Fuller TDX kexec support
Subsystems (5)
v2 cover Fuller TDX kexec support
Hi,
This series adds a couple of cool things -
1. Allow kexec and kdump on systems with the partial write errata
2. Allow using TDX in the second (kexec'ed) kernel
It has been waiting for VMXON refactor to land because the implementation is much cleaner on top of that.
KVM folks, just a few deletions on your side and the long discussed moving of tdx_errno.h. Tip folks and reviewers, the changes here are pretty small. Optimistically, I'm hoping we can iterate this quickly and see it off the list in the next few weeks.
Background
==========
Some early TDX-capable platforms have an erratum where a partial write to TDX private memory can cause a machine check on a subsequent read. Currently, kexec and kdump are disabled on these platforms because the new (or kdump) kernel may trip over these, causing a machine check.
Future TDX modules will support TDH.SYS.DISABLE SEAMCALL, which disables the TDX module and reclaims all memory resources allocated to TDX, and cleans up any poison. After this SEAMCALL succeeds, the new kernel can also re-initialize the TDX module from scratch via the normal bring-up sequence.
It is probably worth mentioning that this is a different kind of cleanup than the WBINVD stuff that was the cause of all the fuss in the earlier kexec enabling. The WBINVD is flushing private keyid cachelines so they are not later written back over the new kernels memory. It needs to happen after the last SEAMCALL that might have produced them. So this new SEAMCALL is for something else, but also needs to be slotted with respect to WBINVD.
Implementation
==============
The series adds:
1. A pre-requisite patch to move TDX error code definitions to a shared location so that TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE etc. are accessible from arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/. This comes from the Dynamic PAMT series [0], but is also needed by some other series, and can benefit them all from an early merge.
2. A preparatory patch to move some straggling stuff into arch/x86 in the wake of the VMXON series.
3. A tdx_sys_disable() helper that wraps calls TDH.SYS.DISABLE with a retry loop to handle TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE.
4. Integration into the kexec path: Remove the check for partial write errata platforms as this is addressed by the SEAMCALL clearing any poisoned memory locations. Call tdx_sys_disable() in tdx_shutdown which is called via syscore ops in the kexec path. Call tdx_sys_disable() in native_machine_crash_shutdown() to cover the crash (kdump) path.
5. A patch to update (remove) the kexec section in TDX docs.
Testing
=======
The implementation is based on the draft TDX module spec available at [1], and was smoke tested with an engineering build of the TDX module that supports the new SEAMCALL. The new kernel was able to initialize the TDX module successfully:
kvm: exiting hardware virtualization
kexec_core: Starting new kernel
Linux version 7.0.0-rc2-g0077f702b21c...
...
virt/tdx: 1034220 KB allocated for PAMT
virt/tdx: TDX-Module initialized
All the other TDX CI tests pass, and some other scenarios that were manually tested and also pass or behave as expected:
- Running on a completely non-TDX system
- Running on a TDX capable system with an old module
- Running on a TDX capable system where the module hasn't been initialized
During development further testing was done by mocking up the new SEAMCALL to introduce delays and exercise the retry loops, combined with kexec, kdump, reboot and shutdown flows.
Base
====
This series is based on the vmxon branch Sean pushed to kvm_x86, kvm-x86-vmxon-2026.03.05.
[0]: https://lore.kernel.org/kvm/[email protected]/
[1]: https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/871617
---
Changes in v2:
- Use patch 1 from the DPAMT series with other feedback (Kai)
- Fix commit message typo (s/adjust_/adjust /)
- In patch 2, drop "too late to be helpful" in favor of something more explicit (Kai)
- Fix commit message typo in patch 2 (s/both/bother/)
- In patch 2, add a bit about dropping the TDX specific WBINVD (Kai)
- Reword some commit logs to use the imperative mood (Chao)
- Kai raised offline that TDH.SYS.DISABLE can return TDX_SYS_BUSY too. In theory this could happen if another SEAMCALL happens concurrently, however that contention should be short lived. Update the loop to continue on a TDX_SYS_BUSY error code too. (Kai)
- Patch 3: Add a print for SEAMCALL errors reported by the TDX module (excluding SW errors like #UD and #GP) (Kiryl)
- Patch 3: Add a sentence to the log about skipping enumeration for the new SEAMCALL (Kiryl)
- Adjust the patch 4 subject (Chao)
- Add a new patch to update the docs (Chao)
- Smoke test with TDX module engineering build with the new SEAMCALL.
Kiryl Shutsemau (1):
x86/tdx: Move all TDX error defines into <asm/shared/tdx_errno.h>
Rick Edgecombe (2):
x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86 x86/virt/tdx: Remove kexec docs
Vishal Verma (2):
x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE x86/tdx: Disable the TDX module during kexec and kdump
Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst | 7 -------
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h | 1 +
arch/x86/{kvm/vmx => include/asm/shared}/tdx_errno.h | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++------
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 30 +++---------------------------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 1 -
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 2 ++
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 16 ----------------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 10 ----------
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
10 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)--
2.53.0
---
Kiryl Shutsemau (1):
x86/tdx: Move all TDX error defines into <asm/shared/tdx_errno.h>
Rick Edgecombe (2):
x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86 x86/virt/tdx: Remove kexec docs
Vishal Verma (2):
x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE x86/tdx: Disable the TDX module during kexec and kdump
Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst | 7 ---
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h | 1 +
.../{kvm/vmx => include/asm/shared}/tdx_errno.h | 29 +++++++++---
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 30 ++----------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 1 -
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 2 +
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 16 -------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 10 ----
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++-----
10 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-)---
base-commit: f630de1f8d70d7e29e12bc25dc63f9c5f771dc59
change-id: 20260317-fuller_tdx_kexec_support-bc79694678be
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
PATCH v2 1/5 x86/tdx: Move all TDX error defines into <asm/shared/tdx_errno.h>
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Today there are two separate locations where TDX error codes are defined:
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.hThey have some overlap that is already defined similarly. Reduce the duplication and prepare to introduce some helpers for these error codes in the central place by unifying them. Join them at:
asm/shared/tdx_errno.h
...and update the headers that contained the duplicated definitions to include the new unified header.
"asm/shared" is used for sharing TDX code between the early compressed code and the normal kernel code. While the compressed code for the guest doesn't use these error code header definitions today, it does make the types of calls that return the values they define. So place the defines in "shared" location so that it can, but leave such cleanups for future changes.
Also, adjust BITUL() -> _BITULL() to address 32 bit build errors after the move.
---
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h | 1 +
.../{kvm/vmx => include/asm/shared}/tdx_errno.h | 28 +++++++++++++++++-----
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 21 ----------------
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 1 -
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h +1 -0
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@#include <linux/bits.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include <asm/shared/tdx_errno.h> #define TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD 0
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx_errno.h renamed from arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h +22 -6
@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* architectural status code for SEAMCALL */ - -#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H -#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H +#ifndef _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_ERRNO_H +#define _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_ERRNO_H +#include <asm/trapnr.h> +/* Upper 32 bit of the TDX error code encodes the status */ #define TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL/* -* TDX SEAMCALL Status Codes (returned in RAX) +* TDX Status Codes (returned in RAX) */ +#define TDX_SUCCESS 0ULL#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_VCPU 0x4000000100000000ULL#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD 0x4000000200000000ULL#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD_NON_ACCESSIBLE 0x6000000500000000ULL
@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@#define TDX_OPERAND_INVALID 0xC000010000000000ULL#define TDX_OPERAND_BUSY 0x8000020000000000ULL#define TDX_PREVIOUS_TLB_EPOCH_BUSY 0x8000020100000000ULL +#define TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY 0x8000020300000000ULL#define TDX_PAGE_METADATA_INCORRECT 0xC000030000000000ULL#define TDX_VCPU_NOT_ASSOCIATED 0x8000070200000000ULL#define TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED 0x8000080000000000ULL
@@ -28,6 +30,20 @@#define TDX_EPT_ENTRY_STATE_INCORRECT 0xC0000B0D00000000ULL#define TDX_METADATA_FIELD_NOT_READABLE 0xC0000C0200000000ULL +/* +* SW-defined error codes. +* +* Bits 47:40 == 0xFF indicate Reserved status code class that never used by +* TDX module. +*/ +#define TDX_ERROR _BITULL(63) +#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE _BITULL(62) +#define TDX_SW_ERROR (TDX_ERROR | GENMASK_ULL(47, 40)) +#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID (TDX_SW_ERROR | _ULL(0xFFFF0000)) + +#define TDX_SEAMCALL_GP (TDX_SW_ERROR | X86_TRAP_GP) +#define TDX_SEAMCALL_UD (TDX_SW_ERROR | X86_TRAP_UD) +/* * TDX module operand ID, appears in 31:0 part of error code as * detail information
@@ -37,4 +53,4 @@#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_SEPT 0x92#define TDX_OPERAND_ID_TD_EPOCH 0xa9 -#endif /* __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H */ +#endif /* _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_ERRNO_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +0 -21
@@ -9,29 +9,8 @@#include <asm/errno.h> #include <asm/ptrace.h> -#include <asm/trapnr.h> #include <asm/shared/tdx.h> -/* -* SW-defined error codes. -* -* Bits 47:40 == 0xFF indicate Reserved status code class that never used by -* TDX module. -*/ -#define TDX_ERROR _BITUL(63) -#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE _BITUL(62) -#define TDX_SW_ERROR (TDX_ERROR | GENMASK_ULL(47, 40)) -#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID (TDX_SW_ERROR | _UL(0xFFFF0000)) - -#define TDX_SEAMCALL_GP (TDX_SW_ERROR | X86_TRAP_GP) -#define TDX_SEAMCALL_UD (TDX_SW_ERROR | X86_TRAP_UD) - -/* -* TDX module SEAMCALL leaf function error codes -*/ -#define TDX_SUCCESS 0ULL -#define TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY 0x8000020300000000ULL -#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__#include <uapi/asm/mce.h>
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h +0 -1
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@#define __KVM_X86_VMX_TDX_H#include "tdx_arch.h" -#include "tdx_errno.h" #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_INTEL_TDX #include "common.h"
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/tdx: Move all TDX error defines into <asm/shared/tdx_errno.h>
Quoted 20 lines · Vishal Verma
From: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <[email protected]>
Today there are two separate locations where TDX error codes are defined:
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.hThey have some overlap that is already defined similarly. Reduce the duplication and prepare to introduce some helpers for these error codes in the central place by unifying them. Join them at:
asm/shared/tdx_errno.h
...and update the headers that contained the duplicated definitions to include the new unified header."asm/shared" is used for sharing TDX code between the early compressed code and the normal kernel code. While the compressed code for the guest doesn't use these error code header definitions today, it does make the types of calls that return the values they define. So place the defines in "shared" location so that it can, but leave such cleanups for future changes.
