Dealing with corporate email recycling

Hi all,

We are currently replaying a 15-year SVN history into Git -- with contributions from thousands of developers -- and are faced with the challenge of corporate email recycling, departures, re-hires, and name changes causing identity issues.

* Background

As you know (also to validate my own knowledge/assumptions), a Git commit stores identity as a name and an email. The only means to validate this information is via signing; commits are otherwise taken at face-value. This seems pretty core to Git's decentralized design. So to identify who is responsible for a commit, you have only the two name+email pairs.

The problem in a nutshell: names and emails change over time. The simple cases can be handled by gitmailmap, but there are more challenging cases:

- A commit author might have had some email <[email protected]>, but then was able to 'upgrade' to <[email protected]> after a departure.

- It's even possible that this departure might 'boomerang' and return to their old job, albeit now with a different email (since they forfeited <[email protected]> upon departure).

In effect, the email address (or even email+name pair) used by a given developer is not enough to identify that developer.

This issue is exacerbated by the features of some Git forges (e.g. GitHub, GitLab, etc.) that will map an email address to a user account. In the degenerate case, this would cause the forge to attribute the commit incorrectly -- causing communication issues as developers use the misattribution to reach out to the wrong people.

As a baseline, we know the following statements are true:

1. A person's preferred name can change at any time.
2. A person's preferred email can change at any time.
3. Neither of these pieces of information are necessarily identifying in a given codebase.

* Current Options

Setting aside the dubious practice of email recycling, how should we look at resolving this confusion in a sensible way? I see three general options that are possible today, each with their drawbacks:

1. Do nothing. Leave it to the developer to determine the correct contact information without assistance.

This doesn't really resolve the confusion, but it is technically an option.

2. Use gitmailmap(5) functionality to resolve historical emails to primary emails.

Sadly this doesn't actually solve the email recycling problem. Since one email could be used by multiple developers, there's no way (that I can see) to use a single mailmap file to resolve one of these emails to a single person.

3. Use and require commit signing -- using some separate system to keep track of who used what public key when (valid-before/-after).

This is an attractive option and very much fits the 'identity' portion of this problem, but evidently, it's not yet supported by git-fast-import. This becomes a non-starter for at least all our SVN history we're importing over. Even a potential concept of providing personal private keys to an impersonal import process also seems less than appealing, but I'm open to the possibility that I'm being too paranoid here.

At this point, I'd like to ask the community what approaches have already proven successful. I have a design sketch below, but I would not want to propose introducing a new standard if a standard already exists. I tend to think this is not the first time this problem has come up.

* Bad Proposal: Using Mailmap Over-Time

In the absence of other options, this leaves us to consider another:
if the mailmap file is tracked in history, we can know who had which email when. Taking advantage of this fact right now is a bit roundabout, but workable. Using the mailmap.blob config and pointing to the mailmap version as of a given commit yields behavior that *looks* promising: we can resolve an email in a commit to the person who had that email when the commit was made. Mentally extending this concept to do this automatically in git-log and friends, however, shows that this wholesale removes the value of
mailmap: the ability to change your name as it appears in history *after* that history is created. More details at [1].

There are of course legitimate reasons for a developer to change their name and desire that name to be used throughout the history. It would seem then that current mailmap functionality is insufficient to create an external system that solves the problem.

* Proposal: UUIDs

To get what we want (i.e., the ability to run git show HEAD~1, know that Ada wrote it, and report her current contact information), we need some way of tracking identity over time. A naive solution could be to extend the mailmap format as recognized by Git:

    $ git cat-file blob HEAD~1:.mailmap
    A. U. Thor <[email protected]> [uuid A] <[email protected]>

    $ git cat-file blob HEAD:.mailmap
    A. U. Thor <[email protected]> [uuid A]
    Roy G. Biv <[email protected]> [uuid B] <[email protected]>

Now, when I run git show HEAD~1, Git would determine the UUID of the email on the commit using the mailmap version in that tree:

    $ git -c mailmap.blob=HEAD~1:.mailmap check-mailmap --uuid "<[email protected]>"
    A

Then, we can use that UUID to resolve to the current contact information:

    $ git check-mailmap --uuid=A
    A. U. Thor <[email protected]>

Mailmap-sensitive commands can use this logic internally -- possibly guarded under some new config setting.

