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5.4.257-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 10 participants 385 messages Sep 20, 2023 – Sep 26, 2023 Page 3 of 3

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#291 lore raw

PATCH 290/367 usb: typec: tcpm: Refactor tcpm_handle_vdm_request

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans de Goede <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 95b4d51c96a87cd760c2a4f27fb28a59a27b6368 ]

Refactor tcpm_handle_vdm_request and its tcpm_pd_svdm helper function so that reporting the results of the vdm to the altmode-driver is separated out into a clear separate step inside tcpm_handle_vdm_request, instead of being scattered over various places inside the tcpm_pd_svdm helper.

This is a preparation patch for fixing an AB BA lock inversion between the tcpm code and some altmode drivers.

Stable-dep-of: f23643306430 ("usb: typec: bus: verify partner exists in typec_altmode_attention")

---
 drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c +48 -28
index 949325692e664..9e71e0d9a09cd 100644
@@ -159,6 +159,14 @@ enum pd_msg_request {
 	PD_MSG_DATA_SOURCE_CAP,
 };
 
+enum adev_actions {
+	ADEV_NONE = 0,
+	ADEV_NOTIFY_USB_AND_QUEUE_VDM,
+	ADEV_QUEUE_VDM,
+	ADEV_QUEUE_VDM_SEND_EXIT_MODE_ON_FAIL,
+	ADEV_ATTENTION,
+};
+
 /* Events from low level driver */
 
 #define TCPM_CC_EVENT		BIT(0)
@@ -1080,10 +1088,10 @@ static void tcpm_register_partner_altmodes(struct tcpm_port *port)
 
 #define supports_modal(port)	PD_IDH_MODAL_SUPP((port)->partner_ident.id_header)
 
-static int tcpm_pd_svdm(struct tcpm_port *port, const u32 *p, int cnt,
-			u32 *response)
+static int tcpm_pd_svdm(struct tcpm_port *port, struct typec_altmode *adev,
+			const u32 *p, int cnt, u32 *response,
+			enum adev_actions *adev_action)
 {
-	struct typec_altmode *adev;
 	struct typec_altmode *pdev;
 	struct pd_mode_data *modep;
 	int rlen = 0;
@@ -1099,9 +1107,6 @@ static int tcpm_pd_svdm(struct tcpm_port *port, const u32 *p, int cnt,
 
 	modep = &port->mode_data;
 
-	adev = typec_match_altmode(port->port_altmode, ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX,
-				   PD_VDO_VID(p[0]), PD_VDO_OPOS(p[0]));
-
 	pdev = typec_match_altmode(port->partner_altmode, ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX,
 				   PD_VDO_VID(p[0]), PD_VDO_OPOS(p[0]));
 
@@ -1127,8 +1132,7 @@ static int tcpm_pd_svdm(struct tcpm_port *port, const u32 *p, int cnt,
 			break;
 		case CMD_ATTENTION:
 			/* Attention command does not have response */
-			if (adev)
-				typec_altmode_attention(adev, p[1]);
+			*adev_action = ADEV_ATTENTION;
 			return 0;
 		default:
 			break;
@@ -1182,23 +1186,15 @@ static int tcpm_pd_svdm(struct tcpm_port *port, const u32 *p, int cnt,
 		case CMD_ENTER_MODE:
 			if (adev && pdev) {
 				typec_altmode_update_active(pdev, true);
-
-				if (typec_altmode_vdm(adev, p[0], &p[1], cnt)) {
-					response[0] = VDO(adev->svid, 1,
-							  CMD_EXIT_MODE);
-					response[0] |= VDO_OPOS(adev->mode);
-					return 1;
-				}
+				*adev_action = ADEV_QUEUE_VDM_SEND_EXIT_MODE_ON_FAIL;
 			}
 			return 0;
 		case CMD_EXIT_MODE:
 			if (adev && pdev) {
 				typec_altmode_update_active(pdev, false);
-
 				/* Back to USB Operation */
-				WARN_ON(typec_altmode_notify(adev,
-							     TYPEC_STATE_USB,
-							     NULL));
+				*adev_action = ADEV_NOTIFY_USB_AND_QUEUE_VDM;
+				return 0;
 			}
 			break;
 		default:
@@ -1209,11 +1205,8 @@ static int tcpm_pd_svdm(struct tcpm_port *port, const u32 *p, int cnt,
 		switch (cmd) {
 		case CMD_ENTER_MODE:
 			/* Back to USB Operation */
-			if (adev)
-				WARN_ON(typec_altmode_notify(adev,
-							     TYPEC_STATE_USB,
-							     NULL));
-			break;
+			*adev_action = ADEV_NOTIFY_USB_AND_QUEUE_VDM;
+			return 0;
 		default:
 			break;
 		}
@@ -1223,15 +1216,15 @@ static int tcpm_pd_svdm(struct tcpm_port *port, const u32 *p, int cnt,
 	}
 
 	/* Informing the alternate mode drivers about everything */
-	if (adev)
-		typec_altmode_vdm(adev, p[0], &p[1], cnt);
-
+	*adev_action = ADEV_QUEUE_VDM;
 	return rlen;
 }
 
 static void tcpm_handle_vdm_request(struct tcpm_port *port,
 				    const __le32 *payload, int cnt)
 {
+	enum adev_actions adev_action = ADEV_NONE;
+	struct typec_altmode *adev;
 	u32 p[PD_MAX_PAYLOAD];
 	u32 response[8] = { };
 	int i, rlen = 0;
@@ -1239,6 +1232,9 @@ static void tcpm_handle_vdm_request(struct tcpm_port *port,
 	for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++)
 		p[i] = le32_to_cpu(payload[i]);
 
+	adev = typec_match_altmode(port->port_altmode, ALTMODE_DISCOVERY_MAX,
+				   PD_VDO_VID(p[0]), PD_VDO_OPOS(p[0]));
+
 	if (port->vdm_state == VDM_STATE_BUSY) {
 		/* If UFP responded busy retry after timeout */
 		if (PD_VDO_CMDT(p[0]) == CMDT_RSP_BUSY) {
@@ -1253,7 +1249,31 @@ static void tcpm_handle_vdm_request(struct tcpm_port *port,
 	}
 
 	if (PD_VDO_SVDM(p[0]))
-		rlen = tcpm_pd_svdm(port, p, cnt, response);
+		rlen = tcpm_pd_svdm(port, adev, p, cnt, response, &adev_action);
+
+	if (adev) {
+		switch (adev_action) {
+		case ADEV_NONE:
+			break;
+		case ADEV_NOTIFY_USB_AND_QUEUE_VDM:
+			WARN_ON(typec_altmode_notify(adev, TYPEC_STATE_USB, NULL));
+			typec_altmode_vdm(adev, p[0], &p[1], cnt);
+			break;
+		case ADEV_QUEUE_VDM:
+			typec_altmode_vdm(adev, p[0], &p[1], cnt);
+			break;
+		case ADEV_QUEUE_VDM_SEND_EXIT_MODE_ON_FAIL:
+			if (typec_altmode_vdm(adev, p[0], &p[1], cnt)) {
+				response[0] = VDO(adev->svid, 1, CMD_EXIT_MODE);
+				response[0] |= VDO_OPOS(adev->mode);
+				rlen = 1;
+			}
+			break;
+		case ADEV_ATTENTION:
+			typec_altmode_attention(adev, p[1]);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
 
 	if (rlen > 0) {
 		tcpm_queue_vdm(port, response[0], &response[1], rlen - 1);
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#292 lore raw

PATCH 291/367 usb: typec: bus: verify partner exists in typec_altmode_attention

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: RD Babiera <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f23643306430f86e2f413ee2b986e0773e79da31 ]

Some usb hubs will negotiate DisplayPort Alt mode with the device but will then negotiate a data role swap after entering the alt mode. The data role swap causes the device to unregister all alt modes, however the usb hub will still send Attention messages even after failing to reregister the Alt Mode. type_altmode_attention currently does not verify whether or not a device's altmode partner exists, which results in a NULL pointer error when dereferencing the typec_altmode and typec_altmode_ops belonging to the altmode partner.

Verify the presence of a device's altmode partner before sending the Attention message to the Alt Mode driver.

---
 drivers/usb/typec/bus.c           | 12 ++++++++++--
 drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c     |  3 ++-
 include/linux/usb/typec_altmode.h |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/typec/bus.c +10 -2
index 0369ad92a1c8e..052b8fb21344c 100644
@@ -146,12 +146,20 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(typec_altmode_exit);
  *
  * Notifies the partner of @adev about Attention command.
  */
-void typec_altmode_attention(struct typec_altmode *adev, u32 vdo)
+int typec_altmode_attention(struct typec_altmode *adev, u32 vdo)
 {
-	struct typec_altmode *pdev = &to_altmode(adev)->partner->adev;
+	struct altmode *partner = to_altmode(adev)->partner;
+	struct typec_altmode *pdev;
+
+	if (!partner)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	pdev = &partner->adev;
 
 	if (pdev->ops && pdev->ops->attention)
 		pdev->ops->attention(pdev, vdo);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(typec_altmode_attention);
 
drivers/usb/typec/tcpm/tcpm.c +2 -1
index 9e71e0d9a09cd..07db1f1a1f72a 100644
@@ -1270,7 +1270,8 @@ static void tcpm_handle_vdm_request(struct tcpm_port *port,
 			}
 			break;
 		case ADEV_ATTENTION:
-			typec_altmode_attention(adev, p[1]);
+			if (typec_altmode_attention(adev, p[1]))
+				tcpm_log(port, "typec_altmode_attention no port partner altmode");
 			break;
 		}
 	}
include/linux/usb/typec_altmode.h +1 -1
index 9a88c74a1d0d0..969b7c5040875 100644
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ struct typec_altmode_ops {
 
 int typec_altmode_enter(struct typec_altmode *altmode);
 int typec_altmode_exit(struct typec_altmode *altmode);
-void typec_altmode_attention(struct typec_altmode *altmode, u32 vdo);
+int typec_altmode_attention(struct typec_altmode *altmode, u32 vdo);
 int typec_altmode_vdm(struct typec_altmode *altmode,
 		      const u32 header, const u32 *vdo, int count);
 int typec_altmode_notify(struct typec_altmode *altmode, unsigned long conf,
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#293 lore raw

PATCH 292/367 ARM: dts: BCM5301X: Extend RAM to full 256MB for Linksys EA6500 V2

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Aleksey Nasibulin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 91994e59079dcb455783d3f9ea338eea6f671af3 ]

Linksys ea6500-v2 have 256MB of ram. Currently we only use 128MB. Expand the definition to use all the available RAM.

---
 arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm4708-linksys-ea6500-v2.dts | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/arm/boot/dts/bcm4708-linksys-ea6500-v2.dts +2 -1
index cd797b4202ad8..01c48faabfade 100644
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@
 
 	memory@0 {
 		device_type = "memory";
-		reg = <0x00000000 0x08000000>;
+		reg = <0x00000000 0x08000000>,
+		      <0x88000000 0x08000000>;
 	};
 
 	gpio-keys {
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#294 lore raw

PATCH 293/367 clk: imx8mm: Move 1443X/1416X PLL clock structure to common place

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Anson Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 43cdaa1567ad3931fbde438853947d45238cc040 ]

Many i.MX8M SoCs use same 1443X/1416X PLL, such as i.MX8MM, i.MX8MN and later i.MX8M SoCs, moving these PLL definitions to pll14xx driver can save a lot of duplicated code on each platform.

Meanwhile, no need to define PLL clock structure for every module which uses same type of PLL, e.g., audio/video/dram use 1443X PLL, arm/gpu/vpu/sys use 1416X PLL, define 2 PLL clock structure for each group is enough.

Stable-dep-of: 72d00e560d10 ("clk: imx: pll14xx: dynamically configure PLL for 393216000/361267200Hz")

---
 drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx8mm.c  | 87 ++++-------------------------------
 drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c | 30 ++++++++++++
 drivers/clk/imx/clk.h         |  3 ++
 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/imx/clk-imx8mm.c +10 -77
index 172589e94f60e..ec34c52416369 100644
@@ -26,73 +26,6 @@ static u32 share_count_disp;
 static u32 share_count_pdm;
 static u32 share_count_nand;
 
-static const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx8mm_pll1416x_tbl[] = {
-	PLL_1416X_RATE(1800000000U, 225, 3, 0),
-	PLL_1416X_RATE(1600000000U, 200, 3, 0),
-	PLL_1416X_RATE(1200000000U, 300, 3, 1),
-	PLL_1416X_RATE(1000000000U, 250, 3, 1),
-	PLL_1416X_RATE(800000000U,  200, 3, 1),
-	PLL_1416X_RATE(750000000U,  250, 2, 2),
-	PLL_1416X_RATE(700000000U,  350, 3, 2),
-	PLL_1416X_RATE(600000000U,  300, 3, 2),
-};
-
-static const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx8mm_audiopll_tbl[] = {
-	PLL_1443X_RATE(393216000U, 262, 2, 3, 9437),
-	PLL_1443X_RATE(361267200U, 361, 3, 3, 17511),
-};
-
-static const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx8mm_videopll_tbl[] = {
-	PLL_1443X_RATE(650000000U, 325, 3, 2, 0),
-	PLL_1443X_RATE(594000000U, 198, 2, 2, 0),
-};
-
-static const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx8mm_drampll_tbl[] = {
-	PLL_1443X_RATE(650000000U, 325, 3, 2, 0),
-};
-
-static struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx8mm_audio_pll = {
-		.type = PLL_1443X,
-		.rate_table = imx8mm_audiopll_tbl,
-		.rate_count = ARRAY_SIZE(imx8mm_audiopll_tbl),
-};
-
-static struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx8mm_video_pll = {
-		.type = PLL_1443X,
-		.rate_table = imx8mm_videopll_tbl,
-		.rate_count = ARRAY_SIZE(imx8mm_videopll_tbl),
-};
-
-static struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx8mm_dram_pll = {
-		.type = PLL_1443X,
-		.rate_table = imx8mm_drampll_tbl,
-		.rate_count = ARRAY_SIZE(imx8mm_drampll_tbl),
-};
-
-static struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx8mm_arm_pll = {
-		.type = PLL_1416X,
-		.rate_table = imx8mm_pll1416x_tbl,
-		.rate_count = ARRAY_SIZE(imx8mm_pll1416x_tbl),
-};
-
-static struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx8mm_gpu_pll = {
-		.type = PLL_1416X,
-		.rate_table = imx8mm_pll1416x_tbl,
-		.rate_count = ARRAY_SIZE(imx8mm_pll1416x_tbl),
-};
-
-static struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx8mm_vpu_pll = {
-		.type = PLL_1416X,
-		.rate_table = imx8mm_pll1416x_tbl,
-		.rate_count = ARRAY_SIZE(imx8mm_pll1416x_tbl),
-};
-
-static struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx8mm_sys_pll = {
-		.type = PLL_1416X,
-		.rate_table = imx8mm_pll1416x_tbl,
-		.rate_count = ARRAY_SIZE(imx8mm_pll1416x_tbl),
-};
-
 static const char *pll_ref_sels[] = { "osc_24m", "dummy", "dummy", "dummy", };
 static const char *audio_pll1_bypass_sels[] = {"audio_pll1", "audio_pll1_ref_sel", };
 static const char *audio_pll2_bypass_sels[] = {"audio_pll2", "audio_pll2_ref_sel", };
@@ -396,16 +329,16 @@ static int imx8mm_clocks_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	clks[IMX8MM_SYS_PLL2_REF_SEL] = imx_clk_mux("sys_pll2_ref_sel", base + 0x104, 0, 2, pll_ref_sels, ARRAY_SIZE(pll_ref_sels));
 	clks[IMX8MM_SYS_PLL3_REF_SEL] = imx_clk_mux("sys_pll3_ref_sel", base + 0x114, 0, 2, pll_ref_sels, ARRAY_SIZE(pll_ref_sels));
 
-	clks[IMX8MM_AUDIO_PLL1] = imx_clk_pll14xx("audio_pll1", "audio_pll1_ref_sel", base, &imx8mm_audio_pll);
-	clks[IMX8MM_AUDIO_PLL2] = imx_clk_pll14xx("audio_pll2", "audio_pll2_ref_sel", base + 0x14, &imx8mm_audio_pll);
-	clks[IMX8MM_VIDEO_PLL1] = imx_clk_pll14xx("video_pll1", "video_pll1_ref_sel", base + 0x28, &imx8mm_video_pll);
-	clks[IMX8MM_DRAM_PLL] = imx_clk_pll14xx("dram_pll", "dram_pll_ref_sel", base + 0x50, &imx8mm_dram_pll);
-	clks[IMX8MM_GPU_PLL] = imx_clk_pll14xx("gpu_pll", "gpu_pll_ref_sel", base + 0x64, &imx8mm_gpu_pll);
-	clks[IMX8MM_VPU_PLL] = imx_clk_pll14xx("vpu_pll", "vpu_pll_ref_sel", base + 0x74, &imx8mm_vpu_pll);
-	clks[IMX8MM_ARM_PLL] = imx_clk_pll14xx("arm_pll", "arm_pll_ref_sel", base + 0x84, &imx8mm_arm_pll);
-	clks[IMX8MM_SYS_PLL1] = imx_clk_pll14xx("sys_pll1", "sys_pll1_ref_sel", base + 0x94, &imx8mm_sys_pll);
-	clks[IMX8MM_SYS_PLL2] = imx_clk_pll14xx("sys_pll2", "sys_pll2_ref_sel", base + 0x104, &imx8mm_sys_pll);
-	clks[IMX8MM_SYS_PLL3] = imx_clk_pll14xx("sys_pll3", "sys_pll3_ref_sel", base + 0x114, &imx8mm_sys_pll);
+	clks[IMX8MM_AUDIO_PLL1] = imx_clk_pll14xx("audio_pll1", "audio_pll1_ref_sel", base, &imx_1443x_pll);
+	clks[IMX8MM_AUDIO_PLL2] = imx_clk_pll14xx("audio_pll2", "audio_pll2_ref_sel", base + 0x14, &imx_1443x_pll);
+	clks[IMX8MM_VIDEO_PLL1] = imx_clk_pll14xx("video_pll1", "video_pll1_ref_sel", base + 0x28, &imx_1443x_pll);
+	clks[IMX8MM_DRAM_PLL] = imx_clk_pll14xx("dram_pll", "dram_pll_ref_sel", base + 0x50, &imx_1443x_pll);
+	clks[IMX8MM_GPU_PLL] = imx_clk_pll14xx("gpu_pll", "gpu_pll_ref_sel", base + 0x64, &imx_1416x_pll);
+	clks[IMX8MM_VPU_PLL] = imx_clk_pll14xx("vpu_pll", "vpu_pll_ref_sel", base + 0x74, &imx_1416x_pll);
+	clks[IMX8MM_ARM_PLL] = imx_clk_pll14xx("arm_pll", "arm_pll_ref_sel", base + 0x84, &imx_1416x_pll);
+	clks[IMX8MM_SYS_PLL1] = imx_clk_pll14xx("sys_pll1", "sys_pll1_ref_sel", base + 0x94, &imx_1416x_pll);
+	clks[IMX8MM_SYS_PLL2] = imx_clk_pll14xx("sys_pll2", "sys_pll2_ref_sel", base + 0x104, &imx_1416x_pll);
+	clks[IMX8MM_SYS_PLL3] = imx_clk_pll14xx("sys_pll3", "sys_pll3_ref_sel", base + 0x114, &imx_1416x_pll);
 
 	/* PLL bypass out */
 	clks[IMX8MM_AUDIO_PLL1_BYPASS] = imx_clk_mux_flags("audio_pll1_bypass", base, 16, 1, audio_pll1_bypass_sels, ARRAY_SIZE(audio_pll1_bypass_sels), CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT);
drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c +30 -0
index 047f1d8fe323f..c43e9653b4156 100644
@@ -41,6 +41,36 @@ struct clk_pll14xx {
 
 #define to_clk_pll14xx(_hw) container_of(_hw, struct clk_pll14xx, hw)
 
+const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx_pll1416x_tbl[] = {
+	PLL_1416X_RATE(1800000000U, 225, 3, 0),
+	PLL_1416X_RATE(1600000000U, 200, 3, 0),
+	PLL_1416X_RATE(1200000000U, 300, 3, 1),
+	PLL_1416X_RATE(1000000000U, 250, 3, 1),
+	PLL_1416X_RATE(800000000U,  200, 3, 1),
+	PLL_1416X_RATE(750000000U,  250, 2, 2),
+	PLL_1416X_RATE(700000000U,  350, 3, 2),
+	PLL_1416X_RATE(600000000U,  300, 3, 2),
+};
+
+const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx_pll1443x_tbl[] = {
+	PLL_1443X_RATE(650000000U, 325, 3, 2, 0),
+	PLL_1443X_RATE(594000000U, 198, 2, 2, 0),
+	PLL_1443X_RATE(393216000U, 262, 2, 3, 9437),
+	PLL_1443X_RATE(361267200U, 361, 3, 3, 17511),
+};
+
+struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx_1443x_pll = {
+	.type = PLL_1443X,
+	.rate_table = imx_pll1443x_tbl,
+	.rate_count = ARRAY_SIZE(imx_pll1443x_tbl),
+};
+
+struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx_1416x_pll = {
+	.type = PLL_1416X,
+	.rate_table = imx_pll1416x_tbl,
+	.rate_count = ARRAY_SIZE(imx_pll1416x_tbl),
+};
+
 static const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table *imx_get_pll_settings(
 		struct clk_pll14xx *pll, unsigned long rate)
 {
drivers/clk/imx/clk.h +3 -0
index 6fe64ff8ffa12..30ddbc1ced2ee 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,9 @@ struct imx_pll14xx_clk {
 	int flags;
 };
 
+extern struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx_1416x_pll;
+extern struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx_1443x_pll;
+
 #define imx_clk_cpu(name, parent_name, div, mux, pll, step) \
 	to_clk(imx_clk_hw_cpu(name, parent_name, div, mux, pll, step))
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#295 lore raw

PATCH 294/367 clk: imx: clk-pll14xx: Make two variables static

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: YueHaibing <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8f2d3c1759d19232edf1e9ef43d40a44e31493d6 ]

Fix sparse warnings:

drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c:44:37:
warning: symbol 'imx_pll1416x_tbl' was not declared. Should it be static?
drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c:57:37:
warning: symbol 'imx_pll1443x_tbl' was not declared. Should it be static?

Stable-dep-of: 72d00e560d10 ("clk: imx: pll14xx: dynamically configure PLL for 393216000/361267200Hz")

---
 drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c +2 -2
index c43e9653b4156..129a28c3366eb 100644
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ struct clk_pll14xx {
 
 #define to_clk_pll14xx(_hw) container_of(_hw, struct clk_pll14xx, hw)
 
-const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx_pll1416x_tbl[] = {
+static const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx_pll1416x_tbl[] = {
 	PLL_1416X_RATE(1800000000U, 225, 3, 0),
 	PLL_1416X_RATE(1600000000U, 200, 3, 0),
 	PLL_1416X_RATE(1200000000U, 300, 3, 1),
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx_pll1416x_tbl[] = {
 	PLL_1416X_RATE(600000000U,  300, 3, 2),
 };
 
-const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx_pll1443x_tbl[] = {
+static const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx_pll1443x_tbl[] = {
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(650000000U, 325, 3, 2, 0),
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(594000000U, 198, 2, 2, 0),
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(393216000U, 262, 2, 3, 9437),
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#296 lore raw

PATCH 295/367 clk: imx: pll14xx: Add new frequency entries for pll1443x table

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Anson Huang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 57795654fb553a78f07a9f92d87fb2582379cd93 ]

Add new frequency entries to pll1443x table to meet different display settings requirement.

Stable-dep-of: 72d00e560d10 ("clk: imx: pll14xx: dynamically configure PLL for 393216000/361267200Hz")

---
 drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c +2 -0
index 129a28c3366eb..e7bf6babc28b4 100644
@@ -53,8 +53,10 @@ static const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx_pll1416x_tbl[] = {
 };
 
 static const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx_pll1443x_tbl[] = {
+	PLL_1443X_RATE(1039500000U, 173, 2, 1, 16384),
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(650000000U, 325, 3, 2, 0),
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(594000000U, 198, 2, 2, 0),
+	PLL_1443X_RATE(519750000U, 173, 2, 2, 16384),
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(393216000U, 262, 2, 3, 9437),
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(361267200U, 361, 3, 3, 17511),
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#297 lore raw

PATCH 296/367 clk: imx: pll14xx: dynamically configure PLL for 393216000/361267200Hz

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ahmad Fatoum <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 72d00e560d10665e6139c9431956a87ded6e9880 ]

Since commit b09c68dc57c9 ("clk: imx: pll14xx: Support dynamic rates"), the driver has the ability to dynamically compute PLL parameters to approximate the requested rates. This is not always used, because the logic is as follows:

- Check if the target rate is hardcoded in the frequency table
- Check if varying only kdiv is possible, so switch over is glitch free
- Compute rate dynamically by iterating over pdiv range

If we skip the frequency table for the 1443x PLL, we find that the computed values differ to the hardcoded ones. This can be valid if the hardcoded values guarantee for example an earlier lock-in or if the divisors are chosen, so that other important rates are more likely to be reached glitch-free.

For rates (393216000 and 361267200, this doesn't seem to be the case:
They are only approximated by existing parameters (393215995 and 361267196 Hz, respectively) and they aren't reachable glitch-free from other hardcoded frequencies. Dropping them from the table allows us to lock-in to these frequencies exactly.

This is immediately noticeable because they are the assigned-clock-rates for IMX8MN_AUDIO_PLL1 and IMX8MN_AUDIO_PLL2, respectively and a look into clk_summary so far showed that they were a few Hz short of the target:

imx8mn-board:~# grep audio_pll[12]_out /sys/kernel/debug/clk/clk_summary
audio_pll2_out           0        0        0   361267196 0     0  50000   N
audio_pll1_out           1        1        0   393215995 0     0  50000   Y

and afterwards:

imx8mn-board:~# grep audio_pll[12]_out /sys/kernel/debug/clk/clk_summary
audio_pll2_out           0        0        0   361267200 0     0  50000   N
audio_pll1_out           1        1        0   393216000 0     0  50000   Y

This change is equivalent to adding following hardcoded values:

/* rate mdiv pdiv sdiv kdiv */
PLL_1443X_RATE(393216000, 655, 5, 3, 23593),
PLL_1443X_RATE(361267200, 497, 33, 0, -16882),

Fixes 053a4ffe2988 ("clk: imx: imx8mm: fix audio pll setting")
Cc [email protected] # v5.18+
---
 drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c +0 -2
index e7bf6babc28b4..0dbe8c05af478 100644
@@ -57,8 +57,6 @@ static const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx_pll1443x_tbl[] = {
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(650000000U, 325, 3, 2, 0),
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(594000000U, 198, 2, 2, 0),
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(519750000U, 173, 2, 2, 16384),
-	PLL_1443X_RATE(393216000U, 262, 2, 3, 9437),
-	PLL_1443X_RATE(361267200U, 361, 3, 3, 17511),
 };
 
 struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx_1443x_pll = {
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
#298 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.4 296/367] clk: imx: pll14xx: dynamically configure PLL for 393216000/361267200Hz

Quoted 1 line · Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

[snip]

Quoted 1 line
Cc [email protected] # v5.18+

Objection: This fix is only applicable starting with v5.18, as before commit b09c68dc57c9 ("clk: imx: pll14xx: Support dynamic rates"), there was no dynamic rate calculation that would substitute the hardcoded parameters removed by my patch.

