x86/amd: don't set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS if forced to zero
PATCH 1/1 x86/amd: don't set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS if forced to zero
When running as Xen pv guest X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS must not be set on AMD cpus. Xen will disable this via setup_clear_cpu_cap(), so test cpu_caps_cleared to not have disabled this bit.
This bug/feature bit is kind of special as it will be used very early when switching threads. Setting the bit and clearing it a little bit later leaves a critical window where things can go wrong. This time window has enlarged a little bit by using setup_clear_cpu_cap() instead of the hypervisor's set_cpu_features callback. It seems this larger window now makes it rather easy to hit the problem.
The proper solution is to never set the bit in case of Xen.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +3 -1
@@ -800,7 +800,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH );/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET */ -set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); +if (!test_bit (X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS , + (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) +set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); }#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
Signature · 1 line
2.12.0
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 23 lines · Juergen Gross
When running as Xen pv guest
X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSmust not be set on AMD cpus. Xen will disable this viasetup_clear_cpu_cap(), so testcpu_caps_clearedto not have disabled this bit.This bug/feature bit is kind of special as it will be used very early when switching threads. Setting the bit and clearing it a little bit later leaves a critical window where things can go wrong. This time window has enlarged a little bit by using
setup_clear_cpu_cap()instead of the hypervisor'sset_cpu_featurescallback. It seems this larger window now makes it rather easy to hit the problem.The proper solution is to never set the bit in case of Xen.
Signed-off-by Juergen Gross <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 806
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +3
-1@@ -800,7 +800,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH );/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET */ -set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); +if (!test_bit (X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS , + (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) +set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); }
Hold on, AFAICT we have this order:
c_init() -> init_amd() sets X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS init_hypervisor->x86_hyper->set_cpu_features-> clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
and all is good.
And I remember seeing a patchset doing some xen cpuid cleanup so I'm assuming you're doing setup_clear_cpu_cap() now? And now we have to wag the dog?
Confused.
Signature · 9 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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https://lists.xen.org/xen-develBorislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 23 lines · Juergen Gross
When running as Xen pv guest
X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSmust not be set on AMD cpus. Xen will disable this viasetup_clear_cpu_cap(), so testcpu_caps_clearedto not have disabled this bit.This bug/feature bit is kind of special as it will be used very early when switching threads. Setting the bit and clearing it a little bit later leaves a critical window where things can go wrong. This time window has enlarged a little bit by using
setup_clear_cpu_cap()instead of the hypervisor'sset_cpu_featurescallback. It seems this larger window now makes it rather easy to hit the problem.The proper solution is to never set the bit in case of Xen.
Signed-off-by Juergen Gross <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 806
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +3
-1@@ -800,7 +800,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH );/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET */ -set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); +if (!test_bit (X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS , + (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) +set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); }
Hold on, AFAICT we have this order:
c_init() -> init_amd() sets X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS init_hypervisor->x86_hyper->set_cpu_features-> clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
and all is good.
And I remember seeing a patchset doing some xen cpuid cleanup so I'm assuming you're doing setup_clear_cpu_cap() now? And now we have to wag the dog?
Confused.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.Quoted 35 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 23 lines · Juergen Gross
When running as Xen pv guest
X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSmust not be set on AMD cpus. Xen will disable this viasetup_clear_cpu_cap(), so testcpu_caps_clearedto not have disabled this bit.This bug/feature bit is kind of special as it will be used very early when switching threads. Setting the bit and clearing it a little bit later leaves a critical window where things can go wrong. This time window has enlarged a little bit by using
setup_clear_cpu_cap()instead of the hypervisor'sset_cpu_featurescallback. It seems this larger window now makes it rather easy to hit the problem.The proper solution is to never set the bit in case of Xen.
Signed-off-by Juergen Gross <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +0
-0arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 806
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +3
-1@@ -800,7 +800,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH );/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET */ -set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); +if (!test_bit (X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS , + (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) +set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); }Hold on, AFAICT we have this order:
Quoted 1 line
c_init()->init_amd()setsX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS
And what happens when there is a scheduling event right here? __switch_to() will see X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS set and take a wrong path.
Quoted 1 line
init_hypervisor->x86_hyper->set_cpu_features->
clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
And now (with setup_clear_cpu_cap()) the bit is cleared a little bit later. And all should be good. But it isn't.