Quoted 7 lines
Also, adjust
BITUL()->_BITULL()to address 32 bit build errors after the move.Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>[enhance log]Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/tdx: Move all TDX error defines into <asm/shared/tdx_errno.h>
In reply to Vishal VermaQuoted 43 lines · Vishal Verma
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx_errno.h renamed from arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h +10
-5@@ -1,14 +1,15 @@/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ -/* architectural status code for SEAMCALL */ - -#ifndef __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H -#define __KVM_X86_TDX_ERRNO_H +#ifndef _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_ERRNO_H +#define _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_ERRNO_H +#include <asm/trapnr.h> +/* Upper 32 bit of the TDX error code encodes the status */ #define TDX_SEAMCALL_STATUS_MASK 0xFFFFFFFF00000000ULL/* -* TDX SEAMCALL Status Codes (returned in RAX) +* TDX Status Codes (returned in RAX) */ +#define TDX_SUCCESS 0ULL#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_VCPU 0x4000000100000000ULL#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD 0x4000000200000000ULL#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD_NON_ACCESSIBLE 0x6000000500000000ULL@@ -17,6 +18,7 @@#define TDX_OPERAND_INVALID 0xC000010000000000ULL#define TDX_OPERAND_BUSY 0x8000020000000000ULL#define TDX_PREVIOUS_TLB_EPOCH_BUSY 0x8000020100000000ULL +#define TDX_RND_NO_ENTROPY 0x8000020300000000ULL#define TDX_PAGE_METADATA_INCORRECT 0xC000030000000000ULL#define TDX_VCPU_NOT_ASSOCIATED 0x8000070200000000ULL#define TDX_KEY_GENERATION_FAILED 0x8000080000000000ULL@@ -28,6 +30,20 @@#define TDX_EPT_ENTRY_STATE_INCORRECT 0xC0000B0D00000000ULL#define TDX_METADATA_FIELD_NOT_READABLE 0xC0000C0200000000ULL +/* +* SW-defined error codes. +*
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx_errno.h line 45
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx_errno.h renamed from arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h +10
-0+* Bits 47:40 == 0xFF indicate Reserved status code class that never used by +* TDX module. +*/ +#define TDX_ERROR _BITULL(63) +#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE _BITULL(62) +#define TDX_SW_ERROR (TDX_ERROR | GENMASK_ULL(47, 40)) +#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID (TDX_SW_ERROR | _ULL(0xFFFF0000)) + +#define TDX_SEAMCALL_GP (TDX_SW_ERROR | X86_TRAP_GP) +#define TDX_SEAMCALL_UD (TDX_SW_ERROR | X86_TRAP_UD)
I don't think the host's SW-defined error codes should be used by the guest. The guest can't even make SEAMCALLs. So unless I'm misunderstanding the purpose, I don't think it makes sense to move these into tdx_errno.h.
Regardless, please split this up into two patches:
1. Move tdx_errno.h
2. Land more #defines in tdx_errno.h
Because IIUC, tdx_errno.h holds *only* architecturally defined values, which makes
(1) super duper trivial to review and ack.
Edgecombe, Rick P
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/tdx: Move all TDX error defines into <asm/shared/tdx_errno.h>
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
+#define
TDX_SW_ERROR(TDX_ERROR|GENMASK_ULL(47, 40))arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx_errno.h line 45
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx_errno.h renamed from arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h +4
-0+#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID (TDX_SW_ERROR | _ULL(0xFFFF0000)) + +#define TDX_SEAMCALL_GP (TDX_SW_ERROR | X86_TRAP_GP) +#define TDX_SEAMCALL_UD (TDX_SW_ERROR | X86_TRAP_UD)I don't think the host's SW-defined error codes should be used by the guest. The guest can't even make SEAMCALLs. So unless I'm misunderstanding the purpose, I don't think it makes sense to move these into
tdx_errno.h.
Seems reasonable.
Quoted 8 lines
Regardless, please split this up into two patches:
1. Move
tdx_errno.h
2. Land more #defines intdx_errno.hBecause IIUC,
tdx_errno.hholds *only* architecturally defined values, which makes
(1) super duper trivial to review and ack.
Thanks!
PATCH v2 2/5 x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86
In reply to Vishal VermaFrom: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
KVM tries to take care of some required cache flushing earlier in the kexec path in order to be kind to some long standing races that can occur later in the operation. Until recently, VMXOFF was handled within KVM. Since VMX being enabled is required to make a SEAMCALL, it had the best per-cpu scoped operation to plug the flushing into. So it is kicked off from there.
This early kexec cache flushing in KVM happens via a syscore shutdown callback. Now that VMX enablement control has moved to arch/x86, which has grown its own syscore shutdown callback, it no longer make sense for it to live in KVM. It fits better with the TDX enablement managing code.
In addition, future changes will add a SEAMCALL that happens immediately before VMXOFF, which means the cache flush in KVM will be too late to flush the cache before the last SEAMCALL. So move it to the newly added TDX arch/x86 syscore shutdown handler.
Since tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec() is no longer needed by KVM, make it static and remove the export. Since it is also not part of an operation spread across disparate components, remove the redundant comments and verbose naming.
In the existing KVM based code, CPU offline also funnels through tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec(). So the centralization to the arch/x86 syscore shutdown callback elides this CPU offline time behavior. However, WBINVD is already generally done at CPU offline as matter of course. So don't bother adding TDX specific logic for this, and rely on the normal WBINVD to handle it.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 6 ------ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 10 ---------- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +0 -6
@@ -205,11 +205,5 @@ static inline const char *tdx_dump_mce_info(struct mce *m) { return NULL; }static inline const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) {return NULL ; }#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE -void tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec (void ); -#else -static inline void tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec (void ) { } -#endif -#endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_TDX_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +0 -10
@@ -440,16 +440,6 @@ void tdx_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)tdx_flush_vp (&arg); }local_irq_restore (flags); - -/* -* Flush cache now if kexec is possible: this is necessary to avoid -* having dirty private memory cachelines when the new kernel boots, -* but WBINVD is a relatively expensive operation and doing it during -* kexec can exacerbate races in native_stop_other_cpus(). Do it -* now, since this is a safe moment and there is going to be no more -* TDX activity on this CPU from this point on. -*/ -tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec (); }#define TDX_SEAMCALL_RETRIES 10000
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +20 -19
@@ -224,8 +224,28 @@ static int tdx_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu)return 0 ; } +static void tdx_cpu_flush_cache (void ) +{ +lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled (); + +if (!this_cpu_read (cache_state_incoherent)) +return ; + +wbinvd (); +this_cpu_write (cache_state_incoherent, false); +} +static void tdx_shutdown_cpu (void *ign) { +/* +* Flush cache now if kexec is possible: this is necessary to avoid +* having dirty private memory cachelines when the new kernel boots, +* but WBINVD is a relatively expensive operation and doing it during +* kexec can exacerbate races in native_stop_other_cpus(). Do it +* now, since this is a safe moment and there is going to be no more +* TDX activity on this CPU from this point on. +*/ +tdx_cpu_flush_cache ();x86_virt_put_ref (X86_FEATURE_VMX ); }
@@ -1920,22 +1940,3 @@ u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page)return seamcall (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD , &args); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid); - -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE -void tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec (void ) -{ -lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled (); - -if (!this_cpu_read (cache_state_incoherent)) -return ; - -/* -* Private memory cachelines need to be clean at the time of -* kexec. Write them back now, as the caller promises that -* there should be no more SEAMCALLs on this CPU. -*/ -wbinvd (); -this_cpu_write (cache_state_incoherent, false); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec); -#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86
Quoted 31 lines · Vishal Verma
From: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
KVM tries to take care of some required cache flushing earlier in the kexec path in order to be kind to some long standing races that can occur later in the operation. Until recently, VMXOFF was handled within KVM. Since VMX being enabled is required to make a SEAMCALL, it had the best per-cpu scoped operation to plug the flushing into. So it is kicked off from there.