Cheers,
Ahmad

Quoted 22 lines
---
 drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
drivers/clk/imx/clk-pll14xx.c +0 -2
index e7bf6babc28b4..0dbe8c05af478 100644
@@ -57,8 +57,6 @@ static const struct imx_pll14xx_rate_table imx_pll1443x_tbl[] = {
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(650000000U, 325, 3, 2, 0),
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(594000000U, 198, 2, 2, 0),
 	PLL_1443X_RATE(519750000U, 173, 2, 2, 16384),
-	PLL_1443X_RATE(393216000U, 262, 2, 3, 9437),
-	PLL_1443X_RATE(361267200U, 361, 3, 3, 17511),
 };
 
 struct imx_pll14xx_clk imx_1443x_pll = {
Signature · 4 lines
Pengutronix e.K.                           |                             |
Steuerwalder Str. 21                       | http://www.pengutronix.de/  |
31137 Hildesheim, Germany                  | Phone: +49-5121-206917-0    |
Amtsgericht Hildesheim, HRA 2686           | Fax:   +49-5121-206917-5555 |
author maintainer
#299 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.4 296/367] clk: imx: pll14xx: dynamically configure PLL for 393216000/361267200Hz

Quoted 11 lines · Ahmad Fatoum
Quoted 1 line · Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

[snip]

Quoted 1 line
Cc [email protected] # v5.18+

Objection: This fix is only applicable starting with v5.18, as before commit b09c68dc57c9 ("clk: imx: pll14xx: Support dynamic rates"), there was no dynamic rate calculation that would substitute the hardcoded parameters removed by my patch.

Ok, thanks, now dropped.

greg k-h

author maintainer
#300 lore raw

PATCH 297/367 net: ipv4: fix one memleak in __inet_del_ifa()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Liu Jian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ac28b1ec6135649b5d78b028e47264cb3ebca5ea ]

I got the below warning when do fuzzing test:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for bond0 to become free. Usage count = 2

It can be repoduced via:

ip link add bond0 type bond
sysctl -w net.ipv4.conf.bond0.promote_secondaries=1 ip addr add 4.117.174.103/0 scope 0x40 dev bond0
ip addr add 192.168.100.111/255.255.255.254 scope 0 dev bond0 ip addr add 0.0.0.4/0 scope 0x40 secondary dev bond0 ip addr del 4.117.174.103/0 scope 0x40 dev bond0
ip link delete bond0 type bond

In this reproduction test case, an incorrect 'last_prim' is found in __inet_del_ifa(), as a result, the secondary address(0.0.0.4/0 scope 0x40) is lost. The memory of the secondary address is leaked and the reference of in_device and net_device is leaked.

Fix this problem:
Look for 'last_prim' starting at location of the deleted IP and inserting the promoted IP into the location of 'last_prim'.

Fixes 0ff60a45678e ("[IPV4]: Fix secondary IP addresses after promotion")
---
 net/ipv4/devinet.c | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
net/ipv4/devinet.c +5 -5
index 4a8ad46397c0e..4c013f8800f0c 100644
@@ -351,14 +351,14 @@ static void __inet_del_ifa(struct in_device *in_dev,
 {
 	struct in_ifaddr *promote = NULL;
 	struct in_ifaddr *ifa, *ifa1;
-	struct in_ifaddr *last_prim;
+	struct in_ifaddr __rcu **last_prim;
 	struct in_ifaddr *prev_prom = NULL;
 	int do_promote = IN_DEV_PROMOTE_SECONDARIES(in_dev);
 
 	ASSERT_RTNL();
 
 	ifa1 = rtnl_dereference(*ifap);
-	last_prim = rtnl_dereference(in_dev->ifa_list);
+	last_prim = ifap;
 	if (in_dev->dead)
 		goto no_promotions;
 
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ static void __inet_del_ifa(struct in_device *in_dev,
 		while ((ifa = rtnl_dereference(*ifap1)) != NULL) {
 			if (!(ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY) &&
 			    ifa1->ifa_scope <= ifa->ifa_scope)
-				last_prim = ifa;
+				last_prim = &ifa->ifa_next;
 
 			if (!(ifa->ifa_flags & IFA_F_SECONDARY) ||
 			    ifa1->ifa_mask != ifa->ifa_mask ||
@@ -436,9 +436,9 @@ static void __inet_del_ifa(struct in_device *in_dev,
 
 			rcu_assign_pointer(prev_prom->ifa_next, next_sec);
 
-			last_sec = rtnl_dereference(last_prim->ifa_next);
+			last_sec = rtnl_dereference(*last_prim);
 			rcu_assign_pointer(promote->ifa_next, last_sec);
-			rcu_assign_pointer(last_prim->ifa_next, promote);
+			rcu_assign_pointer(*last_prim, promote);
 		}
 
 		promote->ifa_flags &= ~IFA_F_SECONDARY;
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#301 lore raw

PATCH 298/367 net: ethernet: mvpp2_main: fix possible OOB write in mvpp2_ethtool_get_rxnfc()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hangyu Hua <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 51fe0a470543f345e3c62b6798929de3ddcedc1d ]

rules is allocated in ethtool_get_rxnfc and the size is determined by rule_cnt from user space. So rule_cnt needs to be check before using rules to avoid OOB writing or NULL pointer dereference.

Fixes 90b509b39ac9 ("net: mvpp2: cls: Add Classification offload support")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/marvell/mvpp2/mvpp2_main.c +5 -0
index 31dde6fbdbdca..7a2293a5bcc9f 100644
@@ -4233,6 +4233,11 @@ static int mvpp2_ethtool_get_rxnfc(struct net_device *dev,
 		break;
 	case ETHTOOL_GRXCLSRLALL:
 		for (i = 0; i < MVPP2_N_RFS_ENTRIES_PER_FLOW; i++) {
+			if (loc == info->rule_cnt) {
+				ret = -EMSGSIZE;
+				break;
+			}
+
 			if (port->rfs_rules[i])
 				rules[loc++] = i;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#302 lore raw

PATCH 299/367 net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: fix possible NULL pointer dereference in mtk_hwlro_get_fdir_all()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hangyu Hua <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e4c79810755f66c9a933ca810da2724133b1165a ]

rule_locs is allocated in ethtool_get_rxnfc and the size is determined by rule_cnt from user space. So rule_cnt needs to be check before using rule_locs to avoid NULL pointer dereference.

Fixes 7aab747e5563 ("net: ethernet: mediatek: add ethtool functions to configure RX flows of HW LRO")
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/ethernet/mediatek/mtk_eth_soc.c +3 -0
index f9139150a8a26..7b9f5eba78dcc 100644
@@ -2008,6 +2008,9 @@ static int mtk_hwlro_get_fdir_all(struct net_device *dev,
 	int i;
 
 	for (i = 0; i < MTK_MAX_LRO_IP_CNT; i++) {
+		if (cnt == cmd->rule_cnt)
+			return -EMSGSIZE;
+
 		if (mac->hwlro_ip[i]) {
 			rule_locs[cnt] = i;
 			cnt++;
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#303 lore raw

PATCH 300/367 r8152: check budget for r8152_poll()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hayes Wang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a7b8d60b37237680009dd0b025fe8c067aba0ee3 ]

According to the document of napi, there is no rx process when the budget is 0. Therefore, r8152_poll() has to return 0 directly when the budget is equal to 0.

Fixes d2187f8e4454 ("r8152: divide the tx and rx bottom functions")
---
 drivers/net/usb/r8152.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/net/usb/r8152.c +3 -0
index b0412d14e8f6c..a19f0431e6f99 100644
@@ -2253,6 +2253,9 @@ static int r8152_poll(struct napi_struct *napi, int budget)
 	struct r8152 *tp = container_of(napi, struct r8152, napi);
 	int work_done;
 
+	if (!budget)
+		return 0;
+
 	work_done = rx_bottom(tp, budget);
 
 	if (work_done < budget) {
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#304 lore raw

PATCH 301/367 kcm: Fix memory leak in error path of kcm_sendmsg()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shigeru Yoshida <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c821a88bd720b0046433173185fd841a100d44ad ]

syzbot reported a memory leak like below:

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810b088c00 (size 240):
  comm "syz-executor186", pid 5012, jiffies 4294943306 (age 13.680s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 89 08 0b 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ................
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff83e5d5ff>] __alloc_skb+0x1ef/0x230 net/core/skbuff.c:634
    [<ffffffff84606e59>] alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1289 [inline]
    [<ffffffff84606e59>] kcm_sendmsg+0x269/0x1050 net/kcm/kcmsock.c:815
    [<ffffffff83e479c6>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:725 [inline]
    [<ffffffff83e479c6>] sock_sendmsg+0x56/0xb0 net/socket.c:748
    [<ffffffff83e47f55>] ____sys_sendmsg+0x365/0x470 net/socket.c:2494
    [<ffffffff83e4c389>] ___sys_sendmsg+0xc9/0x130 net/socket.c:2548
    [<ffffffff83e4c536>] __sys_sendmsg+0xa6/0x120 net/socket.c:2577
    [<ffffffff84ad7bb8>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
    [<ffffffff84ad7bb8>] do_syscall_64+0x38/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
    [<ffffffff84c0008b>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

In kcm_sendmsg(), kcm_tx_msg(head)->last_skb is used as a cursor to append newly allocated skbs to 'head'. If some bytes are copied, an error occurred, and jumped to out_error label, 'last_skb' is left unmodified. A later kcm_sendmsg() will use an obsoleted 'last_skb' reference, corrupting the 'head' frag_list and causing the leak.

This patch fixes this issue by properly updating the last allocated skb in 'last_skb'.

Fixes ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
Reported-and-tested-by [email protected]
---
 net/kcm/kcmsock.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
net/kcm/kcmsock.c +2 -0
index 50bcfc71389ab..8668348aa3f2b 100644
@@ -1075,6 +1075,8 @@ static int kcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 
 	if (head != kcm->seq_skb)
 		kfree_skb(head);
+	else if (copied)
+		kcm_tx_msg(head)->last_skb = skb;
 
 	err = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, err);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#305 lore raw

PATCH 302/367 platform/mellanox: mlxbf-tmfifo: Drop the Rx packet if no more descriptors

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Liming Sun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 78034cbece79c2d730ad0770b3b7f23eedbbecf5 ]

This commit fixes tmfifo console stuck issue when the virtual networking interface is in down state. In such case, the network Rx descriptors runs out and causes the Rx network packet staying in the head of the tmfifo thus blocking the console packets. The fix is to drop the Rx network packet when no more Rx descriptors. Function name mlxbf_tmfifo_release_pending_pkt() is also renamed to mlxbf_tmfifo_release_pkt() to be more approperiate.

---
 drivers/platform/mellanox/mlxbf-tmfifo.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 49 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/mellanox/mlxbf-tmfifo.c +49 -17
index 4b18ebd7e850c..0d77cc94c3f0e 100644
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ struct mlxbf_tmfifo;
  * @vq: pointer to the virtio virtqueue
  * @desc: current descriptor of the pending packet
  * @desc_head: head descriptor of the pending packet
+ * @drop_desc: dummy desc for packet dropping
  * @cur_len: processed length of the current descriptor
  * @rem_len: remaining length of the pending packet
  * @pkt_len: total length of the pending packet
@@ -72,6 +73,7 @@ struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring {
 	struct virtqueue *vq;
 	struct vring_desc *desc;
 	struct vring_desc *desc_head;
+	struct vring_desc drop_desc;
 	int cur_len;
 	int rem_len;
 	u32 pkt_len;
@@ -83,6 +85,14 @@ struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring {
 	struct mlxbf_tmfifo *fifo;
 };
 
+/* Check whether vring is in drop mode. */
+#define IS_VRING_DROP(_r) ({ \
+	typeof(_r) (r) = (_r); \
+	(r->desc_head == &r->drop_desc ? true : false); })
+
+/* A stub length to drop maximum length packet. */
+#define VRING_DROP_DESC_MAX_LEN		GENMASK(15, 0)
+
 /* Interrupt types. */
 enum {
 	MLXBF_TM_RX_LWM_IRQ,
@@ -243,6 +253,7 @@ static int mlxbf_tmfifo_alloc_vrings(struct mlxbf_tmfifo *fifo,
 		vring->align = SMP_CACHE_BYTES;
 		vring->index = i;
 		vring->vdev_id = tm_vdev->vdev.id.device;
+		vring->drop_desc.len = VRING_DROP_DESC_MAX_LEN;
 		dev = &tm_vdev->vdev.dev;
 
 		size = vring_size(vring->num, vring->align);
@@ -348,7 +359,7 @@ static u32 mlxbf_tmfifo_get_pkt_len(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring,
 	return len;
 }
 
-static void mlxbf_tmfifo_release_pending_pkt(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring)
+static void mlxbf_tmfifo_release_pkt(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring)
 {
 	struct vring_desc *desc_head;
 	u32 len = 0;
@@ -577,19 +588,25 @@ static void mlxbf_tmfifo_rxtx_word(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring,
 
 	if (vring->cur_len + sizeof(u64) <= len) {
 		/* The whole word. */
-		if (is_rx)
-			memcpy(addr + vring->cur_len, &data, sizeof(u64));
-		else
-			memcpy(&data, addr + vring->cur_len, sizeof(u64));
+		if (!IS_VRING_DROP(vring)) {
+			if (is_rx)
+				memcpy(addr + vring->cur_len, &data,
+				       sizeof(u64));
+			else
+				memcpy(&data, addr + vring->cur_len,
+				       sizeof(u64));
+		}
 		vring->cur_len += sizeof(u64);
 	} else {
 		/* Leftover bytes. */
-		if (is_rx)
-			memcpy(addr + vring->cur_len, &data,
-			       len - vring->cur_len);
-		else
-			memcpy(&data, addr + vring->cur_len,
-			       len - vring->cur_len);
+		if (!IS_VRING_DROP(vring)) {
+			if (is_rx)
+				memcpy(addr + vring->cur_len, &data,
+				       len - vring->cur_len);
+			else
+				memcpy(&data, addr + vring->cur_len,
+				       len - vring->cur_len);
+		}
 		vring->cur_len = len;
 	}
 
@@ -687,8 +704,16 @@ static bool mlxbf_tmfifo_rxtx_one_desc(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring,
 	/* Get the descriptor of the next packet. */
 	if (!vring->desc) {
 		desc = mlxbf_tmfifo_get_next_pkt(vring, is_rx);
-		if (!desc)
-			return false;
+		if (!desc) {
+			/* Drop next Rx packet to avoid stuck. */
+			if (is_rx) {
+				desc = &vring->drop_desc;
+				vring->desc_head = desc;
+				vring->desc = desc;
+			} else {
+				return false;
+			}
+		}
 	} else {
 		desc = vring->desc;
 	}
@@ -721,17 +746,24 @@ static bool mlxbf_tmfifo_rxtx_one_desc(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring,
 		vring->rem_len -= len;
 
 		/* Get the next desc on the chain. */
-		if (vring->rem_len > 0 &&
+		if (!IS_VRING_DROP(vring) && vring->rem_len > 0 &&
 		    (virtio16_to_cpu(vdev, desc->flags) & VRING_DESC_F_NEXT)) {
 			idx = virtio16_to_cpu(vdev, desc->next);
 			desc = &vr->desc[idx];
 			goto mlxbf_tmfifo_desc_done;
 		}
 
-		/* Done and release the pending packet. */
-		mlxbf_tmfifo_release_pending_pkt(vring);
+		/* Done and release the packet. */
 		desc = NULL;
 		fifo->vring[is_rx] = NULL;
+		if (!IS_VRING_DROP(vring)) {
+			mlxbf_tmfifo_release_pkt(vring);
+		} else {
+			vring->pkt_len = 0;
+			vring->desc_head = NULL;
+			vring->desc = NULL;
+			return false;
+		}
 
 		/*
 		 * Make sure the load/store are in order before
@@ -911,7 +943,7 @@ static void mlxbf_tmfifo_virtio_del_vqs(struct virtio_device *vdev)
 
 		/* Release the pending packet. */
 		if (vring->desc)
-			mlxbf_tmfifo_release_pending_pkt(vring);
+			mlxbf_tmfifo_release_pkt(vring);
 		vq = vring->vq;
 		if (vq) {
 			vring->vq = NULL;
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#306 lore raw

PATCH 303/367 mlxbf-tmfifo: sparse tags for config access

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 03bea764bf61c9f9918324bda7362616024386e8 ]

mlxbf-tmfifo accesses config space using native types - which works for it since the legacy virtio native types.

This will break if it ever needs to support modern virtio, so with new tags previously introduced for virtio net config, sparse now warns for this in drivers.

Since this is a legacy only device, fix it up using virtio_legacy_is_little_endian for now.

No functional changes.

Stable-dep-of: fc4c65582154 ("platform/mellanox: mlxbf-tmfifo: Drop jumbo frames")

---
 drivers/platform/mellanox/mlxbf-tmfifo.c | 13 ++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/mellanox/mlxbf-tmfifo.c +10 -3
index 0d77cc94c3f0e..42fcccf06157f 100644
@@ -645,7 +645,10 @@ static void mlxbf_tmfifo_rxtx_header(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring,
 			vdev_id = VIRTIO_ID_NET;
 			hdr_len = sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr);
 			config = &fifo->vdev[vdev_id]->config.net;
-			if (ntohs(hdr.len) > config->mtu +
+			/* A legacy-only interface for now. */
+			if (ntohs(hdr.len) >
+			    __virtio16_to_cpu(virtio_legacy_is_little_endian(),
+					      config->mtu) +
 			    MLXBF_TMFIFO_NET_L2_OVERHEAD)
 				return;
 		} else {
@@ -1273,8 +1276,12 @@ static int mlxbf_tmfifo_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	/* Create the network vdev. */
 	memset(&net_config, 0, sizeof(net_config));
-	net_config.mtu = ETH_DATA_LEN;
-	net_config.status = VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP;
+
+	/* A legacy-only interface for now. */
+	net_config.mtu = __cpu_to_virtio16(virtio_legacy_is_little_endian(),
+					   ETH_DATA_LEN);
+	net_config.status = __cpu_to_virtio16(virtio_legacy_is_little_endian(),
+					      VIRTIO_NET_S_LINK_UP);
 	mlxbf_tmfifo_get_cfg_mac(net_config.mac);
 	rc = mlxbf_tmfifo_create_vdev(dev, fifo, VIRTIO_ID_NET,
 				      MLXBF_TMFIFO_NET_FEATURES, &net_config,
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#307 lore raw

PATCH 304/367 platform/mellanox: mlxbf-tmfifo: Drop jumbo frames

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Liming Sun <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fc4c655821546239abb3cf4274d66b9747aa87dd ]

This commit drops over-sized network packets to avoid tmfifo queue stuck.

---
 drivers/platform/mellanox/mlxbf-tmfifo.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
drivers/platform/mellanox/mlxbf-tmfifo.c +17 -7
index 42fcccf06157f..194f3205e5597 100644
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ static u8 mlxbf_tmfifo_net_default_mac[ETH_ALEN] = {
 static efi_char16_t mlxbf_tmfifo_efi_name[] = L"RshimMacAddr";
 
 /* Maximum L2 header length. */
-#define MLXBF_TMFIFO_NET_L2_OVERHEAD	36
+#define MLXBF_TMFIFO_NET_L2_OVERHEAD	(ETH_HLEN + VLAN_HLEN)
 
 /* Supported virtio-net features. */
 #define MLXBF_TMFIFO_NET_FEATURES \
@@ -623,13 +623,14 @@ static void mlxbf_tmfifo_rxtx_word(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring,
  * flag is set.
  */
 static void mlxbf_tmfifo_rxtx_header(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring,
-				     struct vring_desc *desc,
+				     struct vring_desc **desc,
 				     bool is_rx, bool *vring_change)
 {
 	struct mlxbf_tmfifo *fifo = vring->fifo;
 	struct virtio_net_config *config;
 	struct mlxbf_tmfifo_msg_hdr hdr;
 	int vdev_id, hdr_len;
+	bool drop_rx = false;
 
 	/* Read/Write packet header. */
 	if (is_rx) {
@@ -649,8 +650,8 @@ static void mlxbf_tmfifo_rxtx_header(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring,
 			if (ntohs(hdr.len) >
 			    __virtio16_to_cpu(virtio_legacy_is_little_endian(),
 					      config->mtu) +
-			    MLXBF_TMFIFO_NET_L2_OVERHEAD)
-				return;
+					      MLXBF_TMFIFO_NET_L2_OVERHEAD)
+				drop_rx = true;
 		} else {
 			vdev_id = VIRTIO_ID_CONSOLE;
 			hdr_len = 0;
@@ -665,16 +666,25 @@ static void mlxbf_tmfifo_rxtx_header(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring,
 
 			if (!tm_dev2)
 				return;
-			vring->desc = desc;
+			vring->desc = *desc;
 			vring = &tm_dev2->vrings[MLXBF_TMFIFO_VRING_RX];
 			*vring_change = true;
 		}
+
+		if (drop_rx && !IS_VRING_DROP(vring)) {
+			if (vring->desc_head)
+				mlxbf_tmfifo_release_pkt(vring);
+			*desc = &vring->drop_desc;
+			vring->desc_head = *desc;
+			vring->desc = *desc;
+		}
+
 		vring->pkt_len = ntohs(hdr.len) + hdr_len;
 	} else {
 		/* Network virtio has an extra header. */
 		hdr_len = (vring->vdev_id == VIRTIO_ID_NET) ?
 			   sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr) : 0;
-		vring->pkt_len = mlxbf_tmfifo_get_pkt_len(vring, desc);
+		vring->pkt_len = mlxbf_tmfifo_get_pkt_len(vring, *desc);
 		hdr.type = (vring->vdev_id == VIRTIO_ID_NET) ?
 			    VIRTIO_ID_NET : VIRTIO_ID_CONSOLE;
 		hdr.len = htons(vring->pkt_len - hdr_len);
@@ -723,7 +733,7 @@ static bool mlxbf_tmfifo_rxtx_one_desc(struct mlxbf_tmfifo_vring *vring,
 
 	/* Beginning of a packet. Start to Rx/Tx packet header. */
 	if (vring->pkt_len == 0) {
-		mlxbf_tmfifo_rxtx_header(vring, desc, is_rx, &vring_change);
+		mlxbf_tmfifo_rxtx_header(vring, &desc, is_rx, &vring_change);
 		(*avail)--;
 
 		/* Return if new packet is for another ring. */
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#308 lore raw

PATCH 305/367 net/tls: do not free tls_rec on async operation in bpf_exec_tx_verdict()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Liu Jian <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cfaa80c91f6f99b9342b6557f0f0e1143e434066 ]

I got the below warning when do fuzzing test:

BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in scatterwalk_copychunks+0x320/0x470
Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000008 by task kworker/u8:1/9

CPU: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/u8:1 Tainted: G           OE
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Workqueue: pencrypt_parallel padata_parallel_worker
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0x0/0x420
 show_stack+0x34/0x44
 dump_stack+0x1d0/0x248
 __kasan_report+0x138/0x140
 kasan_report+0x44/0x6c
 __asan_load4+0x94/0xd0
 scatterwalk_copychunks+0x320/0x470
 skcipher_next_slow+0x14c/0x290
 skcipher_walk_next+0x2fc/0x480
 skcipher_walk_first+0x9c/0x110
 skcipher_walk_aead_common+0x380/0x440
 skcipher_walk_aead_encrypt+0x54/0x70
 ccm_encrypt+0x13c/0x4d0
 crypto_aead_encrypt+0x7c/0xfc
 pcrypt_aead_enc+0x28/0x84
 padata_parallel_worker+0xd0/0x2dc
 process_one_work+0x49c/0xbdc
 worker_thread+0x124/0x880
 kthread+0x210/0x260
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18

This is because the value of rec_seq of tls_crypto_info configured by the user program is too large, for example, 0xffffffffffffff. In addition, TLS is asynchronously accelerated. When tls_do_encryption() returns -EINPROGRESS and sk->sk_err is set to EBADMSG due to rec_seq overflow, skmsg is released before the asynchronous encryption process ends. As a result, the UAF problem occurs during the asynchronous processing of the encryption module.

If the operation is asynchronous and the encryption module returns EINPROGRESS, do not free the record information.

Fixes 635d93981786 ("net/tls: free record only on encryption error")
---
 net/tls/tls_sw.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/tls/tls_sw.c +2 -2
index f4091fba4c722..62bc7e5c58e53 100644
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
 	psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
 	if (!psock || !policy) {
 		err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
-		if (err && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
+		if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
 			*copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
 			tls_free_open_rec(sk);
 			err = -sk->sk_err;
@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
 	switch (psock->eval) {
 	case __SK_PASS:
 		err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
-		if (err && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
+		if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
 			*copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
 			tls_free_open_rec(sk);
 			err = -sk->sk_err;
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#309 lore raw

PATCH 306/367 ixgbe: fix timestamp configuration code

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Vadim Fedorenko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3c44191dd76cf9c0cc49adaf34384cbd42ef8ad2 ]

The commit in fixes introduced flags to control the status of hardware configuration while processing packets. At the same time another structure is used to provide configuration of timestamper to user-space applications. The way it was coded makes this structures go out of sync easily. The repro is easy for 82599 chips:

[root@hostname ~]# hwstamp_ctl -i eth0 -r 12 -t 1
current settings:
tx_type 0
rx_filter 0
new settings:
tx_type 1
rx_filter 12

The eth0 device is properly configured to timestamp any PTPv2 events.

[root@hostname ~]# hwstamp_ctl -i eth0 -r 1 -t 1 current settings:
tx_type 1
rx_filter 12
SIOCSHWTSTAMP failed: Numerical result out of range
The requested time stamping mode is not supported by the hardware.

