a few KVM patches
Subsystems (2)
Nicholas Piggin
reviewercover a few KVM patches
These patches are unrelated except touching some of the same code. The first two fix actual guest exploitable issues, the other two try to tidy up SLB management slightly.
Thanks,
Nick
Nicholas Piggin (4):
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Remove support for running HPT guest on RPT host
without mixed mode support
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix radix guest SLB side channel
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: No need to clear radix host SLB before loading
guest
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Use POWER9 SLBIA IH=6 variant to clear SLB
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_asm.h | 11 -- arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 3 - arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 56 ++-------- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_builtin.c | 108 +----------------- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 129 ++++++++++------------ 5 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 237 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
Nicholas Piggin
reviewerPATCH 1/4 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Remove support for running HPT guest on RPT host without mixed mode
This reverts much of commit c01015091a770 ("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Run HPT guests on POWER9 radix hosts"), which was required to run HPT guests on RPT hosts on early POWER9 CPUs without support for "mixed mode", which meant the host could not run with MMU on while guests were running.
This code has some corner case bugs, e.g., when the guest hits a machine check or HMI the primary locks up waiting for secondaries to switch LPCR to host, which they never do. This could all be fixed in software, but most CPUs in production have mixed mode support, and those that don't are believed to be all in installations that don't use this capability. So simplify things and remove support.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_asm.h | 11 --- arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 3 - arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 56 +++-------- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_builtin.c | 108 +--------------------- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 80 ++++------------ 5 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_book3s_asm.h +0 -11
@@ -74,16 +74,6 @@ struct kvm_split_mode {u8 do_nap;u8 napped[MAX_SMT_THREADS ];struct kvmppc_vcore *vc[MAX_SUBCORES ]; -/* Bits for changing lpcr on P9 */ -unsigned long lpcr_req; -unsigned long lpidr_req; -unsigned long host_lpcr; -u32 do_set; -u32 do_restore; -union { -u32 allphases; -u8 phase[4 ]; - } lpcr_sync; };/*
@@ -110,7 +100,6 @@ struct kvmppc_host_state {u8 hwthread_state;u8 host_ipi;u8 ptid;/* thread number within subcore when split */ -u8 tid;/* thread number within whole core */ u8 fake_suspend;struct kvm_vcpu *kvm_vcpu;struct kvmppc_vcore *kvm_vcore;
arch/powerpc/kernel/asm-offsets.c +0 -3
@@ -668,7 +668,6 @@ int main(void)HSTATE_FIELD (HSTATE_SAVED_XIRR , saved_xirr);HSTATE_FIELD (HSTATE_HOST_IPI , host_ipi);HSTATE_FIELD (HSTATE_PTID , ptid); -HSTATE_FIELD (HSTATE_TID , tid);HSTATE_FIELD (HSTATE_FAKE_SUSPEND , fake_suspend);HSTATE_FIELD (HSTATE_MMCR0 , host_mmcr[0 ]);HSTATE_FIELD (HSTATE_MMCR1 , host_mmcr[1 ]);
@@ -698,8 +697,6 @@ int main(void)OFFSET (KVM_SPLIT_LDBAR , kvm_split_mode, ldbar);OFFSET (KVM_SPLIT_DO_NAP , kvm_split_mode, do_nap);OFFSET (KVM_SPLIT_NAPPED , kvm_split_mode, napped); -OFFSET (KVM_SPLIT_DO_SET , kvm_split_mode, do_set); -OFFSET (KVM_SPLIT_DO_RESTORE , kvm_split_mode, do_restore);#endif /* CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE */ #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +12 -44
132 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_builtin.c +1 -107
126 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S +19 -61
147 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
Re: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Remove support for running HPT guest on RPT host without mixed
Resending because the previous got spam-filtered:
Quoted 11 lines · Nicholas Piggin
This reverts much of commit
c01015091a770("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Run HPT guests on POWER9 radix hosts"), which was required to run HPT guests on RPT hosts on early POWER9 CPUs without support for "mixed mode", which meant the host could not run with MMU on while guests were running.This code has some corner case bugs, e.g., when the guest hits a machine check or HMI the primary locks up waiting for secondaries to switch LPCR to host, which they never do. This could all be fixed in software, but most CPUs in production have mixed mode support, and those that don't are believed to be all in installations that don't use this capability. So simplify things and remove support.
With this patch in a DD2.1 machine + indep_threads_mode=N + disable_radix, QEMU aborts and dumps registers, is that intended?
Could we use the 'no_mixing_hpt_and_radix' logic in check_extension to advertise only KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_RADIX to the guest via OV5 so it doesn't try to run hash?
For instance, if I hack QEMU's 'spapr_dt_ov5_platform_support' from OV5_MMU_BOTH to OV5_MMU_RADIX_300 then it boots succesfuly, but the guest turns into radix, due to this code in prom_init:
prom_parse_mmu_model:
case OV5_FEAT(OV5_MMU_RADIX): /* Only Radix */
prom_debug("MMU - radix only\n");
if (prom_radix_disable) {
/*
* If we __have__ to do radix, we're better off ignoring
* the command line rather than not booting.
*/
prom_printf("WARNING: Ignoring cmdline option disable_radix\n");
}
support->radix_mmu = true;
break;It seems we could explicitly say that the host does not support hash and that would align with the above code.
Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>---
Nicholas Piggin
reviewerRe: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Remove support for running HPT guest on RPT host without mixed
Excerpts from Fabiano Rosas's message of January 19, 2021 11:46 am:
Quoted 16 lines
Resending because the previous got spam-filtered:
Quoted 11 lines · Nicholas Piggin
This reverts much of commit
c01015091a770("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Run HPT guests on POWER9 radix hosts"), which was required to run HPT guests on RPT hosts on early POWER9 CPUs without support for "mixed mode", which meant the host could not run with MMU on while guests were running.This code has some corner case bugs, e.g., when the guest hits a machine check or HMI the primary locks up waiting for secondaries to switch LPCR to host, which they never do. This could all be fixed in software, but most CPUs in production have mixed mode support, and those that don't are believed to be all in installations that don't use this capability. So simplify things and remove support.
Quoted 2 lines
With this patch in a DD2.1 machine + indep_threads_mode=N +
disable_radix, QEMU aborts and dumps registers, is that intended?
Yes. That configuration is hanging handling MCEs in the guest with some threads waiting forever to synchronize. Paul suggested it was never a supported configuration so we might just remove it.
Quoted 22 lines
Could we use the '
no_mixing_hpt_and_radix' logic incheck_extensionto advertise onlyKVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_RADIXto the guest via OV5 so it doesn't try to run hash?For instance, if I hack QEMU's '
spapr_dt_ov5_platform_support' fromOV5_MMU_BOTHtoOV5_MMU_RADIX_300then it boots succesfuly, but the guest turns into radix, due to this code inprom_init:
prom_parse_mmu_model:case
OV5_FEAT(OV5_MMU_RADIX): /* Only Radix */prom_debug("MMU - radix only\n"); if (prom_radix_disable) { /* * If we __have__ to do radix, we're better off ignoring * the command line rather than not booting. */ prom_printf("WARNING: Ignoring cmdline option disable_radix\n"); } support->radix_mmu = true; break;
Quoted 2 lines
It seems we could explicitly say that the host does not support hash and that would align with the above code.
I'm not sure, sounds like you could, on the other hand these aborts seem like the prefered failure mode for these kinds of configuration issues, I don't know what the policy is, is reverting back to radix acceptable?
Thanks,
Nick
Fabiano Rosas
Tested-byRe: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Remove support for running HPT guest on RPT host without mixed
Quoted 17 lines · Nicholas Piggin
Excerpts from Fabiano Rosas's message of January 19, 2021 11:46 am:
Quoted 16 lines
Resending because the previous got spam-filtered:
Quoted 11 lines · Nicholas Piggin
This reverts much of commit
c01015091a770("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Run HPT guests on POWER9 radix hosts"), which was required to run HPT guests on RPT hosts on early POWER9 CPUs without support for "mixed mode", which meant the host could not run with MMU on while guests were running.This code has some corner case bugs, e.g., when the guest hits a machine check or HMI the primary locks up waiting for secondaries to switch LPCR to host, which they never do. This could all be fixed in software, but most CPUs in production have mixed mode support, and those that don't are believed to be all in installations that don't use this capability. So simplify things and remove support.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
With this patch in a DD2.1 machine + indep_threads_mode=N +
disable_radix, QEMU aborts and dumps registers, is that intended?Yes. That configuration is hanging handling MCEs in the guest with some threads waiting forever to synchronize. Paul suggested it was never a supported configuration so we might just remove it.
OK, so:
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 22 lines
Could we use the '
no_mixing_hpt_and_radix' logic incheck_extensionto advertise onlyKVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_RADIXto the guest via OV5 so it doesn't try to run hash?For instance, if I hack QEMU's '
spapr_dt_ov5_platform_support' fromOV5_MMU_BOTHtoOV5_MMU_RADIX_300then it boots succesfuly, but the guest turns into radix, due to this code inprom_init:
prom_parse_mmu_model:case
OV5_FEAT(OV5_MMU_RADIX): /* Only Radix */prom_debug("MMU - radix only\n"); if (prom_radix_disable) { /* * If we __have__ to do radix, we're better off ignoring * the command line rather than not booting. */ prom_printf("WARNING: Ignoring cmdline option disable_radix\n"); } support->radix_mmu = true; break;
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
It seems we could explicitly say that the host does not support hash and that would align with the above code.
I'm not sure, sounds like you could, on the other hand these aborts seem like the prefered failure mode for these kinds of configuration issues, I don't know what the policy is, is reverting back to radix acceptable?
Yeah, I couldn't find documentation about why we're reverting back to radix. I personally dislike it, but there is already a precedent so I'm not sure. A radix guest on a hash host does the same transparent conversion AFAICT.
But despite that, this patch removes support for hash MMU in this particular scenario. I don't see why continuing to tell the guest we support hash.
Anyway, here's a patch if you decide to go that way (tested w/ DD2.1 & 2.3 machines):
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h +1 -0
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ struct kvmppc_ops { int size);int (*enable_svm)(struct kvm *kvm);int (*svm_off)(struct kvm *kvm); +bool (*hash_possible)(void ); };extern struct kvmppc_ops *kvmppc_hv_ops;
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +10 -0
@@ -5599,6 +5599,15 @@ static int kvmhv_svm_off(struct kvm *kvm)return ret; } +static bool kvmppc_hash_possible (void ) +{ +if (radix_enabled () && no_mixing_hpt_and_radix) +return false; + +return cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_300 ) && +cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_HVMODE ); +} +static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .get_sregs = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_sregs_hv, .set_sregs = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs_hv,
@@ -5642,6 +5651,7 @@ static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .store_to_eaddr = kvmhv_store_to_eaddr, .enable_svm = kvmhv_enable_svm, .svm_off = kvmhv_svm_off, + .hash_possible = kvmppc_hash_possible, };static int kvm_init_subcore_bitmap (void )
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +1 -2
@@ -611,8 +611,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) r = !!(hv_enabled &&radix_enabled ());break ;case KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_HASH_V3 : - r = !!(hv_enabled &&cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_300 ) && -cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_HVMODE )); + r = !!(hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->hash_possible ());break ;case KVM_CAP_PPC_NESTED_HV : r = !!(hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->enable_nested &&
---
https://github.com/farosas/linux/commit/0ae6c65ba9592c23215899c473acf392bd6e36d5.patch
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks,
Nick
Nicholas Piggin
reviewerRe: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Remove support for running HPT guest on RPT host without mixed
Excerpts from Fabiano Rosas's message of January 20, 2021 7:07 am:
Quoted 66 lines
Quoted 17 lines · Nicholas Piggin
Excerpts from Fabiano Rosas's message of January 19, 2021 11:46 am:
Quoted 16 lines
Resending because the previous got spam-filtered:
Quoted 11 lines · Nicholas Piggin
This reverts much of commit
c01015091a770("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Run HPT guests on POWER9 radix hosts"), which was required to run HPT guests on RPT hosts on early POWER9 CPUs without support for "mixed mode", which meant the host could not run with MMU on while guests were running.This code has some corner case bugs, e.g., when the guest hits a machine check or HMI the primary locks up waiting for secondaries to switch LPCR to host, which they never do. This could all be fixed in software, but most CPUs in production have mixed mode support, and those that don't are believed to be all in installations that don't use this capability. So simplify things and remove support.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
With this patch in a DD2.1 machine + indep_threads_mode=N +
disable_radix, QEMU aborts and dumps registers, is that intended?Yes. That configuration is hanging handling MCEs in the guest with some threads waiting forever to synchronize. Paul suggested it was never a supported configuration so we might just remove it.
OK, so:
Tested-by Fabiano Rosas <[email protected]>Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 22 lines
Could we use the '
no_mixing_hpt_and_radix' logic incheck_extensionto advertise onlyKVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_RADIXto the guest via OV5 so it doesn't try to run hash?For instance, if I hack QEMU's '
spapr_dt_ov5_platform_support' fromOV5_MMU_BOTHtoOV5_MMU_RADIX_300then it boots succesfuly, but the guest turns into radix, due to this code inprom_init:
prom_parse_mmu_model:case
OV5_FEAT(OV5_MMU_RADIX): /* Only Radix */prom_debug("MMU - radix only\n"); if (prom_radix_disable) { /* * If we __have__ to do radix, we're better off ignoring * the command line rather than not booting. */ prom_printf("WARNING: Ignoring cmdline option disable_radix\n"); } support->radix_mmu = true; break;Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
It seems we could explicitly say that the host does not support hash and that would align with the above code.
I'm not sure, sounds like you could, on the other hand these aborts seem like the prefered failure mode for these kinds of configuration issues, I don't know what the policy is, is reverting back to radix acceptable?
Yeah, I couldn't find documentation about why we're reverting back to radix. I personally dislike it, but there is already a precedent so I'm not sure. A radix guest on a hash host does the same transparent conversion AFAICT.
Quoted 6 lines
But despite that, this patch removes support for hash MMU in this particular scenario. I don't see why continuing to tell the guest we support hash.
Anyway, here's a patch if you decide to go that way (tested w/ DD2.1 & 2.3 machines):
Thanks, I don't mind it, have to see if the maintainer will take it :)
You could add a small changelog / SOB and I could putit after my patch?
Quoted 20 lines
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h +1
-0@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ struct kvmppc_ops { int size);int (*enable_svm)(struct kvm *kvm);int (*svm_off)(struct kvm *kvm); +bool (*hash_possible)(void ); };extern struct kvmppc_ops *kvmppc_hv_ops;arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +0
-0@@ -5599,6 +5599,15 @@ static int kvmhv_svm_off(struct kvm *kvm)return ret;
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c static int kvmhv_svm_off(struct kvm *kvm) · line 5609
Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +8
-0} +static bool kvmppc_hash_possible (void ) +{ +if (radix_enabled () && no_mixing_hpt_and_radix) +return false; + +return cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_300 ) && +cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_HVMODE ); +}
Just be careful, it's hash_v3 specifically. Either make this return true for arch < 300 add the ARCH_300 check in the ioctl, or rename to include v3.
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { · line 5656
Quoted 11 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +2
-0+static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .get_sregs = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_sregs_hv, .set_sregs = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs_hv,@@ -5642,6 +5651,7 @@ static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .store_to_eaddr = kvmhv_store_to_eaddr, .enable_svm = kvmhv_enable_svm, .svm_off = kvmhv_svm_off, + .hash_possible = kvmppc_hash_possible, };
How about adding an op which can check extensions? It could return false if it wasn't checked and so default to the generic checks in kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension, and take a pointer to 'r' to set.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +0
-0static int kvm_init_subcore_bitmap (void )arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +0
-0
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) · line 617
Quoted 9 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +1
-2@@ -611,8 +611,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) r = !!(hv_enabled &&radix_enabled ());break ;case KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_HASH_V3 : - r = !!(hv_enabled &&cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_300 ) && -cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_HVMODE )); + r = !!(hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->hash_possible ());break ;case KVM_CAP_PPC_NESTED_HV : r = !!(hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->enable_nested &&
Thanks,
Nick
Re: [PATCH 1/4] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Remove support for running HPT guest on RPT host without mixed
Quoted 71 lines · Nicholas Piggin
Excerpts from Fabiano Rosas's message of January 20, 2021 7:07 am:
Quoted 70 lines
Quoted 17 lines · Nicholas Piggin
Excerpts from Fabiano Rosas's message of January 19, 2021 11:46 am:
Quoted 16 lines
Resending because the previous got spam-filtered:
Quoted 11 lines · Nicholas Piggin
This reverts much of commit
c01015091a770("KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Run HPT guests on POWER9 radix hosts"), which was required to run HPT guests on RPT hosts on early POWER9 CPUs without support for "mixed mode", which meant the host could not run with MMU on while guests were running.This code has some corner case bugs, e.g., when the guest hits a machine check or HMI the primary locks up waiting for secondaries to switch LPCR to host, which they never do. This could all be fixed in software, but most CPUs in production have mixed mode support, and those that don't are believed to be all in installations that don't use this capability. So simplify things and remove support.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
With this patch in a DD2.1 machine + indep_threads_mode=N +
disable_radix, QEMU aborts and dumps registers, is that intended?Yes. That configuration is hanging handling MCEs in the guest with some threads waiting forever to synchronize. Paul suggested it was never a supported configuration so we might just remove it.
OK, so:
Tested-by Fabiano Rosas <[email protected]>Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 22 lines
Could we use the '
no_mixing_hpt_and_radix' logic incheck_extensionto advertise onlyKVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_RADIXto the guest via OV5 so it doesn't try to run hash?For instance, if I hack QEMU's '
spapr_dt_ov5_platform_support' fromOV5_MMU_BOTHtoOV5_MMU_RADIX_300then it boots succesfuly, but the guest turns into radix, due to this code inprom_init:
prom_parse_mmu_model:case
OV5_FEAT(OV5_MMU_RADIX): /* Only Radix */prom_debug("MMU - radix only\n"); if (prom_radix_disable) { /* * If we __have__ to do radix, we're better off ignoring * the command line rather than not booting. */ prom_printf("WARNING: Ignoring cmdline option disable_radix\n"); } support->radix_mmu = true; break;Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
It seems we could explicitly say that the host does not support hash and that would align with the above code.
I'm not sure, sounds like you could, on the other hand these aborts seem like the prefered failure mode for these kinds of configuration issues, I don't know what the policy is, is reverting back to radix acceptable?
Yeah, I couldn't find documentation about why we're reverting back to radix. I personally dislike it, but there is already a precedent so I'm not sure. A radix guest on a hash host does the same transparent conversion AFAICT.
But despite that, this patch removes support for hash MMU in this particular scenario. I don't see why continuing to tell the guest we support hash.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Anyway, here's a patch if you decide to go that way (tested w/ DD2.1 & 2.3 machines):
Thanks, I don't mind it, have to see if the maintainer will take it :)
You could add a small changelog / SOB and I could putit after my patch?
Sure, I'll reply to this thread with a proper patch.
Quoted 35 lines
Quoted 20 lines
---
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h +1
-0@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ struct kvmppc_ops { int size);int (*enable_svm)(struct kvm *kvm);int (*svm_off)(struct kvm *kvm); +bool (*hash_possible)(void ); };extern struct kvmppc_ops *kvmppc_hv_ops;arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +0
-0@@ -5599,6 +5599,15 @@ static int kvmhv_svm_off(struct kvm *kvm)return ret;arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c static int kvmhv_svm_off(struct kvm *kvm) · line 5609
Quoted 10 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +8
-0} +static bool kvmppc_hash_possible (void ) +{ +if (radix_enabled () && no_mixing_hpt_and_radix) +return false; + +return cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_300 ) && +cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_HVMODE ); +}Just be careful, it's
hash_v3specifically. Either make this return true for arch < 300 add theARCH_300check in the ioctl, or rename to include v3.
Quoted 16 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { · line 5656
Quoted 11 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +2
-0+static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .get_sregs = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_sregs_hv, .set_sregs = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs_hv,@@ -5642,6 +5651,7 @@ static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .store_to_eaddr = kvmhv_store_to_eaddr, .enable_svm = kvmhv_enable_svm, .svm_off = kvmhv_svm_off, + .hash_possible = kvmppc_hash_possible, };How about adding an op which can check extensions? It could return false if it wasn't checked and so default to the generic checks in
kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension, and take a pointer to 'r' to set.
