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Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response

PATCH In review Luiz Augusto von Dentz 3 participants 5 messages Apr 1

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Luiz Augusto von Dentz

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/3 Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response

From: Oleh Konko <[email protected]>

smp_cmd_pairing_req() currently builds the pairing response from the initiator auth_req before enforcing the local BT_SECURITY_HIGH requirement. If the initiator omits SMP_AUTH_MITM, the response can also omit it even though the local side still requires MITM.

tk_request() then sees an auth value without SMP_AUTH_MITM and may select JUST_CFM, making method selection inconsistent with the pairing policy the responder already enforces.

When the local side requires HIGH security, first verify that MITM can be achieved from the IO capabilities and then force SMP_AUTH_MITM in the response before build_pairing_cmd(). This keeps the responder auth bits and later method selection aligned.

Fixes 2b64d153a0cc ("Bluetooth: Add MITM mechanism to LE-SMP")

---
v5: Address the comments on
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/bt-smp-v4-ea63d24bfcd1416f9da279190fab15fc%401seal.org?patch=14762

 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/bluetooth/smp.c +5 -1
index 485e3468bd26..deb8dd244b77 100644
@@ -1826,7 +1826,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
 		conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
 
-	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved */
+	/* If we need MITM check that it can be achieved. */
 	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
 		u8 method;
 
@@ -1834,6 +1834,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 					 req->io_capability);
 		if (method == JUST_WORKS || method == JUST_CFM)
 			return SMP_AUTH_REQUIREMENTS;
+
+		/* Force MITM bit if it isn't set by the initiator. */
+		auth |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+		rsp.auth_req |= SMP_AUTH_MITM;
 	}
 
 	key_size = min(req->max_key_size, rsp.max_key_size);
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v5 2/3 Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state

From: Oleh Konko <[email protected]>

The legacy responder path in smp_random() currently labels the stored STK as authenticated whenever pending_sec_level is BT_SECURITY_HIGH. That reflects what the local service requested, not what the pairing flow actually achieved.

For Just Works/Confirm legacy pairing, SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH stays clear and the resulting STK should remain unauthenticated even if the local side requested HIGH security. Use the established MITM state when storing the responder STK so the key metadata matches the pairing result.

This also keeps the legacy path aligned with the Secure Connections code, which already treats JUST_WORKS/JUST_CFM as unauthenticated.

Fixes fff3490f4781 ("Bluetooth: Fix setting correct authentication information for SMP STK")
---
 net/bluetooth/smp.c | 5 +----
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/bluetooth/smp.c +1 -4
index deb8dd244b77..98f1da4f5f55 100644
@@ -1018,10 +1018,7 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 
 		smp_s1(smp->tk, smp->prnd, smp->rrnd, stk);
 
-		if (hcon->pending_sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
-			auth = 1;
-		else
-			auth = 0;
+		auth = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags) ? 1 : 0;
 
 		/* Even though there's no _RESPONDER suffix this is the
 		 * responder STK we're adding for later lookup (the initiator
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH v5 3/3 Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix allowing to change security multiple times

In reply to Luiz Augusto von Dentz

From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>

If FLAG_PENDING_SECURITY is already set it means SMP pairing process is in progress and hcon->pending_sec_level shouldn't be changed since it may require to change pairing requirements (MITM), which may not be supported depending on stage of the pairing procedure, and may result in a security level that don't match with the pairing keys authentication (e.g. upgrading to BT_SECURITY_HIGH without setting MITM requirements).

To fix tis problem the code will now return -EINPROGRESS if a process call setsockopt(BT_SECURITY) and set FLAG_PENDING_SECURITY it needs to await the socket to resume and clear the flag before it can update the security level again.

Fixes bbb69b37be15 ("Bluetooth: Add return check for L2CAP security level set")

---
v5: New patch to address comments on:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/bt-smp-v4-ea63d24bfcd1416f9da279190fab15fc%401seal.org?patch=14763

 net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c +9 -0
index 71e8c1b45bce..786ca7c6e272 100644
@@ -929,6 +929,15 @@ static int l2cap_sock_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
 
 		/* change security for LE channels */
 		if (chan->scid == L2CAP_CID_ATT) {
+			/* If security already pending, return error to avoid
+			 * changing the pending_sec_level while the pairing
+			 * procedure is still ongoing.
+			 */
+			if (test_bit(FLAG_PENDING_SECURITY, &chan->flags)) {
+				err = -EINPROGRESS;
+				break;
+			}
+
 			if (smp_conn_security(conn->hcon, sec.level)) {
 				err = -EINVAL;
 				break;
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
#3 lore raw
In reply to Luiz Augusto von Dentz

This is automated email and please do not reply to this email!