The error is properly returned because HW doesn't support all packets timestamping. But the adapter->flags is cleared of timestamp flags even though no HW configuration was done. From that point no RX timestamps are received by user-space application. But configuration shows good values:

[root@hostname ~]# hwstamp_ctl -i eth0
current settings:
tx_type 1
rx_filter 12

Fix the issue by applying new flags only when the HW was actually configured.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ptp.c | 28 +++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_ptp.c +15 -13
index d155181b939e4..f5e36417c33e2 100644
@@ -989,6 +989,7 @@ static int ixgbe_ptp_set_timestamp_mode(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter,
 	u32 tsync_tx_ctl = IXGBE_TSYNCTXCTL_ENABLED;
 	u32 tsync_rx_ctl = IXGBE_TSYNCRXCTL_ENABLED;
 	u32 tsync_rx_mtrl = PTP_EV_PORT << 16;
+	u32 aflags = adapter->flags;
 	bool is_l2 = false;
 	u32 regval;
 
@@ -1009,20 +1010,20 @@ static int ixgbe_ptp_set_timestamp_mode(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter,
 	case HWTSTAMP_FILTER_NONE:
 		tsync_rx_ctl = 0;
 		tsync_rx_mtrl = 0;
-		adapter->flags &= ~(IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED |
-				    IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_IN_REGISTER);
+		aflags &= ~(IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED |
+			    IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_IN_REGISTER);
 		break;
 	case HWTSTAMP_FILTER_PTP_V1_L4_SYNC:
 		tsync_rx_ctl |= IXGBE_TSYNCRXCTL_TYPE_L4_V1;
 		tsync_rx_mtrl |= IXGBE_RXMTRL_V1_SYNC_MSG;
-		adapter->flags |= (IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED |
-				   IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_IN_REGISTER);
+		aflags |= (IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED |
+			   IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_IN_REGISTER);
 		break;
 	case HWTSTAMP_FILTER_PTP_V1_L4_DELAY_REQ:
 		tsync_rx_ctl |= IXGBE_TSYNCRXCTL_TYPE_L4_V1;
 		tsync_rx_mtrl |= IXGBE_RXMTRL_V1_DELAY_REQ_MSG;
-		adapter->flags |= (IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED |
-				   IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_IN_REGISTER);
+		aflags |= (IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED |
+			   IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_IN_REGISTER);
 		break;
 	case HWTSTAMP_FILTER_PTP_V2_EVENT:
 	case HWTSTAMP_FILTER_PTP_V2_L2_EVENT:
@@ -1036,8 +1037,8 @@ static int ixgbe_ptp_set_timestamp_mode(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter,
 		tsync_rx_ctl |= IXGBE_TSYNCRXCTL_TYPE_EVENT_V2;
 		is_l2 = true;
 		config->rx_filter = HWTSTAMP_FILTER_PTP_V2_EVENT;
-		adapter->flags |= (IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED |
-				   IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_IN_REGISTER);
+		aflags |= (IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED |
+			   IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_IN_REGISTER);
 		break;
 	case HWTSTAMP_FILTER_PTP_V1_L4_EVENT:
 	case HWTSTAMP_FILTER_NTP_ALL:
@@ -1048,7 +1049,7 @@ static int ixgbe_ptp_set_timestamp_mode(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter,
 		if (hw->mac.type >= ixgbe_mac_X550) {
 			tsync_rx_ctl |= IXGBE_TSYNCRXCTL_TYPE_ALL;
 			config->rx_filter = HWTSTAMP_FILTER_ALL;
-			adapter->flags |= IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED;
+			aflags |= IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED;
 			break;
 		}
 		/* fall through */
@@ -1059,8 +1060,6 @@ static int ixgbe_ptp_set_timestamp_mode(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter,
 		 * Delay_Req messages and hardware does not support
 		 * timestamping all packets => return error
 		 */
-		adapter->flags &= ~(IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED |
-				    IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_IN_REGISTER);
 		config->rx_filter = HWTSTAMP_FILTER_NONE;
 		return -ERANGE;
 	}
@@ -1092,8 +1091,8 @@ static int ixgbe_ptp_set_timestamp_mode(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter,
 			       IXGBE_TSYNCRXCTL_TYPE_ALL |
 			       IXGBE_TSYNCRXCTL_TSIP_UT_EN;
 		config->rx_filter = HWTSTAMP_FILTER_ALL;
-		adapter->flags |= IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED;
-		adapter->flags &= ~IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_IN_REGISTER;
+		aflags |= IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_ENABLED;
+		aflags &= ~IXGBE_FLAG_RX_HWTSTAMP_IN_REGISTER;
 		is_l2 = true;
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -1126,6 +1125,9 @@ static int ixgbe_ptp_set_timestamp_mode(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter,
 
 	IXGBE_WRITE_FLUSH(hw);
 
+	/* configure adapter flags only when HW is actually configured */
+	adapter->flags = aflags;
+
 	/* clear TX/RX time stamp registers, just to be sure */
 	ixgbe_ptp_clear_tx_timestamp(adapter);
 	IXGBE_READ_REG(hw, IXGBE_RXSTMPH);
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#310 lore raw

PATCH 307/367 kcm: Fix error handling for SOCK_DGRAM in kcm_sendmsg().

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Kuniyuki Iwashima <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit a22730b1b4bf437c6bbfdeff5feddf54be4aeada ]

syzkaller found a memory leak in kcm_sendmsg(), and commit c821a88bd720 ("kcm: Fix memory leak in error path of kcm_sendmsg()") suppressed it by updating kcm_tx_msg(head)->last_skb if partial data is copied so that the following sendmsg() will resume from the skb.

However, we cannot know how many bytes were copied when we get the error. Thus, we could mess up the MSG_MORE queue.

When kcm_sendmsg() fails for SOCK_DGRAM, we should purge the queue as we do so for UDP by udp_flush_pending_frames().

Even without this change, when the error occurred, the following sendmsg() resumed from a wrong skb and the queue was messed up. However, we have yet to get such a report, and only syzkaller stumbled on it. So, this can be changed safely.

Note this does not change SOCK_SEQPACKET behaviour.

Fixes c821a88bd720 ("kcm: Fix memory leak in error path of kcm_sendmsg()")
Fixes ab7ac4eb9832 ("kcm: Kernel Connection Multiplexor module")
---
 net/kcm/kcmsock.c | 15 ++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
net/kcm/kcmsock.c +8 -7
index 8668348aa3f2b..8a8ea7e6774d5 100644
@@ -1066,17 +1066,18 @@ static int kcm_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
 out_error:
 	kcm_push(kcm);
 
-	if (copied && sock->type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
+	if (sock->type == SOCK_SEQPACKET) {
 		/* Wrote some bytes before encountering an
 		 * error, return partial success.
 		 */
-		goto partial_message;
-	}
-
-	if (head != kcm->seq_skb)
+		if (copied)
+			goto partial_message;
+		if (head != kcm->seq_skb)
+			kfree_skb(head);
+	} else {
 		kfree_skb(head);
-	else if (copied)
-		kcm_tx_msg(head)->last_skb = skb;
+		kcm->seq_skb = NULL;
+	}
 
 	err = sk_stream_error(sk, msg->msg_flags, err);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#311 lore raw

PATCH 308/367 drm/amd/display: Fix a bug when searching for insert_above_mpcc

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wesley Chalmers <[email protected]>

commit 3d028d5d60d516c536de1ddd3ebf3d55f3f8983b upstream.

[WHY]
Currently, when insert_plane is called with insert_above_mpcc parameter that is equal to tree->opp_list, the function returns NULL.

[HOW]
Instead, the function should insert the plane at the top of the tree.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_mpc.c |    5 +++--
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/dcn10/dcn10_mpc.c +3 -2
@@ -199,8 +199,9 @@ struct mpcc *mpc1_insert_plane(
 		/* check insert_above_mpcc exist in tree->opp_list */
 		struct mpcc *temp_mpcc = tree->opp_list;
 
-		while (temp_mpcc && temp_mpcc->mpcc_bot != insert_above_mpcc)
-			temp_mpcc = temp_mpcc->mpcc_bot;
+		if (temp_mpcc != insert_above_mpcc)
+			while (temp_mpcc && temp_mpcc->mpcc_bot != insert_above_mpcc)
+				temp_mpcc = temp_mpcc->mpcc_bot;
 		if (temp_mpcc == NULL)
 			return NULL;
 	}
author maintainer
#312 lore raw

PATCH 309/367 parisc: Drop loops_per_jiffy from per_cpu struct

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Helge Deller <[email protected]>

commit 93346da8ff47cc00f953c7f38a2d6ba11977fc42 upstream.

There is no need to keep a loops_per_jiffy value per cpu. Drop it.

---
 arch/parisc/include/asm/processor.h |    1 -
 arch/parisc/kernel/processor.c      |    5 ++---
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/parisc/include/asm/processor.h +0 -1
@@ -97,7 +97,6 @@ struct cpuinfo_parisc {
 	unsigned long cpu_loc;      /* CPU location from PAT firmware */
 	unsigned int state;
 	struct parisc_device *dev;
-	unsigned long loops_per_jiffy;
 };
 
 extern struct system_cpuinfo_parisc boot_cpu_data;
arch/parisc/kernel/processor.c +2 -3
@@ -163,7 +163,6 @@ static int __init processor_probe(struct
 	if (cpuid)
 		memset(p, 0, sizeof(struct cpuinfo_parisc));
 
-	p->loops_per_jiffy = loops_per_jiffy;
 	p->dev = dev;		/* Save IODC data in case we need it */
 	p->hpa = dev->hpa.start;	/* save CPU hpa */
 	p->cpuid = cpuid;	/* save CPU id */
@@ -440,8 +439,8 @@ show_cpuinfo (struct seq_file *m, void *
 		show_cache_info(m);
 
 		seq_printf(m, "bogomips\t: %lu.%02lu\n",
-			     cpuinfo->loops_per_jiffy / (500000 / HZ),
-			     (cpuinfo->loops_per_jiffy / (5000 / HZ)) % 100);
+			     loops_per_jiffy / (500000 / HZ),
+			     loops_per_jiffy / (5000 / HZ) % 100);
 
 		seq_printf(m, "software id\t: %ld\n\n",
 				boot_cpu_data.pdc.model.sw_id);
author maintainer
#313 lore raw

PATCH 310/367 autofs: fix memory leak of waitqueues in autofs_catatonic_mode

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ccbe77f7e45dfb4420f7f531b650c00c6e9c7507 ]

Syzkaller reports a memory leak:

BUG: memory leak
unreferenced object 0xffff88810b279e00 (size 96):
  comm "syz-executor399", pid 3631, jiffies 4294964921 (age 23.870s)
  hex dump (first 32 bytes):
    00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 08 9e 27 0b 81 88 ff ff  ..........'.....
    08 9e 27 0b 81 88 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ..'.............
  backtrace:
    [<ffffffff814cfc90>] kmalloc_trace+0x20/0x90 mm/slab_common.c:1046
    [<ffffffff81bb75ca>] kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:576 [inline]
    [<ffffffff81bb75ca>] autofs_wait+0x3fa/0x9a0 fs/autofs/waitq.c:378
    [<ffffffff81bb88a7>] autofs_do_expire_multi+0xa7/0x3e0 fs/autofs/expire.c:593
    [<ffffffff81bb8c33>] autofs_expire_multi+0x53/0x80 fs/autofs/expire.c:619
    [<ffffffff81bb6972>] autofs_root_ioctl_unlocked+0x322/0x3b0 fs/autofs/root.c:897
    [<ffffffff81bb6a95>] autofs_root_ioctl+0x25/0x30 fs/autofs/root.c:910
    [<ffffffff81602a9c>] vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
    [<ffffffff81602a9c>] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline]
    [<ffffffff81602a9c>] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline]
    [<ffffffff81602a9c>] __x64_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:856
    [<ffffffff84608225>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
    [<ffffffff84608225>] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
    [<ffffffff84800087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

autofs_wait_queue structs should be freed if their wait_ctr becomes zero. Otherwise they will be lost.

In this case an AUTOFS_IOC_EXPIRE_MULTI ioctl is done, then a new waitqueue struct is allocated in autofs_wait(), its initial wait_ctr equals 2. After that wait_event_killable() is interrupted (it returns -ERESTARTSYS), so that 'wq->name.name == NULL' condition may be not satisfied. Actually, this condition can be satisfied when autofs_wait_release() or autofs_catatonic_mode() is called and, what is also important, wait_ctr is decremented in those places. Upon the exit of autofs_wait(), wait_ctr is decremented to 1. Then the unmounting process
begins: kill_sb calls autofs_catatonic_mode(), which should have freed the waitqueues, but it only decrements its usage counter to zero which is not a correct behaviour.

edit:imk
This description is of course not correct. The umount performed as a result of an expire is a umount of a mount that has been automounted, it's not the autofs mount itself. They happen independently, usually after everything mounted within the autofs file system has been expired away. If everything hasn't been expired away the automount daemon can still exit leaving mounts in place. But expires done in both cases will result in a notification that calls autofs_wait_release() with a result status. The problem case is the summary execution of of the automount daemon. In this case any waiting processes won't be woken up until either they are terminated or the mount is umounted.
end edit: imk

So in catatonic mode we should free waitqueues which counter becomes zero.

edit: imk
Initially I was concerned that the calling of autofs_wait_release() and autofs_catatonic_mode() was not mutually exclusive but that can't be the case (obviously) because the queue entry (or entries) is removed from the list when either of these two functions are called. Consequently the wait entry will be freed by only one of these functions or by the woken process in autofs_wait() depending on the order of the calls.
end edit: imk

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 fs/autofs/waitq.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/autofs/waitq.c +2 -1
index b04c528b19d34..1230bdf329898 100644
@@ -32,8 +32,9 @@ void autofs_catatonic_mode(struct autofs_sb_info *sbi)
 		wq->status = -ENOENT; /* Magic is gone - report failure */
 		kfree(wq->name.name);
 		wq->name.name = NULL;
-		wq->wait_ctr--;
 		wake_up_interruptible(&wq->queue);
+		if (!--wq->wait_ctr)
+			kfree(wq);
 		wq = nwq;
 	}
 	fput(sbi->pipe);	/* Close the pipe */
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#314 lore raw

PATCH 311/367 btrfs: output extra debug info if we failed to find an inline backref

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7f72f50547b7af4ddf985b07fc56600a4deba281 ]

[BUG]
Syzbot reported several warning triggered inside
lookup_inline_extent_backref().

[CAUSE]
As usual, the reproducer doesn't reliably trigger locally here, but at least we know the WARN_ON() is triggered when an inline backref can not be found, and it can only be triggered when @insert is true. (I.e. inserting a new inline backref, which means the backref should already exist)

[ENHANCEMENT]
After the WARN_ON(), dump all the parameters and the extent tree leaf to help debug.

---
 fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c +5 -0
index e47f53e780890..a9191a0d2f4c9 100644
@@ -895,6 +895,11 @@ int lookup_inline_extent_backref(struct btrfs_trans_handle *trans,
 		err = -ENOENT;
 		goto out;
 	} else if (WARN_ON(ret)) {
+		btrfs_print_leaf(path->nodes[0]);
+		btrfs_err(fs_info,
+"extent item not found for insert, bytenr %llu num_bytes %llu parent %llu root_objectid %llu owner %llu offset %llu",
+			  bytenr, num_bytes, parent, root_objectid, owner,
+			  offset);
 		err = -EIO;
 		goto out;
 	}
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#315 lore raw

PATCH 312/367 locks: fix KASAN: use-after-free in trace_event_raw_event_filelock_lock

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Will Shiu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 74f6f5912693ce454384eaeec48705646a21c74f ]

As following backtrace, the struct file_lock request , in posix_lock_inode is free before ftrace function using.
Replace the ftrace function ahead free flow could fix the use-after-free issue.

[name:report&]=============================================== BUG:KASAN: use-after-free in trace_event_raw_event_filelock_lock+0x80/0x12c [name:report&]Read at addr f6ffff8025622620 by task NativeThread/16753 [name:report_hw_tags&]Pointer tag: [f6], memory tag: [fe] [name:report&]
BT:

Hardware name: MT6897 (DT)
Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xf8/0x148
 show_stack+0x18/0x24
 dump_stack_lvl+0x60/0x7c
 print_report+0x2c8/0xa08
 kasan_report+0xb0/0x120
 __do_kernel_fault+0xc8/0x248
 do_bad_area+0x30/0xdc
 do_tag_check_fault+0x1c/0x30
 do_mem_abort+0x58/0xbc
 el1_abort+0x3c/0x5c
 el1h_64_sync_handler+0x54/0x90
 el1h_64_sync+0x68/0x6c
 trace_event_raw_event_filelock_lock+0x80/0x12c
 posix_lock_inode+0xd0c/0xd60
 do_lock_file_wait+0xb8/0x190
 fcntl_setlk+0x2d8/0x440

...
[name:report&]
[name:report&]Allocated by task 16752:
...

 slab_post_alloc_hook+0x74/0x340
 kmem_cache_alloc+0x1b0/0x2f0
 posix_lock_inode+0xb0/0xd60

...
[name:report&]
[name:report&]Freed by task 16752:
...

  kmem_cache_free+0x274/0x5b0
  locks_dispose_list+0x3c/0x148
  posix_lock_inode+0xc40/0xd60
  do_lock_file_wait+0xb8/0x190
  fcntl_setlk+0x2d8/0x440
  do_fcntl+0x150/0xc18

...

---
 fs/locks.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/locks.c +1 -1
index b8a31c1c4fff3..90f92784aa554 100644
@@ -1338,6 +1338,7 @@ static int posix_lock_inode(struct inode *inode, struct file_lock *request,
  out:
 	spin_unlock(&ctx->flc_lock);
 	percpu_up_read(&file_rwsem);
+	trace_posix_lock_inode(inode, request, error);
 	/*
 	 * Free any unused locks.
 	 */
@@ -1346,7 +1347,6 @@ static int posix_lock_inode(struct inode *inode, struct file_lock *request,
 	if (new_fl2)
 		locks_free_lock(new_fl2);
 	locks_dispose_list(&dispose);
-	trace_posix_lock_inode(inode, request, error);
 
 	return error;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#316 lore raw

PATCH 313/367 ACPICA: Add AML_NO_OPERAND_RESOLVE flag to Timer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Abhishek Mainkar <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3a21ffdbc825e0919db9da0e27ee5ff2cc8a863e ]

ACPICA commit 90310989a0790032f5a0140741ff09b545af4bc5

According to the ACPI specification 19.6.134, no argument is required to be passed for ASL Timer instruction. For taking care of no argument, AML_NO_OPERAND_RESOLVE flag is added to ASL Timer instruction opcode.

When ASL timer instruction interpreted by ACPI interpreter, getting error. After adding AML_NO_OPERAND_RESOLVE flag to ASL Timer instruction opcode, issue is not observed.

=============================================================

UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in acpica/dswexec.c:401:12 index -1 is out of range for type 'union acpi_operand_object *[9]'
CPU: 37 PID: 1678 Comm: cat Not tainted
6.0.0-dev-th500-6.0.y-1+bcf8c46459e407-generic-64k
HW name: NVIDIA BIOS v1.1.1-d7acbfc-dirty 12/19/2022 Call trace:
 dump_backtrace+0xe0/0x130
 show_stack+0x20/0x60
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
 dump_stack+0x18/0x34
 ubsan_epilogue+0x10/0x50
 __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x80/0x90
 acpi_ds_exec_end_op+0x1bc/0x6d8
 acpi_ps_parse_loop+0x57c/0x618
 acpi_ps_parse_aml+0x1e0/0x4b4
 acpi_ps_execute_method+0x24c/0x2b8
 acpi_ns_evaluate+0x3a8/0x4bc
 acpi_evaluate_object+0x15c/0x37c
 acpi_evaluate_integer+0x54/0x15c
 show_power+0x8c/0x12c [acpi_power_meter]
---
 drivers/acpi/acpica/psopcode.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/acpi/acpica/psopcode.c +1 -1
index 43775c5ce17c5..2f9b226ec4f63 100644
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ const struct acpi_opcode_info acpi_gbl_aml_op_info[AML_NUM_OPCODES] = {
 
 /* 7E */ ACPI_OP("Timer", ARGP_TIMER_OP, ARGI_TIMER_OP, ACPI_TYPE_ANY,
 			 AML_CLASS_EXECUTE, AML_TYPE_EXEC_0A_0T_1R,
-			 AML_FLAGS_EXEC_0A_0T_1R),
+			 AML_FLAGS_EXEC_0A_0T_1R | AML_NO_OPERAND_RESOLVE),
 
 /* ACPI 5.0 opcodes */
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#317 lore raw

PATCH 314/367 kernel/fork: beware of __put_task_struct() calling context

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Wander Lairson Costa <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d243b34459cea30cfe5f3a9b2feb44e7daff9938 ]

Under PREEMPT_RT, __put_task_struct() indirectly acquires sleeping locks. Therefore, it can't be called from an non-preemptible context.

One practical example is splat inside inactive_task_timer(), which is called in a interrupt context:

  CPU: 1 PID: 2848 Comm: life Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W ---------
   Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL388p Gen8, BIOS P70 07/15/2012
   Call Trace:
   dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x7d
   mark_lock_irq.cold+0x33/0xba
   mark_lock+0x1e7/0x400
   mark_usage+0x11d/0x140
   __lock_acquire+0x30d/0x930
   lock_acquire.part.0+0x9c/0x210
   rt_spin_lock+0x27/0xe0
   refill_obj_stock+0x3d/0x3a0
   kmem_cache_free+0x357/0x560
   inactive_task_timer+0x1ad/0x340
   __run_hrtimer+0x8a/0x1a0
   __hrtimer_run_queues+0x91/0x130
   hrtimer_interrupt+0x10f/0x220
   __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x7b/0xd0
   sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x4f/0xd0
   asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x12/0x20
   RIP: 0033:0x7fff196bf6f5

Instead of calling __put_task_struct() directly, we defer it using call_rcu(). A more natural approach would use a workqueue, but since in PREEMPT_RT, we can't allocate dynamic memory from atomic context, the code would become more complex because we would need to put the work_struct instance in the task_struct and initialize it when we allocate a new task_struct.

The issue is reproducible with stress-ng:

while true; do

      stress-ng --sched deadline --sched-period 1000000000 \
	      --sched-runtime 800000000 --sched-deadline \
	      1000000000 --mmapfork 23 -t 20

done

---
 include/linux/sched/task.h | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 kernel/fork.c              |  8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/sched/task.h +27 -1
index 853ab403e77b8..e3c20a4f81f5e 100644
@@ -113,10 +113,36 @@ static inline struct task_struct *get_task_struct(struct task_struct *t)
 }
 
 extern void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *t);
+extern void __put_task_struct_rcu_cb(struct rcu_head *rhp);
 
 static inline void put_task_struct(struct task_struct *t)
 {
-	if (refcount_dec_and_test(&t->usage))
+	if (!refcount_dec_and_test(&t->usage))
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * under PREEMPT_RT, we can't call put_task_struct
+	 * in atomic context because it will indirectly
+	 * acquire sleeping locks.
+	 *
+	 * call_rcu() will schedule delayed_put_task_struct_rcu()
+	 * to be called in process context.
+	 *
+	 * __put_task_struct() is called when
+	 * refcount_dec_and_test(&t->usage) succeeds.
+	 *
+	 * This means that it can't "conflict" with
+	 * put_task_struct_rcu_user() which abuses ->rcu the same
+	 * way; rcu_users has a reference so task->usage can't be
+	 * zero after rcu_users 1 -> 0 transition.
+	 *
+	 * delayed_free_task() also uses ->rcu, but it is only called
+	 * when it fails to fork a process. Therefore, there is no
+	 * way it can conflict with put_task_struct().
+	 */
+	if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT) && !preemptible())
+		call_rcu(&t->rcu, __put_task_struct_rcu_cb);
+	else
 		__put_task_struct(t);
 }
 
kernel/fork.c +8 -0
index 39134effb2bff..1728aa77861cb 100644
@@ -749,6 +749,14 @@ void __put_task_struct(struct task_struct *tsk)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__put_task_struct);
 
+void __put_task_struct_rcu_cb(struct rcu_head *rhp)
+{
+	struct task_struct *task = container_of(rhp, struct task_struct, rcu);
+
+	__put_task_struct(task);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__put_task_struct_rcu_cb);
+
 void __init __weak arch_task_cache_init(void) { }
 
 /*
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#318 lore raw

PATCH 315/367 ACPI: video: Add backlight=native DMI quirk for Lenovo Ideapad Z470

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Slaby (SUSE) <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 96b709be183c56293933ef45b8b75f8af268c6de ]

The Lenovo Ideapad Z470 predates Windows 8, so it defaults to using acpi_video for backlight control. But this is not functional on this model.

Add a DMI quirk to use the native backlight interface which works.

---
 drivers/acpi/video_detect.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/video_detect.c +9 -0
index ef40cd7f36eba..be9c70806b620 100644
@@ -310,6 +310,15 @@ static const struct dmi_system_id video_detect_dmi_table[] = {
 		DMI_MATCH(DMI_BOARD_NAME, "Lenovo IdeaPad S405"),
 		},
 	},
+	{
+	 /* https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1208724 */
+	 .callback = video_detect_force_native,
+	 /* Lenovo Ideapad Z470 */
+	 .matches = {
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_SYS_VENDOR, "LENOVO"),
+		DMI_MATCH(DMI_PRODUCT_VERSION, "IdeaPad Z470"),
+		},
+	},
 	{
 	 /* https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1187004 */
 	 .callback = video_detect_force_native,
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#319 lore raw

PATCH 316/367 perf/smmuv3: Enable HiSilicon Erratum 162001900 quirk for HIP08/09

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yicong Yang <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0242737dc4eb9f6e9a5ea594b3f93efa0b12f28d ]

Some HiSilicon SMMU PMCG suffers the erratum 162001900 that the PMU disable control sometimes fail to disable the counters. This will lead to error or inaccurate data since before we enable the counters the counter's still counting for the event used in last perf session.

This patch tries to fix this by hardening the global disable process. Before disable the PMU, writing an invalid event type (0xffff) to focibly stop the counters. Correspondingly restore each events on pmu::pmu_enable().

---
 Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.rst |  3 ++
 drivers/acpi/arm64/iort.c              |  5 ++-
 drivers/perf/arm_smmuv3_pmu.c          | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 include/linux/acpi_iort.h              |  1 +
 4 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/arm64/silicon-errata.rst +3 -0
index 36a8c01191a07..6b70b6aabcffe 100644
@@ -134,6 +134,9 @@ stable kernels.
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | Hisilicon      | Hip08 SMMU PMCG | #162001800      | N/A                         |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
+| Hisilicon      | Hip08 SMMU PMCG | #162001900      | N/A                         |
+|                | Hip09 SMMU PMCG |                 |                             |
++----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
 | Qualcomm Tech. | Kryo/Falkor v1  | E1003           | QCOM_FALKOR_ERRATUM_1003    |
 +----------------+-----------------+-----------------+-----------------------------+
drivers/acpi/arm64/iort.c +4 -1
index 553c89b0bdcbb..09eb170f26d27 100644
@@ -1393,7 +1393,10 @@ static void __init arm_smmu_v3_pmcg_init_resources(struct resource *res,
 static struct acpi_platform_list pmcg_plat_info[] __initdata = {
 	/* HiSilicon Hip08 Platform */
 	{"HISI  ", "HIP08   ", 0, ACPI_SIG_IORT, greater_than_or_equal,
-	 "Erratum #162001800", IORT_SMMU_V3_PMCG_HISI_HIP08},
+	 "Erratum #162001800, Erratum #162001900", IORT_SMMU_V3_PMCG_HISI_HIP08},
+	/* HiSilicon Hip09 Platform */
+	{"HISI  ", "HIP09   ", 0, ACPI_SIG_IORT, greater_than_or_equal,
+	 "Erratum #162001900", IORT_SMMU_V3_PMCG_HISI_HIP09},
 	{ }
 };
 
drivers/perf/arm_smmuv3_pmu.c +45 -1

76 lines not on this page · raw message

include/linux/acpi_iort.h +1 -0
index 8e7e2ec37f1b2..64f700254ca0f 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  */
 #define IORT_SMMU_V3_PMCG_GENERIC        0x00000000 /* Generic SMMUv3 PMCG */
 #define IORT_SMMU_V3_PMCG_HISI_HIP08     0x00000001 /* HiSilicon HIP08 PMCG */
+#define IORT_SMMU_V3_PMCG_HISI_HIP09     0x00000002 /* HiSilicon HIP09 PMCG */
 
 int iort_register_domain_token(int trans_id, phys_addr_t base,
 			       struct fwnode_handle *fw_node);
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#320 lore raw

PATCH 317/367 hw_breakpoint: fix single-stepping when using bpf_overflow_handler

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tomislav Novak <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit d11a69873d9a7435fe6a48531e165ab80a8b1221 ]

Arm platforms use is_default_overflow_handler() to determine if the hw_breakpoint code should single-step over the breakpoint trigger or let the custom handler deal with it.

