x86/SMP: guard socket_cpumask[] access in cpu_smpboot_free()
PATCH 1/1 x86/SMP: guard socket_cpumask[] access in cpu_smpboot_free()
Before CPU identification has run (and it may not have run at all e.g. when AP bringup failed altogether), cpu_data[].phys_proc_id (which is what cpu_to_socket() resolves to) can't really be used. The use of cpu_to_socket()'s result as an array index cpu_smpboot_free() therefore needs guarding, as the function will also be invoked upon AP bringup failure, in which case CPU identification may not have run.
Without "x86/CPU: re-work populating of cpu_data[]" [1] the issue is less pronounced: The field starts out as zero, then has the BSP value (likely again zero) copied into it, and it is properly invalidated only in cpu_smpboot_free(). Still it is clearly wrong to use the BSP's socket number here.
Making the guard work with and without the above patch applied turns out
interesting: Prior to that patch, the sole invalidation done is that in cpu_smpboot_free(). Upon a later bringup attempt, the fields invalidated are overwritten by the BSP values again, though. Hence compare APIC IDs, as they cannot validly be the same once CPU identification has run.
[1] https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2024-02/msg00727.html
---
Sadly there was no feedback at all yet for the referenced patch.
xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c +7 -1
@@ -958,7 +958,13 @@ static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned inunsigned int socket =cpu_to_socket (cpu);struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = cpu_data; -if (cpumask_empty (socket_cpumask[socket]) ) +/* +* We may come here without the CPU having run through CPU identification. +* In that case the socket number cannot be relied upon, but the respective +* socket_cpumask[] slot also wouldn't have been set. +*/ +if ( c[cpu].apicid != boot_cpu_data.apicid && +cpumask_empty (socket_cpumask[socket]) ) {xfree (socket_cpumask[socket]); socket_cpumask[socket] =NULL ;
Quoted 13 lines · Jan Beulich
Before CPU identification has run (and it may not have run at all e.g. when AP bringup failed altogether), cpu_data[].phys_proc_id (which is what
cpu_to_socket()resolves to) can't really be used. The use of cpu_to_socket()'s result as an array indexcpu_smpboot_free()therefore needs guarding, as the function will also be invoked upon AP bringup failure, in which case CPU identification may not have run.Without "x86/CPU: re-work populating of cpu_data[]" [1] the issue is less pronounced: The field starts out as zero, then has the BSP value (likely again zero) copied into it, and it is properly invalidated only in
cpu_smpboot_free(). Still it is clearly wrong to use the BSP's socket number here.
Quoted 7 lines
Making the guard work with and without the above patch applied turns out
interesting: Prior to that patch, the sole invalidation done is that incpu_smpboot_free(). Upon a later bringup attempt, the fields invalidated are overwritten by the BSP values again, though. Hence compare APIC IDs, as they cannot validly be the same once CPU identification has run.[1] https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2024-02/msg00727.html
Quoted 21 lines
Signed-off-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>---
Sadly there was no feedback at all yet for the referenced patch.xen/arch/x86/smpboot.c +7
-1@@ -958,7 +958,13 @@ static void cpu_smpboot_free(unsigned inunsigned int socket =cpu_to_socket (cpu);struct cpuinfo_x86 *c = cpu_data; -if (cpumask_empty (socket_cpumask[socket]) ) +/* +* We may come here without the CPU having run through CPU identification. +* In that case the socket number cannot be relied upon, but the respective +* socket_cpumask[] slot also wouldn't have been set. +*/ +if ( c[cpu].apicid != boot_cpu_data.apicid && +cpumask_empty (socket_cpumask[socket]) ) {xfree (socket_cpumask[socket]); socket_cpumask[socket] =NULL ;
Quoted 19 lines · Jan Beulich
Before CPU identification has run (and it may not have run at all e.g. when AP bringup failed altogether), cpu_data[].phys_proc_id (which is what
cpu_to_socket()resolves to) can't really be used. The use of cpu_to_socket()'s result as an array indexcpu_smpboot_free()therefore needs guarding, as the function will also be invoked upon AP bringup failure, in which case CPU identification may not have run.Without "x86/CPU: re-work populating of cpu_data[]" [1] the issue is less pronounced: The field starts out as zero, then has the BSP value (likely again zero) copied into it, and it is properly invalidated only in
cpu_smpboot_free(). Still it is clearly wrong to use the BSP's socket number here.Making the guard work with and without the above patch applied turns out
interesting: Prior to that patch, the sole invalidation done is that incpu_smpboot_free(). Upon a later bringup attempt, the fields invalidated are overwritten by the BSP values again, though. Hence compare APIC IDs, as they cannot validly be the same once CPU identification has run.
Quoted 3 lines
[1] https://lists.xen.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2024-02/msg00727.html
Signed-off-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Thanks, Roger.