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lsm: make SECURITY_PATH always enabled

PATCH In review Song Liu 3 participants 8 messages Apr 22, 2025 – Apr 23, 2025

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MIPS BPF Tracing Security (LSM) +7 more subsystems
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Song Liu

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 lsm: make SECURITY_PATH always enabled

From: Tetsuo Handa <[email protected]>

Only TOMOYO needed CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when it was introduced. But now, AppArmor, EVM, IMA and LandLock also need it. And kernels are likely built with at least one of these enabled if CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled. Let's simplify the dependency.

---

This was initially proposed in [1], but got Nacked by Paul. However, I still think this change makes sense. This is because the definition of "pathname based access control" is not clear. For example, security_path_notify, security_sb_mount, security_move_mount are enabled by CONFIG_SECURITY, but they all use struct path, and thus are "path based access control". Yes, there is a difference between "path based" and "pathname based", but it is really up to the LSMs to decide how they use struct path. TOMOYO uses d_abosolute_path on security_sb_mount, while LandLock does path walk with dget_parent() and follow_up().

The separation of CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH has actually caused confusion. In some of our early kernels, we enabled CONFIG_SECURITY but not CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH. Now, we have to add separate logic in user space to deal with missing CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH in these systems.

Given the vague definition and real world issue, I think we should just merge CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH.

PS: [1] doesn't build with CONFIG_SECURITY=n case. This issue is fixed in this version.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/[email protected]/

---
 arch/mips/configs/loongson2k_defconfig |   1 -
 arch/mips/configs/loongson3_defconfig  |   1 -
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h          |   2 -
 include/linux/security.h               | 174 ++++++++++++-------------
 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c                   |   2 -
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c               |   2 -
 security/Kconfig                       |   9 --
 security/apparmor/Kconfig              |   1 -
 security/integrity/evm/Kconfig         |   1 -
 security/integrity/ima/Kconfig         |   1 -
 security/landlock/Kconfig              |   1 -
 security/security.c                    |   2 -
 security/tomoyo/Kconfig                |   1 -
 13 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 112 deletions(-)
arch/mips/configs/loongson2k_defconfig +0 -1
index 4b7f914d01d0..fb149d2f3ef5 100644
@@ -325,7 +325,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY=y
 CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
-CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE=y
arch/mips/configs/loongson3_defconfig +0 -1
index 98844b457b7f..84fdbc6fdace 100644
@@ -376,7 +376,6 @@ CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY=y
 CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
-CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y
 CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y
 CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC=y
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +0 -2
index bf3bbac4e02a..b2c21e5f6fbd 100644
@@ -87,7 +87,6 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry_init_security, struct dentry *dentry,
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, dentry_create_files_as, struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
 	 struct qstr *name, const struct cred *old, struct cred *new)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_unlink, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_mkdir, const struct path *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	 umode_t mode)
@@ -107,7 +106,6 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_rename, const struct path *old_dir,
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_chmod, const struct path *path, umode_t mode)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_chown, const struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_chroot, const struct path *path)
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
 
 /* Needed for inode based security check */
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_notify, const struct path *path, u64 mask,
include/linux/security.h +86 -88

192 lines not on this page · raw message

kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +0 -2
index 0a59df1c550a..e4b00a8897b1 100644
@@ -329,7 +329,6 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_kernel_module_request)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_kernel_read_file)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_kernfs_init_security)
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_unlink)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_mkdir)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_rmdir)
@@ -339,7 +338,6 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_link)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_rename)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_chmod)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_path_chown)
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
 
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_mmap_file)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_netlink_send)
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c +0 -2
index 187dc37d61d4..e93f77c086ba 100644
@@ -936,9 +936,7 @@ BTF_ID(func, security_file_permission)
 BTF_ID(func, security_inode_getattr)
 BTF_ID(func, security_file_open)
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
 BTF_ID(func, security_path_truncate)
-#endif
 BTF_ID(func, vfs_truncate)
 BTF_ID(func, vfs_fallocate)
 BTF_ID(func, dentry_open)
security/Kconfig +0 -9
index 4816fc74f81e..07b3c74981a6 100644
@@ -129,15 +129,6 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	  IPSec.
 	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
 
