scan: parse password identifier/exclusive bits
PATCH 1/10 scan: parse password identifier/exclusive bits
These bits are used to communicate to the station that SAE password identifiers are used or required.
--- src/scan.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- src/scan.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
src/scan.c +17 -3
@@ -1404,10 +1404,24 @@ static bool scan_parse_bss_information_elements(struct scan_bss *bss,* Currently only Proxy ARP bit (12) is checked, and if * not found, this is not a fatal error. */ -if (iter.len <2 ) -break ; +if (iter.len >=2 ) + bss->proxy_arp =test_bit (iter.data,12 ); + +/* +* 802.11-2020 Table 9-153 +* +* The spec merely mentions the "exclusive" bit and +* doesn't enforce a requirement to check it anywhere. +* But if set it would indicate the AP will only accept +* auths when a password ID is used so store this in +* order to fail early if no ID is set. +*/ +if (iter.len >=11 ) { + bss->sae_pw_id_used =test_bit (iter.data,81 ); + bss->sae_pw_id_exclusive = +test_bit (iter.data,82 ); + } - bss->proxy_arp =test_bit (iter.data,12 ); } }
src/scan.h +2 -0
@@ -88,6 +88,8 @@ struct scan_bss { uint8_t cost_level : 3; uint8_t cost_flags : 4; bool dpp_configurator : 1; + bool sae_pw_id_used : 1; + bool sae_pw_id_exclusive : 1; };struct scan_parameters {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 2/10 network: pass scan_bss into network_load_psk
For adding SAE password identifiers the capability bits need to be verified when loading the identifier from the profile. Pass the BSS object in to network_load_psk rather than the 'need_passphrase' boolean.
--- src/network.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 30 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
src/network.c +30 -30
@@ -594,8 +594,34 @@ generate:return -EIO ; } -static int network_load_psk (struct network *network,bool need_passphrase) +static inline bool __bss_is_sae (const struct scan_bss *bss, +const struct ie_rsn_info *rsn) { +if (rsn->akm_suites &IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_SAE_SHA256 ) +return true; + +return false; +} + +static bool bss_is_sae (const struct scan_bss *bss) +{ +struct ie_rsn_info rsn; + +memset (&rsn,0 ,sizeof (rsn)); +scan_bss_get_rsn_info (bss, &rsn); + +return __bss_is_sae (bss, &rsn); +} + +static int network_load_psk (struct network *network,struct scan_bss *bss) +{ +/* +* A legacy psk file may only contain the PreSharedKey entry. For SAE +* networks the raw Passphrase is required. So in this case where +* the psk is found but no Passphrase, we ask the agent. The psk file +* will then be re-written to contain the raw passphrase. +*/ +bool is_sae =bss_is_sae (bss);const char *ssid =network_get_ssid (network);enum security security =network_get_security (network);size_t psk_len;
@@ -616,7 +642,7 @@ static int network_load_psk(struct network *network, bool need_passphrase) }/* PSK can be generated from the passphrase but not the other way */ -if (!psk || need_passphrase) { +if (!psk || is_sae) {if (!passphrase)return -ENOKEY ;
@@ -778,25 +804,6 @@ bool network_get_force_default_owe_group(struct network *network)return network->force_default_owe_group; } -static inline bool __bss_is_sae (const struct scan_bss *bss, -const struct ie_rsn_info *rsn) -{ -if (rsn->akm_suites &IE_RSN_AKM_SUITE_SAE_SHA256 ) -return true; - -return false; -} - -static bool bss_is_sae (const struct scan_bss *bss) -{ -struct ie_rsn_info rsn; - -memset (&rsn,0 ,sizeof (rsn)); -scan_bss_get_rsn_info (bss, &rsn); - -return __bss_is_sae (bss, &rsn); -} -int network_can_connect_bss (struct network *network,const struct scan_bss *bss) {struct station *station = network->station;