** Criticisms

Main criticisms of this proposal that I can think of off-hand:

1. As far as I know, the mailmap format is pretty well-established. I don't know how additions/extensions to the format will be interpreted by other tools.

This could be mitigated with a config option or even a magic comment in the file itself noting its format version.

2. This also assumes that any given email can belong to at most one person at a time. This is true for us, but may not be generally true. I don't know if this is a new assumption for mailmap.

I don't know of any mitigation here.

3. The current mailmap format of 'one line per pair' potentially opens up the format to ambiguities when resolving an email address -- ambiguities that become more apparent with the introduction of a UUID. For example:

A. U. Thor <[email protected]> [uuid A] <[email protected]> Ada Thor <[email protected]> [uuid A] <[email protected]>

When evaluating git check-mailmap --uuid=A, which line is used? Perhaps this is not a new problem, but it is a disconcerting one.

This might be resolved by allowing many aliases on a single line and restricting UUIDs to be unique in the file. Since the introduction of UUIDs would be a change to the format that by definition would need to be opted-into (to provide the UUIDs), this would not be a breaking change in and of itself.

I am additionally unsure of how the following current behavior (from gitmailmap(5)) should play into this proposal -- mostly because I don't understand the use-case to carve out a specific author/committer name for the mapping:

* Proposal: Valid-Before/Valid-After

Another potential idea is to record a transition point in the mailmap file:

A. U. Thor <[email protected]> <[email protected]> valid-before=<timestamp> A. U. Thor <[email protected]>

This draws on the valid-before/-after pattern used in commit signing. While I've signed a few commits in my day, I'm admittedly not versed on that infrastructure/implementation. I'd be curious if this idea would have a champion to argue for it. I personally prefer UUIDs.

** Criticisms

There are a few things I can identify:

1. While it's potentially good enough to solve the immediate problem, this doesn't actually establish a tangible identity.

2. Parsing this as a human being could become difficult if there are a few transition points.

* Summary

All of this is under the assumption that there is no viable approach out there, which I'm not convinced of. This proposal is only a suggestion of how it *could* be standardized with development if no standard practice currently exists.

So, two questions remain:

1. Is there a standard approach out there already that was not discussed above? (Are there statements I made about those approaches that are not true?)

2. Assuming there is no suitable standard, is the above proposal worth investing development time, or are there fundamental flaws?

Thanks,
Sean Allred

---

[1]: See below. I removed this from the main body to try and control its length.

* Failed Plan: using mailmap over-time

(I'm going to say things in the course of this example that are 'wrong' and/or 'working as designed', so bear with me!)

Consider the following. At some point in the past, <[email protected]> belonged to Ada. She wrote the following commit:

    $ git cat-file commit HEAD~1
    ...
    author A. U. Thor <[email protected]> ...
    committer A. U. Thor <[email protected]> ...

    $ git cat-file blob HEAD~1:.mailmap
    A. U. Thor <[email protected]> <[email protected]>

Somewhere down the line, Ada has left, <[email protected]> transferred to Roy, and he wrote the following commit:

    $ git cat-file commit HEAD
    ...
    author Roy G. Biv <[email protected]> ...
    committer Roy G. Biv <[email protected]> ...

    $ git cat-file blob HEAD:.mailmap
    A. U. Thor <[email protected]>
    Roy G. Biv <[email protected]> <[email protected]>

If we check the mailmap to resolve <[email protected]> from HEAD~1, we get the wrong answer:

    $ git show HEAD~1
    ...
    Author: Roy G. Biv <[email protected]>
    ...