Quoted 6 lines
and all is good.
And I remember seeing a patchset doing some xen cpuid cleanup so I'm assuming you're doing
setup_clear_cpu_cap()now? And now we have to wag the dog?
No, now the time window with X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS set is so long we actually see the problem happening.
Juergen
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Quoted 35 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 23 lines · Juergen Gross
When running as Xen pv guest
X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSmust not be set on AMD cpus. Xen will disable this viasetup_clear_cpu_cap(), so testcpu_caps_clearedto not have disabled this bit.This bug/feature bit is kind of special as it will be used very early when switching threads. Setting the bit and clearing it a little bit later leaves a critical window where things can go wrong. This time window has enlarged a little bit by using
setup_clear_cpu_cap()instead of the hypervisor'sset_cpu_featurescallback. It seems this larger window now makes it rather easy to hit the problem.The proper solution is to never set the bit in case of Xen.
Signed-off-by Juergen Gross <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +0
-0arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 806
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +3
-1@@ -800,7 +800,9 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)set_cpu_cap (c,X86_FEATURE_3DNOWPREFETCH );/* AMD CPUs don't reset SS attributes on SYSRET */ -set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); +if (!test_bit (X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS , + (unsigned long *)cpu_caps_cleared)) +set_cpu_bug (c,X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS ); }Hold on, AFAICT we have this order:
Quoted 1 line
c_init()->init_amd()setsX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS
And what happens when there is a scheduling event right here? __switch_to() will see X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS set and take a wrong path.
Quoted 1 line
init_hypervisor->x86_hyper->set_cpu_features->
clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
And now (with setup_clear_cpu_cap()) the bit is cleared a little bit later. And all should be good. But it isn't.
Quoted 6 lines
and all is good.
And I remember seeing a patchset doing some xen cpuid cleanup so I'm assuming you're doing
setup_clear_cpu_cap()now? And now we have to wag the dog?
No, now the time window with X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS set is so long we actually see the problem happening.
Juergen
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · Juergen Gross
And what happens when there is a scheduling event right here?
__switch_to()will seeX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSset and take a wrong path.
So the whole thing we're doing right now is wrong: set bit and then clear bit.
We should not set the bit at all and there won't be any window to get it wrong.
So can we do something like this instead:
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
or is XENPV the wrong thing to test?
Signature · 9 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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https://lists.xen.org/xen-develBorislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · Juergen Gross
And what happens when there is a scheduling event right here?
__switch_to()will seeX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSset and take a wrong path.
So the whole thing we're doing right now is wrong: set bit and then clear bit.
We should not set the bit at all and there won't be any window to get it wrong.
So can we do something like this instead:
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
or is XENPV the wrong thing to test?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Juergen Gross
And what happens when there is a scheduling event right here?
__switch_to()will seeX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSset and take a wrong path.So the whole thing we're doing right now is wrong: set bit and then clear bit.
We should not set the bit at all and there won't be any window to get it wrong.
Quoted 7 lines
So can we do something like this instead:
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);or is XENPV the wrong thing to test?
X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS only actually causes a problem if you enter the kernel via an IDT vector (forcing %ss to NULL), then exiting the kernel via the optimistic sysret path, which on AMD loads the %ss selector, but apparently doesn't update the segment cache (and %ss.dpl in particular).
The problem (for all ring-deprivileged virtuailsation; not just Xen PV), is that
savesegment(ss, ss_sel);
if (ss_sel != __KERNEL_DS)
loadsegment(ss, __KERNEL_DS);
tries to load %ss with an RPL of 0, and things blow up.
~Andrew
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Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Juergen Gross
And what happens when there is a scheduling event right here?
__switch_to()will seeX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSset and take a wrong path.So the whole thing we're doing right now is wrong: set bit and then clear bit.
We should not set the bit at all and there won't be any window to get it wrong.
Quoted 7 lines
So can we do something like this instead:
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);or is XENPV the wrong thing to test?
X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS only actually causes a problem if you enter the kernel via an IDT vector (forcing %ss to NULL), then exiting the kernel via the optimistic sysret path, which on AMD loads the %ss selector, but apparently doesn't update the segment cache (and %ss.dpl in particular).
