arm64: entry: Place an SB sequence following an ERET instruction
Subsystems (2)
PATCH v2 1/1 arm64: entry: Place an SB sequence following an ERET instruction
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit 679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8 upstream
Some CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack.
This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return.
[florian: Adjust hyp-entry.S to account for the label
added change to hyp/entry.S]
---
Changes in v2:
- added missing hunk in hyp/entry.S per Will's feedback
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S | 2 ++ arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 4 ++++ 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S +2 -0
@@ -255,6 +255,7 @@ alternative_insn eret, nop, ARM64_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 .else eret .endif + sb .endm .macro get_thread_info, rd
@@ -945,6 +946,7 @@ __ni_sys_trace: mrs x30, far_el1 .endif eret + sb .endm .align 11
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/entry.S +2 -0
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ ENTRY(__guest_enter) // Do not touch any register after this! eret + sb ENDPROC(__guest_enter) ENTRY(__guest_exit)
@@ -195,4 +196,5 @@ alternative_endif ldp x0, x1, [sp], #16 eret + sb ENDPROC(__fpsimd_guest_restore)
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S +4 -0
@@ -97,6 +97,7 @@ el1_sync: // Guest trapped into EL2 do_el2_call 2: eret + sb el1_hvc_guest: /*
@@ -147,6 +148,7 @@ wa_epilogue: mov x0, xzr add sp, sp, #16 eret + sb el1_trap: get_vcpu_ptr x1, x0
@@ -198,6 +200,7 @@ el2_error: b.ne __hyp_panic mov x0, #(1 << ARM_EXIT_WITH_SERROR_BIT) eret + sb ENTRY(__hyp_do_panic) mov lr, #(PSR_F_BIT | PSR_I_BIT | PSR_A_BIT | PSR_D_BIT |\
@@ -206,6 +209,7 @@ ENTRY(__hyp_do_panic) ldr lr, =panic msr elr_el2, lr eret + sb ENDPROC(__hyp_do_panic) ENTRY(__hyp_panic)
Signature · 6 lines
2.17.1 _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list [email protected] https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
Quoted 10 lines · Florian Fainelli
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit
679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8upstreamSome CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack.
Quoted 7 lines
This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return.
Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>[florian: Adjust
hyp-entry.Sto account for the label added change tohyp/entry.S]Signed-off-by Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
I've queued it up, thanks!
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks, Sasha
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 13 lines · Florian Fainelli
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit
679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8upstreamSome CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack.
This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return.
Quoted 8 lines
Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>[florian: Adjust
hyp-entry.Sto account for the label
added change tohyp/entry.S]Signed-off-by Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:- added missing hunk in
hyp/entry.Sper Will's feedback
What about 4.19.y and 4.14.y trees? I can't take something for 4.9.y and then have a regression if someone moves to a newer release, right?
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 21 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Fainelli
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit
679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8upstreamSome CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack.
This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return.
Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>[florian: Adjust
hyp-entry.Sto account for the label
added change tohyp/entry.S]Signed-off-by Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
- added missing hunk in
hyp/entry.Sper Will's feedbackWhat about 4.19.y and 4.14.y trees? I can't take something for 4.9.y and then have a regression if someone moves to a newer release, right?
Sure, send you candidates for 4.14 and 4.19.
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Quoted 22 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 21 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Fainelli
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit
679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8upstreamSome CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack.
This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return.
Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>[florian: Adjust
hyp-entry.Sto account for the label
added change tohyp/entry.S]Signed-off-by Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
- added missing hunk in
hyp/entry.Sper Will's feedbackWhat about 4.19.y and 4.14.y trees? I can't take something for 4.9.y and then have a regression if someone moves to a newer release, right?
Sure, send you candidates for 4.14 and 4.19.
Greg, did you have a chance to queue those changes for 4.9, 4.14 and 4.19?
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
Thanks
Signature · 5 lines
Florian _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list [email protected] https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 30 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 27 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 25 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 13 lines · Florian Fainelli
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit
679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8upstreamSome CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack.
This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return.
