powerpc: Set right value of Speculation_Store_Bypass in /proc/<pid>/status
PATCH v2 1/1 powerpc: Set right value of Speculation_Store_Bypass in /proc/<pid>/status
The issue has showed the value of status of Speculation_Store_Bypass in the /proc/<pid>/status as unknown for PowerPC systems.
The patch fix the checking of the mitigation status of Speculation, and can be reported as "not vulnerable", "globally mitigated" or "vulnerable".
Changelog:
Rebase on v5.4-rc8
--- arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +24 -1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@#include <asm/debugfs.h> #include <asm/security_features.h> #include <asm/setup.h> - +#include <linux/prctl.h> u64 powerpc_security_features__read_mostly =SEC_FTR_DEFAULT ;
@@ -344,6 +344,29 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable\n" ); } +static int ssb_prctl_get (struct task_struct *task) +{ +if (stf_barrier) { +if (stf_enabled_flush_types ==STF_BARRIER_NONE ) +return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED ; +else +return PR_SPEC_DISABLE ; + }else +return PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC ; + +return -EINVAL ; +} + +int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long which) +{ +switch (which) { +case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS : +return ssb_prctl_get (task); +default : +return -ENODEV ; + } +} +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS static int stf_barrier_set (void *data,u64 val) {
Signature · 1 line
2.19.1
Michael Ellerman
reviewerQuoted 8 lines · Gustavo Walbon
The issue has showed the value of status of
Speculation_Store_Bypassin the /proc/<pid>/status asunknownfor PowerPC systems.The patch fix the checking of the mitigation status of Speculation, and can be reported as "not vulnerable", "globally mitigated" or "vulnerable".
Quoted 7 lines
Changelog:
Rebase on v5.4-rc8Signed-off-by Gustavo Walbon <[email protected]>--- arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
On further thoughts I don't think this logic (which I suggested) is right >:(
I commented on the issue:
I think my original suggestion on this was wrong.
Our mitigation is not global, ie. it's a barrier that must be used in the right location. We have kernel code to insert the barrier on kernel entry/exit, but that doesn't protect userspace against itself (ie. sandboxes).
There's no way to express that with the current values as far as I can see.
I think all we can do for now is:
if stf_enabled_flush_types == STF_BARRIER_NONE:
return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED // "not vulnerable"
else
return PR_SPEC_ENABLE // "vulnerable"
To express the situation properly we'd need another value, something like PR_SPEC_MITIGATION_AVAILABLE (??) which says that there is a mitigation available but it must be used. That still has the problem that it doesn't tell userspace what the mitigation is, userspace would have to know.
cheers
Quoted 45 lines
arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c +24
-1@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@#include <asm/debugfs.h> #include <asm/security_features.h> #include <asm/setup.h> - +#include <linux/prctl.h> u64 powerpc_security_features__read_mostly =SEC_FTR_DEFAULT ;@@ -344,6 +344,29 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spec_store_bypass(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *return sprintf (buf,"Vulnerable\n" ); } +static int ssb_prctl_get (struct task_struct *task) +{ +if (stf_barrier) { +if (stf_enabled_flush_types ==STF_BARRIER_NONE ) +return PR_SPEC_NOT_AFFECTED ; +else +return PR_SPEC_DISABLE ; + }else +return PR_SPEC_DISABLE_NOEXEC ; + +return -EINVAL ; +} + +int arch_prctl_spec_ctrl_get (struct task_struct *task,unsigned long which) +{ +switch (which) { +case PR_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS : +return ssb_prctl_get (task); +default : +return -ENODEV ; + } +} +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_FS static int stf_barrier_set (void *data,u64 val) {Signature · 1 line
2.19.1