I'm not sure I get the part about "return false if it wasn't checked". Do you mean like this?
static bool kvmhv_check_extension(long ext, int *r)
{
switch (ext) {
case KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_HASH_V3:
r = kvmppc_hash_v3_possible();
break;
default:
return false;
}
return true;
}And then we could move all of the #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_BOOK3S_HV_POSSIBLE cases into it and early in kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension have something like:
if (hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->check_extension(ext, &r))
return r;
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 6 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +0
-0static int kvm_init_subcore_bitmap (void )arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +0
-0arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) · line 617
Quoted 9 lines
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +1
-2@@ -611,8 +611,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) r = !!(hv_enabled &&radix_enabled ());break ;case KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_HASH_V3 : - r = !!(hv_enabled &&cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_300 ) && -cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_HVMODE )); + r = !!(hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->hash_possible ());break ;case KVM_CAP_PPC_NESTED_HV : r = !!(hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->enable_nested &&Thanks,
Nick
PATCH 1/1 KVM: PPC: Don't always report hash MMU capability for P9 < DD2.2
In reply to Nicholas PigginThese machines don't support running both MMU types at the same time, so remove the KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_HASH_V3 capability when the host is using Radix MMU.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c | 10 ++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c | 3 +-- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kvm_ppc.h +1 -0
@@ -314,6 +314,7 @@ struct kvmppc_ops { int size);int (*enable_svm)(struct kvm *kvm);int (*svm_off)(struct kvm *kvm); +bool (*hash_v3_possible)(void ); };extern struct kvmppc_ops *kvmppc_hv_ops;
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv.c +10 -0
@@ -5599,6 +5599,15 @@ static int kvmhv_svm_off(struct kvm *kvm)return ret; } +static bool kvmppc_hash_v3_possible (void ) +{ +if (radix_enabled () && no_mixing_hpt_and_radix) +return false; + +return cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_300 ) && +cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_HVMODE ); +} +static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .get_sregs = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_get_sregs_hv, .set_sregs = kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_set_sregs_hv,
@@ -5642,6 +5651,7 @@ static struct kvmppc_ops kvm_ops_hv = { .store_to_eaddr = kvmhv_store_to_eaddr, .enable_svm = kvmhv_enable_svm, .svm_off = kvmhv_svm_off, + .hash_v3_possible = kvmppc_hash_v3_possible, };static int kvm_init_subcore_bitmap (void )
arch/powerpc/kvm/powerpc.c +1 -2
@@ -611,8 +611,7 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext) r = !!(hv_enabled &&radix_enabled ());break ;case KVM_CAP_PPC_MMU_HASH_V3 : - r = !!(hv_enabled &&cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_ARCH_300 ) && -cpu_has_feature (CPU_FTR_HVMODE )); + r = !!(hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->hash_v3_possible ());break ;case KVM_CAP_PPC_NESTED_HV : r = !!(hv_enabled && kvmppc_hv_ops->enable_nested &&
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
Nicholas Piggin
reviewerPATCH 2/4 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix radix guest SLB side channel
In reply to Nicholas PigginThe slbmte instruction is legal in radix mode, including radix guest mode. This means radix guests can load the SLB with arbitrary data.
KVM host does not clear the SLB when exiting a guest if it was a radix guest, which would allow a rogue radix guest to use the SLB as a side channel to communicate with other guests.
Fix this by ensuring the SLB is cleared when coming out of a radix guest. Only the first 4 entries are a concern, because radix guests always run with LPCR[UPRT]=1, which limits the reach of slbmte. slbia is not used (except in a non-performance-critical path) because it can clear cached translations.
--- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S +31 -8
@@ -1157,6 +1157,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvmhv_vcpu_entry_p9) mr r4, r3 b fast_guest_entry_c guest_exit_short_path: + /* + * Malicious or buggy radix guests may have inserted SLB entries + * (only 0..3 because radix always runs with UPRT=1), so these must + * be cleared here to avoid side-channels. slbmte is used rather + * than slbia, as it won't clear cached translations. + */ + li r0,0 + slbmte r0,r0 + li r4,1 + slbmte r0,r4 + li r4,2 + slbmte r0,r4 + li r4,3 + slbmte r0,r4 li r0, KVM_GUEST_MODE_NONE stb r0, HSTATE_IN_GUEST(r13)
@@ -1469,7 +1483,7 @@ guest_exit_cont: /* r9 = vcpu, r12 = trap, r13 = paca */ lbz r0, KVM_RADIX(r5) li r5, 0 cmpwi r0, 0 - bne 3f /* for radix, save 0 entries */ + bne 0f /* for radix, save 0 entries */ lwz r0,VCPU_SLB_NR(r9) /* number of entries in SLB */ mtctr r0 li r6,0
@@ -1490,12 +1504,9 @@ guest_exit_cont: /* r9 = vcpu, r12 = trap, r13 = paca */ slbmte r0,r0 slbia ptesync -3: stw r5,VCPU_SLB_MAX(r9) + stw r5,VCPU_SLB_MAX(r9) /* load host SLB entries */ -BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION - b 0f -END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX) ld r8,PACA_SLBSHADOWPTR(r13) .rept SLB_NUM_BOLTED
@@ -1508,7 +1519,17 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX) slbmte r6,r5 1: addi r8,r8,16 .endr -0: + b guest_bypass + +0: /* Sanitise radix guest SLB, see guest_exit_short_path comment. */ + li r0,0 + slbmte r0,r0 + li r4,1 + slbmte r0,r4 + li r4,2 + slbmte r0,r4 + li r4,3 + slbmte r0,r4 guest_bypass: stw r12, STACK_SLOT_TRAP(r1)
@@ -3302,12 +3323,14 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300) mtspr SPRN_CIABR, r0 mtspr SPRN_DAWRX0, r0 + /* Clear hash and radix guest SLB, see guest_exit_short_path comment. */ + slbmte r0, r0 + slbia + BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION b 4f END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX) - slbmte r0, r0 - slbia ptesync ld r8, PACA_SLBSHADOWPTR(r13) .rept SLB_NUM_BOLTED
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
Re: [PATCH 2/4] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix radix guest SLB side channel
Quoted 7 lines · Nicholas Piggin
The slbmte instruction is legal in radix mode, including radix guest mode. This means radix guests can load the SLB with arbitrary data.
KVM host does not clear the SLB when exiting a guest if it was a radix guest, which would allow a rogue radix guest to use the SLB as a side channel to communicate with other guests.
Quoted 7 lines
Fix this by ensuring the SLB is cleared when coming out of a radix guest. Only the first 4 entries are a concern, because radix guests always run with LPCR[UPRT]=1, which limits the reach of slbmte. slbia is not used (except in a non-performance-critical path) because it can clear cached translations.
Signed-off-by Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
Quoted 88 lines
--- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S +31
-8@@ -1157,6 +1157,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__kvmhv_vcpu_entry_p9) mr r4, r3 b fast_guest_entry_c guest_exit_short_path: + /* + * Malicious or buggy radix guests may have inserted SLB entries + * (only 0..3 because radix always runs with UPRT=1), so these must + * be cleared here to avoid side-channels. slbmte is used rather + * than slbia, as it won't clear cached translations. + */ + li r0,0 + slbmte r0,r0 + li r4,1 + slbmte r0,r4 + li r4,2 + slbmte r0,r4 + li r4,3 + slbmte r0,r4 li r0, KVM_GUEST_MODE_NONE stb r0, HSTATE_IN_GUEST(r13)@@ -1469,7 +1483,7 @@ guest_exit_cont: /* r9 = vcpu, r12 = trap, r13 = paca */ lbz r0, KVM_RADIX(r5) li r5, 0 cmpwi r0, 0 - bne 3f /* for radix, save 0 entries */ + bne 0f /* for radix, save 0 entries */ lwz r0,VCPU_SLB_NR(r9) /* number of entries in SLB */ mtctr r0 li r6,0@@ -1490,12 +1504,9 @@ guest_exit_cont: /* r9 = vcpu, r12 = trap, r13 = paca */ slbmte r0,r0 slbia ptesync -3: stw r5,VCPU_SLB_MAX(r9) + stw r5,VCPU_SLB_MAX(r9) /* load host SLB entries */ -BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION - b 0f -END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX) ld r8,PACA_SLBSHADOWPTR(r13) .rept SLB_NUM_BOLTED@@ -1508,7 +1519,17 @@ END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX) slbmte r6,r5 1: addi r8,r8,16 .endr -0: + b guest_bypass + +0: /* Sanitise radix guest SLB, see guest_exit_short_path comment. */ + li r0,0 + slbmte r0,r0 + li r4,1 + slbmte r0,r4 + li r4,2 + slbmte r0,r4 + li r4,3 + slbmte r0,r4 guest_bypass: stw r12, STACK_SLOT_TRAP(r1)@@ -3302,12 +3323,14 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300) mtspr SPRN_CIABR, r0 mtspr SPRN_DAWRX0, r0 + /* Clear hash and radix guest SLB, see guest_exit_short_path comment. */ + slbmte r0, r0 + slbia + BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION b 4f END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFSET(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX) - slbmte r0, r0 - slbia ptesync ld r8, PACA_SLBSHADOWPTR(r13) .rept SLB_NUM_BOLTED
Re: [PATCH 2/4] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix radix guest SLB side channel
In reply to Nicholas PigginQuoted 6 lines · Nicholas Piggin
The slbmte instruction is legal in radix mode, including radix guest mode. This means radix guests can load the SLB with arbitrary data.
KVM host does not clear the SLB when exiting a guest if it was a radix guest, which would allow a rogue radix guest to use the SLB as a side channel to communicate with other guests.
No, because the code currently clears the SLB when entering a radix guest, which you remove in the next patch. I'm OK with moving the SLB clearing from guest entry to guest exit, I guess, but I don't see that you are in fact fixing anything by doing so.
Paul.
Nicholas Piggin
reviewerRe: [PATCH 2/4] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix radix guest SLB side channel
Excerpts from Paul Mackerras's message of February 10, 2021 11:28 am:
Quoted 10 lines · Nicholas Piggin
Quoted 6 lines
The slbmte instruction is legal in radix mode, including radix guest mode. This means radix guests can load the SLB with arbitrary data.
KVM host does not clear the SLB when exiting a guest if it was a radix guest, which would allow a rogue radix guest to use the SLB as a side channel to communicate with other guests.
No, because the code currently clears the SLB when entering a radix guest,
Not AFAIKS.
Quoted 1 line
which you remove in the next patch.
The next patch avoids clearing host SLB entries when a hash guest is entered from a radix host, it doesn't apply to radix guests. Not sure where the changelog for it went but it should have "HPT guests" in the title at least, I guess.
Quoted 3 lines
I'm OK with moving the SLB
clearing from guest entry to guest exit, I guess, but I don't see that you are in fact fixing anything by doing so.
I can set slb entries in a radix guest in simulator and observe they stay around over host<->guest transitions, and they don't after this patch.
Thanks,
Nick
Nicholas Piggin
reviewerPATCH 3/4 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: No need to clear radix host SLB before loading guest
In reply to Nicholas Piggin--- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S +5 -1
@@ -888,15 +888,19 @@ ALT_FTR_SECTION_END_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300) cmpdi r3, 512 /* 1 microsecond */ blt hdec_soon - /* For hash guest, clear out and reload the SLB */ ld r6, VCPU_KVM(r4) lbz r0, KVM_RADIX(r6) cmpwi r0, 0 bne 9f + + /* For hash guest, clear out and reload the SLB */ +BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION + /* Radix host won't have populated the SLB, so no need to clear */ li r6, 0 slbmte r6, r6 slbia ptesync +END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX) /* Load up guest SLB entries (N.B. slb_max will be 0 for radix) */ lwz r5,VCPU_SLB_MAX(r4)
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0
Nicholas Piggin
reviewerPATCH 4/4 KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Use POWER9 SLBIA IH=6 variant to clear SLB
In reply to Nicholas PigginIH=6 may preserve hypervisor real-mode ERAT entries and is the recommended SLBIA hint for switching partitions.
--- arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/kvm/book3s_hv_rmhandlers.S +3 -3
@@ -898,7 +898,7 @@ BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION /* Radix host won't have populated the SLB, so no need to clear */ li r6, 0 slbmte r6, r6 - slbia + PPC_SLBIA(6) ptesync END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(MMU_FTR_TYPE_RADIX)
@@ -1506,7 +1506,7 @@ guest_exit_cont: /* r9 = vcpu, r12 = trap, r13 = paca */ /* Finally clear out the SLB */ li r0,0 slbmte r0,r0 - slbia + PPC_SLBIA(6) ptesync stw r5,VCPU_SLB_MAX(r9)
@@ -3329,7 +3329,7 @@ END_FTR_SECTION_IFCLR(CPU_FTR_ARCH_300) /* Clear hash and radix guest SLB, see guest_exit_short_path comment. */ slbmte r0, r0 - slbia + PPC_SLBIA(6) BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION b 4f
Signature · 1 line
2.23.0