Skip to contentSkip to conversation

boot/arm-trusted-firmware: Forward stack protection configuration

PATCH Superseded Christoph Müllner 2 participants 6 messages Nov 22, 2020 – Nov 23, 2020

v1 of 4 Superseded Latest is v4 →

lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 boot/arm-trusted-firmware: Forward stack protection configuration

TF-A supports stack smashing protection (-fstack-protector-*). However it currenlty fails to build when built with BR2_SSP_* enabled, because stack protection needs to be enabled for the TF-A build process itself as well to generate the required symbols (e.g. __stack_chk_guard).

So in case we see that BR2_SSP_* is enabled, let's enable the corresponding build flag for TF-A as documented in the TF-A user guide.

Tested on a Rockchip PX30 based system.

---
 boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk +8 -0
index a3553e36cf..0597cecf71 100644
@@ -100,6 +100,14 @@ ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += MV_DDR_PATH=$(MV_DDR_MARVELL_DIR)
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_DEPENDENCIES += mv-ddr-marvell
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_REGULAR),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=default
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_STRONG),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=strong
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_ALL),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=all
+endif
+
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_TARGETS = all
 
 ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_FIP),y)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 boot/arm-trusted-firmware: Forward stack protection configuration

TF-A supports stack smashing protection (-fstack-protector-*). However it currenlty fails to build when built with BR2_SSP_* enabled, because stack protection needs to be enabled for the TF-A build process itself as well to generate the required symbols (e.g. __stack_chk_guard).

So in case we see that BR2_SSP_* is enabled, let's enable the corresponding build flag for TF-A as documented in the TF-A user guide.

Tested on a Rockchip PX30 based system.

---
 boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk +8 -0
index a3553e36cf..0597cecf71 100644
@@ -100,6 +100,14 @@ ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += MV_DDR_PATH=$(MV_DDR_MARVELL_DIR)
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_DEPENDENCIES += mv-ddr-marvell
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_REGULAR),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=default
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_STRONG),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=strong
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_ALL),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=all
+endif
+
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_TARGETS = all
 
 ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_FIP),y)
Signature · 1 line
2.28.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 boot/arm-trusted-firmware: Forward stack protection configuration

Hi Christoph,

Quoted 5 lines · Christoph M?llner

TF-A supports stack smashing protection (-fstack-protector-*). However it currenlty fails to build when built with BR2_SSP_* enabled, because stack protection needs to be enabled for the TF-A build process itself as well to generate the required symbols (e.g. __stack_chk_guard).

So you are saying that the toolchain wrapper actually breaks ATF build when SSP is enabled. Is that correct? If so, this patch is not (only) about enabling the SSP feature for ATF, but about fixing the ATF build. Can you add the build failure error message to the commit log?

Also, the subject line should say something like "fix build with SSP enabled".

This patch should be applied to the master branch, and backported to stable branches, I believe.

baruch

Quoted 30 lines

So in case we see that BR2_SSP_* is enabled, let's enable the corresponding build flag for TF-A as documented in the TF-A user guide.

Tested on a Rockchip PX30 based system.

---
 boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk +8 -0
index a3553e36cf..0597cecf71 100644
@@ -100,6 +100,14 @@ ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += MV_DDR_PATH=$(MV_DDR_MARVELL_DIR)
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_DEPENDENCIES += mv-ddr-marvell
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_REGULAR),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=default
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_STRONG),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=strong
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_ALL),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=all
+endif
+
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_TARGETS = all
 
 ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_FIP),y)
Signature · 3 lines
                                                     ~. .~   Tk Open Systems
=}------------------------------------------------ooO--U--Ooo------------{=
   - baruch at tkos.co.il - tel: +972.52.368.4656, http://www.tkos.co.il -
#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 boot/arm-trusted-firmware: Forward stack protection configuration

Hi Baruch,

Quoted 9 lines · Baruch Siach

Hi Christoph,

Quoted 5 lines · Christoph M?llner

TF-A supports stack smashing protection (-fstack-protector-*). However it currenlty fails to build when built with BR2_SSP_* enabled, because stack protection needs to be enabled for the TF-A build process itself as well to generate the required symbols (e.g. __stack_chk_guard).

Quoted 4 lines

So you are saying that the toolchain wrapper actually breaks ATF build when SSP is enabled. Is that correct? If so, this patch is not (only) about enabling the SSP feature for ATF, but about fixing the ATF build. Can you add the build failure error message to the commit log?

I double checked that.
When SSP is enabled and the build system does not provide the ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR flags, then the TF-A build process used to break at link time.

This behavior was changed a year ago from from "linking breaks" to "silently disable the feature":
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=7af195e29a4213eefac0661d84e1c9c20476e166

So now we end up with a TF-A without stack protection in case we enable BR2_SSP_*.

So Buildroot expects that stack protection is enabled when "-fstack-protector*" is enabled, but TF-A requires additional flags.

FWIW, the link errors with older TF-A (I tested with v2.2) builds are:

Quoted 11 lines

[...]
params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0xc): undefined reference to __stack_chk_guard' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x14): undefined reference to __stack_chk_guard' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x104): undefined reference to __stack_chk_guard' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x118): undefined reference to __stack_chk_fail' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: ./build/px30/release/bl31/pmu.o: in function `rockchip_soc_sys_pwr_dm_suspend':
pmu.c:(.text.rockchip_soc_sys_pwr_dm_suspend+0xc): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
[...]

Quoted 5 lines

Also, the subject line should say something like "fix build with SSP enabled".

This patch should be applied to the master branch, and backported to stable branches, I believe.

I am not sure about this.
Is an enabled, but silently disabled, hardening feature considered as bug? If so, the we should reach out to the TF-A devs and ask for a different build policy here (i.e prefer hardening over build success).

BR,
Christoph

Quoted 35 lines

baruch

Quoted 30 lines

So in case we see that BR2_SSP_* is enabled, let's enable the corresponding build flag for TF-A as documented in the TF-A user guide.

Tested on a Rockchip PX30 based system.

---
 boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk +8 -0
index a3553e36cf..0597cecf71 100644
@@ -100,6 +100,14 @@ ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += MV_DDR_PATH=$(MV_DDR_MARVELL_DIR)
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_DEPENDENCIES += mv-ddr-marvell
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_REGULAR),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=default
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_STRONG),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=strong
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_ALL),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=all
+endif
+
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_TARGETS = all
 
 ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_FIP),y)
#4 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 boot/arm-trusted-firmware: Forward stack protection configuration

Hi Christoph,

Quoted 43 lines · Christoph M?llner
Quoted 11 lines · Baruch Siach
Quoted 5 lines · Christoph M?llner

TF-A supports stack smashing protection (-fstack-protector-*). However it currenlty fails to build when built with BR2_SSP_* enabled, because stack protection needs to be enabled for the TF-A build process itself as well to generate the required symbols (e.g. __stack_chk_guard).

So you are saying that the toolchain wrapper actually breaks ATF build when SSP is enabled. Is that correct? If so, this patch is not (only) about enabling the SSP feature for ATF, but about fixing the ATF build. Can you add the build failure error message to the commit log?

I double checked that.
When SSP is enabled and the build system does not provide the ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR flags, then the TF-A build process used to break at link time.

This behavior was changed a year ago from from "linking breaks" to "silently disable the feature":
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=7af195e29a4213eefac0661d84e1c9c20476e166

So now we end up with a TF-A without stack protection in case we enable BR2_SSP_*.

So Buildroot expects that stack protection is enabled when "-fstack-protector*" is enabled, but TF-A requires additional flags.

FWIW, the link errors with older TF-A (I tested with v2.2) builds are:

Quoted 12 lines

[...]
params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0xc): undefined reference to __stack_chk_guard' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x14): undefined reference to __stack_chk_guard' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x104): undefined reference to __stack_chk_guard' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x118): undefined reference to __stack_chk_fail' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: ./build/px30/release/bl31/pmu.o: in function `rockchip_soc_sys_pwr_dm_suspend':
pmu.c:(.text.rockchip_soc_sys_pwr_dm_suspend+0xc): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
[...]

Also, the subject line should say something like "fix build with SSP enabled".

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

This patch should be applied to the master branch, and backported to stable branches, I believe.

I am not sure about this.
Is an enabled, but silently disabled, hardening feature considered as bug? If so, the we should reach out to the TF-A devs and ask for a different build policy here (i.e prefer hardening over build success).

I agree that a silently disabled feature is not a bug. But a build failure is a bug.

arm-trusted-firmware.mk is meant to support older ATF version as well, just like uboot.mk, and linux.mk. We have configurations under configs/ that set custom, vendor provided, ATF versions. In many (most?) cases these versions predate ATF commit 7af195e29a4. So build breaks for them once you enable SSP.

