1
@@ -7897,8 +7897,14 @@ int btf_prepare_func_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog) tname, nargs, MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS);return -EINVAL ; } -if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) +if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) { +if (!bpf_jit_supports_stack_args ()) { +bpf_log (log,"JIT does not support function %s() with %d args\n" , + tname, nargs); +return -ENOTSUPP ; + } sub->incoming_stack_arg_depth = (nargs -MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) *BPF_REG_SIZE ; + }/* check that function is void or returns int, exception cb also requires this */ t =btf_type_by_id (btf, t->type);
kernel/bpf/core.c +5 -0
@@ -3217,6 +3217,11 @@ bool __weak bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call(void)return false; } +bool __weak bpf_jit_supports_stack_args (void ) +{ +return false; +} +bool __weak bpf_jit_supports_far_kfunc_call (void ) {return false;
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5 -0
@@ -12363,6 +12363,11 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS);return -EINVAL ; } +if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS && !bpf_jit_supports_stack_args ()) { +verbose (env,"JIT does not support kfunc %s() with %d args\n" , + func_name, nargs); +return -ENOTSUPP ; + }/* Check that BTF function arguments match actual types that the * verifier sees.
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 11/17 bpf: Enable r11 based insns
In reply to Yonghong SongBPF_REG_PARAMS (r11) is used for stack argument accesses and the following are the only insns with r11 presence:
- BPF_LDX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW (load incoming stack arg)
- BPF_STX | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW (store register to outgoing stack arg)
- BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW (store immediate to outgoing stack arg)The LLVM compiler [1] implemented the above BPF_REG_PARAMS insns.
[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/189060
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +15 -4
@@ -18791,13 +18791,24 @@ static int check_and_resolve_insns(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)return err;for (i =0 ; i < insn_cnt; i++, insn++) { +u8 class =BPF_CLASS (insn->code); +u8 mode =BPF_MODE (insn->code); +u8 size =BPF_SIZE (insn->code); +if (insn->dst_reg >=MAX_BPF_REG ) { -verbose (env,"R%d is invalid\n" , insn->dst_reg); -return -EINVAL ; +if (insn->dst_reg !=BPF_REG_PARAMS || + (class !=BPF_ST && class !=BPF_STX ) || + mode !=BPF_MEM || size !=BPF_DW ) { +verbose (env,"R%d is invalid\n" , insn->dst_reg); +return -EINVAL ; + } }if (insn->src_reg >=MAX_BPF_REG ) { -verbose (env,"R%d is invalid\n" , insn->src_reg); -return -EINVAL ; +if (insn->src_reg !=BPF_REG_PARAMS || + insn->code != (BPF_LDX |BPF_MEM |BPF_DW )) { +verbose (env,"R%d is invalid\n" , insn->src_reg); +return -EINVAL ; + } }if (insn[0 ].code == (BPF_LD |BPF_IMM |BPF_DW )) {struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux;
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 12/17 bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls
In reply to Yonghong SongExtend the stack argument mechanism to kfunc calls, allowing kfuncs with more than 5 parameters to receive additional arguments via the r11-based stack arg area.
For kfuncs, the caller is a BPF program and the callee is a kernel function. The BPF program writes outgoing args at negative r11 offsets, following the same convention as BPF-to-BPF calls:
Outgoing: r11 - 8 (arg6), ..., r11 - N*8 (last arg)
The following is an example:
int foo(int a1, int a2, int a3, int a4, int a5, int a6, int a7) {
...
kfunc1(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8);
...
kfunc2(a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9);
...
} Caller (foo), generated by llvm
===============================
Incoming (positive offsets):
r11+8: [incoming arg 6]
r11+16: [incoming arg 7]Outgoing for kfunc1 (negative offsets):
r11-8: [outgoing arg 6]
r11-16: [outgoing arg 7]
r11-24: [outgoing arg 8]Outgoing for kfunc2 (negative offsets):
r11-8: [outgoing arg 6]
r11-16: [outgoing arg 7]
r11-24: [outgoing arg 8]
r11-32: [outgoing arg 9]Later JIT will marshal outgoing arguments to the native calling convention for kfunc1() and kfunc2().
There are two places where meta->release_regno needs to keep
regno for later releasing the reference. Also, 'cur_aux(env)->arg_prog = regno' is also keeping regno for later fixup. Since stack arguments don't have a valid register number (regno is set to -1), these three cases are rejected for now if the argument is on the stack.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 103 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +103 -24
@@ -4502,6 +4502,14 @@ static int check_stack_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,return 0 ; } +/* Check whether a stack arg slot has been properly initialized. */ +static bool is_stack_arg_slot_initialized (struct bpf_func_state *state,int spi) +{ +if (spi >= (int )(state->stack_arg_depth /BPF_REG_SIZE )) +return false; +return state->stack_arg_regs[spi].type !=NOT_INIT ; +} +static int out_arg_idx_from_off (int off) {return -off /BPF_REG_SIZE -1 ;
@@ -7314,8 +7322,12 @@ static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } err =check_helper_mem_access (env, mem_reg, mem_argno, size_reg->umax_value, access_type, zero_size_allowed, meta); -if (!err && !is_stack_argno (size_argno)) - err =mark_chain_precision (env, size_argno); +if (!err) { +if (is_stack_argno (size_argno)) + size_reg->precise = true; +else + err =mark_chain_precision (env, size_argno); + }return err; }
@@ -7358,8 +7370,6 @@ static int check_kfunc_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_regu32 argno =make_argno (mem_argno);int err; -WARN_ON_ONCE (mem_argno >BPF_REG_3 ); -memset (&meta,0 ,sizeof (meta));if (may_be_null) {
@@ -11667,6 +11677,21 @@ bool bpf_is_kfunc_pkt_changing(struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta)return meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_xdp_pull_data]; } +static struct bpf_reg_state *get_kfunc_arg_reg (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int argno) +{ +struct bpf_func_state *caller; +int spi; + +if (argno <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) +return &cur_regs (env)[argno +1 ]; + + caller =cur_func (env); + spi =out_arg_spi (caller, argno -MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ); +if (spi >= caller->stack_arg_depth /BPF_REG_SIZE ) +return NULL ; +return &caller->stack_arg_regs[spi]; +} + static enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta *meta,
@@ -11674,8 +11699,6 @@ get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, const char *ref_tname, const struct btf_param *args, int argno, int nargs, struct bpf_reg_state *reg) { - u32 regno = argno + 1; -struct bpf_reg_state *regs =cur_regs (env); bool arg_mem_size = false; if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx] ||
@@ -11683,10 +11706,14 @@ get_kfunc_ptr_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_session_cookie])return KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CTX ; -if (argno +1 < nargs && - (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size (meta->btf, &args[argno +1 ], ®s[regno +1 ]) || -is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size (meta->btf, &args[argno +1 ], ®s[regno +1 ]))) - arg_mem_size = true; +if (argno +1 < nargs) { +struct bpf_reg_state *next_reg =get_kfunc_arg_reg (env, argno +1 ); + +if (next_reg && + (is_kfunc_arg_mem_size (meta->btf, &args[argno +1 ], next_reg) || +is_kfunc_arg_const_mem_size (meta->btf, &args[argno +1 ], next_reg))) + arg_mem_size = true; + }/* In this function, we verify the kfunc's BTF as per the argument type, * leaving the rest of the verification with respect to the register
@@ -12358,9 +12385,9 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta->func_proto +1 ); nargs =btf_type_vlen (meta->func_proto); -if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) { +if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS ) {verbose (env,"Function %s has %d > %d args\n" , func_name, nargs, -MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ); +MAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS );return -EINVAL ; }if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS && !bpf_jit_supports_stack_args ()) {
@@ -12373,20 +12400,44 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_* verifier sees. */ for (i =0 ; i < nargs; i++) { -struct bpf_reg_state *regs =cur_regs (env), *reg = ®s[i +1 ]; +struct bpf_reg_state *regs =cur_regs (env), *reg;const struct btf_type *t, *ref_t, *resolve_ret;enum bpf_arg_type arg_type =ARG_DONTCARE ;u32 argno =make_argno (i); -u32 regno = i +1 , ref_id, type_size; +struct bpf_reg_state tmp_reg; +int regno = i +1 ; +u32 ref_id, type_size;bool is_ret_buf_sz = false;int kf_arg_type; +if (i <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) { + reg = ®s[i +1 ]; + }else { +/* Retrieve the reg state from the outgoing stack arg slot. */ +struct bpf_func_state *caller =cur_func (env); +int spi =out_arg_spi (caller, i -MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ); + +if (!is_stack_arg_slot_initialized (caller, spi)) { +verbose (env,"stack %s not properly initialized\n" , +reg_arg_name (env, argno)); +return -EINVAL ; + } + + tmp_reg = caller->stack_arg_regs[spi]; + reg = &tmp_reg; + regno =-1 ; + } +if (is_kfunc_arg_prog_aux (btf, &args[i])) {/* Reject repeated use bpf_prog_aux */ if (meta->arg_prog) {verifier_bug (env,"Only 1 prog->aux argument supported per-kfunc" );return -EFAULT ; } +if (regno <0 ) { +verbose (env,"%s prog->aux cannot be a stack argument\n" ,reg_arg_name (env, argno)); +return -EINVAL ; + } meta->arg_prog = true;cur_aux (env)->arg_prog = regno;continue ;
@@ -12413,9 +12464,13 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ reg_arg_name(env, argno));return -EINVAL ; } - ret =mark_chain_precision (env, regno); -if (ret <0 ) -return ret; +if (regno <0 ) { + reg->precise = true; + }else { + ret =mark_chain_precision (env, regno); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; + } meta->arg_constant.found = true; meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value; }else if (is_kfunc_arg_scalar_with_name (btf, &args[i],"rdonly_buf_size" )) {
@@ -12438,9 +12493,13 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ } meta->r0_size = reg->var_off.value; - ret =mark_chain_precision (env, regno); -if (ret) -return ret; +if (regno <0 ) { + reg->precise = true; + }else { + ret =mark_chain_precision (env, regno); +if (ret) +return ret; + } }continue ; }
@@ -12466,8 +12525,13 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_return -EFAULT ; } meta->ref_obj_id = reg->ref_obj_id; -if (is_kfunc_release (meta)) +if (is_kfunc_release (meta)) { +if (regno <0 ) { +verbose (env,"%s release arg cannot be a stack argument\n" ,reg_arg_name (env, argno)); +return -EINVAL ; + } meta->release_regno = regno; + } } ref_t =btf_type_skip_modifiers (btf, t->type, &ref_id);
@@ -12626,6 +12690,10 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ dynptr_arg_type |=DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE ; }else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_file_discard]) { dynptr_arg_type |=DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE ; +if (regno <0 ) { +verbose (env,"%s release arg cannot be a stack argument\n" ,reg_arg_name (env, argno)); +return -EINVAL ; + } meta->release_regno = regno; }else if (meta->func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_clone] && (dynptr_arg_type &MEM_UNINIT )) {
@@ -12780,9 +12848,9 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_break ;case KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE : { -struct bpf_reg_state *buff_reg = ®s[regno]; +struct bpf_reg_state *buff_reg = reg;const struct btf_param *buff_arg = &args[i]; -struct bpf_reg_state *size_reg = ®s[regno +1 ]; +struct bpf_reg_state *size_reg =get_kfunc_arg_reg (env, i +1 );const struct btf_param *size_arg = &args[i +1 ];if (!bpf_register_is_null (buff_reg) || !is_kfunc_arg_nullable (meta->btf, buff_arg)) {
@@ -13686,7 +13754,7 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn, nargs =btf_type_vlen (meta.func_proto); args = (const struct btf_param *)(meta.func_proto +1 ); -for (i =0 ; i < nargs; i++) { +for (i =0 ; i <min_t (int, nargs,MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ); i++) {u32 regno = i +1 ; t =btf_type_skip_modifiers (desc_btf, args[i].type,NULL );
@@ -13697,6 +13765,17 @@ static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,mark_btf_func_reg_size (env, regno, t->size); } +/* Track outgoing stack arg depth for kfuncs with >5 args */ +if (nargs >MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) { +struct bpf_func_state *caller =cur_func (env); +struct bpf_subprog_info *caller_info = &env->subprog_info[caller->subprogno]; +u16 kfunc_stack_arg_depth = (nargs -MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) *BPF_REG_SIZE ; + +if (kfunc_stack_arg_depth > caller_info->outgoing_stack_arg_depth) + caller_info->outgoing_stack_arg_depth = kfunc_stack_arg_depth; +invalidate_outgoing_stack_args (caller); + } +if (bpf_is_iter_next_kfunc (&meta)) { err =process_iter_next_call (env, insn_idx, &meta);if (err)
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 12/17] bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls
Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s): - [Critical] Loss of precision tracking for scalar stack arguments due to modifying a local copy (`tmp_reg`). - [Critical] Bypassing…
Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s):
- [Critical] Loss of precision tracking for scalar stack arguments due to modifying a local copy (tmp_reg).