The problem (for all ring-deprivileged virtuailsation; not just Xen PV), is that
savesegment(ss, ss_sel);
if (ss_sel != __KERNEL_DS)
loadsegment(ss, __KERNEL_DS);
tries to load %ss with an RPL of 0, and things blow up.
~Andrew
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Andrew Cooper
The problem (for all ring-deprivileged virtuailsation; not just Xen PV), is that
I know what that that bug flag is for.
I'm asking whether the xen guest boot sets a flag early - like XENPV, for example - which can differentiate between baremetal and virt boot in a fairly generic manner so that we don't set that bug flag then instead of the set and then clear dance we do currently.
Signature · 9 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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https://lists.xen.org/xen-develBorislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 2 lines · Andrew Cooper
The problem (for all ring-deprivileged virtuailsation; not just Xen PV), is that
I know what that that bug flag is for.
I'm asking whether the xen guest boot sets a flag early - like XENPV, for example - which can differentiate between baremetal and virt boot in a fairly generic manner so that we don't set that bug flag then instead of the set and then clear dance we do currently.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Juergen Gross
And what happens when there is a scheduling event right here?
__switch_to()will seeX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSset and take a wrong path.So the whole thing we're doing right now is wrong: set bit and then clear bit.
Right. And this is handled by my patch.
The really clean solution would be to add this test to set_cpu_bug() et al. Don't set/clear the bit if anyone selected to force a value. The force variants would be capable to overwrite, the normal variants wouldn't. This would require a lot of research to avoid pitfalls with today's handling, though. OTOH one could remove all the calls to apply_forced_caps().
Quoted 10 lines
We should not set the bit at all and there won't be any window to get it wrong.
So can we do something like this instead:
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);or is XENPV the wrong thing to test?
This would work. OTOH I'd prefer to test whether the bit should be forced to remain zero than use the knowledge _who_ is trying to force it.
Juergen
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Quoted 7 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Juergen Gross
And what happens when there is a scheduling event right here?
__switch_to()will seeX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSset and take a wrong path.So the whole thing we're doing right now is wrong: set bit and then clear bit.
Right. And this is handled by my patch.
The really clean solution would be to add this test to set_cpu_bug() et al. Don't set/clear the bit if anyone selected to force a value. The force variants would be capable to overwrite, the normal variants wouldn't. This would require a lot of research to avoid pitfalls with today's handling, though. OTOH one could remove all the calls to apply_forced_caps().
Quoted 10 lines
We should not set the bit at all and there won't be any window to get it wrong.
So can we do something like this instead:
if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV)) set_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);or is XENPV the wrong thing to test?
This would work. OTOH I'd prefer to test whether the bit should be forced to remain zero than use the knowledge _who_ is trying to force it.
Juergen
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Juergen Gross
The really clean solution would be to add this test to
set_cpu_bug()
No, the really clean solution is to set it once and not play toggle games.
Quoted 3 lines
This would work. OTOH I'd prefer to test whether the bit should be forced to remain zero than use the knowledge _who_ is trying to force it.
Because we're in the business of investigating who did?
Nah, we should set it or clear it once and not do funky toggle games. Especially if in the future something else changes and timing windows grow and we refactor stuff and yadda yadda...
Signature · 9 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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https://lists.xen.org/xen-develBorislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Juergen Gross
The really clean solution would be to add this test to
set_cpu_bug()
No, the really clean solution is to set it once and not play toggle games.
Quoted 3 lines
This would work. OTOH I'd prefer to test whether the bit should be forced to remain zero than use the knowledge _who_ is trying to force it.
Because we're in the business of investigating who did?
Nah, we should set it or clear it once and not do funky toggle games. Especially if in the future something else changes and timing windows grow and we refactor stuff and yadda yadda...
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Juergen Gross
The really clean solution would be to add this test to
set_cpu_bug()No, the really clean solution is to set it once and not play toggle games.
Quoted 3 lines
This would work. OTOH I'd prefer to test whether the bit should be forced to remain zero than use the knowledge _who_ is trying to force it.
Quoted 5 lines
Because we're in the business of investigating who did?
Nah, we should set it or clear it once and not do funky toggle games. Especially if in the future something else changes and timing windows grow and we refactor stuff and yadda yadda...
So what else is my patch doing? It is avoiding to set the bit in case somebody (i.e. Xen) was forcing it to remain zero.
