newrole: preserve environment variable XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
PATCH 1/1 newrole: preserve environment variable XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
XDG_RUNTIME_DIR is required for systemctl --user to work. See https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/15231
--- policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c +15 -5
@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static int extract_pw_data(struct passwd *pw_copy)* Either restore the original environment, or set up a minimal one. * * The minimal environment contains: -* TERM, DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY - if they are set, preserve values +* TERM, DISPLAY, XAUTHORITY and XDG_RUNTIME_DIR - if they are set, preserve values * HOME, SHELL, USER and LOGNAME - set to contents of /etc/passwd * PATH - set to default value DEFAULT_PATH *
@@ -478,9 +478,11 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment,char const *term_env;char const *display_env;char const *xauthority_env; -char *term =NULL ;/* temporary container */ -char *display =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char const *xdg_runtime_dir_env; +char *term =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char *display =NULL ;/* temporary container */ char *xauthority =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char *xdg_runtime_dir =NULL ;/* temporary container */ int rc; environ = old_environ;
@@ -491,6 +493,7 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, term_env =getenv ("TERM" ); display_env =getenv ("DISPLAY" ); xauthority_env =getenv ("XAUTHORITY" ); + xdg_runtime_dir_env =getenv ("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" );/* needed for `systemd --user` operations */ /* Save the variable values we want */ if (term_env)
@@ -499,8 +502,12 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, display =strdup (display_env);if (xauthority_env) xauthority =strdup (xauthority_env); -if ((term_env && !term) || (display_env && !display) || - (xauthority_env && !xauthority)) { +if (xdg_runtime_dir_env) + xdg_runtime_dir =strdup (xdg_runtime_dir_env); +if ((term_env && !term) || + (display_env && !display) || + (xauthority_env && !xauthority) || + (xdg_runtime_dir_env && !xdg_runtime_dir)) { rc =-1 ; goto out; }
@@ -518,6 +525,8 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, rc |=setenv ("DISPLAY" , display,1 );if (xauthority) rc |=setenv ("XAUTHORITY" , xauthority,1 ); +if (xdg_runtime_dir) + rc |=setenv ("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" , xdg_runtime_dir,1 ); rc |=setenv ("HOME" , pw->pw_dir,1 ); rc |=setenv ("SHELL" , pw->pw_shell,1 ); rc |=setenv ("USER" , pw->pw_name,1 );
@@ -527,6 +536,7 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment,free (term);free (display);free (xauthority); +free (xdg_runtime_dir);return rc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
Quoted 69 lines · Christian Göttsche
XDG_RUNTIME_DIRis required for systemctl --user to work. See https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/15231Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>--- policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c +14
-5@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static int extract_pw_data(struct passwd *pw_copy)* Either restore the original environment, or set up a minimal one. * * The minimal environment contains: -* TERM, DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY - if they are set, preserve values +* TERM, DISPLAY, XAUTHORITY and XDG_RUNTIME_DIR - if they are set, preserve values * HOME, SHELL, USER and LOGNAME - set to contents of /etc/passwd * PATH - set to default value DEFAULT_PATH * @@ -478,9 +478,11 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment,char const *term_env;char const *display_env;char const *xauthority_env; -char *term =NULL ;/* temporary container */ -char *display =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char const *xdg_runtime_dir_env; +char *term =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char *display =NULL ;/* temporary container */ char *xauthority =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char *xdg_runtime_dir =NULL ;/* temporary container */ int rc; environ = old_environ;@@ -491,6 +493,7 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, term_env =getenv ("TERM" ); display_env =getenv ("DISPLAY" ); xauthority_env =getenv ("XAUTHORITY" ); + xdg_runtime_dir_env =getenv ("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" );/* needed for `systemd --user` operations */ /* Save the variable values we want */ if (term_env)@@ -499,8 +502,12 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, display =strdup (display_env);if (xauthority_env) xauthority =strdup (xauthority_env); -if ((term_env && !term) || (display_env && !display) || - (xauthority_env && !xauthority)) { +if (xdg_runtime_dir_env) + xdg_runtime_dir =strdup (xdg_runtime_dir_env); +if ((term_env && !term) || + (display_env && !display) || + (xauthority_env && !xauthority) || + (xdg_runtime_dir_env && !xdg_runtime_dir)) { rc =-1 ; goto out; }@@ -518,6 +525,8 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, rc |=setenv ("DISPLAY" , display,1 );if (xauthority) rc |=setenv ("XAUTHORITY" , xauthority,1 ); +if (xdg_runtime_dir) + rc |=setenv ("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" , xdg_runtime_dir,1 ); rc |=setenv ("HOME" , pw->pw_dir,1 ); rc |=setenv ("SHELL" , pw->pw_shell,1 ); rc |=setenv ("USER" , pw->pw_name,1 );
policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, · line 541
Quoted 6 lines
policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c +1
-0@@ -527,6 +536,7 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment,free (term);free (display);free (xauthority); +free (xdg_runtime_dir);return rc; }
Hello,
I am quite uncomfortable with this approach of keeping only one more
variable: why is only XDG_RUNTIME_DIR added, and not also XDG_DATA_DIRS, XDG_SESSION_ID, XDG_SESSION_PATH, etc.? For example someone pointed out in
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/18301#issuecomment-763933678
that DBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESS could also need to be preserved, so there seem to be a long list of items.
Moreover I am wondering whether this would be fine to keep such environment variables while newrole uses the information from another user (i.e. when newrole is built with USE_AUDIT and audit_getloginuid() != getuid() because the user changed their UID ; in such a situation newrole resets $HOME and $SHELL to the HOME of audit_getloginuid()).
In my humble opinion, I also do not understand why TERM, DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY are kept but not LANG, LC_ALL, and all other LC_... variables. I understand that there exist dangerous environment variables (LD_LIBRARY_PATH, LD_PRELOAD, ...), that resetting the environment to a minimal one is nice, and that using "newrole --preserve-environment" could seem dangerous. For information, sudo has been maintaining a list of "bad" variables, of variables with potential dangerous values and of variables preserved by default, in
https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/blob/SUDO_1_9_5p1/plugins/sudoers/env.c#L134-L228.
This being said, I have never really used newrole but to expose a bug in "sudo -r" a few years ago
(https://bugzilla.sudo.ws/show_bug.cgi?id=611 "root user can change its SELinux context without password"). Since then I have always used sudo to change role, with the advantage that it can be configured to keep some environment variables, so I am not really the best reviewer for such a patch (and also I am a little bit confused about the "isolation guarantees" that newrole implements, and I am not sure whether keeping XDG_RUNTIME_DIR would not break such guarantees).
TL;DR: can another maintainer more familiar with newrole review this patch, please?
Thanks,
Nicolas
Quoted 114 lines · Nicolas Iooss
Quoted 69 lines · Christian Göttsche
XDG_RUNTIME_DIRis required for systemctl --user to work. See https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/15231Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>--- policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c +14
-5@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static int extract_pw_data(struct passwd *pw_copy)* Either restore the original environment, or set up a minimal one. * * The minimal environment contains: -* TERM, DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY - if they are set, preserve values +* TERM, DISPLAY, XAUTHORITY and XDG_RUNTIME_DIR - if they are set, preserve values * HOME, SHELL, USER and LOGNAME - set to contents of /etc/passwd * PATH - set to default value DEFAULT_PATH * @@ -478,9 +478,11 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment,char const *term_env;char const *display_env;char const *xauthority_env; -char *term =NULL ;/* temporary container */ -char *display =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char const *xdg_runtime_dir_env; +char *term =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char *display =NULL ;/* temporary container */ char *xauthority =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char *xdg_runtime_dir =NULL ;/* temporary container */ int rc; environ = old_environ;@@ -491,6 +493,7 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, term_env =getenv ("TERM" ); display_env =getenv ("DISPLAY" ); xauthority_env =getenv ("XAUTHORITY" ); + xdg_runtime_dir_env =getenv ("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" );/* needed for `systemd --user` operations */ /* Save the variable values we want */ if (term_env)@@ -499,8 +502,12 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, display =strdup (display_env);if (xauthority_env) xauthority =strdup (xauthority_env); -if ((term_env && !term) || (display_env && !display) || - (xauthority_env && !xauthority)) { +if (xdg_runtime_dir_env) + xdg_runtime_dir =strdup (xdg_runtime_dir_env); +if ((term_env && !term) || + (display_env && !display) || + (xauthority_env && !xauthority) || + (xdg_runtime_dir_env && !xdg_runtime_dir)) { rc =-1 ; goto out; }@@ -518,6 +525,8 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, rc |=setenv ("DISPLAY" , display,1 );if (xauthority) rc |=setenv ("XAUTHORITY" , xauthority,1 ); +if (xdg_runtime_dir) + rc |=setenv ("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" , xdg_runtime_dir,1 ); rc |=setenv ("HOME" , pw->pw_dir,1 ); rc |=setenv ("SHELL" , pw->pw_shell,1 ); rc |=setenv ("USER" , pw->pw_name,1 );policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, · line 541
