Support eliding map lookup nullness
Subsystems (4)
v2 cover Support eliding map lookup nullness
This patch allows progs to elide a null check on statically known map lookup keys. In other words, if the verifier can statically prove that the lookup will be in-bounds, allow the prog to drop the null check.
This is useful for two reasons:
1. Large numbers of nullness checks (especially when they cannot fail) unnecessarily pushes prog towards BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ.
2. It forms a tighter contract between programmer and verifier.
For (1), bpftrace is starting to make heavier use of percpu scratch maps. As a result, for user scripts with large number of unrolled loops, we are starting to hit jump complexity verification errors. These percpu lookups cannot fail anyways, as we only use static key values. Eliding nullness probably results in less work for verifier as well.
For (2), percpu scratch maps are often used as a larger stack, as the currrent stack is limited to 512 bytes. In these situations, it is desirable for the programmer to express: "this lookup should never fail, and if it does, it means I messed up the code". By omitting the null check, the programmer can "ask" the verifier to double check the logic.
Changes from v1:
* Added a check for when R2 is not a ptr to stack
* Added a check for when stack is uninitialized (no stack slot yet)
* Fix spinlock reg id bumping
* Updated existing tests to account for null elision
* Added test case for when R2 can be both const and non-const
Daniel Xu (2):
bpf: verifier: Support eliding map lookup nullness
bpf: selftests: verifier: Add nullness elision tests
kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 64 ++++++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 14 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../bpf/progs/verifier_array_access.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_kptr.c | 2 +- 6 files changed, 239 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0
PATCH v2 1/2 bpf: verifier: Support eliding map lookup nullness
This commit allows progs to elide a null check on statically known map lookup keys. In other words, if the verifier can statically prove that the lookup will be in-bounds, allow the prog to drop the null check.
This is useful for two reasons:
1. Large numbers of nullness checks (especially when they cannot fail) unnecessarily pushes prog towards BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ.
2. It forms a tighter contract between programmer and verifier.
For (1), bpftrace is starting to make heavier use of percpu scratch maps. As a result, for user scripts with large number of unrolled loops, we are starting to hit jump complexity verification errors. These percpu lookups cannot fail anyways, as we only use static key values. Eliding nullness probably results in less work for verifier as well.
For (2), percpu scratch maps are often used as a larger stack, as the currrent stack is limited to 512 bytes. In these situations, it is desirable for the programmer to express: "this lookup should never fail, and if it does, it means I messed up the code". By omitting the null check, the programmer can "ask" the verifier to double check the logic.
--- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++- tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c | 14 ++-- .../selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c | 2 +- .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c | 2 +- .../testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_kptr.c | 2 +- 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +63 -1
@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ struct bpf_call_arg_meta {u32 ret_btf_id;u32 subprogno;struct btf_field *kptr_field; +long const_map_key; };struct bpf_kfunc_call_arg_meta {
@@ -10414,6 +10415,51 @@ static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno state->callback_subprogno == subprogno); } +/* Returns whether or not the given map type can potentially elide +* lookup return value nullness check. This is possible if the key +* is statically known. +*/ +static bool can_elide_value_nullness (enum bpf_map_type type) +{ +switch (type) { +case BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY : +case BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY : +return true; +default : +return false; + } +} + +/* Returns constant key value if possible, else -1 */ +static long get_constant_map_key (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +struct bpf_reg_state *key) +{ +struct bpf_func_state *state =func (env, key); +struct bpf_reg_state *reg; +int stack_off; +int slot; +int spi; + +if (key->type !=PTR_TO_STACK ) +return -1 ; +if (!tnum_is_const (key->var_off)) +return -1 ; + + stack_off = key->off + key->var_off.value; + slot = -stack_off -1 ; +if (slot >= state->allocated_stack) +/* Stack uninitialized */ +return -1 ; + + spi = slot /BPF_REG_SIZE ; + reg = &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; +if (!tnum_is_const (reg->var_off)) +/* Stack value not statically known */ +return -1 ; + +return reg->var_off.value; +} +static int get_helper_proto (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int func_id,const struct bpf_func_proto **ptr) {