Since bpf_overflow_handler() currently isn't recognized as a default handler, attaching a BPF program to a PERF_TYPE_BREAKPOINT event causes it to keep firing (the instruction triggering the data abort exception is never skipped). For example:

  # bpftrace -e 'watchpoint:0x10000:4:w { print("hit") }' -c ./test
  Attaching 1 probe...
  hit
  hit
  [...]
  ^C

(./test performs a single 4-byte store to 0x10000)

This patch replaces the check with uses_default_overflow_handler(), which accounts for the bpf_overflow_handler() case by also testing if one of the perf_event_output functions gets invoked indirectly, via orig_default_handler.

---
 arch/arm/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c   |  8 ++++----
 arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c |  4 ++--
 include/linux/perf_event.h        | 22 +++++++++++++++++++---
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/arm/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +4 -4
index b06d9ea07c846..a69dd64a84017 100644
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ int hw_breakpoint_arch_parse(struct perf_event *bp,
 	hw->address &= ~alignment_mask;
 	hw->ctrl.len <<= offset;
 
-	if (is_default_overflow_handler(bp)) {
+	if (uses_default_overflow_handler(bp)) {
 		/*
 		 * Mismatch breakpoints are required for single-stepping
 		 * breakpoints.
@@ -795,7 +795,7 @@ static void watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
 		 * Otherwise, insert a temporary mismatch breakpoint so that
 		 * we can single-step over the watchpoint trigger.
 		 */
-		if (!is_default_overflow_handler(wp))
+		if (!uses_default_overflow_handler(wp))
 			continue;
 step:
 		enable_single_step(wp, instruction_pointer(regs));
@@ -808,7 +808,7 @@ static void watchpoint_handler(unsigned long addr, unsigned int fsr,
 		info->trigger = addr;
 		pr_debug("watchpoint fired: address = 0x%x\n", info->trigger);
 		perf_bp_event(wp, regs);
-		if (is_default_overflow_handler(wp))
+		if (uses_default_overflow_handler(wp))
 			enable_single_step(wp, instruction_pointer(regs));
 	}
 
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ static void breakpoint_handler(unsigned long unknown, struct pt_regs *regs)
 			info->trigger = addr;
 			pr_debug("breakpoint fired: address = 0x%x\n", addr);
 			perf_bp_event(bp, regs);
-			if (is_default_overflow_handler(bp))
+			if (uses_default_overflow_handler(bp))
 				enable_single_step(bp, addr);
 			goto unlock;
 		}
arch/arm64/kernel/hw_breakpoint.c +2 -2
index b4a1607958246..534578eba556e 100644
@@ -654,7 +654,7 @@ static int breakpoint_handler(unsigned long unused, unsigned int esr,
 		perf_bp_event(bp, regs);
 
 		/* Do we need to handle the stepping? */
-		if (is_default_overflow_handler(bp))
+		if (uses_default_overflow_handler(bp))
 			step = 1;
 unlock:
 		rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ static u64 get_distance_from_watchpoint(unsigned long addr, u64 val,
 static int watchpoint_report(struct perf_event *wp, unsigned long addr,
 			     struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	int step = is_default_overflow_handler(wp);
+	int step = uses_default_overflow_handler(wp);
 	struct arch_hw_breakpoint *info = counter_arch_bp(wp);
 
 	info->trigger = addr;
include/linux/perf_event.h +19 -3
index b7ac395513c0f..c99e2f851d312 100644
@@ -1018,15 +1018,31 @@ extern int perf_event_output(struct perf_event *event,
 			     struct pt_regs *regs);
 
 static inline bool
-is_default_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event)
+__is_default_overflow_handler(perf_overflow_handler_t overflow_handler)
 {
-	if (likely(event->overflow_handler == perf_event_output_forward))
+	if (likely(overflow_handler == perf_event_output_forward))
 		return true;
-	if (unlikely(event->overflow_handler == perf_event_output_backward))
+	if (unlikely(overflow_handler == perf_event_output_backward))
 		return true;
 	return false;
 }
 
+#define is_default_overflow_handler(event) \
+	__is_default_overflow_handler((event)->overflow_handler)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+static inline bool uses_default_overflow_handler(struct perf_event *event)
+{
+	if (likely(is_default_overflow_handler(event)))
+		return true;
+
+	return __is_default_overflow_handler(event->orig_overflow_handler);
+}
+#else
+#define uses_default_overflow_handler(event) \
+	is_default_overflow_handler(event)
+#endif
+
 extern void
 perf_event_header__init_id(struct perf_event_header *header,
 			   struct perf_sample_data *data,
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#321 lore raw

PATCH 318/367 devlink: remove reload failed checks in params get/set callbacks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 633d76ad01ad0321a1ace3e5cc4fed06753d7ac4 ]

The checks in question were introduced by:
commit 6b4db2e528f6 ("devlink: Fix use-after-free after a failed reload"). That fixed an issue of reload with mlxsw driver.

Back then, that was a valid fix, because there was a limitation in place that prevented drivers from registering/unregistering params when devlink instance was registered.

It was possible to do the fix differently by changing drivers to register/unregister params in appropriate places making sure the ops operate only on memory which is allocated and initialized. But that, as a dependency, would require to remove the limitation mentioned above.

Eventually, this limitation was lifted by:
commit 1d18bb1a4ddd ("devlink: allow registering parameters after the instance")

Also, the alternative fix (which also fixed another issue) was done by:
commit 74cbc3c03c82 ("mlxsw: spectrum_acl_tcam: Move devlink param to TCAM code").

Therefore, the checks are no longer relevant. Each driver should make sure to have the params registered only when the memory the ops are working with is allocated and initialized.

So remove the checks.

---
 net/core/devlink.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
net/core/devlink.c +2 -2
index b4dabe5d89f72..5bd6330ab4275 100644
@@ -2953,7 +2953,7 @@ static int devlink_param_get(struct devlink *devlink,
 			     const struct devlink_param *param,
 			     struct devlink_param_gset_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	if (!param->get || devlink->reload_failed)
+	if (!param->get)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	return param->get(devlink, param->id, ctx);
 }
@@ -2962,7 +2962,7 @@ static int devlink_param_set(struct devlink *devlink,
 			     const struct devlink_param *param,
 			     struct devlink_param_gset_ctx *ctx)
 {
-	if (!param->set || devlink->reload_failed)
+	if (!param->set)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	return param->set(devlink, param->id, ctx);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#322 lore raw

PATCH 319/367 wifi: ath9k: fix printk specifier

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dongliang Mu <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 061115fbfb2ce5870c9a004d68dc63138c07c782 ]

Smatch reports:

ath_pci_probe() warn: argument 4 to %lx specifier is cast from pointer ath_ahb_probe() warn: argument 4 to %lx specifier is cast from pointer

Fix it by modifying %lx to %p in the printk format string.

Note that with this change, the pointer address will be printed as a hashed value by default. This is appropriate because the kernel should not leak kernel pointers to user space in an informational message. If someone wants to see the real address for debugging purposes, this can be achieved with the no_hash_pointers kernel option.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ahb.c | 4 ++--
 drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/pci.c | 4 ++--
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/ahb.c +2 -2
index 63019c3de034d..26023e3b4b9df 100644
@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ static int ath_ahb_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	ah = sc->sc_ah;
 	ath9k_hw_name(ah, hw_name, sizeof(hw_name));
-	wiphy_info(hw->wiphy, "%s mem=0x%lx, irq=%d\n",
-		   hw_name, (unsigned long)mem, irq);
+	wiphy_info(hw->wiphy, "%s mem=0x%p, irq=%d\n",
+		   hw_name, mem, irq);
 
 	return 0;
 
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/pci.c +2 -2
index 92b2dd396436a..cb3318bd3cad2 100644
@@ -993,8 +993,8 @@ static int ath_pci_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *id)
 	sc->sc_ah->msi_reg = 0;
 
 	ath9k_hw_name(sc->sc_ah, hw_name, sizeof(hw_name));
-	wiphy_info(hw->wiphy, "%s mem=0x%lx, irq=%d\n",
-		   hw_name, (unsigned long)sc->mem, pdev->irq);
+	wiphy_info(hw->wiphy, "%s mem=0x%p, irq=%d\n",
+		   hw_name, sc->mem, pdev->irq);
 
 	return 0;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#323 lore raw

PATCH 320/367 wifi: mwifiex: fix fortify warning

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Dmitry Antipov <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit dcce94b80a954a8968ff29fafcfb066d6197fa9a ]

When compiling with gcc 13.1 and CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE=y, I've noticed the following:

In function ‘fortify_memcpy_chk’,
inlined from ‘mwifiex_construct_tdls_action_frame’ at drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/tdls.c:765:3, inlined from ‘mwifiex_send_tdls_action_frame’ at drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/tdls.c:856:6:
./include/linux/fortify-string.h:529:25: warning: call to ‘__read_overflow2_field’ declared with attribute warning: detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter);
maybe use struct_group()? [-Wattribute-warning]

  529 |                         __read_overflow2_field(q_size_field, size);
      |                         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

The compiler actually complains on:

memmove(pos + ETH_ALEN, &mgmt->u.action.category,

	sizeof(mgmt->u.action.u.tdls_discover_resp));

and it happens because the fortification logic interprets this as an attempt to overread 1-byte 'u.action.category' member of 'struct ieee80211_mgmt'. To silence this warning, it's enough to pass an address of 'u.action' itself instead of an address of its first member.

This also fixes an improper usage of 'sizeof()'. Since 'skb' is extended with 'sizeof(mgmt->u.action.u.tdls_discover_resp) + 1' bytes (where 1 is actually 'sizeof(mgmt->u.action.category)'), I assume that the same number of bytes should be copied.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/tdls.c | 9 ++++++---
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/tdls.c +6 -3
index f8f282ce39bd4..17f8379351923 100644
@@ -734,6 +734,7 @@ mwifiex_construct_tdls_action_frame(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
 	int ret;
 	u16 capab;
 	struct ieee80211_ht_cap *ht_cap;
+	unsigned int extra;
 	u8 radio, *pos;
 
 	capab = priv->curr_bss_params.bss_descriptor.cap_info_bitmap;
@@ -752,7 +753,10 @@ mwifiex_construct_tdls_action_frame(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
 
 	switch (action_code) {
 	case WLAN_PUB_ACTION_TDLS_DISCOVER_RES:
-		skb_put(skb, sizeof(mgmt->u.action.u.tdls_discover_resp) + 1);
+		/* See the layout of 'struct ieee80211_mgmt'. */
+		extra = sizeof(mgmt->u.action.u.tdls_discover_resp) +
+			sizeof(mgmt->u.action.category);
+		skb_put(skb, extra);
 		mgmt->u.action.category = WLAN_CATEGORY_PUBLIC;
 		mgmt->u.action.u.tdls_discover_resp.action_code =
 					      WLAN_PUB_ACTION_TDLS_DISCOVER_RES;
@@ -761,8 +765,7 @@ mwifiex_construct_tdls_action_frame(struct mwifiex_private *priv,
 		mgmt->u.action.u.tdls_discover_resp.capability =
 							     cpu_to_le16(capab);
 		/* move back for addr4 */
-		memmove(pos + ETH_ALEN, &mgmt->u.action.category,
-			sizeof(mgmt->u.action.u.tdls_discover_resp));
+		memmove(pos + ETH_ALEN, &mgmt->u.action, extra);
 		/* init address 4 */
 		eth_broadcast_addr(pos);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#324 lore raw

PATCH 321/367 crypto: lib/mpi - avoid null pointer deref in mpi_cmp_ui()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Mark O'Donovan <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9e47a758b70167c9301d2b44d2569f86c7796f2d ]

During NVMeTCP Authentication a controller can trigger a kernel oops by specifying the 8192 bit Diffie Hellman group and passing a correctly sized, but zeroed Diffie Hellamn value. mpi_cmp_ui() was detecting this if the second parameter was 0, but 1 is passed from dh_is_pubkey_valid(). This causes the null pointer u->d to be dereferenced towards the end of mpi_cmp_ui()

---
 lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
lib/mpi/mpi-cmp.c +6 -2
index d25e9e96c310f..ceaebe181cd70 100644
@@ -25,8 +25,12 @@ int mpi_cmp_ui(MPI u, unsigned long v)
 	mpi_limb_t limb = v;
 
 	mpi_normalize(u);
-	if (!u->nlimbs && !limb)
-		return 0;
+	if (u->nlimbs == 0) {
+		if (v == 0)
+			return 0;
+		else
+			return -1;
+	}
 	if (u->sign)
 		return -1;
 	if (u->nlimbs > 1)
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#325 lore raw

PATCH 322/367 tpm_tis: Resend command to recover from data transfer errors

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Alexander Steffen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 280db21e153d8810ce3b93640c63ae922bcb9e8e ]

Similar to the transmission of TPM responses, also the transmission of TPM commands may become corrupted. Instead of aborting when detecting such issues, try resending the command again.

---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c | 15 +++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/char/tpm/tpm_tis_core.c +11 -4
index ef47d1d58ac3a..a084f732c1804 100644
@@ -421,10 +421,17 @@ static int tpm_tis_send_main(struct tpm_chip *chip, const u8 *buf, size_t len)
 	int rc;
 	u32 ordinal;
 	unsigned long dur;
-
-	rc = tpm_tis_send_data(chip, buf, len);
-	if (rc < 0)
-		return rc;
+	unsigned int try;
+
+	for (try = 0; try < TPM_RETRY; try++) {
+		rc = tpm_tis_send_data(chip, buf, len);
+		if (rc >= 0)
+			/* Data transfer done successfully */
+			break;
+		else if (rc != -EIO)
+			/* Data transfer failed, not recoverable */
+			return rc;
+	}
 
 	/* go and do it */
 	rc = tpm_tis_write8(priv, TPM_STS(priv->locality), TPM_STS_GO);
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#326 lore raw

PATCH 323/367 mmc: sdhci-esdhc-imx: improve ESDHC_FLAG_ERR010450

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Giulio Benetti <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5ae4b0d8875caa44946e579420c7fd5740d58653 ]

Errata ERR010450 only shows up if voltage is 1.8V, but if the device is supplied by 3v3 the errata can be ignored. So let's check for if quirk SDHCI_QUIRK2_NO_1_8_V is defined or not before limiting the frequency.

---
 drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-esdhc-imx.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/mmc/host/sdhci-esdhc-imx.c +4 -3
index b3f761eca8299..762288c6d30ce 100644
@@ -153,8 +153,8 @@
 #define ESDHC_FLAG_HS400		BIT(9)
 /*
  * The IP has errata ERR010450
- * uSDHC: Due to the I/O timing limit, for SDR mode, SD card clock can't
- * exceed 150MHz, for DDR mode, SD card clock can't exceed 45MHz.
+ * uSDHC: At 1.8V due to the I/O timing limit, for SDR mode, SD card
+ * clock can't exceed 150MHz, for DDR mode, SD card clock can't exceed 45MHz.
  */
 #define ESDHC_FLAG_ERR010450		BIT(10)
 /* The IP supports HS400ES mode */
@@ -777,7 +777,8 @@ static inline void esdhc_pltfm_set_clock(struct sdhci_host *host,
 		| ESDHC_CLOCK_MASK);
 	sdhci_writel(host, temp, ESDHC_SYSTEM_CONTROL);
 
-	if (imx_data->socdata->flags & ESDHC_FLAG_ERR010450) {
+	if ((imx_data->socdata->flags & ESDHC_FLAG_ERR010450) &&
+	    (!(host->quirks2 & SDHCI_QUIRK2_NO_1_8_V))) {
 		unsigned int max_clock;
 
 		max_clock = imx_data->is_ddr ? 45000000 : 150000000;
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#327 lore raw

PATCH 324/367 alx: fix OOB-read compiler warning

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: GONG, Ruiqi <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 3a198c95c95da10ad844cbeade2fe40bdf14c411 ]

The following message shows up when compiling with W=1:

In function ‘fortify_memcpy_chk’,
inlined from ‘alx_get_ethtool_stats’ at drivers/net/ethernet/atheros/alx/ethtool.c:297:2:
./include/linux/fortify-string.h:592:4: error: call to ‘__read_overflow2_field’ declared with attribute warning: detected read beyond size of field (2nd parameter); maybe use struct_group()? [-Werror=attribute-warning]

  592 |    __read_overflow2_field(q_size_field, size);
      |    ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

In order to get alx stats altogether, alx_get_ethtool_stats() reads beyond hw->stats.rx_ok. Fix this warning by directly copying hw->stats, and refactor the unnecessarily complicated BUILD_BUG_ON btw.

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/atheros/alx/ethtool.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/ethernet/atheros/alx/ethtool.c +2 -3
index 2f4eabf652e80..51e5aa2c74b34 100644
@@ -281,9 +281,8 @@ static void alx_get_ethtool_stats(struct net_device *netdev,
 	spin_lock(&alx->stats_lock);
 
 	alx_update_hw_stats(hw);
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(hw->stats) - offsetof(struct alx_hw_stats, rx_ok) <
-		     ALX_NUM_STATS * sizeof(u64));
-	memcpy(data, &hw->stats.rx_ok, ALX_NUM_STATS * sizeof(u64));
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(hw->stats) != ALX_NUM_STATS * sizeof(u64));
+	memcpy(data, &hw->stats, sizeof(hw->stats));
 
 	spin_unlock(&alx->stats_lock);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#328 lore raw

PATCH 325/367 wifi: mac80211_hwsim: drop short frames

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit fba360a047d5eeeb9d4b7c3a9b1c8308980ce9a6 ]

While technically some control frames like ACK are shorter and end after Address 1, such frames shouldn't be forwarded through wmediumd or similar userspace, so require the full 3-address header to avoid accessing invalid memory if shorter frames are passed in.

---
 drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/net/wireless/mac80211_hwsim.c +4 -3
index f80b1d57d6c38..a21739b2f44e6 100644
@@ -3367,14 +3367,15 @@ static int hwsim_cloned_frame_received_nl(struct sk_buff *skb_2,
 	frame_data_len = nla_len(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FRAME]);
 	frame_data = (void *)nla_data(info->attrs[HWSIM_ATTR_FRAME]);
 
+	if (frame_data_len < sizeof(struct ieee80211_hdr_3addr) ||
+	    frame_data_len > IEEE80211_MAX_DATA_LEN)
+		goto err;
+
 	/* Allocate new skb here */
 	skb = alloc_skb(frame_data_len, GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (skb == NULL)
 		goto err;
 
-	if (frame_data_len > IEEE80211_MAX_DATA_LEN)
-		goto err;
-
 	/* Copy the data */
 	skb_put_data(skb, frame_data, frame_data_len);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#329 lore raw

PATCH 326/367 libbpf: Free btf_vmlinux when closing bpf_object

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hao Luo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 29d67fdebc42af6466d1909c60fdd1ef4f3e5240 ]

I hit a memory leak when testing bpf_program__set_attach_target(). Basically, set_attach_target() may allocate btf_vmlinux, for example, when setting attach target for bpf_iter programs. But btf_vmlinux is freed only in bpf_object_load(), which means if we only open bpf object but not load it, setting attach target may leak btf_vmlinux.

So let's free btf_vmlinux in bpf_object__close() anyway.

---
 tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +1 -0
index b8849812449c3..343018632d2d1 100644
@@ -4202,6 +4202,7 @@ void bpf_object__close(struct bpf_object *obj)
 	bpf_object__elf_finish(obj);
 	bpf_object__unload(obj);
 	btf__free(obj->btf);
+	btf__free(obj->btf_vmlinux);
 	btf_ext__free(obj->btf_ext);
 
 	for (i = 0; i < obj->nr_maps; i++) {
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
#330 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.4 326/367] libbpf: Free btf_vmlinux when closing bpf_object

Hi Greg,

Quoted 30 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hao Luo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 29d67fdebc42af6466d1909c60fdd1ef4f3e5240 ]

I hit a memory leak when testing bpf_program__set_attach_target(). Basically, set_attach_target() may allocate btf_vmlinux, for example, when setting attach target for bpf_iter programs. But btf_vmlinux is freed only in bpf_object_load(), which means if we only open bpf object but not load it, setting attach target may leak btf_vmlinux.

So let's free btf_vmlinux in bpf_object__close() anyway.

---
  tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 1 +
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +0 -0
index b8849812449c3..343018632d2d1 100644

tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c void bpf_object__close(struct bpf_object *obj) · line 4205

Quoted 4 lines
tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +1 -0
@@ -4202,6 +4202,7 @@ void bpf_object__close(struct bpf_object *obj)
  	bpf_object__elf_finish(obj);
  	bpf_object__unload(obj);
  	btf__free(obj->btf);
+	btf__free(obj->btf_vmlinux);

This patch introduces a build failure.

libbpf.c: In function 'bpf_object__close':
libbpf.c:4205:22: error: 'struct bpf_object' has no member named 'btf_vmlinux'
4205 | btf__free(obj->btf_vmlinux);
| ^~

This struct member "btf_vmlinux" is added in commit a6ed02cac690 ("libbpf: Load btf_vmlinux only once per object.") which is not in 5.4.y

So I think we should drop this patch.

Thanks,
Harshit

Quoted 3 lines
tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +0 -0
  	btf_ext__free(obj->btf_ext);
 
  	for (i = 0; i < obj->nr_maps; i++) {
author maintainer
#331 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.4 326/367] libbpf: Free btf_vmlinux when closing bpf_object

Quoted 47 lines · Harshit Mogalapalli

Hi Greg,

Quoted 30 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hao Luo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 29d67fdebc42af6466d1909c60fdd1ef4f3e5240 ]

I hit a memory leak when testing bpf_program__set_attach_target(). Basically, set_attach_target() may allocate btf_vmlinux, for example, when setting attach target for bpf_iter programs. But btf_vmlinux is freed only in bpf_object_load(), which means if we only open bpf object but not load it, setting attach target may leak btf_vmlinux.

So let's free btf_vmlinux in bpf_object__close() anyway.

---
  tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 1 +
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +0 -0
index b8849812449c3..343018632d2d1 100644

tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c void bpf_object__close(struct bpf_object *obj) · line 4205

Quoted 4 lines
tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +1 -0
@@ -4202,6 +4202,7 @@ void bpf_object__close(struct bpf_object *obj)
  	bpf_object__elf_finish(obj);
  	bpf_object__unload(obj);
  	btf__free(obj->btf);
+	btf__free(obj->btf_vmlinux);

This patch introduces a build failure.

libbpf.c: In function 'bpf_object__close':
libbpf.c:4205:22: error: 'struct bpf_object' has no member named 'btf_vmlinux'
4205 | btf__free(obj->btf_vmlinux);
| ^~

Quoted 4 lines

This struct member "btf_vmlinux" is added in commit a6ed02cac690 ("libbpf:
Load btf_vmlinux only once per object.") which is not in 5.4.y

So I think we should drop this patch.

Now dropped, thanks.

greg k-h

#332 lore raw

Re: [PATCH 5.4 326/367] libbpf: Free btf_vmlinux when closing bpf_object

Hi Greg,

Quoted 48 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 47 lines · Harshit Mogalapalli

Hi Greg,

Quoted 30 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hao Luo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 29d67fdebc42af6466d1909c60fdd1ef4f3e5240 ]

I hit a memory leak when testing bpf_program__set_attach_target(). Basically, set_attach_target() may allocate btf_vmlinux, for example, when setting attach target for bpf_iter programs. But btf_vmlinux is freed only in bpf_object_load(), which means if we only open bpf object but not load it, setting attach target may leak btf_vmlinux.

So let's free btf_vmlinux in bpf_object__close() anyway.

---
   tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c | 1 +
   1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +0 -0
index b8849812449c3..343018632d2d1 100644

tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c void bpf_object__close(struct bpf_object *obj) · line 4205

Quoted 4 lines
tools/lib/bpf/libbpf.c +1 -0
@@ -4202,6 +4202,7 @@ void bpf_object__close(struct bpf_object *obj)
   	bpf_object__elf_finish(obj);
   	bpf_object__unload(obj);
   	btf__free(obj->btf);
+	btf__free(obj->btf_vmlinux);

This patch introduces a build failure.

libbpf.c: In function 'bpf_object__close':
libbpf.c:4205:22: error: 'struct bpf_object' has no member named 'btf_vmlinux'
4205 | btf__free(obj->btf_vmlinux);
| ^~

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

This struct member "btf_vmlinux" is added in commit a6ed02cac690 ("libbpf:
Load btf_vmlinux only once per object.") which is not in 5.4.y

So I think we should drop this patch.

Now dropped, thanks.

I have tested kernel(5.4.257 final release) where the offending patches are dropped. No regressions seen there.

Thanks,
Harshit

Quoted 1 line

greg k-h

author maintainer
#333 lore raw

PATCH 327/367 drm/exynos: fix a possible null-pointer dereference due to data race in exynos_drm_crtc_atomic_disable()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tuo Li <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2e63972a2de14482d0eae1a03a73e379f1c3f44c ]

The variable crtc->state->event is often protected by the lock crtc->dev->event_lock when is accessed. However, it is accessed as a condition of an if statement in exynos_drm_crtc_atomic_disable() without holding the lock:

  if (crtc->state->event && !crtc->state->active)

However, if crtc->state->event is changed to NULL by another thread right after the conditions of the if statement is checked to be true, a null-pointer dereference can occur in drm_crtc_send_vblank_event():

  e->pipe = pipe;

To fix this possible null-pointer dereference caused by data race, the spin lock coverage is extended to protect the if statement as well as the function call to drm_crtc_send_vblank_event().