- [Critical] Bypassing mark_chain_precision for stack arguments breaks data-flow backtracking, enabling unsafe state pruning. --
commit 96adcc4832214af51212820f2056565abaf42a32
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls
Extend the stack argument mechanism to kfunc calls, allowing kfuncs with more than 5 parameters to receive additional arguments via the r11-based stack arg area.
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0@@ -7314,8 +7322,12 @@ static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } err =check_helper_mem_access (env, mem_reg, mem_argno, size_reg->umax_value, access_type, zero_size_allowed, meta);
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 7332
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +6
-2-if (!err && !is_stack_argno (size_argno)) - err =mark_chain_precision (env, size_argno); +if (!err) { +if (is_stack_argno (size_argno)) + size_reg->precise = true; +else + err =mark_chain_precision (env, size_argno); + }return err; }
Does setting size_reg->precise = true without calling mark_chain_precision() break data-flow backtracking?
If only the current state's flag is set, parent states and the source registers that populated the stack argument will not be marked precise. Could this lead to the verifier incorrectly pruning states if execution paths merge before the stack store?
[ ... ]
Quoted 1 line
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0@@ -12373,20 +12400,44 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_
[ ... ]
Quoted 17 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0if (i <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ) { reg = ®s[i +1 ]; }else {/* Retrieve the reg state from the outgoing stack arg slot. */ struct bpf_func_state *caller =cur_func (env);int spi =out_arg_spi (caller, i -MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS );if (!is_stack_arg_slot_initialized (caller, spi)) {verbose (env,"stack %s not properly initialized\n" ,reg_arg_name (env, argno));return -EINVAL ; } tmp_reg = caller->stack_arg_regs[spi]; reg = &tmp_reg; regno =-1 ; }
[ ... ]
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-2@@ -12413,9 +12464,13 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ reg_arg_name(env, argno));return -EINVAL ; } - ret =mark_chain_precision (env, regno); -if (ret <0 )
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ · line 12475
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7
-1-return ret; +if (regno <0 ) { + reg->precise = true; + }else { + ret =mark_chain_precision (env, regno); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; + } meta->arg_constant.found = true; meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value;
Does setting reg->precise = true here modify a local copy instead of the actual verifier state?
Since reg points to tmp_reg for stack arguments:
tmp_reg = caller->stack_arg_regs[spi];
reg = &tmp_reg;it seems that reg->precise = true will only update the block-scoped tmp_reg, leaving the real state in caller->stack_arg_regs[spi] untouched. Could this cause the verifier to lose track of precision requirements for scalar constraints?
Additionally, similar to check_mem_size_reg() above, bypassing mark_chain_precision() for stack arguments appears to skip backtracking entirely.
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=12
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 12/17] bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls
Quoted 36 lines · On 4/19/26 10:08 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s):
- [Critical] Loss of precision tracking for scalar stack arguments due to modifying a local copy (tmp_reg).
- [Critical] Bypassingmark_chain_precisionfor stack arguments breaks data-flow backtracking, enabling unsafe state pruning. --commit
96adcc4832214af51212820f2056565abaf42a32
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls
Extend the stack argument mechanism to kfunc calls, allowing kfuncs with more than 5 parameters to receive additional arguments via the r11-based stack arg area.
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0@@ -7314,8 +7322,12 @@ static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } err =check_helper_mem_access (env, mem_reg, mem_argno, size_reg->umax_value, access_type, zero_size_allowed, meta);kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 7332
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +6
-2-if (!err && !is_stack_argno (size_argno)) - err =mark_chain_precision (env, size_argno); +if (!err) { +if (is_stack_argno (size_argno)) + size_reg->precise = true; +else + err =mark_chain_precision (env, size_argno); + }return err; }Does setting
size_reg->precise= true without callingmark_chain_precision()break data-flow backtracking?
Quoted 4 lines
If only the current state's flag is set, parent states and the source registers that populated the stack argument will not be marked precise. Could this lead to the verifier incorrectly pruning states if execution paths merge before the stack store?
You are right. Let me think how to resolve this.
Quoted 43 lines
[ ... ]
Quoted 1 line
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0@@ -12373,20 +12400,44 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_[ ... ]
Quoted 17 lines
if (i < MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS) { reg = ®s[i + 1]; } else { /* Retrieve the reg state from the outgoing stack arg slot. */ struct bpf_func_state *caller = cur_func(env); int spi = out_arg_spi(caller, i - MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS); if (!is_stack_arg_slot_initialized(caller, spi)) { verbose(env, "stack %s not properly initialized\n", reg_arg_name(env, argno)); return -EINVAL; } tmp_reg = caller->stack_arg_regs[spi]; reg = &tmp_reg; regno = -1; }[ ... ]
Quoted 6 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-2@@ -12413,9 +12464,13 @@ static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ reg_arg_name(env, argno));return -EINVAL ; } - ret =mark_chain_precision (env, regno); -if (ret <0 )kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_kfunc_call_ · line 12475
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7
-1-return ret; +if (regno <0 ) { + reg->precise = true; + }else { + ret =mark_chain_precision (env, regno); +if (ret <0 ) +return ret; + } meta->arg_constant.found = true; meta->arg_constant.value = reg->var_off.value;Does setting
reg->precise= true here modify a local copy instead of the actual verifier state?Since reg points to
tmp_regfor stack arguments:
Quoted 7 lines
tmp_reg = caller->stack_arg_regs[spi]; reg = &tmp_reg;it seems that
reg->precise= true will only update the block-scopedtmp_reg, leaving the real state in caller->stack_arg_regs[spi] untouched. Could this cause the verifier to lose track of precision requirements for scalar constraints?
Right, tmp_reg is not used. I guess my previous usage of tmp_reg due to an early hack but I didn't remove it. Will remove tmp_reg in the next revision.
Quoted 4 lines
Additionally, similar to
check_mem_size_reg()above, bypassingmark_chain_precision()for stack arguments appears to skip backtracking entirely.
Ack.
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 13/17 bpf: Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable
In reply to Yonghong SongTailcalls have been deprecated. So reject stack arguments if tail call is in the way.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +15 -1
@@ -5519,6 +5519,11 @@ struct bpf_subprog_call_depth_info {int frame;/* # of consecutive static call stack frames on top of stack */ }; +static bool subprog_has_stack_args (const struct bpf_subprog_info *si) +{ +return si->incoming_stack_arg_depth || si->outgoing_stack_arg_depth; +} +/* starting from main bpf function walk all instructions of the function * and recursively walk all callees that given function can call. * Ignore jump and exit insns.
@@ -5672,14 +5677,23 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,* this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls */ -if (tail_call_reachable) +if (tail_call_reachable) {for (tmp = idx; tmp >=0 ; tmp = dinfo[tmp].caller) {if (subprog[tmp].is_exception_cb) {verbose (env,"cannot tail call within exception cb\n" );return -EINVAL ; } +if (subprog_has_stack_args (&subprog[tmp])) { +verbose (env,"tail_calls are not allowed in programs with stack args\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } subprog[tmp].tail_call_reachable = true; } + }else if (!idx && subprog[0 ].has_tail_call &&subprog_has_stack_args (&subprog[0 ])) { +verbose (env,"tail_calls are not allowed in programs with stack args\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (subprog[0 ].tail_call_reachable) env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true;
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 13/17] bpf: Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s): - [High] The verifier incorrectly rejects perfectly valid subprograms with stack arguments due to an order-dependent state leak of `tail_call_reachable`…
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [High] The verifier incorrectly rejects perfectly valid subprograms with stack arguments due to an order-dependent state leak of tail_call_reachable during the call graph traversal. --
commit 2677e39a30cc9fcf44cadb1927d1362ad39f7b4e
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
bpf: Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable
This commit deprecates tailcalls in the presence of stack arguments, rejecting subprograms with stack arguments if a tail call is reachable.
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-1@@ -5672,14 +5677,23 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,* this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls */ -if (tail_call_reachable)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, · line 5689
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5
-0+if (tail_call_reachable) {for (tmp = idx; tmp >=0 ; tmp = dinfo[tmp].caller) {if (subprog[tmp].is_exception_cb) {verbose (env,"cannot tail call within exception cb\n" );return -EINVAL ; } +if (subprog_has_stack_args (&subprog[tmp])) { +verbose (env,"tail_calls are not allowed in programs with stack args\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }
Can this leak the tail_call_reachable state across disjoint call graph branches?
In check_max_stack_depth_subprog(), tail_call_reachable is a local variable that seems to act as an accumulator. If the main program first calls subprogram A (which has a tail call) and subsequently calls subprogram B (which has stack arguments but no tail call), tail_call_reachable remains true while traversing B.
When the traversal finishes subprogram B, this newly added check evaluates the current call stack (main -> B). Since tail_call_reachable leaked from the main -> A traversal, and subprogram B has stack arguments, the check would falsely reject the program.
Conversely, if the bytecode is ordered so that B is called before A, tail_call_reachable would be false while traversing B, allowing the program to load successfully.
Does this introduce an unpredictable, order-dependent functional regression?
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5
-0subprog[tmp].tail_call_reachable = true; } + }else if (!idx && subprog[0 ].has_tail_call &&subprog_has_stack_args (&subprog[0 ])) { +verbose (env,"tail_calls are not allowed in programs with stack args\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (subprog[0 ].tail_call_reachable) env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true;
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=13
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 13/17] bpf: Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable
Quoted 18 lines · On 4/19/26 10:08 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [High] The verifier incorrectly rejects perfectly valid subprograms with stack arguments due to an order-dependent state leak oftail_call_reachableduring the call graph traversal. --commit
2677e39a30cc9fcf44cadb1927d1362ad39f7b4e
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>bpf: Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable
This commit deprecates tailcalls in the presence of stack arguments, rejecting subprograms with stack arguments if a tail call is reachable.
