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Enable root to update the blacklist keyring

PATCH Superseded Mickaël Salaün 3 participants 33 messages Jan 14, 2021 – Jan 21, 2021

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#0 lore raw

v3 cover Enable root to update the blacklist keyring

This third patch series includes back three fix patches taken from the first series (and cherry-picked from David Howells's tree [1]), and one cosmetic fix from Alex Shi which helps avoid future conflicts. I also added some Acked-by and improved comments. As requested, this series is based on v5.11-rc3.

The goal of these patches is to add a new configuration option to enable the root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring. This keyring is useful to "untrust" certificates or files. Enabling to safely update this keyring without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-fixes

Previous patch series:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

Regards,

Alex Shi (1):
certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue

David Howells (1):
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion

Mickaël Salaün (8):
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check PKCS#7: Fix missing include
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist
keyring
tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh

 MAINTAINERS                                   |   2 +
 certs/.gitignore                              |   1 +
 certs/Kconfig                                 |  10 +
 certs/Makefile                                |  15 +-
 certs/blacklist.c                             | 217 ++++++++++++++----
 certs/system_keyring.c                        |   5 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c      |   3 +-
 include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  14 +-
 include/linux/key.h                           |   1 +
 include/linux/verification.h                  |   2 +
 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk            |  37 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c              |   4 +-
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  26 +--
 security/keys/key.c                           |   2 +
 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh            |  91 ++++++++
 15 files changed, 345 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)
 create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
 create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh

base-commit: 7c53f6b671f4aba70ff15e1b05148b10d58c2837

Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH v3 1/10 certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue

From: Alex Shi <[email protected]>

certs/blacklist.c:84: warning: Function parameter or member 'hash' not described in 'mark_hash_blacklisted'

---

Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to avoid future merge conflicts.
* Rearrange Signed-off-by and Reviewed-by order.

---
 certs/blacklist.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
certs/blacklist.c +1 -1
index 6514f9ebc943..2719fb2fbc1c 100644
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = {
 
 /**
  * mark_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
- * @hash - The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783")
+ * @hash: The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783")
  */
 int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
maintainer Reviewed-by on v3 1/10
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 01/10] certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue

Quoted 5 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Alex Shi <[email protected]>

certs/blacklist.c:84: warning: Function parameter or member 'hash' not described in 'mark_hash_blacklisted'

Quoted 7 lines

/Jarkko

#3 lore raw

PATCH v3 2/10 certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

When looking for a blacklisted hash, bin2hex() is used to transform a binary hash to an ascii (lowercase) hexadecimal string. This string is then search for in the description of the keys from the blacklist keyring. When adding a key to the blacklist keyring, blacklist_vet_description() checks the hash prefix and the hexadecimal string, but not that this string is lowercase. It is then valid to set hashes with uppercase hexadecimal, which will be silently ignored by the kernel.

Add an additional check to blacklist_vet_description() to check that hexadecimal strings are in lowercase.

---

Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3.
* Rearrange Cc order.

---
 certs/blacklist.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
certs/blacklist.c +1 -1
index 2719fb2fbc1c..a888b934a1cd 100644
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
 found_colon:
 	desc++;
 	for (; *desc; desc++) {
-		if (!isxdigit(*desc))
+		if (!isxdigit(*desc) || isupper(*desc))
 			return -EINVAL;
 		n++;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
maintainer
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 02/10] certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check

Quoted 45 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

When looking for a blacklisted hash, bin2hex() is used to transform a binary hash to an ascii (lowercase) hexadecimal string. This string is then search for in the description of the keys from the blacklist keyring. When adding a key to the blacklist keyring, blacklist_vet_description() checks the hash prefix and the hexadecimal string, but not that this string is lowercase. It is then valid to set hashes with uppercase hexadecimal, which will be silently ignored by the kernel.

Add an additional check to blacklist_vet_description() to check that hexadecimal strings are in lowercase.

---

Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3.
* Rearrange Cc order.

---
 certs/blacklist.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
certs/blacklist.c +1 -1
index 2719fb2fbc1c..a888b934a1cd 100644
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
 found_colon:
 	desc++;
 	for (; *desc; desc++) {
-		if (!isxdigit(*desc))
+		if (!isxdigit(*desc) || isupper(*desc))
 			return -EINVAL;
 		n++;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0

Shouldn't this rather convert the upper case to lower case? I don't like the ABI break that this causes.

/Jarkko

#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 02/10] certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check

Quoted 41 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 40 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

When looking for a blacklisted hash, bin2hex() is used to transform a binary hash to an ascii (lowercase) hexadecimal string. This string is then search for in the description of the keys from the blacklist keyring. When adding a key to the blacklist keyring, blacklist_vet_description() checks the hash prefix and the hexadecimal string, but not that this string is lowercase. It is then valid to set hashes with uppercase hexadecimal, which will be silently ignored by the kernel.

Add an additional check to blacklist_vet_description() to check that hexadecimal strings are in lowercase.

---

Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3.
* Rearrange Cc order.

---
 certs/blacklist.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
certs/blacklist.c +1 -1
index 2719fb2fbc1c..a888b934a1cd 100644
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
 found_colon:
 	desc++;
 	for (; *desc; desc++) {
-		if (!isxdigit(*desc))
+		if (!isxdigit(*desc) || isupper(*desc))
 			return -EINVAL;
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
certs/blacklist.c +0 -0
 		n++;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0

Shouldn't this rather convert the upper case to lower case? I don't like the ABI break that this causes.