Dear submitter,

Thank you for submitting the patches to the linux bluetooth mailing list. This is a CI test results with your patch series:
PW Link:https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/bluetooth/list/?series=1075938

---Test result---

Test Summary:

CheckPatch                    PENDING   0.32 seconds
GitLint                       PENDING   0.29 seconds
SubjectPrefix                 PASS      0.40 seconds
BuildKernel                   PASS      25.80 seconds
CheckAllWarning               PASS      28.42 seconds
CheckSparse                   PASS      27.16 seconds
BuildKernel32                 PASS      25.12 seconds
TestRunnerSetup               PASS      564.24 seconds
TestRunner_l2cap-tester       PASS      27.98 seconds
TestRunner_iso-tester         PASS      37.67 seconds
TestRunner_bnep-tester        PASS      6.35 seconds
TestRunner_mgmt-tester        FAIL      113.95 seconds
TestRunner_rfcomm-tester      PASS      9.42 seconds
TestRunner_sco-tester         FAIL      14.23 seconds
TestRunner_ioctl-tester       PASS      10.27 seconds
TestRunner_mesh-tester        FAIL      12.52 seconds
TestRunner_smp-tester         PASS      8.54 seconds
TestRunner_userchan-tester    PASS      6.67 seconds
IncrementalBuild              PENDING   0.63 seconds

Details
##############################
Test: CheckPatch - PENDING
Desc: Run checkpatch.pl script
Output:

##############################
Test: GitLint - PENDING
Desc: Run gitlint
Output:

##############################
Test: TestRunner_mgmt-tester - FAIL
Desc: Run mgmt-tester with test-runner Output:
Total: 494, Passed: 488 (98.8%), Failed: 2, Not Run: 4

Failed Test Cases

Read Exp Feature - Success                           Failed       0.105 seconds
LL Privacy - Start Discovery 2 (Disable RL)          Failed       0.177 seconds

##############################
Test: TestRunner_sco-tester - FAIL
Desc: Run sco-tester with test-runner
Output:
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected

BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/core/sock.c:3782

Total: 30, Passed: 30 (100.0%), Failed: 0, Not Run: 0
##############################
Test: TestRunner_mesh-tester - FAIL
Desc: Run mesh-tester with test-runner Output:
Total: 10, Passed: 8 (80.0%), Failed: 2, Not Run: 0

Failed Test Cases

Mesh - Send cancel - 1                               Timed out    2.695 seconds
Mesh - Send cancel - 2                               Timed out    1.998 seconds

##############################
Test: IncrementalBuild - PENDING
Desc: Incremental build with the patches in the series Output:

---
Regards,
Linux Bluetooth

#4 lore raw
In reply to Luiz Augusto von Dentz
This series was applied to bluetooth/bluetooth-next.git (master) by Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>:

Hello:

This series was applied to bluetooth/bluetooth-next.git (master) by Luiz Augusto von Dentz <[email protected]>:

Quoted 8 lines · On Wed, 1 Apr 2026 12:01:51 -0400 you wrote:

From: Oleh Konko <[email protected]>

smp_cmd_pairing_req() currently builds the pairing response from the initiator auth_req before enforcing the local BT_SECURITY_HIGH requirement. If the initiator omits SMP_AUTH_MITM, the response can also omit it even though the local side still requires MITM.

[...]

Here is the summary with links:
- [v5,1/3] Bluetooth: SMP: force responder MITM requirements before building the pairing response

    https://git.kernel.org/bluetooth/bluetooth-next/c/1bd2e4ce149f
  - [v5,2/3] Bluetooth: SMP: derive legacy responder STK authentication from MITM state
    https://git.kernel.org/bluetooth/bluetooth-next/c/3a0b100b337c

- [v5,3/3] Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix allowing to change security multiple times (no matching commit)

You are awesome, thank you!

Signature · 2 lines
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