This early kexec cache flushing in KVM happens via a syscore shutdown callback. Now that VMX enablement control has moved to
arch/x86, which has grown its own syscore shutdown callback, it no longer make sense for it to live in KVM. It fits better with the TDX enablement managing code.In addition, future changes will add a SEAMCALL that happens immediately before VMXOFF, which means the cache flush in KVM will be too late to flush the cache before the last SEAMCALL. So move it to the newly added TDX
arch/x86syscore shutdown handler.Since
tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec()is no longer needed by KVM, make it static and remove the export. Since it is also not part of an operation spread across disparate components, remove the redundant comments and verbose naming.In the existing KVM based code, CPU offline also funnels through
tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec(). So the centralization to thearch/x86syscore shutdown callback elides this CPU offline time behavior. However, WBINVD is already generally done at CPU offline as matter of course. So don't bother adding TDX specific logic for this, and rely on the normal WBINVD to handle it.
Quoted 3 lines
Acked-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86
In reply to Vishal VermaQuoted 31 lines · Vishal Verma
From: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
KVM tries to take care of some required cache flushing earlier in the kexec path in order to be kind to some long standing races that can occur later in the operation. Until recently, VMXOFF was handled within KVM. Since VMX being enabled is required to make a SEAMCALL, it had the best per-cpu scoped operation to plug the flushing into. So it is kicked off from there.
This early kexec cache flushing in KVM happens via a syscore shutdown callback. Now that VMX enablement control has moved to
arch/x86, which has grown its own syscore shutdown callback, it no longer make sense for it to live in KVM. It fits better with the TDX enablement managing code.In addition, future changes will add a SEAMCALL that happens immediately before VMXOFF, which means the cache flush in KVM will be too late to flush the cache before the last SEAMCALL. So move it to the newly added TDX
arch/x86syscore shutdown handler.Since
tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec()is no longer needed by KVM, make it static and remove the export. Since it is also not part of an operation spread across disparate components, remove the redundant comments and verbose naming.In the existing KVM based code, CPU offline also funnels through
tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec(). So the centralization to thearch/x86syscore shutdown callback elides this CPU offline time behavior. However, WBINVD is already generally done at CPU offline as matter of course. So don't bother adding TDX specific logic for this, and rely on the normal WBINVD to handle it.
Quoted 3 lines
Acked-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86
In reply to Vishal VermaQuoted 31 lines · Vishal Verma
From: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
KVM tries to take care of some required cache flushing earlier in the kexec path in order to be kind to some long standing races that can occur later in the operation. Until recently, VMXOFF was handled within KVM. Since VMX being enabled is required to make a SEAMCALL, it had the best per-cpu scoped operation to plug the flushing into. So it is kicked off from there.
This early kexec cache flushing in KVM happens via a syscore shutdown callback. Now that VMX enablement control has moved to
arch/x86, which has grown its own syscore shutdown callback, it no longer make sense for it to live in KVM. It fits better with the TDX enablement managing code.In addition, future changes will add a SEAMCALL that happens immediately before VMXOFF, which means the cache flush in KVM will be too late to flush the cache before the last SEAMCALL. So move it to the newly added TDX
arch/x86syscore shutdown handler.Since
tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec()is no longer needed by KVM, make it static and remove the export. Since it is also not part of an operation spread across disparate components, remove the redundant comments and verbose naming.In the existing KVM based code, CPU offline also funnels through
tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec(). So the centralization to thearch/x86syscore shutdown callback elides this CPU offline time behavior. However, WBINVD is already generally done at CPU offline as matter of course. So don't bother adding TDX specific logic for this, and rely on the normal WBINVD to handle it.
Quoted 3 lines
Acked-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Ingoring the potential fixup needed for the existing bug...
Quoted 77 lines
--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 6 ------ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 10 ---------- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +0
-6@@ -205,11 +205,5 @@ static inline const char *tdx_dump_mce_info(struct mce *m) { return NULL; }static inline const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) {return NULL ; }#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE -void tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec (void ); -#else -static inline void tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec (void ) { } -#endif -#endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_TDX_H */ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +0
-10@@ -440,16 +440,6 @@ void tdx_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)tdx_flush_vp (&arg); }local_irq_restore (flags); - -/* -* Flush cache now if kexec is possible: this is necessary to avoid -* having dirty private memory cachelines when the new kernel boots, -* but WBINVD is a relatively expensive operation and doing it during -* kexec can exacerbate races in native_stop_other_cpus(). Do it -* now, since this is a safe moment and there is going to be no more -* TDX activity on this CPU from this point on. -*/ -tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec (); }#define TDX_SEAMCALL_RETRIES 10000arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +20
-0@@ -224,8 +224,28 @@ static int tdx_offline_cpu(unsigned int cpu)return 0 ; } +static void tdx_cpu_flush_cache (void ) +{ +lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled (); + +if (!this_cpu_read (cache_state_incoherent)) +return ; + +wbinvd (); +this_cpu_write (cache_state_incoherent, false); +} +static void tdx_shutdown_cpu (void *ign) { +/* +* Flush cache now if kexec is possible: this is necessary to avoid +* having dirty private memory cachelines when the new kernel boots, +* but WBINVD is a relatively expensive operation and doing it during +* kexec can exacerbate races in native_stop_other_cpus(). Do it +* now, since this is a safe moment and there is going to be no more +* TDX activity on this CPU from this point on. +*/ +tdx_cpu_flush_cache ();x86_virt_put_ref (X86_FEATURE_VMX ); }
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page) · line 1927
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +0
-5@@ -1920,22 +1940,3 @@ u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page)return seamcall (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD , &args); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid); - -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE -void tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec (void ) -{ -lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled ();
Is there a pre-existing bug here that gets propagate to tdx_shutdown_cpu()? When called from kvm_offline_cpu(), preemption won't be fully disabled, but per-CPU access are fine because the task is pinned to the target CPU.
Quoted 18 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +0
-14- -if (!this_cpu_read (cache_state_incoherent)) -return ; - -/* -* Private memory cachelines need to be clean at the time of -* kexec. Write them back now, as the caller promises that -* there should be no more SEAMCALLs on this CPU. -*/ -wbinvd (); - this_cpu_write(cache_state_incoherent, false); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec); -#endif Signature · 2 lines
-- 2.53.0
Edgecombe, Rick P
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86
Quoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page) · line 1927
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +0
-5- -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE -void tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec (void ) -{ -lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled ();Is there a pre-existing bug here that gets propagate to
tdx_shutdown_cpu()? When called fromkvm_offline_cpu(), preemption won't be fully disabled, but per-CPU access are fine because the task is pinned to the target CPU.
Yes. And actually it got hit during development of this series. This patch will conflict with the fix:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Oh, you acked it actually. But I was under the impression that after this patch here, the splat wouldn't be triggered. So it inadvertently fixes it. But that other patch is much more backport friendly.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86
Quoted 11 lines · Rick P Edgecombe
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page) · line 1927
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +0
-5- -#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE -void tdx_cpu_flush_cache_for_kexec (void ) -{ -lockdep_assert_preemption_disabled ();Is there a pre-existing bug here that gets propagate to
tdx_shutdown_cpu()? When called fromkvm_offline_cpu(), preemption won't be fully disabled, but per-CPU access are fine because the task is pinned to the target CPU.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Yes. And actually it got hit during development of this series. This patch will conflict with the fix:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/Oh, you acked it actually. But I was under the impression that after this patch here, the splat wouldn't be triggered. So it inadvertently fixes it.
Ah, that's why I was a bit confused. I was assuming tdx_shutdown_cpu() was a cpuhp callback, but it's actually an IPI callback.
Hmm, isn't this patch wrong then? Ah, no, the changelog says:
However, WBINVD is already generally done at CPU offline as matter of course. So don't bother adding TDX specific logic for this, and rely on the normal WBINVD to handle it.
What's the "normal" WBINVD? At the very least, tdx_offline_cpu() should have a comment that explicitly calls out where that WBVIND is. I assume you're referring to the wbinvd() calls in things like hlt_play_dead()?
But unless the WBINVD is actually costly, why bother getting fancy?
Quoted 1 line
But that other patch is much more backport friendly.
Edgecombe, Rick P
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86
Quoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 2 lines
Oh, you acked it actually. But I was under the impression that after this patch here, the splat wouldn't be triggered. So it inadvertently fixes it.
Ah, that's why I was a bit confused. I was assuming
tdx_shutdown_cpu()was a cpuhp callback, but it's actually an IPI callback.
Quoted 8 lines
Hmm, isn't this patch wrong then? Ah, no, the changelog says:
However, WBINVD is already generally done at CPU offline as matter of course. So don't bother adding TDX specific logic for this, and rely on the normal WBINVD to handle it.
What's the "normal" WBINVD? At the very least,
tdx_offline_cpu()should have a comment that explicitly calls out where that WBVIND is.
I guess we could add one in tdx_offline_cpu(). Seems reasonable.
Quoted 2 lines
I assume you're
referring to thewbinvd()calls in things likehlt_play_dead()?
Yea.
Quoted 2 lines
But unless the WBINVD is actually costly, why bother getting fancy?
What is the suggestion to make it less fancy? Just put the wbinvd in tdx_offline_cpu()? Yea that works too. Probably will get a comment either way.
Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 1 line · Sean Christopherson
But unless the WBINVD is actually costly, why bother getting fancy?
WBINVD might be the most expensive single instruction in the whole ISA.
That said, I'd much rather have a potentially unnecessary WBINVD than miss one. The thing I'd be worried about would be something wonky like:
1. CPU offline does WBINVD
2. Some other TDX call gets made, dirties caches again
3. tdx_offline_cpu() skips WBINVD
So, let's just do both for now: Do WBINVD in tdx_offline_cpu() and comment that it might be redundant with other things in the CPU offline procedure.
This really needs to be solved with infrastructure and keeping data about the reasons for needing WBINVD, not relying on code ordering or fragile semantics.
H. Peter Anvin
reviewerRe: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86
Quoted 12 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 1 line · Sean Christopherson
But unless the WBINVD is actually costly, why bother getting fancy?
WBINVD might be the most expensive single instruction in the whole ISA.
That said, I'd much rather have a potentially unnecessary WBINVD than miss one. The thing I'd be worried about would be something wonky like:
1. CPU offline does WBINVD
2. Some other TDX call gets made, dirties caches again
3.tdx_offline_cpu()skips WBINVD
Quoted 7 lines
So, let's just do both for now: Do WBINVD in
tdx_offline_cpu()and comment that it might be redundant with other things in the CPU offline procedure.This really needs to be solved with infrastructure and keeping data about the reasons for needing WBINVD, not relying on code ordering or fragile semantics.
It is, *by far*, the most expensive *uninterruptible* instruction in the ISA. REP string instructions can of course be arbitrarily long, but are interruptible and so don't really count.
Some MSRs used during very early (pre-OS) initialization might be even slower on some implementations, but that's not visible to Linux and no workload of any kind is running.
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86
Quoted 21 lines · H. Peter Anvin
Quoted 12 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 1 line · Sean Christopherson
But unless the WBINVD is actually costly, why bother getting fancy?
WBINVD might be the most expensive single instruction in the whole ISA.
That said, I'd much rather have a potentially unnecessary WBINVD than miss one. The thing I'd be worried about would be something wonky like:
1. CPU offline does WBINVD
2. Some other TDX call gets made, dirties caches again
3.tdx_offline_cpu()skips WBINVDQuoted 7 lines
So, let's just do both for now: Do WBINVD in
tdx_offline_cpu()and comment that it might be redundant with other things in the CPU offline procedure.This really needs to be solved with infrastructure and keeping data about the reasons for needing WBINVD, not relying on code ordering or fragile semantics.
Quoted 7 lines
It is, *by far*, the most expensive *uninterruptible* instruction in the ISA. REP string instructions can of course be arbitrarily long, but are interruptible and so don't really count.
Some MSRs used during very early (pre-OS) initialization might be even slower on some implementations, but that's not visible to Linux and no workload of any kind is running.
Sorry, "costly" wasn't the right word. I know WBINVD super expensive, but unless someone cares deeply about the latency of offlining a CPU after its down TDX stuff, the "cost" is effectively zero.
Re: [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/virt/tdx: Pull kexec cache flush logic into arch/x86
Quoted 4 lines · Sean Christopherson
Sorry, "costly" wasn't the right word. I know WBINVD super expensive, but unless someone cares deeply about the latency of offlining a CPU after its down TDX stuff, the "cost" is effectively zero.
I once increased the CPU online/offline latency once and got nastygrams from folks. IIRC, I added a synchronize_rcu() which incurs way more latency than WBINVD, but folks _do_ care about CPU online/offline latency surprisingly.
In this case, though, I'm happy to add the WBINVD for simplicity and wait for a possible repeat of the torches an pitchforks.
PATCH v2 3/5 x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
In reply to Vishal VermaSome early TDX-capable platforms have an erratum where a partial write to TDX private memory can cause a machine check on a subsequent read. On these platforms, kexec and kdump have been disabled in these cases, because the old kernel cannot safely hand off TDX state to the new kernel. Later TDX modules support the TDH.SYS.DISABLE SEAMCALL, which provides a way to cleanly disable TDX and allow kexec to proceed.
The new SEAMCALL has an enumeration bit, but that is ignored. It is expected that users will be using the latest TDX module, and the failure mode for running the missing SEAMCALL on an older module is not fatal.
This can be a long running operation, and the time needed largely depends on the amount of memory that has been allocated to TDs. If all TDs have been destroyed prior to the sys_disable call, then it is fast, with only needing to override the TDX module memory.
After the SEAMCALL completes, the TDX module is disabled and all memory resources allocated to TDX are freed and reset. The next kernel can then re-initialize the TDX module from scratch via the normal TDX bring-up sequence.
The SEAMCALL can return two different error codes that expect a retry.
- TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE can be returned in the case of a host interrupt. However, it will not return until it makes some forward progress, so we can expect to complete even in the case of interrupt storms.
- TDX_SYS_BUSY will be returned on contention with other TDH.SYS.* SEAMCALLs, however a side effect of TDH.SYS.DISABLE is that it will block other SEAMCALLs once it gets going. So this contention will be short lived.
So loop infinitely on either of these error codes, until success or other error.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx_errno.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 1 + arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx_errno.h +1 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD_NON_ACCESSIBLE 0x6000000500000000ULL#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD_WRONG_APIC_MODE 0x6000000700000000ULL#define TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE 0x8000000300000000ULL +#define TDX_SYS_BUSY 0x8000020200000000ULL#define TDX_OPERAND_INVALID 0xC000010000000000ULL#define TDX_OPERAND_BUSY 0x8000020000000000ULL#define TDX_PREVIOUS_TLB_EPOCH_BUSY 0x8000020100000000ULL
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +3 -0
@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ static inline int pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(enum pg_level level)return level -1 ; } +void tdx_sys_disable (void ); +u64 tdh_vp_enter (struct tdx_vp *vp,struct tdx_module_args *args);u64 tdh_mng_addcx (struct tdx_td *td,struct page *tdcs_page);u64 tdh_mem_page_add (struct tdx_td *td,u64 gpa,struct page *page,struct page *source,u64 *ext_err1,u64 *ext_err2);
@@ -203,6 +205,7 @@ static inline void tdx_init(void) { }static inline u32 tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids (void ) {return 0 ; }static inline const char *tdx_dump_mce_info (struct mce *m) {return NULL ; }static inline const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) {return NULL ; } +static inline void tdx_sys_disable (void ) { }#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h +1 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD 41#define TDH_VP_WR 43#define TDH_SYS_CONFIG 45 +#define TDH_SYS_DISABLE 69/* * SEAMCALL leaf:
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +28 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@#include <asm/msr.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/tdx.h> +#include <asm/shared/tdx_errno.h> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/mce.h>
@@ -1940,3 +1941,30 @@ u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page)return seamcall (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD , &args); }EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid); + +void tdx_sys_disable (void ) +{ +struct tdx_module_args args = {}; +u64 ret; + +/* +* Don't loop forever. +* - TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE guarantees forward progress between +* calls. +* - TDX_SYS_BUSY could transiently contend with TDH.SYS.* SEAMCALLs, +* but will lock out future ones. +* +* This is a 'destructive' SEAMCALL, in that no other SEAMCALL can be +* run after this until a full reinitialization is done. +*/ +do { + ret =seamcall (TDH_SYS_DISABLE , &args); + }while (ret ==TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE || ret ==TDX_SYS_BUSY ); + +/* +* Print SEAMCALL failures, but not SW-defined error codes +* (SEAMCALL faulted with #GP/#UD, TDX not supported). +*/ +if (ret && (ret &TDX_SW_ERROR ) !=TDX_SW_ERROR ) +pr_err ("TDH.SYS.DISABLE failed: 0x%016llx\n" , ret); +}
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
Quoted 1 line · Vishal Verma
[..]
Quoted 16 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +16
-0+void tdx_sys_disable (void ) +{ +struct tdx_module_args args = {}; +u64 ret; + +/* +* Don't loop forever. +* - TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE guarantees forward progress between +* calls. +* - TDX_SYS_BUSY could transiently contend with TDH.SYS.* SEAMCALLs, +* but will lock out future ones. +* +* This is a 'destructive' SEAMCALL, in that no other SEAMCALL can be +* run after this until a full reinitialization is done. +*/ + do {
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page) · line 1970
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +10
-0+ ret =seamcall (TDH_SYS_DISABLE , &args); + }while (ret ==TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE || ret ==TDX_SYS_BUSY ); + +/* +* Print SEAMCALL failures, but not SW-defined error codes +* (SEAMCALL faulted with #GP/#UD, TDX not supported). +*/ +if (ret && (ret &TDX_SW_ERROR ) !=TDX_SW_ERROR ) +pr_err ("TDH.SYS.DISABLE failed: 0x%016llx\n" , ret); +}
Note - old TDX modules that don't implement this SEAMCALL produce a message like:
virt/tdx: TDH.SYS.DISABLE failed: 0xc000010000000000
Where that code translates to TDX_OPERAND_INVALID. This also serves as a nudge that the module should be updated.