It doesn't break the ABI because keys loaded in the blacklist keyring can only happen with builtin hashes. Moreover these builtin hashes will be checked by patch 10/10 at build time.

This patch is also important to remove a false sense of security and warns about mis-blacklisted certificates or binaries:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

Hot-patching keys doesn't seem a good idea, especially when these keys are signed. Moreover, it would bring additional complexity and will require to change the core of the key management.

Quoted 3 lines

/Jarkko

maintainer
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 02/10] certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check

Quoted 52 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 41 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 40 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

When looking for a blacklisted hash, bin2hex() is used to transform a binary hash to an ascii (lowercase) hexadecimal string. This string is then search for in the description of the keys from the blacklist keyring. When adding a key to the blacklist keyring, blacklist_vet_description() checks the hash prefix and the hexadecimal string, but not that this string is lowercase. It is then valid to set hashes with uppercase hexadecimal, which will be silently ignored by the kernel.

Add an additional check to blacklist_vet_description() to check that hexadecimal strings are in lowercase.

---

Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3.
* Rearrange Cc order.

---
 certs/blacklist.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
certs/blacklist.c +1 -1
index 2719fb2fbc1c..a888b934a1cd 100644
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
 found_colon:
 	desc++;
 	for (; *desc; desc++) {
-		if (!isxdigit(*desc))
+		if (!isxdigit(*desc) || isupper(*desc))
 			return -EINVAL;
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
certs/blacklist.c +0 -0
 		n++;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0

Shouldn't this rather convert the upper case to lower case? I don't like the ABI break that this causes.

Quoted 3 lines

It doesn't break the ABI because keys loaded in the blacklist keyring can only happen with builtin hashes. Moreover these builtin hashes will be checked by patch 10/10 at build time.

Right the patches are just out of order then.

/Jarkko

Quoted 13 lines

This patch is also important to remove a false sense of security and warns about mis-blacklisted certificates or binaries:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

Hot-patching keys doesn't seem a good idea, especially when these keys are signed. Moreover, it would bring additional complexity and will require to change the core of the key management.

Quoted 3 lines

/Jarkko

#7 lore raw

PATCH v3 3/10 PKCS#7: Fix missing include

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add missing linux/types.h for size_t.

[DH: Changed from stddef.h]

---

Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3.

---
 include/linux/verification.h | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
include/linux/verification.h +2 -0
index 911ab7c2b1ab..a655923335ae 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H
 #define _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H
 
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
 /*
  * Indicate that both builtin trusted keys and secondary trusted keys
  * should be used.
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
maintainer Reviewed-by on v3 3/10
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 03/10] PKCS#7: Fix missing include

Quoted 10 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add missing linux/types.h for size_t.

[DH: Changed from stddef.h]

---

/Jarkko

Quoted 25 lines

Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3.

---
 include/linux/verification.h | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
include/linux/verification.h +2 -0
index 911ab7c2b1ab..a655923335ae 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@
 #ifndef _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H
 #define _LINUX_VERIFICATION_H
 
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
 /*
  * Indicate that both builtin trusted keys and secondary trusted keys
  * should be used.
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
#9 lore raw

PATCH v3 4/10 certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(), as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update() uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash from it.

Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass this to keyring_alloc().

We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag manually.

Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.

Fixes 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
[[email protected]: fix ima_mok_init()]

---

Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick rewritten v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3 and fix ima_mok_init().

---
 certs/blacklist.c                | 2 +-
 include/linux/key.h              | 1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 4 +---
 security/keys/key.c              | 2 ++
 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +1 -1
index a888b934a1cd..029471947838 100644
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)
 			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
 			      KEY_USR_SEARCH,
 			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
-			      KEY_FLAG_KEEP,
+			      KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
 			      NULL, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(blacklist_keyring))
 		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
include/linux/key.h +1 -0
index 0f2e24f13c2b..eed3ce139a32 100644
@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
 #define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN		0x0004	/* Key is built into kernel */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION	0x0008	/* Override the check on restricted keyrings */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING		0x0010	/* allocating a user or user session keyring */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP		0x0020	/* Set the KEEP flag on the key/keyring */
 
 extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
 extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c +1 -3
index 36cadadbfba4..5594dd38ab04 100644
@@ -38,13 +38,11 @@ __init int ima_mok_init(void)
 				(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
 				KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
 				KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
-				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
 				restriction, NULL);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring))
 		panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist keyring.");
-
-	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags);
 	return 0;
 }
 device_initcall(ima_mok_init);
security/keys/key.c +2 -0
index ebe752b137aa..c45afdd1dfbb 100644
@@ -303,6 +303,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
 	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING)
 		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING;
+	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP)
+		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_KEEP;
 
 #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
 	key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
maintainer Acked-by on v3 4/10
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 04/10] certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion

Quoted 7 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(), as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update() uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.

Quoted 7 lines

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash from it.

Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass this to keyring_alloc().

OK, so thing work by luck now, but given the new patches which allow to append new keys they would break, right?

Quoted 2 lines

We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag manually.

What does ima_mok_init() do?

Quoted 6 lines

Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.

Fixes 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>

Nit: Cc

Quoted 78 lines

---

Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick rewritten v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3 and fix ima_mok_init().

---
 certs/blacklist.c                | 2 +-
 include/linux/key.h              | 1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 4 +---
 security/keys/key.c              | 2 ++
 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +1 -1
index a888b934a1cd..029471947838 100644
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)
 			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
 			      KEY_USR_SEARCH,
 			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
-			      KEY_FLAG_KEEP,
+			      KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
 			      NULL, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(blacklist_keyring))
 		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
include/linux/key.h +1 -0
index 0f2e24f13c2b..eed3ce139a32 100644
@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
 #define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN		0x0004	/* Key is built into kernel */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION	0x0008	/* Override the check on restricted keyrings */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING		0x0010	/* allocating a user or user session keyring */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP		0x0020	/* Set the KEEP flag on the key/keyring */
 
 extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
 extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c +1 -3
index 36cadadbfba4..5594dd38ab04 100644
@@ -38,13 +38,11 @@ __init int ima_mok_init(void)
 				(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
 				KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
 				KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
-				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
 				restriction, NULL);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring))
 		panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist keyring.");
-
-	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags);
 	return 0;
 }
 device_initcall(ima_mok_init);
security/keys/key.c +2 -0
index ebe752b137aa..c45afdd1dfbb 100644
@@ -303,6 +303,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
 	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING)
 		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING;
+	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP)
+		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_KEEP;
 
 #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
 	key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0

/Jarkko

#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 04/10] certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion

Quoted 12 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 11 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(), as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update() uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash from it.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass this to keyring_alloc().

OK, so thing work by luck now, but given the new patches which allow to append new keys they would break, right?

Without this fix, patch 9/10 would allow to remove and modify keys from the blacklist keyring.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag manually.

What does ima_mok_init() do?

This was initially an addition from David Howells, I only fixed the argument bit-ORing. ima_mok_init() allocates a blacklist keyring (with different properties) dedicated to IMA.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Note that this doesn't fix an observable bug with the current implementation but it is required to allow addition of new hashes to the blacklist in the future without making it possible for them to be removed.

Fixes 734114f8782f ("KEYS: Add a system blacklist keyring")
cc Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>

Nit: Cc

OK

Quoted 84 lines
Quoted 79 lines

---

Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick rewritten v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3 and fix ima_mok_init().

---
 certs/blacklist.c                | 2 +-
 include/linux/key.h              | 1 +
 security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c | 4 +---
 security/keys/key.c              | 2 ++
 4 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +1 -1
index a888b934a1cd..029471947838 100644
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)
 			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
 			      KEY_USR_SEARCH,
 			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA |
-			      KEY_FLAG_KEEP,
+			      KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
 			      NULL, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(blacklist_keyring))
 		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
include/linux/key.h +1 -0
index 0f2e24f13c2b..eed3ce139a32 100644
@@ -289,6 +289,7 @@ extern struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type,
 #define KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN		0x0004	/* Key is built into kernel */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION	0x0008	/* Override the check on restricted keyrings */
 #define KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING		0x0010	/* allocating a user or user session keyring */
+#define KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP		0x0020	/* Set the KEEP flag on the key/keyring */
 
 extern void key_revoke(struct key *key);
 extern void key_invalidate(struct key *key);
security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c +1 -3
index 36cadadbfba4..5594dd38ab04 100644
@@ -38,13 +38,11 @@ __init int ima_mok_init(void)
 				(KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
 				KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
 				KEY_USR_WRITE | KEY_USR_SEARCH,
-				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
+				KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA | KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP,
 				restriction, NULL);
 
 	if (IS_ERR(ima_blacklist_keyring))
 		panic("Can't allocate IMA blacklist keyring.");
-
-	set_bit(KEY_FLAG_KEEP, &ima_blacklist_keyring->flags);
 	return 0;
 }
 device_initcall(ima_mok_init);
security/keys/key.c +2 -0
index ebe752b137aa..c45afdd1dfbb 100644
@@ -303,6 +303,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc,
 		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN;
 	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING)
 		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING;
+	if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP)
+		key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_KEEP;
 
 #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING
 	key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC;
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0

/Jarkko

maintainer
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 04/10] certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion

Quoted 25 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 12 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 11 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: David Howells <[email protected]>

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is not meant to be passed to keyring_alloc() or key_alloc(), as these only take KEY_ALLOC_* flags. KEY_FLAG_KEEP has the same value as KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION, but fortunately only key_create_or_update() uses it. LSMs using the key_alloc hook don't check that flag.

KEY_FLAG_KEEP is then ignored but fortunately (again) the root user cannot write to the blacklist keyring, so it is not possible to remove a key/hash from it.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Fix this by adding a KEY_ALLOC_SET_KEEP flag that tells key_alloc() to set KEY_FLAG_KEEP on the new key. blacklist_init() can then, correctly, pass this to keyring_alloc().

OK, so thing work by luck now, but given the new patches which allow to append new keys they would break, right?

Without this fix, patch 9/10 would allow to remove and modify keys from the blacklist keyring.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines

We can also use this in ima_mok_init() rather than setting the flag manually.

What does ima_mok_init() do?

This was initially an addition from David Howells, I only fixed the argument bit-ORing. ima_mok_init() allocates a blacklist keyring (with different properties) dedicated to IMA.

Please add this to the commit message.

/Jarkko

#13 lore raw

PATCH v3 5/10 certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Align with the new macros and add appropriate include files.

---

Changes since v2:
* Cherry-pick v1 patch from
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
to rebase on v5.11-rc3.