It's only when we provide the version of the mailmap file that was active at the time do we get the right answer:

    $ git -c mailmap.blob=HEAD~1:.mailmap show HEAD~1
    ...
    Author: A. U. Thor <[email protected]>
    ...

So, if we can instruct git-show and friends to check the mailmap version at the time of the commit, we get what appears to be the desired behavior. Great, right?

Not so fast. This loses sight of one of the main purposes of gitmailmap. This idea failed.

You're at the end now; thanks for reading :-)

--
Sean Allred

Another thing we know is

4. People know that old e-mail addresses stay in archives and address books of people, and find it wise to avoid reusing an address somebody else (especially well-known ones) has been using, so that they do not get e-mails from total strangers and having to tell them that the intended recipient does not read the mailbox anymore.

GNU arch (tla) had an interesting idea around this area and used combination of time and e-mail address to identify a person. one@corp--$date referred to the person who had control of the address on the specified date, where $date can be abbreviated to 2022 or 202201 to mean 20220101.

The mailmap allows "Name e-mail" or "e-mail" to be mapped to canonical "Name e-mail", but we should be able to coax "valid time range" information encoded in each entry of the .mailmap format, i.e. "if you see 'Name e-mail' between time X and Y, map that to...".

combination of

the

"Name

encoded in

time X

Is there anything we could do around the new signature infrastructure relating to this? I am NOT a fan of SSH keys without passphrases, but what if we could use the coaxing above and map to SSH expiring keys then stitch in signatures (a.k.a. sign the commits) to correspond to the users in the given timeframe - then destroy the private keys to prevent further signing. After that the Name/email becomes somewhat irrelevant from an integrity standpoint.

Is this really possible? Is it really as straightforward as splicing in some text into the commit message to the effect of 'this commit is signed' along with some signature artifact calculated pre-signing?

Though I'll note I *think* this would only solve the problem for the committer field -- it's my current understanding that a commit can only be signed by one signature. (I have heard of systems that generate a new key that is then signed by multiple signatures, then signing with that new key -- but even if this is possible, it seems pretty involved for such a common workflow. This level of coordination might not be possible for us -- especially given the merge workflows we've needed to create to accommodate our current release process.)

--
Sean Allred

prevent

some text into the

signature

committer field

signed by

possible, it

coordination

(I am a little nervous about this advice, hoping others will chime in and correct anything wrong here)

While this will change the commit hashes, AFAIK, the other metadata is preserved, including date, author, and committer. Set up the specific keys/settings in ssh-agent and the user.signingKey value, then:

git filter-branch --commit-filter 'git commit-tree -S "$@";' <FROM-COMMIT>..<TO-COMMIT>

Others might have a better way of doing this or may tell me this will not work. Test this before you do it. I have not done this operation before. You do need to start from the oldest commit going forward otherwise I think that filter-branch will (should!) invalidate child commits. I suspect this is going to be a rather lengthy script to build and run.

Given the size of our history (several orders of magnitude larger than linux.git), using git-filter-branch after the fact is certainly not ideal. The replay already takes a week to run (we're IO-bound). We'd rather want to extend git-fast-import to allow signing commits instead -- which comes back to our shared 'nervousness' about this approach in
general: I don't know that Git should endorse this as a standard option.

But yes -- hoping others can chime in with more thoughts :-)

--
Sean Allred

I have another reluctant suggestion, but it depends on your industry, regulations, and other factors. In some sectors, there is a requirement to keep only some period of time worth of history. In fact, in some settings, keeping user identifying information beyond, say 7 years, actually is problematic. Pruning your history may be not only an option but required. An alternative is to use filter-branch to essentially tokenize the identities of past authors and keep those in a electronic vault somewhere. I have customers who are interpreting GDPR-like rules just such as situation, where employees gone 7 years ago and cannot be retained, by name, in the repos. I am not personally happy about that, because my own repo-OCD demands that I know exactly who did what until the end of time, but according to them, it actually violates the local regulations. I'm sure you have had conversations with lawyers, yes? ☹