@@ -10511,6 +10557,15 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].storage_get_func_atomic = true; } +/* Logically we are trying to check on key register state before +* the helper is called, so process here. Otherwise argument processing +* may clobber the spilled key values. +*/ + regs =cur_regs (env); +if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) + meta.const_map_key =get_constant_map_key (env, ®s[BPF_REG_2 ]); + + meta.func_id = func_id;/* check args */ for (i =0 ; i <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ; i++) {
@@ -10771,10 +10826,17 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn "kernel subsystem misconfigured verifier\n");return -EINVAL ; } + +if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem && +can_elide_value_nullness (meta.map_ptr->map_type) && + meta.const_map_key >=0 && + meta.const_map_key < meta.map_ptr->max_entries) + ret_flag &= ~PTR_MAYBE_NULL ; + regs[BPF_REG_0 ].map_ptr = meta.map_ptr; regs[BPF_REG_0 ].map_uid = meta.map_uid; regs[BPF_REG_0 ].type =PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE | ret_flag; -if (!type_may_be_null (ret_type) && +if (!type_may_be_null (regs[BPF_REG_0 ].type) &&btf_record_has_field (meta.map_ptr->record,BPF_SPIN_LOCK )) { regs[BPF_REG_0 ].id = ++env->id_gen; }
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c +7 -7
@@ -524,11 +524,11 @@ int iter_subprog_iters(const void *ctx) }struct { - __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY); + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH); __type(key, int); __type(value, int); __uint(max_entries, 1000); -} arr_map SEC(".maps"); +} hash_map SEC(".maps"); SEC("?raw_tp") __failure __msg("invalid mem access 'scalar'")
@@ -539,7 +539,7 @@ int iter_err_too_permissive1(const void *ctx)MY_PID_GUARD (); - map_val =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&arr_map, &key); + map_val =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&hash_map, &key);if (!map_val)return 0 ;
@@ -561,12 +561,12 @@ int iter_err_too_permissive2(const void *ctx)MY_PID_GUARD (); - map_val =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&arr_map, &key); + map_val =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&hash_map, &key);if (!map_val)return 0 ; bpf_repeat(1000000) { - map_val =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&arr_map, &key); + map_val =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&hash_map, &key); } *map_val =123 ;
@@ -585,7 +585,7 @@ int iter_err_too_permissive3(const void *ctx)MY_PID_GUARD (); bpf_repeat(1000000) { - map_val =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&arr_map, &key); + map_val =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&hash_map, &key); found = true; }
@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ int iter_tricky_but_fine(const void *ctx)MY_PID_GUARD (); bpf_repeat(1000000) { - map_val =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&arr_map, &key); + map_val =bpf_map_lookup_elem (&hash_map, &key);if (map_val) { found = true;break ;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/map_kptr_fail.c +1 -1
@@ -345,7 +345,7 @@ int reject_indirect_global_func_access(struct __sk_buff *ctx) } SEC("?tc") -__failure __msg("Unreleased reference id=5 alloc_insn=") +__failure __msg("Unreleased reference id=4 alloc_insn=") int kptr_xchg_ref_state(struct __sk_buff *ctx) {struct prog_test_ref_kfunc *p;
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_map_in_map.c +1 -1
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ l0_%=: r0 = 0; \ SEC("xdp") __description("map in map state pruning") -__success __msg("processed 26 insns") +__success __msg("processed 15 insns") __log_level(2) __retval(0) __flag(BPF_F_TEST_STATE_FREQ) __naked void map_in_map_state_pruning(void) {
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_kptr.c +1 -1
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ .prog_type = BPF_PROG_TYPE_SCHED_CLS, .fixup_map_kptr = { 1 }, .result = REJECT, - .errstr = "Unreleased reference id=5 alloc_insn=20", + .errstr = "Unreleased reference id=4 alloc_insn=20", .fixup_kfunc_btf_id = { { "bpf_kfunc_call_test_acquire", 15 }, }
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0
Eduard Zingerman
maintainerRe: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/2] bpf: verifier: Support eliding map lookup nullness
Quoted 16 lines · Daniel Xu
This commit allows progs to elide a null check on statically known map lookup keys. In other words, if the verifier can statically prove that the lookup will be in-bounds, allow the prog to drop the null check.
This is useful for two reasons:
1. Large numbers of nullness checks (especially when they cannot fail) unnecessarily pushes prog towards
BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ.
2. It forms a tighter contract between programmer and verifier.For (1), bpftrace is starting to make heavier use of percpu scratch maps. As a result, for user scripts with large number of unrolled loops, we are starting to hit jump complexity verification errors. These percpu lookups cannot fail anyways, as we only use static key values. Eliding nullness probably results in less work for verifier as well.
Quoted 5 lines
For (2), percpu scratch maps are often used as a larger stack, as the currrent stack is limited to 512 bytes. In these situations, it is desirable for the programmer to express: "this lookup should never fail, and if it does, it means I messed up the code". By omitting the null check, the programmer can "ask" the verifier to double check the logic.
Nit: maybe add a few lines why tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c
has to be changed.
[...]
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10
-0+/* Returns constant key value if possible, else -1 */ +static long get_constant_map_key (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +struct bpf_reg_state *key) +{ +struct bpf_func_state *state =func (env, key); +struct bpf_reg_state *reg; +int stack_off; +int slot; +int spi; +
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno · line 10452
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10
-0+if (key->type !=PTR_TO_STACK ) +return -1 ; +if (!tnum_is_const (key->var_off)) +return -1 ; + + stack_off = key->off + key->var_off.value; + slot = -stack_off -1 ; +if (slot >= state->allocated_stack) +/* Stack uninitialized */ +return -1 ;
I'm not sure verifier guarantees that key->off is negative. E.g. the following simple program:
0: (b7) r1 = 16 ; R1_w=16
1: (bf) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0
2: (0f) r2 += r1
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 2 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 1: (bf) r2 = r10
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 0: (b7) r1 = 16
3: R1_w=16 R2_w=fp16=> I think 'slot' should be checked to be >= 0.
Quoted 14 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10
-0+ + spi = slot /BPF_REG_SIZE ; + reg = &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; +if (!tnum_is_const (reg->var_off)) +/* Stack value not statically known */ +return -1 ; + +return reg->var_off.value; +} +static int get_helper_proto (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int func_id,const struct bpf_func_proto **ptr) {
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn · line 10566
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7
-0@@ -10511,6 +10557,15 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].storage_get_func_atomic = true; } +/* Logically we are trying to check on key register state before +* the helper is called, so process here. Otherwise argument processing +* may clobber the spilled key values. +*/ + regs =cur_regs (env); +if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) + meta.const_map_key =get_constant_map_key (env, ®s[BPF_REG_2 ]);
Nit: there is a long 'switch (func_id)' slightly below this point,
maybe move this check there?
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +2
-0+ + meta.func_id = func_id;/* check args */ for (i =0 ; i <MAX_BPF_FUNC_REG_ARGS ; i++) {
[...]
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/2] bpf: verifier: Support eliding map lookup nullness
Quoted 17 lines · Eduard Zingerman
Quoted 16 lines · Daniel Xu
This commit allows progs to elide a null check on statically known map lookup keys. In other words, if the verifier can statically prove that the lookup will be in-bounds, allow the prog to drop the null check.
This is useful for two reasons:
1. Large numbers of nullness checks (especially when they cannot fail) unnecessarily pushes prog towards
BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_JMP_SEQ.
2. It forms a tighter contract between programmer and verifier.For (1), bpftrace is starting to make heavier use of percpu scratch maps. As a result, for user scripts with large number of unrolled loops, we are starting to hit jump complexity verification errors. These percpu lookups cannot fail anyways, as we only use static key values. Eliding nullness probably results in less work for verifier as well.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
For (2), percpu scratch maps are often used as a larger stack, as the currrent stack is limited to 512 bytes. In these situations, it is desirable for the programmer to express: "this lookup should never fail, and if it does, it means I messed up the code". By omitting the null check, the programmer can "ask" the verifier to double check the logic.
Nit: maybe add a few lines why
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/iters.c
has to be changed.
Ack.
Quoted 35 lines
[...]
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10
-0+/* Returns constant key value if possible, else -1 */ +static long get_constant_map_key (struct bpf_verifier_env *env, +struct bpf_reg_state *key) +{ +struct bpf_func_state *state =func (env, key); +struct bpf_reg_state *reg; +int stack_off; +int slot; +int spi; +kernel/bpf/verifier.c static void update_loop_inline_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 subprogno · line 10452
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10
-0+if (key->type !=PTR_TO_STACK ) +return -1 ; +if (!tnum_is_const (key->var_off)) +return -1 ; + + stack_off = key->off + key->var_off.value; + slot = -stack_off -1 ; +if (slot >= state->allocated_stack) +/* Stack uninitialized */ +return -1 ;I'm not sure verifier guarantees that
key->offis negative. E.g. the following simple program:0: (b7) r1 = 16 ; R1_w=16 1: (bf) r2 = r10 ; R2_w=fp0 R10=fp0 2: (0f) r2 += r1 mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 2 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1 mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 1: (bf) r2 = r10 mark_precise: frame0: regs=r1 stack= before 0: (b7) r1 = 16 3: R1_w=16 R2_w=fp16
Quoted 1 line
=> I think 'slot' should be checked to be >= 0.
Ah, so in case stack grows "up" right? Which seems invalid but probably good to check.
Quoted 18 lines
Quoted 18 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10
-0+ + spi = slot /BPF_REG_SIZE ; + reg = &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr; +if (!tnum_is_const (reg->var_off)) +/* Stack value not statically known */ +return -1 ; + +return reg->var_off.value; +} +static int get_helper_proto (struct bpf_verifier_env *env,int func_id,const struct bpf_func_proto **ptr) {@@ -10511,6 +10557,15 @@ static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].storage_get_func_atomic = true; }
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn · line 10566
Quoted 7 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +7
-0+/* Logically we are trying to check on key register state before +* the helper is called, so process here. Otherwise argument processing +* may clobber the spilled key values. +*/ + regs =cur_regs (env); +if (func_id == BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem) + meta.const_map_key =get_constant_map_key (env, ®s[BPF_REG_2 ]);Nit: there is a long 'switch (
func_id)' slightly below this point,
maybe move this check there?
I had that initially but discovered that verifier marks the stack value as unknown as part of check_func_arg(). I _think_ it was:
if (is_spilled_reg(&state->stack[spi]) &&
(state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE ||
env->allow_ptr_leaks)) {
if (clobber) {
__mark_reg_unknown(env, &state->stack[spi].spilled_ptr);
for (j = 0; j < BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)
scrub_spilled_slot(&state->stack[spi].slot_type[j]);
}
goto mark;
}I remember spending some time debugging it. Which is why I left that comment above this code.
Thanks for reviewing!
PATCH v2 2/2 bpf: selftests: verifier: Add nullness elision tests
In reply to Daniel XuTest that nullness elision works for common use cases. For example, we want to check that both full and subreg stack slots are recognized. As well as when there's both const and non-const values of R2 leading up to a lookup. And obviously some bound checks.