---
 certs/blacklist.c      | 4 ++--
 certs/system_keyring.c | 5 +++--
 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +2 -2
index 029471947838..bffe4c6f4a9e 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/ctype.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/uidgid.h>
 #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include "blacklist.h"
 
@@ -156,8 +157,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)
 
 	blacklist_keyring =
 		keyring_alloc(".blacklist",
-			      KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0),
-			      current_cred(),
+			      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
 			      (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
 			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ |
 			      KEY_USR_SEARCH,
certs/system_keyring.c +3 -2
index 798291177186..4b693da488f1 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/cred.h>
 #include <linux/err.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/uidgid.h>
 #include <linux/verification.h>
 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
 #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
@@ -98,7 +99,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
 
 	builtin_trusted_keys =
 		keyring_alloc(".builtin_trusted_keys",
-			      KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
+			      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
 			      ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
 			      KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH),
 			      KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA,
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ static __init int system_trusted_keyring_init(void)
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 	secondary_trusted_keys =
 		keyring_alloc(".secondary_trusted_keys",
-			      KUIDT_INIT(0), KGIDT_INIT(0), current_cred(),
+			      GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, current_cred(),
 			      ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) |
 			       KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH |
 			       KEY_USR_WRITE),
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 05/10] certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID

Quoted 10 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 7 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Align with the new macros and add appropriate include files.

The commit message makes no sense. What you new macros?

What about "Use the new GLOBAL_ROOT_UID and GLOBAL_ROOT_GID definitions, and add appropriate include files."?

Quoted 3 lines

/Jarkko

maintainer
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 05/10] certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID

Quoted 7 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 5 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 4 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Align with the new macros and add appropriate include files.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines

The commit message makes no sense. What you new macros?

What about "Use the new GLOBAL_ROOT_UID and GLOBAL_ROOT_GID definitions, and add appropriate include files."?

They were added in 2011 so you could just remove "the new". Otherwise, WFM.

/Jarkko

#17 lore raw

PATCH v3 6/10 certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Before exposing this new key type to user space, make sure that only meaningful blacklisted hashes are accepted. This is also checked for builtin blacklisted hashes, but a following commit make sure that the user will notice (at built time) and will fix the configuration if it already included errors.

Check that a blacklist key description starts with a valid prefix and then a valid hexadecimal string.

---

Changes since v2:
* Fix typo in blacklist_vet_description() comment, spotted by Tyler Hicks.
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.

Changes since v1:
* Return ENOPKG (instead of EINVAL) when a hash is greater than the maximum currently known hash (suggested by David Howells).

---
 certs/blacklist.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +36 -10
index bffe4c6f4a9e..334ab7b964bc 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,16 @@
 #include <keys/system_keyring.h>
 #include "blacklist.h"
 
+/*
+ * According to crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c:x509_note_pkey_algo(),
+ * the size of the currently longest supported hash algorithm is 512 bits,
+ * which translates into 128 hex characters.
+ */
+#define MAX_HASH_LEN	128
+
+static const char tbs_prefix[] = "tbs";
+static const char bin_prefix[] = "bin";
+
 static struct key *blacklist_keyring;
 
 /*
@@ -26,24 +36,40 @@ static struct key *blacklist_keyring;
  */
 static int blacklist_vet_description(const char *desc)
 {
-	int n = 0;
-
-	if (*desc == ':')
-		return -EINVAL;
-	for (; *desc; desc++)
-		if (*desc == ':')
-			goto found_colon;
+	int i, prefix_len, tbs_step = 0, bin_step = 0;
+
+	/* The following algorithm only works if prefix lengths match. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(tbs_prefix) != sizeof(bin_prefix));
+	prefix_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
+	for (i = 0; *desc; desc++, i++) {
+		if (*desc == ':') {
+			if (tbs_step == prefix_len)
+				goto found_colon;
+			if (bin_step == prefix_len)
+				goto found_colon;
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		if (i >= prefix_len)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		if (*desc == tbs_prefix[i])
+			tbs_step++;
+		if (*desc == bin_prefix[i])
+			bin_step++;
+	}
 	return -EINVAL;
 
 found_colon:
 	desc++;
-	for (; *desc; desc++) {
+	for (i = 0; *desc && i < MAX_HASH_LEN; desc++, i++) {
 		if (!isxdigit(*desc) || isupper(*desc))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		n++;
 	}
+	if (*desc)
+		/* The hash is greater than MAX_HASH_LEN. */
+		return -ENOPKG;
 
-	if (n == 0 || n & 1)
+	/* Checks for an even number of hexadecimal characters. */
+	if (i == 0 || i & 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
 	return 0;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
maintainer
#18 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 06/10] certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict

Quoted 8 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Before exposing this new key type to user space, make sure that only meaningful blacklisted hashes are accepted. This is also checked for builtin blacklisted hashes, but a following commit make sure that the user will notice (at built time) and will fix the configuration if it already included errors.

Quoted 7 lines

Check that a blacklist key description starts with a valid prefix and then a valid hexadecimal string.

In this I'm not as worried about ABI, i.e. you don't have any reason supply any other data, which doesn't follow these ruels, whereas there could very well be a script that does format hex "incorrectly".

/Jarkko

#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 06/10] certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict

Quoted 12 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 11 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Before exposing this new key type to user space, make sure that only meaningful blacklisted hashes are accepted. This is also checked for builtin blacklisted hashes, but a following commit make sure that the user will notice (at built time) and will fix the configuration if it already included errors.

Check that a blacklist key description starts with a valid prefix and then a valid hexadecimal string.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

In this I'm not as worried about ABI, i.e. you don't have any reason supply any other data, which doesn't follow these ruels, whereas there could very well be a script that does format hex "incorrectly".