Added relevant link.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c | 5 ++---
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/exynos/exynos_drm_crtc.c +2 -3
index 77ce78986408b..c10eea6db9a80 100644
@@ -39,13 +39,12 @@ static void exynos_drm_crtc_atomic_disable(struct drm_crtc *crtc,
 	if (exynos_crtc->ops->disable)
 		exynos_crtc->ops->disable(exynos_crtc);
 
+	spin_lock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock);
 	if (crtc->state->event && !crtc->state->active) {
-		spin_lock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock);
 		drm_crtc_send_vblank_event(crtc, crtc->state->event);
-		spin_unlock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock);
-
 		crtc->state->event = NULL;
 	}
+	spin_unlock_irq(&crtc->dev->event_lock);
 }
 
 static int exynos_crtc_atomic_check(struct drm_crtc *crtc,
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#334 lore raw

PATCH 328/367 bus: ti-sysc: Configure uart quirks for k3 SoC

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tony Lindgren <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 03a711d3cb83692733f865312f49e665c49de6de ]

Enable the uart quirks similar to the earlier SoCs. Let's assume we are likely going to need a k3 specific quirk mask separate from the earlier SoCs, so let's not start changing the revision register mask at this point.

Note that SYSC_QUIRK_LEGACY_IDLE will be needed until we can remove the need for pm_runtime_irq_safe() from 8250_omap driver.

---
 drivers/bus/ti-sysc.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/bus/ti-sysc.c +2 -0
index e1a9838c96655..b542c2b2aef49 100644
@@ -1379,6 +1379,8 @@ static const struct sysc_revision_quirk sysc_revision_quirks[] = {
 		   SYSC_QUIRK_SWSUP_SIDLE | SYSC_QUIRK_LEGACY_IDLE),
 	SYSC_QUIRK("uart", 0, 0x50, 0x54, 0x58, 0x47422e03, 0xffffffff,
 		   SYSC_QUIRK_SWSUP_SIDLE | SYSC_QUIRK_LEGACY_IDLE),
+	SYSC_QUIRK("uart", 0, 0x50, 0x54, 0x58, 0x47424e03, 0xffffffff,
+		   SYSC_QUIRK_SWSUP_SIDLE | SYSC_QUIRK_LEGACY_IDLE),
 
 	/* Quirks that need to be set based on the module address */
 	SYSC_QUIRK("mcpdm", 0x40132000, 0, 0x10, -ENODEV, 0x50000800, 0xffffffff,
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#335 lore raw

PATCH 329/367 md: raid1: fix potential OOB in raid1_remove_disk()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Shurong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 8b0472b50bcf0f19a5119b00a53b63579c8e1e4d ]

If rddev->raid_disk is greater than mddev->raid_disks, there will be an out-of-bounds in raid1_remove_disk(). We have already found similar reports as follows:

1) commit d17f744e883b ("md-raid10: fix KASAN warning")
2) commit 1ebc2cec0b7d ("dm raid: fix KASAN warning in raid5_remove_disk")

Fix this bug by checking whether the "number" variable is valid.

---
 drivers/md/raid1.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
drivers/md/raid1.c +4 -0
index 1919de4c8c12d..f96e079454700 100644
@@ -1808,6 +1808,10 @@ static int raid1_remove_disk(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev)
 	struct r1conf *conf = mddev->private;
 	int err = 0;
 	int number = rdev->raid_disk;
+
+	if (unlikely(number >= conf->raid_disks))
+		goto abort;
+
 	struct raid1_info *p = conf->mirrors + number;
 
 	if (rdev != p->rdev)
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#336 lore raw

PATCH 330/367 ext2: fix datatype of block number in ext2_xattr_set2()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Georg Ottinger <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e88076348425b7d0491c8c98d8732a7df8de7aa3 ]

I run a small server that uses external hard drives for backups. The backup software I use uses ext2 filesystems with 4KiB block size and the server is running SELinux and therefore relies on xattr. I recently upgraded the hard drives from 4TB to 12TB models. I noticed that after transferring some TBs I got a filesystem error "Freeing blocks not in datazone - block = 18446744071529317386, count = 1" and the backup process stopped. Trying to fix the fs with e2fsck resulted in a completely corrupted fs. The error probably came from ext2_free_blocks(), and because of the large number 18e19 this problem immediately looked like some kind of integer overflow. Whereas the 4TB fs was about 1e9 blocks, the new 12TB is about 3e9 blocks. So, searching the ext2 code, I came across the line in fs/ext2/xattr.c:745 where ext2_new_block() is called and the resulting block number is stored in the variable block as an int datatype. If a block with a block number greater than INT32_MAX is returned, this variable overflows and the call to sb_getblk() at line fs/ext2/xattr.c:750 fails, then the call to ext2_free_blocks() produces the error.

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 fs/ext2/xattr.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/ext2/xattr.c +2 -2
index 62acbe27d8bf4..ca7ff31a1f194 100644
@@ -690,10 +690,10 @@ ext2_xattr_set2(struct inode *inode, struct buffer_head *old_bh,
 			/* We need to allocate a new block */
 			ext2_fsblk_t goal = ext2_group_first_block_no(sb,
 						EXT2_I(inode)->i_block_group);
-			int block = ext2_new_block(inode, goal, &error);
+			ext2_fsblk_t block = ext2_new_block(inode, goal, &error);
 			if (error)
 				goto cleanup;
-			ea_idebug(inode, "creating block %d", block);
+			ea_idebug(inode, "creating block %lu", block);
 
 			new_bh = sb_getblk(sb, block);
 			if (unlikely(!new_bh)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#337 lore raw

PATCH 331/367 fs/jfs: prevent double-free in dbUnmount() after failed jfs_remount()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Andrew Kanner <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit cade5397e5461295f3cb87880534b6a07cafa427 ]

Syzkaller reported the following issue:
==================================================================

BUG: KASAN: double-free in slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: double-free in __kmem_cache_free+0x71/0x110 mm/slub.c:3800
Free of addr ffff888086408000 by task syz-executor.4/12750
[...]
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
[...]
 kasan_report_invalid_free+0xac/0xd0 mm/kasan/report.c:482
 ____kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x120
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x12e/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:1807
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_free+0x71/0x110 mm/slub.c:3800
 dbUnmount+0xf4/0x110 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:264
 jfs_umount+0x248/0x3b0 fs/jfs/jfs_umount.c:87
 jfs_put_super+0x86/0x190 fs/jfs/super.c:194
 generic_shutdown_super+0x130/0x310 fs/super.c:492
 kill_block_super+0x79/0xd0 fs/super.c:1386
 deactivate_locked_super+0xa7/0xf0 fs/super.c:332
 cleanup_mnt+0x494/0x520 fs/namespace.c:1291
 task_work_run+0x243/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:179
 resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:49 [inline]
 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x124/0x150 kernel/entry/common.c:171
 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xb2/0x140 kernel/entry/common.c:203
 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:285 [inline]
 syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x26/0x60 kernel/entry/common.c:296
 do_syscall_64+0x49/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
[...]
 </TASK>

Allocated by task 13352:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
 kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 ____kasan_kmalloc mm/kasan/common.c:371 [inline]
 __kasan_kmalloc+0x97/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:380
 kmalloc include/linux/slab.h:580 [inline]
 dbMount+0x54/0x980 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:164
 jfs_mount+0x1dd/0x830 fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c:121
 jfs_fill_super+0x590/0xc50 fs/jfs/super.c:556
 mount_bdev+0x26c/0x3a0 fs/super.c:1359
 legacy_get_tree+0xea/0x180 fs/fs_context.c:610
 vfs_get_tree+0x88/0x270 fs/super.c:1489
 do_new_mount+0x289/0xad0 fs/namespace.c:3145
 do_mount fs/namespace.c:3488 [inline]
 __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3697 [inline]
 __se_sys_mount+0x2d3/0x3c0 fs/namespace.c:3674
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

Freed by task 13352:
 kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:45 [inline]
 kasan_set_track+0x3d/0x60 mm/kasan/common.c:52
 kasan_save_free_info+0x27/0x40 mm/kasan/generic.c:518
 ____kasan_slab_free+0xd6/0x120 mm/kasan/common.c:236
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
 slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1781 [inline]
 slab_free_freelist_hook+0x12e/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:1807
 slab_free mm/slub.c:3787 [inline]
 __kmem_cache_free+0x71/0x110 mm/slub.c:3800
 dbUnmount+0xf4/0x110 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:264
 jfs_mount_rw+0x545/0x740 fs/jfs/jfs_mount.c:247
 jfs_remount+0x3db/0x710 fs/jfs/super.c:454
 reconfigure_super+0x3bc/0x7b0 fs/super.c:935
 vfs_fsconfig_locked fs/fsopen.c:254 [inline]
 __do_sys_fsconfig fs/fsopen.c:439 [inline]
 __se_sys_fsconfig+0xad5/0x1060 fs/fsopen.c:314
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

[...]

JFS_SBI(ipbmap->i_sb)->bmap wasn't set to NULL after kfree() in dbUnmount().

Syzkaller uses faultinject to reproduce this KASAN double-free warning. The issue is triggered if either diMount() or dbMount() fail in jfs_remount(), since diUnmount() or dbUnmount() already happened in such a case - they will do double-free on next execution: jfs_umount or jfs_remount.

Tested on both upstream and jfs-next by syzkaller.

---
 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c +1 -0
index 8e8d53241386f..a785c747a8cbb 100644
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ int dbUnmount(struct inode *ipbmap, int mounterror)
 
 	/* free the memory for the in-memory bmap. */
 	kfree(bmp);
+	JFS_SBI(ipbmap->i_sb)->bmap = NULL;
 
 	return (0);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#338 lore raw

PATCH 332/367 jfs: fix invalid free of JFS_IP(ipimap)->i_imap in diUnmount

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Liu Shixin via Jfs-discussion <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6e2bda2c192d0244b5a78b787ef20aa10cb319b7 ]

syzbot found an invalid-free in diUnmount:

BUG: KASAN: double-free in slab_free mm/slub.c:3661 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: double-free in __kmem_cache_free+0x71/0x110 mm/slub.c:3674

Free of addr ffff88806f410000 by task syz-executor131/3632

 CPU: 0 PID: 3632 Comm: syz-executor131 Not tainted 6.1.0-rc7-syzkaller-00012-gca57f02295f1 #0
 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
  dump_stack_lvl+0x1b1/0x28e lib/dump_stack.c:106
  print_address_description+0x74/0x340 mm/kasan/report.c:284
  print_report+0x107/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:395
  kasan_report_invalid_free+0xac/0xd0 mm/kasan/report.c:460
  ____kasan_slab_free+0xfb/0x120
  kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:177 [inline]
  slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:1724 [inline]
  slab_free_freelist_hook+0x12e/0x1a0 mm/slub.c:1750
  slab_free mm/slub.c:3661 [inline]
  __kmem_cache_free+0x71/0x110 mm/slub.c:3674
  diUnmount+0xef/0x100 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c:195
  jfs_umount+0x108/0x370 fs/jfs/jfs_umount.c:63
  jfs_put_super+0x86/0x190 fs/jfs/super.c:194
  generic_shutdown_super+0x130/0x310 fs/super.c:492
  kill_block_super+0x79/0xd0 fs/super.c:1428
  deactivate_locked_super+0xa7/0xf0 fs/super.c:332
  cleanup_mnt+0x494/0x520 fs/namespace.c:1186
  task_work_run+0x243/0x300 kernel/task_work.c:179
  exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:38 [inline]
  do_exit+0x664/0x2070 kernel/exit.c:820
  do_group_exit+0x1fd/0x2b0 kernel/exit.c:950
  __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:961 [inline]
  __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:959 [inline]
  __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3b/0x40 kernel/exit.c:959
  do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
  do_syscall_64+0x3d/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

[...]

JFS_IP(ipimap)->i_imap is not setting to NULL after free in diUnmount. If jfs_remount() free JFS_IP(ipimap)->i_imap but then failed at diMount(). JFS_IP(ipimap)->i_imap will be freed once again.
Fix this problem by setting JFS_IP(ipimap)->i_imap to NULL after free.

---
 fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/jfs/jfs_imap.c +1 -0
index 937ca07b58b1d..67c67604b8c85 100644
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ int diUnmount(struct inode *ipimap, int mounterror)
 	 * free in-memory control structure
 	 */
 	kfree(imap);
+	JFS_IP(ipimap)->i_imap = NULL;
 
 	return (0);
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#339 lore raw

PATCH 333/367 powerpc/pseries: fix possible memory leak in ibmebus_bus_init()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: ruanjinjie <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit afda85b963c12947e298ad85d757e333aa40fd74 ]

If device_register() returns error in ibmebus_bus_init(), name of kobject which is allocated in dev_set_name() called in device_add() is leaked.

As comment of device_add() says, it should call put_device() to drop the reference count that was set in device_initialize() when it fails, so the name can be freed in kobject_cleanup().

---
 arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ibmebus.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/ibmebus.c +1 -0
index b91eb0929ed14..55569e3c9db72 100644
@@ -450,6 +450,7 @@ static int __init ibmebus_bus_init(void)
 	if (err) {
 		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: device_register returned %i\n",
 		       __func__, err);
+		put_device(&ibmebus_bus_device);
 		bus_unregister(&ibmebus_bus_type);
 
 		return err;
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#340 lore raw

PATCH 334/367 media: dvb-usb-v2: af9035: Fix null-ptr-deref in af9035_i2c_master_xfer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Shurong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7bf744f2de0a848fb1d717f5831b03db96feae89 ]

In af9035_i2c_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be passed. Malicious data finally reach af9035_i2c_master_xfer. If accessing msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

[ moved variable declaration to fix build issues in older kernels - gregkh ]
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c |   14 ++++++++------
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/af9035.c +8 -6
@@ -269,6 +269,7 @@ static int af9035_i2c_master_xfer(struct
 	struct dvb_usb_device *d = i2c_get_adapdata(adap);
 	struct state *state = d_to_priv(d);
 	int ret;
+	u32 reg;
 
 	if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&d->i2c_mutex) < 0)
 		return -EAGAIN;
@@ -321,8 +322,10 @@ static int af9035_i2c_master_xfer(struct
 			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		} else if ((msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[0]) ||
 			   (msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])) {
+			if (msg[0].len < 3 || msg[1].len < 1)
+				return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 			/* demod access via firmware interface */
-			u32 reg = msg[0].buf[0] << 16 | msg[0].buf[1] << 8 |
+			reg = msg[0].buf[0] << 16 | msg[0].buf[1] << 8 |
 					msg[0].buf[2];
 
 			if (msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])
@@ -380,17 +383,16 @@ static int af9035_i2c_master_xfer(struct
 			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		} else if ((msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[0]) ||
 			   (msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])) {
+			if (msg[0].len < 3)
+				return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 			/* demod access via firmware interface */
-			u32 reg = msg[0].buf[0] << 16 | msg[0].buf[1] << 8 |
+			reg = msg[0].buf[0] << 16 | msg[0].buf[1] << 8 |
 					msg[0].buf[2];
 
 			if (msg[0].addr == state->af9033_i2c_addr[1])
 				reg |= 0x100000;
 
-			ret = (msg[0].len >= 3) ? af9035_wr_regs(d, reg,
-							         &msg[0].buf[3],
-							         msg[0].len - 3)
-					        : -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			ret = af9035_wr_regs(d, reg, &msg[0].buf[3], msg[0].len - 3);
 		} else {
 			/* I2C write */
 			u8 buf[MAX_XFER_SIZE];
author maintainer
#341 lore raw

PATCH 335/367 media: dw2102: Fix null-ptr-deref in dw2102_i2c_transfer()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Shurong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 5ae544d94abc8ff77b1b9bf8774def3fa5689b5b ]

In dw2102_i2c_transfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be passed. Malicious data finally reach dw2102_i2c_transfer. If accessing msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 950e252cb469
("[media] dw2102: limit messages to buffer size")

---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/dw2102.c +24 -0
index f8f589ebab74b..924a6478007a8 100644
@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@ static int dw2102_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 
 	switch (num) {
 	case 2:
+		if (msg[0].len < 1) {
+			num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			break;
+		}
 		/* read stv0299 register */
 		value = msg[0].buf[0];/* register */
 		for (i = 0; i < msg[1].len; i++) {
@@ -139,6 +143,10 @@ static int dw2102_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 	case 1:
 		switch (msg[0].addr) {
 		case 0x68:
+			if (msg[0].len < 2) {
+				num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				break;
+			}
 			/* write to stv0299 register */
 			buf6[0] = 0x2a;
 			buf6[1] = msg[0].buf[0];
@@ -148,6 +156,10 @@ static int dw2102_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 			break;
 		case 0x60:
 			if (msg[0].flags == 0) {
+				if (msg[0].len < 4) {
+					num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 			/* write to tuner pll */
 				buf6[0] = 0x2c;
 				buf6[1] = 5;
@@ -159,6 +171,10 @@ static int dw2102_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 				dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0xb2, 0, 0,
 						buf6, 7, DW210X_WRITE_MSG);
 			} else {
+				if (msg[0].len < 1) {
+					num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+					break;
+				}
 			/* read from tuner */
 				dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0xb5, 0, 0,
 						buf6, 1, DW210X_READ_MSG);
@@ -166,12 +182,20 @@ static int dw2102_i2c_transfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 			}
 			break;
 		case (DW2102_RC_QUERY):
+			if (msg[0].len < 2) {
+				num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				break;
+			}
 			dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0xb8, 0, 0,
 					buf6, 2, DW210X_READ_MSG);
 			msg[0].buf[0] = buf6[0];
 			msg[0].buf[1] = buf6[1];
 			break;
 		case (DW2102_VOLTAGE_CTRL):
+			if (msg[0].len < 1) {
+				num = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+				break;
+			}
 			buf6[0] = 0x30;
 			buf6[1] = msg[0].buf[0];
 			dw210x_op_rw(d->udev, 0xb2, 0, 0,
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#342 lore raw

PATCH 336/367 media: af9005: Fix null-ptr-deref in af9005_i2c_xfer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Shurong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit f4ee84f27625ce1fdf41e8483fa0561a1b837d10 ]

In af9005_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be passed. Malicious data finally reach af9005_i2c_xfer. If accessing msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb/af9005.c +5 -0
index 89b4b5d84cdff..827f9db16aa10 100644
@@ -422,6 +422,10 @@ static int af9005_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 		if (ret == 0)
 			ret = 2;
 	} else {
+		if (msg[0].len < 2) {
+			ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+			goto unlock;
+		}
 		/* write one or more registers */
 		reg = msg[0].buf[0];
 		addr = msg[0].addr;
@@ -431,6 +435,7 @@ static int af9005_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msg[],
 			ret = 1;
 	}
 
+unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&d->i2c_mutex);
 	return ret;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#343 lore raw

PATCH 337/367 media: anysee: fix null-ptr-deref in anysee_master_xfer

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Shurong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c30411266fd67ea3c02a05c157231654d5a3bdc9 ]

In anysee_master_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be passed. Malicious data finally reach anysee_master_xfer. If accessing msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

[hverkuil: add spaces around +]
---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/anysee.c +1 -1
index fb6d99dea31aa..08fdb9e5e3a22 100644
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static int anysee_master_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg *msg,
 
 	while (i < num) {
 		if (num > i + 1 && (msg[i+1].flags & I2C_M_RD)) {
-			if (msg[i].len > 2 || msg[i+1].len > 60) {
+			if (msg[i].len != 2 || msg[i + 1].len > 60) {
 				ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 				break;
 			}
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#344 lore raw

PATCH 338/367 media: az6007: Fix null-ptr-deref in az6007_i2c_xfer()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhang Shurong <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 1047f9343011f2cedc73c64829686206a7e9fc3f ]

In az6007_i2c_xfer, msg is controlled by user. When msg[i].buf is null and msg[i].len is zero, former checks on msg[i].buf would be passed. Malicious data finally reach az6007_i2c_xfer. If accessing msg[i].buf[0] without sanity check, null ptr deref would happen. We add check on msg[i].len to prevent crash.

Similar commit:
commit 0ed554fd769a
("media: dvb-usb: az6027: fix null-ptr-deref in az6027_i2c_xfer()")

---
 drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
drivers/media/usb/dvb-usb-v2/az6007.c +8 -0
index 7524c90f5da61..6cbfe75791c21 100644
@@ -788,6 +788,10 @@ static int az6007_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[],
 			if (az6007_xfer_debug)
 				printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C W addr=0x%x len=%d\n",
 				       addr, msgs[i].len);
+			if (msgs[i].len < 1) {
+				ret = -EIO;
+				goto err;
+			}
 			req = AZ6007_I2C_WR;
 			index = msgs[i].buf[0];
 			value = addr | (1 << 8);
@@ -802,6 +806,10 @@ static int az6007_i2c_xfer(struct i2c_adapter *adap, struct i2c_msg msgs[],
 			if (az6007_xfer_debug)
 				printk(KERN_DEBUG "az6007: I2C R addr=0x%x len=%d\n",
 				       addr, msgs[i].len);
+			if (msgs[i].len < 1) {
+				ret = -EIO;
+				goto err;
+			}
 			req = AZ6007_I2C_RD;
 			index = msgs[i].buf[0];
 			value = addr;
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#345 lore raw

PATCH 339/367 media: tuners: qt1010: replace BUG_ON with a regular error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ee630b29ea44d1851bb6c903f400956604834463 ]

BUG_ON is unnecessary here, and in addition it confuses smatch. Replacing this with an error return help resolve this smatch warning:

drivers/media/tuners/qt1010.c:350 qt1010_init() error: buffer overflow 'i2c_data' 34 <= 34

---
 drivers/media/tuners/qt1010.c | 11 ++++++-----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/media/tuners/qt1010.c +6 -5
index fa5d2692131f9..f7516cb52436e 100644
@@ -342,11 +342,12 @@ static int qt1010_init(struct dvb_frontend *fe)
 			else
 				valptr = &tmpval;
 
-			BUG_ON(i >= ARRAY_SIZE(i2c_data) - 1);
-
-			err = qt1010_init_meas1(priv, i2c_data[i+1].reg,
-						i2c_data[i].reg,
-						i2c_data[i].val, valptr);
+			if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(i2c_data) - 1)
+				err = -EIO;
+			else
+				err = qt1010_init_meas1(priv, i2c_data[i + 1].reg,
+							i2c_data[i].reg,
+							i2c_data[i].val, valptr);
 			i++;
 			break;
 		}
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#346 lore raw

PATCH 340/367 media: pci: cx23885: replace BUG with error return

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Hans Verkuil <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 2e1796fd4904fdd6062a8e4589778ea899ea0c8d ]

It was completely unnecessary to use BUG in buffer_prepare(). Just replace it with an error return. This also fixes a smatch warning:

drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-video.c:422 buffer_prepare() error: uninitialized symbol 'ret'.

---
 drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-video.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/pci/cx23885/cx23885-video.c +1 -1
index 7fc408ee4934f..f56b271db8bea 100644
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static int buffer_prepare(struct vb2_buffer *vb)
 				dev->height >> 1);
 		break;
 	default:
-		BUG();
+		return -EINVAL; /* should not happen */
 	}
 	dprintk(2, "[%p/%d] buffer_init - %dx%d %dbpp 0x%08x - dma=0x%08lx\n",
 		buf, buf->vb.vb2_buf.index,
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#347 lore raw

PATCH 341/367 usb: gadget: fsl_qe_udc: validate endpoint index for ch9 udc

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ma Ke <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit ce9daa2efc0872a9a68ea51dc8000df05893ef2e ]

We should verify the bound of the array to assure that host may not manipulate the index to point past endpoint array.

---
 drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/fsl_qe_udc.c +2 -0
index 2707be6282988..63109c6e55068 100644
@@ -1950,6 +1950,8 @@ static void ch9getstatus(struct qe_udc *udc, u8 request_type, u16 value,
 	} else if ((request_type & USB_RECIP_MASK) == USB_RECIP_ENDPOINT) {
 		/* Get endpoint status */
 		int pipe = index & USB_ENDPOINT_NUMBER_MASK;
+		if (pipe >= USB_MAX_ENDPOINTS)
+			goto stall;
 		struct qe_ep *target_ep = &udc->eps[pipe];
 		u16 usep;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#348 lore raw

PATCH 342/367 scsi: target: iscsi: Fix buffer overflow in lio_target_nacl_info_show()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Konstantin Shelekhin <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 801f287c93ff95582b0a2d2163f12870a2f076d4 ]

The function lio_target_nacl_info_show() uses sprintf() in a loop to print details for every iSCSI connection in a session without checking for the buffer length. With enough iSCSI connections it's possible to overflow the buffer provided by configfs and corrupt the memory.

This patch replaces sprintf() with sysfs_emit_at() that checks for buffer boundries.