I don't believe we've involved our legal team here (I'll follow up with them internally), but that might be a spin-off discussion for folks who know they're affected. It would seem that the design of Git makes purging history on an ongoing basis problematic -- you would always have at least one unresolvable reference to a parent commit. If this is a real requirement from GDPR-like laws, either 'reasonable' VCS metadata needs to be a specific carve-out in those laws -- but who the heck knows what is 'reasonable' -- or as a project, Git needs to have an answer to this situation and an ability to truncate history without otherwise altering it.

It's also worth noting that even in the last five years, at our scale, we've definitely run into the email-recycling problem already.

Being based in the U.S. and not having seen pitchforks about this yet, I'd like to assume for the purpose of this discussion that we're keeping all our history.

I think if the topic of legal implications of keeping history in perpetuity is valuable to continue, we should spin it off into a separate thread. Personally I'm not seeing what we (Git) could realistically do about it other than provide recommendations and paths forward -- which might require considerable development.

--
Sean Allred

The GDPR isn't as onerous as some suggest, as it isn't a set of black and white rules, rather in cases like these you need to have a real strong reason for why data is retained etc, such as being part of the verification and validation of the commit data. There have been various discussions around this in many of the technical journals.

It maybe that your internal Git version could disable the particular format option ('%ae'?) for the original name, so only the designated ('redacted') mailmap entry is shown to casual users (assumes the repo is inside the corporate firewall). This would avoid invalidating the repos validation capability, while meeting the needs of GDPR type regulations.

In the same vein, a local Git version could, being open source, add allowances for your extra mailmap entry details, such as adding a post fix " % <approxidate>" limits for the use of the particular name/email combo to allow date ranges to emerge.

I noted that all the .mailmap examples in the man page have ">" as the final character, but I haven't looked to see if the code always requires that the last element of the entry is an <email> address, or whether it currently barfs on extra elements.

--
Philip

That's good to hear that this has already been discussed in the community (though I'm hardly surprised now that you mention it -- I'm sure it was and remains a hot topic!).

I do want to note that at present we're not primarily concerned with GDPR, but I am following up on that internally to see if there are any considerations we need to make. This is certainly an interesting tactic for repositories that are hosted in GDPR-effective states, though.

I'd prefer the ability to agree on a pattern and merge support for it upstream. This way, forges can pick up support, too. Bonus points if the forge doesn't necessarily have to do more work than it already does.

Your " % <approxidate>" suggestion sounds a lot like the 'Valid-Before/ Valid-After' proposal from my original post in this thread (admittedly not my idea). Is there a compelling reason to use this approach over UUIDs? I ask not to suggest there isn't a compelling reason, but mostly to make sure we consider the best arguments (and drawbacks) for any/all approaches.

FYI mailmap does support comment syntax (starting with # through \n). It's worth noting that Ævar suggested earlier that perhaps we could "(ab)use the comment syntax". I tend to prefer their other approach, though:

rather than use magic comments :-) Adapting to your suggestion, this might look like the following:

A. U. Thor <[email protected]> <ada.example.com> <[ approxidate ]>

Would be curious to know what other mailmap readers exist and how they would react to this.

--
Sean Allred

You'd probably want a timerange (valid-from and valid-to), instead of one single timestamp?

Because at least three valid forms of mailmap entries should be understood by the current generation of mailmap readers, i.e.

Human Readable Name <[email protected]>
Right Name <[email protected]> <[email protected]> Right Name <[email protected]> Wrong Name <[email protected]>

the extended entry format to record the validity timerange should be chosen to cause parsers that are prepared to take these three kinds of lines to barf and ignore.

single

by the

to

and

Could we not use SSH's ssh-keygen -V for this purpose when establishing persistent identities independent of user/email? We already do this for signed commits.