I think I answered this comment in patch 2/10: there is no ABI breakage, it only prepares for safe dynamic key addition. Patch 10/10 enables to avoid using incorrect/useless/mis-leading hashes and force users to fix these hashes (that were not taken into account)

Quoted 3 lines

/Jarkko

#20 lore raw

PATCH v3 7/10 certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Factor out the blacklist hash creation with the get_raw_hash() helper. This also centralize the "tbs" and "bin" prefixes and make them private, which help to manage them consistently.

Cc David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc David S. Miller <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>
Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v2:
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.

---
 certs/blacklist.c                             | 73 ++++++++++++++-----
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c      |  3 +-
 include/keys/system_keyring.h                 | 14 +++-
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          | 26 +------
 4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
certs/blacklist.c +55 -18
index 334ab7b964bc..1e63971bea94 100644
@@ -103,11 +103,43 @@ static struct key_type key_type_blacklist = {
 	.describe		= blacklist_describe,
 };
 
+static char *get_raw_hash(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
+{
+	size_t type_len;
+	const char *type_prefix;
+	char *buffer, *p;
+
+	switch (hash_type) {
+	case BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS:
+		type_len = sizeof(tbs_prefix) - 1;
+		type_prefix = tbs_prefix;
+		break;
+	case BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY:
+		type_len = sizeof(bin_prefix) - 1;
+		type_prefix = bin_prefix;
+		break;
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+	buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!buffer)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+	p = memcpy(buffer, type_prefix, type_len);
+	p += type_len;
+	*p++ = ':';
+	bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len);
+	p += hash_len * 2;
+	*p = '\0';
+	return buffer;
+}
+
 /**
- * mark_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
+ * mark_raw_hash_blacklisted - Add a hash to the system blacklist
  * @hash: The hash as a hex string with a type prefix (eg. "tbs:23aa429783")
  */
-int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
+static int mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
 {
 	key_ref_t key;
 
@@ -127,29 +159,33 @@ int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
+{
+	const char *buffer;
+
+	buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
+	if (IS_ERR(buffer))
+		return PTR_ERR(buffer);
+	kfree(buffer);
+	return 0;
+}
 /**
  * is_hash_blacklisted - Determine if a hash is blacklisted
  * @hash: The hash to be checked as a binary blob
  * @hash_len: The length of the binary hash
- * @type: Type of hash
+ * @hash_type: Type of hash
  */
-int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len, const char *type)
+int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+		enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
 {
 	key_ref_t kref;
-	size_t type_len = strlen(type);
-	char *buffer, *p;
+	const char *buffer;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	buffer = kmalloc(type_len + 1 + hash_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!buffer)
-		return -ENOMEM;
-	p = memcpy(buffer, type, type_len);
-	p += type_len;
-	*p++ = ':';
-	bin2hex(p, hash, hash_len);
-	p += hash_len * 2;
-	*p = 0;
-
+	buffer = get_raw_hash(hash, hash_len, hash_type);
+	if (IS_ERR(buffer))
+		return PTR_ERR(buffer);
 	kref = keyring_search(make_key_ref(blacklist_keyring, true),
 			      &key_type_blacklist, buffer, false);
 	if (!IS_ERR(kref)) {
@@ -164,7 +200,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(is_hash_blacklisted);
 
 int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len)
 {
-	if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, "bin") == -EKEYREJECTED)
+	if (is_hash_blacklisted(hash, hash_len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY) ==
+			-EKEYREJECTED)
 		return -EPERM;
 
 	return 0;
@@ -194,7 +231,7 @@ static int __init blacklist_init(void)
 		panic("Can't allocate system blacklist keyring\n");
 
 	for (bl = blacklist_hashes; *bl; bl++)
-		if (mark_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0)
+		if (mark_raw_hash_blacklisted(*bl) < 0)
 			pr_err("- blacklisting failed\n");
 	return 0;
 }
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +2 -1
index ae450eb8be14..3b7dba5e4cd9 100644
@@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ int x509_get_sig_params(struct x509_certificate *cert)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error_2;
 
-	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size, "tbs");
+	ret = is_hash_blacklisted(sig->digest, sig->digest_size,
+				  BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
 	if (ret == -EKEYREJECTED) {
 		pr_err("Cert %*phN is blacklisted\n",
 		       sig->digest_size, sig->digest);
include/keys/system_keyring.h +11 -3
index fb8b07daa9d1..b184d8743e23 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,13 @@
 
 #include <linux/key.h>
 
+enum blacklist_hash_type {
+	/* TBSCertificate hash */
+	BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS = 1,
+	/* Raw data hash */
+	BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY = 2,
+};
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 
 extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_trusted(struct key *keyring,
@@ -32,13 +39,14 @@ extern int restrict_link_by_builtin_and_secondary_trusted(
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
-extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const char *hash);
+extern int mark_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
+			       enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);
 extern int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
-			       const char *type);
+			       enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type);
 extern int is_binary_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len);
 #else
 static inline int is_hash_blacklisted(const u8 *hash, size_t hash_len,
-				      const char *type)
+				      enum blacklist_hash_type hash_type)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c +2 -24
index c5ba695c10e3..4a78fa1fde53 100644
@@ -15,35 +15,13 @@ static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =
 	EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID;
 static efi_guid_t efi_cert_sha256_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID;
 
