timekeeping: Require permission to set auxiliary clocks
Subsystems (2)
PATCH 1/1 timekeeping: Require permission to set auxiliary clocks
The generic clock_settime() entry point delegates permission checks to each clock-specific callback. aux_clock_set() does not perform one. Once an administrator enables an auxiliary clock, any local process can therefore change the global clock offset.
A test process running as UID and GID 65534 with no effective, permitted, inheritable, or ambient capabilities set CLOCK_AUX0 successfully, and a separate process observed the new value. The same process was denied by clock_adjtime(). An AppArmor profile denying sys_time also blocked CLOCK_REALTIME changes but did not see the auxiliary clock operation.
Call security_settime64() before mutating the auxiliary timekeeper. This matches CLOCK_REALTIME's permission model, enforces initial-user-namespace CAP_SYS_TIME, and gives LSMs the settime hook while preserving authorized clock changes.
---
AI assistance was used for source analysis, reproducer development, and validation. The submitter reviewed the resulting change before signing it.
kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
kernel/time/timekeeping.c +5 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h> #include <linux/sched/loadavg.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/static_key.h> #include <linux/stop_machine.h> #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
@@ -3215,11 +3216,15 @@ static int aux_clock_set(const clockid_t id, const struct timespec64 *tnew)struct tk_data *aux_tkd =aux_get_tk_data (id);struct timekeeper *aux_tks;ktime_t tnow, nsecs; +int ret;if (!timespec64_valid_settod (tnew))return -EINVAL ;if (!aux_tkd)return -ENODEV ; + ret =security_settime64 (tnew,NULL ); +if (ret) +return ret; aux_tks = &aux_tkd->shadow_timekeeper;
base-commit: c03c1a14507dfaf8b856c2608f9ac216021fc222
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
I tested this patch on x86_64 using QEMU TCG, with the reproduction configuration and PoC from my report. The patch applied cleanly to c03c1a14507dfaf8b856c2608f9ac216021fc222, and the kernel built and booted successfully.
With the patch applied, an unprivileged process (uid 65534, with CapEff=0) receives EPERM when calling clock_settime(CLOCK_AUX0) after the clock has been enabled. An additional privileged control call successfully set CLOCK_AUX0. The CLOCK_REALTIME settime and CLOCK_AUX0 adjtime controls returned EPERM as expected.
For completeness, setting the disabled CLOCK_AUX1 as an unprivileged caller also returned EPERM; the permission check runs before the enabled-clock check.
Quoted 44 lines · Daehyeon Ko
The generic
clock_settime()entry point delegates permission checks to each clock-specific callback.aux_clock_set()does not perform one. Once an administrator enables an auxiliary clock, any local process can therefore change the global clock offset.A test process running as UID and GID 65534 with no effective, permitted, inheritable, or ambient capabilities set
CLOCK_AUX0successfully, and a separate process observed the new value. The same process was denied byclock_adjtime(). An AppArmor profile denyingsys_timealso blockedCLOCK_REALTIMEchanges but did not see the auxiliary clock operation.Call
security_settime64()before mutating the auxiliary timekeeper. This matches CLOCK_REALTIME's permission model, enforces initial-user-namespaceCAP_SYS_TIME, and gives LSMs the settime hook while preserving authorized clock changes.Fixes 60ecc26ec5af ("timekeeping: Provide time setter for auxiliary clocks")Signed-off-by Daehyeon Ko <[email protected]>---
AI assistance was used for source analysis, reproducer development, and validation. The submitter reviewed the resulting change before signing it.kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)kernel/time/timekeeping.c +2
-0@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h> #include <linux/sched/loadavg.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/static_key.h> #include <linux/stop_machine.h> #include <linux/syscore_ops.h> @@ -3215,11 +3216,15 @@ static int aux_clock_set(const clockid_t id, const struct timespec64 *tnew)struct tk_data *aux_tkd =aux_get_tk_data (id);struct timekeeper *aux_tks;ktime_t tnow, nsecs; +int ret;
kernel/time/timekeeping.c static int aux_clock_set(const clockid_t id, const struct timespec64 *tnew) · line 3229
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/time/timekeeping.c +3
-0if (!timespec64_valid_settod (tnew))return -EINVAL ;if (!aux_tkd)return -ENODEV ; + ret =security_settime64 (tnew,NULL ); +if (ret) +return ret; aux_tks = &aux_tkd->shadow_timekeeper;
This looked a little odd adding the security_settime64() check in the core timekeeping.c where as is usually called closer to the syscall in time.c, but given the clock_aux k_clock is defined in timekeeping.c, I guess this makes it the best place to add the check.
thanks
-john
Thomas Gleixner
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · John Stultz
kernel/time/timekeeping.c static int aux_clock_set(const clockid_t id, const struct timespec64 *tnew) · line 3229
Quoted 5 lines · Daehyeon Ko
kernel/time/timekeeping.c +3
-0+ ret =security_settime64 (tnew,NULL ); +if (ret) +return ret; aux_tks = &aux_tkd->shadow_timekeeper;This looked a little odd adding the
security_settime64()check in the coretimekeeping.cwhere as is usually called closer to the syscall intime.c, but given theclock_auxk_clockis defined intimekeeping.c, I guess this makes it the best place to add the check.
The reason why it's not in the syscall is that posix clocks have a different permission scheme than system time, so the check ends up in the clock_set() callback of the individial clocks.
The following commit has been merged into the timers/urgent branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the timers/urgent branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 524d95c8a2000cba6cb80a173d76cb746c561244 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/524d95c8a2000cba6cb80a173d76cb746c561244 Author: Daehyeon Ko <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Mon, 19 Oct 2026 17:03:24 +09:00 Committer: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Fri, 23 Oct 2026 21:49:57 +02:00
timekeeping: Require permission to set auxiliary clocks
The generic clock_settime() entry point delegates permission checks to each clock-specific callback. aux_clock_set() does not perform one. Once an administrator enables an auxiliary clock, any local process can therefore change the global clock offset.
A test process running as UID and GID 65534 with no effective, permitted, inheritable, or ambient capabilities set CLOCK_AUX0 successfully, and a separate process observed the new value. The same process was denied by clock_adjtime(). An AppArmor profile denying sys_time also blocked CLOCK_REALTIME changes but did not see the auxiliary clock operation.
Call security_settime64() before mutating the auxiliary timekeeper. This matches CLOCK_REALTIME's permission model, enforces initial-user-namespace CAP_SYS_TIME, and gives LSMs the settime hook while preserving authorized clock changes.
--- kernel/time/timekeeping.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
kernel/time/timekeeping.c +5 -0
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@#include <linux/random.h> #include <linux/sched/clock.h> #include <linux/sched/loadavg.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/static_key.h> #include <linux/stop_machine.h> #include <linux/syscore_ops.h>
@@ -3215,11 +3216,15 @@ static int aux_clock_set(const clockid_t id, const struct timespec64 *tnew)struct tk_data *aux_tkd =aux_get_tk_data (id);struct timekeeper *aux_tks;ktime_t tnow, nsecs; +int ret;if (!timespec64_valid_settod (tnew))return -EINVAL ;if (!aux_tkd)return -ENODEV ; + ret =security_settime64 (tnew,NULL ); +if (ret) +return ret; aux_tks = &aux_tkd->shadow_timekeeper;