package/zziplib: fix CVE-2018-16548
PATCH 1/2 package/zziplib: fix CVE-2018-16548
An issue was discovered in ZZIPlib through 0.13.69. There is a memory leak triggered in the function __zzip_parse_root_directory in zip.c, which will lead to a denial of service attack.
--- ...eak-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory.patch | 74 +++++++++++++++++++ ...k-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory-2.patch | 53 +++++++++++++ ...3-One-more-free-to-avoid-memory-leak.patch | 25 +++++++ package/zziplib/zziplib.mk | 5 ++ 4 files changed, 157 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/zziplib/0001-Avoid-memory-leak-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory.patch create mode 100644 package/zziplib/0002-Avoid-memory-leak-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory-2.patch create mode 100644 package/zziplib/0003-One-more-free-to-avoid-memory-leak.patch
package/zziplib/0001-Avoid-memory-leak-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory.patch new file +74 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ +From 9411bde3e4a70a81ff3ffd256b71927b2d90dcbb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: jmoellers <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 11:32:04 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Avoid memory leak from __zzip_parse_root_directory(). + +[Retrieved (and slightly updated to remove test.zip) from: +https://github.com/gdraheim/zziplib/commit/9411bde3e4a70a81ff3ffd256b71927b2d90dcbb] +Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> +--- + test/test.zip | Bin 1361 -> 1361 bytes + zzip/zip.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/zzip/zip.c b/zzip/zip.c +index 88b833b..a685280 100644 +--- a/zzip/zip.c ++++ b/zzip/zip.c +@@ -475,9 +475,15 @@ __zzip_parse_root_directory(int fd, + } else + { + if (io->fd.seeks(fd, zz_rootseek + zz_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) ++ { ++ free(hdr0); + return ZZIP_DIR_SEEK; ++ } + if (io->fd.read(fd, &dirent, sizeof(dirent)) < __sizeof(dirent)) ++ { ++ free(hdr0); + return ZZIP_DIR_READ; ++ } + d = &dirent; + } + +@@ -577,12 +583,38 @@ __zzip_parse_root_directory(int fd, + + if (hdr_return) + *hdr_return = hdr0; ++ else ++ { ++ /* If it is not assigned to *hdr_return, it will never be free()'d */ ++ free(hdr0); ++ /* Make sure we don't free it again in case of error */ ++ hdr0 = NULL; ++ } + } /* else zero (sane) entries */ + # ifndef ZZIP_ALLOW_MODULO_ENTRIES +- return (entries != zz_entries ? ZZIP_CORRUPTED : 0); ++ if (entries != zz_entries) ++ { ++ /* If it was assigned to *hdr_return, undo assignment */ ++ if (p_reclen && hdr_return) ++ *hdr_return = NULL; ++ /* Free it, if it was not already free()'d */ ++ if (hdr0 != NULL) ++ free(hdr0); ++ return ZZIP_CORRUPTED; ++ } + # else +- return ((entries & (unsigned)0xFFFF) != zz_entries ? ZZIP_CORRUPTED : 0); ++ if (((entries & (unsigned)0xFFFF) != zz_entries) ++ { ++ /* If it was assigned to *hdr_return, undo assignment */ ++ if (p_reclen && hdr_return) ++ *hdr_return = NULL; ++ /* Free it, if it was not already free()'d */ ++ if (hdr0 != NULL) ++ free(hdr0); ++ return ZZIP_CORRUPTED; ++ } + # endif ++ return 0; + } + + /* ------------------------- high-level interface ------------------------- */
package/zziplib/0002-Avoid-memory-leak-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory-2.patch new file +53 -0
53 lines not on this page · raw message
