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perf/core: take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON cap

PATCH Applied Alexey Budankov 3 participants 3 messages Aug 5, 2020 – Aug 6, 2020 perf events

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 perf/core: take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON cap

Open access to per-process monitoring for CAP_PERFMON only privileged processes [1]. Extend ptrace_may_access() check in perf_events subsystem with perfmon_capable() to simplify user experience and make monitoring more secure by reducing attack surface.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +2 -2
index 856d98c36f56..f50d528af444 100644
@@ -11587,7 +11587,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 			goto err_task;
 
 		/*
-		 * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
+		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
 		 *
 		 * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
 		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
@@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+		if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
#1 lore raw

[tip: perf/urgent] perf/core: Take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON capability

The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:

The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     45fd22da97c6125d8d0d35bd1791e7c0c4175279
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/45fd22da97c6125d8d0d35bd1791e7c0c4175279
Author:        Alexey Budankov <[email protected]>
AuthorDate:    Wed, 05 Aug 2020 10:56:56 +03:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
CommitterDate: Thu, 06 Aug 2020 15:03:20 +02:00

perf/core: Take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON capability

Open access to per-process monitoring for CAP_PERFMON only privileged processes [1]. Extend ptrace_may_access() check in perf_events subsystem with perfmon_capable() to simplify user experience and make monitoring more secure by reducing attack surface.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +2 -2
index 78e69e1..41e0cef 100644
@@ -11689,7 +11689,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 			goto err_task;
 
 		/*
-		 * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
+		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
 		 *
 		 * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
 		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
@@ -11697,7 +11697,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+		if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}
 
maintainer Acked-by on v1 1/1
#2 lore raw
In reply to Alexey Budankov

Em Wed, Aug 05, 2020 at 10:56:56AM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu:

Quoted 6 lines

Open access to per-process monitoring for CAP_PERFMON only privileged processes [1]. Extend ptrace_may_access() check in perf_events subsystem with perfmon_capable() to simplify user experience and make monitoring more secure by reducing attack surface.

Peter, can you pick up this one? You said it was ok last time we discussed this.

- Arnaldo

Quoted 32 lines

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/events/core.c +2 -2
index 856d98c36f56..f50d528af444 100644
@@ -11587,7 +11587,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 			goto err_task;
 
 		/*
-		 * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
+		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
 		 *
 		 * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
 		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
@@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+		if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Signature · 1 line
- Arnaldo