-/*
- * Blacklist a hash.
- */
-static __init void uefi_blacklist_hash(const char *source, const void *data,
-				       size_t len, const char *type,
-				       size_t type_len)
-{
-	char *hash, *p;
-
-	hash = kmalloc(type_len + len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!hash)
-		return;
-	p = memcpy(hash, type, type_len);
-	p += type_len;
-	bin2hex(p, data, len);
-	p += len * 2;
-	*p = 0;
-
-	mark_hash_blacklisted(hash);
-	kfree(hash);
-}
-
 /*
  * Blacklist an X509 TBS hash.
  */
 static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
 					   const void *data, size_t len)
 {
-	uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "tbs:", 4);
+	mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_X509_TBS);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -52,7 +30,7 @@ static __init void uefi_blacklist_x509_tbs(const char *source,
 static __init void uefi_blacklist_binary(const char *source,
 					 const void *data, size_t len)
 {
-	uefi_blacklist_hash(source, data, len, "bin:", 4);
+	mark_hash_blacklisted(data, len, BLACKLIST_HASH_BINARY);
 }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
#21 lore raw

PATCH v3 8/10 certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the builtin blacklist hashes will be approved by the run time blacklist description checks. This is useful to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes which could have been loaded in the kernel (but ignored) are now noticed and deal with by the user.

---

Changes since v2:
* Add Jarkko's Acked-by.

Changes since v1:
* Prefix script path with $(scrtree)/ (suggested by David Howells).
* Fix hexadecimal number check.

---
 MAINTAINERS                        |  1 +
 certs/.gitignore                   |  1 +
 certs/Makefile                     | 15 +++++++++++-
 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
index cc1e6a5ee6e6..bda31ccbfad0 100644
@@ -4120,6 +4120,7 @@ L:	[email protected]
 S:	Maintained
 F:	Documentation/admin-guide/module-signing.rst
 F:	certs/
+F:	scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
 F:	scripts/extract-cert.c
 F:	scripts/sign-file.c
 
certs/.gitignore +1 -0
index 2a2483990686..42cc2ac24b93 100644
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+blacklist_hashes_checked
 x509_certificate_list
certs/Makefile +14 -1
index f4c25b67aad9..eb45407ff282 100644
@@ -6,7 +6,20 @@
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING) += system_keyring.o system_certificates.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist.o
 ifneq ($(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST),"")
+
+quiet_cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = CHECK   $(patsubst "%",%,$(2))
+      cmd_check_blacklist_hashes = $(AWK) -f $(srctree)/scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk $(2); touch $@
+
+$(eval $(call config_filename,SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST))
+
+$(obj)/blacklist_hashes.o: $(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked
+
+targets += blacklist_hashes_checked
+$(obj)/blacklist_hashes_checked: $(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_FILENAME) scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk FORCE
+	$(call if_changed,check_blacklist_hashes,$(SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST))
+
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_hashes.o
+
 else
 obj-$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING) += blacklist_nohashes.o
 endif
@@ -29,7 +42,7 @@ $(obj)/x509_certificate_list: scripts/extract-cert $(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREF
 	$(call if_changed,extract_certs,$(SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS_SRCPREFIX)$(CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS))
 endif # CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING
 
-clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list
+clean-files := x509_certificate_list .x509.list blacklist_hashes_checked
 
 ifeq ($(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG),y)
 ###############################################################################
scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk new file +37 -0
new file mode 100755
index 000000000000..107c1d3204d4
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+#!/usr/bin/awk -f
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#
+# Copyright © 2020, Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved.
+#
+# Author: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>
+#
+# Check that a CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST file contains a valid array of
+# hash strings.  Such string must start with a prefix ("tbs" or "bin"), then a
+# colon (":"), and finally an even number of hexadecimal lowercase characters
+# (up to 128).
+
+BEGIN {
+	RS = ","
+}
+{
+	if (!match($0, "^[ \t\n\r]*\"([^\"]*)\"[ \t\n\r]*$", part1)) {
+		print "Not a string (item " NR "):", $0;
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (!match(part1[1], "^(tbs|bin):(.*)$", part2)) {
+		print "Unknown prefix (item " NR "):", part1[1];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (!match(part2[2], "^([0-9a-f]+)$", part3)) {
+		print "Not a lowercase hexadecimal string (item " NR "):", part2[2];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (length(part3[1]) > 128) {
+		print "Hash string too long (item " NR "):", part3[1];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+	if (length(part3[1]) % 2 == 1) {
+		print "Not an even number of hexadecimal characters (item " NR "):", part3[1];
+		exit 1;
+	}
+}
Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
maintainer
#22 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 08/10] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid

Quoted 8 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the builtin blacklist hashes will be approved by the run time blacklist description checks. This is useful to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes which could have been loaded in the kernel (but ignored) are now noticed and deal with by the user.

Quoted 4 lines

I get this with a self-signed cert:

certs/Makefile:18: *** target pattern contains no '%'. Stop.

CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="tbs:8eed1340eef37c1dc84d996406ad05c7dbb3eade19132d688408ca2f63904869"

I used the script in 10/10 to test this, which is another
reamark: the patches are in invalid order, as you need to apply 10/10 before you can test 8/10.

/Jarkko

#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 08/10] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid

Quoted 14 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 8 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the builtin blacklist hashes will be approved by the run time blacklist description checks. This is useful to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes which could have been loaded in the kernel (but ignored) are now noticed and deal with by the user.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I get this with a self-signed cert:

certs/Makefile:18: *** target pattern contains no '%'. Stop.

CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="tbs:8eed1340eef37c1dc84d996406ad05c7dbb3eade19132d688408ca2f63904869"

As said in the Kconfig documentation for CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, you need to provide a file with the list, not to set the string directly in the configuration variable. This patch series didn't change this behavior. The same kind of macros are used for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY.

Quoted 4 lines

I used the script in 10/10 to test this, which is another
reamark: the patches are in invalid order, as you need to apply 10/10 before you can test 8/10.