---
 drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c | 54 ++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target_configfs.c +27 -27
index 0fa1d57b26fa8..3cd671bbb9a41 100644
@@ -508,102 +508,102 @@ static ssize_t lio_target_nacl_info_show(struct config_item *item, char *page)
 	spin_lock_bh(&se_nacl->nacl_sess_lock);
 	se_sess = se_nacl->nacl_sess;
 	if (!se_sess) {
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "No active iSCSI Session for Initiator"
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "No active iSCSI Session for Initiator"
 			" Endpoint: %s\n", se_nacl->initiatorname);
 	} else {
 		sess = se_sess->fabric_sess_ptr;
 
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "InitiatorName: %s\n",
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "InitiatorName: %s\n",
 			sess->sess_ops->InitiatorName);
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "InitiatorAlias: %s\n",
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "InitiatorAlias: %s\n",
 			sess->sess_ops->InitiatorAlias);
 
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 			      "LIO Session ID: %u   ISID: 0x%6ph  TSIH: %hu  ",
 			      sess->sid, sess->isid, sess->tsih);
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "SessionType: %s\n",
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "SessionType: %s\n",
 				(sess->sess_ops->SessionType) ?
 				"Discovery" : "Normal");
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "Session State: ");
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "Session State: ");
 		switch (sess->session_state) {
 		case TARG_SESS_STATE_FREE:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "TARG_SESS_FREE\n");
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "TARG_SESS_FREE\n");
 			break;
 		case TARG_SESS_STATE_ACTIVE:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_ACTIVE\n");
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_ACTIVE\n");
 			break;
 		case TARG_SESS_STATE_LOGGED_IN:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_LOGGED_IN\n");
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_LOGGED_IN\n");
 			break;
 		case TARG_SESS_STATE_FAILED:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_FAILED\n");
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_FAILED\n");
 			break;
 		case TARG_SESS_STATE_IN_CONTINUE:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_IN_CONTINUE\n");
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "TARG_SESS_STATE_IN_CONTINUE\n");
 			break;
 		default:
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "ERROR: Unknown Session"
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "ERROR: Unknown Session"
 					" State!\n");
 			break;
 		}
 
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "---------------------[iSCSI Session"
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "---------------------[iSCSI Session"
 				" Values]-----------------------\n");
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "  CmdSN/WR  :  CmdSN/WC  :  ExpCmdSN"
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "  CmdSN/WR  :  CmdSN/WC  :  ExpCmdSN"
 				"  :  MaxCmdSN  :     ITT    :     TTT\n");
 		max_cmd_sn = (u32) atomic_read(&sess->max_cmd_sn);
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, " 0x%08x   0x%08x   0x%08x   0x%08x"
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, " 0x%08x   0x%08x   0x%08x   0x%08x"
 				"   0x%08x   0x%08x\n",
 			sess->cmdsn_window,
 			(max_cmd_sn - sess->exp_cmd_sn) + 1,
 			sess->exp_cmd_sn, max_cmd_sn,
 			sess->init_task_tag, sess->targ_xfer_tag);
-		rb += sprintf(page+rb, "----------------------[iSCSI"
+		rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "----------------------[iSCSI"
 				" Connections]-------------------------\n");
 
 		spin_lock(&sess->conn_lock);
 		list_for_each_entry(conn, &sess->sess_conn_list, conn_list) {
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "CID: %hu  Connection"
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "CID: %hu  Connection"
 					" State: ", conn->cid);
 			switch (conn->conn_state) {
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_FREE:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_FREE\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_XPT_UP:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_XPT_UP\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_IN_LOGIN:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_IN_LOGIN\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_LOGGED_IN:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_LOGGED_IN\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_IN_LOGOUT:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_IN_LOGOUT\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_LOGOUT_REQUESTED:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_LOGOUT_REQUESTED\n");
 				break;
 			case TARG_CONN_STATE_CLEANUP_WAIT:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"TARG_CONN_STATE_CLEANUP_WAIT\n");
 				break;
 			default:
-				rb += sprintf(page+rb,
+				rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb,
 					"ERROR: Unknown Connection State!\n");
 				break;
 			}
 
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "   Address %pISc %s", &conn->login_sockaddr,
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "   Address %pISc %s", &conn->login_sockaddr,
 				(conn->network_transport == ISCSI_TCP) ?
 				"TCP" : "SCTP");
-			rb += sprintf(page+rb, "  StatSN: 0x%08x\n",
+			rb += sysfs_emit_at(page, rb, "  StatSN: 0x%08x\n",
 				conn->stat_sn);
 		}
 		spin_unlock(&sess->conn_lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#349 lore raw

PATCH 343/367 serial: cpm_uart: Avoid suspicious locking

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christophe Leroy <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 36ef11d311f405e55ad8e848c19b212ff71ef536 ]

CHECK drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c
drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c:1271:39: warning: context imbalance in 'cpm_uart_console_write' - unexpected unlock

Allthough 'nolock' is not expected to change, sparse find the following form suspicious:

	if (unlikely(nolock)) {
		local_irq_save(flags);
	} else {
		spin_lock_irqsave(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
	}

	cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);

	if (unlikely(nolock)) {
		local_irq_restore(flags);
	} else {
		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
	}

Rewrite it a more obvious form:

	if (unlikely(oops_in_progress)) {
		local_irq_save(flags);
		cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);
		local_irq_restore(flags);
	} else {
		spin_lock_irqsave(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
		cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);
		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
	}
---
 drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c | 13 ++++---------
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
drivers/tty/serial/cpm_uart/cpm_uart_core.c +4 -9
index de6d02f7abe2b..c37036fee231d 100644
@@ -1267,19 +1267,14 @@ static void cpm_uart_console_write(struct console *co, const char *s,
 {
 	struct uart_cpm_port *pinfo = &cpm_uart_ports[co->index];
 	unsigned long flags;
-	int nolock = oops_in_progress;
 
-	if (unlikely(nolock)) {
+	if (unlikely(oops_in_progress)) {
 		local_irq_save(flags);
-	} else {
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
-	}
-
-	cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);
-
-	if (unlikely(nolock)) {
+		cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);
 		local_irq_restore(flags);
 	} else {
+		spin_lock_irqsave(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
+		cpm_uart_early_write(pinfo, s, count, true);
 		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&pinfo->port.lock, flags);
 	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#350 lore raw

PATCH 344/367 media: pci: ipu3-cio2: Initialise timing struct to avoid a compiler warning

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Sakari Ailus <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 9d7531be3085a8f013cf173ccc4e72e3cf493538 ]

Initialise timing struct in cio2_hw_init() to zero in order to avoid a compiler warning. The warning was a false positive.

---
 drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu3/ipu3-cio2.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/media/pci/intel/ipu3/ipu3-cio2.c +1 -1
index 3457f0f545c48..9c0d117e093b1 100644
@@ -359,7 +359,7 @@ static int cio2_hw_init(struct cio2_device *cio2, struct cio2_queue *q)
 	void __iomem *const base = cio2->base;
 	u8 lanes, csi2bus = q->csi2.port;
 	u8 sensor_vc = SENSOR_VIR_CH_DFLT;
-	struct cio2_csi2_timing timing;
+	struct cio2_csi2_timing timing = { 0 };
 	int i, r;
 
 	fmt = cio2_find_format(NULL, &q->subdev_fmt.code);
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#351 lore raw

PATCH 345/367 kobject: Add sanity check for kset->kobj.ktype in kset_register()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Zhen Lei <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4d0fe8c52bb3029d83e323c961221156ab98680b ]

When I register a kset in the following way:

	static struct kset my_kset;
	kobject_set_name(&my_kset.kobj, "my_kset");
        ret = kset_register(&my_kset);

A null pointer dereference exception is occurred:

[ 4453.568337] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at \
virtual address 0000000000000028
... ...
[ 4453.810361] Call trace:
[ 4453.813062]  kobject_get_ownership+0xc/0x34
[ 4453.817493]  kobject_add_internal+0x98/0x274
[ 4453.822005]  kset_register+0x5c/0xb4
[ 4453.825820]  my_kobj_init+0x44/0x1000 [my_kset]

... ...

Because I didn't initialize my_kset.kobj.ktype.

According to the description in Documentation/core-api/kobject.rst:
- A ktype is the type of object that embeds a kobject. Every structure that embeds a kobject needs a corresponding ktype.

So add sanity check to make sure kset->kobj.ktype is not NULL.

---
 lib/kobject.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
lib/kobject.c +5 -0
index 0c6d17503a113..c4025a880d753 100644
@@ -877,6 +877,11 @@ int kset_register(struct kset *k)
 	if (!k)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
+	if (!k->kobj.ktype) {
+		pr_err("must have a ktype to be initialized properly!\n");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	kset_init(k);
 	err = kobject_add_internal(&k->kobj);
 	if (err)
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#352 lore raw

PATCH 346/367 tools features: Add feature test to check if libbfd has buildid support

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit e71e19a9ea70952a53d58a99971820ce6c1794a8 ]

Which is needed by the PE executable support, for instance.

Cc Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc Jacek Caban <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Remi Bernon <[email protected]>

Stable-dep-of: 7822a8913f4c ("perf build: Update build rule for generated files")

---
 tools/build/Makefile.feature              | 2 ++
 tools/build/feature/Makefile              | 4 ++++
 tools/build/feature/test-all.c            | 5 +++++
 tools/build/feature/test-libbfd-buildid.c | 8 ++++++++
 tools/perf/Makefile.config                | 6 ++++++
 5 files changed, 25 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tools/build/feature/test-libbfd-buildid.c
tools/build/Makefile.feature +2 -0
index 1ea26bb8c5791..6714c886940f8 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ FEATURE_TESTS_BASIC :=                  \
         gtk2-infobar                    \
         libaudit                        \
         libbfd                          \
+        libbfd-buildid			\
         libcap                          \
         libelf                          \
         libelf-getphdrnum               \
@@ -110,6 +111,7 @@ FEATURE_DISPLAY ?=              \
          gtk2                   \
          libaudit               \
          libbfd                 \
+         libbfd-buildid		\
          libcap                 \
          libelf                 \
          libnuma                \
tools/build/feature/Makefile +4 -0
index 88392219d425e..8104e505efde6 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ FILES=                                          \
          test-hello.bin                         \
          test-libaudit.bin                      \
          test-libbfd.bin                        \
+         test-libbfd-buildid.bin		\
          test-disassembler-four-args.bin        \
          test-reallocarray.bin			\
          test-libbfd-liberty.bin                \
@@ -223,6 +224,9 @@ $(OUTPUT)test-libpython.bin:
 $(OUTPUT)test-libbfd.bin:
 	$(BUILD) -DPACKAGE='"perf"' -lbfd -ldl
 
+$(OUTPUT)test-libbfd-buildid.bin:
+	$(BUILD) -DPACKAGE='"perf"' -lbfd -ldl
+
 $(OUTPUT)test-disassembler-four-args.bin:
 	$(BUILD) -DPACKAGE='"perf"' -lbfd -lopcodes
 
tools/build/feature/test-all.c +5 -0
index 6eaeaf2da36ea..039bd2fbe7d9e 100644
@@ -90,6 +90,10 @@
 # include "test-libbfd.c"
 #undef main
 
+#define main main_test_libbfd_buildid
+# include "test-libbfd-buildid.c"
+#undef main
+
 #define main main_test_backtrace
 # include "test-backtrace.c"
 #undef main
@@ -208,6 +212,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	main_test_gtk2(argc, argv);
 	main_test_gtk2_infobar(argc, argv);
 	main_test_libbfd();
+	main_test_libbfd_buildid();
 	main_test_backtrace();
 	main_test_libnuma();
 	main_test_numa_num_possible_cpus();
tools/build/feature/test-libbfd-buildid.c new file +8 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..157644b04c052
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <bfd.h>
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	bfd *abfd = bfd_openr("Pedro", 0);
+	return abfd && (!abfd->build_id || abfd->build_id->size > 0x506564726f);
+}
tools/perf/Makefile.config +6 -0
index b94d9afad3f79..cc11050420496 100644
@@ -775,6 +775,12 @@ else
   $(call feature_check,disassembler-four-args)
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(feature-libbfd-buildid), 1)
+  CFLAGS += -DHAVE_LIBBFD_BUILDID_SUPPORT
+else
+  msg := $(warning Old version of libbfd/binutils things like PE executable profiling will not be available);
+endif
+
 ifdef NO_DEMANGLE
   CFLAGS += -DNO_DEMANGLE
 else
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#353 lore raw

PATCH 347/367 perf jevents: Make build dependency on test JSONs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: John Garry <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 517db3b59537a59f6cc251b1926df93e93bb9c87 ]

Currently all JSONs and the mapfile for an arch are dependencies for building pmu-events.c

The test JSONs are missing as a dependency, so add them.

Stable-dep-of: 7822a8913f4c ("perf build: Update build rule for generated files")

---
 tools/perf/pmu-events/Build | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
tools/perf/pmu-events/Build +4 -1
index 215ba30b85343..a055dee6a46af 100644
@@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ pmu-events-y	+= pmu-events.o
 JDIR		=  pmu-events/arch/$(SRCARCH)
 JSON		=  $(shell [ -d $(JDIR) ] &&				\
 			find $(JDIR) -name '*.json' -o -name 'mapfile.csv')
+JDIR_TEST	=  pmu-events/arch/test
+JSON_TEST	=  $(shell [ -d $(JDIR_TEST) ] &&			\
+			find $(JDIR_TEST) -name '*.json')
 
 #
 # Locate/process JSON files in pmu-events/arch/
 # directory and create tables in pmu-events.c.
 #
-$(OUTPUT)pmu-events/pmu-events.c: $(JSON) $(JEVENTS)
+$(OUTPUT)pmu-events/pmu-events.c: $(JSON) $(JSON_TEST) $(JEVENTS)
 	$(Q)$(call echo-cmd,gen)$(JEVENTS) $(SRCARCH) pmu-events/arch $(OUTPUT)pmu-events/pmu-events.c $(V)
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#354 lore raw

PATCH 348/367 perf tools: Add an option to build without libbfd

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 0d1c50ac488ebdaeeaea8ed5069f8d435fd485ed ]

Some distributions, like debian, don't link perf with libbfd. Add a build flag to make this configuration buildable and testable.

This was inspired by:

https://lore.kernel.org/linux-perf-users/[email protected]/T/#u

Stable-dep-of: 7822a8913f4c ("perf build: Update build rule for generated files")

---
 tools/perf/Makefile.config | 47 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
tools/perf/Makefile.config +25 -22
index cc11050420496..e95281586f65e 100644
@@ -752,33 +752,36 @@ else
   endif
 endif
 
-ifeq ($(feature-libbfd), 1)
-  EXTLIBS += -lbfd -lopcodes
-else
-  # we are on a system that requires -liberty and (maybe) -lz
-  # to link against -lbfd; test each case individually here
-
-  # call all detections now so we get correct
-  # status in VF output
-  $(call feature_check,libbfd-liberty)
-  $(call feature_check,libbfd-liberty-z)
 
-  ifeq ($(feature-libbfd-liberty), 1)
-    EXTLIBS += -lbfd -lopcodes -liberty
-    FEATURE_CHECK_LDFLAGS-disassembler-four-args += -liberty -ldl
+ifndef NO_LIBBFD
+  ifeq ($(feature-libbfd), 1)
+    EXTLIBS += -lbfd -lopcodes
   else
-    ifeq ($(feature-libbfd-liberty-z), 1)
-      EXTLIBS += -lbfd -lopcodes -liberty -lz
-      FEATURE_CHECK_LDFLAGS-disassembler-four-args += -liberty -lz -ldl
+    # we are on a system that requires -liberty and (maybe) -lz
+    # to link against -lbfd; test each case individually here
+
+    # call all detections now so we get correct
+    # status in VF output
+    $(call feature_check,libbfd-liberty)
+    $(call feature_check,libbfd-liberty-z)
+
+    ifeq ($(feature-libbfd-liberty), 1)
+      EXTLIBS += -lbfd -lopcodes -liberty
+      FEATURE_CHECK_LDFLAGS-disassembler-four-args += -liberty -ldl
+    else
+      ifeq ($(feature-libbfd-liberty-z), 1)
+        EXTLIBS += -lbfd -lopcodes -liberty -lz
+        FEATURE_CHECK_LDFLAGS-disassembler-four-args += -liberty -lz -ldl
+      endif
     endif
+    $(call feature_check,disassembler-four-args)
   endif
-  $(call feature_check,disassembler-four-args)
-endif
 
-ifeq ($(feature-libbfd-buildid), 1)
-  CFLAGS += -DHAVE_LIBBFD_BUILDID_SUPPORT
-else
-  msg := $(warning Old version of libbfd/binutils things like PE executable profiling will not be available);
+  ifeq ($(feature-libbfd-buildid), 1)
+    CFLAGS += -DHAVE_LIBBFD_BUILDID_SUPPORT
+  else
+    msg := $(warning Old version of libbfd/binutils things like PE executable profiling will not be available);
+  endif
 endif
 
 ifdef NO_DEMANGLE
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#355 lore raw

PATCH 349/367 perf jevents: Switch build to use jevents.py

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Ian Rogers <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 00facc760903be6675870c2749e2cd72140e396e ]

Generate pmu-events.c using jevents.py rather than the binary built from jevents.c.

Add a new config variable NO_JEVENTS that is set when there is no architecture json or an appropriate python interpreter isn't present.

When NO_JEVENTS is defined the file pmu-events/empty-pmu-events.c is copied and used as the pmu-events.c file.

Cc Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Cc Ananth Narayan <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Kilroy <[email protected]>
Cc Caleb Biggers <[email protected]>
Cc Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc James Clark <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Kajol Jain <[email protected]>
Cc Kan Liang <[email protected]>
Cc Kshipra Bopardikar <[email protected]>
Cc Like Xu <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Mathieu Poirier <[email protected]>
Cc Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
Cc Nick Forrington <[email protected]>
Cc Paul Clarke <[email protected]>
Cc Perry Taylor <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
Cc Qi Liu <[email protected]>
Cc Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Cc Sandipan Das <[email protected]>
Cc Santosh Shukla <[email protected]>
Cc Stephane Eranian <[email protected]>
Cc Will Deacon <[email protected]>
Cc Xing Zhengjun <[email protected]>

Stable-dep-of: 7822a8913f4c ("perf build: Update build rule for generated files")

---
 tools/perf/Makefile.config               |  19 +++
 tools/perf/Makefile.perf                 |   1 +
 tools/perf/pmu-events/Build              |  13 +-
 tools/perf/pmu-events/empty-pmu-events.c | 158 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 189 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/perf/pmu-events/empty-pmu-events.c
tools/perf/Makefile.config +19 -0
index e95281586f65e..b76800bbc632a 100644
@@ -752,6 +752,25 @@ else
   endif
 endif
 
+ifneq ($(NO_JEVENTS),1)
+  ifeq ($(wildcard pmu-events/arch/$(SRCARCH)/mapfile.csv),)
+    NO_JEVENTS := 1
+  endif
+endif
+ifneq ($(NO_JEVENTS),1)
+  NO_JEVENTS := 0
+  ifndef PYTHON
+    $(warning No python interpreter disabling jevent generation)
+    NO_JEVENTS := 1
+  else
+    # jevents.py uses f-strings present in Python 3.6 released in Dec. 2016.
+    JEVENTS_PYTHON_GOOD := $(shell $(PYTHON) -c 'import sys;print("1" if(sys.version_info.major >= 3 and sys.version_info.minor >= 6) else "0")' 2> /dev/null)
+    ifneq ($(JEVENTS_PYTHON_GOOD), 1)
+      $(warning Python interpreter too old (older than 3.6) disabling jevent generation)
+      NO_JEVENTS := 1
+    endif
+  endif
+endif
 
 ifndef NO_LIBBFD
   ifeq ($(feature-libbfd), 1)
tools/perf/Makefile.perf +1 -0
index 961f5e4fd6566..b0314f31e5a37 100644
@@ -584,6 +584,7 @@ JEVENTS       := $(OUTPUT)pmu-events/jevents
 JEVENTS_IN    := $(OUTPUT)pmu-events/jevents-in.o
 
 PMU_EVENTS_IN := $(OUTPUT)pmu-events/pmu-events-in.o
+export NO_JEVENTS
 
 export JEVENTS
 
tools/perf/pmu-events/Build +11 -2
index a055dee6a46af..5ec5ce8c31bab 100644
@@ -9,10 +9,19 @@ JSON		=  $(shell [ -d $(JDIR) ] &&				\
 JDIR_TEST	=  pmu-events/arch/test
 JSON_TEST	=  $(shell [ -d $(JDIR_TEST) ] &&			\
 			find $(JDIR_TEST) -name '*.json')
+JEVENTS_PY	=  pmu-events/jevents.py
 
 #
 # Locate/process JSON files in pmu-events/arch/
 # directory and create tables in pmu-events.c.
 #
-$(OUTPUT)pmu-events/pmu-events.c: $(JSON) $(JSON_TEST) $(JEVENTS)
-	$(Q)$(call echo-cmd,gen)$(JEVENTS) $(SRCARCH) pmu-events/arch $(OUTPUT)pmu-events/pmu-events.c $(V)
+
+ifeq ($(NO_JEVENTS),1)
+$(OUTPUT)pmu-events/pmu-events.c: pmu-events/empty-pmu-events.c
+	$(call rule_mkdir)
+	$(Q)$(call echo-cmd,gen)cp $< $@
+else
+$(OUTPUT)pmu-events/pmu-events.c: $(JSON) $(JSON_TEST) $(JEVENTS_PY)
+	$(call rule_mkdir)
+	$(Q)$(call echo-cmd,gen)$(PYTHON) $(JEVENTS_PY) $(SRCARCH) pmu-events/arch $@
+endif
tools/perf/pmu-events/empty-pmu-events.c new file +158 -0

158 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#356 lore raw

PATCH 350/367 perf build: Update build rule for generated files

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7822a8913f4c51c7d1aff793b525d60c3384fb5b ]

The bison and flex generate C files from the source (.y and .l) files. When O= option is used, they are saved in a separate directory but the default build rule assumes the .C files are in the source directory. So it might read invalid file if there are generated files from an old version. The same is true for the pmu-events files.

For example, the following command would cause a build failure:

  $ git checkout v6.3
  $ make -C tools/perf  # build in the same directory
  $ git checkout v6.5-rc2
  $ mkdir build  # create a build directory
  $ make -C tools/perf O=build  # build in a different directory but it
                                # refers files in the source directory

Let's update the build rule to specify those cases explicitly to depend on the files in the output directory.

Note that it's not a complete fix and it needs the next patch for the include path too.

Fixes 80eeb67fe577aa76 ("perf jevents: Program to convert JSON file")
Cc Adrian Hunter <[email protected]>
Cc Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
Cc Anup Sharma <[email protected]>
Cc Ian Rogers <[email protected]>
Cc Ingo Molnar <[email protected]>
Cc Jiri Olsa <[email protected]>
Cc Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]>
---
 tools/build/Makefile.build  | 10 ++++++++++
 tools/perf/pmu-events/Build |  6 ++++++
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+)
tools/build/Makefile.build +10 -0
index cd72016c3cfa7..5a727094ae832 100644
@@ -116,6 +116,16 @@ $(OUTPUT)%.s: %.c FORCE
 	$(call rule_mkdir)
 	$(call if_changed_dep,cc_s_c)
 
+# bison and flex files are generated in the OUTPUT directory
+# so it needs a separate rule to depend on them properly
+$(OUTPUT)%-bison.o: $(OUTPUT)%-bison.c FORCE
+	$(call rule_mkdir)
+	$(call if_changed_dep,$(host)cc_o_c)
+
+$(OUTPUT)%-flex.o: $(OUTPUT)%-flex.c FORCE
+	$(call rule_mkdir)
+	$(call if_changed_dep,$(host)cc_o_c)
+
 # Gather build data:
 #   obj-y        - list of build objects
 #   subdir-y     - list of directories to nest
tools/perf/pmu-events/Build +6 -0
index 5ec5ce8c31bab..ea8c41f9c7398 100644
@@ -25,3 +25,9 @@ $(OUTPUT)pmu-events/pmu-events.c: $(JSON) $(JSON_TEST) $(JEVENTS_PY)
 	$(call rule_mkdir)
 	$(Q)$(call echo-cmd,gen)$(PYTHON) $(JEVENTS_PY) $(SRCARCH) pmu-events/arch $@
 endif
+
+# pmu-events.c file is generated in the OUTPUT directory so it needs a
+# separate rule to depend on it properly
+$(OUTPUT)pmu-events/pmu-events.o: $(PMU_EVENTS_C)
+	$(call rule_mkdir)
+	$(call if_changed_dep,cc_o_c)
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#357 lore raw

PATCH 351/367 btrfs: move btrfs_pinned_by_swapfile prototype into volumes.h

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Josef Bacik <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit c2e79e865b87c2920a3cd39de69c35f2bc758a51 ]

This is defined in volumes.c, move the prototype into volumes.h.

Stable-dep-of: 6bfe3959b0e7 ("btrfs: compare the correct fsid/metadata_uuid in btrfs_validate_super")

---
 fs/btrfs/ctree.h   | 2 --
 fs/btrfs/volumes.h | 2 ++
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/ctree.h +0 -2
index c2e5fe972f566..b141a7ba4507b 100644
@@ -482,8 +482,6 @@ struct btrfs_swapfile_pin {
 	bool is_block_group;
 };
 
-bool btrfs_pinned_by_swapfile(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, void *ptr);
-
 enum {
 	BTRFS_FS_BARRIER,
 	BTRFS_FS_CLOSING_START,
fs/btrfs/volumes.h +2 -0
index aa6a6d7b2978e..fd8fdaa4b0cdf 100644
@@ -581,4 +581,6 @@ int btrfs_bg_type_to_factor(u64 flags);
 const char *btrfs_bg_type_to_raid_name(u64 flags);
 int btrfs_verify_dev_extents(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info);
 
+bool btrfs_pinned_by_swapfile(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, void *ptr);
+
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#358 lore raw

PATCH 352/367 btrfs: add a helper to read the superblock metadata_uuid

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 4844c3664a72d36cc79752cb651c78860b14c240 ]

In some cases, we need to read the FSID from the superblock when the metadata_uuid is not set, and otherwise, read the metadata_uuid. So, add a helper.

Stable-dep-of: 6bfe3959b0e7 ("btrfs: compare the correct fsid/metadata_uuid in btrfs_validate_super")

---
 fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 8 ++++++++
 fs/btrfs/volumes.h | 1 +
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
fs/btrfs/volumes.c +8 -0
index 0d4afeacb237b..f9192dcb9208b 100644
@@ -895,6 +895,14 @@ static int btrfs_open_one_device(struct btrfs_fs_devices *fs_devices,
 	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
+u8 *btrfs_sb_fsid_ptr(struct btrfs_super_block *sb)
+{
+	bool has_metadata_uuid = (btrfs_super_incompat_flags(sb) &
+				  BTRFS_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_METADATA_UUID);
+
+	return has_metadata_uuid ? sb->metadata_uuid : sb->fsid;
+}
+
 /*
  * Handle scanned device having its CHANGING_FSID_V2 flag set and the fs_devices
  * being created with a disk that has already completed its fsid change.
fs/btrfs/volumes.h +1 -0
index fd8fdaa4b0cdf..762c0a3754982 100644
@@ -582,5 +582,6 @@ const char *btrfs_bg_type_to_raid_name(u64 flags);
 int btrfs_verify_dev_extents(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info);
 
 bool btrfs_pinned_by_swapfile(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info, void *ptr);
+u8 *btrfs_sb_fsid_ptr(struct btrfs_super_block *sb);
 
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#359 lore raw

PATCH 353/367 btrfs: compare the correct fsid/metadata_uuid in btrfs_validate_super

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Anand Jain <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 6bfe3959b0e7a526f5c64747801a8613f002f05a ]

The function btrfs_validate_super() should verify the metadata_uuid in the provided superblock argument. Because, all its callers expect it to do that.

Such as in the following stacks:

  write_all_supers()
   sb = fs_info->super_for_commit;
   btrfs_validate_write_super(.., sb)
     btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)

scrub_one_super()

	btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)

And
check_dev_super()

	btrfs_validate_super(.., sb, ..)

However, it currently verifies the fs_info::super_copy::metadata_uuid instead. Fix this using the correct metadata_uuid in the superblock argument.

---
 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 8 +++-----
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c +3 -5
index a02fa6c07087c..b4ed11b5f1480 100644
@@ -2487,13 +2487,11 @@ static int validate_super(struct btrfs_fs_info *fs_info,
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
-	if (btrfs_fs_incompat(fs_info, METADATA_UUID) &&
-	    memcmp(fs_info->fs_devices->metadata_uuid,
-		   fs_info->super_copy->metadata_uuid, BTRFS_FSID_SIZE)) {
+	if (memcmp(fs_info->fs_devices->metadata_uuid, btrfs_sb_fsid_ptr(sb),
+		   BTRFS_FSID_SIZE) != 0) {
 		btrfs_err(fs_info,
 "superblock metadata_uuid doesn't match metadata uuid of fs_devices: %pU != %pU",
-			fs_info->super_copy->metadata_uuid,
-			fs_info->fs_devices->metadata_uuid);
+			  btrfs_sb_fsid_ptr(sb), fs_info->fs_devices->metadata_uuid);
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 	}
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#360 lore raw

PATCH 354/367 selftests: tracing: Fix to unmount tracefs for recovering environment

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 7e021da80f48582171029714f8a487347f29dddb ]

Fix to unmount the tracefs if the ftracetest mounted it for recovering system environment. If the tracefs is already mounted, this does nothing.

Fixes cbd965bde74c ("ftrace/selftests: Return the skip code when tracing directory not configured in kernel")
---
 tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/ftracetest | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
tools/testing/selftests/ftrace/ftracetest +8 -0
index 19e9236dec5e2..f2e1b2bfcf0b0 100755
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ err_ret=1
 # kselftest skip code is 4
 err_skip=4
 
+# umount required
+UMOUNT_DIR=""
+
 # cgroup RT scheduling prevents chrt commands from succeeding, which
 # induces failures in test wakeup tests.  Disable for the duration of
 # the tests.
@@ -44,6 +47,9 @@ setup() {
 
 cleanup() {
   echo $sched_rt_runtime_orig > $sched_rt_runtime
+  if [ -n "${UMOUNT_DIR}" ]; then
+    umount ${UMOUNT_DIR} ||:
+  fi
 }
 
 errexit() { # message
@@ -155,11 +161,13 @@ if [ -z "$TRACING_DIR" ]; then
 	    mount -t tracefs nodev /sys/kernel/tracing ||
 	      errexit "Failed to mount /sys/kernel/tracing"
 	    TRACING_DIR="/sys/kernel/tracing"
+	    UMOUNT_DIR=${TRACING_DIR}
 	# If debugfs exists, then so does /sys/kernel/debug
 	elif [ -d "/sys/kernel/debug" ]; then
 	    mount -t debugfs nodev /sys/kernel/debug ||
 	      errexit "Failed to mount /sys/kernel/debug"
 	    TRACING_DIR="/sys/kernel/debug/tracing"
+	    UMOUNT_DIR=${TRACING_DIR}
 	else
 	    err_ret=$err_skip
 	    errexit "debugfs and tracefs are not configured in this kernel"
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#361 lore raw

PATCH 355/367 md/raid1: fix error: ISO C90 forbids mixed declarations

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Nigel Croxon <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit df203da47f4428bc286fc99318936416253a321c ]

There is a compile error when this commit is added:
md: raid1: fix potential OOB in raid1_remove_disk()

drivers/md/raid1.c: In function 'raid1_remove_disk':
drivers/md/raid1.c:1844:9: error: ISO C90 forbids mixed declarations and code [-Werror=declaration-after-statement]
1844 |         struct raid1_info *p = conf->mirrors + number;
    |         ^~~~~~

That's because the new code was inserted before the struct. The change is move the struct command above this commit.

Fixes 8b0472b50bcf ("md: raid1: fix potential OOB in raid1_remove_disk()")
---
 drivers/md/raid1.c | 3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/md/raid1.c +1 -2
index f96e079454700..c40237cfdcb0f 100644
@@ -1808,12 +1808,11 @@ static int raid1_remove_disk(struct mddev *mddev, struct md_rdev *rdev)
 	struct r1conf *conf = mddev->private;
 	int err = 0;
 	int number = rdev->raid_disk;
+	struct raid1_info *p = conf->mirrors + number;
 
 	if (unlikely(number >= conf->raid_disks))
 		goto abort;
 
-	struct raid1_info *p = conf->mirrors + number;
-
 	if (rdev != p->rdev)
 		p = conf->mirrors + conf->raid_disks + number;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.40.1
author maintainer
#362 lore raw

PATCH 356/367 attr: block mode changes of symlinks

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian Brauner <[email protected]>

commit 5d1f903f75a80daa4dfb3d84e114ec8ecbf29956 upstream.

Changing the mode of symlinks is meaningless as the vfs doesn't take the mode of a symlink into account during path lookup permission checking.

However, the vfs doesn't block mode changes on symlinks. This however, has lead to an untenable mess roughly classifiable into the following two categories:

(1) Filesystems that don't implement a i_op->setattr() for symlinks.

Such filesystems may or may not know that without i_op->setattr() defined, notify_change() falls back to simple_setattr() causing the inode's mode in the inode cache to be changed.

That's a generic issue as this will affect all non-size changing inode attributes including ownership changes.

Example: afs

(2) Filesystems that fail with EOPNOTSUPP but change the mode of the symlink nonetheless.

Some filesystems will happily update the mode of a symlink but still return EOPNOTSUPP. This is the biggest source of confusion for userspace.

The EOPNOTSUPP in this case comes from POSIX ACLs. Specifically it comes from filesystems that call posix_acl_chmod(), e.g., btrfs via

if (!err && attr->ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)
err = posix_acl_chmod(idmap, dentry, inode->i_mode);

Filesystems including btrfs don't implement i_op->set_acl() so posix_acl_chmod() will report EOPNOTSUPP.

When posix_acl_chmod() is called, most filesystems will have finished updating the inode.

Perversely, this has the consequences that this behavior may depend on two kconfig options and mount options:

* CONFIG_POSIX_ACL={y,n}
* CONFIG_${FSTYPE}_POSIX_ACL={y,n}
* Opt_acl, Opt_noacl

Example: btrfs, ext4, xfs

The only way to change the mode on a symlink currently involves abusing an O_PATH file descriptor in the following manner:

        fd = openat(-1, "/path/to/link", O_CLOEXEC | O_PATH | O_NOFOLLOW);

        char path[PATH_MAX];
        snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/self/fd/%d", fd);
        chmod(path, 0000);

But for most major filesystems with POSIX ACL support such as btrfs, ext4, ceph, tmpfs, xfs and others this will fail with EOPNOTSUPP with the mode still updated due to the aforementioned posix_acl_chmod() nonsense.

So, given that for all major filesystems this would fail with EOPNOTSUPP and that both glibc (cf. [1]) and musl (cf. [2]) outright block mode changes on symlinks we should just try and block mode changes on symlinks directly in the vfs and have a clean break with this nonsense.

If this causes any regressions, we do the next best thing and fix up all filesystems that do return EOPNOTSUPP with the mode updated to not call posix_acl_chmod() on symlinks.

But as usual, let's try the clean cut solution first. It's a simple patch that can be easily reverted. Not marking this for backport as I'll do that manually if we're reasonably sure that this works and there are no strong objections.

We could block this in chmod_common() but it's more appropriate to do it notify_change() as it will also mean that we catch filesystems that change symlink permissions explicitly or accidently.

Similar proposals were floated in the past as in [3] and [4] and again recently in [5]. There's also a couple of bugs about this inconsistency as in [6] and [7].

Message-Id: <[email protected]>

---
 fs/attr.c |   20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/attr.c +18 -2
@@ -253,9 +253,25 @@ int notify_change(struct dentry * dentry
 	}
 
 	if ((ia_valid & ATTR_MODE)) {
-		umode_t amode = attr->ia_mode;
+		/*
+		 * Don't allow changing the mode of symlinks:
+		 *
+		 * (1) The vfs doesn't take the mode of symlinks into account
+		 *     during permission checking.
+		 * (2) This has never worked correctly. Most major filesystems
+		 *     did return EOPNOTSUPP due to interactions with POSIX ACLs
+		 *     but did still updated the mode of the symlink.
+		 *     This inconsistency led system call wrapper providers such
+		 *     as libc to block changing the mode of symlinks with
+		 *     EOPNOTSUPP already.
+		 * (3) To even do this in the first place one would have to use
+		 *     specific file descriptors and quite some effort.
+		 */
+		if (S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
+			return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
 		/* Flag setting protected by i_mutex */
-		if (is_sxid(amode))
+		if (is_sxid(attr->ia_mode))
 			inode->i_flags &= ~S_NOSEC;
 	}
 
author maintainer
#363 lore raw

PATCH 357/367 btrfs: fix lockdep splat and potential deadlock after failure running delayed items

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Filipe Manana <[email protected]>

commit e110f8911ddb93e6f55da14ccbbe705397b30d0b upstream.

When running delayed items we are holding a delayed node's mutex and then we will attempt to modify a subvolume btree to insert/update/delete the delayed items. However if have an error during the insertions for example, btrfs_insert_delayed_items() may return with a path that has locked extent buffers (a leaf at the very least), and then we attempt to release the delayed node at __btrfs_run_delayed_items(), which requires taking the delayed node's mutex, causing an ABBA type of deadlock. This was reported by syzbot and the lockdep splat is the following:

WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0 Not tainted
------------------------------------------------------
syz-executor.2/13257 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff88801835c0c0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256

but task is already holding lock:
ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #1 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}:

         __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5475 [inline]
         lock_release+0x36f/0x9d0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5781
         up_write+0x79/0x580 kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1625
         btrfs_tree_unlock_rw fs/btrfs/locking.h:189 [inline]
         btrfs_unlock_up_safe+0x179/0x3b0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:239
         search_leaf fs/btrfs/ctree.c:1986 [inline]
         btrfs_search_slot+0x2511/0x2f80 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2230
         btrfs_insert_empty_items+0x9c/0x180 fs/btrfs/ctree.c:4376
         btrfs_insert_delayed_item fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:746 [inline]
         btrfs_insert_delayed_items fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:824 [inline]
         __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items+0xd24/0x2410 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1111
         __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x1db/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1153
         flush_space+0x269/0xe70 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:723
         btrfs_async_reclaim_metadata_space+0x106/0x350 fs/btrfs/space-info.c:1078
         process_one_work+0x92c/0x12c0 kernel/workqueue.c:2600
         worker_thread+0xa63/0x1210 kernel/workqueue.c:2751
         kthread+0x2b8/0x350 kernel/kthread.c:389
         ret_from_fork+0x2e/0x60 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:145
         ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304

-> #0 (&delayed_node->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:

         check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
         check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
         validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
         __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
         lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
         __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603
         __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline]
         mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799
         __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256
         btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline]
         __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156
         btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276
         btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988
         vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline]
         vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline]
         do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline]
         __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline]
         __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline]
         __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218
         do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
         do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd

other info that might help us debug this:

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:
         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    lock(btrfs-tree-00);
                                 lock(&delayed_node->mutex);
                                 lock(btrfs-tree-00);
    lock(&delayed_node->mutex);

*** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by syz-executor.2/13257:
#0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: spin_unlock include/linux/spinlock.h:391 [inline] #0: ffff88802c1ee370 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xb87/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:287 #1: ffff88802c1ee398 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0xbb2/0xe00 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:288 #2: ffff88802a5ab8e8 (btrfs-tree-00){++++}-{3:3}, at: __btrfs_tree_lock+0x3c/0x2a0 fs/btrfs/locking.c:198

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 13257 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.5.0-rc7-syzkaller-00024-g93f5de5f648d #0
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/26/2023
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
   dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106
   check_noncircular+0x375/0x4a0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2195
   check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3142 [inline]
   check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3261 [inline]
   validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3876 [inline]
   __lock_acquire+0x39ff/0x7f70 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5144
   lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x520 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5761
   __mutex_lock_common+0x1d8/0x2530 kernel/locking/mutex.c:603
   __mutex_lock kernel/locking/mutex.c:747 [inline]
   mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20 kernel/locking/mutex.c:799
   __btrfs_release_delayed_node+0x9a/0xaa0 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:256
   btrfs_release_delayed_node fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:281 [inline]
   __btrfs_run_delayed_items+0x2b5/0x430 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1156
   btrfs_commit_transaction+0x859/0x2ff0 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2276
   btrfs_sync_file+0xf56/0x1330 fs/btrfs/file.c:1988
   vfs_fsync_range fs/sync.c:188 [inline]
   vfs_fsync fs/sync.c:202 [inline]
   do_fsync fs/sync.c:212 [inline]
   __do_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:220 [inline]
   __se_sys_fsync fs/sync.c:218 [inline]
   __x64_sys_fsync+0x196/0x1e0 fs/sync.c:218
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0x41/0xc0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd
  RIP: 0033:0x7f3ad047cae9
  Code: 28 00 00 00 75 (...)
  RSP: 002b:00007f3ad12510c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000004a
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f3ad059bf80 RCX: 00007f3ad047cae9
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000005
  RBP: 00007f3ad04c847a R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f3ad059bf80 R15: 00007ffe56af92f8
   </TASK>
  ------------[ cut here ]------------

Fix this by releasing the path before releasing the delayed node in the error path at __btrfs_run_delayed_items().

---
 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c |   19 ++++++++++++++++---
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c +16 -3
@@ -1175,20 +1175,33 @@ static int __btrfs_run_delayed_items(str
 		ret = __btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_items(trans, path,
 							 curr_node);
 		if (ret) {
-			btrfs_release_delayed_node(curr_node);
-			curr_node = NULL;
 			btrfs_abort_transaction(trans, ret);
 			break;
 		}
 
 		prev_node = curr_node;
 		curr_node = btrfs_next_delayed_node(curr_node);
+		/*
+		 * See the comment below about releasing path before releasing
+		 * node. If the commit of delayed items was successful the path
+		 * should always be released, but in case of an error, it may
+		 * point to locked extent buffers (a leaf at the very least).
+		 */
+		ASSERT(path->nodes[0] == NULL);
 		btrfs_release_delayed_node(prev_node);
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * Release the path to avoid a potential deadlock and lockdep splat when
+	 * releasing the delayed node, as that requires taking the delayed node's
+	 * mutex. If another task starts running delayed items before we take
+	 * the mutex, it will first lock the mutex and then it may try to lock
+	 * the same btree path (leaf).
+	 */
+	btrfs_free_path(path);
+
 	if (curr_node)
 		btrfs_release_delayed_node(curr_node);
-	btrfs_free_path(path);
 	trans->block_rsv = block_rsv;
 
 	return ret;
author maintainer
#364 lore raw

PATCH 358/367 tracing: Have current_trace inc the trace array ref count

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>

commit 9b37febc578b2e1ad76a105aab11d00af5ec3d27 upstream.

The current_trace updates the trace array tracer. For an instance, if the file is opened and the instance is deleted, reading or writing to the file will cause a use after free.

Up the ref count of the trace array when current_trace is opened.

Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Zheng Yejian <[email protected]>
Fixes 8530dec63e7b4 ("tracing: Add tracing_check_open_get_tr()")
---
 kernel/trace/trace.c |    3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/trace.c +2 -1
@@ -6951,10 +6951,11 @@ static const struct file_operations trac
 #endif
 
 static const struct file_operations set_tracer_fops = {
-	.open		= tracing_open_generic,
+	.open		= tracing_open_generic_tr,
 	.read		= tracing_set_trace_read,
 	.write		= tracing_set_trace_write,
 	.llseek		= generic_file_llseek,
+	.release	= tracing_release_generic_tr,
 };
 
 static const struct file_operations tracing_pipe_fops = {
author maintainer
#365 lore raw

PATCH 359/367 tracing: Have option files inc the trace array ref count

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>

commit 7e2cfbd2d3c86afcd5c26b5c4b1dd251f63c5838 upstream.

The option files update the options for a given trace array. For an instance, if the file is opened and the instance is deleted, reading or writing to the file will cause a use after free.

Up the ref count of the trace_array when an option file is opened.

Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Zheng Yejian <[email protected]>
Fixes 8530dec63e7b4 ("tracing: Add tracing_check_open_get_tr()")
---
 kernel/trace/trace.c |   23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
kernel/trace/trace.c +22 -1
@@ -7996,12 +7996,33 @@ trace_options_write(struct file *filp, c
 	return cnt;
 }
 
+static int tracing_open_options(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)
+{
+	struct trace_option_dentry *topt = inode->i_private;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = tracing_check_open_get_tr(topt->tr);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	filp->private_data = inode->i_private;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int tracing_release_options(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct trace_option_dentry *topt = file->private_data;
+
+	trace_array_put(topt->tr);
+	return 0;
+}
 
 static const struct file_operations trace_options_fops = {
-	.open = tracing_open_generic,
+	.open = tracing_open_options,
 	.read = trace_options_read,
 	.write = trace_options_write,
 	.llseek	= generic_file_llseek,
+	.release = tracing_release_options,
 };
 
 /*
author maintainer
#366 lore raw

PATCH 360/367 nfsd: fix change_info in NFSv4 RENAME replies

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jeff Layton <[email protected]>

commit fdd2630a7398191e84822612e589062063bd4f3d upstream.

nfsd sends the transposed directory change info in the RENAME reply. The source directory is in save_fh and the target is in current_fh.

---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4proc.c +2 -2
@@ -865,8 +865,8 @@ nfsd4_rename(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, str
 			     rename->rn_tname, rename->rn_tnamelen);
 	if (status)
 		return status;
-	set_change_info(&rename->rn_sinfo, &cstate->current_fh);
-	set_change_info(&rename->rn_tinfo, &cstate->save_fh);
+	set_change_info(&rename->rn_sinfo, &cstate->save_fh);
+	set_change_info(&rename->rn_tinfo, &cstate->current_fh);
 	return nfs_ok;
 }
 
author maintainer
#367 lore raw

PATCH 361/367 tracefs: Add missing lockdown check to tracefs_create_dir()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Steven Rostedt (Google) <[email protected]>

commit 51aab5ffceb43e05119eb059048fd75765d2bc21 upstream.

The function tracefs_create_dir() was missing a lockdown check and was called by the RV code. This gave an inconsistent behavior of this function returning success while other tracefs functions failed. This caused the inode being freed by the wrong kmem_cache.

Cc Masami Hiramatsu <[email protected]>
Cc Mark Rutland <[email protected]>
Cc Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
Cc Ajay Kaher <[email protected]>
Cc Ching-lin Yu <[email protected]>
Fixes bf8e602186ec4 ("tracing: Do not create tracefs files if tracefs lockdown is in effect")
---
 fs/tracefs/inode.c |    3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
fs/tracefs/inode.c +3 -0
@@ -551,6 +551,9 @@ static struct dentry *__create_dir(const
  */
 struct dentry *tracefs_create_dir(const char *name, struct dentry *parent)
 {
+	if (security_locked_down(LOCKDOWN_TRACEFS))
+		return NULL;
+
 	return __create_dir(name, parent, &simple_dir_inode_operations);
 }
 
author maintainer
#368 lore raw

PATCH 362/367 i2c: aspeed: Reset the i2c controller when timeout occurs

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Tommy Huang <[email protected]>

commit fee465150b458351b6d9b9f66084f3cc3022b88b upstream.

Reset the i2c controller when an i2c transfer timeout occurs. The remaining interrupts and device should be reset to avoid unpredictable controller behavior.

Fixes 2e57b7cebb98 ("i2c: aspeed: Add multi-master use case support")
Cc <[email protected]> # v5.1+
---
 drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-aspeed.c |    7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
drivers/i2c/busses/i2c-aspeed.c +5 -2
@@ -693,13 +693,16 @@ static int aspeed_i2c_master_xfer(struct
 
 	if (time_left == 0) {
 		/*
-		 * If timed out and bus is still busy in a multi master
-		 * environment, attempt recovery at here.
+		 * In a multi-master setup, if a timeout occurs, attempt
+		 * recovery. But if the bus is idle, we still need to reset the
+		 * i2c controller to clear the remaining interrupts.
 		 */
 		if (bus->multi_master &&
 		    (readl(bus->base + ASPEED_I2C_CMD_REG) &
 		     ASPEED_I2CD_BUS_BUSY_STS))
 			aspeed_i2c_recover_bus(bus);
+		else
+			aspeed_i2c_reset(bus);
 
 		/*
 		 * If timed out and the state is still pending, drop the pending
author maintainer
#369 lore raw

PATCH 363/367 scsi: megaraid_sas: Fix deadlock on firmware crashdump

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Junxiao Bi <[email protected]>

commit 0b0747d507bffb827e40fc0f9fb5883fffc23477 upstream.

The following processes run into a deadlock. CPU 41 was waiting for CPU 29 to handle a CSD request while holding spinlock "crashdump_lock", but CPU 29 was hung by that spinlock with IRQs disabled.

PID: 17360 TASK: ffff95c1090c5c40 CPU: 41 COMMAND: "mrdiagd"
!# 0 [ffffb80edbf37b58] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b871a40 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0
!# 1 [ffffb80edbf37b58] atomic_read at ffffffff9b871a40 arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:27:0
!# 2 [ffffb80edbf37b58] dump_stack at ffffffff9b871a40 lib/dump_stack.c:54:0
# 3 [ffffb80edbf37b78] csd_lock_wait_toolong at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:364:0
# 4 [ffffb80edbf37b78] __csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b131ad5 kernel/smp.c:384:0
# 5 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] csd_lock_wait at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:394:0
# 6 [ffffb80edbf37bf8] smp_call_function_many at ffffffff9b13267a kernel/smp.c:843:0
# 7 [ffffb80edbf37c50] smp_call_function at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:867:0
# 8 [ffffb80edbf37c50] on_each_cpu at ffffffff9b13279d kernel/smp.c:976:0
# 9 [ffffb80edbf37c78] flush_tlb_kernel_range at ffffffff9b085c4b arch/x86/mm/tlb.c:742:0
#10 [ffffb80edbf37cb8] __purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a1e0 mm/vmalloc.c:701:0
#11 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] try_purge_vmap_area_lazy at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:722:0
#12 [ffffb80edbf37ce0] free_vmap_area_noflush at ffffffff9b23a2cc mm/vmalloc.c:754:0
#13 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] free_unmap_vmap_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:764:0
#14 [ffffb80edbf37cf8] remove_vm_area at ffffffff9b23bb3b mm/vmalloc.c:1509:0
#15 [ffffb80edbf37d18] __vunmap at ffffffff9b23bb8a mm/vmalloc.c:1537:0
#16 [ffffb80edbf37d40] vfree at ffffffff9b23bc85 mm/vmalloc.c:1612:0
#17 [ffffb80edbf37d58] megasas_free_host_crash_buffer [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc020b7f2 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_fusion.c:3932:0 #18 [ffffb80edbf37d80] fw_crash_state_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f804d drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3291:0 #19 [ffffb80edbf37dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0
#20 [ffffb80edbf37dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0
#21 [ffffb80edbf37de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0
#22 [ffffb80edbf37e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0
#23 [ffffb80edbf37ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0
#24 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0
#25 [ffffb80edbf37ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0
#26 [ffffb80edbf37f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0
#27 [ffffb80edbf37f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0

PID: 17355 TASK: ffff95c1090c3d80 CPU: 29 COMMAND: "mrdiagd"
!# 0 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] __read_once_size at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 include/linux/compiler.h:185:0
!# 1 [ffffb80f2d3c7d30] native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f2ab0 kernel/locking/qspinlock.c:368:0
# 2 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] pv_queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/paravirt.h:674:0 # 3 [ffffb80f2d3c7d58] queued_spin_lock_slowpath at ffffffff9b0f244b arch/x86/include/asm/qspinlock.h:53:0 # 4 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] queued_spin_lock at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/asm-generic/qspinlock.h:90:0
# 5 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] do_raw_spin_lock_flags at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock.h:173:0
# 6 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:122:0
# 7 [ffffb80f2d3c7d68] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave at ffffffff9b8961a6 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:160:0
# 8 [ffffb80f2d3c7d88] fw_crash_buffer_store [megaraid_sas] at ffffffffc01f8129 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c:3205:0 # 9 [ffffb80f2d3c7dc0] dev_attr_store at ffffffff9b56dd7b drivers/base/core.c:758:0
#10 [ffffb80f2d3c7dd0] sysfs_kf_write at ffffffff9b326acf fs/sysfs/file.c:144:0
#11 [ffffb80f2d3c7de0] kernfs_fop_write at ffffffff9b325fd4 fs/kernfs/file.c:316:0
#12 [ffffb80f2d3c7e20] __vfs_write at ffffffff9b29418a fs/read_write.c:480:0
#13 [ffffb80f2d3c7ea8] vfs_write at ffffffff9b294462 fs/read_write.c:544:0
#14 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SYSC_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:590:0
#15 [ffffb80f2d3c7ee8] SyS_write at ffffffff9b2946ec fs/read_write.c:582:0
#16 [ffffb80f2d3c7f30] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9b003ca9 arch/x86/entry/common.c:298:0
#17 [ffffb80f2d3c7f58] entry_SYSCALL_64 at ffffffff9ba001b1 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:238:0

The lock is used to synchronize different sysfs operations, it doesn't protect any resource that will be touched by an interrupt. Consequently it's not required to disable IRQs. Replace the spinlock with a mutex to fix the deadlock.

---
 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas.h      |    2 +-
 drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c |   21 +++++++++------------
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas.h +1 -1
@@ -2324,7 +2324,7 @@ struct megasas_instance {
 	u32 support_morethan256jbod; /* FW support for more than 256 PD/JBOD */
 	bool use_seqnum_jbod_fp;   /* Added for PD sequence */
 	bool smp_affinity_enable;
-	spinlock_t crashdump_lock;
+	struct mutex crashdump_lock;
 
 	struct megasas_register_set __iomem *reg_set;
 	u32 __iomem *reply_post_host_index_addr[MR_MAX_MSIX_REG_ARRAY];
drivers/scsi/megaraid/megaraid_sas_base.c +9 -12
@@ -3208,14 +3208,13 @@ fw_crash_buffer_store(struct device *cde
 	struct megasas_instance *instance =
 		(struct megasas_instance *) shost->hostdata;
 	int val = 0;
-	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (kstrtoint(buf, 0, &val) != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->crashdump_lock, flags);
+	mutex_lock(&instance->crashdump_lock);
 	instance->fw_crash_buffer_offset = val;
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->crashdump_lock, flags);
+	mutex_unlock(&instance->crashdump_lock);
 	return strlen(buf);
 }
 
@@ -3230,24 +3229,23 @@ fw_crash_buffer_show(struct device *cdev
 	unsigned long dmachunk = CRASH_DMA_BUF_SIZE;
 	unsigned long chunk_left_bytes;
 	unsigned long src_addr;
-	unsigned long flags;
 	u32 buff_offset;
 
-	spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->crashdump_lock, flags);
+	mutex_lock(&instance->crashdump_lock);
 	buff_offset = instance->fw_crash_buffer_offset;
 	if (!instance->crash_dump_buf ||
 		!((instance->fw_crash_state == AVAILABLE) ||
 		(instance->fw_crash_state == COPYING))) {
 		dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
 			"Firmware crash dump is not available\n");
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->crashdump_lock, flags);
+		mutex_unlock(&instance->crashdump_lock);
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	if (buff_offset > (instance->fw_crash_buffer_size * dmachunk)) {
 		dev_err(&instance->pdev->dev,
 			"Firmware crash dump offset is out of range\n");
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->crashdump_lock, flags);
+		mutex_unlock(&instance->crashdump_lock);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -3259,7 +3257,7 @@ fw_crash_buffer_show(struct device *cdev
 	src_addr = (unsigned long)instance->crash_buf[buff_offset / dmachunk] +
 		(buff_offset % dmachunk);
 	memcpy(buf, (void *)src_addr, size);
-	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->crashdump_lock, flags);
+	mutex_unlock(&instance->crashdump_lock);
 
 	return size;
 }
@@ -3284,7 +3282,6 @@ fw_crash_state_store(struct device *cdev
 	struct megasas_instance *instance =
 		(struct megasas_instance *) shost->hostdata;
 	int val = 0;
-	unsigned long flags;
 
 	if (kstrtoint(buf, 0, &val) != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -3298,9 +3295,9 @@ fw_crash_state_store(struct device *cdev
 	instance->fw_crash_state = val;
 
 	if ((val == COPIED) || (val == COPY_ERROR)) {
-		spin_lock_irqsave(&instance->crashdump_lock, flags);
+		mutex_lock(&instance->crashdump_lock);
 		megasas_free_host_crash_buffer(instance);
-		spin_unlock_irqrestore(&instance->crashdump_lock, flags);
+		mutex_unlock(&instance->crashdump_lock);
 		if (val == COPY_ERROR)
 			dev_info(&instance->pdev->dev, "application failed to "
 				"copy Firmware crash dump\n");
@@ -7301,7 +7298,7 @@ static inline void megasas_init_ctrl_par
 	init_waitqueue_head(&instance->int_cmd_wait_q);
 	init_waitqueue_head(&instance->abort_cmd_wait_q);
 
-	spin_lock_init(&instance->crashdump_lock);
+	mutex_init(&instance->crashdump_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&instance->mfi_pool_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&instance->hba_lock);
 	spin_lock_init(&instance->stream_lock);
author maintainer
#370 lore raw

PATCH 364/367 ext4: fix rec_len verify error

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Shida Zhang <[email protected]>

commit 7fda67e8c3ab6069f75888f67958a6d30454a9f6 upstream.

With the configuration PAGE_SIZE 64k and filesystem blocksize 64k, a problem occurred when more than 13 million files were directly created under a directory:

EXT4-fs error (device xx): ext4_dx_csum_set:492: inode #xxxx: comm xxxxx: dir seems corrupt? Run e2fsck -D. EXT4-fs error (device xx): ext4_dx_csum_verify:463: inode #xxxx: comm xxxxx: dir seems corrupt? Run e2fsck -D. EXT4-fs error (device xx): dx_probe:856: inode #xxxx: block 8188: comm xxxxx: Directory index failed checksum

When enough files are created, the fake_dirent->reclen will be 0xffff. it doesn't equal to the blocksize 65536, i.e. 0x10000.

But it is not the same condition when blocksize equals to 4k. when enough files are created, the fake_dirent->reclen will be 0x1000. it equals to the blocksize 4k, i.e. 0x1000.

The problem seems to be related to the limitation of the 16-bit field when the blocksize is set to 64k.
To address this, helpers like ext4_rec_len_{from,to}_disk has already been introduced to complete the conversion between the encoded and the plain form of rec_len.

So fix this one by using the helper, and all the other in this file too.

---
 fs/ext4/namei.c |   26 +++++++++++++++-----------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
fs/ext4/namei.c +15 -11
@@ -325,17 +325,17 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *get_d
 						   struct buffer_head *bh)
 {
 	struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *t;
+	int blocksize = EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb);
 
 #ifdef PARANOID
 	struct ext4_dir_entry *d, *top;
 
 	d = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)bh->b_data;
 	top = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(bh->b_data +
-		(EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) -
-		 sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail)));
-	while (d < top && d->rec_len)
+		(blocksize - sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail)));
+	while (d < top && ext4_rec_len_from_disk(d->rec_len, blocksize))
 		d = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(((void *)d) +
-		    le16_to_cpu(d->rec_len));
+		    ext4_rec_len_from_disk(d->rec_len, blocksize));
 
 	if (d != top)
 		return NULL;
@@ -346,7 +346,8 @@ static struct ext4_dir_entry_tail *get_d
 #endif
 
 	if (t->det_reserved_zero1 ||
-	    le16_to_cpu(t->det_rec_len) != sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail) ||
+	    (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(t->det_rec_len, blocksize) !=
+	     sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail)) ||
 	    t->det_reserved_zero2 ||
 	    t->det_reserved_ft != EXT4_FT_DIR_CSUM)
 		return NULL;
@@ -427,13 +428,14 @@ static struct dx_countlimit *get_dx_coun
 	struct ext4_dir_entry *dp;
 	struct dx_root_info *root;
 	int count_offset;
+	int blocksize = EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb);
+	unsigned int rlen = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(dirent->rec_len, blocksize);
 
-	if (le16_to_cpu(dirent->rec_len) == EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb))
+	if (rlen == blocksize)
 		count_offset = 8;
-	else if (le16_to_cpu(dirent->rec_len) == 12) {
+	else if (rlen == 12) {
 		dp = (struct ext4_dir_entry *)(((void *)dirent) + 12);
-		if (le16_to_cpu(dp->rec_len) !=
-		    EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(inode->i_sb) - 12)
+		if (ext4_rec_len_from_disk(dp->rec_len, blocksize) != blocksize - 12)
 			return NULL;
 		root = (struct dx_root_info *)(((void *)dp + 12));
 		if (root->reserved_zero ||
@@ -1246,6 +1248,7 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir
 	unsigned int buflen = bh->b_size;
 	char *base = bh->b_data;
 	struct dx_hash_info h = *hinfo;
+	int blocksize = EXT4_BLOCK_SIZE(dir->i_sb);
 
 	if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(dir->i_sb))
 		buflen -= sizeof(struct ext4_dir_entry_tail);
@@ -1259,11 +1262,12 @@ static int dx_make_map(struct inode *dir
 			map_tail--;
 			map_tail->hash = h.hash;
 			map_tail->offs = ((char *) de - base)>>2;
-			map_tail->size = le16_to_cpu(de->rec_len);
+			map_tail->size = ext4_rec_len_from_disk(de->rec_len,
+								blocksize);
 			count++;
 			cond_resched();
 		}
-		de = ext4_next_entry(de, dir->i_sb->s_blocksize);
+		de = ext4_next_entry(de, blocksize);
 	}
 	return count;
 }
author maintainer
#371 lore raw

PATCH 365/367 mtd: rawnand: brcmnand: Fix ECC level field setting for v7.2 controller

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: William Zhang <[email protected]>

commit 2ec2839a9062db8a592525a3fdabd42dcd9a3a9b upstream.

v7.2 controller has different ECC level field size and shift in the acc control register than its predecessor and successor controller. It needs to be set specifically.

---
 drivers/mtd/nand/raw/brcmnand/brcmnand.c |   74 +++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
drivers/mtd/nand/raw/brcmnand/brcmnand.c +41 -33
@@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ struct brcmnand_controller {
 	unsigned int		max_page_size;
 	const unsigned int	*page_sizes;
 	unsigned int		max_oob;
+	u32			ecc_level_shift;
 	u32			features;
 
 	/* for low-power standby/resume only */
@@ -487,6 +488,34 @@ enum {
 	INTFC_CTLR_READY		= BIT(31),
 };
 
+/***********************************************************************
+ * NAND ACC CONTROL bitfield
+ *
+ * Some bits have remained constant throughout hardware revision, while
+ * others have shifted around.
+ ***********************************************************************/
+
+/* Constant for all versions (where supported) */
+enum {
+	/* See BRCMNAND_HAS_CACHE_MODE */
+	ACC_CONTROL_CACHE_MODE				= BIT(22),
+
+	/* See BRCMNAND_HAS_PREFETCH */
+	ACC_CONTROL_PREFETCH				= BIT(23),
+
+	ACC_CONTROL_PAGE_HIT				= BIT(24),
+	ACC_CONTROL_WR_PREEMPT				= BIT(25),
+	ACC_CONTROL_PARTIAL_PAGE			= BIT(26),
+	ACC_CONTROL_RD_ERASED				= BIT(27),
+	ACC_CONTROL_FAST_PGM_RDIN			= BIT(28),
+	ACC_CONTROL_WR_ECC				= BIT(30),
+	ACC_CONTROL_RD_ECC				= BIT(31),
+};
+
+#define	ACC_CONTROL_ECC_SHIFT			16
+/* Only for v7.2 */
+#define	ACC_CONTROL_ECC_EXT_SHIFT		13
+
 static inline u32 nand_readreg(struct brcmnand_controller *ctrl, u32 offs)
 {
 	return brcmnand_readl(ctrl->nand_base + offs);
@@ -590,6 +619,12 @@ static int brcmnand_revision_init(struct
 	else if (of_property_read_bool(ctrl->dev->of_node, "brcm,nand-has-wp"))
 		ctrl->features |= BRCMNAND_HAS_WP;
 
+	/* v7.2 has different ecc level shift in the acc register */
+	if (ctrl->nand_version == 0x0702)
+		ctrl->ecc_level_shift = ACC_CONTROL_ECC_EXT_SHIFT;
+	else
+		ctrl->ecc_level_shift = ACC_CONTROL_ECC_SHIFT;
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -752,30 +787,6 @@ static inline int brcmnand_cmd_shift(str
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/***********************************************************************
- * NAND ACC CONTROL bitfield
- *
- * Some bits have remained constant throughout hardware revision, while
- * others have shifted around.
- ***********************************************************************/
-
-/* Constant for all versions (where supported) */
-enum {
-	/* See BRCMNAND_HAS_CACHE_MODE */
-	ACC_CONTROL_CACHE_MODE				= BIT(22),
-
-	/* See BRCMNAND_HAS_PREFETCH */
-	ACC_CONTROL_PREFETCH				= BIT(23),
-
-	ACC_CONTROL_PAGE_HIT				= BIT(24),
-	ACC_CONTROL_WR_PREEMPT				= BIT(25),
-	ACC_CONTROL_PARTIAL_PAGE			= BIT(26),
-	ACC_CONTROL_RD_ERASED				= BIT(27),
-	ACC_CONTROL_FAST_PGM_RDIN			= BIT(28),
-	ACC_CONTROL_WR_ECC				= BIT(30),
-	ACC_CONTROL_RD_ECC				= BIT(31),
-};
-
 static inline u32 brcmnand_spare_area_mask(struct brcmnand_controller *ctrl)
 {
 	if (ctrl->nand_version == 0x0702)
@@ -786,18 +797,15 @@ static inline u32 brcmnand_spare_area_ma
 		return GENMASK(5, 0);
 }
 
-#define NAND_ACC_CONTROL_ECC_SHIFT	16
-#define NAND_ACC_CONTROL_ECC_EXT_SHIFT	13
-
 static inline u32 brcmnand_ecc_level_mask(struct brcmnand_controller *ctrl)
 {
 	u32 mask = (ctrl->nand_version >= 0x0600) ? 0x1f : 0x0f;
 
-	mask <<= NAND_ACC_CONTROL_ECC_SHIFT;
+	mask <<= ACC_CONTROL_ECC_SHIFT;
 
 	/* v7.2 includes additional ECC levels */
-	if (ctrl->nand_version >= 0x0702)
-		mask |= 0x7 << NAND_ACC_CONTROL_ECC_EXT_SHIFT;
+	if (ctrl->nand_version == 0x0702)
+		mask |= 0x7 << ACC_CONTROL_ECC_EXT_SHIFT;
 
 	return mask;
 }
@@ -811,8 +819,8 @@ static void brcmnand_set_ecc_enabled(str
 
 	if (en) {
 		acc_control |= ecc_flags; /* enable RD/WR ECC */
-		acc_control |= host->hwcfg.ecc_level
-			       << NAND_ACC_CONTROL_ECC_SHIFT;
+		acc_control &= ~brcmnand_ecc_level_mask(ctrl);
+		acc_control |= host->hwcfg.ecc_level << ctrl->ecc_level_shift;
 	} else {
 		acc_control &= ~ecc_flags; /* disable RD/WR ECC */
 		acc_control &= ~brcmnand_ecc_level_mask(ctrl);
@@ -2193,7 +2201,7 @@ static int brcmnand_set_cfg(struct brcmn
 
 	tmp = nand_readreg(ctrl, acc_control_offs);
 	tmp &= ~brcmnand_ecc_level_mask(ctrl);
-	tmp |= cfg->ecc_level << NAND_ACC_CONTROL_ECC_SHIFT;
+	tmp |= cfg->ecc_level << ctrl->ecc_level_shift;
 	tmp &= ~brcmnand_spare_area_mask(ctrl);
 	tmp |= cfg->spare_area_size;
 	nand_writereg(ctrl, acc_control_offs, tmp);
author maintainer
#372 lore raw

PATCH 366/367 drm/amdgpu: fix amdgpu_cs_p1_user_fence

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Christian König <[email protected]>

commit 35588314e963938dfdcdb792c9170108399377d6 upstream.

The offset is just 32bits here so this can potentially overflow if somebody specifies a large value. Instead reduce the size to calculate the last possible offset.

The error handling path incorrectly drops the reference to the user fence BO resulting in potential reference count underflow.

---
 drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c |   20 +++++---------------
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_cs.c +5 -15
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ static int amdgpu_cs_user_fence_chunk(st
 	struct drm_gem_object *gobj;
 	struct amdgpu_bo *bo;
 	unsigned long size;
-	int r;
 
 	gobj = drm_gem_object_lookup(p->filp, data->handle);
 	if (gobj == NULL)
@@ -58,23 +57,14 @@ static int amdgpu_cs_user_fence_chunk(st
 	drm_gem_object_put_unlocked(gobj);
 
 	size = amdgpu_bo_size(bo);
-	if (size != PAGE_SIZE || (data->offset + 8) > size) {
-		r = -EINVAL;
-		goto error_unref;
-	}
-
-	if (amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_usermm(bo->tbo.ttm)) {
-		r = -EINVAL;
-		goto error_unref;
-	}
+	if (size != PAGE_SIZE || data->offset > (size - 8))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
-	*offset = data->offset;
+	if (amdgpu_ttm_tt_get_usermm(bo->tbo.ttm))
+		return -EINVAL;
 
+	*offset = data->offset;
 	return 0;
-
-error_unref:
-	amdgpu_bo_unref(&bo);
-	return r;
 }
 
 static int amdgpu_cs_bo_handles_chunk(struct amdgpu_cs_parser *p,
author maintainer
#373 lore raw

PATCH 367/367 net/sched: Retire rsvp classifier

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

5.4-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Jamal Hadi Salim <[email protected]>

commit 265b4da82dbf5df04bee5a5d46b7474b1aaf326a upstream.

The rsvp classifier has served us well for about a quarter of a century but has has not been getting much maintenance attention due to lack of known users.

---
 net/sched/Kconfig     |   28 -
 net/sched/Makefile    |    2 
 net/sched/cls_rsvp.c  |   24 -
 net/sched/cls_rsvp.h  |  777 --------------------------------------------------
 net/sched/cls_rsvp6.c |   24 -
 5 files changed, 855 deletions(-)
net/sched/Kconfig +0 -28
@@ -514,34 +514,6 @@ config CLS_U32_MARK
 	---help---
 	  Say Y here to be able to use netfilter marks as u32 key.
 
-config NET_CLS_RSVP
-	tristate "IPv4 Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP)"
-	select NET_CLS
-	---help---
-	  The Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) permits end systems to
-	  request a minimum and maximum data flow rate for a connection; this
-	  is important for real time data such as streaming sound or video.
-
-	  Say Y here if you want to be able to classify outgoing packets based
-	  on their RSVP requests.
-
-	  To compile this code as a module, choose M here: the
-	  module will be called cls_rsvp.
-
-config NET_CLS_RSVP6
-	tristate "IPv6 Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP6)"
-	select NET_CLS
-	---help---
-	  The Resource Reservation Protocol (RSVP) permits end systems to
-	  request a minimum and maximum data flow rate for a connection; this
-	  is important for real time data such as streaming sound or video.
-
-	  Say Y here if you want to be able to classify outgoing packets based
-	  on their RSVP requests and you are using the IPv6 protocol.
-
-	  To compile this code as a module, choose M here: the
-	  module will be called cls_rsvp6.
-
 config NET_CLS_FLOW
 	tristate "Flow classifier"
 	select NET_CLS
net/sched/Makefile +0 -2
@@ -65,8 +65,6 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NET_SCH_TAPRIO)	+= sch_tapr
 obj-$(CONFIG_NET_CLS_U32)	+= cls_u32.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NET_CLS_ROUTE4)	+= cls_route.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NET_CLS_FW)	+= cls_fw.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_NET_CLS_RSVP)	+= cls_rsvp.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_NET_CLS_RSVP6)	+= cls_rsvp6.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NET_CLS_BASIC)	+= cls_basic.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NET_CLS_FLOW)	+= cls_flow.o
 obj-$(CONFIG_NET_CLS_CGROUP)	+= cls_cgroup.o
net/sched/cls_rsvp.c deleted +0 -24
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
-/*
- * net/sched/cls_rsvp.c	Special RSVP packet classifier for IPv4.
- *
- * Authors:	Alexey Kuznetsov, <[email protected]>
- */
-
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/errno.h>
-#include <linux/skbuff.h>
-#include <net/ip.h>
-#include <net/netlink.h>
-#include <net/act_api.h>
-#include <net/pkt_cls.h>
-
-#define RSVP_DST_LEN	1
-#define RSVP_ID		"rsvp"
-#define RSVP_OPS	cls_rsvp_ops
-
-#include "cls_rsvp.h"
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
net/sched/cls_rsvp.h deleted +0 -777

777 lines not on this page · raw message

net/sched/cls_rsvp6.c deleted +0 -24
@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
-/*
- * net/sched/cls_rsvp6.c	Special RSVP packet classifier for IPv6.
- *
- * Authors:	Alexey Kuznetsov, <[email protected]>
- */
-
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/string.h>
-#include <linux/errno.h>
-#include <linux/ipv6.h>
-#include <linux/skbuff.h>
-#include <net/act_api.h>
-#include <net/pkt_cls.h>
-#include <net/netlink.h>
-
-#define RSVP_DST_LEN	4
-#define RSVP_ID		"rsvp6"
-#define RSVP_OPS	cls_rsvp6_ops
-
-#include "cls_rsvp.h"
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
#374 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.257 release. There are 367 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri, 22 Sep 2023 11:28:09 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.257-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

perf does not build with:

libbpf.c: In function 'bpf_object__close':
libbpf.c:4205:15: error: 'struct bpf_object' has no member named 'btf_vmlinux'

  btf__free(obj->btf_vmlinux);
               ^~

due to 34d66b750e83d49c7d3d33d59e6a1b49e0d5db15 ("libbpf: Free btf_vmlinux when closing bpf_object")

the btf_vmlinux member was introduced with a6ed02cac690b635dbb938690e795812ce1e14ca ("libbpf: Load btf_vmlinux only once per object.") which is only in >= 5.6.

Suggset we drop that commit.

Signature · 1 line
Florian
#375 lore raw
Quoted 26 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 14 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.257 release. There are 367 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri, 22 Sep 2023 11:28:09 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
    https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.257-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
    git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y and the diffstat can be found below.

Quoted 3 lines

thanks,

greg k-h

perf does not build with:

libbpf.c: In function 'bpf_object__close':
libbpf.c:4205:15: error: 'struct bpf_object' has no member named 'btf_vmlinux'
  btf__free(obj->btf_vmlinux);
               ^~

Quoted 5 lines

due to 34d66b750e83d49c7d3d33d59e6a1b49e0d5db15 ("libbpf: Free btf_vmlinux when closing bpf_object")

the btf_vmlinux member was introduced with a6ed02cac690b635dbb938690e795812ce1e14ca ("libbpf: Load btf_vmlinux only once per object.") which is only in >= 5.6.

Suggset we drop that commit.

This problem affects 5.4, 5.10, and 5.15.

Guenter

author maintainer
#376 lore raw
Quoted 27 lines · Guenter Roeck
Quoted 26 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 14 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.257 release. There are 367 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri, 22 Sep 2023 11:28:09 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
    https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.257-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
    git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y and the diffstat can be found below.

Quoted 3 lines

thanks,

greg k-h

perf does not build with:

libbpf.c: In function 'bpf_object__close':
libbpf.c:4205:15: error: 'struct bpf_object' has no member named 'btf_vmlinux'
  btf__free(obj->btf_vmlinux);
               ^~

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines

due to 34d66b750e83d49c7d3d33d59e6a1b49e0d5db15 ("libbpf: Free btf_vmlinux when closing bpf_object")

the btf_vmlinux member was introduced with a6ed02cac690b635dbb938690e795812ce1e14ca ("libbpf: Load btf_vmlinux only once per object.") which is only in >= 5.6.

Suggset we drop that commit.

This problem affects 5.4, 5.10, and 5.15.

Now dropped from all of those queues, thanks.

greg k-h

Tested-by on the v1 series
#377 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.257 release. There are 367 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri, 22 Sep 2023 11:28:09 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.257-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

thanks,
-- Shuah

#378 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.257 release. There are 367 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri, 22 Sep 2023 11:28:09 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.257-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Following build warnings noticed while building arm64 with allmodconfig on stable-rc 5.4 with gcc-8 and gcc-12 toolchains.

drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_gem.c: In function 'mtk_drm_gem_prime_vmap':
drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_gem.c:273:10: warning: returning 'int' from a function with return type 'void *' makes pointer from integer without a cast [-Wint-conversion]

   return -ENOMEM;
          ^

Links:
- https://storage.tuxsuite.com/public/linaro/lkft/builds/2VfG47LmPH9MUEuIcMVftu6NsFy/

Following commit is causing this build warning.

drm/mediatek: Fix potential memory leak if vmap() fail [ Upstream commit 379091e0f6d179d1a084c65de90fa44583b14a70 ]

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

#379 lore raw

Hi,

Quoted 22 lines · Naresh Kamboju
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.257 release. There are 367 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri, 22 Sep 2023 11:28:09 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.257-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Following build warnings noticed while building arm64 with allmodconfig on stable-rc 5.4 with gcc-8 and gcc-12 toolchains.

Quoted 8 lines

drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_gem.c: In function 'mtk_drm_gem_prime_vmap':
drivers/gpu/drm/mediatek/mtk_drm_gem.c:273:10: warning: returning 'int' from a function with return type 'void *' makes pointer from integer without a cast [-Wint-conversion]

    return -ENOMEM;
           ^

Well, this is easy to solve.
For the Linux-5.4 kernel, we should use "return -ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM)" instead of "return -ENOMEM". Since, newer version kernel prefer to return error code instead of error pointer. See below commit for more information.

commit <7e542ff8b463>  ("drm/mediatek: Use struct dma_buf_map in GEM vmap ops") commit <49a3f51dfeee> ("drm/gem: Use struct dma_buf_map in GEM vmap ops and convert GEM backends")

Quoted 12 lines

Links:
- https://storage.tuxsuite.com/public/linaro/lkft/builds/2VfG47LmPH9MUEuIcMVftu6NsFy/

Following commit is causing this build warning.

drm/mediatek: Fix potential memory leak if vmap() fail [ Upstream commit 379091e0f6d179d1a084c65de90fa44583b14a70 ]

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

#380 lore raw

Hi,

Quoted 1 line · Sui Jingfeng

return -ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM)

return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

author maintainer
#381 lore raw
Quoted 8 lines · Sui Jingfeng

Hi,

Quoted 1 line · Sui Jingfeng

return -ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM)

return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);

Thanks, now fixed up.

greg k-h

Tested-by Linux Kernel Functional Testing on the v1 series
#382 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.257 release. There are 367 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri, 22 Sep 2023 11:28:09 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.257-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

NOTE:
Build warnings noticed on arm64 with allmodconfig as reported.

## Build
* kernel: 5.4.257-rc1
* git: https://gitlab.com/Linaro/lkft/mirrors/stable/linux-stable-rc
* git branch: linux-5.4.y
* git commit: 831ef442fc4c4000caab32d35d6a4c5fe9d41706
* git describe: v5.4.256-368-g831ef442fc4c
* test details:
https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.4.y/build/v5.4.256-368-g831ef442fc4c

## Test Regressions (compared to v5.4.256)

## Metric Regressions (compared to v5.4.256)

## Test Fixes (compared to v5.4.256)

## Metric Fixes (compared to v5.4.256)

## Test result summary
total: 87749, pass: 69286, fail: 2073, skip: 16347, xfail: 43

## Build Summary
* arc: 5 total, 5 passed, 0 failed
* arm: 148 total, 147 passed, 1 failed
* arm64: 46 total, 43 passed, 3 failed
* i386: 30 total, 24 passed, 6 failed
* mips: 30 total, 29 passed, 1 failed
* parisc: 4 total, 0 passed, 4 failed
* powerpc: 33 total, 32 passed, 1 failed
* riscv: 15 total, 15 passed, 0 failed
* s390: 8 total, 8 passed, 0 failed
* sh: 14 total, 12 passed, 2 failed
* sparc: 8 total, 8 passed, 0 failed
* x86_64: 41 total, 41 passed, 0 failed

## Test suites summary
* boot
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-arm64
* kselftest-breakpoints
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-drivers-dma-buf
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-exec
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-filesystems-binderfs
* kselftest-filesystems-epoll
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-ftrace
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-memfd
* kselftest-memory-hotplug
* kselftest-mincore
* kselftest-mount
* kselftest-mqueue
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-net-forwarding
* kselftest-net-mptcp
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-openat2
* kselftest-pid_namespace
* kselftest-pidfd
* kselftest-proc
* kselftest-pstore
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-user_events
* kselftest-vDSO
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-watchdog
* kselftest-x86
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* log-parser-boot
* log-parser-test
* ltp-cap_bounds
* ltp-commands
* ltp-containers
* ltp-controllers
* ltp-cpuhotplug
* ltp-crypto
* ltp-cve
* ltp-dio
* ltp-fcntl-locktests
* ltp-filecaps
* ltp-fs
* ltp-fs_bind
* ltp-fs_perms_simple
* ltp-fsx
* ltp-hugetlb
* ltp-io
* ltp-ipc
* ltp-math
* ltp-mm
* ltp-nptl
* ltp-pty
* ltp-sched
* ltp-securebits
* ltp-smoke
* ltp-syscalls
* ltp-tracing
* perf
* rcutorture

--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org

#383 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.257 release. There are 367 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri, 22 Sep 2023 11:28:09 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 154 pass: 152 fail: 2
Failed builds:
	i386:tools/perf
	x86_64:tools/perf
Qemu test results:
	total: 464 pass: 464 fail: 0

libbpf.c: In function ‘bpf_object__close’:
libbpf.c:4205:15: error: ‘struct bpf_object’ has no member named ‘btf_vmlinux’

Old question: Should we stop build testing perf on older kernels ? If so, why are perf patches backported ?

Guenter

maintainer Tested-by on the v1 series
#384 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.4.257 release. There are 367 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Fri, 22 Sep 2023 11:28:09 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.4.257-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.4.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

All tests passing for Tegra ...

Test results for stable-v5.4:

    11 builds:	11 pass, 0 fail
    26 boots:	26 pass, 0 fail
    59 tests:	59 pass, 0 fail

Linux version: 5.4.257-rc1-g831ef442fc4c
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra186-p2771-0000,

                tegra194-p2972-0000, tegra20-ventana,
                tegra210-p2371-2180, tegra210-p3450-0000,
                tegra30-cardhu-a04

Jon