Quoted 8 lines
Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>[florian: Adjust
hyp-entry.Sto account for the label
added change tohyp/entry.S]Signed-off-by Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:- added missing hunk in
hyp/entry.Sper Will's feedbackWhat about 4.19.y and 4.14.y trees? I can't take something for 4.9.y and then have a regression if someone moves to a newer release, right?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Sure, send you candidates for 4.14 and 4.19.
Greg, did you have a chance to queue those changes for 4.9, 4.14 and 4.19?
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
Nope, I was waiting for Will's "ack" for these.
thanks,
greg k-h
Quoted 33 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 32 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 28 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 21 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Fainelli
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit
679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8upstreamSome CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack.
This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return.
Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>[florian: Adjust
hyp-entry.Sto account for the label
added change tohyp/entry.S]Signed-off-by Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
- added missing hunk in
hyp/entry.Sper Will's feedbackWhat about 4.19.y and 4.14.y trees? I can't take something for 4.9.y and then have a regression if someone moves to a newer release, right?
Sure, send you candidates for 4.14 and 4.19.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Greg, did you have a chance to queue those changes for 4.9, 4.14 and 4.19?
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/Nope, I was waiting for Will's "ack" for these.
OK, Will, can you review those? Thanks
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Quoted 38 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 35 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 34 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 22 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 21 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Fainelli
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit
679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8upstreamSome CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack.
This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return.
Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>[florian: Adjust
hyp-entry.Sto account for the label
added change tohyp/entry.S]Signed-off-by Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
- added missing hunk in
hyp/entry.Sper Will's feedbackWhat about 4.19.y and 4.14.y trees? I can't take something for 4.9.y and then have a regression if someone moves to a newer release, right?
Sure, send you candidates for 4.14 and 4.19.
Greg, did you have a chance to queue those changes for 4.9, 4.14 and 4.19?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/Nope, I was waiting for Will's "ack" for these.
OK, Will, can you review those? Thanks
Will, can you please review those patches?
Signature · 1 line
Florian
Quoted 33 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 32 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 28 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 21 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Fainelli
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit
679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8upstreamSome CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack.
This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return.
Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>[florian: Adjust
hyp-entry.Sto account for the label
added change tohyp/entry.S]Signed-off-by Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
- added missing hunk in
hyp/entry.Sper Will's feedbackWhat about 4.19.y and 4.14.y trees? I can't take something for 4.9.y and then have a regression if someone moves to a newer release, right?
Sure, send you candidates for 4.14 and 4.19.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Greg, did you have a chance to queue those changes for 4.9, 4.14 and 4.19?
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/Nope, I was waiting for Will's "ack" for these.
This patch doesn't even build for me (the 'sb' macro is not defined in 4.9), and I really wonder why we bother backporting it at all. Nobody's ever shown it to be a problem in practice, and it's clear that this is just being submitted to tick a box rather than anything else (otherwise it would build, right?).
So I'm not going to Ack any of them. As with a lot of this side-channel stuff the cure is far worse than the disease.
Will
_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
Quoted 40 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 39 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 37 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 22 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 21 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 20 lines · Florian Fainelli
From: Will Deacon <[email protected]>
commit
679db70801da9fda91d26caf13bf5b5ccc74e8e8upstreamSome CPUs can speculate past an ERET instruction and potentially perform speculative accesses to memory before processing the exception return. Since the register state is often controlled by a lower privilege level at the point of an ERET, this could potentially be used as part of a side-channel attack.
This patch emits an SB sequence after each ERET so that speculation is held up on exception return.
Signed-off-by Will Deacon <[email protected]>[florian: Adjust
hyp-entry.Sto account for the label
added change tohyp/entry.S]Signed-off-by Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
- added missing hunk in
hyp/entry.Sper Will's feedbackWhat about 4.19.y and 4.14.y trees? I can't take something for 4.9.y and then have a regression if someone moves to a newer release, right?
Sure, send you candidates for 4.14 and 4.19.
Greg, did you have a chance to queue those changes for 4.9, 4.14 and 4.19?
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Nope, I was waiting for Will's "ack" for these.
This patch doesn't even build for me (the 'sb' macro is not defined in 4.9), and I really wonder why we bother backporting it at all. Nobody's ever shown it to be a problem in practice, and it's clear that this is just being submitted to tick a box rather than anything else (otherwise it would build, right?).