package/zziplib/0003-One-more-free-to-avoid-memory-leak.patch new file +25 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +From 0e1dadb05c1473b9df2d7b8f298dab801778ef99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: jmoellers <[email protected]> +Date: Fri, 7 Sep 2018 13:55:35 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] One more free() to avoid memory leak. + +[Retrieved from: +https://github.com/gdraheim/zziplib/commit/0e1dadb05c1473b9df2d7b8f298dab801778ef99] +Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> +--- + zzip/zip.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/zzip/zip.c b/zzip/zip.c +index 51a1a4d..bc6c080 100644 +--- a/zzip/zip.c ++++ b/zzip/zip.c +@@ -589,6 +589,8 @@ __zzip_parse_root_directory(int fd, + free(hdr0); + } + } /* else zero (sane) entries */ ++ else ++ free(hdr0); + # ifndef ZZIP_ALLOW_MODULO_ENTRIES + return (entries != zz_entries) ? ZZIP_CORRUPTED : 0; + # else
package/zziplib/zziplib.mk +5 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,11 @@ ZZIPLIB_LICENSE = LGPL-2.0+ or MPL-1.1 ZZIPLIB_LICENSE_FILES = docs/COPYING.LIB docs/COPYING.MPL docs/copying.htm ZZIPLIB_INSTALL_STAGING = YES +# 0001-Avoid-memory-leak-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory.patch +# 0002-Avoid-memory-leak-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory-2.patch +# 0003-One-more-free-to-avoid-memory-leak.patch +ZZIPLIB_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-16548 + ZZIPLIB_DEPENDENCIES = host-pkgconf host-python zlib # zziplib is not python3 friendly, so force the python interpreter
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
PATCH 2/2 package/zziplib: fix CVE-2018-17828
Directory traversal vulnerability in ZZIPlib 0.13.69 allows attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in a zip file, because of the function unzzip_cat in the bins/unzzipcat-mem.c file.
--- ...omponents-from-pathnames-of-extracte.patch | 344 ++++++++++++++++++ package/zziplib/zziplib.mk | 3 + 2 files changed, 347 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/zziplib/0004-Fix-issue-62-Remove-any-components-from-pathnames-of-extracte.patch
package/zziplib/0004-Fix-issue-62-Remove-any-components-from-pathnames-of-extracte.patch new file +344 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@ +From 81dfa6b3e08f6934885ba5c98939587d6850d08e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Josef Moellers <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 4 Oct 2018 14:21:48 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix issue #62: Remove any "../" components from pathnames of + extracted files. [CVE-2018-17828] + +[Retrieved from: +https://github.com/gdraheim/zziplib/commit/81dfa6b3e08f6934885ba5c98939587d6850d08e] +Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> +--- + bins/unzzipcat-big.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + bins/unzzipcat-mem.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + bins/unzzipcat-mix.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + bins/unzzipcat-zip.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + 4 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-big.c b/bins/unzzipcat-big.c +index 982d262..88c4d65 100644 +--- a/bins/unzzipcat-big.c ++++ b/bins/unzzipcat-big.c +@@ -53,6 +53,48 @@ static void unzzip_cat_file(FILE* disk, char* name, FILE* out) + } + } + ++/* ++ * NAME: remove_dotdotslash ++ * PURPOSE: To remove any "../" components from the given pathname ++ * ARGUMENTS: path: path name with maybe "../" components ++ * RETURNS: Nothing, "path" is modified in-place ++ * NOTE: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! ++ * Also, "path" is not used after creating it. ++ * So modifying "path" in-place is safe to do. ++ */ ++static inline void ++remove_dotdotslash(char *path) ++{ ++ /* Note: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! */ ++ char *dotdotslash; ++ int warned = 0; ++ ++ dotdotslash = path; ++ while ((dotdotslash = strstr(dotdotslash, "../")) != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Remove only if at the beginning of the pathname ("../path/name") ++ * or when preceded by a slash ("path/../name"), ++ * otherwise not ("path../name..")