It might be worth including a blurb about this in the commit message - something like below. This could be included when applying, or I can send an updated version with this if it is acceptable.
---
An error is printed if the SEAMCALL fails with anything other than the error codes that cause retries, or 'synthesized' error codes produced for #GP or #UD. e.g., an old module that has been properly initialized, that doesn't implement SYS_DISABLE, returns TDX_OPERAND_INVALID. This prints:
virt/tdx: TDH.SYS.DISABLE failed: 0xc000010000000000
But a system that doesn't have any TDX support at all doesn't print anything.
Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
In reply to Vishal VermaQuoted 31 lines · Vishal Verma
Some early TDX-capable platforms have an erratum where a partial write to TDX private memory can cause a machine check on a subsequent read. On these platforms, kexec and kdump have been disabled in these cases, because the old kernel cannot safely hand off TDX state to the new kernel. Later TDX modules support the TDH.SYS.DISABLE SEAMCALL, which provides a way to cleanly disable TDX and allow kexec to proceed.
The new SEAMCALL has an enumeration bit, but that is ignored. It is expected that users will be using the latest TDX module, and the failure mode for running the missing SEAMCALL on an older module is not fatal.
This can be a long running operation, and the time needed largely depends on the amount of memory that has been allocated to TDs. If all TDs have been destroyed prior to the
sys_disablecall, then it is fast, with only needing to override the TDX module memory.After the SEAMCALL completes, the TDX module is disabled and all memory resources allocated to TDX are freed and reset. The next kernel can then re-initialize the TDX module from scratch via the normal TDX bring-up sequence.
The SEAMCALL can return two different error codes that expect a retry.
-TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLEcan be returned in the case of a host interrupt. However, it will not return until it makes some forward progress, so we can expect to complete even in the case of interrupt storms.
-TDX_SYS_BUSYwill be returned on contention with other TDH.SYS.* SEAMCALLs, however a side effect of TDH.SYS.DISABLE is that it will block other SEAMCALLs once it gets going. So this contention will be short lived.
Quoted 7 lines
So loop infinitely on either of these error codes, until success or other error.
Co-developed-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
In reply to Vishal VermaQuoted 31 lines · Vishal Verma
Some early TDX-capable platforms have an erratum where a partial write to TDX private memory can cause a machine check on a subsequent read. On these platforms, kexec and kdump have been disabled in these cases, because the old kernel cannot safely hand off TDX state to the new kernel. Later TDX modules support the TDH.SYS.DISABLE SEAMCALL, which provides a way to cleanly disable TDX and allow kexec to proceed.
The new SEAMCALL has an enumeration bit, but that is ignored. It is expected that users will be using the latest TDX module, and the failure mode for running the missing SEAMCALL on an older module is not fatal.
This can be a long running operation, and the time needed largely depends on the amount of memory that has been allocated to TDs. If all TDs have been destroyed prior to the
sys_disablecall, then it is fast, with only needing to override the TDX module memory.After the SEAMCALL completes, the TDX module is disabled and all memory resources allocated to TDX are freed and reset. The next kernel can then re-initialize the TDX module from scratch via the normal TDX bring-up sequence.
The SEAMCALL can return two different error codes that expect a retry.
-TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLEcan be returned in the case of a host interrupt. However, it will not return until it makes some forward progress, so we can expect to complete even in the case of interrupt storms.
-TDX_SYS_BUSYwill be returned on contention with other TDH.SYS.* SEAMCALLs, however a side effect of TDH.SYS.DISABLE is that it will block other SEAMCALLs once it gets going. So this contention will be short lived.
Quoted 6 lines
So loop infinitely on either of these error codes, until success or other error.
Co-developed-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Kiryl Shutsemau
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
In reply to Vishal VermaQuoted 103 lines · Vishal Verma
Some early TDX-capable platforms have an erratum where a partial write to TDX private memory can cause a machine check on a subsequent read. On these platforms, kexec and kdump have been disabled in these cases, because the old kernel cannot safely hand off TDX state to the new kernel. Later TDX modules support the TDH.SYS.DISABLE SEAMCALL, which provides a way to cleanly disable TDX and allow kexec to proceed.
The new SEAMCALL has an enumeration bit, but that is ignored. It is expected that users will be using the latest TDX module, and the failure mode for running the missing SEAMCALL on an older module is not fatal.
This can be a long running operation, and the time needed largely depends on the amount of memory that has been allocated to TDs. If all TDs have been destroyed prior to the
sys_disablecall, then it is fast, with only needing to override the TDX module memory.After the SEAMCALL completes, the TDX module is disabled and all memory resources allocated to TDX are freed and reset. The next kernel can then re-initialize the TDX module from scratch via the normal TDX bring-up sequence.
The SEAMCALL can return two different error codes that expect a retry.
-TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLEcan be returned in the case of a host interrupt. However, it will not return until it makes some forward progress, so we can expect to complete even in the case of interrupt storms.
-TDX_SYS_BUSYwill be returned on contention with other TDH.SYS.* SEAMCALLs, however a side effect of TDH.SYS.DISABLE is that it will block other SEAMCALLs once it gets going. So this contention will be short lived.So loop infinitely on either of these error codes, until success or other error.
Co-developed-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vishal Verma <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx_errno.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 1 + arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+)arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx_errno.h +1
-0@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD_NON_ACCESSIBLE 0x6000000500000000ULL#define TDX_NON_RECOVERABLE_TD_WRONG_APIC_MODE 0x6000000700000000ULL#define TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE 0x8000000300000000ULL +#define TDX_SYS_BUSY 0x8000020200000000ULL#define TDX_OPERAND_INVALID 0xC000010000000000ULL#define TDX_OPERAND_BUSY 0x8000020000000000ULL#define TDX_PREVIOUS_TLB_EPOCH_BUSY 0x8000020100000000ULLarch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +3
-0@@ -172,6 +172,8 @@ static inline int pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(enum pg_level level)return level -1 ; } +void tdx_sys_disable (void ); +u64 tdh_vp_enter (struct tdx_vp *vp,struct tdx_module_args *args);u64 tdh_mng_addcx (struct tdx_td *td,struct page *tdcs_page);u64 tdh_mem_page_add (struct tdx_td *td,u64 gpa,struct page *page,struct page *source,u64 *ext_err1,u64 *ext_err2);@@ -203,6 +205,7 @@ static inline void tdx_init(void) { }static inline u32 tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids (void ) {return 0 ; }static inline const char *tdx_dump_mce_info (struct mce *m) {return NULL ; }static inline const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) {return NULL ; } +static inline void tdx_sys_disable (void ) { }#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h +1
-0@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD 41#define TDH_VP_WR 43#define TDH_SYS_CONFIG 45 +#define TDH_SYS_DISABLE 69/* * SEAMCALL leaf: arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +1
-0@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@#include <asm/msr.h> #include <asm/cpufeature.h> #include <asm/tdx.h> +#include <asm/shared/tdx_errno.h> #include <asm/cpu_device_id.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/mce.h> @@ -1940,3 +1941,30 @@ u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page)return seamcall (TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD , &args);
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page) · line 1951
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +8
-0}EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM (tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid); + +void tdx_sys_disable (void ) +{ +struct tdx_module_args args = {}; +u64 ret; + +/* +* Don't loop forever.
Nit: Add a new line here.
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page) · line 1953
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +2
-0+* - TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE guarantees forward progress between +* calls.
And here.
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page) · line 1955
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +2
-0+* - TDX_SYS_BUSY could transiently contend with TDH.SYS.* SEAMCALLs, +* but will lock out future ones.
Locked out by who? Is it TDX module contract? I don't see it documented in the spec.
I assumed that if the SEAMCALL fails other SEAMCALLs suppose to be functional. Hm?
Quoted 19 lines
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +15
-0+* +* This is a 'destructive' SEAMCALL, in that no other SEAMCALL can be +* run after this until a full reinitialization is done. +*/ +do { + ret =seamcall (TDH_SYS_DISABLE , &args); + }while (ret ==TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE || ret ==TDX_SYS_BUSY ); + +/* +* Print SEAMCALL failures, but not SW-defined error codes +* (SEAMCALL faulted with #GP/#UD, TDX not supported). +*/ +if (ret && (ret &TDX_SW_ERROR ) !=TDX_SW_ERROR ) +pr_err ("TDH.SYS.DISABLE failed: 0x%016llx\n" , ret); +}Signature · 2 lines
-- 2.53.0
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Edgecombe, Rick P
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
Quoted 7 lines · Kiryl Shutsemau
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, struct page *page) · line 1955
Quoted 3 lines
(quoted diff) +1
-0+ * - TDX_SYS_BUSY could transiently contend withTDH.SYS.* SEAMCALLs,
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +1
-0+ * but will lock out future ones.Locked out by who? Is it TDX module contract? I don't see it documented in
the spec.
Yea, by the TDX module.
We relayed that we need this specific behavior around TDX_SYS_BUSY contention, but the implementation isn't done. That spec is actually still in draft form. Which is refreshing, because we can actually tweak things like this based on what the kernel needs.
Quoted 3 lines
I assumed that if the SEAMCALL fails other SEAMCALLs suppose to be functional. Hm?
The behavior should be that once you make this seamcall (assuming it's supported) that no other seamcalls can be made. They will return an error. Do you think something else would be better? If it's an old TDX module, nothing happens of course.
So let's change the module if we see a problem. What should it be?
Kiryl Shutsemau
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
Quoted 7 lines · Rick P
Quoted 2 lines
I assumed that if the SEAMCALL fails other SEAMCALLs suppose to be functional. Hm?
The behavior should be that once you make this seamcall (assuming it's supported) that no other seamcalls can be made. They will return an error. Do you think something else would be better? If it's an old TDX module, nothing happens of course.
I guess the actual behaviour is dependant on the return code. It is obviously going to be the case for TDX_SUCCESS. And from the discussion, I guess that's true for TDX_SYS_BUSY and TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE.
What about other cases? The spec draft also lists TDX_SYS_NOT_READY and TDX_SYS_SHUTDOWN.
I wounder if it can affect the kernel. Consider the case when kexec (crash kernel start) happens due to crash on TDX module.
Will we be able to shutdown TDX module cleanly and make kexec safe?
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
Quoted 9 lines · Kiryl Shutsemau
Quoted 7 lines · Rick P
Quoted 2 lines
I assumed that if the SEAMCALL fails other SEAMCALLs suppose to be functional. Hm?
The behavior should be that once you make this seamcall (assuming it's supported) that no other seamcalls can be made. They will return an error. Do you think something else would be better? If it's an old TDX module, nothing happens of course.
Quoted 6 lines
I guess the actual behaviour is dependant on the return code. It is obviously going to be the case for
TDX_SUCCESS. And from the discussion, I guess that's true forTDX_SYS_BUSYandTDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE.What about other cases? The spec draft also lists
TDX_SYS_NOT_READYandTDX_SYS_SHUTDOWN.
I think these are safe too - TDX_SYS_SHUTDOWN means the module has already been shutdown, which this seamcall would've done, so things should be in the same state either way.
TDX_SYS_NOT_READY means the module hasn't been initialized yet. This seamcall should just exit, and the module is already blocking any seamcall that need the module to be initialized. The seamcalls to initialize the module will be allowed, as they are after a sys_disable call anyway.
Quoted 5 lines
I wounder if it can affect the kernel. Consider the case when kexec (crash kernel start) happens due to crash on TDX module.
Will we be able to shutdown TDX module cleanly and make kexec safe?
Hm -are the semantics for what happens if there is a crash in the module defined? I think Linux should expect that sys_disable should either start doing its shutdown work, or exit with one of the other defined exit statuses. Anything else would be considered a module bug.
Edgecombe, Rick P
maintainerRe: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
Quoted 12 lines · Vishal L
Quoted 7 lines
I guess the actual behaviour is dependant on the return code. It is obviously going to be the case for
TDX_SUCCESS. And from the discussion, I guess that's true forTDX_SYS_BUSYandTDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE.What about other cases? The spec draft also lists
TDX_SYS_NOT_READYandTDX_SYS_SHUTDOWN.I think these are safe too -
TDX_SYS_SHUTDOWNmeans the module has already been shutdown, which this seamcall would've done, so things should be in the same state either way.
Quoted 5 lines
TDX_SYS_NOT_READYmeans the module hasn't been initialized yet. This seamcall should just exit, and the module is already blocking any seamcall that need the module to be initialized. The seamcalls to initialize the module will be allowed, as they are after asys_disablecall anyway.
Should the seamcall return success in the case where it would return TDX_SYS_NOT_READY? It is in basically a reset state right? The errors we care about are actual errors (TDX_SW_ERROR), so it makes no difference to the code in the patch. But it might be a nicer API for the seamcall?
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I wounder if it can affect the kernel. Consider the case when kexec (crash kernel start) happens due to crash on TDX module.
Will we be able to shutdown TDX module cleanly and make kexec safe?
Hm -are the semantics for what happens if there is a crash in the module defined? I think Linux should expect that
sys_disableshould either start doing its shutdown work, or exit with one of the other defined exit statuses. Anything else would be considered a module bug.
We often have the question come up about how much we should to guard against bugs in the TDX module. I tend to also think we should not do defensive programming, same as we do for the kernel. If it's easy to handle something or emit a warning it's nice, but otherwise the solution for such cases should be to fix the TDX module bug.
But for the kdump case, we don't actually need sys disable to succeed. The kdump kernel will not load the TDX module. And as for the errata, this already needs a special situation to be a problem. But even if it happens, I'd think better to try to the kdump. Not sure what the fix would be for that scenario, even if we allowed for a large complexity budget. So best effort seems good.
Does it seem reasonable?
Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
Quoted 19 lines · Rick P
Quoted 12 lines · Vishal L
Quoted 7 lines
I guess the actual behaviour is dependant on the return code. It is obviously going to be the case for
TDX_SUCCESS. And from the discussion, I guess that's true forTDX_SYS_BUSYandTDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE.What about other cases? The spec draft also lists
TDX_SYS_NOT_READYandTDX_SYS_SHUTDOWN.I think these are safe too -
TDX_SYS_SHUTDOWNmeans the module has already been shutdown, which this seamcall would've done, so things should be in the same state either way.Quoted 5 lines
TDX_SYS_NOT_READYmeans the module hasn't been initialized yet. This seamcall should just exit, and the module is already blocking any seamcall that need the module to be initialized. The seamcalls to initialize the module will be allowed, as they are after asys_disablecall anyway.
Quoted 4 lines
Should the seamcall return success in the case where it would return
TDX_SYS_NOT_READY? It is in basically a reset state right? The errors we care about are actual errors (TDX_SW_ERROR), so it makes no difference to the code in the patch. But it might be a nicer API for the seamcall?
I am not sure. TDX_SYS_NOT_READY can be useful as might indicate mismatch of system state understanding between kernel and TDX module.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I wounder if it can affect the kernel. Consider the case when kexec (crash kernel start) happens due to crash on TDX module.
Will we be able to shutdown TDX module cleanly and make kexec safe?
Hm -are the semantics for what happens if there is a crash in the module defined?
I meant kernel crash around/before TDX module initialization. Sorry for confusion.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I think Linux should expect that
sys_disableshould
either start doing its shutdown work, or exit with one of the other defined exit statuses. Anything else would be considered a module bug.
Quoted 8 lines
We often have the question come up about how much we should to guard against bugs in the TDX module. I tend to also think we should not do defensive programming, same as we do for the kernel. If it's easy to handle something or emit a warning it's nice, but otherwise the solution for such cases should be to fix the TDX module bug.
But for the kdump case, we don't actually need sys disable to succeed. The kdump kernel will not load the TDX module.
AFAIK, it is possible to start a normal kernel after kdump is done with kexec (requires memmap= tricks). And the normal kernel might want to use TDX again.
Not sure if it is done in practice. I would rather go full reboot path after crash.
Quoted 6 lines
And as for the errata, this already needs a
special situation to be a problem. But even if it happens, I'd think better to try to the kdump. Not sure what the fix would be for that scenario, even if we allowed for a large complexity budget. So best effort seems good.Does it seem reasonable?
I am probably too picky here. We want to start from make basic kexec functionality to work for start.
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Re: [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/virt/tdx: Add SEAMCALL wrapper for TDH.SYS.DISABLE
In reply to Edgecombe, Rick PQuoted 16 lines · Rick P
Quoted 10 lines · Vishal L
Quoted 6 lines
I guess the actual behaviour is dependant on the return code. It is obviously going to be the case for
TDX_SUCCESS. And from the discussion, I guess that's true forTDX_SYS_BUSYandTDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE.What about other cases? The spec draft also lists
TDX_SYS_NOT_READYandTDX_SYS_SHUTDOWN.I think these are safe too -
TDX_SYS_SHUTDOWNmeans the module has already been shutdown, which this seamcall would've done, so things should be in the same state either way.Quoted 5 lines
TDX_SYS_NOT_READYmeans the module hasn't been initialized yet. This seamcall should just exit, and the module is already blocking any seamcall that need the module to be initialized. The seamcalls to initialize the module will be allowed, as they are after asys_disablecall anyway.
Quoted 4 lines
Should the seamcall return success in the case where it would return
TDX_SYS_NOT_READY? It is in basically a reset state right? The errors we care about are actual errors (TDX_SW_ERROR), so it makes no difference to the code in the patch. But it might be a nicer API for the seamcall?
The problem is that the module doesn't have *a* reset state. TDX_SYS_NOT_READY gets returned before the module is initialized and initialization is a long, arduous process.
For instance, I believe the module stays "not ready" in the middle of giving it PAMT memory and a keyID and all that jazz.
TDX_SYS_NOT_READY is a way of saying it can't easily *make* it to the actual reset state that TDH.SYS.DISABLE wants it to be in.
It's arguable that the module should be made more resilient to stop returning TDX_SYS_NOT_READY. But it's not as simple as just changing a return code in the module.
I'm OK with it continuing to return TDX_SYS_NOT_READY for now. I think it's a useful indicator. Maybe the kernel can't do much with it, but it's a little window into what went wrong.
PATCH v2 4/5 x86/tdx: Disable the TDX module during kexec and kdump
In reply to Vishal VermaUse the TDH.SYS.DISABLE SEAMCALL, which disables the TDX module, reclaims all memory resources assigned to TDX, and clears any partial-write induced poison, to allow kexec and kdump on platforms with the partial write errata.
On TDX-capable platforms with the partial write erratum, kexec has been disabled because the new kernel could hit a machine check reading a previously poisoned memory location.
Later TDX modules support TDH.SYS.DISABLE, which disables the module and reclaims all TDX memory resources, allowing the new kernel to re-initialize TDX from scratch. This operation also clears the old memory, cleaning up any poison.
Add tdx_sys_disable() to tdx_shutdown(), which is called in the syscore_shutdown path for kexec. This is done just before tdx_shutdown() disables VMX on all CPUs.
For kdump, call tdx_sys_disable() in the crash path before x86_virt_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu() does VMXOFF.
Since this clears any poison on TDX-managed memory, remove the X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE check in machine_kexec() that blocked kexec on partial write errata platforms.
--- arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c | 16 ---------------- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 1 + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/crash.c +2 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@#include <linux/kdebug.h> #include <asm/cpu.h> #include <asm/reboot.h> +#include <asm/tdx.h> #include <asm/intel_pt.h> #include <asm/crash.h> #include <asm/cmdline.h>
@@ -112,6 +113,7 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)crash_smp_send_stop (); +tdx_sys_disable ();x86_virt_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu ();/*
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +0 -16
@@ -347,22 +347,6 @@ int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image)unsigned long reloc_end = (unsigned long )__relocate_kernel_end;int result; -/* -* Some early TDX-capable platforms have an erratum. A kernel -* partial write (a write transaction of less than cacheline -* lands at memory controller) to TDX private memory poisons that -* memory, and a subsequent read triggers a machine check. -* -* On those platforms the old kernel must reset TDX private -* memory before jumping to the new kernel otherwise the new -* kernel may see unexpected machine check. For simplicity -* just fail kexec/kdump on those platforms. -*/ -if (boot_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE )) { -pr_info_once ("Not allowed on platform with tdx_pw_mce bug\n" ); -return -EOPNOTSUPP ; - } -/* Setup the identity mapped 64bit page table */ result =init_pgtable (image,__pa (control_page));if (result)
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +1 -0
@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static void tdx_shutdown_cpu(void *ign)static void tdx_shutdown (void *ign) { +tdx_sys_disable ();on_each_cpu (tdx_shutdown_cpu,NULL ,1 ); }
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/tdx: Disable the TDX module during kexec and kdump
Quoted 21 lines · Vishal Verma
Use the TDH.SYS.DISABLE SEAMCALL, which disables the TDX module, reclaims all memory resources assigned to TDX, and clears any partial-write induced poison, to allow kexec and kdump on platforms with the partial write errata.
On TDX-capable platforms with the partial write erratum, kexec has been disabled because the new kernel could hit a machine check reading a previously poisoned memory location.
Later TDX modules support TDH.SYS.DISABLE, which disables the module and reclaims all TDX memory resources, allowing the new kernel to re-initialize TDX from scratch. This operation also clears the old memory, cleaning up any poison.
Add
tdx_sys_disable()totdx_shutdown(), which is called in thesyscore_shutdownpath for kexec. This is done just beforetdx_shutdown()disables VMX on all CPUs.For kdump, call
tdx_sys_disable()in the crash path beforex86_virt_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu()does VMXOFF.
Quoted 8 lines
Since this clears any poison on TDX-managed memory, remove the
X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCEcheck inmachine_kexec()that blocked kexec on partial write errata platforms.Co-developed-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/tdx: Disable the TDX module during kexec and kdump
In reply to Vishal VermaQuoted 21 lines · Vishal Verma
Use the TDH.SYS.DISABLE SEAMCALL, which disables the TDX module, reclaims all memory resources assigned to TDX, and clears any partial-write induced poison, to allow kexec and kdump on platforms with the partial write errata.
On TDX-capable platforms with the partial write erratum, kexec has been disabled because the new kernel could hit a machine check reading a previously poisoned memory location.
Later TDX modules support TDH.SYS.DISABLE, which disables the module and reclaims all TDX memory resources, allowing the new kernel to re-initialize TDX from scratch. This operation also clears the old memory, cleaning up any poison.
Add
tdx_sys_disable()totdx_shutdown(), which is called in thesyscore_shutdownpath for kexec. This is done just beforetdx_shutdown()disables VMX on all CPUs.For kdump, call
tdx_sys_disable()in the crash path beforex86_virt_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu()does VMXOFF.
Quoted 7 lines
Since this clears any poison on TDX-managed memory, remove the
X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCEcheck inmachine_kexec()that blocked kexec on partial write errata platforms.Co-developed-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
PATCH v2 5/5 x86/virt/tdx: Remove kexec docs
In reply to Vishal VermaFrom: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Recent changes have removed the hard limitations for using kexec and TDX together. So remove the section in the TDX docs.
Users on partial write erratums will need an updated TDX module to handle the rare edge cases. The docs do not currently provide any guidance on recommended TDX module versions, so don't keep a whole section around to document this interaction.
--- Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst | 7 ------- 1 file changed, 7 deletions(-)
Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst +0 -7
@@ -138,13 +138,6 @@ If the platform has such erratum, the kernel prints additional message in machine check handler to tell user the machine check may be caused by kernel bug on TDX private memory. -Kexec -~~~~~~~ - -Currently kexec doesn't work on the TDX platforms with the aforementioned -erratum. It fails when loading the kexec kernel image. Otherwise it -works normally. - Interaction vs S3 and deeper states ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/virt/tdx: Remove kexec docs
Quoted 5 lines · Vishal Verma
From: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Recent changes have removed the hard limitations for using kexec and TDX together. So remove the section in the TDX docs.
Quoted 8 lines
Users on partial write erratums will need an updated TDX module to handle the rare edge cases. The docs do not currently provide any guidance on recommended TDX module versions, so don't keep a whole section around to document this interaction.
Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/virt/tdx: Remove kexec docs
In reply to Vishal VermaQuoted 5 lines · Vishal Verma
From: Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
Recent changes have removed the hard limitations for using kexec and TDX together. So remove the section in the TDX docs.
Quoted 7 lines
Users on partial write erratums will need an updated TDX module to handle the rare edge cases. The docs do not currently provide any guidance on recommended TDX module versions, so don't keep a whole section around to document this interaction.
Signed-off-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vishal Verma <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
PATCH 1/1 x86/tdx, KVM: fix HKID leak when kexec is initiated with active TDs
In reply to Vishal VermaWhen kexec is initiated while TDs are running, vCPU threads can be mid-TDH.VP.ENTER on other CPUs when tdx_shutdown() fires. The TDX module rejects TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE for a VP in RUNNING state, leaving the HKID in a leaked state:
kvm_intel: tdh_mng_vpflushdone() failed. HKID 33 is leaked.
Fix this by introducing a quiescing flag set at the start of tdx_shutdown(). KVM's tdx_vcpu_run() checks the flag and returns EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE before attempting TDH.VP.ENTER. After setting the flag, tdx_shutdown() calls on_each_cpu(tdx_seam_sync) with wait=1 to ensure any CPU currently inside TDH.VP.ENTER has exited SEAM before tdx_sys_disable() is called.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +2 -0
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@ static inline int pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(enum pg_level level) }void tdx_sys_disable (void ); +bool tdx_kexec_quiescing (void );u64 tdh_vp_enter (struct tdx_vp *vp,struct tdx_module_args *args);u64 tdh_mng_addcx (struct tdx_td *td,struct page *tdcs_page);
@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ static inline u32 tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids(void) { return 0; }static inline const char *tdx_dump_mce_info (struct mce *m) {return NULL ; }static inline const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) {return NULL ; }static inline void tdx_sys_disable (void ) { } +static inline bool tdx_kexec_quiescing (void ) {return false; }#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +3 -0
@@ -1053,6 +1053,9 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 run_flags)struct vcpu_tdx *tdx =to_tdx (vcpu);struct vcpu_vt *vt =to_vt (vcpu); +if (unlikely (tdx_kexec_quiescing ())) +return EXIT_FASTPATH_NONE ; +/* * WARN if KVM wants to force an immediate exit, as the TDX module does * not guarantee entry into the guest, i.e. it's possible for KVM to
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +12 -0
@@ -236,6 +236,16 @@ static void tdx_cpu_flush_cache(void)this_cpu_write (cache_state_incoherent, false); } + +static atomic_t tdx_shutdown_in_progress =ATOMIC_INIT (0 ); + +bool tdx_kexec_quiescing (void ) +{ +return atomic_read (&tdx_shutdown_in_progress); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (tdx_kexec_quiescing); + +static void tdx_seam_sync (void *ign) { }static void tdx_shutdown_cpu (void *ign) {/*
@@ -252,6 +262,8 @@ static void tdx_shutdown_cpu(void *ign)static void tdx_shutdown (void *ign) { +atomic_set (&tdx_shutdown_in_progress,1 ); +on_each_cpu (tdx_seam_sync,NULL ,1 );tdx_sys_disable ();on_each_cpu (tdx_shutdown_cpu,NULL ,1 ); }
Signature · 9 lines
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Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/tdx, KVM: fix HKID leak when kexec is initiated with active TDs
Quoted 7 lines · Robert Nowicki
When kexec is initiated while TDs are running, vCPU threads can be mid-TDH.VP.ENTER on other CPUs when
tdx_shutdown()fires. The TDX module rejects TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE for a VP in RUNNING state, leaving the HKID in a leaked state:
kvm_intel:tdh_mng_vpflushdone()failed. HKID 33 is leaked.