Doh, I completely missed submitting the patch this depended on that's why I did not notice the build failure locally, sorry about that, what a shame.
Would not be the same "tick a box" argument be used against your original submission then? Sure, I have not been able to demonstrate in real life this was a problem, however the same can be said about a lot security related fixes.
What if it becomes exploitable in the future, would not it be nice to have it in a 6 year LTS kernel?
Quoted 3 lines
So I'm not going to Ack any of them. As with a lot of this side-channel stuff the cure is far worse than the disease.
Assuming that my v3 does build correctly, which it will, would you be keen on changing your position?
Signature · 5 lines
Florian _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list [email protected] https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
Hi Florian,
Quoted 17 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 8 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 7 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 5 lines · Florian Fainelli
Greg, did you have a chance to queue those changes for 4.9, 4.14 and 4.19?
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Nope, I was waiting for Will's "ack" for these.
This patch doesn't even build for me (the 'sb' macro is not defined in 4.9), and I really wonder why we bother backporting it at all. Nobody's ever shown it to be a problem in practice, and it's clear that this is just being submitted to tick a box rather than anything else (otherwise it would build, right?).
Quoted 8 lines
Doh, I completely missed submitting the patch this depended on that's why I did not notice the build failure locally, sorry about that, what a shame.
Would not be the same "tick a box" argument be used against your original submission then? Sure, I have not been able to demonstrate in real life this was a problem, however the same can be said about a lot security related fixes.
Sort of, although I wrote the original patch because it was dead easy to do and saved having to think too much about the problem, whereas the complexity of backporting largerly diminishes that imo.
Quoted 2 lines
What if it becomes exploitable in the future, would not it be nice to have it in a 6 year LTS kernel?
Even if people are stuck on an old LTS, they should still be taking the regular updates for it, and we would obviously need to backport the fix if it turned out to be exploitable (and hey, we could even test it then!).
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So I'm not going to Ack any of them. As with a lot of this side-channel stuff the cure is far worse than the disease.
Assuming that my v3 does build correctly, which it will, would you be keen on changing your position?
Note that I'm not trying to block this patch from going in, I'm just saying that I'm not supportive of it. Perhaps somebody from Arm can review it if they think it's worth the effort.
Will
_______________________________________________
kvmarm mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
Quoted 40 lines · Will Deacon
Hi Florian,
Quoted 17 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 8 lines · Will Deacon
Quoted 7 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 5 lines · Florian Fainelli
Greg, did you have a chance to queue those changes for 4.9, 4.14 and 4.19?
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-arm-kernel/[email protected]/Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Nope, I was waiting for Will's "ack" for these.
This patch doesn't even build for me (the 'sb' macro is not defined in 4.9), and I really wonder why we bother backporting it at all. Nobody's ever shown it to be a problem in practice, and it's clear that this is just being submitted to tick a box rather than anything else (otherwise it would build, right?).
Quoted 8 lines
Doh, I completely missed submitting the patch this depended on that's why I did not notice the build failure locally, sorry about that, what a shame.
Would not be the same "tick a box" argument be used against your original submission then? Sure, I have not been able to demonstrate in real life this was a problem, however the same can be said about a lot security related fixes.
Sort of, although I wrote the original patch because it was dead easy to do and saved having to think too much about the problem, whereas the complexity of backporting largerly diminishes that imo.
Quoted 2 lines
What if it becomes exploitable in the future, would not it be nice to have it in a 6 year LTS kernel?
Even if people are stuck on an old LTS, they should still be taking the regular updates for it, and we would obviously need to backport the fix if it turned out to be exploitable (and hey, we could even test it then!).
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So I'm not going to Ack any of them. As with a lot of this side-channel stuff the cure is far worse than the disease.
Assuming that my v3 does build correctly, which it will, would you be keen on changing your position?
Note that I'm not trying to block this patch from going in, I'm just saying that I'm not supportive of it. Perhaps somebody from Arm can review it if they think it's worth the effort.
How about I submit the actual full series (two patches) and we take the discussion from there?
Thanks for responding!
Signature · 5 lines
Florian _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list [email protected] https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm