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package/connman: add upstream security fixes for CVE-2021-2667{5, 6}

PATCH New Peter Korsgaard 2 participants 6 messages Feb 8, 2021 – Feb 10, 2021

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PATCH 1/1 package/connman: add upstream security fixes for CVE-2021-2667{5, 6}

Fixes the following security issues:

- CVE-2021-26675: Remote (adjacent network) code execution flaw
- CVE-2021-26676: Remote stack information leak

For details, see the advisory:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/02/08/2

---
 ...ding-invalid-data-in-dhcp_get_option.patch | 226 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...ing-stack-data-via-unitiialized-vari.patch |  27 +++
 ...gth-checks-to-prevent-buffer-overflo.patch |  56 +++++
 3 files changed, 309 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 package/connman/0001-gdhcp-Avoid-reading-invalid-data-in-dhcp_get_option.patch
 create mode 100644 package/connman/0002-gdhcp-Avoid-leaking-stack-data-via-unitiialized-vari.patch
 create mode 100644 package/connman/0003-dnsproxy-Add-length-checks-to-prevent-buffer-overflo.patch
package/connman/0001-gdhcp-Avoid-reading-invalid-data-in-dhcp_get_option.patch new file +226 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0c29895abf
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@
+From 58d397ba74873384aee449690a9070bacd5676fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Wee <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 19:39:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] gdhcp: Avoid reading invalid data in dhcp_get_option
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>
+---
+ gdhcp/client.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
+ gdhcp/common.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
+ gdhcp/common.h |  2 +-
+ gdhcp/server.c | 12 +++++++-----
+ 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/gdhcp/client.c b/gdhcp/client.c
+index 09dfe5ec..6a5613e7 100644
+--- a/gdhcp/client.c
++++ b/gdhcp/client.c
+@@ -1629,12 +1629,12 @@ static void start_request(GDHCPClient *dhcp_client)
+ 							NULL);
+ }
+ 
+-static uint32_t get_lease(struct dhcp_packet *packet)
++static uint32_t get_lease(struct dhcp_packet *packet, uint16_t packet_len)
+ {
+ 	uint8_t *option;
+ 	uint32_t lease_seconds;
+ 
+-	option = dhcp_get_option(packet, DHCP_LEASE_TIME);
++	option = dhcp_get_option(packet, packet_len, DHCP_LEASE_TIME);
+ 	if (!option)
+ 		return 3600;
+ 
+@@ -2226,7 +2226,8 @@ static void get_dhcpv6_request(GDHCPClient *dhcp_client,
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+-static void get_request(GDHCPClient *dhcp_client, struct dhcp_packet *packet)
++static void get_request(GDHCPClient *dhcp_client, struct dhcp_packet *packet,
++		uint16_t packet_len)
+ {
+ 	GDHCPOptionType type;
+ 	GList *list, *value_list;
+@@ -2237,7 +2238,7 @@ static void get_request(GDHCPClient *dhcp_client, struct dhcp_packet *packet)
+ 	for (list = dhcp_client->request_list; list; list = list->next) {
+ 		code = (uint8_t) GPOINTER_TO_INT(list->data);
+ 
+-		option = dhcp_get_option(packet, code);
++		option = dhcp_get_option(packet, packet_len, code);
+ 		if (!option) {
+ 			g_hash_table_remove(dhcp_client->code_value_hash,
+ 						GINT_TO_POINTER((int) code));
+@@ -2297,6 +2298,7 @@ static gboolean listener_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
+ 		re = dhcp_recv_l2_packet(&packet,
+ 					dhcp_client->listener_sockfd,
+ 					&dst_addr);
++		pkt_len = (uint16_t)(unsigned int)re;
+ 		xid = packet.xid;
+ 	} else if (dhcp_client->listen_mode == L3) {
+ 		if (dhcp_client->type == G_DHCP_IPV6) {
+@@ -2361,7 +2363,7 @@ static gboolean listener_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
+ 			dhcp_client->status_code = status;
+ 		}
+ 	} else {
+-		message_type = dhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_MESSAGE_TYPE);
++		message_type = dhcp_get_option(&packet, pkt_len, DHCP_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ 		if (!message_type)
+ 			return TRUE;
+ 	}
+@@ -2378,7 +2380,7 @@ static gboolean listener_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
+ 		dhcp_client->timeout = 0;
+ 		dhcp_client->retry_times = 0;
+ 
+-		option = dhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_SERVER_ID);
++		option = dhcp_get_option(&packet, pkt_len, DHCP_SERVER_ID);
+ 		dhcp_client->server_ip = get_be32(option);
+ 		dhcp_client->requested_ip = ntohl(packet.yiaddr);
+ 
+@@ -2428,9 +2430,9 @@ static gboolean listener_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
+ 
+ 			remove_timeouts(dhcp_client);
+ 
+-			dhcp_client->lease_seconds = get_lease(&packet);
++			dhcp_client->lease_seconds = get_lease(&packet, pkt_len);
+ 
+-			get_request(dhcp_client, &packet);
++			get_request(dhcp_client, &packet, pkt_len);
+ 
+ 			switch_listening_mode(dhcp_client, L_NONE);
+ 
+@@ -2438,7 +2440,7 @@ static gboolean listener_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
+ 			dhcp_client->assigned_ip = get_ip(packet.yiaddr);
+ 
+ 			if (dhcp_client->state == REBOOTING) {
+-				option = dhcp_get_option(&packet,
++				option = dhcp_get_option(&packet, pkt_len,
+ 							DHCP_SERVER_ID);
+ 				dhcp_client->server_ip = get_be32(option);
+ 			}
+diff --git a/gdhcp/common.c b/gdhcp/common.c
+index 1d667d17..c8916aa8 100644
+--- a/gdhcp/common.c
++++ b/gdhcp/common.c
+@@ -73,18 +73,21 @@ GDHCPOptionType dhcp_get_code_type(uint8_t code)
+ 	return OPTION_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ 
+-uint8_t *dhcp_get_option(struct dhcp_packet *packet, int code)
++uint8_t *dhcp_get_option(struct dhcp_packet *packet, uint16_t packet_len, int code)
+ {
+ 	int len, rem;
+-	uint8_t *optionptr;
++	uint8_t *optionptr, *options_end;
++	size_t options_len;
+ 	uint8_t overload = 0;
+ 
+ 	/* option bytes: [code][len][data1][data2]..[dataLEN] */
+ 	optionptr = packet->options;
+ 	rem = sizeof(packet->options);
++	options_len = packet_len - (sizeof(*packet) - sizeof(packet->options));
++	options_end = optionptr + options_len - 1;
+ 
+ 	while (1) {
+-		if (rem <= 0)
++		if ((rem <= 0) && (optionptr + OPT_CODE > options_end))
+ 			/* Bad packet, malformed option field */
+ 			return NULL;
+ 
+@@ -115,14 +118,25 @@ uint8_t *dhcp_get_option(struct dhcp_packet *packet, int code)
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 
++		if (optionptr + OPT_LEN > options_end) {
++			/* bad packet, would read length field from OOB */
++			return NULL;
++		}
++
+ 		len = 2 + optionptr[OPT_LEN];
+ 
+ 		rem -= len;
+ 		if (rem < 0)
+ 			continue; /* complain and return NULL */
+ 
+-		if (optionptr[OPT_CODE] == code)
+-			return optionptr + OPT_DATA;
++		if (optionptr[OPT_CODE] == code) {
++			if (optionptr + len > options_end) {
++				/* bad packet, option length points OOB */
++				return NULL;
++			} else {
++				return optionptr + OPT_DATA;
++			}
++		}
+ 
+ 		if (optionptr[OPT_CODE] == DHCP_OPTION_OVERLOAD)
+ 			overload |= optionptr[OPT_DATA];
+diff --git a/gdhcp/common.h b/gdhcp/common.h
+index 9660231c..8f63fd75 100644
+--- a/gdhcp/common.h
++++ b/gdhcp/common.h
+@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ struct in6_pktinfo {
+ };
+ #endif
+ 
+-uint8_t *dhcp_get_option(struct dhcp_packet *packet, int code);
++uint8_t *dhcp_get_option(struct dhcp_packet *packet, uint16_t packet_len, int code);
+ uint8_t *dhcpv6_get_option(struct dhcpv6_packet *packet, uint16_t pkt_len,
+ 			int code, uint16_t *option_len, int *option_count);
+ uint8_t *dhcpv6_get_sub_option(unsigned char *option, uint16_t max_len,
+diff --git a/gdhcp/server.c b/gdhcp/server.c
+index 85405f19..52ea2a55 100644
+--- a/gdhcp/server.c
++++ b/gdhcp/server.c
+@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ error:
+ }
+ 
+ 
+-static uint8_t check_packet_type(struct dhcp_packet *packet)
++static uint8_t check_packet_type(struct dhcp_packet *packet, uint16_t packet_len)
+ {
+ 	uint8_t *type;
+ 
+@@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ static uint8_t check_packet_type(struct dhcp_packet *packet)
+ 	if (packet->op != BOOTREQUEST)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
+-	type = dhcp_get_option(packet, DHCP_MESSAGE_TYPE);
++	type = dhcp_get_option(packet, packet_len, DHCP_MESSAGE_TYPE);
+ 
+ 	if (!type)
+ 		return 0;
+@@ -651,6 +651,7 @@ static gboolean listener_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
+ 	struct dhcp_lease *lease;
+ 	uint32_t requested_nip = 0;
+ 	uint8_t type, *server_id_option, *request_ip_option;
++	uint16_t packet_len;
+ 	int re;
+ 
+ 	if (condition & (G_IO_NVAL | G_IO_ERR | G_IO_HUP)) {
+@@ -661,12 +662,13 @@ static gboolean listener_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
+ 	re = dhcp_recv_l3_packet(&packet, dhcp_server->listener_sockfd);
+ 	if (re < 0)
+ 		return TRUE;
++	packet_len = (uint16_t)(unsigned int)re;
+ 
+-	type = check_packet_type(&packet);
++	type = check_packet_type(&packet, packet_len);
+ 	if (type == 0)
+ 		return TRUE;
+ 
+-	server_id_option = dhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_SERVER_ID);
++	server_id_option = dhcp_get_option(&packet, packet_len, DHCP_SERVER_ID);
+ 	if (server_id_option) {
+ 		uint32_t server_nid =
+ 			get_unaligned((const uint32_t *) server_id_option);
+@@ -675,7 +677,7 @@ static gboolean listener_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
+ 			return TRUE;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	request_ip_option = dhcp_get_option(&packet, DHCP_REQUESTED_IP);
++	request_ip_option = dhcp_get_option(&packet, packet_len, DHCP_REQUESTED_IP);
+ 	if (request_ip_option)
+ 		requested_nip = get_be32(request_ip_option);
+ 
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
package/connman/0002-gdhcp-Avoid-leaking-stack-data-via-unitiialized-vari.patch new file +27 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dc15ac3be3
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From a74524b3e3fad81b0fd1084ffdf9f2ea469cd9b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Colin Wee <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 28 Jan 2021 19:41:09 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] gdhcp: Avoid leaking stack data via unitiialized variable
+
+Fixes: CVE-2021-26676
+Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>
+---
+ gdhcp/client.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/gdhcp/client.c b/gdhcp/client.c
+index 6a5613e7..c7b85e58 100644
+--- a/gdhcp/client.c
++++ b/gdhcp/client.c
+@@ -2270,7 +2270,7 @@ static gboolean listener_event(GIOChannel *channel, GIOCondition condition,
+ {
+ 	GDHCPClient *dhcp_client = user_data;
+ 	struct sockaddr_in dst_addr = { 0 };
+-	struct dhcp_packet packet;
++	struct dhcp_packet packet = { 0 };
+ 	struct dhcpv6_packet *packet6 = NULL;
+ 	uint8_t *message_type = NULL, *client_id = NULL, *option,
+ 		*server_id = NULL;
+-- 
+2.20.1
+
package/connman/0003-dnsproxy-Add-length-checks-to-prevent-buffer-overflo.patch new file +56 -0

56 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/connman: add upstream security fixes for CVE-2021-2667{5, 6}

Hi Peter,

Am Mo., 8. Feb. 2021 um 10:39 Uhr schrieb Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>:

Quoted 10 lines

Fixes the following security issues:

- CVE-2021-26675: Remote (adjacent network) code execution flaw
- CVE-2021-26676: Remote stack information leak

For details, see the advisory:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/02/08/2

Quoted 8 lines
---
 ...ding-invalid-data-in-dhcp_get_option.patch | 226 ++++++++++++++++++
 ...ing-stack-data-via-unitiialized-vari.patch |  27 +++
 ...gth-checks-to-prevent-buffer-overflo.patch |  56 +++++
 3 files changed, 309 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 package/connman/0001-gdhcp-Avoid-reading-invalid-data-in-dhcp_get_option.patch
 create mode 100644 package/connman/0002-gdhcp-Avoid-leaking-stack-data-via-unitiialized-vari.patch
 create mode 100644 package/connman/0003-dnsproxy-Add-length-checks-to-prevent-buffer-overflo.patch

A new version [1] was released today that has these patches integrated. Maybe we should bump to that.

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=47bd7ab21bfbe115ca4a10b9b96bdbfeb6c35bff

Signature · 1 line
Heiko
#2 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/connman: add upstream security fixes for CVE-2021-2667{5, 6}

Quoted 26 lines
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"Heiko" == Heiko Thiery <[email protected]> writes:

Hi Peter,
Am Mo., 8. Feb. 2021 um 10:39 Uhr schrieb Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>:

Quoted 15 lines

Fixes the following security issues:

- CVE-2021-26675: Remote (adjacent network) code execution flaw
- CVE-2021-26676: Remote stack information leak

For details, see the advisory:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/02/08/2

---

...ding-invalid-data-in-dhcp_get_option.patch | 226 ++++++++++++++++++
...ing-stack-data-via-unitiialized-vari.patch |  27 +++
...gth-checks-to-prevent-buffer-overflo.patch |  56 +++++
3 files changed, 309 insertions(+)
Quoted 6 lines

create mode 100644 package/connman/0001-gdhcp-Avoid-reading-invalid-data-in-dhcp_get_option.patch create mode 100644 package/connman/0002-gdhcp-Avoid-leaking-stack-data-via-unitiialized-vari.patch create mode 100644 package/connman/0003-dnsproxy-Add-length-checks-to-prevent-buffer-overflo.patch

Quoted 5 lines

A new version [1] was released today that has these patches integrated. Maybe we should bump to that.

[1]
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=47bd7ab21bfbe115ca4a10b9b96bdbfeb6c35bff

I would prefer to add the security patches now, as they are lower risk to backport to 2020.02.x (1.39 has ~100 changes on top of 1.38).

But we can certainly bump to 1.39 on master, care to send a patch?

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
#3 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/connman: add upstream security fixes for CVE-2021-2667{5, 6}

Hi Peter,

Am Mo., 8. Feb. 2021 um 22:10 Uhr schrieb Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>:

Quoted 27 lines
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"Heiko" == Heiko Thiery <[email protected]> writes:

Hi Peter,
Am Mo., 8. Feb. 2021 um 10:39 Uhr schrieb Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]>:

Quoted 21 lines

Fixes the following security issues:

- CVE-2021-26675: Remote (adjacent network) code execution flaw
- CVE-2021-26676: Remote stack information leak

For details, see the advisory:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/02/08/2

---

...ding-invalid-data-in-dhcp_get_option.patch | 226 ++++++++++++++++++
...ing-stack-data-via-unitiialized-vari.patch |  27 +++
...gth-checks-to-prevent-buffer-overflo.patch |  56 +++++
3 files changed, 309 insertions(+)

create mode 100644 package/connman/0001-gdhcp-Avoid-reading-invalid-data-in-dhcp_get_option.patch create mode 100644 package/connman/0002-gdhcp-Avoid-leaking-stack-data-via-unitiialized-vari.patch create mode 100644 package/connman/0003-dnsproxy-Add-length-checks-to-prevent-buffer-overflo.patch

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

A new version [1] was released today that has these patches integrated. Maybe we should bump to that.

[1]
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/network/connman/connman.git/commit/?id=47bd7ab21bfbe115ca4a10b9b96bdbfeb6c35bff

I would prefer to add the security patches now, as they are lower risk to backport to 2020.02.x (1.39 has ~100 changes on top of 1.38).

Ah ok .. that makes sense.

Quoted 1 line

But we can certainly bump to 1.39 on master, care to send a patch?

I will do it.

Signature · 1 line
Heiko
#4 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/connman: add upstream security fixes for CVE-2021-2667{5, 6}

In reply to Peter Korsgaard
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 1 line
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"Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> writes:

Fixes the following security issues:
- CVE-2021-26675: Remote (adjacent network) code execution flaw
- CVE-2021-26676: Remote stack information leak

For details, see the advisory:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/02/08/2

Committed, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard
#5 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 package/connman: add upstream security fixes for CVE-2021-2667{5, 6}

In reply to Peter Korsgaard
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

"Peter" == Peter Korsgaard <[email protected]> writes:

Fixes the following security issues:
- CVE-2021-26675: Remote (adjacent network) code execution flaw
- CVE-2021-26676: Remote stack information leak

For details, see the advisory:
https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/02/08/2

Committed to 2020.02.x and 2020.11.x, thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Bye, Peter Korsgaard