Quoted 6 lines
policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c +1
-0@@ -527,6 +536,7 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment,free (term);free (display);free (xauthority); +free (xdg_runtime_dir);return rc; }Hello,
I am quite uncomfortable with this approach of keeping only one more
variable: why is onlyXDG_RUNTIME_DIRadded, and not alsoXDG_DATA_DIRS,XDG_SESSION_ID,XDG_SESSION_PATH, etc.? For example someone pointed out in
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/18301#issuecomment-763933678
thatDBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESScould also need to be preserved, so there seem to be a long list of items.Moreover I am wondering whether this would be fine to keep such environment variables while newrole uses the information from another user (i.e. when newrole is built with
USE_AUDITandaudit_getloginuid()!=getuid()because the user changed their UID ; in such a situation newrole resets $HOME and $SHELL to the HOME ofaudit_getloginuid()).In my humble opinion, I also do not understand why TERM, DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY are kept but not LANG,
LC_ALL, and all otherLC_... variables. I understand that there exist dangerous environment variables (LD_LIBRARY_PATH,LD_PRELOAD, ...), that resetting the environment to a minimal one is nice, and that using "newrole --preserve-environment" could seem dangerous. For information, sudo has been maintaining a list of "bad" variables, of variables with potential dangerous values and of variables preserved by default, in
https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/blob/SUDO_1_9_5p1/plugins/sudoers/env.c#L134-L228.This being said, I have never really used newrole but to expose a bug in "sudo -r" a few years ago
(https://bugzilla.sudo.ws/show_bug.cgi?id=611 "root user can change its SELinux context without password"). Since then I have always used sudo to change role, with the advantage that it can be configured to keep some environment variables, so I am not really the best reviewer for such a patch (and also I am a little bit confused about the "isolation guarantees" that newrole implements, and I am not sure whether keepingXDG_RUNTIME_DIRwould not break such guarantees).
Quoted 5 lines
TL;DR: can another maintainer more familiar with newrole review this patch, please?
Thanks,
Nicolas
I think it does not make much sense to keep XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
When you change a role, type or level, it's like changing a linux user and it should be completely new session.
In Fedora, sysadm_t is not even allow to get status of staff_t units:
[staff@rawhide ~]$ echo $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
/run/user/1001
[staff@rawhide ~]$ newrole -r sysadm_r
Password:
[staff@rawhide ~]$ export XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1001
[staff@rawhide ~]$ systemctl --user list-units
Failed to list units: Access denied
systemd[33326]: selinux: avc: denied { status } for auid=n/a uid=1001 gid=1001 cmdline="" scontext=staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=system permissive=0
systemd[33326]: selinux: avc: denied { status } for auid=n/a uid=1001 gid=1001 cmdline="" scontext=staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=system permissive=0There's also question why one would use newrole to control their a systemd user session when it's possible to control it directly.
