package/lxc: security bump to version 5.0.2
PATCH 1/1 package/lxc: security bump to version 5.0.2
- Fix CVE-2022-47952: lxc-user-nic in lxc through 5.0.1 is installed setuid root, and may allow local users to infer whether any file exists, even within a protected directory tree, because "Failed to open" often indicates that a file does not exist, whereas "does not refer to a network namespace path" often indicates that a file exists.
NOTE: this is different from CVE-2018-6556 because the CVE-2018-6556 fix design was based on the premise that "we will report back to the user that the open() failed but the user has no way of knowing why it failed"; however, in many realistic cases, there are no plausible reasons for failing except that the file does not exist.
- Drop patches (already in version)
--- ...-where-struct-mount_attr-is-declared.patch | 186 ------------------ ...thod_async-to-replace-the-asyncv-one.patch | 47 ----- ...uild-detect-sys-pidfd.h-availability.patch | 55 ------ package/lxc/lxc.hash | 2 +- package/lxc/lxc.mk | 2 +- 5 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 290 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 package/lxc/0001-build-detect-where-struct-mount_attr-is-declared.patch delete mode 100644 package/lxc/0002-use-sd_bus_call_method_async-to-replace-the-asyncv-one.patch delete mode 100644 package/lxc/0003-build-detect-sys-pidfd.h-availability.patch
package/lxc/0001-build-detect-where-struct-mount_attr-is-declared.patch deleted +0 -186
@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@ -From c1115e1503bf955c97f4cf3b925a6a9f619764c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]> -Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 16:14:25 +0200 -Subject: [PATCH] build: detect where struct mount_attr is declared - -Fixes: #4176 -Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Microsoft) <[email protected]> -[Retrieved from: -https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/c1115e1503bf955c97f4cf3b925a6a9f619764c3] -Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> ---- - meson.build | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- - src/lxc/conf.c | 6 +++--- - src/lxc/conf.h | 2 +- - src/lxc/mount_utils.c | 6 +++--- - src/lxc/syscall_wrappers.h | 12 ++++++++++-- - 5 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) - -diff --git a/meson.build b/meson.build -index a145faf069..f679aabbc8 100644 ---- a/meson.build -+++ b/meson.build -@@ -590,7 +590,6 @@ decl_headers = ''' - foreach decl: [ - '__aligned_u64', - 'struct clone_args', -- 'struct mount_attr', - 'struct open_how', - 'struct rtnl_link_stats64', - ] -@@ -610,7 +609,6 @@ foreach tuple: [ - ['struct seccomp_notif_sizes'], - ['struct clone_args'], - ['__aligned_u64'], -- ['struct mount_attr'], - ['struct open_how'], - ['struct rtnl_link_stats64'], - ] -@@ -630,6 +628,34 @@ foreach tuple: [ - endif - endforeach - -+## Types. -+decl_headers = ''' -+#include <sys/mount.h> -+''' -+ -+# We get -1 if the size cannot be determined -+if cc.sizeof('struct mount_attr', prefix: decl_headers, args: '-D_GNU_SOURCE') > 0 -+ srcconf.set10('HAVE_' + 'struct mount_attr'.underscorify().to_upper(), true) -+ found_types += 'struct mount_attr (sys/mount.h)' -+else -+ srcconf.set10('HAVE_' + 'struct mount_attr'.underscorify().to_upper(), false) -+ missing_types += 'struct mount_attr (sys/mount.h)' -+endif -+ -+## Types. -+decl_headers = ''' -+#include <linux/mount.h> -+''' -+ -+# We get -1 if the size cannot be determined -+if cc.sizeof('struct mount_attr', prefix: decl_headers, args: '-D_GNU_SOURCE') > 0 -+ srcconf.set10('HAVE_UAPI_' + 'struct mount_attr'.underscorify().to_upper(), true) -+ found_types += 'struct mount_attr (linux/mount.h)' -+else -+ srcconf.set10('HAVE_UAPI_' + 'struct mount_attr'.underscorify().to_upper(), false) -+ missing_types += 'struct mount_attr (linux/mount.h)' -+endif -+ - ## Headers. - foreach ident: [ - ['bpf', '''#include <sys/syscall.h> -diff --git a/src/lxc/conf.c b/src/lxc/conf.c -index ffbe74c2f6..4193cd07f5 100644 ---- a/src/lxc/conf.c -+++ b/src/lxc/conf.c -@@ -2885,7 +2885,7 @@ static int __lxc_idmapped_mounts_child(struct lxc_handler *handler, FILE *f) - struct lxc_mount_options opts = {}; - int dfd_from; - const char *source_relative, *target_relative; -- struct lxc_mount_attr attr = {}; -+ struct mount_attr attr = {}; - - ret = parse_lxc_mount_attrs(&opts, mntent.mnt_opts); - if (ret < 0) -@@ -3005,7 +3005,7 @@ static int __lxc_idmapped_mounts_child(struct lxc_handler *handler, FILE *f) - - /* Set propagation mount options. */ - if (opts.attr.propagation) { -- attr = (struct lxc_mount_attr) { -+ attr = (struct mount_attr) { - .propagation = opts.attr.propagation, - }; - -@@ -4109,7 +4109,7 @@ int lxc_idmapped_mounts_parent(struct lxc_handler *handler) - - for (;;) { - __do_close int fd_from = -EBADF, fd_userns = -EBADF; -- struct lxc_mount_attr attr = {}; -+ struct mount_attr attr = {}; - struct lxc_mount_options opts = {}; - ssize_t ret; - -diff --git a/src/lxc/conf.h b/src/lxc/conf.h -index 7dc2f15b60..772479f9e1 100644 ---- a/src/lxc/conf.h -+++ b/src/lxc/conf.h -@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ struct lxc_mount_options { - unsigned long mnt_flags; - unsigned long prop_flags; - char *data; -- struct lxc_mount_attr attr; -+ struct mount_attr attr; - char *raw_options; - }; - -diff --git a/src/lxc/mount_utils.c b/src/lxc/mount_utils.c -index bba75f933c..88dd73ee36 100644 ---- a/src/lxc/mount_utils.c -+++ b/src/lxc/mount_utils.c -@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ lxc_log_define(mount_utils, lxc); - * setting in @attr_set, but must also specify MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME in the - * @attr_clr field. - */ --static inline void set_atime(struct lxc_mount_attr *attr) -+static inline void set_atime(struct mount_attr *attr) - { - switch (attr->attr_set & MOUNT_ATTR__ATIME) { - case MOUNT_ATTR_RELATIME: -@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ int create_detached_idmapped_mount(const char *path, int userns_fd, - { - __do_close int fd_tree_from = -EBADF; - unsigned int open_tree_flags = OPEN_TREE_CLONE | OPEN_TREE_CLOEXEC; -- struct lxc_mount_attr attr = { -+ struct mount_attr attr = { - .attr_set = MOUNT_ATTR_IDMAP | attr_set, - .attr_clr = attr_clr, - .userns_fd = userns_fd, -@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ int __fd_bind_mount(int dfd_from, const char *path_from, __u64 o_flags_from, - __u64 attr_clr, __u64 propagation, int userns_fd, - bool recursive) - { -- struct lxc_mount_attr attr = { -+ struct mount_attr attr = { - .attr_set = attr_set, - .attr_clr = attr_clr, - .propagation = propagation, -diff --git a/src/lxc/syscall_wrappers.h b/src/lxc/syscall_wrappers.h -index a5e98b565c..c8a7d0c7b7 100644 ---- a/src/lxc/syscall_wrappers.h -+++ b/src/lxc/syscall_wrappers.h -@@ -18,6 +18,12 @@ - #include "macro.h" - #include "syscall_numbers.h" - -+#if HAVE_STRUCT_MOUNT_ATTR -+#include <sys/mount.h> -+#elif HAVE_UAPI_STRUCT_MOUNT_ATTR -+#include <linux/mount.h> -+#endif -+ - #ifdef HAVE_LINUX_MEMFD_H - #include <linux/memfd.h> - #endif -@@ -210,16 +216,18 @@ extern int fsmount(int fs_fd, unsigned int flags, unsigned int attr_flags); - /* - * mount_setattr() - */ --struct lxc_mount_attr { -+#if !HAVE_STRUCT_MOUNT_ATTR && !HAVE_UAPI_STRUCT_MOUNT_ATTR -+struct mount_attr { - __u64 attr_set; - __u64 attr_clr; - __u64 propagation; - __u64 userns_fd; - }; -+#endif - - #if !HAVE_MOUNT_SETATTR - static inline int mount_setattr(int dfd, const char *path, unsigned int flags, -- struct lxc_mount_attr *attr, size_t size) -+ struct mount_attr *attr, size_t size) - { - return syscall(__NR_mount_setattr, dfd, path, flags, attr, size); - }
package/lxc/0002-use-sd_bus_call_method_async-to-replace-the-asyncv-one.patch deleted +0 -47
47 lines not on this page · raw message
package/lxc/0003-build-detect-sys-pidfd.h-availability.patch deleted +0 -55
55 lines not on this page · raw message
package/lxc/lxc.hash +1 -1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ # Locally calculated -sha256 d8195423bb1e206f8521d24b6cde4789f043960c7cf065990a9cf741dcfd4222 lxc-5.0.1.tar.gz +sha256 bea08d2e49efcee34fa58acd2bc95c0adc64d291c07f4cfaf4ac1d8ac5a36f45 lxc-5.0.2.tar.gz sha256 ab15fd526bd8dd18a9e77ebc139656bf4d33e97fc7238cd11bf60e2b9b8666c6 LICENSE.GPL2 sha256 dc626520dcd53a22f727af3ee42c770e56c97a64fe3adb063799d8ab032fe551 LICENSE.LGPL2.1
package/lxc/lxc.mk +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ # ################################################################################ -LXC_VERSION = 5.0.1 +LXC_VERSION = 5.0.2 LXC_SITE = https://linuxcontainers.org/downloads/lxc LXC_LICENSE = GPL-2.0 (some tools), LGPL-2.1+ LXC_LICENSE_FILES = LICENSE.GPL2 LICENSE.LGPL2.1
Signature · 6 lines
2.39.0 _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:
- Fix CVE-2022-47952: lxc-user-nic in lxc through 5.0.1 is installed setuid root, and may allow local users to infer whether any file exists, even within a protected directory tree, because "Failed to open" often indicates that a file does not exist, whereas "does not refer to a network namespace path" often indicates that a file exists.
NOTE: this is different from CVE-2018-6556 because the CVE-2018-6556 fix design was based on the premise that "we will report back to the user that theopen()failed but the user has no way of knowing why it failed"; however, in many realistic cases, there are no plausible reasons for failing except that the file does not exist.
- Drop patches (already in version)
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
I guess we don't install lxc-user-nic setuid root, but ok.
Committed, thanks.
Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:
- Fix CVE-2022-47952: lxc-user-nic in lxc through 5.0.1 is installed setuid root, and may allow local users to infer whether any file exists, even within a protected directory tree, because "Failed to open" often indicates that a file does not exist, whereas "does not refer to a network namespace path" often indicates that a file exists.
NOTE: this is different from CVE-2018-6556 because the CVE-2018-6556 fix design was based on the premise that "we will report back to the user that theopen()failed but the user has no way of knowing why it failed"; however, in many realistic cases, there are no plausible reasons for failing except that the file does not exist.
- Drop patches (already in version)
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>
Committed to 2022.11.x, thanks.
I see that there isn't a new 4.0.x release. Do you know if 4.0.x is also vulnerable to this issue?
Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Hello,
Le lun. 6 févr. 2023 à 00:00, Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> a écrit :
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:
- Fix CVE-2022-47952: lxc-user-nic in lxc through 5.0.1 is installed setuid root, and may allow local users to infer whether any file exists, even within a protected directory tree, because "Failed to open" often indicates that a file does not exist, whereas "does not refer to a network namespace path" often indicates that a file exists.
NOTE: this is different from CVE-2018-6556 because the CVE-2018-6556 fix design was based on the premise that "we will report back to the user that theopen()failed but the user has no way of knowing why it failed"; however, in many realistic cases, there are no plausible reasons for failing except that the file does not exist.
- Drop patches (already in version)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]>Committed to 2022.11.x, thanks.
I see that there isn't a new 4.0.x release. Do you know if 4.0.x is also vulnerable to this issue?
To my understanding 4.0.x is also vulnerable.
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/1b0469530d7a38b8f8990e114b52530d1bf7f3b8
should be backported.
Quoted 4 lines
--
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
Best Regards,
Fabrice
_______________________________________________
buildroot mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
"Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine <[email protected]> writes:
Hi,
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Committed to 2022.11.x, thanks.
I see that there isn't a new 4.0.x release. Do you know if 4.0.x is also vulnerable to this issue?
To my understanding 4.0.x is also vulnerable.
https://github.com/lxc/lxc/commit/1b0469530d7a38b8f8990e114b52530d1bf7f3b8
should be backported.
Ok, thanks. Will you send a patch for 2022.02.x?
Signature · 5 lines
Bye, Peter Korsgaard _______________________________________________ buildroot mailing list [email protected] https://lists.buildroot.org/mailman/listinfo/buildroot