--- .../bpf/progs/verifier_array_access.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 166 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_array_access.c +166 -0
@@ -28,6 +28,20 @@ struct {__uint (map_flags,BPF_F_WRONLY_PROG ); } map_array_wo SEC(".maps"); +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_PERCPU_ARRAY); + __uint(max_entries, 2); + __type(key, int); + __type(value, struct test_val); +} map_array_pcpu SEC(".maps"); + +struct { + __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY); + __uint(max_entries, 2); + __type(key, int); + __type(value, struct test_val); +} map_array SEC(".maps"); +struct { __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH); __uint(max_entries, 1);
@@ -526,4 +540,156 @@ l0_%=: exit; \ : __clobber_all); } +SEC("socket") +__description("valid map access into an array using constant without nullness") +__success __retval(4) +__naked void an_array_with_a_constant_no_nullness(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r1 = 1; \ +*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \ +r2 = r10; \ +r2 += -8; \ +r1 = %[map_array] ll; \ +call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ +r1 = %[test_val_foo]; \ +*(u64*)(r0 + 0) = r1; \ +r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ +exit; \ +" : + : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), +__imm_addr (map_array), +__imm_const (test_val_foo, offsetof(struct test_val , foo)) + : __clobber_all); +} + +SEC("socket") +__description("valid multiple map access into an array using constant without nullness") +__success __retval(8) +__naked void multiple_array_with_a_constant_no_nullness(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r1 = 1; \ +*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \ +r2 = r10; \ +r2 += -8; \ +r1 = %[map_array] ll; \ +call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ +r6 = %[test_val_foo]; \ +*(u64*)(r0 + 0) = r6; \ +r7 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ +r1 = 0; \ +*(u64*)(r10 - 16) = r1; \ +r2 = r10; \ +r2 += -16; \ +r1 = %[map_array] ll; \ +call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ +*(u64*)(r0 + 0) = r6; \ +r1 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ +r7 += r1; \ +r0 = r7; \ +exit; \ +" : + : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), +__imm_addr (map_array), +__imm_const (test_val_foo, offsetof(struct test_val , foo)) + : __clobber_all); +} + +SEC("socket") +__description("valid map access into an array using 32-bit constant without nullness") +__success __retval(4) +__naked void an_array_with_a_32bit_constant_no_nullness(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r1 = 1; \ +*(u32*)(r10 - 4) = r1; \ +r2 = r10; \ +r2 += -4; \ +r1 = %[map_array] ll; \ +call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ +r1 = %[test_val_foo]; \ +*(u64*)(r0 + 0) = r1; \ +r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ +exit; \ +" : + : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), +__imm_addr (map_array), +__imm_const (test_val_foo, offsetof(struct test_val , foo)) + : __clobber_all); +} + +SEC("socket") +__description("valid map access into a pcpu array using constant without nullness") +__success __retval(4) +__naked void a_pcpu_array_with_a_constant_no_nullness(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r1 = 1; \ +*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \ +r2 = r10; \ +r2 += -8; \ +r1 = %[map_array_pcpu] ll; \ +call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ +r1 = %[test_val_foo]; \ +*(u64*)(r0 + 0) = r1; \ +r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ +exit; \ +" : + : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), +__imm_addr (map_array_pcpu), +__imm_const (test_val_foo, offsetof(struct test_val , foo)) + : __clobber_all); +} + +SEC("socket") +__description("invalid map access into an array using constant without nullness") +__failure __msg("R0 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'") +__naked void an_array_with_a_constant_no_nullness_out_of_bounds(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +r1 = 3; \ +*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \ +r2 = r10; \ +r2 += -8; \ +r1 = %[map_array] ll; \ +call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ +r1 = %[test_val_foo]; \ +*(u64*)(r0 + 0) = r1; \ +r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ +exit; \ +" : + : __imm(bpf_map_lookup_elem), +__imm_addr (map_array), +__imm_const (test_val_foo, offsetof(struct test_val , foo)) + : __clobber_all); +} + +SEC("socket") +__description("invalid elided lookup using const and non-const key") +__failure __msg("R0 invalid mem access 'map_value_or_null'") +__naked void mixed_const_and_non_const_key_lookup(void) +{ + asmvolatile (" \ +call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32]; \ +if r0 > 42 goto l1_%=; \ +*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r0; \ +r2 = r10; \ +r2 += -8; \ +goto l0_%=; \ +l1_%=: r1 = 1; \ +*(u64*)(r10 - 8) = r1; \ +r2 = r10; \ +r2 += -8; \ +l0_%=: r1 = %[map_array] ll; \ +call %[bpf_map_lookup_elem]; \ +r0 = *(u64*)(r0 + 0); \ +exit; \ +" : + : __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32), +__imm (bpf_map_lookup_elem), +__imm_addr (map_array) + : __clobber_all); +} + char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
Signature · 1 line
2.46.0
Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 2/2] bpf: selftests: verifier: Add nullness elision tests
Quoted 7 lines · Daniel Xu
Test that nullness elision works for common use cases. For example, we want to check that both full and subreg stack slots are recognized. As well as when there's both const and non-const values of R2 leading up to a lookup. And obviously some bound checks.
Signed-off-by Daniel Xu <[email protected]>---
[...]