So I still think that the commit log should mention the fix to build breakage of older ATF versions.

baruch

Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 30 lines

So in case we see that BR2_SSP_* is enabled, let's enable the corresponding build flag for TF-A as documented in the TF-A user guide.

Tested on a Rockchip PX30 based system.

---
 boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk +8 -0
index a3553e36cf..0597cecf71 100644
@@ -100,6 +100,14 @@ ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += MV_DDR_PATH=$(MV_DDR_MARVELL_DIR)
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_DEPENDENCIES += mv-ddr-marvell
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_REGULAR),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=default
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_STRONG),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=strong
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_ALL),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=all
+endif
+
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_TARGETS = all
 
 ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_FIP),y)
Signature · 3 lines
                                                     ~. .~   Tk Open Systems
=}------------------------------------------------ooO--U--Ooo------------{=
   - baruch at tkos.co.il - tel: +972.52.368.4656, http://www.tkos.co.il -
#5 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 boot/arm-trusted-firmware: Forward stack protection configuration

Quoted 57 lines · Baruch Siach

Hi Christoph,

Quoted 43 lines · Christoph M?llner
Quoted 11 lines · Baruch Siach
Quoted 5 lines · Christoph M?llner

TF-A supports stack smashing protection (-fstack-protector-*). However it currenlty fails to build when built with BR2_SSP_* enabled, because stack protection needs to be enabled for the TF-A build process itself as well to generate the required symbols (e.g. __stack_chk_guard).

So you are saying that the toolchain wrapper actually breaks ATF build when SSP is enabled. Is that correct? If so, this patch is not (only) about enabling the SSP feature for ATF, but about fixing the ATF build. Can you add the build failure error message to the commit log?

I double checked that.
When SSP is enabled and the build system does not provide the ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR flags, then the TF-A build process used to break at link time.

This behavior was changed a year ago from from "linking breaks" to "silently disable the feature":
https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=7af195e29a4213eefac0661d84e1c9c20476e166

So now we end up with a TF-A without stack protection in case we enable BR2_SSP_*.

So Buildroot expects that stack protection is enabled when "-fstack-protector*" is enabled, but TF-A requires additional flags.

FWIW, the link errors with older TF-A (I tested with v2.2) builds are:

Quoted 12 lines

[...]
params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0xc): undefined reference to __stack_chk_guard' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x14): undefined reference to __stack_chk_guard' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x104): undefined reference to __stack_chk_guard' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: params_setup.c:(.text.params_early_setup+0x118): undefined reference to __stack_chk_fail' /home/cm/build-debug/host/bin/aarch64-none-linux-gnu-ld: ./build/px30/release/bl31/pmu.o: in function `rockchip_soc_sys_pwr_dm_suspend':
pmu.c:(.text.rockchip_soc_sys_pwr_dm_suspend+0xc): undefined reference to `__stack_chk_guard'
[...]

Also, the subject line should say something like "fix build with SSP enabled".

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines

This patch should be applied to the master branch, and backported to stable branches, I believe.

I am not sure about this.
Is an enabled, but silently disabled, hardening feature considered as bug? If so, the we should reach out to the TF-A devs and ask for a different build policy here (i.e prefer hardening over build success).

I agree that a silently disabled feature is not a bug. But a build failure is a bug.

Quoted 8 lines

arm-trusted-firmware.mk is meant to support older ATF version as well, just like uboot.mk, and linux.mk. We have configurations under configs/ that set custom, vendor provided, ATF versions. In many (most?) cases these versions predate ATF commit 7af195e29a4. So build breaks for them once you enable SSP.

So I still think that the commit log should mention the fix to build breakage of older ATF versions.

Ok, will send out a v4.

Quoted 34 lines

baruch

Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 30 lines
Quoted 30 lines

So in case we see that BR2_SSP_* is enabled, let's enable the corresponding build flag for TF-A as documented in the TF-A user guide.

Tested on a Rockchip PX30 based system.

---
 boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
boot/arm-trusted-firmware/arm-trusted-firmware.mk +8 -0
index a3553e36cf..0597cecf71 100644
@@ -100,6 +100,14 @@ ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += MV_DDR_PATH=$(MV_DDR_MARVELL_DIR)
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_DEPENDENCIES += mv-ddr-marvell
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_REGULAR),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=default
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_STRONG),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=strong
+else ifeq ($(BR2_SSP_ALL),y)
+ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_OPTS += ENABLE_STACK_PROTECTOR=all
+endif
+
 ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_MAKE_TARGETS = all
 
 ifeq ($(BR2_TARGET_ARM_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_FIP),y)