Fingerprint of cryptographic key would be easy to use as an identity, for which the person who claims ownership can easily produce proof of ownership. Various other "identitying strings" like human readable name and e-mail addresses from different validity periods can be all tied to such an identity. Taking key revocation into account, keys from different validity period may have to be tied together in a same way. "The person who used to sign the commits with key A and the person who signs the commits with key B are the same, and in real life, they are known as A. U. Thor"

But proving that such a mapping is in a meaningful way is much harder, I would imagine, but perhaps addresses and human readable names do not matter as much. Or continuity of identity, for that matter. I dunno.

I'm not so sure that the date range approach won't bring it's own problems. What happens outside the date range? i.e. Do we then have three identities: Before, During, and After, with only 'During' being defined?

I more see a single date being used as a termination point for an existing email sequence that defines a retrospective end point for the mapping of the old email addresses to a single person. Future emails for the same mailbox will be for a different 'current' person. This would match the single linked list commit history view using the chronology heuristic.

The key here being to have a final identity system in place so that you can uniquely identify the old John Doe, from the newer John Doe`s at the relevant time point in the mailmap.

The presence of a _sequence_ of name/email changes isn't well defined. As I remember it we take the name/email updates in sequence and then apply a last one wins approach. It's not clear what would be done when we have two, or three different John Doe sequences all mixed in.

A broader issue for the corporate email mailbox systems is those that are allocated to roles. So you may have [email protected] thru [email protected] (we had) and if that training includes practical low hanging fruit examples from a project, it's difficult to disambiguate those commits. More likely is say, having TestPC1 - TestPC9 that included debug commits, perhaps even with pair programming test & debug sessions, so allocation to individuals (rather than mailbox) becomes a real problem. Hopefully that's rare in Sean's case.

Philip

I have been assuming that the default is "what the commit has is correct".

Implicitly specifying the valid-from date (which is either the beginning of time, or the newest of valid-until time for the same identifying string that is older than the valid-until date for the entry in question) is fine. I do not see fundamental difference between the approach you suggest and having an explicit valid-from date.

That default is only true when there are no date limitations because of email re-use. i.e. singleton persons with unique emails do fit that default, which should be the majority.

If an old email has been reused, then that default becomes false, which was Sean's starting point. In the corporate case, two (or more) distinct individuals have used the same commit|author email address, and the hope is, for a way of providing a disambiguation of those persons, based on their email and the commit date.

With the first case we guarantee that we have named cover for all of the chronology via bisection, while the trisection can leave gaps without any allocation to a person,  or possibly overlaps.

A more convoluted case would be where three persons share the same emails in a rollover fashion, so the mailmap's simple name/email handover becomes knotted and intertwined in the handovers (Joe3->Joe2->Joe1).

P.

Yep, this wouldn't happen for us. Lots of other processes depend on there being an individual making the commit.

I'd also be surprised if this didn't cause process problems for other folks, too.

--
Sean Allred

I was in equipment engineering where independent dedicated test equipment was more common, rather than pure software, so the potential for  role based commits from TestPC1 - TestPC9 was far more likely (for cases where it's the hardware that needs to be understood, not the engineers' choice of code ;-)

Naming is a big issue [1,2].

Do you already have a map of those personal name and email name changes that are causing conflicts, or are you hoping for a way of detecting such changes? If you already know which names produce conflicts you are more than half way there.

If you do know of the name conflicts, (e.g. when John Doe changed to Jane Doe2, then acquired Jane Doe, before being put back to Jane Doe2), do you have dates for the change over to map into the commit dates (assuming no slop or author/committer date slip). At least with the change-over dates you can apply mapping during the history transfer.

An alternate option is to simply stick with the fact that history is messy, and use internal corporate knowledge for the few case that cause the major issues. It some point it always gets to be a Gödel Grammar (needing another rule).