I'll move patch 10/10 earlier but this kind of formatting was already required (but silently ignored) for this option to be really taken into account. Only the kernel code was available to understand how to effectively create such hash.

Quoted 3 lines

/Jarkko

maintainer
#24 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 08/10] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid

Quoted 20 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 18 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 8 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the builtin blacklist hashes will be approved by the run time blacklist description checks. This is useful to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes which could have been loaded in the kernel (but ignored) are now noticed and deal with by the user.

Quoted 4 lines

I get this with a self-signed cert:

certs/Makefile:18: *** target pattern contains no '%'. Stop.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="tbs:8eed1340eef37c1dc84d996406ad05c7dbb3eade19132d688408ca2f63904869"

As said in the Kconfig documentation for CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, you need to provide a file with the list, not to set the string directly in the configuration variable. This patch series didn't change this behavior. The same kind of macros are used for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY.

OK, the documentation just states that:

"Hashes to be preloaded into the system blacklist keyring"

No mention about a file. I'd add a patch to update this documentation.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 5 lines

I used the script in 10/10 to test this, which is another
reamark: the patches are in invalid order, as you need to apply 10/10 before you can test 8/10.

I'll move patch 10/10 earlier but this kind of formatting was already required (but silently ignored) for this option to be really taken into account. Only the kernel code was available to understand how to effectively create such hash.

Great, thanks.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

/Jarkko

/Jarkko

#25 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 08/10] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid

Quoted 29 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 20 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 18 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 8 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the builtin blacklist hashes will be approved by the run time blacklist description checks. This is useful to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes which could have been loaded in the kernel (but ignored) are now noticed and deal with by the user.

Quoted 4 lines

I get this with a self-signed cert:

certs/Makefile:18: *** target pattern contains no '%'. Stop.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="tbs:8eed1340eef37c1dc84d996406ad05c7dbb3eade19132d688408ca2f63904869"

As said in the Kconfig documentation for CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, you need to provide a file with the list, not to set the string directly in the configuration variable. This patch series didn't change this behavior. The same kind of macros are used for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY.

Quoted 5 lines

OK, the documentation just states that:

"Hashes to be preloaded into the system blacklist keyring"

No mention about a file. I'd add a patch to update this documentation.

I was referring to the full description:

config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
string "Hashes to be preloaded into the system blacklist keyring" depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
help
If set, this option should be the filename of a list of hashes in the form "<hash>", "<hash>", ... . This will be included into a C wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> should be a string of hex digits.

…but the short description doesn't mention filename.

Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 6 lines

I used the script in 10/10 to test this, which is another
reamark: the patches are in invalid order, as you need to apply 10/10 before you can test 8/10.

I'll move patch 10/10 earlier but this kind of formatting was already required (but silently ignored) for this option to be really taken into account. Only the kernel code was available to understand how to effectively create such hash.

Great, thanks.

Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines

/Jarkko

/Jarkko

maintainer
#26 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 08/10] certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid

Quoted 48 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 29 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 20 lines · Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 18 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 8 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add and use a check-blacklist-hashes.awk script to make sure that the builtin blacklist hashes will be approved by the run time blacklist description checks. This is useful to debug invalid hash formats, and it make sure that previous hashes which could have been loaded in the kernel (but ignored) are now noticed and deal with by the user.

Quoted 4 lines

I get this with a self-signed cert:

certs/Makefile:18: *** target pattern contains no '%'. Stop.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line

CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST="tbs:8eed1340eef37c1dc84d996406ad05c7dbb3eade19132d688408ca2f63904869"

As said in the Kconfig documentation for CONFIG_SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST, you need to provide a file with the list, not to set the string directly in the configuration variable. This patch series didn't change this behavior. The same kind of macros are used for CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_KEY.

Quoted 5 lines

OK, the documentation just states that:

"Hashes to be preloaded into the system blacklist keyring"

No mention about a file. I'd add a patch to update this documentation.

I was referring to the full description:

config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
string "Hashes to be preloaded into the system blacklist keyring" depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
help
If set, this option should be the filename of a list of hashes in the form "<hash>", "<hash>", ... . This will be included into a C wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel. Each <hash> should be a string of hex digits.

Quoted 1 line

…but the short description doesn't mention filename.

Aah.

Anyway, I'll test the next version. Now all should be clear how to approach that. Thanks.

/Jarkko

#27 lore raw

PATCH v3 9/10 certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.

Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be provided as the key payload.

Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.

Update blacklist keyring and blacklist key access rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update;
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the root user rights.

See the help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh provided by a following commit.

Cc David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v2:
* Add comment for blacklist_key_instantiate().

---
 certs/Kconfig     | 10 ++++++
 certs/blacklist.c | 90 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
certs/Kconfig +10 -0
index c94e93d8bccf..35fe9989e7b9 100644
@@ -83,4 +83,14 @@ config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_HASH_LIST
 	  wrapper to incorporate the list into the kernel.  Each <hash> should
 	  be a string of hex digits.
 
+config SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE
+	bool "Allow root to add signed blacklist keys"
+	depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+	depends on SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION
+	help
+	  If set, provide the ability to load new blacklist keys at run time if
+	  they are signed and vouched by a certificate from the builtin trusted
+	  keyring.  The PKCS#7 signature of the description is set in the key
+	  payload.  Blacklist keys cannot be removed.
+
 endmenu
certs/blacklist.c +71 -19

144 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
maintainer
#28 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 09/10] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring

Hi Mickaël,

Quoted 25 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.

Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be provided as the key payload.

Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.