-config SECURITY_PATH
-	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
-	depends on SECURITY
-	help
-	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
-	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
-	  implement pathname based access controls.
-	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
-
 config INTEL_TXT
 	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
 	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
security/apparmor/Kconfig +0 -1
index 64cc3044a42c..f7c196ffbf93 100644
@@ -3,7 +3,6 @@ config SECURITY_APPARMOR
 	bool "AppArmor support"
 	depends on SECURITY && NET
 	select AUDIT
-	select SECURITY_PATH
 	select SECURITYFS
 	select SECURITY_NETWORK
 	default n
security/integrity/evm/Kconfig +0 -1
index 861b3bacab82..fba9ee359bc9 100644
@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ config EVM
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
-	select SECURITY_PATH
 	default n
 	help
 	  EVM protects a file's security extended attributes against
security/integrity/ima/Kconfig +0 -1
index 475c32615006..b98bfe9efd0c 100644
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ config IMA
 	select CRYPTO_HMAC
 	select CRYPTO_SHA1
 	select CRYPTO_HASH_INFO
-	select SECURITY_PATH
 	select TCG_TPM if HAS_IOMEM
 	select TCG_TIS if TCG_TPM && X86
 	select TCG_CRB if TCG_TPM && ACPI
security/landlock/Kconfig +0 -1
index 3f1493402052..b7bb22471867 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
 	bool "Landlock support"
 	depends on SECURITY
 	select SECURITY_NETWORK
-	select SECURITY_PATH
 	help
 	  Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict
 	  themselves (and their future children) by gradually enforcing
security/security.c +0 -2
index fb57e8fddd91..dbfe95eb3064 100644
@@ -1878,7 +1878,6 @@ int security_inode_init_security_anon(struct inode *inode,
 			     context_inode);
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
 /**
  * security_path_mknod() - Check if creating a special file is allowed
  * @dir: parent directory
@@ -2092,7 +2091,6 @@ int security_path_chroot(const struct path *path)
 {
 	return call_int_hook(path_chroot, path);
 }
-#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
 
 /**
  * security_inode_create() - Check if creating a file is allowed
security/tomoyo/Kconfig +0 -1
index 1e0dd1a6d0b0..ab8a5aaa301b 100644
@@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ config SECURITY_TOMOYO
 	depends on SECURITY
 	depends on NET
 	select SECURITYFS
-	select SECURITY_PATH
 	select SECURITY_NETWORK
 	default n
 	help
Signature · 1 line
2.47.1
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · On Apr 22, 2025 Song Liu <[email protected]> wrote:

Only TOMOYO needed CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when it was introduced. But now, AppArmor, EVM, IMA and LandLock also need it. And kernels are likely built with at least one of these enabled if CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled. Let's simplify the dependency.

---
This was initially proposed in [1], but got Nacked by Paul.

I chose not to merge the patch with the following comment:

"If a Kconfig option is only needed by a subset of LSMs, which is the
case for CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, it should remain a build-time option."

... and that reasoning still sounds reasonable to me today.

Quoted 2 lines

... but it is really up to the LSMs to decide how
they use struct path.

LSMs are currently free to select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH as needed. In fact, if you look any modern Linux tree you'll see that TOMOYO, AppArmor, Landlock, IMA, and EVM all select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH based on their individual Kconfig settings.

Quoted 4 lines

The separation of CONFIG_SECURITY and CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH has actually caused confusion. In some of our early kernels, we enabled CONFIG_SECURITY but not CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH. Now, we have to add separate logic in user space to deal with missing CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH in these systems.

I'm sorry that you made some Kconfig choices on a production kernel that you now regret, but that doesn't change things from an upstream perspective. The exception of course would be if there was a LSM that *required* CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH but did not enable it or mark it as a dependency in the LSM's Kconfig. It doesn't sound like that is the case here, but please let me know if that was the root cause so we can work with the individual LSM to fix the associated Kconfig.

As you likely know, the LSM subsystem as a whole (framework and individual LSMs) is often criticized over various performance impacts; one of the easiest ways to limit the impact of the LSM on overall system performance is to remove LSM hooks that are not needed. Keeping the CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH hooks as-is and allowing individual LSMs to opt-in as needed is a reasonable balance between providing the necessary LSM hook support and limiting performance impacts.