! ++ */ ++ if (dotdotslash == path || dotdotslash[-1] == '/') ++ { ++ char *src, *dst; ++ if (!warned) ++ { ++ /* Note: the first time through the pathname is still intact */ ++ fprintf(stderr, "Removing \"../\" path component(s) in %s\n", path); ++ warned = 1; ++ } ++ /* We cannot use strcpy(), as there "The strings may not overlap" */ ++ for (src = dotdotslash+3, dst=dotdotslash; (*dst = *src) != '\0'; src++, dst++) ++ ; ++ } ++ else ++ dotdotslash +=3; /* skip this instance to prevent infinite loop */ ++ } ++} ++ + static void makedirs(const char* name) + { + char* p = strrchr(name, '/'); +@@ -70,6 +112,16 @@ static void makedirs(const char* name) + + static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs) + { ++ char *name_stripped; ++ FILE *fp; ++ int mustfree = 0; ++ ++ if ((name_stripped = strdup(name)) != NULL) ++ { ++ remove_dotdotslash(name_stripped); ++ name = name_stripped; ++ mustfree = 1; ++ } + if (subdirs) + { + char* p = strrchr(name, '/'); +@@ -79,7 +131,10 @@ static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs) + free (dir_name); + } + } +- return fopen(name, mode); ++ fp = fopen(name, mode); ++ if (mustfree) ++ free(name_stripped); ++ return fp; + } + + +diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c b/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c +index 9bc966b..793bde8 100644 +--- a/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c ++++ b/bins/unzzipcat-mem.c +@@ -58,6 +58,48 @@ static void unzzip_mem_disk_cat_file(ZZIP_MEM_DISK* disk, char* name, FILE* out) + } + } + ++/* ++ * NAME: remove_dotdotslash ++ * PURPOSE: To remove any "../" components from the given pathname ++ * ARGUMENTS: path: path name with maybe "../" components ++ * RETURNS: Nothing, "path" is modified in-place ++ * NOTE: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! ++ * Also, "path" is not used after creating it. ++ * So modifying "path" in-place is safe to do. ++ */ ++static inline void ++remove_dotdotslash(char *path) ++{ ++ /* Note: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! */ ++ char *dotdotslash; ++ int warned = 0; ++ ++ dotdotslash = path; ++ while ((dotdotslash = strstr(dotdotslash, "../")) != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Remove only if at the beginning of the pathname ("../path/name") ++ * or when preceded by a slash ("path/../name"), ++ * otherwise not ("path../name..")! ++ */ ++ if (dotdotslash == path || dotdotslash[-1] == '/') ++ { ++ char *src, *dst; ++ if (!warned) ++ { ++ /* Note: the first time through the pathname is still intact */ ++ fprintf(stderr, "Removing \"../\" path component(s) in %s\n", path); ++ warned = 1; ++ } ++ /* We cannot use strcpy(), as there "The strings may not overlap" */ ++ for (src = dotdotslash+3, dst=dotdotslash; (*dst = *src) != '\0'; src++, dst++) ++ ; ++ } ++ else ++ dotdotslash +=3; /* skip this instance to prevent infinite loop */ ++ } ++} ++ + static void makedirs(const char* name) + { + char* p = strrchr(name, '/'); +@@ -75,6 +117,16 @@ static void makedirs(const char* name) + + static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs) + { ++ char *name_stripped; ++ FILE *fp; ++ int mustfree = 0; ++ ++ if ((name_stripped = strdup(name)) != NULL) ++ { ++ remove_dotdotslash(name_stripped); ++ name = name_stripped; ++ mustfree = 1; ++ } + if (subdirs) + { + char* p = strrchr(name, '/'); +@@ -84,7 +136,10 @@ static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs) + free (dir_name); + } + } +- return fopen(name, mode); ++ fp = fopen(name, mode); ++ if (mustfree) ++ free(name_stripped); ++ return fp; + } + + static int unzzip_cat (int argc, char ** argv, int extract) +diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c