Philip

[1]
https://www.kalzumeus.com/2010/06/17/falsehoods-programmers-believe-about-names/
[2] https://acrl.ala.org/techconnect/post/names-are-hard/

Whether or not we have maintained such a list in real-time remains to be seen, but we have been able to put together such a list using both SVN history and a variety of other internal data sources. It's worth noting that, if we do have to use this generated mapping, a mapping of over 10k entries is surely to have the odd mistake every now and then. So it's not *totally* trustworthy (and never could be).

This is definitely on the table, though it seems a shame to not attempt to use the information we've been able to compile.

--
Sean Allred

I'd agree there. Adding role based mailboxes will further complicate such mappings.

Philip

Aside from technical solutions and twists on mailmap, you haven't *really* described what practical problem you're facing here.

I.e. this, sure, that can happen, but what's the negative effect of that in practice?

I've been involved in similar migrations in the past, and the primary way to deal with it was to mostly ignore it, especially in a corporate setting.

I.e. sure, you'll have some edge cases here and there, but the value of knowing who exactly authored something tend to be proportional to how recent the commit is.

If someone wrote something 10 years ago they're probably not even working there anymore, or if they are will long since have forgotten what they need to know to answer any specific questions etc.

The only people who tend to look at it are developers using "git blame" or something, and usually humans are smart enough to spot that even if it's [email protected] they were expecting Roy, not Ada, or the other way around.

Side note: To the extent that I've had to deal with this (in a corporate setting) I found myself wanting git to have the exact opposite, i.e. some feature where we'd just hide the author for anything any work that's >5 years old or whatever.

Not for any privacy reason, but just because some UI's wouldn't really communicate (in a way that people actually noticed) that the relevant work was ancient, and someone who'd since long-moved-on would get occasional interruptions due to ancient code they wrote but weren't equipped to currently maintain.

Or similarly, to have anything >N years old "git blame" to the team currently maintaining that thing, not to the person.

But I digress.

Having said that I think if you do need such a back-annotated history you should look into "git notes" and/or "git replace". I.e. you could have some lookup system maintain a mapping from OIDs to current IDs.

I've implemented a system like that in the past (in a MySQL table, but whatever). I'd think this use-case of perfectly annotated old history is probably obscure enough that that's the primary thing we should steer people towards...

It's perfectly OK to change parts of that format in backwards-"incompatible" ways, i.e. there's enough leeway in the existing format definition and in-the-wild readers to have new readers pick up new information that old readers will ignore.

I.e. we simply ignore things we can't map now, so one way to do it is to start with something that produces an invalid (but harmless) mapping to current readers, another is to borrow a trick from "/etc/sudoers" and (ab)use the comment syntax.

It's my intention to implement an approach where people's emails are identified by a key fingerprint of some sort and then converted into the proper email address by a mailmap that lives outside of the main
history. That is, my email address might be ba7816bf8f01cfea414140de5dae2223b00361a396177a9cb410ff61f20015ad@ssh-sha256.ns.git-scm.com, and then we have a mailmap that converts between the two. If you wanted
to have a UUID-based one, you could do [email protected] (assuming that namespace were registered).

The benefit to the key part is that you can essentially prove that you are who you say you are. A UUID doesn't have the possibility.

This was discussed briefly at some sort of contributor summit we had at some point, but I've been busy and haven't gotten to it yet. It is on my list of projects, however.

brian m. carlson (he/him or they/them)
Toronto, Ontario, CA

This could require a global and security hardened tokenization or signing approach. Email fingerprints from one organization would have to be able to move to another organization easily - potentially as part of the git repo's metadata. I would not use the same key as is used for signing fingerprints (mostly out of paranoia), but this is conceptually similar to the public side of a key-pair. One would have to have access to the private key in order to be a committer/author. Unfortunately, as it stands today, that may be easily spoofed (--committer, --author), so that part of the code would have to change with safeguards on what can be supplied - something I think would be welcome. Keeping with a distributed philosophy is probably essential. Just my take on it.

What about abstracting this into a map-email or map-identity hook of some kind? So, whenever there is a need to write an identity (committer, author, signed-off-by, etc.). That way, anyone who wants to, can implement whatever policy they want for replacing emails with some other value in the repo, and back again. It might be good to optimize it so that the hook is only invoked once per identity per request so that git log does not become insanely expensive.

Something like map-identity from <internal-value> and map-identity to <external-value>, for example:

map-identity from "Randall S. Becker <[email protected]>" > A056AAB2123

And

map-identity to A056AAB2123 > Randall S. Becker <[email protected]>

Again, just a notion.

This is an interesting idea, but I'm afraid it might be difficult for forges to implement support for as opposed to something built-in. If that's not as difficult as I might think it is, then perhaps this is a viable option once fleshed out.

I'll add that Windows (and our particular environment) makes this troublesome as well. Currently we see a base cost of 300ms for starting up a process. Given how many identities git-log and friends would be chugging through, any hook would need to be capable of staying open -- feeding identities through stdin. I'm not sure run_hooks supports that right now.

--
Sean Allred

(CC others who have been involved in the conversation; I started a separate thread off the original post since this takes an entirely separate direction.)

I wanted to provide a possible approach for other organizations that may run into this issue in the future. If you have the opportunity that we do in rewriting history, we found a nice workaround by way of 'unique-ifying' the email address using the '+' syntax supported by most email providers -- notably for us, we tested that it does work with Exchange.

As I went through previously, the problem is that our organization recycles emails like <[email protected]>. If the owner of <[email protected]> leaves, I have the opportunity to take ownership of <[email protected]> after a waiting period. This presents the core problem: <[email protected]> could be two different people at two different points in time.

Our first approach to solving this problem was to collaborate with our internal IT folks to see if we could additionally generate a totally unique email address based on that employee's ID. For various reasons with which I'm not familiar enough to elaborate, this wasn't really possible -- we could not be provided a totally static email address for any given person. After bouncing the problem around internally for a while, we reached out to this list :-) and I think a lot of cool conversation is happening that I want to continue! It seems there is still value in finding a generalizable solution.

---

As for solutions that are *not* necessarily generalizable, what we were able to come up with is to use a 'unique-ified' email of the form <[email protected]>, where 314159 might be my employee ID. That way, even if another Sean might inherit <[email protected]>, they can never inherit <[email protected]>. The use of this unique-ified email address will be enforced via pre-receive -- possibly checking for its existence in the mailmap as well.

Using this unique-ified email address, we can construct a mailmap like the following:

    Sean Allred <[email protected]> <[email protected]>

This uses the already-built functionality of gitmailmap to interpret the committer email of <[email protected]> to the friendlier <[email protected]> while still maintaining the requirement (for us) that the email on the commit be a real, usable email.

When I eventually get hit by a bus and give up <[email protected]>, the mailmap can be updated to

    Sean Allred <[email protected]> <[email protected]>
    Sean Allblue <[email protected]> <[email protected]>

(possibly using some support list instead of <[email protected]>).

This has proven itself in a few informal design chats already and is going to be the approach we take for our replay. I look forward to a future situation where we might be able to use SSH key validity periods instead :-) but that functionality will surely only be available after our migration in a few months' time.

I hope this helps others!

--
Sean Allred

I have performed a couple of imports of old version history into Git, from various version control systems, some of them with history dating to before the corporation even had e-mail addresses for employees. In those cases I found that the easiest option was just to use whatever user identification was available in the old version control system -- Git does not explicitely require a valid e-mail address in the author and committer header.

For Subversion import, for instance, I used "Name <login>" where "login" was the Subversion committer ID, and "Name" was from a mapping file I created for the repository. Where records were sketchy and Name information was not available, I would just use "<login>".

When it comes to name changes, I have had scripts map login + date to name. For instance, I changed my last name when I married, so I would have my old (I don't know what the masculine equivalent of "maiden name" is in English) mapped up until a specific date, and my current name afterwards.

\\// Peter