Quoted 4 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0
-1@@ -5672,14 +5677,23 @@ static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx,* this info will be utilized by JIT so that we will be preserving the * tail call counter throughout bpf2bpf calls combined with tailcalls */ -if (tail_call_reachable)kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_max_stack_depth_subprog(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, · line 5689
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5
-0+if (tail_call_reachable) {for (tmp = idx; tmp >=0 ; tmp = dinfo[tmp].caller) {if (subprog[tmp].is_exception_cb) {verbose (env,"cannot tail call within exception cb\n" );return -EINVAL ; } +if (subprog_has_stack_args (&subprog[tmp])) { +verbose (env,"tail_calls are not allowed in programs with stack args\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + }Can this leak the
tail_call_reachablestate across disjoint call graph branches?
I guess this is a known issue such that tail_call_reachable is marked more than necessar. Since this has been mentioned a couple of times. I will fix it in the next revision.
Quoted 27 lines
In
check_max_stack_depth_subprog(),tail_call_reachableis a local variable that seems to act as an accumulator. If the main program first calls subprogram A (which has a tail call) and subsequently calls subprogram B (which has stack arguments but no tail call),tail_call_reachableremains true while traversing B.When the traversal finishes subprogram B, this newly added check evaluates the current call stack (main -> B). Since
tail_call_reachableleaked from the main -> A traversal, and subprogram B has stack arguments, the check would falsely reject the program.Conversely, if the bytecode is ordered so that B is called before A,
tail_call_reachablewould be false while traversing B, allowing the program to load successfully.Does this introduce an unpredictable, order-dependent functional regression?
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5
-0subprog[tmp].tail_call_reachable = true; } + }else if (!idx && subprog[0 ].has_tail_call &&subprog_has_stack_args (&subprog[0 ])) { +verbose (env,"tail_calls are not allowed in programs with stack args\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; + } +if (subprog[0 ].tail_call_reachable) env->prog->aux->tail_call_reachable = true;
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 14/17 bpf,x86: Implement JIT support for stack arguments
In reply to Yonghong SongAdd x86_64 JIT support for BPF functions and kfuncs with more than 5 arguments. The extra arguments are passed through a stack area addressed by register r11 (BPF_REG_PARAMS) in BPF bytecode, which the JIT translates to native code.
The JIT follows the x86-64 calling convention for both BPF-to-BPF and kfunc calls:
- Arg 6 is passed in the R9 register
- Args 7+ are passed on the stack
Incoming arg 6 (BPF r11+8) is translated to a MOV from R9 rather than a memory load. Incoming args 7+ (BPF r11+16, r11+24, ...) map directly to [rbp + 16], [rbp + 24], ..., matching the x86-64 stack layout after CALL + PUSH RBP, so no offset adjustment is needed.
The verifier guarantees that neither tail_call_reachable nor priv_stack is set when stack args exist, so R9 is always available. When BPF bytecode writes to the arg-6 stack slot (offset -8), the JIT emits a MOV into R9 instead of a memory store. Outgoing args 7+ are placed at [rsp] in a pre-allocated area below callee-saved registers, using:
native_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - bpf_off - 16
The native x86_64 stack layout with stack arguments:
high address
+-------------------------+ | incoming stack arg N | [rbp + 16 + (N-7)*8] (from caller) | ... | | incoming stack arg 7 | [rbp + 16] +-------------------------+ | return address | [rbp + 8] | saved rbp | [rbp] +-------------------------+ | BPF program stack | (round_up(stack_depth, 8) bytes) +-------------------------+ | callee-saved regs | (r12, rbx, r13, r14, r15 as needed) +-------------------------+ | outgoing arg M | [rsp + (M-7)*8] | ... | | outgoing arg 7 | [rsp] +-------------------------+ rsp
low address
--- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 154 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 148 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +148 -6
@@ -390,6 +390,34 @@ static void pop_callee_regs(u8 **pprog, bool *callee_regs_used) *pprog = prog; } +/* add rsp, depth */ +static void emit_add_rsp (u8 **pprog,u16 depth) +{ +u8 *prog = *pprog; + +if (!depth) +return ; +if (is_imm8 (depth)) +EMIT4 (0x48 ,0x83 ,0xC4 , depth);/* add rsp, imm8 */ +else +EMIT3_off32 (0x48 ,0x81 ,0xC4 , depth);/* add rsp, imm32 */ + *pprog = prog; +} + +/* sub rsp, depth */ +static void emit_sub_rsp (u8 **pprog,u16 depth) +{ +u8 *prog = *pprog; + +if (!depth) +return ; +if (is_imm8 (depth)) +EMIT4 (0x48 ,0x83 ,0xEC , depth);/* sub rsp, imm8 */ +else +EMIT3_off32 (0x48 ,0x81 ,0xEC , depth);/* sub rsp, imm32 */ + *pprog = prog; +} +static void emit_nops (u8 **pprog,int len) {u8 *prog = *pprog;
@@ -1664,16 +1692,45 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *int i, excnt =0 ;int ilen, proglen =0 ;u8 *ip, *prog = temp; +u16 stack_arg_depth, incoming_stack_arg_depth, outgoing_stack_arg_depth; +u16 outgoing_rsp;u32 stack_depth; +int callee_saved_size; +s32 outgoing_arg_base;int err; stack_depth = bpf_prog->aux->stack_depth; + stack_arg_depth = bpf_prog->aux->stack_arg_depth; + incoming_stack_arg_depth = bpf_prog->aux->incoming_stack_arg_depth; + outgoing_stack_arg_depth = stack_arg_depth - incoming_stack_arg_depth; priv_stack_ptr = bpf_prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr;if (priv_stack_ptr) { priv_frame_ptr = priv_stack_ptr +PRIV_STACK_GUARD_SZ +round_up (stack_depth,8 ); stack_depth =0 ; } +/* +* Follow x86-64 calling convention for both BPF-to-BPF and +* kfunc calls: +* - Arg 6 is passed in R9 register +* - Args 7+ are passed on the stack at [rsp] +* +* Incoming arg 6 is read from R9 (BPF r11+8 → MOV from R9). +* Incoming args 7+ are read from [rbp + 16], [rbp + 24], ... +* (BPF r11+16, r11+24, ... map directly with no offset change). +* +* The verifier guarantees that neither tail_call_reachable nor +* priv_stack is set when outgoing stack args exist, so R9 is +* always available. +* +* Stack layout (high to low): +* [rbp + 16 + ...] incoming stack args 7+ (from caller) +* [rbp + 8] return address +* [rbp] saved rbp +* [rbp - prog_stack] program stack +* [below] callee-saved regs +* [below] outgoing args 7+ (= rsp) +*/ arena_vm_start =bpf_arena_get_kern_vm_start (bpf_prog->aux->arena); user_vm_start =bpf_arena_get_user_vm_start (bpf_prog->aux->arena);
@@ -1700,6 +1757,42 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *push_r12 (&prog);push_callee_regs (&prog, callee_regs_used); } + +/* Compute callee-saved register area size. */ + callee_saved_size =0 ; +if (bpf_prog->aux->exception_boundary || arena_vm_start) + callee_saved_size +=8 ;/* r12 */ +if (bpf_prog->aux->exception_boundary) { + callee_saved_size +=4 *8 ;/* rbx, r13, r14, r15 */ + }else { +int j; + +for (j =0 ; j <4 ; j++) +if (callee_regs_used[j]) + callee_saved_size +=8 ; + } +/* +* Base offset from rbp for translating BPF outgoing args 7+ +* to native offsets. BPF uses negative offsets from r11 +* (r11-8 for arg6, r11-16 for arg7, ...) while x86 uses +* positive offsets from rsp ([rsp+0] for arg7, [rsp+8] for +* arg8, ...). Arg 6 goes to R9 directly. +* +* The translation reverses direction: +* native_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - bpf_off - 16 +* +* Note that tail_call_reachable is guaranteed to be false when +* stack args exist, so tcc pushes need not be accounted for. +*/ + outgoing_arg_base = -(round_up (stack_depth,8 ) + callee_saved_size); + +/* +* Allocate outgoing stack arg area for args 7+ only. +* Arg 6 goes into r9 register, not on stack. +*/ + outgoing_rsp = outgoing_stack_arg_depth >8 ? outgoing_stack_arg_depth -8 :0 ; +emit_sub_rsp (&prog, outgoing_rsp); +if (arena_vm_start)emit_mov_imm64 (&prog,X86_REG_R12 , arena_vm_start >>32 , (u32 ) arena_vm_start);
@@ -1721,7 +1814,7 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *u8 b2 =0 , b3 =0 ;u8 *start_of_ldx;s64 jmp_offset; -s16 insn_off; +s32 insn_off;u8 jmp_cond;u8 *func;int nops;
@@ -2134,12 +2227,26 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *EMIT1 (0xC7 ); goto st;case BPF_ST |BPF_MEM |BPF_DW : +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS && insn->off ==-8 ) { +/* Arg 6: store immediate in r9 register */ +emit_mov_imm64 (&prog,X86_REG_R9 , imm32 >>31 , (u32 )imm32); +break ; + }EMIT2 (add_1mod (0x48 , dst_reg),0xC7 ); -st:if (is_imm8 (insn->off)) -EMIT2 (add_1reg (0x40 , dst_reg), insn->off); +st: insn_off = insn->off; +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS ) { +/* Args 7+: reverse BPF negative offsets to +* x86 positive rsp offsets. +* BPF off=-16 → [rsp+0], off=-24 → [rsp+8], ... +*/ + insn_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - insn_off -16 ; + dst_reg =BPF_REG_FP ; + } +if (is_imm8 (insn_off)) +EMIT2 (add_1reg (0x40 , dst_reg), insn_off);else -EMIT1_off32 (add_1reg (0x80 , dst_reg), insn->off); +EMIT1_off32 (add_1reg (0x80 , dst_reg), insn_off);EMIT (imm32,bpf_size_to_x86_bytes (BPF_SIZE (insn->code)));break ;
@@ -2149,7 +2256,17 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off))case BPF_STX |BPF_MEM |BPF_H :case BPF_STX |BPF_MEM |BPF_W :case BPF_STX |BPF_MEM |BPF_DW : -emit_stx (&prog,BPF_SIZE (insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, insn->off); +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS && insn->off ==-8 ) { +/* Arg 6: store register value in r9 */ +EMIT_mov (X86_REG_R9 , src_reg); +break ; + } + insn_off = insn->off; +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS ) { + insn_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - insn_off -16 ; + dst_reg =BPF_REG_FP ; + } +emit_stx (&prog,BPF_SIZE (insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, insn_off);break ;case BPF_ST |BPF_PROBE_MEM32 |BPF_B :
@@ -2248,6 +2365,19 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off))case BPF_LDX |BPF_PROBE_MEMSX |BPF_H :case BPF_LDX |BPF_PROBE_MEMSX |BPF_W : insn_off = insn->off; +if (src_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS ) { +if (insn_off ==8 ) { +/* Incoming arg 6: read from r9 */ +EMIT_mov (dst_reg,X86_REG_R9 ); +break ; + } + src_reg =BPF_REG_FP ; +/* +* Incoming args 7+: native_off == bpf_off +* (r11+16 → [rbp+16], r11+24 → [rbp+24], ...) +* No offset adjustment needed. +*/ + }if (BPF_MODE (insn->code) ==BPF_PROBE_MEM ||BPF_MODE (insn->code) ==BPF_PROBE_MEMSX ) {
@@ -2736,6 +2866,8 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off))if (emit_spectre_bhb_barrier (&prog, ip, bpf_prog))return -EINVAL ; } +/* Deallocate outgoing args 7+ area. */ +emit_add_rsp (&prog, outgoing_rsp);if (bpf_prog->aux->exception_boundary) {pop_callee_regs (&prog, all_callee_regs_used);pop_r12 (&prog);
@@ -3743,7 +3875,12 @@ struct bpf_prog *bpf_int_jit_compile(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_pr prog->aux->jit_data = jit_data; } priv_stack_ptr = prog->aux->priv_stack_ptr; -if (!priv_stack_ptr && prog->aux->jits_use_priv_stack) { +/* +* x86-64 uses R9 for both private stack frame pointer and arg 6, +* so disable private stack when stack args are present. +*/ +if (!priv_stack_ptr && prog->aux->jits_use_priv_stack && + prog->aux->stack_arg_depth ==0 ) {/* Allocate actual private stack size with verifier-calculated * stack size plus two memory guards to protect overflow and * underflow.
@@ -3910,6 +4047,11 @@ bool bpf_jit_supports_kfunc_call(void)return true; } +bool bpf_jit_supports_stack_args (void ) +{ +return true; +} +void *bpf_arch_text_copy (void *dst,void *src,size_t len) {if (text_poke_copy (dst, src, len) ==NULL )
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 14/17] bpf,x86: Implement JIT support for stack arguments
Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s): - [Critical] Incoming Arg 6 mapped to volatile R9 is clobbered by calls, causing verifier type confusion. - [Critical] Sub-register BPF_LDX from…
Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s):
- [Critical] Incoming Arg 6 mapped to volatile R9 is clobbered by calls, causing verifier type confusion.
- [Critical] Sub-register BPF_LDX from incoming Arg 6 incorrectly copies the full 64-bit R9 register, breaking verifier bounds tracking.
- [High] BPF_ST instructions for outgoing Arg 6 miss size checks, causing out-of-bounds stack corruption and uninitialized arguments.
- [High] Sub-register BPF_STX to outgoing Arg 6 overwrites the entire 64-bit R9 register.
--
commit 16df4bd097c0d6a600a22bdb40ebfc360ece0fc6
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
bpf,x86: Implement JIT support for stack arguments
This commit adds x86_64 JIT support for BPF functions with more than 5 arguments. The extra arguments are passed through a stack area addressed by register r11 (BPF_REG_PARAMS), mapping Arg 6 to R9 and Args 7+ to the stack.
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +5
-0@@ -2134,12 +2227,26 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *EMIT1 (0xC7 ); goto st;case BPF_ST |BPF_MEM |BPF_DW : +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS && insn->off ==-8 ) { +/* Arg 6: store immediate in r9 register */ +emit_mov_imm64 (&prog,X86_REG_R9 , imm32 >>31 , (u32 )imm32); +break ; + }EMIT2 (add_1mod (0x48 , dst_reg),0xC7 );
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * · line 2243
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +7
-2-st:if (is_imm8 (insn->off)) -EMIT2 (add_1reg (0x40 , dst_reg), insn->off); +st: insn_off = insn->off; +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS ) { +/* Args 7+: reverse BPF negative offsets to +* x86 positive rsp offsets. +* BPF off=-16 → [rsp+0], off=-24 → [rsp+8], ... +*/ + insn_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - insn_off -16 ;
Does this code handle 32-bit, 16-bit, or 8-bit stores to Arg 6 correctly?
The check for dst_reg == BPF_REG_PARAMS && insn->off == -8 is uniquely placed inside the BPF_ST | BPF_MEM | BPF_DW case block. If a BPF program uses a smaller size store like BPF_W to prepare Arg 6, the code bypasses this check and falls through to the st: label.
At the st: label, the insn_off calculation equates to RSP - 8 relative to RBP, emitting a memory store that corrupts unallocated stack memory. In addition, R9 is never updated, which leaves Arg 6 uninitialized for the callee.
[ ... ]
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c st: if (is_imm8(insn->off)) · line 2264
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +5
-1@@ -2149,7 +2256,17 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off))case BPF_STX |BPF_MEM |BPF_B :case BPF_STX |BPF_MEM |BPF_H :case BPF_STX |BPF_MEM |BPF_W :case BPF_STX |BPF_MEM |BPF_DW : -emit_stx (&prog,BPF_SIZE (insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, insn->off); +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS && insn->off ==-8 ) { +/* Arg 6: store register value in r9 */ +EMIT_mov (X86_REG_R9 , src_reg); +break ; + }
Does this full 64-bit move break semantics for partial writes?
For smaller sizes like BPF_B or BPF_W, EMIT_mov generates a full 64-bit move that copies all 64 bits from src_reg to R9.
BPF semantics dictate that a sub-register store should only modify the specified lower bytes of the target location, leaving the rest unmodified. This full copy could overwrite data previously stored in the upper bytes of Arg 6 via other partial writes.
[ ... ]
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c st: if (is_imm8(insn->off)) · line 2373
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +6
-0@@ -2248,6 +2365,19 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off))case BPF_LDX |BPF_PROBE_MEMSX |BPF_H :case BPF_LDX |BPF_PROBE_MEMSX |BPF_W : insn_off = insn->off; +if (src_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS ) { +if (insn_off ==8 ) { +/* Incoming arg 6: read from r9 */ +EMIT_mov (dst_reg,X86_REG_R9 ); +break ; + }
Can R9 be clobbered by function calls when used for Arg 6?
The verifier treats incoming stack arguments as stable memory preserved across function calls. However, under the x86-64 System V ABI, R9 is a caller-saved (volatile) register.
If a BPF program reads [r11+8] after making a helper, kfunc, or subprog call, it will read the clobbered value left in R9. The verifier will incorrectly track this as the uncorrupted argument, which could cause type confusion.
Additionally, does EMIT_mov(dst_reg, X86_REG_R9) zero-extend sub-register loads?
This generates a full 64-bit register-to-register move regardless of the load size. For smaller loads like BPF_B, BPF semantics require the value to be zero-extended.
Since the entire 64-bit R9 register is copied without zeroing the upper 56 bits, garbage left by the caller in the upper bits will leak into the destination register, breaking the bounds tracked by the verifier.
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=14
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 14/17] bpf,x86: Implement JIT support for stack arguments
Quoted 32 lines · On 4/19/26 10:25 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s):
- [Critical] Incoming Arg 6 mapped to volatile R9 is clobbered by calls, causing verifier type confusion.
- [Critical] Sub-registerBPF_LDXfrom incoming Arg 6 incorrectly copies the full 64-bit R9 register, breaking verifier bounds tracking.
- [High]BPF_STinstructions for outgoing Arg 6 miss size checks, causing out-of-bounds stack corruption and uninitialized arguments.
- [High] Sub-registerBPF_STXto outgoing Arg 6 overwrites the entire 64-bit R9 register.
--commit
16df4bd097c0d6a600a22bdb40ebfc360ece0fc6
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>bpf,x86: Implement JIT support for stack arguments
This commit adds
x86_64JIT support for BPF functions with more than 5 arguments. The extra arguments are passed through a stack area addressed by register r11 (BPF_REG_PARAMS), mapping Arg 6 to R9 and Args 7+ to the stack.Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +5
-0@@ -2134,12 +2227,26 @@ static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int *EMIT1 (0xC7 ); goto st;case BPF_ST |BPF_MEM |BPF_DW : +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS && insn->off ==-8 ) { +/* Arg 6: store immediate in r9 register */ +emit_mov_imm64 (&prog,X86_REG_R9 , imm32 >>31 , (u32 )imm32); +break ; + }EMIT2 (add_1mod (0x48 , dst_reg),0xC7 );
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c static int do_jit(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_prog *bpf_prog, int * · line 2243
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +7
-2-st:if (is_imm8 (insn->off)) -EMIT2 (add_1reg (0x40 , dst_reg), insn->off); +st: insn_off = insn->off; +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS ) { +/* Args 7+: reverse BPF negative offsets to +* x86 positive rsp offsets. +* BPF off=-16 → [rsp+0], off=-24 → [rsp+8], ... +*/ + insn_off = outgoing_arg_base - outgoing_rsp - insn_off -16 ;Does this code handle 32-bit, 16-bit, or 8-bit stores to Arg 6 correctly?
No. Only 64-bit stores are supported. See patch "bpf: Enable r11 based insns".
Quoted 11 lines
The check for
dst_reg==BPF_REG_PARAMS&&insn->off== -8 is uniquely placed inside theBPF_ST|BPF_MEM|BPF_DWcase block. If a BPF program uses a smaller size store likeBPF_Wto prepare Arg 6, the code bypasses this check and falls through to the st: label.At the st: label, the
insn_offcalculation equates to RSP - 8 relative to RBP, emitting a memory store that corrupts unallocated stack memory. In addition, R9 is never updated, which leaves Arg 6 uninitialized for the callee.[ ... ]
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c st: if (is_imm8(insn->off)) · line 2264
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +5
-1@@ -2149,7 +2256,17 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off))case BPF_STX |BPF_MEM |BPF_B :case BPF_STX |BPF_MEM |BPF_H :case BPF_STX |BPF_MEM |BPF_W :case BPF_STX |BPF_MEM |BPF_DW : -emit_stx (&prog,BPF_SIZE (insn->code), dst_reg, src_reg, insn->off); +if (dst_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS && insn->off ==-8 ) { +/* Arg 6: store register value in r9 */ +EMIT_mov (X86_REG_R9 , src_reg); +break ; + }Does this full 64-bit move break semantics for partial writes?
It should be okay. llvm compiler will promote the value to 64bit before r11 based load/store's.
Quoted 10 lines
For smaller sizes like
BPF_BorBPF_W,EMIT_movgenerates a full 64-bit move that copies all 64 bits fromsrc_regto R9.BPF semantics dictate that a sub-register store should only modify the specified lower bytes of the target location, leaving the rest unmodified. This full copy could overwrite data previously stored in the upper bytes of Arg 6 via other partial writes.
[ ... ]
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c st: if (is_imm8(insn->off)) · line 2373
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +6
-0@@ -2248,6 +2365,19 @@ st: if (is_imm8(insn->off))case BPF_LDX |BPF_PROBE_MEMSX |BPF_H :case BPF_LDX |BPF_PROBE_MEMSX |BPF_W : insn_off = insn->off; +if (src_reg ==BPF_REG_PARAMS ) { +if (insn_off ==8 ) { +/* Incoming arg 6: read from r9 */ +EMIT_mov (dst_reg,X86_REG_R9 ); +break ; + }Can R9 be clobbered by function calls when used for Arg 6?
I think yes as you mentioned below for Arg 6 (r9) usage.
Quoted 8 lines
The verifier treats incoming stack arguments as stable memory preserved across function calls. However, under the x86-64 System V ABI, R9 is a caller-saved (volatile) register.
If a BPF program reads [r11+8] after making a helper, kfunc, or subprog call, it will read the clobbered value left in R9. The verifier will incorrectly track this as the uncorrupted argument, which could cause type confusion.
To make things easier, I think verifier can enforce all stack loads must be before stack stores. And all stack loads must be before any function/kfunc calls. The following is an example:
$ cat t.c
int bar1(int, int, int, int, int, int);
int foo(int a, int b, int c, int d, int e, int f) {
int ret;
ret = bar1(a, a, a, b, b, b);
ret += bar1(a, a, a, b, b, f);
return ret;
}$ llvm-objdump -d t.o
t.o: file format elf64-x86-64
Disassembly of section .text:
0000000000000000 <foo>:
0: 55 pushq %rbp
1: 41 57 pushq %r15
3: 41 56 pushq %r14
5: 53 pushq %rbx
6: 50 pushq %rax
7: 44 89 cb movl %r9d, %ebx
a: 89 f5 movl %esi, %ebp
c: 41 89 fe movl %edi, %r14d
f: 89 fe movl %edi, %esi
11: 89 fa movl %edi, %edx
13: 89 e9 movl %ebp, %ecx
15: 41 89 e8 movl %ebp, %r8d
18: 41 89 e9 movl %ebp, %r9d
1b: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x20 <foo+0x20>
20: 41 89 c7 movl %eax, %r15d
23: 44 89 f7 movl %r14d, %edi
26: 44 89 f6 movl %r14d, %esi
29: 44 89 f2 movl %r14d, %edx
2c: 89 e9 movl %ebp, %ecx
2e: 41 89 e8 movl %ebp, %r8d
31: 41 89 d9 movl %ebx, %r9d
34: e8 00 00 00 00 callq 0x39 <foo+0x39>
39: 44 01 f8 addl %r15d, %eax
3c: 48 83 c4 08 addq $0x8, %rsp
40: 5b popq %rbx
41: 41 5e popq %r14
43: 41 5f popq %r15
45: 5d popq %rbp
46: c3 retqfoo()'s argument 'f' is first loaded and saved to an callee saved register:
movl %r9d, %ebx
and after the first bar1(), it did
movl %ebx, %r9d
to push as #6 argument.
So I think we can enforce certain rules (as mentioned in the above) in the verifier.
Quoted 3 lines
Additionally, does
EMIT_mov(dst_reg, X86_REG_R9)zero-extend sub-register loads?
Only 64-bit register-to-register is supported.
Quoted 9 lines
This generates a full 64-bit register-to-register move regardless of the load size. For smaller loads like
BPF_B, BPF semantics require the value to be zero-extended.Since the entire 64-bit R9 register is copied without zeroing the upper 56 bits, garbage left by the caller in the upper bits will leak into the destination register, breaking the bounds tracked by the verifier.
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 15/17 selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF function stack arguments
In reply to Yonghong SongAdd selftests covering stack argument passing for both BPF-to-BPF subprog calls and kfunc calls with more than 5 arguments. All tests are guarded by __BPF_FEATURE_STACK_ARGUMENT and __TARGET_ARCH_x86.
BPF-to-BPF subprog call tests (stack_arg.c):
- Scalar stack args
- Pointer stack args
- Mixed pointer/scalar stack args
- Nested calls
- Dynptr stack arg
- Two callees with different stack arg counts
- Async callback
Kfunc call tests (stack_arg_kfunc.c, with bpf_testmod kfuncs):
- Scalar stack args
- Pointer stack args
- Mixed pointer/scalar stack args
- Dynptr stack arg
- Memory buffer + size pair
- Iterator
- Const string pointer
- Timer pointer
--- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c | 139 ++++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg.c | 254 ++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_kfunc.c | 164 +++++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c | 66 +++++ .../bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h | 20 +- 5 files changed, 642 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_kfunc.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c new file +139 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright (c) 2026 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */ + +#include <test_progs.h> +#include <network_helpers.h> +#include "stack_arg.skel.h" +#include "stack_arg_kfunc.skel.h" + +static void run_subtest (struct bpf_program *prog,int expected) +{ +int err, prog_fd; +LIBBPF_OPTS (bpf_test_run_opts, topts, + .data_in = &pkt_v4, + .data_size_in = sizeof(pkt_v4), + .repeat = 1, + ); + + prog_fd =bpf_program__fd (prog); + err =bpf_prog_test_run_opts (prog_fd, &topts); +ASSERT_OK (err,"test_run" ); +ASSERT_EQ (topts.retval, expected,"retval" ); +} + +static void test_global_many (void ) +{ +struct stack_arg *skel; + + skel =stack_arg__open (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"open" )) +return ; + +if (!skel->rodata->has_stack_arg) { +test__skip (); + goto out; + } + +if (!ASSERT_OK (stack_arg__load (skel),"load" )) + goto out; + +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_global_many_args,36 ); + +out: +stack_arg__destroy (skel); +} + +static void test_async_cb_many (void ) +{ +struct stack_arg *skel; + + skel =stack_arg__open (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"open" )) +return ; + +if (!skel->rodata->has_stack_arg) { +test__skip (); + goto out; + } + +if (!ASSERT_OK (stack_arg__load (skel),"load" )) + goto out; + +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_async_cb_many_args,0 ); + +/* Wait for the timer callback to fire and verify the result. +* 10+20+30+40+50+60+70+80 = 360 +*/ +usleep (50 ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->bss->timer_result,360 ,"timer_result" ); + +out: +stack_arg__destroy (skel); +} + +static void test_bpf2bpf (void ) +{ +struct stack_arg *skel; + + skel =stack_arg__open (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"open" )) +return ; + +if (!skel->rodata->has_stack_arg) { +test__skip (); + goto out; + } + +if (!ASSERT_OK (stack_arg__load (skel),"load" )) + goto out; + +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_bpf2bpf_ptr_stack_arg,45 ); +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_bpf2bpf_mix_stack_args,51 ); +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_bpf2bpf_nesting_stack_arg,50 ); +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_bpf2bpf_dynptr_stack_arg,69 ); +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_two_callees,91 ); + +out: +stack_arg__destroy (skel); +} + +static void test_kfunc (void ) +{ +struct stack_arg_kfunc *skel; + + skel =stack_arg_kfunc__open (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"open" )) +return ; + +if (!skel->rodata->has_stack_arg) { +test__skip (); + goto out; + } + +if (!ASSERT_OK (stack_arg_kfunc__load (skel),"load" )) + goto out; + +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_stack_arg_scalar,36 ); +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_stack_arg_ptr,45 ); +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_stack_arg_mix,51 ); +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_stack_arg_dynptr,69 ); +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_stack_arg_mem,151 ); +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_stack_arg_iter,115 ); +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_stack_arg_const_str,15 ); +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_stack_arg_timer,15 ); + +out: +stack_arg_kfunc__destroy (skel); +} + +void test_stack_arg (void ) +{ +if (test__start_subtest ("global_many_args" )) +test_global_many (); +if (test__start_subtest ("async_cb_many_args" )) +test_async_cb_many (); +if (test__start_subtest ("bpf2bpf" )) +test_bpf2bpf (); +if (test__start_subtest ("kfunc" )) +test_kfunc (); +}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg.c new file +254 -0
254 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_kfunc.c new file +164 -0
164 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c +66 -0
78 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h +19 -1
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ struct prog_test_ref_kfunc { };#endif +struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq ; +struct prog_test_pass1 {int x0;struct {
@@ -111,7 +113,23 @@ int bpf_kfunc_call_test2(struct sock *sk, __u32 a, __u32 b) __ksym;struct sock *bpf_kfunc_call_test3 (struct sock *sk) __ksym; long bpf_kfunc_call_test4(signed char a, short b, int c, long d) __ksym; int bpf_kfunc_call_test5(__u8 a, __u16 b, __u32 c) __ksym; - +__u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg(__u64 a, __u64 b, __u64 c, __u64 d, + __u64 e, __u64 f, __u64 g, __u64 h) __ksym; +__u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_ptr(__u64 a, __u64 b, __u64 c, __u64 d, __u64 e, + struct prog_test_pass1 *p) __ksym; +__u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_mix(__u64 a, __u64 b, __u64 c, __u64 d, __u64 e, + struct prog_test_pass1 *p, __u64 f, + struct prog_test_pass1 *q) __ksym; +__u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_dynptr(__u64 a, __u64 b, __u64 c, __u64 d, __u64 e, + struct bpf_dynptr *ptr) __ksym; +__u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_mem(__u64 a, __u64 b, __u64 c, __u64 d, __u64 e, + void *mem, int mem__sz) __ksym; +__u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_iter(__u64 a, __u64 b, __u64 c, __u64 d, __u64 e, + struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq *it__iter) __ksym; +__u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_const_str(__u64 a, __u64 b, __u64 c, __u64 d, __u64 e, + const char *str__str) __ksym; +__u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_timer(__u64 a, __u64 b, __u64 c, __u64 d, __u64 e, + struct bpf_timer *timer) __ksym; void bpf_kfunc_call_test_pass_ctx(struct __sk_buff *skb) __ksym; void bpf_kfunc_call_test_pass1(struct prog_test_pass1 *p) __ksym; void bpf_kfunc_call_test_pass2(struct prog_test_pass2 *p) __ksym;
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 15/17] selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF function stack arguments
Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s): - [Medium] The `test_async_cb_many` test uses an extremely short `usleep(50)` to wait for a BPF timer callback to execute, leading to potential…
Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s):
- [Medium] The test_async_cb_many test uses an extremely short usleep(50) to wait for a BPF timer callback to execute, leading to potential flakiness.
- [Low] The block comment for global_two_callees incorrectly refers to the function as bar.
- [Low] The bpf_iter_testmod_seq_next kfunc is incorrectly declared with an int * return type in stack_arg_kfunc.c.
--
commit 63c1c9ef99d02448833e84a39ecb212ccaaf5b80
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF function stack arguments
This commit adds selftests covering stack argument passing for both BPF-to-BPF subprog calls and kfunc calls with more than 5 arguments.
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c new file +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 13 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c new file +13
-0+static void test_async_cb_many (void ) +{ +struct stack_arg *skel; + + skel =stack_arg__open (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"open" )) +return ; + +if (!skel->rodata->has_stack_arg) { +test__skip (); + goto out; + } +
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c line 68
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c new file +10
-0+if (!ASSERT_OK (stack_arg__load (skel),"load" )) + goto out; + +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_async_cb_many_args,0 ); + +/* Wait for the timer callback to fire and verify the result. +* 10+20+30+40+50+60+70+80 = 360 +*/ +usleep (50 ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->bss->timer_result,360 ,"timer_result" );
Is 50 microseconds enough time to reliably wait for the timer callback to execute?
In CI environments or heavily loaded virtualization systems, might the scheduling and softirq execution be delayed by more than a fraction of a millisecond? If the timer does not fire in exactly that short window, the test would incorrectly read a timer_result of 0 and fail.
Would it be more robust to use a polling loop or a significantly larger timeout to avoid flaky tests?
[ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg.c new file +0
-0
[ ... ]
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg.c line 169
Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg.c new file +8
-0+/* bar calls foo1 (3 stack args) and foo2 (5 stack args). +* The outgoing stack arg area is sized for foo2 (the larger callee). +* Stores for foo1 are a subset of the area used by foo2. +* Result: foo1(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8) + foo2(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10) = 36 + 55 = 91 +* +* Pass a-e through so the compiler can't constant-fold the stack args away. +*/ +__noinline int global_two_callees(int a, int b, int c, int d, int e)
This isn't a bug, but the comment refers to a function named bar, while the function being described is actually named global_two_callees.
[ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_kfunc.c new file +0
-0
[ ... ]
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_kfunc.c line 19
Quoted 11 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_kfunc.c new file +11
-0+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) && defined(__BPF_FEATURE_STACK_ARGUMENT) + +const volatile bool has_stack_arg = true; + +struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq { + u64 :64; + u64 :64; +}; + +extern int bpf_iter_testmod_seq_new(struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq *it, s64 value, int cnt) __ksym; +extern int *bpf_iter_testmod_seq_next (struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq *it) __ksym;
Does bpf_iter_testmod_seq_next() actually return an int pointer?
Looking at the corresponding kfunc definition in bpf_testmod.c, the function appears to return an s64 pointer. Although this function isn't actively called in this test file (which prevents a BTF verifier failure here), could the mismatched return type declaration cause confusion or subtle issues in the future?
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=15
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 15/17] selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF function stack arguments
Quoted 47 lines · On 4/19/26 10:15 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s):
- [Medium] Thetest_async_cb_manytest uses an extremely shortusleep(50)to wait for a BPF timer callback to execute, leading to potential flakiness.
- [Low] The block comment forglobal_two_calleesincorrectly refers to the function asbar.
- [Low] Thebpf_iter_testmod_seq_nextkfunc is incorrectly declared with anint *return type instack_arg_kfunc.c.
--commit
63c1c9ef99d02448833e84a39ecb212ccaaf5b80
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF function stack arguments
This commit adds selftests covering stack argument passing for both BPF-to-BPF subprog calls and kfunc calls with more than 5 arguments.
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c new file +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 13 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c new file +13
-0+static void test_async_cb_many (void ) +{ +struct stack_arg *skel; + + skel =stack_arg__open (); +if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR (skel,"open" )) +return ; + +if (!skel->rodata->has_stack_arg) { +test__skip (); + goto out; + } +tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c line 68
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg.c new file +10
-0+if (!ASSERT_OK (stack_arg__load (skel),"load" )) + goto out; + +run_subtest (skel->progs.test_async_cb_many_args,0 ); + +/* Wait for the timer callback to fire and verify the result. +* 10+20+30+40+50+60+70+80 = 360 +*/ +usleep (50 ); +ASSERT_EQ (skel->bss->timer_result,360 ,"timer_result" );Is 50 microseconds enough time to reliably wait for the timer callback to execute?
Quoted 7 lines
In CI environments or heavily loaded virtualization systems, might the scheduling and softirq execution be delayed by more than a fraction of a millisecond? If the timer does not fire in exactly that short window, the test would incorrectly read a
timer_resultof 0 and fail.Would it be more robust to use a polling loop or a significantly larger timeout to avoid flaky tests?
I am using the same 'usleep(50)' in prog_tests/timer.c:
timer__detach(timer_skel);
usleep(50); /* 10 usecs should be enough, but give it extra */
/* check that timer_cb1() was executed 10+10 times */
...So I think 50 us should be okay.
Quoted 10 lines
[ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg.c new file +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 10 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg.c line 169
Quoted 8 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg.c new file +8
-0+/* bar calls foo1 (3 stack args) and foo2 (5 stack args). +* The outgoing stack arg area is sized for foo2 (the larger callee). +* Stores for foo1 are a subset of the area used by foo2. +* Result: foo1(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8) + foo2(1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10) = 36 + 55 = 91 +* +* Pass a-e through so the compiler can't constant-fold the stack args away. +*/ +__noinline int global_two_callees(int a, int b, int c, int d, int e)This isn't a bug, but the comment refers to a function named bar, while the function being described is actually named
global_two_callees.
Thanks. Will fix.
Quoted 10 lines
[ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_kfunc.c new file +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 12 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_kfunc.c line 19
Quoted 11 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_kfunc.c new file +11
-0+#if defined(__TARGET_ARCH_x86) && defined(__BPF_FEATURE_STACK_ARGUMENT) + +const volatile bool has_stack_arg = true; + +struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq { + u64 :64; + u64 :64; +}; + +extern int bpf_iter_testmod_seq_new(struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq *it, s64 value, int cnt) __ksym; +extern int *bpf_iter_testmod_seq_next (struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq *it) __ksym;Does
bpf_iter_testmod_seq_next()actually return an int pointer?
This one
+extern int *bpf_iter_testmod_seq_next(struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq *it) __ksym;
is dead code. Will remove.
Quoted 7 lines
Looking at the corresponding kfunc definition in
bpf_testmod.c, the function appears to return an s64 pointer. Although this function isn't actively called in this test file (which prevents a BTF verifier failure here), could the mismatched return type declaration cause confusion or subtle issues in the future?
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 16/17 selftests/bpf: Add tests for stack argument validation
In reply to Yonghong SongAdd negative tests that verify the kfunc (rejecting kfunc call with >8 byte struct as stack argument) and the verifier (rejecting invalid uses of r11 for stack arguments).
--- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg_fail.c | 10 ++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_fail.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c | 7 + .../bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h | 8 ++ 4 files changed, 149 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg_fail.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_fail.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/stack_arg_fail.c new file +10 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* Copyright (c) 2026 Meta Platforms, Inc. and affiliates. */ + +#include <test_progs.h> +#include "stack_arg_fail.skel.h" + +void test_stack_arg_fail (void ) +{ +RUN_TESTS (stack_arg_fail); +}
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/stack_arg_fail.c new file +124 -0
124 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c +7 -0
@@ -882,6 +882,12 @@ __bpf_kfunc u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_timer(u64 a, u64 b, u64 c, u64 d, u64 ereturn a + b + c + d + e; } +__bpf_kfunc u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_big(u64 a, u64 b, u64 c, u64 d, u64 e, +struct prog_test_big_arg s) +{ +return a + b + c + d + e + s.a + s.b; +} +static struct prog_test_ref_kfunc prog_test_struct = { .a =42 , .b =108 ,
@@ -1353,6 +1359,7 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_mem) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_iter) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_const_str) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_timer) +BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_big) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_pass1) BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_fail1)BTF_ID_FLAGS (func, bpf_kfunc_call_test_mem_len_fail2)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h +8 -0
@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ struct prog_test_pass2 { } x; }; +struct prog_test_big_arg { +__u64 a; +__u64 b; +}; +struct prog_test_fail1 {void *p;int x;
@@ -130,6 +135,9 @@ __u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_const_str(__u64 a, __u64 b, __u64 c, __u64 d, __u const char *str__str) __ksym; __u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_timer(__u64 a, __u64 b, __u64 c, __u64 d, __u64 e, struct bpf_timer *timer) __ksym; +__u64 bpf_kfunc_call_stack_arg_big(__u64 a, __u64 b, __u64 c, __u64 d, __u64 e, + struct prog_test_big_arg s) __ksym; + void bpf_kfunc_call_test_pass_ctx(struct __sk_buff *skb) __ksym; void bpf_kfunc_call_test_pass1(struct prog_test_pass1 *p) __ksym; void bpf_kfunc_call_test_pass2(struct prog_test_pass2 *p) __ksym;
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Yonghong Song
reviewerPATCH v6 17/17 selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for stack argument validation
In reply to Yonghong SongAdd inline-asm based verifier tests that exercise stack argument validation logic directly.
Positive tests:
- subprog call with 6 arg's
- Two sequential calls to different subprogs (6-arg and 7-arg)
- Share a r11 store for both branches
Negative tests — verifier rejection:
- Read from uninitialized incoming stack arg slot
- Gap in outgoing slots: only r11-16 written, r11-8 missing
- Write at r11-80, exceeding max 7 stack args
- Missing store on one branch with a shared store
- First call has proper stack arguments and the second call intends to inherit stack arguments but not working
Negative tests — pointer/ref tracking:
- Pruning type mismatch: one branch stores PTR_TO_STACK, the other stores a scalar, callee dereferences — must not prune
- Release invalidation: bpf_sk_release invalidates a socket pointer stored in a stack arg slot
- Packet pointer invalidation: bpf_skb_pull_data invalidates a packet pointer stored in a stack arg slot
- Null propagation: PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE_OR_NULL stored in stack arg slot, null branch attempts dereference via callee
--- .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c | 2 + .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c | 433 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 435 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/verifier.c +2 -0
@@ -91,6 +91,7 @@#include "verifier_sockmap_mutate.skel.h" #include "verifier_spill_fill.skel.h" #include "verifier_spin_lock.skel.h" +#include "verifier_stack_arg.skel.h" #include "verifier_stack_ptr.skel.h" #include "verifier_store_release.skel.h" #include "verifier_subprog_precision.skel.h"
@@ -238,6 +239,7 @@ void test_verifier_sock_addr(void) { RUN(verifier_sock_addr); }void test_verifier_sockmap_mutate (void ) {RUN (verifier_sockmap_mutate); }void test_verifier_spill_fill (void ) {RUN (verifier_spill_fill); }void test_verifier_spin_lock (void ) {RUN (verifier_spin_lock); } +void test_verifier_stack_arg (void ) {RUN (verifier_stack_arg); }void test_verifier_stack_ptr (void ) {RUN (verifier_stack_ptr); }void test_verifier_store_release (void ) {RUN (verifier_store_release); }void test_verifier_subprog_precision (void ) {RUN (verifier_subprog_precision); }
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c new file +433 -0
433 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
[email protected]
AI reviewRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 17/17] selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for stack argument validation
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s): - [Medium] Test fragility in `subprog_deref_arg6` error matching due to compiler register allocation --
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [Medium] Test fragility in subprog_deref_arg6 error matching due to compiler register allocation --
commit 3936b0a6dea45627278be80c25b20ff18f2821d4
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>
selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for stack argument validation
This commit adds inline-asm based verifier tests to exercise BPF stack argument validation logic directly, including both positive and negative tests for tracking pointers, references, and null propagation.
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c new file +0
-0
[ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c new file +5
-0+__noinline __used +static long subprog_deref_arg6(long a, long b, long c, long d, long e, long *f) +{ +return *f; +}
[ ... ]
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c line 123
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c new file +6
-0+SEC("tc") +__description("stack_arg: pruning with different stack arg types") +__failure +__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ) +__arch_x86_64 +__msg("R1 invalid mem access 'scalar'")
Does this hardcode an assumption about Clang's register allocation?
Since subprog_deref_arg6 is standard C rather than a __naked inline assembly function, the compiler determines which register is used to dereference f. If a future LLVM version chooses a different register, the tests will fail because the verifier error will mention the new register instead of R1.
Could these tests use __regex to match the register dynamically, or be rewritten so subprog_deref_arg6 is a __naked function to guarantee the register choice?
Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c new file +4
-0+__naked void stack_arg_pruning_type_mismatch (void ) +{ + asmvolatile ( + "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"
[ ... ]
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=17
Yonghong Song
reviewerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v6 17/17] selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for stack argument validation
Quoted 27 lines · On 4/19/26 10:21 AM, [email protected] wrote:
Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s):
- [Medium] Test fragility insubprog_deref_arg6error matching due to compiler register allocation --commit
3936b0a6dea45627278be80c25b20ff18f2821d4
Author: Yonghong Song <[email protected]>selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for stack argument validation
This commit adds inline-asm based verifier tests to exercise BPF stack argument validation logic directly, including both positive and negative tests for tracking pointers, references, and null propagation.
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c new file +0
-0[ ... ]
Quoted 5 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c new file +5
-0+__noinline __used +static long subprog_deref_arg6(long a, long b, long c, long d, long e, long *f) +{ +return *f; +}[ ... ]
Quoted 7 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c line 123
Quoted 6 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c new file +6
-0+SEC("tc") +__description("stack_arg: pruning with different stack arg types") +__failure +__flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ) +__arch_x86_64 +__msg("R1 invalid mem access 'scalar'")Does this hardcode an assumption about Clang's register allocation?
Yes, it is possible that clang may pick a different register. So as you suggested, I will use regex like below:
__msg("R{{[0-9]}} invalid mem access 'scalar'")which should fix the issue.
Quoted 17 lines
Since
subprog_deref_arg6is standard C rather than a__nakedinline assembly function, the compiler determines which register is used to dereference f. If a future LLVM version chooses a different register, the tests will fail because the verifier error will mention the new register instead of R1.Could these tests use
__regexto match the register dynamically, or be rewritten sosubprog_deref_arg6is a__nakedfunction to guarantee the register choice?Quoted 4 lines
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_stack_arg.c new file +4
-0+__naked void stack_arg_pruning_type_mismatch (void ) +{ + asmvolatile ( + "call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];"[ ... ]
Quoted 137 lines · Yonghong Song
Currently, bpf function calls and kfunc's are limited by 5 reg-level parameters. For function calls with more than 5 parameters, developers can use always inlining or pass a struct pointer after packing more parameters in that struct although it may have some inconvenience. But there is no workaround for kfunc if more than 5 parameters is needed.
This patch set lifts the 5-argument limit by introducing stack-based argument passing for BPF functions and kfunc's, coordinated with compiler support in LLVM [1]. The compiler emits loads/stores through a new bpf register r11 (
BPF_REG_PARAMS) to pass arguments beyond the 5th, keeping the stack arg area separate from the r10-based program stack. The current maximum number of arguments is capped atMAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS(12), which is sufficient for the vast majority of use cases.All kfunc/bpf-function arguments are caller saved, including stack arguments. For register arguments (r1-r5), the verifier already marks them as clobbered after each call. For stack arguments, the verifier invalidates all outgoing stack arg slots immediately after a call, requiring the compiler to re-store them before any subsequent call. This follows the native calling convention where all function parameters are caller saved.
The
x86_64JIT translates r11-relative accesses to RBP-relative native instructions. Each function's stack allocation is extended by 'max_outgoing' bytes to hold the outgoing arg area below the callee-saved registers. This makes implementation easier as the r10 can be reused for stack argument access. At both BPF-to-BPF and kfunc calls, outgoing args are pushed onto the expected calling convention locations directly. The incoming parameters can directly get the value from caller.To support kfunc stack arguments, before doing any stack arguments, existing codes are refactored/modified to use
bpf_reg_stateas much as possible instead of using regno, and to pass a non-negative argno, encoded to support both registers and stack arguments, as a single variable.Global subprogs with >5 args are not yet supported. Only
x86_64is supported for now.For the rest of patches, patches 1-4 make changes to make it easy for future stack arguments for kfuncs. Patches 5-8 supports bpf-to-bpf stack arguments. Patch 9 rejects interpreter for stack arguments. Patch 10 rejects subprogs if tailcall reachable. Patch 11 adds stack argument support for kfuncs. Patch 12 enables stack arguments for
x86_64and Patch 13 implements thex86_64JIT. Patches 14-16 are some test cases.[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/189060
Note:
- The patch set is on top of the following commit:
eb0d6d97c27cMerge tag 'bpf-fixes' ofgit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf
- This patch set requires latest llvm23 compiler. It is possible that a buildfailure may appear: /home/yhs/work/bpf-next/scripts/mod/modpost.c:59:13: error: variable 'extra_warn' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-global] 59 | static bool extra_warn; | ^ 1 error generated. In this case, the following hack can workaround the build issue: --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ KERNELDOC = $(srctree)/tools/docs/kernel-doc export KERNELDOC KBUILD_USERHOSTCFLAGS := -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes \ - -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -std=gnu11 + -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -std=gnu11 -Wno-unused-but-set-global KBUILD_USERCFLAGS := $(KBUILD_USERHOSTCFLAGS) $(USERCFLAGS) KBUILD_USERLDFLAGS := $(USERLDFLAGS)Changelogs:
v5 -> v6:
- v5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Do stack arguments invalidation after bpf function or kfunc all. This is to following native achitecture calling convention.
- Fix some r11 related issues inconst_fold, liveness and insn checking.
- Fix a few places for precision marking for stack arguments. All these cases have const value and mark them as precise.
- Unconditionally copy some incoming/outgoing stat.
- Fix a missing tailcall case with main prog having tailcall and there is no other subprog's.
- Add and fix tests as suggested in v5.
- Reorder some patches, e.g., preparing stack arguments in bpf functions, disabling JIT, before allowing proper r11 usage.
v4 -> v5:
- v4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Use r11 instead of r12, llvm also updated with r11.
- Change int type 'reg_or_arg' to u32 'argno' where 'argno' encodes to support both bpf registers and stack arguments.
- Track per-state bitmask 'out_stack_arg_mask' for r11 based stores, so at any particular call, it knows what stores are available. This is important since stores may be in different basic block.
- Previously after each call, all store slots are invalidated. This patches disabled such invalidation.
- Ensure r11 reg only appearing in allowed insns. Also avoid r11 for reg tracking purpose.
- Makestack_arg_regsmore similar to regular reg's (structbpf_reg_state*)..
- Reorder r11 based stores from 'arg6:off:-24, arg7:off:-16, arg8:off:-8" to "arg6:off:-8, arg7:off:-16, arg8:off:-24".
- Add a few more tests, including e.g., two callee's with different number of stack arguments, shared r11-stores in different branches, etc.v3 -> v4:
- v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Refactor/Modify codes to make it easier for later kfunc stack argument support
- Invalidate outgoing slots immediately after the call to prevent reuse
- Fix interaction between stack argumentPTR_TO_STACKand dead slot poisoning
- Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable
- Disable private stack if stack argument is used
- Allocate outgoing stack argument region after callee saved registers, and this simplifies the JITed code a lot.
v2 -> v3:
- v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Fix selfteststack_arg_gap_at_minus8().
- Fix a few 'UTF-8' issues.
v1 -> v2:
- v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Addstack_arg_safe()to do pruning for stack arguments.
- Fix an issue withKF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE. Since a faked register is used, added verification log to indicate the start and end of such faked register usage.
- Forx86_64JIT, copying incoming parameter values directly from caller's stack.
- Add test cases with stack arguments e.g. mem, mem+size, dynptr, iter, etc.Yonghong Song (17):
bpf: Remove unused parameter fromcheck_map_kptr_access()
bpf: Refactor to avoid redundant calculation ofbpf_reg_state
bpf: Refactor to handle memory and size together
bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
bpf: Introduce bpf registerBPF_REG_PARAMS
bpf: ReuseMAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGSfor maximum number of arguments
bpf: Support stack arguments for bpf functions
bpf: Reject stack arguments in non-JITed programs
bpf: Track r11 registers inconst_foldand liveness
Quoted 9 lines
bpf: Prepare architecture JIT support for stack arguments
bpf: Enable r11 based insns
bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls
bpf: Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable bpf,x86: Implement JIT support for stack arguments selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF function stack arguments selftests/bpf: Add tests for stack argument validation selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for stack argument validation
This set looks good to me overall:
I added support for arm64 in https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Please incorporate it into your series if you do another version.
Thanks,
Puranjay
Yonghong Song
reviewerQuoted 148 lines · Puranjay Mohan
Quoted 137 lines · Yonghong Song
Currently, bpf function calls and kfunc's are limited by 5 reg-level parameters. For function calls with more than 5 parameters, developers can use always inlining or pass a struct pointer after packing more parameters in that struct although it may have some inconvenience. But there is no workaround for kfunc if more than 5 parameters is needed.
This patch set lifts the 5-argument limit by introducing stack-based argument passing for BPF functions and kfunc's, coordinated with compiler support in LLVM [1]. The compiler emits loads/stores through a new bpf register r11 (
BPF_REG_PARAMS) to pass arguments beyond the 5th, keeping the stack arg area separate from the r10-based program stack. The current maximum number of arguments is capped atMAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS(12), which is sufficient for the vast majority of use cases.All kfunc/bpf-function arguments are caller saved, including stack arguments. For register arguments (r1-r5), the verifier already marks them as clobbered after each call. For stack arguments, the verifier invalidates all outgoing stack arg slots immediately after a call, requiring the compiler to re-store them before any subsequent call. This follows the native calling convention where all function parameters are caller saved.
The
x86_64JIT translates r11-relative accesses to RBP-relative native instructions. Each function's stack allocation is extended by 'max_outgoing' bytes to hold the outgoing arg area below the callee-saved registers. This makes implementation easier as the r10 can be reused for stack argument access. At both BPF-to-BPF and kfunc calls, outgoing args are pushed onto the expected calling convention locations directly. The incoming parameters can directly get the value from caller.To support kfunc stack arguments, before doing any stack arguments, existing codes are refactored/modified to use
bpf_reg_stateas much as possible instead of using regno, and to pass a non-negative argno, encoded to support both registers and stack arguments, as a single variable.Global subprogs with >5 args are not yet supported. Only
x86_64is supported for now.For the rest of patches, patches 1-4 make changes to make it easy for future stack arguments for kfuncs. Patches 5-8 supports bpf-to-bpf stack arguments. Patch 9 rejects interpreter for stack arguments. Patch 10 rejects subprogs if tailcall reachable. Patch 11 adds stack argument support for kfuncs. Patch 12 enables stack arguments for
x86_64and Patch 13 implements thex86_64JIT. Patches 14-16 are some test cases.[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/189060Note:
- The patch set is on top of the following commit:
eb0d6d97c27cMerge tag 'bpf-fixes' ofgit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf
- This patch set requires latest llvm23 compiler. It is possible that a buildfailure may appear: /home/yhs/work/bpf-next/scripts/mod/modpost.c:59:13: error: variable 'extra_warn' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-global] 59 | static bool extra_warn; | ^ 1 error generated. In this case, the following hack can workaround the build issue: --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ KERNELDOC = $(srctree)/tools/docs/kernel-doc export KERNELDOC KBUILD_USERHOSTCFLAGS := -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes \ - -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -std=gnu11 + -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -std=gnu11 -Wno-unused-but-set-global KBUILD_USERCFLAGS := $(KBUILD_USERHOSTCFLAGS) $(USERCFLAGS) KBUILD_USERLDFLAGS := $(USERLDFLAGS)Changelogs:
v5 -> v6:
- v5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Do stack arguments invalidation after bpf function or kfunc all. This is to following native achitecture calling convention.
- Fix some r11 related issues inconst_fold, liveness and insn checking.
- Fix a few places for precision marking for stack arguments. All these cases have const value and mark them as precise.
- Unconditionally copy some incoming/outgoing stat.
- Fix a missing tailcall case with main prog having tailcall and there is no other subprog's.
- Add and fix tests as suggested in v5.
- Reorder some patches, e.g., preparing stack arguments in bpf functions, disabling JIT, before allowing proper r11 usage.
v4 -> v5:
- v4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Use r11 instead of r12, llvm also updated with r11.
- Change int type 'reg_or_arg' to u32 'argno' where 'argno' encodes to support both bpf registers and stack arguments.
- Track per-state bitmask 'out_stack_arg_mask' for r11 based stores, so at any particular call, it knows what stores are available. This is important since stores may be in different basic block.
- Previously after each call, all store slots are invalidated. This patches disabled such invalidation.
- Ensure r11 reg only appearing in allowed insns. Also avoid r11 for reg tracking purpose.
- Makestack_arg_regsmore similar to regular reg's (structbpf_reg_state*)..
- Reorder r11 based stores from 'arg6:off:-24, arg7:off:-16, arg8:off:-8" to "arg6:off:-8, arg7:off:-16, arg8:off:-24".
- Add a few more tests, including e.g., two callee's with different number of stack arguments, shared r11-stores in different branches, etc.v3 -> v4:
- v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Refactor/Modify codes to make it easier for later kfunc stack argument support
- Invalidate outgoing slots immediately after the call to prevent reuse
- Fix interaction between stack argumentPTR_TO_STACKand dead slot poisoning
- Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable
- Disable private stack if stack argument is used
- Allocate outgoing stack argument region after callee saved registers, and this simplifies the JITed code a lot.
v2 -> v3:
- v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Fix selfteststack_arg_gap_at_minus8().
- Fix a few 'UTF-8' issues.
v1 -> v2:
- v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Addstack_arg_safe()to do pruning for stack arguments.
- Fix an issue withKF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE. Since a faked register is used, added verification log to indicate the start and end of such faked register usage.
- Forx86_64JIT, copying incoming parameter values directly from caller's stack.
- Add test cases with stack arguments e.g. mem, mem+size, dynptr, iter, etc.Yonghong Song (17):
bpf: Remove unused parameter fromcheck_map_kptr_access()
bpf: Refactor to avoid redundant calculation ofbpf_reg_state
bpf: Refactor to handle memory and size together
bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
bpf: Introduce bpf registerBPF_REG_PARAMS
bpf: ReuseMAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGSfor maximum number of arguments
bpf: Support stack arguments for bpf functions
bpf: Reject stack arguments in non-JITed programs
bpf: Track r11 registers inconst_foldand livenessQuoted 9 lines
bpf: Prepare architecture JIT support for stack arguments
bpf: Enable r11 based insns
bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls
bpf: Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable bpf,x86: Implement JIT support for stack arguments selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF function stack arguments selftests/bpf: Add tests for stack argument validation selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for stack argument validation
Quoted 6 lines
This set looks good to me overall:
Acked-by Puranjay Mohan <[email protected]>I added support for arm64 in https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Please incorporate it into your series if you do another version.
Thanks, Puranjay! I will send another revision later which adds support for precision backtracking and additional/modified test cases among other things. I won't include your patches in the next revision. Once the patch set is stable enough, I can add your patches. Optionally, the patch set is already large enough, so maybe at some point, after this patch set is merged, you can send your patch set separately.
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks,
Puranjay
Quoted 159 lines · Yonghong Song
Quoted 148 lines · Puranjay Mohan
Quoted 137 lines · Yonghong Song
Currently, bpf function calls and kfunc's are limited by 5 reg-level parameters. For function calls with more than 5 parameters, developers can use always inlining or pass a struct pointer after packing more parameters in that struct although it may have some inconvenience. But there is no workaround for kfunc if more than 5 parameters is needed.
This patch set lifts the 5-argument limit by introducing stack-based argument passing for BPF functions and kfunc's, coordinated with compiler support in LLVM [1]. The compiler emits loads/stores through a new bpf register r11 (
BPF_REG_PARAMS) to pass arguments beyond the 5th, keeping the stack arg area separate from the r10-based program stack. The current maximum number of arguments is capped atMAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGS(12), which is sufficient for the vast majority of use cases.All kfunc/bpf-function arguments are caller saved, including stack arguments. For register arguments (r1-r5), the verifier already marks them as clobbered after each call. For stack arguments, the verifier invalidates all outgoing stack arg slots immediately after a call, requiring the compiler to re-store them before any subsequent call. This follows the native calling convention where all function parameters are caller saved.
The
x86_64JIT translates r11-relative accesses to RBP-relative native instructions. Each function's stack allocation is extended by 'max_outgoing' bytes to hold the outgoing arg area below the callee-saved registers. This makes implementation easier as the r10 can be reused for stack argument access. At both BPF-to-BPF and kfunc calls, outgoing args are pushed onto the expected calling convention locations directly. The incoming parameters can directly get the value from caller.To support kfunc stack arguments, before doing any stack arguments, existing codes are refactored/modified to use
bpf_reg_stateas much as possible instead of using regno, and to pass a non-negative argno, encoded to support both registers and stack arguments, as a single variable.Global subprogs with >5 args are not yet supported. Only
x86_64is supported for now.For the rest of patches, patches 1-4 make changes to make it easy for future stack arguments for kfuncs. Patches 5-8 supports bpf-to-bpf stack arguments. Patch 9 rejects interpreter for stack arguments. Patch 10 rejects subprogs if tailcall reachable. Patch 11 adds stack argument support for kfuncs. Patch 12 enables stack arguments for
x86_64and Patch 13 implements thex86_64JIT. Patches 14-16 are some test cases.[1] https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/pull/189060Note:
- The patch set is on top of the following commit:
eb0d6d97c27cMerge tag 'bpf-fixes' ofgit://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/bpf/bpf
- This patch set requires latest llvm23 compiler. It is possible that a buildfailure may appear: /home/yhs/work/bpf-next/scripts/mod/modpost.c:59:13: error: variable 'extra_warn' set but not used [-Werror,-Wunused-but-set-global] 59 | static bool extra_warn; | ^ 1 error generated. In this case, the following hack can workaround the build issue: --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ KERNELDOC = $(srctree)/tools/docs/kernel-doc export KERNELDOC KBUILD_USERHOSTCFLAGS := -Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes \ - -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -std=gnu11 + -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer -std=gnu11 -Wno-unused-but-set-global KBUILD_USERCFLAGS := $(KBUILD_USERHOSTCFLAGS) $(USERCFLAGS) KBUILD_USERLDFLAGS := $(USERLDFLAGS)Changelogs:
v5 -> v6:
- v5: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Do stack arguments invalidation after bpf function or kfunc all. This is to following native achitecture calling convention.
- Fix some r11 related issues inconst_fold, liveness and insn checking.
- Fix a few places for precision marking for stack arguments. All these cases have const value and mark them as precise.
- Unconditionally copy some incoming/outgoing stat.
- Fix a missing tailcall case with main prog having tailcall and there is no other subprog's.
- Add and fix tests as suggested in v5.
- Reorder some patches, e.g., preparing stack arguments in bpf functions, disabling JIT, before allowing proper r11 usage.
v4 -> v5:
- v4: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Use r11 instead of r12, llvm also updated with r11.
- Change int type 'reg_or_arg' to u32 'argno' where 'argno' encodes to support both bpf registers and stack arguments.
- Track per-state bitmask 'out_stack_arg_mask' for r11 based stores, so at any particular call, it knows what stores are available. This is important since stores may be in different basic block.
- Previously after each call, all store slots are invalidated. This patches disabled such invalidation.
- Ensure r11 reg only appearing in allowed insns. Also avoid r11 for reg tracking purpose.
- Makestack_arg_regsmore similar to regular reg's (structbpf_reg_state*)..
- Reorder r11 based stores from 'arg6:off:-24, arg7:off:-16, arg8:off:-8" to "arg6:off:-8, arg7:off:-16, arg8:off:-24".
- Add a few more tests, including e.g., two callee's with different number of stack arguments, shared r11-stores in different branches, etc.v3 -> v4:
- v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Refactor/Modify codes to make it easier for later kfunc stack argument support
- Invalidate outgoing slots immediately after the call to prevent reuse
- Fix interaction between stack argumentPTR_TO_STACKand dead slot poisoning
- Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable
- Disable private stack if stack argument is used
- Allocate outgoing stack argument region after callee saved registers, and this simplifies the JITed code a lot.
v2 -> v3:
- v2: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Fix selfteststack_arg_gap_at_minus8().
- Fix a few 'UTF-8' issues.
v1 -> v2:
- v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/
- Addstack_arg_safe()to do pruning for stack arguments.
- Fix an issue withKF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM_SIZE. Since a faked register is used, added verification log to indicate the start and end of such faked register usage.
- Forx86_64JIT, copying incoming parameter values directly from caller's stack.
- Add test cases with stack arguments e.g. mem, mem+size, dynptr, iter, etc.Yonghong Song (17):
bpf: Remove unused parameter fromcheck_map_kptr_access()
bpf: Refactor to avoid redundant calculation ofbpf_reg_state
bpf: Refactor to handle memory and size together
bpf: Prepare verifier logs for upcoming kfunc stack arguments
bpf: Introduce bpf registerBPF_REG_PARAMS
bpf: ReuseMAX_BPF_FUNC_ARGSfor maximum number of arguments
bpf: Support stack arguments for bpf functions
bpf: Reject stack arguments in non-JITed programs
bpf: Track r11 registers inconst_foldand livenessQuoted 9 lines
bpf: Prepare architecture JIT support for stack arguments
bpf: Enable r11 based insns
bpf: Support stack arguments for kfunc calls
bpf: Reject stack arguments if tail call reachable bpf,x86: Implement JIT support for stack arguments selftests/bpf: Add tests for BPF function stack arguments selftests/bpf: Add tests for stack argument validation selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for stack argument validationQuoted 6 lines
This set looks good to me overall:
Acked-by Puranjay Mohan <[email protected]>I added support for arm64 in https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Please incorporate it into your series if you do another version.
Quoted 6 lines
Thanks, Puranjay! I will send another revision later which adds support for precision backtracking and additional/modified test cases among other things. I won't include your patches in the next revision. Once the patch set is stable enough, I can add your patches. Optionally, the patch set is already large enough, so maybe at some point, after this patch set is merged, you can send your patch set separately.
Okay, doing it separately is better I guess, I will wait for your patches to land and then resend the arm64 support.
Thanks,
Puranjay
Quoted 4 lines · Puranjay Mohan
Okay, doing it separately is better I guess, I will wait for your patches to land and then resend the arm64 support.
Just combine them into one patchset, so that CI tests it all together.
Yonghong Song
reviewerQuoted 5 lines · Alexei Starovoitov
Quoted 3 lines · Puranjay Mohan
Okay, doing it separately is better I guess, I will wait for your patches to land and then resend the arm64 support.
Just combine them into one patchset, so that CI tests it all together.
Okay, will do.