b/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c +index 91c2f00..73b6ed6 100644 +--- a/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c ++++ b/bins/unzzipcat-mix.c +@@ -69,6 +69,48 @@ static void unzzip_cat_file(ZZIP_DIR* disk, char* name, FILE* out) + } + } + ++/* ++ * NAME: remove_dotdotslash ++ * PURPOSE: To remove any "../" components from the given pathname ++ * ARGUMENTS: path: path name with maybe "../" components ++ * RETURNS: Nothing, "path" is modified in-place ++ * NOTE: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! ++ * Also, "path" is not used after creating it. ++ * So modifying "path" in-place is safe to do. ++ */ ++static inline void ++remove_dotdotslash(char *path) ++{ ++ /* Note: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! */ ++ char *dotdotslash; ++ int warned = 0; ++ ++ dotdotslash = path; ++ while ((dotdotslash = strstr(dotdotslash, "../")) != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Remove only if at the beginning of the pathname ("../path/name") ++ * or when preceded by a slash ("path/../name"), ++ * otherwise not ("path../name..")! ++ */ ++ if (dotdotslash == path || dotdotslash[-1] == '/') ++ { ++ char *src, *dst; ++ if (!warned) ++ { ++ /* Note: the first time through the pathname is still intact */ ++ fprintf(stderr, "Removing \"../\" path component(s) in %s\n", path); ++ warned = 1; ++ } ++ /* We cannot use strcpy(), as there "The strings may not overlap" */ ++ for (src = dotdotslash+3, dst=dotdotslash; (*dst = *src) != '\0'; src++, dst++) ++ ; ++ } ++ else ++ dotdotslash +=3; /* skip this instance to prevent infinite loop */ ++ } ++} ++ + static void makedirs(const char* name) + { + char* p = strrchr(name, '/'); +@@ -86,6 +128,16 @@ static void makedirs(const char* name) + + static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs) + { ++ char *name_stripped; ++ FILE *fp; ++ int mustfree = 0; ++ ++ if ((name_stripped = strdup(name)) != NULL) ++ { ++ remove_dotdotslash(name_stripped); ++ name = name_stripped; ++ mustfree = 1; ++ } + if (subdirs) + { + char* p = strrchr(name, '/'); +@@ -95,7 +147,10 @@ static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs) + free (dir_name); + } + } +- return fopen(name, mode); ++ fp = fopen(name, mode); ++ if (mustfree) ++ free(name_stripped); ++ return fp; + } + + static int unzzip_cat (int argc, char ** argv, int extract) +diff --git a/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c b/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c +index 2810f85..7f7f3fa 100644 +--- a/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c ++++ b/bins/unzzipcat-zip.c +@@ -69,6 +69,48 @@ static void unzzip_cat_file(ZZIP_DIR* disk, char* name, FILE* out) + } + } + ++/* ++ * NAME: remove_dotdotslash ++ * PURPOSE: To remove any "../" components from the given pathname ++ * ARGUMENTS: path: path name with maybe "../" components ++ * RETURNS: Nothing, "path" is modified in-place ++ * NOTE: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! ++ * Also, "path" is not used after creating it. ++ * So modifying "path" in-place is safe to do. ++ */ ++static inline void ++remove_dotdotslash(char *path) ++{ ++ /* Note: removing "../" from the path ALWAYS shortens the path, never adds to it! */ ++ char *dotdotslash; ++ int warned = 0; ++ ++ dotdotslash = path; ++ while ((dotdotslash = strstr(dotdotslash, "../")) != NULL) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Remove only if at the beginning of the pathname ("../path/name") ++ * or when preceded by a slash ("path/../name"), ++ * otherwise not ("path../name..")