@@ -959,7 +966,7 @@ int network_autoconnect(struct network *network, struct scan_bss *bss)switch (security) {case SECURITY_PSK : - ret =network_load_psk (network,bss_is_sae (bss)); + ret =network_load_psk (network, bss);if (ret <0 ) goto close_settings;
@@ -1285,20 +1292,13 @@ static struct l_dbus_message *network_connect_psk(struct network *network, struct l_dbus_message *message) {struct station *station = network->station; -/* -* A legacy psk file may only contain the PreSharedKey entry. For SAE -* networks the raw Passphrase is required. So in this case where -* the psk is found but no Passphrase, we ask the agent. The psk file -* will then be re-written to contain the raw passphrase. -*/ -bool need_passphrase =bss_is_sae (bss);if (!network_settings_load (network)) { network->settings =l_settings_new (); network->ask_passphrase = true; }else if (!network->ask_passphrase) network->ask_passphrase = -network_load_psk (network, need_passphrase) <0 ; +network_load_psk (network, bss) <0 ;l_debug ("ask_passphrase: %s" , network->ask_passphrase ?"true" :"false" );
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 3/10 handshake: add password identifier/setter
In reply to James Prestwood--- src/handshake.c | 12 ++++++++++++ src/handshake.h | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+)
src/handshake.c +12 -0
@@ -137,6 +137,12 @@ void handshake_state_free(struct handshake_state *s)l_free (s->passphrase); } +if (s->password_identifier) { +explicit_bzero (s->password_identifier, +strlen (s->password_identifier)); +l_free (s->password_identifier); + } +if (s->ecc_sae_pts) {unsigned int i;
@@ -364,6 +370,12 @@ void handshake_state_set_passphrase(struct handshake_state *s, s->passphrase =l_strdup (passphrase); } +void handshake_state_set_password_identifier (struct handshake_state *s, +const char *id) +{ + s->password_identifier =l_strdup (id); +} +void handshake_state_set_no_rekey (struct handshake_state *s,bool no_rekey) { s->no_rekey = no_rekey;
src/handshake.h +3 -0
@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct handshake_state {uint8_t ssid[32 ];size_t ssid_len;char *passphrase; +char *password_identifier;uint8_t r0khid[48 ];size_t r0khid_len;uint8_t r1khid[6 ];
@@ -228,6 +229,8 @@ void handshake_state_set_event_func(struct handshake_state *s, void *user_data);void handshake_state_set_passphrase (struct handshake_state *s,const char *passphrase); +void handshake_state_set_password_identifier (struct handshake_state *s, +const char *id);bool handshake_state_add_ecc_sae_pt (struct handshake_state *s,const struct l_ecc_point *pt);void handshake_state_set_no_rekey (struct handshake_state *s,bool no_rekey);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 4/10 network: add support for SAE password identifiers
In reply to James PrestwoodAdds a new network profile setting [Security].PasswordIdentifier. When set (and the BSS enables SAE password identifiers) the network and handshake object will read this and use it for the SAE exchange.
Loading the PSK will fail if there is no password identifier set and the BSS sets the "exclusive" bit. If a password identifier is set and the BSS doesn't indicate support the setting will be ignored (with a debug print).
