libceph: zero out session key and connection secret
Ilya Dryomov
maintainerPATCH 1/1 libceph: zero out session key and connection secret
Try and avoid leaving bits and pieces of session key and connection secret (gets split into GCM key and a pair of GCM IVs) around.
--- net/ceph/auth_x.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- net/ceph/crypto.c | 3 ++- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
net/ceph/auth_x.c +34 -23
@@ -569,6 +569,34 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,return -ERANGE ; } +static int decode_con_secret (void **p,void *end,u8 *con_secret, +int *con_secret_len) +{ +int len; + +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_need (p, end, len, bad); + +dout ("%s len %d\n" , __func__, len); +if (con_secret) { +if (len >CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN ) { +pr_err ("connection secret too big %d\n" , len); + goto bad_memzero; + } +memcpy (con_secret, *p, len); + *con_secret_len = len; + } +memzero_explicit (*p, len); + *p += len; +return 0 ; + +bad_memzero: +memzero_explicit (*p, len); +bad: +pr_err ("failed to decode connection secret\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; +} + static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, void **p, void *end, u8 *session_key, int *session_key_len,
@@ -612,17 +640,9 @@ static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac,dout ("%s decrypted %d bytes\n" , __func__, ret); dend = dp + ret; -ceph_decode_32_safe (&dp, dend, len, e_inval); -if (len >CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN ) { -pr_err ("connection secret too big %d\n" , len); -return -EINVAL ; - } - -dout ("%s connection secret len %d\n" , __func__, len); -if (con_secret) { -memcpy (con_secret, dp, len); - *con_secret_len = len; - } + ret =decode_con_secret (&dp, dend, con_secret, con_secret_len); +if (ret) +return ret; }/* service tickets */
@@ -828,7 +848,6 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, {void *dp, *dend;u8 struct_v; -int len;int ret; dp = *p +ceph_x_encrypt_offset ();
@@ -843,17 +862,9 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret,ceph_decode_64_safe (&dp, dend, *nonce_plus_one, e_inval);dout ("%s nonce_plus_one %llu\n" , __func__, *nonce_plus_one);if (struct_v >=2 ) { -ceph_decode_32_safe (&dp, dend, len, e_inval); -if (len >CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN ) { -pr_err ("connection secret too big %d\n" , len); -return -EINVAL ; - } - -dout ("%s connection secret len %d\n" , __func__, len); -if (con_secret) { -memcpy (con_secret, dp, len); - *con_secret_len = len; - } + ret =decode_con_secret (&dp, dend, con_secret, con_secret_len); +if (ret) +return ret; }return 0 ;
net/ceph/crypto.c +2 -1
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_decode(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void **p, void *end) key->len =ceph_decode_16 (p);ceph_decode_need (p, end, key->len, bad); ret =set_secret (key, *p); +memzero_explicit (*p, key->len); *p += key->len;return ret;
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_unarmor(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const char *inkey)void ceph_crypto_key_destroy (struct ceph_crypto_key *key) {if (key) { -kfree (key->key); +kfree_sensitive (key->key); key->key =NULL ;if (key->tfm) {crypto_free_sync_skcipher (key->tfm);
net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +26 -19
115 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.19.2
Quoted 267 lines · Ilya Dryomov
Try and avoid leaving bits and pieces of session key and connection secret (gets split into GCM key and a pair of GCM IVs) around.
Signed-off-by Ilya Dryomov <[email protected]>---
net/ceph/auth_x.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- net/ceph/crypto.c | 3 ++- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++-------------- 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)net/ceph/auth_x.c +0
-0@@ -569,6 +569,34 @@ static int ceph_x_build_request(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, return -ERANGE; }net/ceph/auth_x.c +28
-0+static int decode_con_secret (void **p,void *end,u8 *con_secret, +int *con_secret_len) +{ +int len; + +ceph_decode_32_safe (p, end, len, bad); +ceph_decode_need (p, end, len, bad); + +dout ("%s len %d\n" , __func__, len); +if (con_secret) { +if (len >CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN ) { +pr_err ("connection secret too big %d\n" , len); + goto bad_memzero; + } +memcpy (con_secret, *p, len); + *con_secret_len = len; + } +memzero_explicit (*p, len); + *p += len; +return 0 ; + +bad_memzero: +memzero_explicit (*p, len); +bad: +pr_err ("failed to decode connection secret\n" ); +return -EINVAL ; +} +static int handle_auth_session_key(struct
ceph_auth_client*ac, void **p, void *end,
u8*session_key, int*session_key_len,net/ceph/auth_x.c +0
-0@@ -612,17 +640,9 @@ static int handle_auth_session_key(struct ceph_auth_client *ac, dout("%s decrypted %d bytes\n", __func__, ret); dend = dp + ret;net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-11-ceph_decode_32_safe (&dp, dend, len, e_inval); -if (len >CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN ) { -pr_err ("connection secret too big %d\n" , len); -return -EINVAL ; - } - -dout ("%s connection secret len %d\n" , __func__, len); -if (con_secret) { -memcpy (con_secret, dp, len); - *con_secret_len = len; - } + ret =decode_con_secret (&dp, dend, con_secret, con_secret_len); +if (ret) +return ret;}
/* service tickets */
net/ceph/auth_x.c +0
-1@@ -828,7 +848,6 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, { void *dp, *dend; u8 struct_v; -int len; int ret;dp = *p +
ceph_x_encrypt_offset();net/ceph/auth_x.c +3
-11@@ -843,17 +862,9 @@ static int decrypt_authorizer_reply(struct ceph_crypto_key *secret, ceph_decode_64_safe(&dp, dend, *nonce_plus_one, e_inval); dout("%s nonce_plus_one %llu\n", __func__, *nonce_plus_one); if (struct_v >= 2) { -ceph_decode_32_safe (&dp, dend, len, e_inval); -if (len >CEPH_MAX_CON_SECRET_LEN ) { -pr_err ("connection secret too big %d\n" , len); -return -EINVAL ; - } - -dout ("%s connection secret len %d\n" , __func__, len); -if (con_secret) { -memcpy (con_secret, dp, len); - *con_secret_len = len; - } + ret =decode_con_secret (&dp, dend, con_secret, con_secret_len); +if (ret) +return ret; }return 0;
net/ceph/crypto.c +1
-0@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_decode(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, void **p, void *end) key->len = ceph_decode_16(p); ceph_decode_need(p, end, key->len, bad); ret = set_secret(key, *p); +memzero_explicit (*p, key->len); *p += key->len; return ret;net/ceph/crypto.c +1
-1@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ int ceph_crypto_key_unarmor(struct ceph_crypto_key *key, const char *inkey) void ceph_crypto_key_destroy(struct ceph_crypto_key *key) { if (key) { -kfree (key->key); +kfree_sensitive (key->key); key->key = NULL; if (key->tfm) { crypto_free_sync_skcipher(key->tfm);net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +0
-0@@ -689,11 +689,10 @@ static int verify_epilogue_crcs(struct ceph_connection *con, u32 front_crc, }static int setup_crypto(struct
ceph_connection*con,net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +2
-2- u8 *session_key, int session_key_len, - u8 *con_secret, int con_secret_len) + const u8 *session_key, int session_key_len, + const u8 *con_secret, int con_secret_len){
unsigned intnoio_flag;net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +0
-1-void *p;int ret;
dout("%s con %p
con_mode%dsession_key_len%dcon_secret_len%d\n",net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +0
-0@@ -751,15 +750,14 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con, return ret; }net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +3
-3- p = con_secret; -WARN_ON ((unsigned long )p &crypto_aead_alignmask (con->v2.gcm_tfm)); - ret =crypto_aead_setkey (con->v2.gcm_tfm, p,CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN ); +WARN_ON ((unsigned long )con_secret & +crypto_aead_alignmask (con->v2.gcm_tfm)); + ret =crypto_aead_setkey (con->v2.gcm_tfm, con_secret,CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN );if (ret) {
pr_err("failed to set gcm key: %d\n", ret); return ret;
}net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +0
-1- p +=CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN ;
WARN_ON(crypto_aead_ivsize(con->v2.gcm_tfm) != CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN); ret =crypto_aead_setauthsize(con->v2.gcm_tfm, CEPH_GCM_TAG_LEN); if (ret) {net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +0
-0@@ -777,8 +775,11 @@ static int setup_crypto(struct ceph_connection *con, aead_request_set_callback(con->v2.gcm_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG, crypto_req_done, &con->v2.gcm_wait);net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +5
-2-memcpy (&con->v2.in_gcm_nonce, p,CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN ); -memcpy (&con->v2.out_gcm_nonce, p +CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN ,CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN ); +memcpy (&con->v2.in_gcm_nonce, con_secret +CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN , +CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN ); +memcpy (&con->v2.out_gcm_nonce, + con_secret +CEPH_GCM_KEY_LEN +CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN , +CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN );return 0; /*
auth_x, secure mode */
}net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +1
-1@@ -800,7 +801,7 @@ static int hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con, const struct kvec *kvecs, desc->tfm = con->v2.hmac_tfm; ret = crypto_shash_init(desc); if (ret) -return ret; + goto out;for (i = 0; i <
kvec_cnt; i++) { WARN_ON((unsigned long)kvecs[i].iov_base &net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +1
-1@@ -808,15 +809,14 @@ static int hmac_sha256(struct ceph_connection *con, const struct kvec *kvecs, ret = crypto_shash_update(desc, kvecs[i].iov_base, kvecs[i].iov_len); if (ret) -return ret; + goto out; }ret =
crypto_shash_final(desc, hmac);net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +0
-2-if (ret) -return ret;+out:
shash_desc_zero(desc);net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +1
-1-return 0 ;/* auth_x, both plain and secure modes */ +return ret;/* auth_x, both plain and secure modes */ }
static void
gcm_inc_nonce(struct ceph_gcm_nonce *nonce)net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +2
-1@@ -2072,27 +2072,32 @@ static int process_auth_done(struct ceph_connection *con, void *p, void *end) if (con->state != CEPH_CON_S_V2_AUTH) { dout("%s con %p state changed to %d\n", __func__, con, con->state); -return -EAGAIN ; + ret = -EAGAIN ; + goto out; }
dout("%s con %p handle_auth_done ret %d\n", __func__, con, ret); if (ret)net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +1
-1-return ret; + goto out;ret =
setup_crypto(con, session_key, session_key_len, con_secret, con_secret_len);
if (ret)net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +1
-1-return ret; + goto out;
reset_out_kvecs(con);
ret =prepare_auth_signature(con);
if (ret) {
pr_err("prepare_auth_signature failed: %d\n", ret);net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +1
-1-return ret; + goto out;}
con->state=CEPH_CON_S_V2_AUTH_SIGNATURE;net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +5
-1-return 0 ; + +out: +memzero_explicit (session_key_buf,sizeof (session_key_buf)); +memzero_explicit (con_secret_buf,sizeof (con_secret_buf)); +return ret;bad:
pr_err("failed to decode auth_done\n");net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +0
-0@@ -3436,6 +3441,8 @@ void ceph_con_v2_reset_protocol(struct ceph_connection *con) }
con->v2.con_mode=CEPH_CON_MODE_UNKNOWN;net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +2
-0+memzero_explicit (&con->v2.in_gcm_nonce,CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN ); +memzero_explicit (&con->v2.out_gcm_nonce,CEPH_GCM_IV_LEN );
Quoted 2 lines
if (
con->v2.hmac_tfm) {crypto_free_shash(con->v2.hmac_tfm);
Looks like a reasonable thing to do: