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fs proc: make pagemap a privileged interface

RFC PATCH Eric W. Biederman 3 participants 4 messages Mar 17, 2015 – Mar 20, 2015 1 message not in the archive

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Eric W. Biederman

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#1 lore raw
Quoted 7 lines · Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

Changes from v1:
* Do not allow a child pid namespace to unset paranoid when its parent had it set.
* Update description text to clarify the options we have to solve this problem.

Again.

The option name "paranoid" is entirely too general. Who knows what it referrs to.

A mount option is not an appropriate place to control one small bit of policy like this. Proc mount options are a real pain in the butt to deal with and to maintain.

Further a per pid namespace decision does not actually work, for having restricted policy only for a small set of processes because it is only with very careful container setup that you would expose this policy.

If you really need a subset of processes with a restricted policy make it a prctl, and bloat struct task. Then disallow a process with the prctl set from reading the file.

Eric

#2 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

Changes from v1:
* Do not allow a child pid namespace to unset paranoid when its parent had it set.
* Update description text to clarify the options we have to solve this problem.

Quoted 6 lines

Again.

The option name "paranoid" is entirely too general. Who knows what it referrs to.

/proc exposes a lot of sensitive information that could be used to determine physical memory ordering (not as bad as actual physical addresses, but still). My hope was that instead of adding an option for every single proc file, we'd have a single one that folks could turn on.

In the end, I'm perfectly fine doing a s/paranoid/pidpagemap/g, I just wanted to point out that there will may be more patches like this down the line.

Quoted 3 lines

A mount option is not an appropriate place to control one small bit of policy like this. Proc mount options are a real pain in the butt to deal with and to maintain.

It sounds like you are of the opinion that this commit:

Quoted 5 lines

commit 0499680a42141d86417a8fbaa8c8db806bea1201

Author: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Date:   Tue Jan 10 15:11:31 2012 -0800

procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount options

was inappropriate.

Quoted 3 lines

Further a per pid namespace decision does not actually work, for having restricted policy only for a small set of processes because it is only with very careful container setup that you would expose this policy.

I would hope that the folks doing the fancy container setup tools would add this when they mount the container /proc and care about exposing physical addresses to it.

I did model this after the _existing_ /proc options (introduced in the commit referenced above). Those also use the pid namespace to store mount options. I assumed they are used out in the real world and that they do not require any kind of careful container setup.

Quoted 3 lines

If you really need a subset of processes with a restricted policy make it a prctl, and bloat struct task. Then disallow a process with the prctl set from reading the file.

Let's say we add the prctl(), and we set it up to block /proc/$pid/pagemap by default at boot. We run for a couple of weeks and an (unprivileged) app breaks. With the mount option, an administrator at least has the option to fall back to a less secure mode for the whole system with a remount.

With a prctl(), don't think that would be feasible, short of a reboot.

Would such a prctl() also have the feature that it could never be set to a less-restrictive policy?

#3 lore raw
Quoted 33 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines · Eric W. Biederman
Quoted 7 lines · Dave Hansen

From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>

Changes from v1:
* Do not allow a child pid namespace to unset paranoid when its parent had it set.
* Update description text to clarify the options we have to solve this problem.

Quoted 6 lines

Again.

The option name "paranoid" is entirely too general. Who knows what it referrs to.

/proc exposes a lot of sensitive information that could be used to determine physical memory ordering (not as bad as actual physical addresses, but still). My hope was that instead of adding an option for every single proc file, we'd have a single one that folks could turn on.

In the end, I'm perfectly fine doing a s/paranoid/pidpagemap/g, I just wanted to point out that there will may be more patches like this down the line.

Quoted 3 lines

A mount option is not an appropriate place to control one small bit of policy like this. Proc mount options are a real pain in the butt to deal with and to maintain.

It sounds like you are of the opinion that this commit:

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

commit 0499680a42141d86417a8fbaa8c8db806bea1201

Author: Vasiliy Kulikov <[email protected]>
Date:   Tue Jan 10 15:11:31 2012 -0800

procfs: add hidepid= and gid= mount options

was inappropriate.

Actually I am. It is a bloody nightmare to maintain. But at least it deals with the core business of proc. That of displaying processes.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Further a per pid namespace decision does not actually work, for having restricted policy only for a small set of processes because it is only with very careful container setup that you would expose this policy.

Quoted 8 lines

I would hope that the folks doing the fancy container setup tools would add this when they mount the container /proc and care about exposing physical addresses to it.

I did model this after the _existing_ /proc options (introduced in the commit referenced above). Those also use the pid namespace to store mount options. I assumed they are used out in the real world and that they do not require any kind of careful container setup.

The use cases are enough different it is different. For the hidepid non-sense a small leak doesn't give you much.

For the case of restricting pagemap. In many cases even a single leak of a single value means you can infer everything else you want to know. Since a single leak of pagemap gives the game away something that does not restrict on a large basis is a problem.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 3 lines

If you really need a subset of processes with a restricted policy make it a prctl, and bloat struct task. Then disallow a process with the prctl set from reading the file.

Let's say we add the prctl(), and we set it up to block /proc/$pid/pagemap by default at boot. We run for a couple of weeks and an (unprivileged) app breaks. With the mount option, an administrator at least has the option to fall back to a less secure mode for the whole system with a remount.

Quoted 4 lines

With a prctl(), don't think that would be feasible, short of a reboot.

Would such a prctl() also have the feature that it could never be set to a less-restrictive policy?

Your choice. For system wide behavior a sysctl or a boot option are likely better.

For the case of just enabling this for a pid namespace or a container prctl() seems reasonable.

I am a bit puzzled though. I though as part of the kernel virtual address randomization effort we had a bunch of similar patches come through that I could refer you to. But for whatever reason I am not seeing them in the source tree now. If those kinds of changes actually exist that class of blinding might be useful for your changes as well.

Eric

#4 lore raw

Just a quick plea here to request that the final solution make it not too hard for my error injection test programs to find physical addresses to pass to EINJ driver. Tests already run as root - I can fix them to also grab some CAP_* permission too if needed. I also don't mind having to reboot the kernel to add a command line option to make real page numbers appear. But I don't want to have to rebuild a kernel, or get stuck using an old kernel.

Thanks

-Tony