--
paul-moore.com

#2 lore raw

Hi Paul,

Thanks for your quick comments!

Quoted 14 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 10 lines · On Apr 22, 2025 Song Liu <[email protected]> wrote:

Only TOMOYO needed CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when it was introduced. But now, AppArmor, EVM, IMA and LandLock also need it. And kernels are likely built with at least one of these enabled if CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled. Let's simplify the dependency.

---
This was initially proposed in [1], but got Nacked by Paul.

Quoted 6 lines

I chose not to merge the patch with the following comment:

"If a Kconfig option is only needed by a subset of LSMs, which is the
case for CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, it should remain a build-time option."

... and that reasoning still sounds reasonable to me today.

I agree that a way to disable some LSM hooks at build time is valuable.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

... but it is really up to the LSMs to decide how
they use struct path.

LSMs are currently free to select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH as needed. In fact, if you look any modern Linux tree you'll see that TOMOYO, AppArmor, Landlock, IMA, and EVM all select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH based on their individual Kconfig settings.

However, I don't think existing CONFIG_SECURITY_* are doing the right things. Among all the configs, CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is the most awkward to me. Say , if we have CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, shouldn't we also have CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE? IOW, something like:

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE
int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); #endif

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
int security_path_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); #endif

OR, maybe we should just remove security_inode_rmdir(), and users of security_inode_rmdir() can just use security_path_rmdir() instead? As I writing this, I think merging security_inode_rmdir() and security_path_rmdir() is a better solution. But the motivation stays the same: the separation of CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH from CONFIG_SECURITY is weird.

Does this make sense?

Thanks,
Song

[...]

maintainer
#3 lore raw
Quoted 37 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 14 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 10 lines · On Apr 22, 2025 Song Liu <[email protected]> wrote:

Only TOMOYO needed CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH when it was introduced. But now, AppArmor, EVM, IMA and LandLock also need it. And kernels are likely built with at least one of these enabled if CONFIG_SECURITY is enabled. Let's simplify the dependency.

---
This was initially proposed in [1], but got Nacked by Paul.

Quoted 6 lines

I chose not to merge the patch with the following comment:

"If a Kconfig option is only needed by a subset of LSMs, which is the
case for CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, it should remain a build-time option."

... and that reasoning still sounds reasonable to me today.

I agree that a way to disable some LSM hooks at build time is valuable.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

... but it is really up to the LSMs to decide how
they use struct path.

LSMs are currently free to select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH as needed. In fact, if you look any modern Linux tree you'll see that TOMOYO, AppArmor, Landlock, IMA, and EVM all select CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH based on their individual Kconfig settings.

However, I don't think existing CONFIG_SECURITY_* are doing the right things. Among all the configs, CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is the most awkward to me. Say , if we have CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, shouldn't we also have CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE? IOW, something like:

Quoted 7 lines

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE
int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); #endif

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
int security_path_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); #endif

Without putting much thought into what would fall under CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE, I think it would be interesting to see what hooks one might be able to make conditional on such a Kconfig knob. Using security_inode_permission() as a simple test, it looks like only SELinux and Smack provide implementations, spot checks on a few other security_*inode*() hooks shows similar, or even more limited, results.

You would need to spend some time to determine what LSM hooks are used by which LSMs and adjust their Kconfigs appropriately for the new CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE knob, but if you do that then I think that would be okay.

Quoted 2 lines

OR, maybe we should just remove security_inode_rmdir(), and users of security_inode_rmdir() can just use security_path_rmdir() instead?

Those two LSM hooks are called from slightly different places in the codepath which has an impact on their environment. For example, the inode variant doesn't have to deal with directory inodes that don't have a defined rmdir op, whereas the path variant does; the inode variant doesn't have to worry about S_KERNEL_FILE files, the inode variant has a refcount'd and locked dentry, etc. Moving an existing LSM, especially complex ones, from one LSM hook to another, is a delicate operation and might not be worth it for such a small return.

If you are interested in reducing the impact of the "inode" LSM hooks, CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE is likely a better place to start.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
#4 lore raw

Hi Paul,

Thanks for your comments!

Quoted 1 line · Paul Moore

[...]

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 6 lines

However, I don't think existing CONFIG_SECURITY_* are doing the right things. Among all the configs, CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is the most awkward to me. Say , if we have CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, shouldn't we also have CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE? IOW, something like:

Quoted 7 lines

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE
int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); #endif

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
int security_path_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); #endif

Without putting much thought into what would fall under CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE, I think it would be interesting to see what hooks one might be able to make conditional on such a Kconfig knob. Using security_inode_permission() as a simple test, it looks like only SELinux and Smack provide implementations, spot checks on a few other security_*inode*() hooks shows similar, or even more limited, results.

Quoted 4 lines

You would need to spend some time to determine what LSM hooks are used by which LSMs and adjust their Kconfigs appropriately for the new CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE knob, but if you do that then I think that would be okay.

Well, I was hoping to simplify the CONFIGs by removing one. So I am not sure whether adding a new CONFIG is the right thing to do.

Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines

OR, maybe we should just remove security_inode_rmdir(), and users of security_inode_rmdir() can just use security_path_rmdir() instead?

Quoted 8 lines

Those two LSM hooks are called from slightly different places in the codepath which has an impact on their environment. For example, the inode variant doesn't have to deal with directory inodes that don't have a defined rmdir op, whereas the path variant does; the inode variant doesn't have to worry about S_KERNEL_FILE files, the inode variant has a refcount'd and locked dentry, etc. Moving an existing LSM, especially complex ones, from one LSM hook to another, is a delicate operation and might not be worth it for such a small return.

Given there is pushback when a new LSM hook is added, I assume removing a hook (or merge two hooks into one) may be a good move. Well, it is totally possible that I underestimated the complexity of the work.

Thanks,
Song

maintainer
#5 lore raw
Quoted 25 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 1 line · Paul Moore

[...]

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 6 lines

However, I don't think existing CONFIG_SECURITY_* are doing the right things. Among all the configs, CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is the most awkward to me. Say , if we have CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH, shouldn't we also have CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE? IOW, something like:

Quoted 7 lines

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE
int security_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); #endif

#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH
int security_path_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry); #endif

Without putting much thought into what would fall under CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE, I think it would be interesting to see what hooks one might be able to make conditional on such a Kconfig knob. Using security_inode_permission() as a simple test, it looks like only SELinux and Smack provide implementations, spot checks on a few other security_*inode*() hooks shows similar, or even more limited, results.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

You would need to spend some time to determine what LSM hooks are used by which LSMs and adjust their Kconfigs appropriately for the new CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE knob, but if you do that then I think that would be okay.

Well, I was hoping to simplify the CONFIGs by removing one. So I am not sure whether adding a new CONFIG is the right thing to do.

Ah, in that case I suspect you're going to be disappointed as I'm fairly confident we don't want to consolidate the inode and path based hooks under one Kconfig knob at this point in time. If anything, I think there may be some value in adding an inode Kconfig as described above, which I realize isn't your original goal, but still ... :)

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 2 lines

OR, maybe we should just remove security_inode_rmdir(), and users of security_inode_rmdir() can just use security_path_rmdir() instead?

Those two LSM hooks are called from slightly different places in the codepath which has an impact on their environment. For example, the inode variant doesn't have to deal with directory inodes that don't have a defined rmdir op, whereas the path variant does; the inode variant doesn't have to worry about S_KERNEL_FILE files, the inode variant has a refcount'd and locked dentry, etc. Moving an existing LSM, especially complex ones, from one LSM hook to another, is a delicate operation and might not be worth it for such a small return.

Quoted 4 lines

Given there is pushback when a new LSM hook is added, I assume removing a hook (or merge two hooks into one) may be a good move. Well, it is totally possible that I underestimated the complexity of the work.

The funny thing is that the difficulty in adding LSM hooks is one of the main reasons why I am so hesitant to remove an existing hook; you can consider it as perhaps an unintended consequence of a general hostility towards the LSM.

Regardless of the above, yes, there can be a lot of complexity involved in adding, modifying, or consolidating LSM hooks as there can be decades worth of assumptions both in the LSMs and in the caller that need to be considered for each change. Of course that doesn't mean such change can't happen - we have plenty of examples where it has - but such changes are often more complicated than they appear.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com
#6 lore raw
Quoted 3 lines · Paul Moore

[...]

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines

Without putting much thought into what would fall under CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE, I think it would be interesting to see what hooks one might be able to make conditional on such a Kconfig knob. Using security_inode_permission() as a simple test, it looks like only SELinux and Smack provide implementations, spot checks on a few other security_*inode*() hooks shows similar, or even more limited, results.

You would need to spend some time to determine what LSM hooks are used by which LSMs and adjust their Kconfigs appropriately for the new CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE knob, but if you do that then I think that would be okay.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Well, I was hoping to simplify the CONFIGs by removing one. So I am not sure whether adding a new CONFIG is the right thing to do.

Ah, in that case I suspect you're going to be disappointed as I'm fairly confident we don't want to consolidate the inode and path based hooks under one Kconfig knob at this point in time. If anything, I think there may be some value in adding an inode Kconfig as described above, which I realize isn't your original goal, but still ... :)

I am thinking whether it is possible to have each LSM selects required hooks, and only enable those at compile time. OTOH, my primary focus is BPF LSM, so these optimizations matter little for my use cases.

Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 2 lines

OR, maybe we should just remove security_inode_rmdir(), and users of security_inode_rmdir() can just use security_path_rmdir() instead?

Those two LSM hooks are called from slightly different places in the codepath which has an impact on their environment. For example, the inode variant doesn't have to deal with directory inodes that don't have a defined rmdir op, whereas the path variant does; the inode variant doesn't have to worry about S_KERNEL_FILE files, the inode variant has a refcount'd and locked dentry, etc. Moving an existing LSM, especially complex ones, from one LSM hook to another, is a delicate operation and might not be worth it for such a small return.

Quoted 4 lines

Given there is pushback when a new LSM hook is added, I assume removing a hook (or merge two hooks into one) may be a good move. Well, it is totally possible that I underestimated the complexity of the work.

Quoted 4 lines

The funny thing is that the difficulty in adding LSM hooks is one of the main reasons why I am so hesitant to remove an existing hook; you can consider it as perhaps an unintended consequence of a general hostility towards the LSM.

I didn't expect this. Thanks for sharing your thoughts.

Quoted 7 lines

Regardless of the above, yes, there can be a lot of complexity involved in adding, modifying, or consolidating LSM hooks as there can be decades worth of assumptions both in the LSMs and in the caller that need to be considered for each change. Of course that doesn't mean such change can't happen - we have plenty of examples where it has - but such changes are often more complicated than they appear.

Song

maintainer
#7 lore raw
Quoted 25 lines · Song Liu
Quoted 1 line · Paul Moore

[...]

Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines

Without putting much thought into what would fall under CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE, I think it would be interesting to see what hooks one might be able to make conditional on such a Kconfig knob. Using security_inode_permission() as a simple test, it looks like only SELinux and Smack provide implementations, spot checks on a few other security_*inode*() hooks shows similar, or even more limited, results.

You would need to spend some time to determine what LSM hooks are used by which LSMs and adjust their Kconfigs appropriately for the new CONFIG_SECURITY_INODE knob, but if you do that then I think that would be okay.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Well, I was hoping to simplify the CONFIGs by removing one. So I am not sure whether adding a new CONFIG is the right thing to do.

Ah, in that case I suspect you're going to be disappointed as I'm fairly confident we don't want to consolidate the inode and path based hooks under one Kconfig knob at this point in time. If anything, I think there may be some value in adding an inode Kconfig as described above, which I realize isn't your original goal, but still ... :)

Quoted 3 lines

I am thinking whether it is possible to have each LSM selects required hooks, and only enable those at compile time. OTOH, my primary focus is BPF LSM, so these optimizations matter little for my use cases.

Ignoring for a moment just how awkward it would be to have a Kconfig value for each LSM, it is important to remember that LSMs are still selectable at system boot (assuming they have been built into the kernel), so there will always be the potential for "empty" LSM hooks on any given system boot.

Like I said before, I'm open to someone exploring the addition of new LSM Kconfig knobs to provide greater granularity about which hooks are enabled at build time, however, these new knobs will both need to make sense from a logical grouping perspective as well as have a meaningful impact on the enabled hooks across the current in-tree LSMs.

Signature · 1 line
paul-moore.com