Update blacklist keyring and blacklist key access rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update;
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the root user rights.

Quoted 2 lines

See the help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh provided by a following commit.

The design looks good. I'm hoping to review/test at least this patch next week.

thanks,

Mimi

maintainer
#29 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 09/10] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring

In reply to Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 25 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.

Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be provided as the key payload.

Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.

Update blacklist keyring and blacklist key access rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update;
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the root user rights.

Quoted 2 lines

See the help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh provided by a following commit.

Please re-order patches in a way that print-cert-tbs-hash.sh is available before this. That way we get rid of this useless remark.

Quoted 3 lines
Cc David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>

/Jarkko

#30 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 09/10] certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring

Quoted 26 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 25 lines · Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add a kernel option SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_AUTH_UPDATE to enable the root user to dynamically add new keys to the blacklist keyring. This enables to invalidate new certificates, either from being loaded in a keyring, or from being trusted in a PKCS#7 certificate chain. This also enables to add new file hashes to be denied by the integrity infrastructure.

Being able to untrust a certificate which could have normaly been trusted is a sensitive operation. This is why adding new hashes to the blacklist keyring is only allowed when these hashes are signed and vouched by the builtin trusted keyring. A blacklist hash is stored as a key description. The PKCS#7 signature of this description must be provided as the key payload.

Marking a certificate as untrusted should be enforced while the system is running. It is then forbiden to remove such blacklist keys.

Update blacklist keyring and blacklist key access rights:
* allows the root user to search for a specific blacklisted hash, which make sense because the descriptions are already viewable;
* forbids key update;
* restricts kernel rights on the blacklist keyring to align with the root user rights.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines

See the help in tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh provided by a following commit.

Please re-order patches in a way that print-cert-tbs-hash.sh is available before this. That way we get rid of this useless remark.

OK

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Cc David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>

/Jarkko

#31 lore raw

PATCH v3 10/10 tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh

In reply to Mickaël Salaün

From: Mickaël Salaün <[email protected]>

Add a new helper print-cert-tbs-hash.sh to generate a TBSCertificate hash from a given certificate. This is useful to generate a blacklist key description used to forbid loading a specific certificate in a keyring, or to invalidate a certificate provided by a PKCS#7 file.

Cc David Howells <[email protected]>
Cc David Woodhouse <[email protected]>

---

Changes since v1:
* Fix typo.
* Use "if" block instead of "||" .

---
 MAINTAINERS                        |  1 +
 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh | 91 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 92 insertions(+)
 create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
MAINTAINERS +1 -0
index bda31ccbfad0..c7bad1354531 100644
@@ -4123,6 +4123,7 @@ F:	certs/
 F:	scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
 F:	scripts/extract-cert.c
 F:	scripts/sign-file.c
+F:	tools/certs/
 
 CFAG12864B LCD DRIVER
 M:	Miguel Ojeda Sandonis <[email protected]>
tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh new file +91 -0

91 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.30.0
maintainer
#32 lore raw
In reply to Mickaël Salaün
Quoted 54 lines · Mickaël Salaün

This third patch series includes back three fix patches taken from the first series (and cherry-picked from David Howells's tree [1]), and one cosmetic fix from Alex Shi which helps avoid future conflicts. I also added some Acked-by and improved comments. As requested, this series is based on v5.11-rc3.

The goal of these patches is to add a new configuration option to enable the root user to load signed keys in the blacklist keyring. This keyring is useful to "untrust" certificates or files. Enabling to safely update this keyring without recompiling the kernel makes it more usable.

[1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-fixes

Previous patch series:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

Regards,

Alex Shi (1):
certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue

David Howells (1):
certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion

Mickaël Salaün (8):
certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check PKCS#7: Fix missing include
certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist
keyring
tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh

 MAINTAINERS                                   |   2 +
 certs/.gitignore                              |   1 +
 certs/Kconfig                                 |  10 +
 certs/Makefile                                |  15 +-
 certs/blacklist.c                             | 217 ++++++++++++++----
 certs/system_keyring.c                        |   5 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c      |   3 +-
 include/keys/system_keyring.h                 |  14 +-
 include/linux/key.h                           |   1 +
 include/linux/verification.h                  |   2 +
 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk            |  37 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_mok.c              |   4 +-
 .../platform_certs/keyring_handler.c          |  26 +--
 security/keys/key.c                           |   2 +
 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh            |  91 ++++++++
 15 files changed, 345 insertions(+), 85 deletions(-)
 create mode 100755 scripts/check-blacklist-hashes.awk
 create mode 100755 tools/certs/print-cert-tbs-hash.sh
Quoted 5 lines

base-commit: 7c53f6b671f4aba70ff15e1b05148b10d58c2837

Signature · 1 line
2.30.0

Thank you. Unfortunately no time to review this anymore this week but I sanity checked that this applies cleanly now, so should be easy to get on testing this series next week:

$ git-pw series apply 414691
Applying: certs/blacklist: fix kernel doc interface issue
Applying: certs: Fix blacklisted hexadecimal hash string check
Applying: PKCS#7: Fix missing include
Applying: certs: Fix blacklist flag type confusion
Applying: certs: Replace K{U,G}IDT_INIT() with GLOBAL_ROOT_{U,G}ID
Applying: certs: Make blacklist_vet_description() more strict
Applying: certs: Factor out the blacklist hash creation
Applying: certs: Check that builtin blacklist hashes are valid
Applying: certs: Allow root user to append signed hashes to the blacklist keyring
Applying: tools/certs: Add print-cert-tbs-hash.sh

/Jarkko