Quoted 8 lines
Fix this by introducing a quiescing flag set at the start of
tdx_shutdown(). KVM'stdx_vcpu_run()checks the flag and returnsEXIT_FASTPATH_NONEbefore attempting TDH.VP.ENTER. After setting the flag,tdx_shutdown()callson_each_cpu(tdx_seam_sync)with wait=1 to ensure any CPU currently inside TDH.VP.ENTER has exited SEAM beforetdx_sys_disable()is called.Fixes 58171ae22e11 ("x86/tdx: Disable the TDX module during kexec and kdump")
Please don't post seemingly standalone patches for code that hasn't yet been merged, it's quite confusing.
Quoted 15 lines
u64
tdh_vp_enter(struct tdx_vp *vp, struct tdx_module_args *args); u64tdh_mng_addcx(struct tdx_td *td, struct page *tdcs_page);arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +1
-0@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ static inline u32 tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids(void) { return 0; }static inline const char *tdx_dump_mce_info (struct mce *m) {return NULL ; }static inline const struct tdx_sys_info *tdx_get_sysinfo (void ) {return NULL ; }static inline void tdx_sys_disable (void ) { } +static inline bool tdx_kexec_quiescing (void ) {return false; }#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST */ #endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 run_flags) · line 1056
Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +1
-0@@ -1053,6 +1053,9 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 run_flags)struct vcpu_tdx *tdx =to_tdx (vcpu);struct vcpu_vt *vt =to_vt (vcpu); +if (unlikely (tdx_kexec_quiescing ()))
Requiring KVM to check a global on every entry is pretty ugly, especially since this is for a very rare scenario (in terms of number of entries). And forcing KVM to do a CALL+RET to check an almost-never-set flag is especially ugly.
Why not handle this entirely in tdx_shutdown_cpu()? E.g. have the last CPU through disable TDX, and hld all the CPUs hostage until that's done. It's not the prettiest thing in the world, but it's entirely self-contained.
static void tdx_shutdown_cpu(void *__nr_cpus_remaining)
{
atomic_t *nr_cpus_remaining = __nr_cpus_remaining;
if (!atomic_add_unless(nr_cpus_remaining, -1, 1)) {
tdx_sys_disable();
atomic_set(nr_cpus_remaining, 0);
}
x86_virt_put_ref(X86_FEATURE_VMX);
while (!atomic_read(nr_cpus_remaining))
cpu_relax();
}static void tdx_shutdown(void *ign)
{
atomic_t nr_cpus_remaining = ATOMIC_INIT(num_online_cpus());
on_each_cpu(tdx_shutdown_cpu, &nr_cpus_remaining, 1);
}A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): CH3PR11MB843450CBD154D42B31D15E93832D2@CH3PR11MB8434.namprd11.prod.outlook.com
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/tdx, KVM: fix HKID leak when kexec is initiated with active TDs
Restoring the Cc (especially the lists), as this is generally useful information for newcomers (e.g. for other people reading along that might be new to upstream).
Quoted 2 lines · Robert
Hi Sean,
Thank you for your reply,
Please don't top post. https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette has a lot of useful information for dealing with the lists.
I also recommend asking others at Intel for tips on setting up your mail client, and other aspects of their upstream workflows. Many/most companies (especially big ones) have restricted environments that can make it annoying to get a "good" setup for upstream development.
Quoted 2 lines
I am not yet well familiar how processes are working here with new features development, trying to learn that.
No worries, pretty much everyone goes through the same experience :-)
Quoted 6 lines
That's the first time I am working with reporting issues faced as just started validating TDX module on top of linux kernel, didn't know how it should be processed.
Intention was to let Vishal know about potential issue and suggest some fix which worked for me.
For patches that have been posted, but not yet merged, reporting issues (real or theorized) is handled like code review. Just reply to the patch email itself with the (suspected) issue. If you have a potential fix, you can include a sample patch, a diff, a snippet of code, or something in between (that's the glorious part of an email based patch+review system, it's very free-form so almost anything goes).
Edgecombe, Rick P
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/tdx, KVM: fix HKID leak when kexec is initiated with active TDs
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 15 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 14 lines · Robert Nowicki
When kexec is initiated while TDs are running, vCPU threads can be mid-TDH.VP.ENTER on other CPUs when
tdx_shutdown()fires. The TDX module rejects TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE for a VP in RUNNING state, leaving the HKID in a leaked state:
kvm_intel:tdh_mng_vpflushdone()failed. HKID 33 is leaked.Fix this by introducing a quiescing flag set at the start of
tdx_shutdown(). KVM'stdx_vcpu_run()checks the flag and returnsEXIT_FASTPATH_NONEbefore attempting TDH.VP.ENTER. After setting the flag,tdx_shutdown()callson_each_cpu(tdx_seam_sync)with wait=1 to ensure any CPU currently inside TDH.VP.ENTER has exited SEAM beforetdx_sys_disable()is called.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Fixes 58171ae22e11 ("x86/tdx: Disable the TDX module during kexec andkdump")
Please don't post seemingly standalone patches for code that hasn't yet been merged, it's quite confusing.
+1. Robert, we try to coordinate public Linux TDX work internally before posting because there is so much of it, it gets confusing to community/maintainers. Please check in with the Linux TDX developers before posing TDX patches so we can have a cohesive effort.
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 16 lines
u64
tdh_vp_enter(struct tdx_vp *vp, struct tdx_module_args *args); u64tdh_mng_addcx(struct tdx_td *td, struct page *tdcs_page);(quoted diff) +0
-0@@ -206,6 +207,7 @@ static inline u32 tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids(void) { return 0; } static inline const char *tdx_dump_mce_info(struct mce *m) { return NULL; }static inline const struct
tdx_sys_info*tdx_get_sysinfo(void){ return NULL; }
static inline voidtdx_sys_disable(void){ }
+static inline booltdx_kexec_quiescing(void){ return false; }
#endif /*CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST*/
#endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +0
-0
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 run_flags) · line 1056
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +0
-0@@ -1053,6 +1053,9 @@ fastpath_t tdx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 run_flags) struct vcpu_tdx *tdx = to_tdx(vcpu); struct vcpu_vt *vt = to_vt(vcpu);arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +1
-0+if (unlikely (tdx_kexec_quiescing ()))
There is essentially an existing kexec race, where vmxoff happens when SEAMCALLs could still happen. It goes back to the first TDX kexec support (i.e. not introduced by vmxon refactor). VMX KVM has some spurious logic to handle something similar for normal VMs, but TDX doesn't.
I don't see why this TDH.MNG.VPFLUSHDONE case is special. If the TDX module is shutdown and the old kernel is going away, how is anything leaked other than the normal type of leakage that happens during kexec? So I think maybe this is just the known vmxoff seamcall race, with the specific case observed generating a message about leaking.
Also, not sure how handling VP.ENTER would prevent the VPFLUSHDONE call from meeting an error and emitting the same message. If the TDX module is shutdown...
Quoted 25 lines
Requiring KVM to check a global on every entry is pretty ugly, especially since this is for a very rare scenario (in terms of number of entries). And forcing KVM to do a CALL+RET to check an almost-never-set flag is especially ugly.
Why not handle this entirely in tdx_shutdown_cpu()? E.g. have the last CPU through disable TDX, and hld all the CPUs hostage until that's done. It's not the prettiest thing in the world, but it's entirely self-contained.
static void
tdx_shutdown_cpu(void *__nr_cpus_remaining){ atomic_t *nr_cpus_remaining = __nr_cpus_remaining; if (!atomic_add_unless(nr_cpus_remaining, -1, 1)) { tdx_sys_disable(); atomic_set(nr_cpus_remaining, 0); } x86_virt_put_ref(X86_FEATURE_VMX); while (!atomic_read(nr_cpus_remaining)) cpu_relax(); }
Quoted 6 lines
static void
tdx_shutdown(void *ign){ atomic_t nr_cpus_remaining = ATOMIC_INIT(num_online_cpus()); on_each_cpu(tdx_shutdown_cpu, &nr_cpus_remaining, 1); }
After vmxoff happens, the SEAMCALLs will just meet other errors. The wrappers will morph the vmxoff condition into a SW error that much of the TDX code can't handle either. So it doesn't help the problem I'm afraid.
It would be my preference to fix the existing issue separately than this series. This series makes kexec way more functional for TDX, and the worst case AFAICT is a splat in an otherwise successful kexec. So a non-critical and existing problem.
Kai and I were previously kicking around some ideas about the general case problem. It somehow missed our cleanup list, but I just added it.