I'm not feeling strong about it. So if you want to test for X86_FEATURE_XENPV to avoid setting X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS I'm fine with it.
Will send V2 with that change.
Juergen
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Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Juergen Gross
The really clean solution would be to add this test to
set_cpu_bug()No, the really clean solution is to set it once and not play toggle games.
Quoted 3 lines
This would work. OTOH I'd prefer to test whether the bit should be forced to remain zero than use the knowledge _who_ is trying to force it.
Quoted 5 lines
Because we're in the business of investigating who did?
Nah, we should set it or clear it once and not do funky toggle games. Especially if in the future something else changes and timing windows grow and we refactor stuff and yadda yadda...
So what else is my patch doing? It is avoiding to set the bit in case somebody (i.e. Xen) was forcing it to remain zero.
I'm not feeling strong about it. So if you want to test for X86_FEATURE_XENPV to avoid setting X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS I'm fine with it.
Will send V2 with that change.
Juergen
Borislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Juergen Gross
I'm not feeling strong about it. So if you want to test for
X86_FEATURE_XENPVto avoid settingX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSI'm fine with it.Will send V2 with that change.
And remove the corresponding
clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
in xen_set_cpu_features().
So that we can set it once, only on !XENPV feature set.
/me looks again at the code...
Gah, except that we do
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV);
and that runs as part of init_hypervisor() and it runs *after* c_init().
So, back to square one. :-\
So lemme try to explain again what I mean:
I'd like to have a generic way of detecting whether I'm running as a xen guest at ->c_init() time and depending on the result of that detection, to set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS or not set it.
Does that make more sense?
Thanks.
Signature · 9 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.
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https://lists.xen.org/xen-develBorislav Petkov
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Juergen Gross
I'm not feeling strong about it. So if you want to test for
X86_FEATURE_XENPVto avoid settingX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSI'm fine with it.Will send V2 with that change.
And remove the corresponding
clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);
in xen_set_cpu_features().
So that we can set it once, only on !XENPV feature set.
/me looks again at the code...
Gah, except that we do
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV);
and that runs as part of init_hypervisor() and it runs *after* c_init().
So, back to square one. :-\
So lemme try to explain again what I mean:
I'd like to have a generic way of detecting whether I'm running as a xen guest at ->c_init() time and depending on the result of that detection, to set X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS or not set it.
Does that make more sense?
Thanks.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
Good mailing practices for 400: avoid top-posting and trim the reply.Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Juergen Gross
I'm not feeling strong about it. So if you want to test for
X86_FEATURE_XENPVto avoid settingX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSI'm fine with it.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Will send V2 with that change.
And remove the corresponding
clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);in
xen_set_cpu_features().
Okay, you are right, we can omit this one now.
Quoted 9 lines
So that we can set it once, only on !XENPV feature set.
/me looks again at the code...
Gah, except that we do
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV);and that runs as part of
init_hypervisor()and it runs *after*c_init().
No, this is called by xen_start_kernel(), long before c_init().
Quoted 9 lines
So, back to square one. :-\
So lemme try to explain again what I mean:
I'd like to have a generic way of detecting whether I'm running as a xen guest at ->c_init() time and depending on the result of that detection, to set
X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSor not set it.Does that make more sense?
This does make sense and it is working, as Sander could confirm.
Juergen
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Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Juergen Gross
I'm not feeling strong about it. So if you want to test for
X86_FEATURE_XENPVto avoid settingX86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSI'm fine with it.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Will send V2 with that change.
And remove the corresponding
clear_cpu_bug(c, X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRS);in
xen_set_cpu_features().
Okay, you are right, we can omit this one now.
Quoted 9 lines
So that we can set it once, only on !XENPV feature set.
/me looks again at the code...
Gah, except that we do
set_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_XENPV);and that runs as part of
init_hypervisor()and it runs *after*c_init().
No, this is called by xen_start_kernel(), long before c_init().
Quoted 9 lines
So, back to square one. :-\
So lemme try to explain again what I mean:
I'd like to have a generic way of detecting whether I'm running as a xen guest at ->c_init() time and depending on the result of that detection, to set
X86_BUG_SYSRET_SS_ATTRSor not set it.Does that make more sense?
This does make sense and it is working, as Sander could confirm.
Juergen