--- src/network.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/network.c +49 -1
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ struct network {struct network_info *info;unsigned char *psk;char *passphrase; +char *password_identifier;struct l_ecc_point *sae_pt_19;/* SAE PT for Group 19 */ struct l_ecc_point *sae_pt_20;/* SAE PT for Group 20 */ unsigned int agent_request;
@@ -124,6 +125,13 @@ static void network_reset_passphrase(struct network *network) network->passphrase =NULL ; } +if (network->password_identifier) { +explicit_bzero (network->password_identifier, +strlen (network->password_identifier)); +l_free (network->password_identifier); + network->password_identifier =NULL ; + } +if (network->sae_pt_19) {l_ecc_point_free (network->sae_pt_19); network->sae_pt_19 =NULL ;
@@ -317,7 +325,8 @@ static struct l_ecc_point *network_generate_sae_pt(struct network *network,l_debug ("Generating PT for Group %u" , group); pt =crypto_derive_sae_pt_ecc (group, network->ssid, - network->passphrase,NULL ); + network->passphrase, + network->password_identifier);if (!pt)l_warn ("SAE PT generation for Group %u failed" , group);
@@ -462,6 +471,10 @@ static int network_set_handshake_secrets_psk(struct network *network,handshake_state_set_passphrase (hs, network->passphrase); +if (network->password_identifier) +handshake_state_set_password_identifier (hs, + network->password_identifier); +if (ie_rsnxe_capable (hs->authenticator_rsnxe,IE_RSNX_SAE_H2E )) {l_debug ("Authenticator is SAE H2E capable" );
@@ -631,6 +644,9 @@ static int network_load_psk(struct network *network, struct scan_bss *bss) _auto_(l_free) char *passphrase =l_settings_get_string (network->settings,"Security" ,"Passphrase" ); + _auto_(l_free) char *password_id = +l_settings_get_string (network->settings,"Security" , +"PasswordIdentifier" ); _auto_(l_free) char *path =storage_get_network_file_path (security, ssid);
@@ -641,6 +657,32 @@ static int network_load_psk(struct network *network, struct scan_bss *bss) psk_len =0 ; } +/* +* Sort out if the password identifier is required, should be used, " +* or should be ignored. +*/ +if (is_sae) { +if (bss->sae_pw_id_exclusive && !password_id) { +l_error ("BSS requires SAE password identifiers, check " +"[Security].PasswordIdentifier" ); +return -ENOKEY ; + } + +/* +* If the profile contains a password identifier but the network +* does not support it IWD will still attempt to connect. The +* caveat here is if the connection is successful the sync will +* remove the password identifier entry. Though this might be +* unexpected to the user, retaining this (invalid) setting +* isn't worth special casing. +*/ +if (!bss->sae_pw_id_used && password_id) { +l_debug ("[Security].PasswordIdentifier set but BSS " +"does not not use password identifiers" ); +l_free (l_steal_ptr (password_id)); + } + } +/* PSK can be generated from the passphrase but not the other way */ if (!psk || is_sae) {if (!passphrase)
@@ -655,6 +697,7 @@ static int network_load_psk(struct network *network, struct scan_bss *bss)network_reset_passphrase (network);network_reset_psk (network); network->passphrase =l_steal_ptr (passphrase); + network->password_identifier =l_steal_ptr (password_id);if (network_settings_load_pt_ecc (network, path,19 , &network->sae_pt_19) >0 )
@@ -726,6 +769,11 @@ static void network_settings_save(struct network *network,l_settings_set_string (settings,"Security" ,"Passphrase" , network->passphrase); +if (network->password_identifier) +l_settings_set_string (settings,"Security" , +"PasswordIdentifier" , + network->password_identifier); +if (network->sae_pt_19)network_settings_save_sae_pt_ecc (settings, network->sae_pt_19);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH 04/10] network: add support for SAE password identifiers
Hi James,
Quoted 7 lines · James Prestwood
Adds a new network profile setting [Security].PasswordIdentifier. When set (and the BSS enables SAE password identifiers) the network and handshake object will read this and use it for the SAE exchange.
Loading the PSK will fail if there is no password identifier set and the BSS sets the "exclusive" bit. If a password identifier is
I'm not so sure about this. The trouble is that this logic is sufficient for the initial connection, but isn't sufficient when you consider re-association.
Quoted 6 lines
set and the BSS doesn't indicate support the setting will be ignored (with a debug print).
