perf/core: take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON cap
PATCH 1/1 perf/core: take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON cap
Open access to per-process monitoring for CAP_PERFMON only privileged processes [1]. Extend ptrace_may_access() check in perf_events subsystem with perfmon_capable() to simplify user experience and make monitoring more secure by reducing attack surface.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
--- kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +2 -2
@@ -11587,7 +11587,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_task;/* -* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. +* Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. * * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
@@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). */ err = -EACCES ; -if (!ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) +if (!perfmon_capable () && !ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) goto err_cred; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
[tip: perf/urgent] perf/core: Take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON capability
The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 45fd22da97c6125d8d0d35bd1791e7c0c4175279 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/45fd22da97c6125d8d0d35bd1791e7c0c4175279 Author: Alexey Budankov <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Wed, 05 Aug 2020 10:56:56 +03:00 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 06 Aug 2020 15:03:20 +02:00
perf/core: Take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON capability
Open access to per-process monitoring for CAP_PERFMON only privileged processes [1]. Extend ptrace_may_access() check in perf_events subsystem with perfmon_capable() to simplify user experience and make monitoring more secure by reducing attack surface.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
--- kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +2 -2
@@ -11689,7 +11689,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_task;/* -* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. +* Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. * * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
@@ -11697,7 +11697,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). */ err = -EACCES ; -if (!ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) +if (!perfmon_capable () && !ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) goto err_cred; }
Em Wed, Aug 05, 2020 at 10:56:56AM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu:
Quoted 6 lines
Open access to per-process monitoring for
CAP_PERFMONonly privileged processes [1]. Extendptrace_may_access()check inperf_eventssubsystem withperfmon_capable()to simplify user experience and make monitoring more secure by reducing attack surface.
Peter, can you pick up this one? You said it was ok last time we discussed this.
- Arnaldo
Quoted 32 lines
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Signed-off-by Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>--- kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)kernel/events/core.c +2
-2@@ -11587,7 +11587,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open, goto err_task;/* -* Reuse ptrace permission checks for now. +* Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility. * * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to @@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,* perf_event_exit_task() that could imply). */ err = -EACCES ; -if (!ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) +if (!perfmon_capable () && !ptrace_may_access (task,PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS )) goto err_cred; }Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Signature · 1 line
- Arnaldo