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hwmon: (xgene) restrict power measurements to admin by default

PATCH In review D Scott Phillips 2 participants 3 messages Jun 3, 2022 Hardware monitoring

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 hwmon: (xgene) restrict power measurements to admin by default

Access to power information can be used to infer the instructions being run and possibly even data being processed on a cpu[1]. Restrict access to power information to administrator users by default. (Cf. a similar powercap change[2].)

[1]: Lipp, Moritz, et al. "PLATYPUS: software-based power side-channel
attacks on x86." 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2021.
[2]: commit 949dd0104c49 ("powercap: restrict energy meter to root access")

Fixes ed42cfa881e1 ("hwmon: Add xgene hwmon driver")
---
 drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c +2 -2
index 5cde837bfd09..6ad1daf2d354 100644
@@ -397,9 +397,9 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(temp1_label);
 static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(temp1_input);
 static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(temp1_critical_alarm);
 static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power1_label);
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power1_input);
+static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(power1_input);
 static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power2_label);
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power2_input);
+static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(power2_input);
 
 static struct attribute *xgene_hwmon_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_temp1_label.attr,
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
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#1 lore raw
Quoted 23 lines · D Scott Phillips

Access to power information can be used to infer the instructions being run and possibly even data being processed on a cpu[1]. Restrict access to power information to administrator users by default. (Cf. a similar powercap change[2].)

[1]: Lipp, Moritz, et al. "PLATYPUS: software-based power side-channel
attacks on x86." 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2021.
[2]: commit 949dd0104c49 ("powercap: restrict energy meter to root access")

Fixes ed42cfa881e1 ("hwmon: Add xgene hwmon driver")
---
  drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c | 4 ++--
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c +0 -0
index 5cde837bfd09..6ad1daf2d354 100644
@@ -397,9 +397,9 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(temp1_label);
  static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(temp1_input);

drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(temp1_label); · line 405

Quoted 10 lines
drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c +2 -2
  static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(temp1_critical_alarm);
  static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power1_label);
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power1_input);
+static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(power1_input);
  static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power2_label);
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power2_input);
+static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(power2_input);
 
  static struct attribute *xgene_hwmon_attrs[] = {
  	&dev_attr_temp1_label.attr,

NACK. The hwmon ABI expects world read access. Either find a workaround by making the measurements less accurate, or drop the driver. Also see commit 9049572fb145 ("hwmon: Remove amd_energy driver"), "Attribute access" in Documentation/hwmon/sysfs-interface.rst, and [1].

Guenter

---
[1] https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-hwmon/patch/[email protected]/

#2 lore raw
Quoted 32 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 31 lines · D Scott Phillips

Access to power information can be used to infer the instructions being run and possibly even data being processed on a cpu[1]. Restrict access to power information to administrator users by default. (Cf. a similar powercap change[2].)

[1]: Lipp, Moritz, et al. "PLATYPUS: software-based power side-channel
attacks on x86." 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP). IEEE, 2021.
[2]: commit 949dd0104c49 ("powercap: restrict energy meter to root access")

Fixes ed42cfa881e1 ("hwmon: Add xgene hwmon driver")
---
  drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c | 4 ++--
  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c +2 -2
index 5cde837bfd09..6ad1daf2d354 100644
@@ -397,9 +397,9 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(temp1_label);
  static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(temp1_input);
  static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(temp1_critical_alarm);
  static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power1_label);
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power1_input);
+static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(power1_input);
  static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power2_label);
-static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(power2_input);
+static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(power2_input);
 
Quoted 8 lines

drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(temp1_label); · line 405

Quoted 2 lines
drivers/hwmon/xgene-hwmon.c +0 -0
  static struct attribute *xgene_hwmon_attrs[] = {
  	&dev_attr_temp1_label.attr,

NACK. The hwmon ABI expects world read access. Either find a workaround by making the measurements less accurate, or drop the driver. Also see commit 9049572fb145 ("hwmon: Remove amd_energy driver"), "Attribute access" in Documentation/hwmon/sysfs-interface.rst, and [1].

Ah, I see, thanks for pointing that out, I had missed that. I'm not confident that the randomization approach can provide robustness against this attack, so I'll follow up with a patch to drop the driver. Cheers,

Scott