--- src/network.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
<snip>
src/network.c static int network_load_psk(struct network *network, struct scan_bss *bss) · line 665
Quoted 10 lines
src/network.c +6
-0@@ -641,6 +657,32 @@ static int network_load_psk(struct network *network, struct scan_bss *bss) psk_len =0 ; } +/* +* Sort out if the password identifier is required, should be used, " +* or should be ignored. +*/ +if (is_sae) { +if (bss->sae_pw_id_exclusive && !password_id) {
This likely needs to be taken into consideration much later, when building the actual handshake state.
src/network.c static int network_load_psk(struct network *network, struct scan_bss *bss) · line 673
Quoted 8 lines
src/network.c +8
-0+l_error ("BSS requires SAE password identifiers, check " +"[Security].PasswordIdentifier" ); +return -ENOKEY ; + } + +/* +* If the profile contains a password identifier but the network +* does not support it IWD will still attempt to connect. The
Password identifier is only used by SAE H2E. One can easily imagine a weird network of mixed APs with some being SAE H2E, some not. This is why I didn't bother implementing this, it is a half-baked feature.
src/network.c static int network_load_psk(struct network *network, struct scan_bss *bss) · line 677
Quoted 4 lines
src/network.c +4
-0+* caveat here is if the connection is successful the sync will +* remove the password identifier entry. Though this might be +* unexpected to the user, retaining this (invalid) setting +* isn't worth special casing.
And this doesn't sound nice at all... I think the setting should be preserved.
src/network.c static int network_load_psk(struct network *network, struct scan_bss *bss) · line 688
Quoted 11 lines
src/network.c +8
-0+*/ +if (!bss->sae_pw_id_used && password_id) { +l_debug ("[Security].PasswordIdentifier set but BSS " +"does not not use password identifiers" ); +l_free (l_steal_ptr (password_id)); + } + } +/* PSK can be generated from the passphrase but not the other way */ if (!psk || is_sae) {if (!passphrase)
Regards,
-Denis
Re: [PATCH 04/10] network: add support for SAE password identifiers
Hi Denis,
Quoted 8 lines · Denis Kenzior
Hi James,
Quoted 5 lines · James Prestwood
Adds a new network profile setting [Security].PasswordIdentifier. When set (and the BSS enables SAE password identifiers) the network and handshake object will read this and use it for the SAE exchange.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Loading the PSK will fail if there is no password identifier set and the BSS sets the "exclusive" bit. If a password identifier is
I'm not so sure about this. The trouble is that this logic is sufficient for the initial connection, but isn't sufficient when you consider re-association.
Your right, roaming would be entirely broken between BSS's that mismatch using password identifiers. Maybe even hunt-and-peck and H2E? not entirely sure. We would need to re-derive the point for each roam, like in network_set_handshake_secrets_psk().
Quoted 10 lines
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set and the BSS doesn't indicate support the setting will be ignored (with a debug print).
---
src/network.c| 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)<snip>
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 11 lines
src/network.c +0
-0@@ -641,6 +657,32 @@ static int network_load_psk(struct network *network, struct scan_bss *bss) psk_len = 0; }+ /*
+ * Sort out if the password identifier is required, should be used, "
+ * or should be ignored.
+ */
+ if (is_sae) {
+ if (bss->sae_pw_id_exclusive&& !password_id) {This likely needs to be taken into consideration much later, when building the actual handshake state.
Yeah, we'd need to move this into network_set_handshake_secrets_psk and rederive the points. And actually if we do this storing the points in the network profile doesn't make a whole lot of sense anymore since its being rederived every time.
Alternatively we just keep it how I have it and tell they user they're network isn't configured properly :)
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 10 lines
+ l_error("BSS requires SAE password identifiers, check " + "[Security].PasswordIdentifier");
+ return-ENOKEY;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the profile contains a password identifier but the network
+ * does not support it IWD will still attempt to connect. The
Quoted 1 line
Password identifier is only used by SAE H2E. One can easily imagine a weird network of mixed APs with some being SAE H2E, some not. This is why I didn't bother implementing this, it is a half-baked feature.
Ugh, ok. I guess we have to keep the identifier around then.
Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 5 lines
+ * caveat here is if the connection is successful the sync will + * remove the password identifier entry. Though this might be + * unexpected to the user, retaining this (invalid) setting + * isn't worth special casing.
And this doesn't sound nice at all... I think the setting should be preserved.
Quoted 11 lines
+ */
+ if (!bss->sae_pw_id_used &&password_id) {
+ l_debug("[Security].PasswordIdentifier set but BSS " + "does not not use password identifiers");
+ l_free(l_steal_ptr(password_id));
+ }
+ }
+
/* PSK can be generated from the passphrase but not the other way */ if (!psk ||is_sae) {
if (!passphrase)Regards,
-Denis
Re: [PATCH 04/10] network: add support for SAE password identifiers
Hi James,
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Loading the PSK will fail if there is no password identifier set and the BSS sets the "exclusive" bit. If a password identifier is
I'm not so sure about this. The trouble is that this logic is sufficient for the initial connection, but isn't sufficient when you consider re-association.
Your right, roaming would be entirely broken between BSS's that mismatch using password identifiers. Maybe even hunt-and-peck and H2E? not entirely sure. We
Well, ReAssociate would just use SAE passphrase directly, so it would work in theory... But it is a bit of a strange case.
Quoted 1 line
would need to re-derive the point for each roam, like in
network_set_handshake_secrets_psk().
?? You mean SAE-H2E with password identifier for BSSes that report exclusive/in-use bit and SAE-H2E for BSSes without? Or something else?
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
This likely needs to be taken into consideration much later, when building the actual handshake state.
Yeah, we'd need to move this into
network_set_handshake_secrets_pskand rederive the points. And actually if we do this storing the points in the network profile doesn't make a whole lot of sense anymore since its being rederived every time.
I would hate for this to be the outcome. Re-deriving the PT is pretty expensive.
Quoted 2 lines
Alternatively we just keep it how I have it and tell they user they're network isn't configured properly :)
I think it could be argued that if PasswordIdentifier is set, then any BSSes that are not H2E/do not set the in-use bit are not connectable.
Regards,
-Denis
Re: [PATCH 04/10] network: add support for SAE password identifiers
Quoted 5 lines · Denis Kenzior
Hi James,
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Loading the PSK will fail if there is no password identifier set and the BSS sets the "exclusive" bit. If a password identifier is
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Quoted 1 line
I'm not so sure about this. The trouble is that this logic is sufficient for the initial connection, but isn't sufficient when you consider re-association.
Your right, roaming would be entirely broken between BSS's that mismatch using password identifiers. Maybe even hunt-and-peck and H2E? not entirely sure. We
Well, ReAssociate would just use SAE passphrase directly, so it would work in theory... But it is a bit of a strange case.
Quoted 1 line
would need to re-derive the point for each roam, like in
network_set_handshake_secrets_psk().?? You mean SAE-H2E with password identifier for BSSes that report exclusive/in-use bit and SAE-H2E for BSSes without? Or something else?
Yeah, I'm talking about multiple H2E BSS's that set or don't set the exclusive/in-use bits. Maybe it would be ok actually. I got concerned when I saw the points being set into the handshake in network_set_handshake_secrets_psk() (which happens on roaming) but it looks like this is only used for initial SAE association. Maybe roaming/FT would be ok? But this is all moot if we just bail early if the password identifier setting does not match the BSS's capabilities.
Quoted 11 lines
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This likely needs to be taken into consideration much later, when building the actual handshake state.
Yeah, we'd need to move this into
network_set_handshake_secrets_pskand rederive the points. And actually if we do this storing the points in the network profile doesn't make a whole lot of sense anymore since its being rederived every time.I would hate for this to be the outcome. Re-deriving the PT is pretty expensive.
Quoted 2 lines
Alternatively we just keep it how I have it and tell they user they're network isn't configured properly :)
I think it could be argued that if PasswordIdentifier is set, then any BSSes that are not H2E/do not set the in-use bit are not connectable.
This works for me. Much easier and will enforce a properly configured network.
Quoted 3 lines
Regards,
-Denis
PATCH 5/10 sae: include password identifier IE in commit
In reply to James PrestwoodInclude the IE if a password identifier is being used. This is only supported by H2E as required by 802.11.
--- src/sae.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
src/sae.c +8 -0
@@ -637,6 +637,14 @@ old_commit:ie_tlv_builder_set_data (&builder, sm->token, sm->token_len); } +if (sm->sae_type ==CRYPTO_SAE_HASH_TO_ELEMENT && + sm->handshake->password_identifier) { +ie_tlv_builder_next (&builder,IE_TYPE_PASSWORD_IDENTIFIER ); +ie_tlv_builder_set_data (&builder, + sm->handshake->password_identifier, +strlen (sm->handshake->password_identifier)); + } +ie_tlv_builder_finalize (&builder, &len);return ptr - commit + len;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 6/10 doc: document [Security].PasswordIdentifier
In reply to James Prestwood--- src/iwd.network.rst | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
src/iwd.network.rst +10 -0
@@ -199,6 +199,16 @@ connect to that network. required if the *PreSharedKey* is not provided. If not provided in settings, the agent will be asked for the passphrase at connection time. + * - PasswordIdentifier + - string + + An identifer string to be used with the passphrase. This is used for + WPA3-Personal (SAE) networks if the security has enabled password + identifiers for clients. + + Note: if the network does not support password identifiers but one is + set in the profile it will be ignored and removed upon a successful + connection to the network. * - PreSharedKey - 64 character hex string
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 7/10 auto-t: add H2E password identifier test
In reply to James PrestwoodIn order to support identifiers the test profiles needed to be reworked due to hostapd allowing multiple password entires. You cannot just call set_value() with a new entry as the old ones still exist. Instead use a unique password for the identifier and non-identifier use cases.
After adding this test the failure_test started failing due to hostapd not starting up. This was due to the group being unsupported but oddly only when hostapd was reloaded (running the test individually worked). To fix this the group number was changed to 21 which hostapd does support but IWD does not.
---
autotests/testSAE/autoconnect_test.py | 20 +++++++++++++------
autotests/testSAE/failure_test.py | 2 +-
autotests/testSAE/ssidSAE.conf | 3 ++-
.../{ssidSAE.psk => ssidSAE.psk.default} | 0
autotests/testSAE/ssidSAE.psk.identifier | 3 +++
5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
rename autotests/testSAE/{ssidSAE.psk => ssidSAE.psk.default} (100%)
create mode 100644 autotests/testSAE/ssidSAE.psk.identifierautotests/testSAE/autoconnect_test.py +14 -6
@@ -35,12 +35,23 @@ class Test(unittest.TestCase): wd.wait_for_object_condition(ordered_network.network_object, condition) def test_SAE(self): + IWD.copy_to_storage("ssidSAE.psk.default", name="ssidSAE.psk") self.hostapd.wait_for_event("AP-ENABLED") wd = IWD(True) self.validate_connection(wd) def test_SAE_H2E(self): + IWD.copy_to_storage("ssidSAE.psk.default", name="ssidSAE.psk") + self.hostapd.set_value('sae_pwe', '1') + self.hostapd.set_value('sae_groups', '20') + self.hostapd.reload() + self.hostapd.wait_for_event("AP-ENABLED") + wd = IWD(True) + self.validate_connection(wd) + + def test_SAE_H2E_password_identifier(self): + IWD.copy_to_storage("ssidSAE.psk.identifier", name="ssidSAE.psk") self.hostapd.set_value('sae_pwe', '1') self.hostapd.set_value('sae_groups', '20') self.hostapd.reload()
@@ -51,15 +62,12 @@ class Test(unittest.TestCase): def setUp(self): self.hostapd.default() + def tearDown(self): + IWD.clear_storage() + @classmethod def setUpClass(cls): cls.hostapd = HostapdCLI(config='ssidSAE.conf') - IWD.copy_to_storage('ssidSAE.psk') - pass - - @classmethod - def tearDownClass(cls): - IWD.clear_storage() if __name__ == '__main__': unittest.main(exit=True)
autotests/testSAE/failure_test.py +1 -1
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ class Test(unittest.TestCase): self.validate_connection(wd, 'InvalidSecret') def test_no_supported_groups(self): - self.hostapd.set_value('sae_groups', '1') + self.hostapd.set_value('sae_groups', '21') self.hostapd.reload() wd = IWD(True)
autotests/testSAE/ssidSAE.conf +2 -1
@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@ ssid=ssidSAE wpa=2 wpa_key_mgmt=SAE wpa_pairwise=CCMP -sae_password=secret123|mac=ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff +sae_password=secret123 +sae_password=withidentifier|id=myidentifier sae_groups=19 ieee80211w=2 sae_pwe=0
autotests/testSAE/ssidSAE.psk.default renamed from autotests/testSAE/ssidSAE.psk +0 -0
autotests/testSAE/ssidSAE.psk.identifier new file +3 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +[Security] +Passphrase=withidentifier +PasswordIdentifier=myidentifier
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 8/10 mpdu: add unknown password identifier status
In reply to James Prestwood--- src/mpdu.h | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
src/mpdu.h +1 -0
@@ -231,6 +231,7 @@ enum mmpdu_status_code {MMPDU_STATUS_CODE_ENABLEMENT_DENIED =105 ,MMPDU_STATUS_CODE_RESTRICT_AUTH_GDB =106 ,MMPDU_STATUS_CODE_AUTHORIZATION_DEENABLED =107 , +MMPDU_STATUS_CODE_UNKNOWN_PASSWORD_IDENTIFIER =123 ,MMPDU_STATUS_CODE_SAE_HASH_TO_ELEMENT =126 , MMPDU_STATUS_CODE_SAE_PK = 127, };
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 9/10 sae: add debugging for incorrect password identifier
In reply to James PrestwoodIf the AP rejects the auth because of an unknown identifier catch this and log the error.
--- src/sae.c | 16 ++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
src/sae.c +12 -4
@@ -1104,11 +1104,19 @@ static int sae_verify_committed(struct sae_sm *sm, uint16_t transaction,* If the Status is some other nonzero value, the frame shall be * silently discarded and the t0 (retransmission) timer shall be set. */ -if (status !=0 && status !=MMPDU_STATUS_CODE_SAE_HASH_TO_ELEMENT ) +switch (status) { +case 0 : +case MMPDU_STATUS_CODE_SAE_HASH_TO_ELEMENT : +if (status !=sae_status_code (sm)) +return -EBADMSG ; +break ; +case MMPDU_STATUS_CODE_UNKNOWN_PASSWORD_IDENTIFIER : +sae_debug ("Incorrect password identifier, check " +"[Security].PasswordIdentifier" ); +/* fall through */ +default :return -ENOMSG ; - -if (status !=sae_status_code (sm)) -return -EBADMSG ; + }if (len <2 )return -EBADMSG ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 10/10 auto-t: throw exception if executable is missing
In reply to James PrestwoodCertain tests may require external processes to work (e.g. testNetconfig) and if missing the test will just hang until the maximum test timeout. Check in start_process if the exe actually exists and if not throw an exception.
--- tools/utils.py | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
tools/utils.py +3 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ class Process(subprocess.Popen): logfile = args[0] + if not shutil.which(args[0]): + raise Exception("%s is not found on system" % args[0]) + if Process.is_verbose(args[0], log=False): self.verbose = True
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Hi James,
Quoted 7 lines · James Prestwood
These bits are used to communicate to the station that SAE password identifiers are used or required.
--- src/scan.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- src/scan.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
I applied patches 1, 2, 3, 5, 8 and 9.
Regards,
-Denis