Am Di., 26. Jan. 2021 um 08:57 Uhr schrieb Petr Lautrbach <[email protected]>:
Quoted 65 lines
Quoted 37 lines · Nicolas Iooss
Hello,
I am quite uncomfortable with this approach of keeping only one more
variable: why is onlyXDG_RUNTIME_DIRadded, and not alsoXDG_DATA_DIRS,XDG_SESSION_ID,XDG_SESSION_PATH, etc.? For example someone pointed out in
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/18301#issuecomment-763933678
thatDBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESScould also need to be preserved, so there seem to be a long list of items.Moreover I am wondering whether this would be fine to keep such environment variables while newrole uses the information from another user (i.e. when newrole is built with
USE_AUDITandaudit_getloginuid()!=getuid()because the user changed their UID ; in such a situation newrole resets $HOME and $SHELL to the HOME ofaudit_getloginuid()).In my humble opinion, I also do not understand why TERM, DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY are kept but not LANG,
LC_ALL, and all otherLC_... variables. I understand that there exist dangerous environment variables (LD_LIBRARY_PATH,LD_PRELOAD, ...), that resetting the environment to a minimal one is nice, and that using "newrole --preserve-environment" could seem dangerous. For information, sudo has been maintaining a list of "bad" variables, of variables with potential dangerous values and of variables preserved by default, in
https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/blob/SUDO_1_9_5p1/plugins/sudoers/env.c#L134-L228.This being said, I have never really used newrole but to expose a bug in "sudo -r" a few years ago
(https://bugzilla.sudo.ws/show_bug.cgi?id=611 "root user can change its SELinux context without password"). Since then I have always used sudo to change role, with the advantage that it can be configured to keep some environment variables, so I am not really the best reviewer for such a patch (and also I am a little bit confused about the "isolation guarantees" that newrole implements, and I am not sure whether keepingXDG_RUNTIME_DIRwould not break such guarantees).Quoted 5 lines
TL;DR: can another maintainer more familiar with newrole review this patch, please?
Thanks,
NicolasI think it does not make much sense to keep
XDG_RUNTIME_DIRWhen you change a role, type or level, it's like changing a linux user and it should be completely new session.
In Fedora,
sysadm_tis not even allow to get status ofstaff_tunits:[staff@rawhide ~]$ echo $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR /run/user/1001 [staff@rawhide ~]$ newrole -r sysadm_r Password: [staff@rawhide ~]$ export XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1001 [staff@rawhide ~]$ systemctl --user list-units Failed to list units: Access denied systemd[33326]: selinux: avc: denied { status } for auid=n/a uid=1001 gid=1001 cmdline="" scontext=staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=system permissive=0 systemd[33326]: selinux: avc: denied { status } for auid=n/a uid=1001 gid=1001 cmdline="" scontext=staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=system permissive=0
Quoted 3 lines
There's also question why one would use newrole to control their a systemd user session when it's possible to control it directly.
Thanks for your comments.
Seems this uncommon use case is not worth the trouble at all, and one can as fallback set environment variables via the user's shell settings (~/.bashrc).
Please disregard this patch.
Quoted 114 lines · Nicolas Iooss
Quoted 69 lines · Christian Göttsche
XDG_RUNTIME_DIRis required for systemctl --user to work. See https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/15231Signed-off-by Christian Göttsche <[email protected]>--- policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c +14
-5@@ -466,7 +466,7 @@ static int extract_pw_data(struct passwd *pw_copy)* Either restore the original environment, or set up a minimal one. * * The minimal environment contains: -* TERM, DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY - if they are set, preserve values +* TERM, DISPLAY, XAUTHORITY and XDG_RUNTIME_DIR - if they are set, preserve values * HOME, SHELL, USER and LOGNAME - set to contents of /etc/passwd * PATH - set to default value DEFAULT_PATH * @@ -478,9 +478,11 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment,char const *term_env;char const *display_env;char const *xauthority_env; -char *term =NULL ;/* temporary container */ -char *display =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char const *xdg_runtime_dir_env; +char *term =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char *display =NULL ;/* temporary container */ char *xauthority =NULL ;/* temporary container */ +char *xdg_runtime_dir =NULL ;/* temporary container */ int rc; environ = old_environ;@@ -491,6 +493,7 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, term_env =getenv ("TERM" ); display_env =getenv ("DISPLAY" ); xauthority_env =getenv ("XAUTHORITY" ); + xdg_runtime_dir_env =getenv ("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" );/* needed for `systemd --user` operations */ /* Save the variable values we want */ if (term_env)@@ -499,8 +502,12 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, display =strdup (display_env);if (xauthority_env) xauthority =strdup (xauthority_env); -if ((term_env && !term) || (display_env && !display) || - (xauthority_env && !xauthority)) { +if (xdg_runtime_dir_env) + xdg_runtime_dir =strdup (xdg_runtime_dir_env); +if ((term_env && !term) || + (display_env && !display) || + (xauthority_env && !xauthority) || + (xdg_runtime_dir_env && !xdg_runtime_dir)) { rc =-1 ; goto out; }@@ -518,6 +525,8 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, rc |=setenv ("DISPLAY" , display,1 );if (xauthority) rc |=setenv ("XAUTHORITY" , xauthority,1 ); +if (xdg_runtime_dir) + rc |=setenv ("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR" , xdg_runtime_dir,1 ); rc |=setenv ("HOME" , pw->pw_dir,1 ); rc |=setenv ("SHELL" , pw->pw_shell,1 ); rc |=setenv ("USER" , pw->pw_name,1 );policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment, · line 541
Quoted 6 lines
policycoreutils/newrole/newrole.c +1
-0@@ -527,6 +536,7 @@ static int restore_environment(int preserve_environment,free (term);free (display);free (xauthority); +free (xdg_runtime_dir);return rc; }Hello,
I am quite uncomfortable with this approach of keeping only one more
variable: why is onlyXDG_RUNTIME_DIRadded, and not alsoXDG_DATA_DIRS,XDG_SESSION_ID,XDG_SESSION_PATH, etc.? For example someone pointed out in
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/18301#issuecomment-763933678
thatDBUS_SESSION_BUS_ADDRESScould also need to be preserved, so there seem to be a long list of items.Moreover I am wondering whether this would be fine to keep such environment variables while newrole uses the information from another user (i.e. when newrole is built with
USE_AUDITandaudit_getloginuid()!=getuid()because the user changed their UID ; in such a situation newrole resets $HOME and $SHELL to the HOME ofaudit_getloginuid()).In my humble opinion, I also do not understand why TERM, DISPLAY and XAUTHORITY are kept but not LANG,
LC_ALL, and all otherLC_... variables. I understand that there exist dangerous environment variables (LD_LIBRARY_PATH,LD_PRELOAD, ...), that resetting the environment to a minimal one is nice, and that using "newrole --preserve-environment" could seem dangerous. For information, sudo has been maintaining a list of "bad" variables, of variables with potential dangerous values and of variables preserved by default, in
https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/blob/SUDO_1_9_5p1/plugins/sudoers/env.c#L134-L228.This being said, I have never really used newrole but to expose a bug in "sudo -r" a few years ago
(https://bugzilla.sudo.ws/show_bug.cgi?id=611 "root user can change its SELinux context without password"). Since then I have always used sudo to change role, with the advantage that it can be configured to keep some environment variables, so I am not really the best reviewer for such a patch (and also I am a little bit confused about the "isolation guarantees" that newrole implements, and I am not sure whether keepingXDG_RUNTIME_DIRwould not break such guarantees).
Quoted 3 lines
TL;DR: can another maintainer more familiar with newrole review this patch, please?
From my POV, it does not make much sense to keep XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
As I see it when you change a role, type or level, it's like changing a linux user and it should be completely new session.
Also using Fedora policy, sysadm_t is not even allow to get status of staff_t units:
[staff@rawhide ~]$ echo $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR
/run/user/1001
[staff@rawhide ~]$ newrole -r sysadm_r
Password:
[staff@rawhide ~]$ export XDG_RUNTIME_DIR=/run/user/1001
[staff@rawhide ~]$ systemctl --user list-units
Failed to list units: Access denied
systemd[33326]: selinux: avc: denied { status } for auid=n/a uid=1001 gid=1001 cmdline="" scontext=staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=system permissive=0
systemd[33326]: selinux: avc: denied { status } for auid=n/a uid=1001 gid=1001 cmdline="" scontext=staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tcontext=staff_u:staff_r:staff_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 tclass=system permissive=0newrole could change level as well and it would be simply inappropriate to control systemd user session using different levels.
And you don't need to run newrole to control your user systemd session.