! ++ */ ++ if (dotdotslash == path || dotdotslash[-1] == '/') ++ { ++ char *src, *dst; ++ if (!warned) ++ { ++ /* Note: the first time through the pathname is still intact */ ++ fprintf(stderr, "Removing \"../\" path component(s) in %s\n", path); ++ warned = 1; ++ } ++ /* We cannot use strcpy(), as there "The strings may not overlap" */ ++ for (src = dotdotslash+3, dst=dotdotslash; (*dst = *src) != '\0'; src++, dst++) ++ ; ++ } ++ else ++ dotdotslash +=3; /* skip this instance to prevent infinite loop */ ++ } ++} ++ + static void makedirs(const char* name) + { + char* p = strrchr(name, '/'); +@@ -86,6 +128,16 @@ static void makedirs(const char* name) + + static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs) + { ++ char *name_stripped; ++ FILE *fp; ++ int mustfree = 0; ++ ++ if ((name_stripped = strdup(name)) != NULL) ++ { ++ remove_dotdotslash(name_stripped); ++ name = name_stripped; ++ mustfree = 1; ++ } + if (subdirs) + { + char* p = strrchr(name, '/'); +@@ -95,7 +147,10 @@ static FILE* create_fopen(char* name, char* mode, int subdirs) + free (dir_name); + } + } +- return fopen(name, mode); ++ fp = fopen(name, mode); ++ if (mustfree) ++ free(name_stripped); ++ return fp; + } + + static int unzzip_cat (int argc, char ** argv, int extract)
package/zziplib/zziplib.mk +3 -0
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ ZZIPLIB_INSTALL_STAGING = YES # 0003-One-more-free-to-avoid-memory-leak.patch ZZIPLIB_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-16548 +# 0004-Fix-issue-62-Remove-any-components-from-pathnames-of-extracte.patch +ZZIPLIB_IGNORE_CVES += CVE-2018-17828 + ZZIPLIB_DEPENDENCIES = host-pkgconf host-python zlib # zziplib is not python3 friendly, so force the python interpreter
Signature · 1 line
2.25.0
PATCH 2/2 package/zziplib: fix CVE-2018-17828
Quoted 7 lines
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Quoted 1 line
"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:
Directory traversal vulnerability in ZZIPlib 0.13.69 allows attackers to overwrite arbitrary files via a .. (dot dot) in a zip file, because of the function
unzzip_catin thebins/unzzipcat-mem.cfile.Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
Committed to 2019.11.x (not in 2019.02.x), thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
PATCH 1/2 package/zziplib: fix CVE-2018-16548
In reply to Fabrice FontaineQuoted 5 lines · On Tue, 3 Mar 2020 21:16:21 +0100 Fabrice Fontaine…
An issue was discovered in ZZIPlib through 0.13.69. There is a memory leak triggered in the function
__zzip_parse_root_directoryinzip.c, which will lead to a denial of service attack.Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
Quoted 9 lines
--- ...eak-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory.patch | 74 +++++++++++++++++++ ...k-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory-2.patch | 53 +++++++++++++ ...3-One-more-free-to-avoid-memory-leak.patch | 25 +++++++ package/zziplib/zziplib.mk | 5 ++ 4 files changed, 157 insertions(+) create mode 100644 package/zziplib/0001-Avoid-memory-leak-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory.patch create mode 100644 package/zziplib/0002-Avoid-memory-leak-from-__zzip_parse_root_directory-2.patch create mode 100644 package/zziplib/0003-One-more-free-to-avoid-memory-leak.patch
Both applied to master. Thanks!
Thomas
Signature · 3 lines
Thomas Petazzoni, CTO, Bootlin Embedded Linux and Kernel engineering https://bootlin.com
PATCH 1/2 package/zziplib: fix CVE-2018-16548
In reply to Fabrice FontaineQuoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
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"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:
An issue was discovered in ZZIPlib through 0.13.69. There is a memory leak triggered in the function
__zzip_parse_root_directoryinzip.c, which will lead to a denial of service attack.Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
Committed to 2019.11.x (not in 2019.02.x), thanks.
Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard