LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
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Casey Schaufler
maintainerv20 cover LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v20: Rebase to 5.9-rc1
Change the BPF security module to use the lsmblob data. (patch 0002) Repair length logic in subject label processing (patch 0015) Handle -EINVAL from the empty BPF setprocattr hook (patch 0020) Correct length processing in append_ctx() (patch 0022)
v19: Rebase to 5.8-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v18
- Revert UDS SO_PEERSEC implementation to use lsmblobs directly, rather than allocating as needed. The correct treatment of out-of-memory conditions in the later case is difficult to define. (patch 0005)
- Use a size_t in append_ctx() (patch 0021)
- Fix a memory leak when creating compound contexts. (patch 0021) Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0013) Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0020) Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0021)
v18: Rebase to 5.8-rc3
Incorporate feedback from v17
- Null pointer checking in UDS (patch 0005) Match changes in IMA code (patch 0012)
Fix the behavior of LSM context supplimental audit records so that there's always exactly one when it's appropriate for there to be one. This is a substantial change that requires extention of the audit_context beyond syscall events. (patch 0020)
v17: Rebase to 5.7-rc4
v16: Rebase to 5.6
Incorporate feedback from v15 - Thanks Stephen, Mimi and Paul
- Generally improve commit messages WRT scaffolding
- Comment ima_lsm_isset() (patch 0002)
- Some question may remain on IMA warning (patch 0002)
- Mark lsm_slot as __lsm_ro_after_init not __init_data (patch 0002)
- Change name of lsmblob variable in ima_match_rules() (patch 0003)
- Instead of putting a struct lsmblob into the unix_skb_parms structure put a pointer to an allocated instance. There is currently only space for 5 u32's in unix_skb_parms and it is likely to get even tighter. Fortunately, the lifecycle management of the allocated lsmblob is simple. (patch 0005)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0005)
- Improved commentary on secmark labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Reduced secmark related labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Replace use of the zeroth entry of an lsmblob in scaffolding with a function lsmblob_value() to hopefully make it less obscure. (patch 0006)
- Convert security_secmark_relabel_packet to use lsmblob as this reduces much of the most contentious scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0006)
- Added BUILD_BUG_ON() for CIPSO tag 6. (patch 0018)
- Reworked audit subject information. Instead of adding fields in the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When a separate record is required use subj="?". (patch 0020)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0020)
- Reworked audit object information. Instead of adding fields in the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When a separate record is required use obj="?". (patch 0021)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0021)
- Enhanced documentation (patch 0022)
- Removed unnecessary error code check in security_getprocattr() (patch 0021)
v15: Rebase to 5.6-rc1
- Revise IMA data use (patch 0002)
Incorporate feedback from v14
- Fix lockdown module registration naming (patch 0002)
- Revise how /proc/self/attr/context is gathered. (patch 0022)
- Revise access modes on /proc/self/attr/context. (patch 0022)
- Revise documentation on LSM external interfaces. (patch 0022)
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
v13: Rebase to 5.5-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v12
- Print lsmblob size with %z (Patch 0002)
- Convert lockdown LSM initialization. (Patch 0002)
- Restore error check in nft_secmark_compute_secid (Patch 0006)
- Correct blob scaffolding in ima_must_appraise() (Patch 0009)
- Make security_setprocattr() clearer (Patch 0013)
- Use lsm_task_display more widely (Patch 0013)
- Use passed size in lsmcontext_init() (Patch 0014)
- Don't add a smack_release_secctx() hook (Patch 0014)
- Don't print warning in security_release_secctx() (Patch 0014)
- Don't duplicate the label in nfs4_label_init_security() (Patch 0016)
- Remove reviewed-by as code has significant change (Patch 0016)
- Send the entire lsmblob for Tag 6 (Patch 0019)
- Fix description of socket_getpeersec_stream parameters (Patch 0023)
- Retain LSMBLOB_FIRST. What was I thinking? (Patch 0023)
- Add compound context to LSM documentation (Patch 0023)
v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1
Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text.
v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v10
- Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting all use of the interface to the current process.
- Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check
v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
v9: There is no version 9
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a common append_ctx() function.
v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The availability of compound contexts reduces the need for setting the display.
v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide the display default value.
v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context "display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the slot value.
- Validate slot values used in security.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check in dentry_init_security
- Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting the audit log
v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor stub, which does nothing useful.
Patch 0001 moves management of the sock security blob from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 0002-0012 replace system use of a "secid" with a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the security modules to be held and reused later. At this point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot" for each of the security modules compiled into the kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when a security module requests one.
The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number to pass the correct secid to or from the security module hooks.
It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places where it is used would have performance and/or locking issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 0013 provides a mechanism for a process to identify which security module's hooks should be used when displaying or converting a security context string. A new interface /proc/self/attr/display contains the name of the security module to show. Reading from this file will present the name of the module, while writing to it will set the value. Only names of active security modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces allow the transition. The "display" of other processess can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases for reading the display of a different process have race conditions.
Patch 0014 Starts the process of changing how a security context is represented. Since it is possible for a security context to have been generated by more than one security module it is now necessary to note which module created a security context so that the correct "release" hook can be called. There are several places where the module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure which contains the context string, its length and the "slot" number of the security module that created it. The security_release_secctx() interface is changed, replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext pointer.
Patches 0015-0017 convert the security interfaces from (string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer. The slot number identifying the creating module is added by the infrastructure. Where the security context is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures instead of secids in Patch 0018.
Patch 0019 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify that if both ends of a transaction use the same "display".
Patches 0020-0021 add addition audit records for subject and object LSM data when there are multiple security modules with such data. The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction with a "subj=?" field to identify the subject data. The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is used in conjuction with a "obj=?" field to identify the object data. The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module with the data: "subj_selinux=xyz_t subj_apparmor=abc". The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record identifies the security module with the data: "obj_selinux=xyz_t obj_apparmor=abc". While AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS records will always contain an entry for each possible security modules, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS records will only contain entries for security modules for which the object in question has data.
Patch 0022 adds a new interfaces for getting the compound security contexts. /proc/self/attr/context
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks removed, Patch 0023 removes the exclusive bit from AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with better performance being as common as worse. The benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.8-rc6-a-v19
---
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 1/23 LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security
Move management of the sock->sk_security blob out of the individual security modules and into the security infrastructure. Instead of allocating the blobs from within the modules the modules tell the infrastructure how much space is required, and the space is allocated there.
--- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 1 + security/apparmor/include/net.h | 6 ++- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 38 ++++----------- security/security.c | 36 +++++++++++++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 78 +++++++++++++++---------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 5 ++ security/selinux/netlabel.c | 23 ++++----- security/smack/smack.h | 5 ++ security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 64 ++++++++++++------------- security/smack/smack_netfilter.c | 8 ++-- 10 files changed, 144 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-)
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +1 -0
@@ -1550,6 +1550,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes {int lbs_cred;int lbs_file;int lbs_inode; +int lbs_sock;int lbs_ipc;int lbs_msg_msg;int lbs_task;
security/apparmor/include/net.h +5 -1
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ struct aa_sk_ctx {struct aa_label *peer; }; -#define SK_CTX (X ) ((X)->sk_security) +static inline struct aa_sk_ctx *aa_sock (const struct sock *sk) +{ +return sk->sk_security + apparmor_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#define SOCK_ctx (X ) SOCK_INODE(X)->i_security#define DEFINE_AUDIT_NET (NAME ,OP ,SK ,F ,T ,P ) \ struct lsm_network_audit NAME ## _net = { .sk = (SK), \
security/apparmor/lsm.c +10 -28
@@ -766,33 +766,15 @@ static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct kernel_siginforeturn error; } -/** -* apparmor_sk_alloc_security - allocate and attach the sk_security field -*/ -static int apparmor_sk_alloc_security (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t flags) -{ -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx; - - ctx =kzalloc (sizeof (*ctx), flags); -if (!ctx) -return -ENOMEM ; - -SK_CTX (sk) = ctx; - -return 0 ; -} -/** * apparmor_sk_free_security - free the sk_security field */ static void apparmor_sk_free_security (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); -SK_CTX (sk) =NULL ;aa_put_label (ctx->label);aa_put_label (ctx->peer); -kfree (ctx); }/**
@@ -801,8 +783,8 @@ static void apparmor_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)static void apparmor_sk_clone_security (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); -struct aa_sk_ctx *new =SK_CTX (newsk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *new =aa_sock (newsk);if (new->label)aa_put_label (new->label);
@@ -858,7 +840,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, label =aa_get_current_label ();if (sock->sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sock->sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sock->sk);aa_put_label (ctx->label); ctx->label =aa_get_label (label);
@@ -1043,7 +1025,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)*/ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;
@@ -1056,7 +1038,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)static struct aa_label *sk_peer_label (struct sock *sk) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (ctx->peer)return ctx->peer;
@@ -1140,7 +1122,7 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,*/ static void apparmor_sock_graft (struct sock *sk,struct socket *parent) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!ctx->label) ctx->label =aa_get_current_label ();
@@ -1150,7 +1132,7 @@ static void apparmor_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)static int apparmor_inet_conn_request (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb,struct request_sock *req) { -struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =SK_CTX (sk); +struct aa_sk_ctx *ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!skb->secmark)return 0 ;
@@ -1167,6 +1149,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_cred = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx *), .lbs_file = sizeof(struct aa_file_ctx), .lbs_task = sizeof(struct aa_task_ctx), + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
@@ -1203,7 +1186,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (getprocattr, apparmor_getprocattr),LSM_HOOK_INIT (setprocattr, apparmor_setprocattr), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_alloc_security, apparmor_sk_alloc_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sk_free_security, apparmor_sk_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_clone_security, apparmor_sk_clone_security),
@@ -1754,7 +1736,7 @@ static unsigned int apparmor_ip_postroute(void *priv,if (sk ==NULL )return NF_ACCEPT ; - ctx =SK_CTX (sk); + ctx =aa_sock (sk);if (!apparmor_secmark_check (ctx->label,OP_SENDMSG ,AA_MAY_SEND , skb->secmark, sk))return NF_ACCEPT ;
security/security.c +35 -1
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@#include <linux/string.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <net/flow.h> +#include <net/sock.h> #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR 2
@@ -201,6 +202,7 @@ static void __init lsm_set_blob_sizes(struct lsm_blob_sizes *needed)lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_inode, &blob_sizes.lbs_inode);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_ipc, &blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_msg_msg, &blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_sock, &blob_sizes.lbs_sock);lsm_set_blob_size (&needed->lbs_task, &blob_sizes.lbs_task); }
@@ -336,6 +338,7 @@ static void __init ordered_lsm_init(void)init_debug ("inode blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_inode);init_debug ("ipc blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_ipc);init_debug ("msg_msg blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_msg_msg); +init_debug ("sock blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_sock);init_debug ("task blob size = %d\n" , blob_sizes.lbs_task);/*
@@ -654,6 +657,28 @@ static int lsm_msg_msg_alloc(struct msg_msg *mp)return 0 ; } +/** +* lsm_sock_alloc - allocate a composite sock blob +* @sock: the sock that needs a blob +* @priority: allocation mode +* +* Allocate the sock blob for all the modules +* +* Returns 0, or -ENOMEM if memory can't be allocated. +*/ +static int lsm_sock_alloc (struct sock *sock,gfp_t priority) +{ +if (blob_sizes.lbs_sock ==0 ) { + sock->sk_security =NULL ; +return 0 ; + } + + sock->sk_security =kzalloc (blob_sizes.lbs_sock, priority); +if (sock->sk_security ==NULL ) +return -ENOMEM ; +return 0 ; +} +/** * lsm_early_task - during initialization allocate a composite task blob * @task: the task that needs a blob
@@ -2177,12 +2202,21 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority) { -return call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +int rc =lsm_sock_alloc (sk, priority); + +if (unlikely (rc)) +return rc; + rc =call_int_hook (sk_alloc_security,0 , sk, family, priority); +if (unlikely (rc)) +security_sk_free (sk); +return rc; }void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk) {call_void_hook (sk_free_security, sk); +kfree (sk->sk_security); + sk->sk_security =NULL ; }void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk)
security/selinux/hooks.c +37 -41
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security/selinux/include/objsec.h +5 -0
@@ -189,4 +189,9 @@ static inline u32 current_sid(void) return tsec->sid; } +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +#endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */
security/selinux/netlabel.c +12 -11
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@#include <linux/gfp.h> #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <net/ip.h>
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb,static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr (struct sock *sk) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (sksec->nlbl_secattr !=NULL )
@@ -100,7 +101,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr( const struct sock *sk, u32 sid) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr;if (secattr ==NULL )
@@ -235,7 +236,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb,* being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */ sk =skb_to_full_sk (skb);if (sk !=NULL ) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB )return 0 ;
@@ -273,7 +274,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_endpoint *ep, {int rc;struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = ep->base.sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (ep->base.sk);struct sockaddr_in addr4;struct sockaddr_in6 addr6;
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(struct request_sock *req, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone (struct sock *sk,u16 family) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (family ==PF_INET ) sksec->nlbl_state =NLBL_LABELED ;
@@ -370,8 +371,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family)*/ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone (struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; -struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk); +struct sk_security_struct *newsksec =selinux_sock (newsk); newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state; }
@@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create (struct sock *sk,u16 family) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;if (family !=PF_INET && family !=PF_INET6 )
@@ -504,7 +505,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, {int rc =0 ;struct sock *sk = sock->sk; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) &&
@@ -542,7 +543,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) {int rc; -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr;/* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family
@@ -581,7 +582,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk,int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked (struct sock *sk,struct sockaddr *addr) { -struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; +struct sk_security_struct *sksec =selinux_sock (sk);if (sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_REQSKB && sksec->nlbl_state !=NLBL_CONNLABELED )
security/smack/smack.h +5 -0
@@ -364,6 +364,11 @@ static inline struct smack_known **smack_ipc(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc)return ipc->security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_ipc; } +static inline struct socket_smack *smack_sock (const struct sock *sock) +{ +return sock->sk_security + smack_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} +/* * Is the directory transmuting? */
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +30 -34
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security/smack/smack_netfilter.c +4 -4
@@ -28,8 +28,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }
@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,struct socket_smack *ssp;struct smack_known *skp; -if (sk && sk->sk_security) { - ssp = sk->sk_security; +if (sk &&smack_sock (sk)) { + ssp =smack_sock (sk); skp = ssp->smk_out; skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 2/23 LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
In reply to Casey SchauflerWhen more than one security module is exporting data to audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the security modules built into the system that would use secids if active. The system assigns the module a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are compiled in but not registered there will be unused slots.
A new lsm_id structure, which contains the name of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.
The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of security module data rather than a single instance. Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is affected as well.
--- include/linux/audit.h | 4 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++- include/linux/security.h | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 24 +++++----- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++- security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 ++++- security/commoncap.c | 7 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 40 +++++++++++----- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++- security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++- security/security.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++- 17 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
include/linux/audit.h +3 -1
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@#include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/ptrace.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <uapi/linux/audit.h> #include <uapi/linux/netfilter/nf_tables.h>
@@ -65,8 +66,9 @@ struct audit_field {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;struct { +bool lsm_isset;char *lsm_str; -void *lsm_rule; +void *lsm_rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ]; }; };u32 op;
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +10 -2
@@ -1532,6 +1532,14 @@ struct security_hook_heads {#undef LSM_HOOK } __randomize_layout; +/* +* Information that identifies a security module. +*/ +struct lsm_id { +const char *lsm;/* Name of the LSM */ +int slot;/* Slot in lsmblob if one is allocated */ +}; +/* * Security module hook list structure. * For use with generic list macros for common operations.
@@ -1540,7 +1548,7 @@ struct security_hook_list {struct hlist_node list;struct hlist_head *head;union security_list_options hook; -char *lsm; +struct lsm_id *lsmid; } __randomize_layout;/*
@@ -1575,7 +1583,7 @@ extern struct security_hook_heads security_hook_heads;extern char *lsm_names;extern void security_add_hooks (struct security_hook_list *hooks,int count, -char *lsm); +struct lsm_id *lsmid);#define LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR BIT(0)#define LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE BIT(1)
include/linux/security.h +63 -4
89 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/auditfilter.c +13 -11
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW :case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH :kfree (f->lsm_str); -security_audit_rule_free (f->lsm_rule); +security_audit_rule_free (f->lsm_rules); } }
@@ -519,9 +519,10 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, goto exit_free; } entry->rule.buflen += f_val; + f->lsm_isset = true; f->lsm_str = str; err =security_audit_rule_init (f->type, f->op, str, - (void **)&f->lsm_rule); + f->lsm_rules);/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (err == -EINVAL ) {
@@ -774,7 +775,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)return 0 ; } -/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be +/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be * re-initialized. */ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field (struct audit_field *df,struct audit_field *sf)
@@ -788,9 +789,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,return -ENOMEM ; df->lsm_str = lsm_str; -/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ +/* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */ ret =security_audit_rule_init (df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, - (void **)&df->lsm_rule); + df->lsm_rules);/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they * become valid after a policy reload. */ if (ret == -EINVAL ) {
@@ -842,7 +843,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old) new->tree = old->tree;memcpy (new->fields, old->fields,sizeof (struct audit_field ) * fcount); -/* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because +/* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */ for (i =0 ; i < fcount; i++) {switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1358,10 +1359,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE :case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN :case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR : -if (f->lsm_rule) { +if (f->lsm_isset) {security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, - f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule); + f->type, f->op, + f->lsm_rules); }break ;case AUDIT_EXE :
@@ -1388,7 +1390,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)return ret; } -static int update_lsm_rule (struct audit_krule *r) +static int update_lsm_rules (struct audit_krule *r) { struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);struct audit_entry *nentry;
@@ -1420,7 +1422,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)return err; } -/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules. +/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules. * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
@@ -1435,7 +1437,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)for (i =0 ; i <AUDIT_NR_FILTERS ; i++) {list_for_each_entry_safe (r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) { -int res =update_lsm_rule (r); +int res =update_lsm_rules (r);if (!err) err = res; }
kernel/auditsc.c +6 -6
@@ -667,14 +667,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,match for now to avoid losing information that may be wanted. An error message will also be logged upon error */ -if (f->lsm_rule) { +if (f->lsm_isset) {if (need_sid) {security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); need_sid =0 ; } result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule); + f->lsm_rules); }break ;case AUDIT_OBJ_USER :
@@ -684,21 +684,21 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH :/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR also applies here */ -if (f->lsm_rule) { +if (f->lsm_isset) {/* Find files that match */ if (name) { result =security_audit_rule_match ( name->osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule); + f->lsm_rules); }else if (ctx) {list_for_each_entry (n, &ctx->names_list, list) {if (security_audit_rule_match ( n->osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule)) { + f->lsm_rules)) { ++result;break ; }
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,break ;if (security_audit_rule_match (ctx->ipc.osid, f->type, f->op, - f->lsm_rule)) + f->lsm_rules)) ++result; }break ;
security/apparmor/lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -1152,6 +1152,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes apparmor_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct aa_sk_ctx), }; +static struct lsm_id apparmor_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="apparmor" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -1852,7 +1857,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) goto buffers_out; }security_add_hooks (apparmor_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (apparmor_hooks), -"apparmor" ); + &apparmor_lsmid);/* Report that AppArmor successfully initialized */ apparmor_initialized =1 ;
security/bpf/hooks.c +11 -1
@@ -13,9 +13,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list bpf_lsm_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {#undef LSM_HOOK }; +/* +* slot has to be LSMBLOB_NEEDED because some of the hooks +* supplied by this module require a slot. +*/ +struct lsm_id bpf_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="bpf" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; +static int __init bpf_lsm_init (void ) { -security_add_hooks (bpf_lsm_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (bpf_lsm_hooks),"bpf" ); +security_add_hooks (bpf_lsm_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (bpf_lsm_hooks), + &bpf_lsmid);pr_info ("LSM support for eBPF active\n" );return 0 ; }
security/commoncap.c +6 -1
@@ -1341,6 +1341,11 @@ int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +static struct lsm_id capability_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="capability" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (capable, cap_capable), LSM_HOOK_INIT(settime, cap_settime),
@@ -1365,7 +1370,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {static int __init capability_init (void ) {security_add_hooks (capability_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (capability_hooks), -"capability" ); + &capability_lsmid);return 0 ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +29 -11
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t ,kuid_t );/* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */ int pcr;struct { -void *rule;/* LSM file metadata specific */ +void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ];/* LSM file metadata specific */ char *args_p;/* audit value */ int type;/* audit type */ } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES ];
@@ -82,6 +82,22 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {struct ima_template_desc *template; }; +/** +* ima_lsm_isset - Is a rule set for any of the active security modules +* @rules: The set of IMA rules to check. +* +* If a rule is set for any LSM return true, otherwise return false. +*/ +static inline bool ima_lsm_isset (void *rules[]) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) +if (rules[i]) +return true; +return false; +} +/* * Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
@@ -256,9 +272,11 @@ __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);static void ima_lsm_free_rule (struct ima_rule_entry *entry) {int i; +int r;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) { -ima_filter_rule_free (entry->lsm[i].rule); +for (r =0 ; r <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; r++) +ima_filter_rule_free (entry->lsm[i].rules[r]);kfree (entry->lsm[i].args_p); } }
@@ -310,8 +328,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)ima_filter_rule_init (nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); -if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) + &nentry->lsm[i].rules[0 ]); +if (!ima_lsm_isset (nentry->lsm[i].rules))pr_warn ("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n" , nentry->lsm[i].args_p); }
@@ -483,7 +501,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,int rc =0 ;u32 osid; -if (!rule->lsm[i].rule) { +if (!ima_lsm_isset (rule->lsm[i].rules)) {if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)continue ;else
@@ -496,14 +514,14 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); rc =ima_filter_rule_match (osid, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rule->lsm[i].rules);break ;case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : rc =ima_filter_rule_match (secid, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, - rule->lsm[i].rule); + rule->lsm[i].rules);default :break ; }
@@ -890,7 +908,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, {int result; -if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) +if (ima_lsm_isset (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules))return -EINVAL ; entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p =match_strdup (args);
@@ -900,8 +918,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; result =ima_filter_rule_init (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); -if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules[0 ]); +if (!ima_lsm_isset (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules)) {pr_warn ("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n" , entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
@@ -1681,7 +1699,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) }for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) { -if (entry->lsm[i].rule) { +if (ima_lsm_isset (entry->lsm[i].rules)) {switch (i) {case LSM_OBJ_USER : seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
security/loadpin/loadpin.c +7 -1
@@ -181,6 +181,11 @@ static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id)return loadpin_read_file (NULL , (enum kernel_read_file_id ) id); } +static struct lsm_id loadpin_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="loadpin" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security),LSM_HOOK_INIT (kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file),
@@ -228,7 +233,8 @@ static int __init loadpin_init(void)pr_info ("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n" , enforce ?"" :"not " );parse_exclude (); -security_add_hooks (loadpin_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (loadpin_hooks),"loadpin" ); +security_add_hooks (loadpin_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (loadpin_hooks), + &loadpin_lsmid);return 0 ; }
security/lockdown/lockdown.c +6 -1
@@ -75,6 +75,11 @@ static struct security_hook_list lockdown_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, lockdown_is_locked_down), }; +static struct lsm_id lockdown_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="lockdown" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +static int __init lockdown_lsm_init (void ) {#if defined(CONFIG_LOCK_DOWN_KERNEL_FORCE_INTEGRITY )
@@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ static int __init lockdown_lsm_init(void)lock_kernel_down ("Kernel configuration" ,LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX );#endif security_add_hooks (lockdown_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (lockdown_hooks), -"lockdown" ); + &lockdown_lsmid);return 0 ; }
security/safesetid/lsm.c +7 -1
@@ -149,6 +149,11 @@ static int safesetid_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new,return -EACCES ; } +static struct lsm_id safesetid_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="safesetid" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (task_fix_setuid, safesetid_task_fix_setuid),LSM_HOOK_INIT (capable, safesetid_security_capable)
@@ -157,7 +162,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list safesetid_security_hooks[] = {static int __init safesetid_security_init (void ) {security_add_hooks (safesetid_security_hooks, -ARRAY_SIZE (safesetid_security_hooks),"safesetid" ); +ARRAY_SIZE (safesetid_security_hooks), + &safesetid_lsmid);/* Report that SafeSetID successfully initialized */ safesetid_initialized =1 ;
security/security.c +61 -11
130 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/hooks.c +7 -1
@@ -6934,6 +6934,11 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) }#endif +static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="selinux" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; +/* * IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order: * 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7245,7 +7250,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)hashtab_cache_init (); -security_add_hooks (selinux_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (selinux_hooks),"selinux" ); +security_add_hooks (selinux_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (selinux_hooks), + &selinux_lsmid);if (avc_add_callback (selinux_netcache_avc_callback,AVC_CALLBACK_RESET ))panic ("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n" );
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -4649,6 +4649,11 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack), }; +static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="smack" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -4848,7 +4853,7 @@ static __init int smack_init(void)/* * Register with LSM */ -security_add_hooks (smack_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (smack_hooks),"smack" ); +security_add_hooks (smack_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (smack_hooks), &smack_lsmid); smack_enabled =1 ;pr_info ("Smack: Initializing.\n" );
security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +7 -1
@@ -523,6 +523,11 @@ static void tomoyo_task_free(struct task_struct *task) } } +static struct lsm_id tomoyo_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="tomoyo" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; +/* * tomoyo_security_ops is a "struct security_operations" which is used for * registering TOMOYO.
@@ -575,7 +580,8 @@ static int __init tomoyo_init(void)struct tomoyo_task *s =tomoyo_task (current);/* register ourselves with the security framework */ -security_add_hooks (tomoyo_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (tomoyo_hooks),"tomoyo" ); +security_add_hooks (tomoyo_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (tomoyo_hooks), + &tomoyo_lsmid);pr_info ("TOMOYO Linux initialized\n" ); s->domain_info = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;atomic_inc (&tomoyo_kernel_domain.users);
security/yama/yama_lsm.c +6 -1
@@ -421,6 +421,11 @@ static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)return rc; } +static struct lsm_id yama_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { + .lsm ="yama" , + .slot =LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED +}; + static struct security_hook_list yama_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_access_check, yama_ptrace_access_check),LSM_HOOK_INIT (ptrace_traceme, yama_ptrace_traceme),
@@ -477,7 +482,7 @@ static inline void yama_init_sysctl(void) { }static int __init yama_init (void ) {pr_info ("Yama: becoming mindful.\n" ); -security_add_hooks (yama_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (yama_hooks),"yama" ); +security_add_hooks (yama_hooks,ARRAY_SIZE (yama_hooks), &yama_lsmid);yama_init_sysctl ();return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure.
Quoted 46 lines · Casey Schaufler
When more than one security module is exporting data to audit and networking sub-systems a single 32 bit integer is no longer sufficient to represent the data. Add a structure to be used instead.
The lsmblob structure is currently an array of u32 "secids". There is an entry for each of the security modules built into the system that would use secids if active. The system assigns the module a "slot" when it registers hooks. If modules are compiled in but not registered there will be unused slots.
A new
lsm_idstructure, which contains the name of the LSM and its slot number, is created. There is an instance for each LSM, which assigns the name and passes it to the infrastructure to set the slot.The audit rules data is expanded to use an array of security module data rather than a single instance. Because IMA uses the audit rule functions it is affected as well.
Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Acked-by Paul Moore <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/audit.h | 4 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 12 ++++- include/linux/security.h | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-- kernel/auditfilter.c | 24 +++++----- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 7 ++- security/bpf/hooks.c | 12 ++++- security/commoncap.c | 7 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 40 +++++++++++----- security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++- security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 7 ++- security/safesetid/lsm.c | 8 +++- security/security.c | 72 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/selinux/hooks.c | 8 +++- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++- security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c | 8 +++- security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 7 ++- 17 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
...
Quoted 31 lines
include/linux/security.h +23
-0@@ -131,6 +131,65 @@ enum lockdown_reason {extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX +1 ]; +/* +* Data exported by the security modules +* +* Any LSM that provides secid or secctx based hooks must be included. +*/ +#define LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ( \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) ? 1 : 0) + \ + (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0)) + +struct lsmblob { +u32 secid[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ]; +}; + +#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1/* Not a valid LSM slot number */ +#define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ +#define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */ + +/** +* lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure. +* @blob: Pointer to the data to initialize +* @secid: The initial secid value
include/linux/security.h enum lockdown_reason { · line 166
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/security.h +10
-0+* +* Set all secid for all modules to the specified value. +*/ +static inline void lsmblob_init (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 secid) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) + blob->secid[i] = secid; +}
As I'm going through the v20 draft of these patches it occurs to me, at least in the intermediate patches, that there is a pretty common pattern involving lsmblob_init():
lsmblob_init(blob, secid); func(blob, ...);
... would it make sense to have lsmblob_init() return *blob instead of void? It doesn't really matter too much, but it seems like it could help cleanup some of the code:
func(lsmblob_init(blob, secid), ...);
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 3/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the secid parameter of security_audit_rule_match to a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.
Change the users of security_audit_rule_match to use the lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding function lsmblob_init() fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid, security_task_getsecid() and security_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series. At the point the use of lsmblob_init() is dropped.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 10 ++++++++-- 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -1879,7 +1879,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule);int security_audit_rule_known (struct audit_krule *krule); -int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void **lsmrule); +int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field,u32 op, +void **lsmrule);void security_audit_rule_free (void **lsmrule);#else
@@ -1895,8 +1896,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)return 0 ; } -static inline int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, -void **lsmrule) +static inline int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field, +u32 op,void **lsmrule) {return 0 ; }
kernel/auditfilter.c +4 -2
@@ -1331,6 +1331,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;switch (f->type) {case AUDIT_PID :
@@ -1361,8 +1362,9 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_isset) {security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, - f->type, f->op, +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match ( + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); }break ;
kernel/auditsc.c +10 -4
@@ -474,6 +474,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;unsigned int sessionid; cred =rcu_dereference_check (tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -672,7 +673,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); need_sid =0 ; } - result =security_audit_rule_match (sid, f->type, +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + result =security_audit_rule_match (&blob, + f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); }
@@ -687,15 +690,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,if (f->lsm_isset) {/* Find files that match */ if (name) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, name->osid); result =security_audit_rule_match ( - name->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules); }else if (ctx) {list_for_each_entry (n, &ctx->names_list, list) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, name->osid);if (security_audit_rule_match ( - n->osid, + &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) {
@@ -707,7 +712,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,/* Find ipc objects that match */ if (!ctx || ctx->type !=AUDIT_IPC )break ; -if (security_audit_rule_match (ctx->ipc.osid, +lsmblob_init (&blob, ctx->ipc.osid); +if (security_audit_rule_match (&blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules)) ++result;
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -2
@@ -429,8 +429,8 @@ static inline void ima_filter_rule_free(void *lsmrule) { } -static inline int ima_filter_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op, -void *lsmrule) +static inline int ima_filter_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field, +u32 op,void *lsmrule) {return -EINVAL ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +5 -2
@@ -500,6 +500,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) {int rc =0 ;u32 osid; +struct lsmblob lsmdata;if (!ima_lsm_isset (rule->lsm[i].rules)) {if (!rule->lsm[i].args_p)
@@ -512,14 +513,16 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_OBJ_ROLE :case LSM_OBJ_TYPE :security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); - rc =ima_filter_rule_match (osid, rule->lsm[i].type, +lsmblob_init (&lsmdata, osid); + rc =ima_filter_rule_match (&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules);break ;case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : - rc =ima_filter_rule_match (secid, rule->lsm[i].type, +lsmblob_init (&lsmdata, secid); + rc =ima_filter_rule_match (&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules);default :
security/security.c +8 -2
@@ -2542,11 +2542,14 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ; +if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] ==NULL ) +continue ; hp->hook.audit_rule_free (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); } } -int security_audit_rule_match (u32 secid,u32 field,u32 op,void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_match (struct lsmblob *blob,u32 field,u32 op, +void **lsmrule) {struct security_hook_list *hp;int rc;
@@ -2554,7 +2557,10 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void **lsmrule)hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_match, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ; - rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match (secid, field, op, +if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] ==NULL ) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match (blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + field, op, &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);if (rc)return rc;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v20 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match
Quoted 17 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the secid parameter of
security_audit_rule_matchto a lsmblob structure pointer. Pass the entry from the lsmblob structure for the approprite slot to the LSM hook.Change the users of
security_audit_rule_matchto use the lsmblob instead of a u32. The scaffolding functionlsmblob_init()fills the blob with the value of the old secid, ensuring that it is available to the appropriate module hook. The sources of the secid,security_task_getsecid()andsecurity_inode_getsecid(), will be converted to use the blob structure later in the series. At the point the use oflsmblob_init()is dropped.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 8 lines
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditfilter.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 14 ++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 4 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++++-- security/security.c | 10 ++++++++-- 6 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 4/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of module stacking. Change its only caller, set_security_override, to do the same. Change that one's only caller, set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new parameter type.
The security module hook is unchanged, still taking a secid. The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob. lsmblob_init() is used to fill the lsmblob structure, however this will be removed later in the series when security_secctx_to_secid() is undated to provide a lsmblob instead of a secid.
--- include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++---- security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/linux/cred.h +2 -1
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@struct cred ;struct inode ; +struct lsmblob ;/* * COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);extern void revert_creds (const struct cred *);extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred (struct task_struct *);extern int change_create_files_as (struct cred *,struct inode *); -extern int set_security_override (struct cred *,u32 ); +extern int set_security_override (struct cred *,struct lsmblob *);extern int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *,const char *);extern int set_create_files_as (struct cred *,struct inode *);extern int cred_fscmp (const struct cred *,const struct cred *);
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);int security_prepare_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,gfp_t gfp);void security_transfer_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old);void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid); -int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,u32 secid); +int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode);int security_kernel_module_request (char *kmod_name);int security_kernel_load_data (enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -1056,7 +1056,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, { } -static inline int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *cred,u32 secid) +static inline int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob) {return 0 ; }
kernel/cred.c +6 -4
@@ -733,14 +733,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);/** * set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials * @new: The credentials to alter -* @secid: The LSM security ID to set +* @blob: The LSM security information to set * * Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective * security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used. */ -int set_security_override (struct cred *new,u32 secid) +int set_security_override (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob) { -return security_kernel_act_as (new, secid); +return security_kernel_act_as (new, blob); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override);
@@ -756,6 +756,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);*/ int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *new,const char *secctx) { +struct lsmblob blob;u32 secid;int ret;
@@ -763,7 +764,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)if (ret <0 )return ret; -return set_security_override (new, secid); +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); +return set_security_override (new, &blob); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override_from_ctx);
security/security.c +12 -2
@@ -1692,9 +1692,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_cred_getsecid); -int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,u32 secid) +int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob) { -return call_int_hook (kernel_act_as,0 , new, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as (new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v20 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
Quoted 18 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the
security_kernel_act_asinterface to use a lsmblob structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of module stacking. Change its only caller,set_security_override, to do the same. Change that one's only caller,set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new parameter type.The security module hook is unchanged, still taking a secid. The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
lsmblob_init()is used to fill the lsmblob structure, however this will be removed later in the series whensecurity_secctx_to_secid()is undated to provide a lsmblob instead of a secid.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines
--- include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++---- security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 5/23 net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the data used in UDS SO_PEERSEC processing from a secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update the security_socket_getpeersec_dgram() interface to use the lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code that will come out when the security_secid_to_secctx() code is brought in line with the lsmblob.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +5 -2
@@ -1398,7 +1398,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);int security_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char __user *optval,int __user *optlen,unsigned len); -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid); +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority);void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk);void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk);
@@ -1536,7 +1537,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __return -ENOPROTOOPT ; } -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob) {return -ENOPROTOOPT ; }
include/net/af_unix.h +1 -1
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {kgid_t gid;struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Security LSM data */ #endif u32 consumed; } __randomize_layout;
include/net/scm.h +5 -3
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ struct scm_creds creds;/* Skb credentials */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Passed security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Passed LSM data */ #endif };
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm) { -security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock,NULL , &scm->secid); +security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock,NULL , &scm->lsmblob); }#else static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm)
@@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen); +/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->lsmblob.secid[0 ], + &secdata, &seclen);if (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata);
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +5 -3
@@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,static void ip_cmsg_recv_security (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb) { +struct lsmblob lb;char *secdata; -u32 seclen, secid; +u32 seclen;int err; - err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &secid); + err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &lb);if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secdata, &seclen); +/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (lb.secid[0 ], &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;
net/unix/af_unix.c +3 -3
@@ -138,17 +138,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -UNIXCB (skb).secid = scm->secid; +UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob = scm->lsmblob; }static inline void unix_set_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { - scm->secid =UNIXCB (skb).secid; + scm->lsmblob =UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob; }static inline bool unix_secdata_eq (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -return (scm->secid ==UNIXCB (skb).secid); +return lsmblob_equal (&scm->lsmblob, &(UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob)); }#else static inline void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb)
security/security.c +15 -3
@@ -2219,10 +2219,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, optval, optlen, len); } -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob) { -return call_int_hook (socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT , sock, - skb, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT ; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram, + list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock, skb, + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +break ; + } +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
James Morris
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 8 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the data used in UDS
SO_PEERSECprocessing from a secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update thesecurity_socket_getpeersec_dgram()interface to use the lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code that will come out when thesecurity_secid_to_secctx()code is brought in line with the lsmblob.Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
This needs some review by networking folk, and/or LSM maintainers. You should probably cc netdev on anything touching the networking code.
Quoted 161 lines
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)include/linux/security.h +5
-2@@ -1398,7 +1398,8 @@ int security_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how);int security_sock_rcv_skb (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_socket_getpeersec_stream (struct socket *sock,char __user *optval,int __user *optlen,unsigned len); -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid); +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob);int security_sk_alloc (struct sock *sk,int family,gfp_t priority);void security_sk_free (struct sock *sk);void security_sk_clone (const struct sock *sk,struct sock *newsk);@@ -1536,7 +1537,9 @@ static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __return -ENOPROTOOPT ; } -static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +static inline int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, +struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob) {return -ENOPROTOOPT ; }include/net/af_unix.h +1
-1@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {kgid_t gid;struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Security LSM data */ #endif u32 consumed; } __randomize_layout;include/net/scm.h +5
-3@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ struct scm_cookie {struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ struct scm_creds creds;/* Skb credentials */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Passed security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Passed LSM data */ #endif };@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm) { -security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock,NULL , &scm->secid); +security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock,NULL , &scm->lsmblob); }#else static __inline__void unix_get_peersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct scm_cookie *scm)@@ -97,7 +97,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->secid, &secdata, &seclen); +/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->lsmblob.secid[0 ], + &secdata, &seclen);if (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata);net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +5
-3@@ -130,15 +130,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,static void ip_cmsg_recv_security (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb) { +struct lsmblob lb;char *secdata; -u32 seclen, secid; +u32 seclen;int err; - err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &secid); + err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &lb);if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secdata, &seclen); +/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (lb.secid[0 ], &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;net/unix/af_unix.c +3
-3@@ -138,17 +138,17 @@ static struct hlist_head *unix_sockets_unbound(void *addr)#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -UNIXCB (skb).secid = scm->secid; +UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob = scm->lsmblob; }static inline void unix_set_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { - scm->secid =UNIXCB (skb).secid; + scm->lsmblob =UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob; }static inline bool unix_secdata_eq (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb) { -return (scm->secid ==UNIXCB (skb).secid); +return lsmblob_equal (&scm->lsmblob, &(UNIXCB (skb).lsmblob)); }#else static inline void unix_get_secdata (struct scm_cookie *scm,struct sk_buff *skb)security/security.c +15
-3@@ -2219,10 +2219,22 @@ int security_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval, optval, optlen, len); } -int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) +int security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock,struct sk_buff *skb, +struct lsmblob *blob) { -return call_int_hook (socket_getpeersec_dgram, -ENOPROTOOPT , sock, - skb, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc = -ENOPROTOOPT ; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.socket_getpeersec_dgram, + list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.socket_getpeersec_dgram (sock, skb, + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +break ; + } +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_socket_getpeersec_dgram);
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
In reply to Casey SchauflerQuoted 17 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the data used in UDS
SO_PEERSECprocessing from a secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update thesecurity_socket_getpeersec_dgram()interface to use the lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code that will come out when thesecurity_secid_to_secctx()code is brought in line with the lsmblob.Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
...
include/net/af_unix.h struct unix_skb_parms { · line 39
Quoted 10 lines
include/net/af_unix.h +1
-1@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {kgid_t gid;struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Security LSM data */
As mentioned in a previous revision, I remain concerned that this is going to become a problem due to the size limit on unix_skb_parms. I would need to redo the math to be certain, but if I recall correctly this would limit us to five LSMs assuming both that we don't need to grow the per-LSM size of lsmblob *and* the netdev folks don't decide to add more fields to the unix_skb_parms.
I lost track of that earlier discussion so I'm not sure where it ended up, but if there is a viable alternative it might be a good idea to pursue it.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 36 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 16 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the data used in UDS
SO_PEERSECprocessing from a secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update thesecurity_socket_getpeersec_dgram()interface to use the lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code that will come out when thesecurity_secid_to_secctx()code is brought in line with the lsmblob.Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)...
include/net/af_unix.h struct unix_skb_parms { · line 39
Quoted 10 lines
include/net/af_unix.h +1
-1@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {kgid_t gid;struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Security LSM data */ As mentioned in a previous revision, I remain concerned that this is going to become a problem due to the size limit on
unix_skb_parms. I would need to redo the math to be certain, but if I recall correctly this would limit us to five LSMs assuming both that we don't need to grow the per-LSM size of lsmblob *and* the netdev folks don't decide to add more fields to theunix_skb_parms.
Quoted 3 lines
I lost track of that earlier discussion so I'm not sure where it ended up, but if there is a viable alternative it might be a good idea to pursue it.
Stephen had concerns about the lifecycle management involved. He also pointed out that I had taken a cowards way out when allocations failed. That could result in unexpected behavior when an allocation failed. Fixing that would have required a major re-write of the currently simple UDS attribute code, which I suspect would be as hard a sell to netdev as expanding the secid to a lsmblob. I also thought I'd gotten netdev on the
CC: for this patch, but it looks like I missed it.
I did start on the UDS attribute re-do, and discovered that I was going to have to introduce new failure paths, and that it might not be possible to maintain compatibility for all cases because of the new possibilities of failure.
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 49 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 36 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 16 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the data used in UDS
SO_PEERSECprocessing from a secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update thesecurity_socket_getpeersec_dgram()interface to use the lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code that will come out when thesecurity_secid_to_secctx()code is brought in line with the lsmblob.Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)...
include/net/af_unix.h struct unix_skb_parms { · line 39
Quoted 10 lines
include/net/af_unix.h +1
-1@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {kgid_t gid;struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Security LSM data */ As mentioned in a previous revision, I remain concerned that this is going to become a problem due to the size limit on
unix_skb_parms. I would need to redo the math to be certain, but if I recall correctly this would limit us to five LSMs assuming both that we don't need to grow the per-LSM size of lsmblob *and* the netdev folks don't decide to add more fields to theunix_skb_parms.Quoted 3 lines
I lost track of that earlier discussion so I'm not sure where it ended up, but if there is a viable alternative it might be a good idea to pursue it.
Stephen had concerns about the lifecycle management involved. He also pointed out that I had taken a cowards way out when allocations failed. That could result in unexpected behavior when an allocation failed. Fixing that would have required a major re-write of the currently simple UDS attribute code, which I suspect would be as hard a sell to netdev as expanding the secid to a lsmblob. I also thought I'd gotten netdev on the
CC: for this patch, but it looks like I missed it.
Quoted 4 lines
I did start on the UDS attribute re-do, and discovered that I was going to have to introduce new failure paths, and that it might not be possible to maintain compatibility for all cases because of the new possibilities of failure.
... and you're hoping to not be responsible for this code by the time this becomes a limiting issue? ;)
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 49 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 48 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 36 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 16 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the data used in UDS
SO_PEERSECprocessing from a secid to a more general struct lsmblob. Update thesecurity_socket_getpeersec_dgram()interface to use the lsmblob. There is a small amount of scaffolding code that will come out when thesecurity_secid_to_secctx()code is brought in line with the lsmblob.Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- include/linux/security.h | 7 +++++-- include/net/af_unix.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 8 +++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 8 +++++--- net/unix/af_unix.c | 6 +++--- security/security.c | 18 +++++++++++++++--- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)...
include/net/af_unix.h struct unix_skb_parms { · line 39
Quoted 10 lines
include/net/af_unix.h +1
-1@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ struct unix_skb_parms {kgid_t gid;struct scm_fp_list *fp;/* Passed files */ #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK -u32 secid;/* Security ID */ +struct lsmblob lsmblob;/* Security LSM data */ As mentioned in a previous revision, I remain concerned that this is going to become a problem due to the size limit on
unix_skb_parms. I would need to redo the math to be certain, but if I recall correctly this would limit us to five LSMs assuming both that we don't need to grow the per-LSM size of lsmblob *and* the netdev folks don't decide to add more fields to theunix_skb_parms.Quoted 3 lines
I lost track of that earlier discussion so I'm not sure where it ended up, but if there is a viable alternative it might be a good idea to pursue it.
Stephen had concerns about the lifecycle management involved. He also pointed out that I had taken a cowards way out when allocations failed. That could result in unexpected behavior when an allocation failed. Fixing that would have required a major re-write of the currently simple UDS attribute code, which I suspect would be as hard a sell to netdev as expanding the secid to a lsmblob. I also thought I'd gotten netdev on the
CC: for this patch, but it looks like I missed it.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
I did start on the UDS attribute re-do, and discovered that I was going to have to introduce new failure paths, and that it might not be possible to maintain compatibility for all cases because of the new possibilities of failure.
... and you're hoping to not be responsible for this code by the time this becomes a limiting issue? ;)
Well, maybe. More likely that full dementia will have set in by the time I get the alternative done correctly. It's a _lot_ more complicated. I'm carefully watching what the BPF people are doing with their memory management schemes in the hope they will come up with something useful.
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 4 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed unix_skb_params approach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed
unix_skb_paramsapproach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?
There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.
Quoted 1 line
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
Thank you
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 25 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed
unix_skb_paramsapproach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
fwiw I prefer the separate allocation strategy, but as you have already said it trading off one set of problems for another. I would rather see this move forward and one set of trade offs isn't significantly worse than the other to me so, either wfm.
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 35 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 25 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed
unix_skb_paramsapproach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
Quoted 4 lines
fwiw I prefer the separate allocation strategy, but as you have already said it trading off one set of problems for another. I would rather see this move forward and one set of trade offs isn't significantly worse than the other to me so, either wfm.
I remain unclear that AppArmor needs this patch at all even when support for SO_PEERSEC lands.
Contrary to the patch description, it is about supporting SCM_SECURITY for datagram not SO_PEERSEC. And I don't know of any actual users of SCM_SECURITY even for SELinux, just SO_PEERSEC.
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 43 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 35 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 25 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed
unix_skb_paramsapproach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
Quoted 4 lines
fwiw I prefer the separate allocation strategy, but as you have already said it trading off one set of problems for another. I would rather see this move forward and one set of trade offs isn't significantly worse than the other to me so, either wfm.
Quoted 5 lines
I remain unclear that AppArmor needs this patch at all even when support for
SO_PEERSEClands.
Contrary to the patch description, it is about supportingSCM_SECURITYfor datagram notSO_PEERSEC. And I don't know of any actual users ofSCM_SECURITYeven for SELinux, justSO_PEERSEC.
I remembered that systemd once tried using SCM_SECURITY but that was a bug since systemd was using it with stream sockets and that wasn't supported by the kernel at the time,
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224211, so systemd switched over to using SO_PEERSEC. Subsequently I did fix SCM_SECURITY to work with stream sockets via kernel commit 37a9a8df8ce9de6ea73349c9ac8bdf6ba4ec4f70 but SO_PEERSEC is still preferred. Looking around, I see that there is still one usage of SCM_SECURITY in systemd-journald but it doesn't seem to be required (if provided, journald will pass the label along but nothing seems to depend on it AFAICT). In any event, I don't believe this patch is needed to support stacking AppArmor.
--
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[email protected]
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 44 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 37 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 31 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 24 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed
unix_skb_paramsapproach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
Quoted 4 lines
fwiw I prefer the separate allocation strategy, but as you have already said it trading off one set of problems for another. I would rather see this move forward and one set of trade offs isn't significantly worse than the other to me so, either wfm.
Quoted 5 lines
I remain unclear that AppArmor needs this patch at all even when support for
SO_PEERSEClands.
Contrary to the patch description, it is about supportingSCM_SECURITYfor datagram notSO_PEERSEC. And I don't know of any actual users ofSCM_SECURITYeven for SELinux, justSO_PEERSEC.
Quoted 12 lines
I remembered that systemd once tried using
SCM_SECURITYbut that was a bug since systemd was using it with stream sockets and that wasn't supported by the kernel at the time,
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224211, so systemd switched over to usingSO_PEERSEC. Subsequently I did fixSCM_SECURITYto work with stream sockets via kernel commit37a9a8df8ce9de6ea73349c9ac8bdf6ba4ec4f70butSO_PEERSECis still preferred. Looking around, I see that there is still one usage ofSCM_SECURITYin systemd-journald but it doesn't seem to be required (if provided, journald will pass the label along but nothing seems to depend on it AFAICT). In any event, I don't believe this patch is needed to support stacking AppArmor.
Stephen is, as is so often the case, correct. AppArmor has a stub socket_getpeersec_dgram() that gets removed in patch 23. If I remove it earlier and throw in a touch of scaffolding for secid_to_secctx() we can leave the secid as is for now. This can't be the final solution as AppArmor will be using the hook someday and we still have the all modules case to worry about for the next phase. It also assumes that The BPF module isn't going to suddenly sprout a security context.
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 58 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 44 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 37 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 31 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 24 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed
unix_skb_paramsapproach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
Quoted 4 lines
fwiw I prefer the separate allocation strategy, but as you have already said it trading off one set of problems for another. I would rather see this move forward and one set of trade offs isn't significantly worse than the other to me so, either wfm.
Quoted 5 lines
I remain unclear that AppArmor needs this patch at all even when support for
SO_PEERSEClands.
Contrary to the patch description, it is about supportingSCM_SECURITYfor datagram notSO_PEERSEC. And I don't know of any actual users ofSCM_SECURITYeven for SELinux, justSO_PEERSEC.Quoted 12 lines
I remembered that systemd once tried using
SCM_SECURITYbut that was a bug since systemd was using it with stream sockets and that wasn't supported by the kernel at the time,
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224211, so systemd switched over to usingSO_PEERSEC. Subsequently I did fixSCM_SECURITYto work with stream sockets via kernel commit37a9a8df8ce9de6ea73349c9ac8bdf6ba4ec4f70butSO_PEERSECis still preferred. Looking around, I see that there is still one usage ofSCM_SECURITYin systemd-journald but it doesn't seem to be required (if provided, journald will pass the label along but nothing seems to depend on it AFAICT). In any event, I don't believe this patch is needed to support stacking AppArmor.
Quoted 2 lines
Stephen is, as is so often the case, correct. AppArmor has a stub
socket_getpeersec_dgram()that gets removed in patch 23. If I remove
right but as I said before this is coming, I have been playing with it and have code. So the series doesn't need it today but sooner than later it will be needed
Quoted 6 lines
it earlier and throw in a touch of scaffolding for
secid_to_secctx()we can leave the secid as is for now. This can't be the final solution as AppArmor will be using the hook someday and we still have the all modules case to worry about for the next phase. It also assumes that The BPF module isn't going to suddenly sprout a security context.
Yep this is something that needs to be dealt with, whether it is now or kicked down the road a little further ...
Stephen Smalley
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 60 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 58 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 56 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 37 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 31 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 24 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed
unix_skb_paramsapproach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
Quoted 4 lines
fwiw I prefer the separate allocation strategy, but as you have already said it trading off one set of problems for another. I would rather see this move forward and one set of trade offs isn't significantly worse than the other to me so, either wfm.
Quoted 5 lines
I remain unclear that AppArmor needs this patch at all even when support for
SO_PEERSEClands.
Contrary to the patch description, it is about supportingSCM_SECURITYfor datagram notSO_PEERSEC. And I don't know of any actual users ofSCM_SECURITYeven for SELinux, justSO_PEERSEC.I remembered that systemd once tried using
SCM_SECURITYbut that was a bug since systemd was using it with stream sockets and that wasn't supported by the kernel at the time,
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224211, so systemd switched over to usingSO_PEERSEC. Subsequently I did fixSCM_SECURITYto work with stream sockets via kernel commit37a9a8df8ce9de6ea73349c9ac8bdf6ba4ec4f70butSO_PEERSECis still preferred. Looking around, I see that there is still one usage ofSCM_SECURITYin systemd-journald but it doesn't seem to be required (if provided, journald will pass the label along but nothing seems to depend on it AFAICT). In any event, I don't believe this patch is needed to support stacking AppArmor.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Stephen is, as is so often the case, correct. AppArmor has a stub
socket_getpeersec_dgram()that gets removed in patch 23. If I removeright but as I said before this is coming, I have been playing with it and have code. So the series doesn't need it today but sooner than later it will be needed
I don't understand why. Is there a userspace component that relies on SCM_SECURITY today for anything real (more than just blindly passing it along and maybe writing to a log somewhere)? And this doesn't provide support for a composite SCM_SECURITY or SCM_CONTEXT, so it doesn't really solve the stacking problem for it anyway. What am I missing? Why do you care about this patch?
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Casey Schaufler
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 60 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 58 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 57 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 56 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 37 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 31 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 24 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 3 lines
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I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed
unix_skb_paramsapproach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
Quoted 4 lines
fwiw I prefer the separate allocation strategy, but as you have already said it trading off one set of problems for another. I would rather see this move forward and one set of trade offs isn't significantly worse than the other to me so, either wfm.
Quoted 5 lines
I remain unclear that AppArmor needs this patch at all even when support for
SO_PEERSEClands.
Contrary to the patch description, it is about supportingSCM_SECURITYfor datagram notSO_PEERSEC. And I don't know of any actual users ofSCM_SECURITYeven for SELinux, justSO_PEERSEC.I remembered that systemd once tried using
SCM_SECURITYbut that was a bug since systemd was using it with stream sockets and that wasn't supported by the kernel at the time,
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224211, so systemd switched over to usingSO_PEERSEC. Subsequently I did fixSCM_SECURITYto work with stream sockets via kernel commit37a9a8df8ce9de6ea73349c9ac8bdf6ba4ec4f70butSO_PEERSECis still preferred. Looking around, I see that there is still one usage ofSCM_SECURITYin systemd-journald but it doesn't seem to be required (if provided, journald will pass the label along but nothing seems to depend on it AFAICT). In any event, I don't believe this patch is needed to support stacking AppArmor.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Stephen is, as is so often the case, correct. AppArmor has a stub
socket_getpeersec_dgram()that gets removed in patch 23. If I removeright but as I said before this is coming, I have been playing with it and have code. So the series doesn't need it today but sooner than later it will be needed
Is sooner like 5.10, or 5.15? It matters.
Quoted 6 lines
I don't understand why. Is there a userspace component that relies on
SCM_SECURITYtoday for anything real (more than just blindly passing it along and maybe writing to a log somewhere)? And this doesn't provide support for a compositeSCM_SECURITYorSCM_CONTEXT, so it doesn't really solve the stacking problem for it anyway. What am I missing? Why do you care about this patch?
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 61 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 60 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 58 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 57 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 56 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 37 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 31 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 24 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed
unix_skb_paramsapproach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
Quoted 4 lines
fwiw I prefer the separate allocation strategy, but as you have already said it trading off one set of problems for another. I would rather see this move forward and one set of trade offs isn't significantly worse than the other to me so, either wfm.
Quoted 5 lines
I remain unclear that AppArmor needs this patch at all even when support for
SO_PEERSEClands.
Contrary to the patch description, it is about supportingSCM_SECURITYfor datagram notSO_PEERSEC. And I don't know of any actual users ofSCM_SECURITYeven for SELinux, justSO_PEERSEC.I remembered that systemd once tried using
SCM_SECURITYbut that was a bug since systemd was using it with stream sockets and that wasn't supported by the kernel at the time,
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224211, so systemd switched over to usingSO_PEERSEC. Subsequently I did fixSCM_SECURITYto work with stream sockets via kernel commit37a9a8df8ce9de6ea73349c9ac8bdf6ba4ec4f70butSO_PEERSECis still preferred. Looking around, I see that there is still one usage ofSCM_SECURITYin systemd-journald but it doesn't seem to be required (if provided, journald will pass the label along but nothing seems to depend on it AFAICT). In any event, I don't believe this patch is needed to support stacking AppArmor.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Stephen is, as is so often the case, correct. AppArmor has a stub
socket_getpeersec_dgram()that gets removed in patch 23. If I removeright but as I said before this is coming, I have been playing with it and have code. So the series doesn't need it today but sooner than later it will be needed
Is sooner like 5.10, or 5.15? It matters.
I can split SCM_SECURITY off from the rest of the unix mediation and push it off for a while. So lets call it 5.15 or later.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
I don't understand why. Is there a userspace component that relies on
SCM_SECURITYtoday for anything real (more than just blindly passing it along and maybe writing to a log somewhere)? And this doesn't provide support for a compositeSCM_SECURITYorSCM_CONTEXT, so it doesn't really solve the stacking problem for it anyway. What am I missing? Why do you care about this patch?
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
In reply to Stephen SmalleyQuoted 69 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 60 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 58 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 56 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 37 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 31 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 24 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed
unix_skb_paramsapproach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
Quoted 4 lines
fwiw I prefer the separate allocation strategy, but as you have already said it trading off one set of problems for another. I would rather see this move forward and one set of trade offs isn't significantly worse than the other to me so, either wfm.
Quoted 5 lines
I remain unclear that AppArmor needs this patch at all even when support for
SO_PEERSEClands.
Contrary to the patch description, it is about supportingSCM_SECURITYfor datagram notSO_PEERSEC. And I don't know of any actual users ofSCM_SECURITYeven for SELinux, justSO_PEERSEC.I remembered that systemd once tried using
SCM_SECURITYbut that was a bug since systemd was using it with stream sockets and that wasn't supported by the kernel at the time,
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224211, so systemd switched over to usingSO_PEERSEC. Subsequently I did fixSCM_SECURITYto work with stream sockets via kernel commit37a9a8df8ce9de6ea73349c9ac8bdf6ba4ec4f70butSO_PEERSECis still preferred. Looking around, I see that there is still one usage ofSCM_SECURITYin systemd-journald but it doesn't seem to be required (if provided, journald will pass the label along but nothing seems to depend on it AFAICT). In any event, I don't believe this patch is needed to support stacking AppArmor.Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Stephen is, as is so often the case, correct. AppArmor has a stub
socket_getpeersec_dgram()that gets removed in patch 23. If I removeright but as I said before this is coming, I have been playing with it and have code. So the series doesn't need it today but sooner than later it will be needed
Quoted 7 lines
I don't understand why. Is there a userspace component that relies on
SCM_SECURITYtoday for anything real (more than just blindly passing it along and maybe writing to a log somewhere)? And this doesn't provide support for a compositeSCM_SECURITYorSCM_CONTEXT, so it doesn't really solve the stacking problem for it anyway. What am I missing? Why do you care about this patch?
personally I don't atm, but there are people who do care about this in there logs, whether they should or shouldn't is an entirely different question.
Long term there may be some uses for it that I care about or "have to care about." For now Casey can drop it from this series.
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
Quoted 1 line · John Johansen
... For now Casey can drop it from this series.
As long as that whenever it reappears there is at the very least some note of the limits in the commit description and the code (via comments in the struct). Of course that assumes we can't find an alternate solution that we can all agree on which doesn't have these stacking limits.
Signature · 7 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
In reply to Stephen SmalleyQuoted 51 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 43 lines · Stephen Smalley
Quoted 35 lines · John Johansen
Quoted 25 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 9 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 3 lines · Casey Schaufler
Quoted 2 lines · Paul Moore
Quoted 1 line · Casey Schaufler
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
...
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.
Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed
unix_skb_paramsapproach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.
I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
Quoted 4 lines
fwiw I prefer the separate allocation strategy, but as you have already said it trading off one set of problems for another. I would rather see this move forward and one set of trade offs isn't significantly worse than the other to me so, either wfm.
Quoted 5 lines
I remain unclear that AppArmor needs this patch at all even when support for
SO_PEERSEClands.
Contrary to the patch description, it is about supportingSCM_SECURITYfor datagram notSO_PEERSEC. And I don't know of any actual users ofSCM_SECURITYeven for SELinux, justSO_PEERSEC.
Quoted 13 lines
I remembered that systemd once tried using
SCM_SECURITYbut that was a bug since systemd was using it with stream sockets and that wasn't supported by the kernel at the time,
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1224211, so systemd switched over to usingSO_PEERSEC. Subsequently I did fixSCM_SECURITYto work with stream sockets via kernel commit37a9a8df8ce9de6ea73349c9ac8bdf6ba4ec4f70butSO_PEERSECis still preferred. Looking around, I see that there is still one usage ofSCM_SECURITYin systemd-journald but it doesn't seem to be required (if provided, journald will pass the label along but nothing seems to depend on it AFAICT). In any event, I don't believe this patch is needed to support stacking AppArmor.
correct it is not currently needed. I have been playing with code to handle it but it is not upstream yet.
Regardless this is something that will need to be solved at some point.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 6/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange security_secctx_to_secid() to fill in a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is appropriate. Change security_secmark_relabel_packet() to use a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. In some other cases there is scaffolding where interfaces have yet to be converted.
--- include/linux/security.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/net/scm.h | 7 +++++-- kernel/cred.c | 4 +--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 6 ++++-- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 18 +++++++++------- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 ++++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++++-------- security/security.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 8 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +26 -4
@@ -190,6 +190,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)return !memcmp (bloba, blobb,sizeof (*bloba)); } +/** +* lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure. +* @blob: Pointer to the data +* +* This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where +* it is appropriate are rare. +* +* Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob. +* There should only be one. +*/ +static inline u32 lsmblob_value (const struct lsmblob *blob) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) +if (blob->secid[i]) +return blob->secid[i]; + +return 0 ; +} +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);
@@ -503,7 +524,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid); +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1322,7 +1344,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclestatic inline int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, -u32 *secid) +struct lsmblob *blob) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
@@ -1412,7 +1434,7 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req);void security_inet_conn_established (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb); -int security_secmark_relabel_packet (u32 secid); +int security_secmark_relabel_packet (struct lsmblob *blob);void security_secmark_refcount_inc (void );void security_secmark_refcount_dec (void );int security_tun_dev_alloc_security (void **security);
@@ -1585,7 +1607,7 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, { } -static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet (u32 secid) +static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet (struct lsmblob *blob) {return 0 ; }
include/net/scm.h +5 -2
@@ -97,8 +97,11 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { -/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->lsmblob.secid[0 ], +/* There can currently be only one value in the lsmblob, +* so getting it from lsmblob_value is appropriate until +* security_secid_to_secctx() is converted to taking a +* lsmblob directly. */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob_value (&scm->lsmblob), &secdata, &seclen);if (!err) {
kernel/cred.c +1 -3
@@ -757,14 +757,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *new,const char *secctx) {struct lsmblob blob; -u32 secid;int ret; - ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &secid); + ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &blob);if (ret <0 )return ret; -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid);return set_security_override (new, &blob); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override_from_ctx);
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +4 -2
@@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; -/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (lb.secid[0 ], &secdata, &seclen); +/* There can only be one secid in the lsmblob at this point, +* so getting it using lsmblob_value() is sufficient until +* security_secid_to_secctx() is changed to use a lsmblob */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob_value (&lb), &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;
net/netfilter/nft_meta.c +11 -7
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ struct nft_expr_type nft_meta_type __read_mostly = {#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK struct nft_secmark { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob lsmdata;char *ctx; };
@@ -811,21 +811,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {static int nft_secmark_compute_secid (struct nft_secmark *priv) { -u32 tmp_secid =0 ; +struct lsmblob blob;int err; - err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &tmp_secid); + err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &blob);if (err)return err; -if (!tmp_secid) +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return -ENOENT ; - err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (tmp_secid); + err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (&blob);if (err)return err; - priv->secid = tmp_secid; + priv->lsmdata = blob;return 0 ; }
@@ -835,7 +835,11 @@ static void nft_secmark_obj_eval(struct nft_object *obj, struct nft_regs *regs,const struct nft_secmark *priv =nft_obj_data (obj);struct sk_buff *skb = pkt->skb; - skb->secmark = priv->secid; +/* It is not possible for more than one secid to be set in +* the lsmblob structure because it is set using +* security_secctx_to_secid(). Any secid that is set must therefore +* be the one that should go in the secmark. */ + skb->secmark =lsmblob_value (&priv->lsmdata); } static int nft_secmark_obj_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c +7 -2
@@ -43,13 +43,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)static int checkentry_lsm (struct xt_secmark_target_info *info) { +struct lsmblob blob;int err; info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX -1 ] ='\0' ; info->secid =0 ; err =security_secctx_to_secid (info->secctx,strlen (info->secctx), - &info->secid); + &blob);if (err) {if (err == -EINVAL ) pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",
@@ -57,13 +58,17 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)return err; } +/* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because +* it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one +* value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */ + info->secid =lsmblob_value (&blob);if (!info->secid) {pr_info_ratelimited ("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n" , info->secctx);return -ENOENT ; } - err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (info->secid); + err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (&blob);if (err) {pr_info_ratelimited ("unable to obtain relabeling permission\n" );return err;
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +15 -8
@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,void *addr;void *mask;u32 addr_len; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -906,13 +906,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &blob);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +/* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob * +* instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid() +* will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is +* safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */ +return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid, - &audit_info); + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, +lsmblob_value (&blob), &audit_info); }/**
@@ -933,7 +938,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,void *addr;void *mask;u32 addr_len; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a
@@ -955,13 +960,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &blob);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +/* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob +* so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */ return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, -NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, secid, - &audit_info); +NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, +lsmblob_value (&blob), &audit_info); }/**
security/security.c +29 -5
@@ -2065,10 +2065,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid) +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -return call_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid (secdata, seclen, + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);
@@ -2301,9 +2313,21 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inet_conn_established); -int security_secmark_relabel_packet (u32 secid) +int security_secmark_relabel_packet (struct lsmblob *blob) { -return call_int_hook (secmark_relabel_packet,0 , secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc =0 ; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet, + list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.secmark_relabel_packet ( + blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +break ; + } +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secmark_relabel_packet);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v20 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid
Quoted 10 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change
security_secctx_to_secid()to fill in a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. Multiple LSMs may be able to interpret the string, and this allows for setting whichever secid is appropriate. Changesecurity_secmark_relabel_packet()to use a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. In some other cases there is scaffolding where interfaces have yet to be converted.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 10 lines
--- include/linux/security.h | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- include/net/scm.h | 7 +++++-- kernel/cred.c | 4 +--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 6 ++++-- net/netfilter/nft_meta.c | 18 +++++++++------- net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c | 9 ++++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 23 +++++++++++++-------- security/security.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----- 8 files changed, 98 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
I imagine there may be ways around the xt_secmark_target_info limitation, but that would require userspace changes to take advantage of it, and the way forward is clearly nftables so it probably isn't worth the effort.
I'm okay with this patch with the understanding that several chunks in the patch are replaced by later patches in the series.
Quoted 334 lines
include/linux/security.h +26
-4@@ -190,6 +190,27 @@ static inline bool lsmblob_equal(struct lsmblob *bloba, struct lsmblob *blobb)return !memcmp (bloba, blobb,sizeof (*bloba)); } +/** +* lsmblob_value - find the first non-zero value in an lsmblob structure. +* @blob: Pointer to the data +* +* This needs to be used with extreme caution, as the cases where +* it is appropriate are rare. +* +* Return the first secid value set in the lsmblob. +* There should only be one. +*/ +static inline u32 lsmblob_value (const struct lsmblob *blob) +{ +int i; + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) +if (blob->secid[i]) +return blob->secid[i]; + +return 0 ; +} +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);@@ -503,7 +524,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid); +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);@@ -1322,7 +1344,7 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclestatic inline int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, -u32 *secid) +struct lsmblob *blob) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }@@ -1412,7 +1434,7 @@ void security_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req);void security_inet_conn_established (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb); -int security_secmark_relabel_packet (u32 secid); +int security_secmark_relabel_packet (struct lsmblob *blob);void security_secmark_refcount_inc (void );void security_secmark_refcount_dec (void );int security_tun_dev_alloc_security (void **security);@@ -1585,7 +1607,7 @@ static inline void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, { } -static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet (u32 secid) +static inline int security_secmark_relabel_packet (struct lsmblob *blob) {return 0 ; }include/net/scm.h +5
-2@@ -97,8 +97,11 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { -/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 for now */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (scm->lsmblob.secid[0 ], +/* There can currently be only one value in the lsmblob, +* so getting it from lsmblob_value is appropriate until +* security_secid_to_secctx() is converted to taking a +* lsmblob directly. */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob_value (&scm->lsmblob), &secdata, &seclen);if (!err) {kernel/cred.c +1
-3@@ -757,14 +757,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);int set_security_override_from_ctx (struct cred *new,const char *secctx) {struct lsmblob blob; -u32 secid;int ret; - ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &secid); + ret =security_secctx_to_secid (secctx,strlen (secctx), &blob);if (ret <0 )return ret; -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid);return set_security_override (new, &blob); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (set_security_override_from_ctx);net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +4
-2@@ -139,8 +139,10 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; -/* Scaffolding - it has to be element 0 */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (lb.secid[0 ], &secdata, &seclen); +/* There can only be one secid in the lsmblob at this point, +* so getting it using lsmblob_value() is sufficient until +* security_secid_to_secctx() is changed to use a lsmblob */ + err =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob_value (&lb), &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;net/netfilter/nft_meta.c +11
-7@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ struct nft_expr_type nft_meta_type __read_mostly = {#ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK struct nft_secmark { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob lsmdata;char *ctx; };@@ -811,21 +811,21 @@ static const struct nla_policy nft_secmark_policy[NFTA_SECMARK_MAX + 1] = {static int nft_secmark_compute_secid (struct nft_secmark *priv) { -u32 tmp_secid =0 ; +struct lsmblob blob;int err; - err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &tmp_secid); + err =security_secctx_to_secid (priv->ctx,strlen (priv->ctx), &blob);if (err)return err; -if (!tmp_secid) +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return -ENOENT ; - err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (tmp_secid); + err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (&blob);if (err)return err; - priv->secid = tmp_secid; + priv->lsmdata = blob;return 0 ; }@@ -835,7 +835,11 @@ static void nft_secmark_obj_eval(struct nft_object *obj, struct nft_regs *regs,const struct nft_secmark *priv =nft_obj_data (obj);struct sk_buff *skb = pkt->skb; - skb->secmark = priv->secid; +/* It is not possible for more than one secid to be set in +* the lsmblob structure because it is set using +* security_secctx_to_secid(). Any secid that is set must therefore +* be the one that should go in the secmark. */ + skb->secmark =lsmblob_value (&priv->lsmdata); } static int nft_secmark_obj_init(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,net/netfilter/xt_SECMARK.c +7
-2@@ -43,13 +43,14 @@ secmark_tg(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct xt_action_param *par)static int checkentry_lsm (struct xt_secmark_target_info *info) { +struct lsmblob blob;int err; info->secctx[SECMARK_SECCTX_MAX -1 ] ='\0' ; info->secid =0 ; err =security_secctx_to_secid (info->secctx,strlen (info->secctx), - &info->secid); + &blob);if (err) {if (err == -EINVAL ) pr_info_ratelimited("invalid security context \'%s\'\n",@@ -57,13 +58,17 @@ static int checkentry_lsm(struct xt_secmark_target_info *info)return err; } +/* xt_secmark_target_info can't be changed to use lsmblobs because +* it is exposed as an API. Use lsmblob_value() to get the one +* value that got set by security_secctx_to_secid(). */ + info->secid =lsmblob_value (&blob);if (!info->secid) {pr_info_ratelimited ("unable to map security context \'%s\'\n" , info->secctx);return -ENOENT ; } - err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (info->secid); + err =security_secmark_relabel_packet (&blob);if (err) {pr_info_ratelimited ("unable to obtain relabeling permission\n" );return err;net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +15
-8@@ -882,7 +882,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb,void *addr;void *mask;u32 addr_len; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a @@ -906,13 +906,18 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadd(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &blob);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +/* netlbl_unlhsh_add will be changed to pass a struct lsmblob * +* instead of a u32 later in this patch set. security_secctx_to_secid() +* will only be setting one entry in the lsmblob struct, so it is +* safe to use lsmblob_value() to get that one value. */ +return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, - dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, secid, - &audit_info); + dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, +lsmblob_value (&blob), &audit_info); }/** @@ -933,7 +938,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb,void *addr;void *mask;u32 addr_len; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;struct netlbl_audit audit_info;/* Don't allow users to add both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a @@ -955,13 +960,15 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticadddef(struct sk_buff *skb, ret_val =security_secctx_to_secid (nla_data (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]),nla_len (info->attrs[NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX ]), - &secid); + &blob);if (ret_val !=0 )return ret_val; +/* security_secctx_to_secid() will only put one secid into the lsmblob +* so it's safe to use lsmblob_value() to get the secid. */ return netlbl_unlhsh_add (&init_net, -NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, secid, - &audit_info); +NULL , addr, mask, addr_len, +lsmblob_value (&blob), &audit_info); }/** security/security.c +29
-6@@ -2065,10 +2065,22 @@ int security_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secid_to_secctx); -int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,u32 *secid) +int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -return call_int_hook (secctx_to_secid,0 , secdata, seclen, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secctx_to_secid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.secctx_to_secid (secdata, seclen, + &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +return rc; + } +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);@@ -2301,9 +2313,21 @@ void security_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inet_conn_established); -int security_secmark_relabel_packet (u32 secid) +int security_secmark_relabel_packet (struct lsmblob *blob) { -return call_int_hook (secmark_relabel_packet,0 , secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; +int rc =0 ; + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secmark_relabel_packet, + list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.secmark_relabel_packet ( + blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); +if (rc !=0 ) +break ; + } +return rc; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secmark_relabel_packet); --
Quoted 2 lines
2.24.1
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 7/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange security_secid_to_secctx() to take a lsmblob as input instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The callers have been updated as well. This allows for the possibility that more than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the audit code.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +++++++++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- include/net/scm.h | 8 ++----- kernel/audit.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++---- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 5 +---- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 ++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 11 +++++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 ++--- security/security.c | 11 +++++---- 12 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +11 -1
@@ -3111,10 +3111,20 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) {u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;size_t added_size;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &secid); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secctx, &secctx_sz); +/* +* Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will +* provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init +* is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob +* get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(), +* which means that the one expected by +* security_secid_to_secctx() will be set. +*/ +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen);
@@ -1337,7 +1337,8 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name)return 0 ; } -static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, +char **secdata,u32 *seclen) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +2 -6
@@ -97,12 +97,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { -/* There can currently be only one value in the lsmblob, -* so getting it from lsmblob_value is appropriate until -* security_secid_to_secctx() is converted to taking a -* lsmblob directly. */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob_value (&scm->lsmblob), - &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &secdata, + &seclen);if (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata);
kernel/audit.c +18 -2
@@ -1443,7 +1443,16 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : len =0 ;if (audit_sig_sid) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len); +struct lsmblob blob; + +/* +* lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob +* to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until +* audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which +* happens later in this patch set. +*/ +lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_sig_sid); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (err)return err; }
@@ -2129,12 +2138,19 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)unsigned len;int error;u32 sid; +struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &sid);if (!sid)return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (sid, &ctx, &len); +/* +* lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid. +* This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted +* to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set. +*/ +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;
kernel/auditsc.c +24 -4
@@ -673,6 +673,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); need_sid =0 ; } +/* +* lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob +* to sid. This is temporary until +* security_task_getsecid() is converted to +* provide a lsmblob, which happens later in +* this patch set. +*/ lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type,
@@ -690,6 +697,13 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,if (f->lsm_isset) {/* Find files that match */ if (name) { +/* +* lsmblob_init sets all values in the +* lsmblob to sid. This is temporary +* until name->osid is converted to a +* lsmblob, which happens later in +* this patch set. +*/ lsmblob_init (&blob, name->osid); result = security_audit_rule_match( &blob,
@@ -995,6 +1009,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ; +struct lsmblob blob; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );if (!ab)
@@ -1004,7 +1019,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (sid) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (sid, &ctx, &len)) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1247,7 +1263,10 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)if (osid) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; -if (security_secid_to_secctx (osid, &ctx, &len)) { +struct lsmblob blob; + +lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else {
@@ -1397,9 +1416,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,if (n->osid !=0 ) {char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; +struct lsmblob blob; -if (security_secid_to_secctx ( - n->osid, &ctx, &len)) { +lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ;
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1 -4
@@ -139,10 +139,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; -/* There can only be one secid in the lsmblob at this point, -* so getting it using lsmblob_value() is sufficient until -* security_secid_to_secctx() is changed to use a lsmblob */ - err =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob_value (&lb), &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &secdata, &seclen);if (err)return ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +12 -2
@@ -333,8 +333,13 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct nlattr *nest_secctx;int len, ret;char *secctx; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark, &secctx, &len); +/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob. +* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module +* to use to create the secctx. */ +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -647,8 +652,13 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct) {#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK int len, ret; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark,NULL , &len); +/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob. +* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module +* to use to create the secctx. */ +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob,NULL , &len);if (ret)return 0 ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +3 -1
@@ -175,8 +175,10 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)int ret;u32 len;char *secctx; +struct lsmblob blob; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (ct->secmark, &secctx, &len); +lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);if (ret)return ;
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +9 -2
@@ -305,13 +305,20 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata) {u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK ) +struct lsmblob blob; +if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;read_lock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); -if (skb->secmark) -security_secid_to_secctx (skb->secmark, secdata, &seclen); +if (skb->secmark) { +/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in +* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security +* module to use to create the secctx. */ +lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, secdata, &seclen); + }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);#endif
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +26 -4
@@ -376,6 +376,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ;char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;if (addr_len !=sizeof (struct in_addr ) && addr_len !=sizeof (struct in6_addr ))
@@ -438,7 +439,11 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (secid, +/* lsmblob_init() puts secid into all of the secids in blob. +* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module +* to use to create the secctx. */ +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);
@@ -475,6 +480,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry = netlbl_af4list_remove(addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr,
@@ -494,8 +500,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net, addr->s_addr, mask->s_addr);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); +/* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids +* in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which +* security module to use to create the secctx. */ +if (entry !=NULL ) +lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (entry->secid, +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -537,6 +548,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock); list_entry =netlbl_af6list_remove (addr, mask, &iface->addr6_list);
@@ -555,8 +567,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net, addr, mask);if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev); +/* lsmblob_init() puts entry->secid into all of the secids +* in blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which +* security module to use to create the secctx. */ +if (entry !=NULL ) +lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (entry->secid, +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len);
@@ -1082,6 +1099,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,u32 secid;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob; data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid, cb_arg->seq, &netlbl_unlabel_gnl_family,
@@ -1136,7 +1154,11 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, secid = addr6->secid; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (secid, &secctx, &secctx_len); +/* lsmblob_init() secid into all of the secids in blob. +* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module +* to use to create the secctx. */ +lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +3 -3
@@ -86,6 +86,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len; +struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ;
@@ -98,10 +99,9 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid), audit_info->sessionid); +lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (audit_info->secid, - &secctx, - &secctx_len) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx);security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); }
security/security.c +5 -6
@@ -2046,17 +2046,16 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (u32 secid,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) {struct security_hook_list *hp;int rc; -/* -* Currently, only one LSM can implement secid_to_secctx (i.e this -* LSM hook is not "stackable"). -*/ hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) { - rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx (secid, secdata, seclen); +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + rc = hp->hook.secid_to_secctx (blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], + secdata, seclen);if (rc !=LSM_RET_DEFAULT (secid_to_secctx))return rc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v20 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx
Quoted 13 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change
security_secid_to_secctx()to take a lsmblob as input instead of a u32 secid. It will then call the LSM hooks using the lsmblob element allocated for that module. The callers have been updated as well. This allows for the possibility that more than one module may be called upon to translate a secid to a string, as can occur in the audit code.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 14 lines
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +++++++++- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- include/net/scm.h | 8 ++----- kernel/audit.c | 20 +++++++++++++++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 28 +++++++++++++++++++---- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 5 +---- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 14 ++++++++++-- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 +++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 11 +++++++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 6 ++--- security/security.c | 11 +++++---- 12 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 8/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerThere may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing. Change security_ipc_getsecid() to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The audit data structure containing the secid will be updated later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++- security/security.c | 12 +++++++++--- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -494,7 +494,7 @@ int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5);void security_task_to_inode (struct task_struct *p,struct inode *inode);int security_ipc_permission (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,short flag); -void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid); +void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg);void security_msg_msg_free (struct msg_msg *msg);int security_msg_queue_alloc (struct kern_ipc_perm *msq);
@@ -1215,9 +1215,10 @@ static inline int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,return 0 ; } -static inline void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg)
kernel/auditsc.c +6 -1
@@ -2341,11 +2341,16 @@ void __audit_mq_getsetattr(mqd_t mqdes, struct mq_attr *mqstat)void __audit_ipc_obj (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsmblob blob; context->ipc.uid = ipcp->uid; context->ipc.gid = ipcp->gid; context->ipc.mode = ipcp->mode; context->ipc.has_perm =0 ; -security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &context->ipc.osid); +security_ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &blob); +/* context->ipc.osid will be changed to a lsmblob later in +* the patch series. This will allow auditing of all the object +* labels associated with the ipc object. */ + context->ipc.osid =lsmblob_value (&blob); context->type =AUDIT_IPC ; }
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1866,10 +1866,16 @@ int security_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)return call_int_hook (ipc_permission,0 , ipcp, flag); } -void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,u32 *secid) +void security_ipc_getsecid (struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (ipc_getsecid, ipcp, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.ipc_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.ipc_getsecid (ipcp, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }int security_msg_msg_alloc (struct msg_msg *msg)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v20 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
There may be more than one LSM that provides IPC data for auditing. Change
security_ipc_getsecid()to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of the u32 secid. The audit data structure containing the secid will be updated later, so there is a bit of scaffolding here.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 5 lines
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 7 ++++++- security/security.c | 12 +++++++++--- 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 9/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_task_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible secids for possible reporting.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +------ include/linux/security.h | 7 ++-- kernel/audit.c | 16 ++++----- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-- kernel/auditsc.c | 25 +++++++------- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 +++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 49 +++++++++++++++------------ security/security.c | 12 +++++-- 10 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +1 -11
@@ -3110,20 +3110,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->priority =task_nice (current);if (target_node && target_node->txn_security_ctx) { -u32 secid;struct lsmblob blob;size_t added_size; -security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &secid); -/* -* Later in this patch set security_task_getsecid() will -* provide a lsmblob instead of a secid. lsmblob_init -* is used to ensure that all the secids in the lsmblob -* get the value returned from security_task_getsecid(), -* which means that the one expected by -* security_secid_to_secctx() will be set. -*/ -lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); +security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ;
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -477,7 +477,7 @@ int security_task_fix_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,int security_task_setpgid (struct task_struct *p,pid_t pgid);int security_task_getpgid (struct task_struct *p);int security_task_getsid (struct task_struct *p); -void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid); +void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice);int security_task_setioprio (struct task_struct *p,int ioprio);int security_task_getioprio (struct task_struct *p);
@@ -1142,9 +1142,10 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)return 0 ; } -static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_task_setnice (struct task_struct *p,int nice)
kernel/audit.c +6 -10
@@ -2137,19 +2137,12 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)char *ctx =NULL ;unsigned len;int error; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob; -security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); -if (!sid) +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; -/* -* lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob to sid. -* This is temporary until security_task_getsecid is converted -* to use a lsmblob, which happens later in this patch set. -*/ -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL )
@@ -2357,6 +2350,7 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)int audit_signal_info (int sig,struct task_struct *t) {kuid_t uid =current_uid (), auid; +struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2367,7 +2361,9 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_sig_sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ + audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; }return audit_signal_info_syscall (t);
kernel/auditfilter.c +1 -3
@@ -1330,7 +1330,6 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)for (i =0 ; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];pid_t pid; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob;switch (f->type) {
@@ -1361,8 +1360,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN :case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR :if (f->lsm_isset) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &sid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); result =security_audit_rule_match ( &blob, f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rules);
kernel/auditsc.c +12 -13
@@ -473,7 +473,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, {const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ; -u32 sid;struct lsmblob blob;unsigned int sessionid;
@@ -670,17 +669,9 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,logged upon error */ if (f->lsm_isset) {if (need_sid) { -security_task_getsecid (tsk, &sid); +security_task_getsecid (tsk, &blob); need_sid =0 ; } -/* -* lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob -* to sid. This is temporary until -* security_task_getsecid() is converted to -* provide a lsmblob, which happens later in -* this patch set. -*/ -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob, f->type, f->op,
@@ -2440,12 +2431,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid =task_tgid_nr (t); context->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); context->target_uid =task_uid (t); context->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &context->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ + context->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (context->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); }
@@ -2461,6 +2455,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;struct audit_context *ctx =audit_context ();kuid_t t_uid =task_uid (t); +struct lsmblob blob;if (!audit_signals ||audit_dummy_context ())return 0 ;
@@ -2472,7 +2467,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &ctx->target_sid); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (ctx->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN );return 0 ; }
@@ -2493,7 +2490,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_loginuid (t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]); +security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); +/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ + axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0 ];memcpy (axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); axp->pid_count++;
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +4 -1
@@ -1557,11 +1557,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)int ret_val;struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;struct netlbl_audit audit_info; +struct lsmblob blob;/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info.secid); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */ + audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0 ]; audit_info.loginuid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ; audit_info.sessionid =0 ;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +5 -1
@@ -34,7 +34,11 @@static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo (struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { -security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info->secid); +struct lsmblob blob; + +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding until secid is converted */ + audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0 ]; audit_info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); audit_info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +6 -4
@@ -54,14 +54,16 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)*/ int ima_must_appraise (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func) { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob blob;if (!ima_appraise)return 0 ; -security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); -return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), secid, func, mask, -IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ); +security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); +/* scaffolding the .secid[0] */ +return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], func, + mask,IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL , +NULL ); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +28 -21
110 lines not on this page · raw message
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1783,10 +1783,16 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)return call_int_hook (task_getsid,0 , p); } -void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,u32 *secid) +void security_task_getsecid (struct task_struct *p,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (task_getsecid, p, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.task_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.task_getsecid (p, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_task_getsecid);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v20 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the
security_task_getsecid()interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid in support of LSM stacking. Audit interfaces will need to collect all possible secids for possible reporting.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 12 lines
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 12 +------ include/linux/security.h | 7 ++-- kernel/audit.c | 16 ++++----- kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 +-- kernel/auditsc.c | 25 +++++++------- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 5 ++- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +++- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 10 +++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 49 +++++++++++++++------------ security/security.c | 12 +++++-- 10 files changed, 76 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 10/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_inode_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided for IMA and audit.
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +--- security/security.c | 11 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +4 -3
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ int security_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);int security_inode_getsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,void **buffer,bool alloc);int security_inode_setsecurity (struct inode *inode,const char *name,const void *value,size_t size,int flags);int security_inode_listsecurity (struct inode *inode,char *buffer,size_t buffer_size); -void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid); +void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new);int security_inode_copy_up_xattr (const char *name); int security_kernfs_init_security(struct kernfs_node *kn_dir,
@@ -958,9 +958,10 @@ static inline int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,return 0 ; } -static inline void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +static inline void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode, +struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); }static inline int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new)
kernel/auditsc.c +5 -1
@@ -1980,13 +1980,17 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name,const struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, unsigned int flags) { + struct lsmblob blob; + name->ino = inode->i_ino; name->dev = inode->i_sb->s_dev; name->mode = inode->i_mode; name->uid = inode->i_uid; name->gid = inode->i_gid; name->rdev = inode->i_rdev; -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &name->osid); +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &blob); +/* scaffolding until osid is updated */ + name->osid = blob.secid[0 ];if (flags &AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL ) { name->fcap_ver =-1 ;return ;
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1 -3
@@ -499,7 +499,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,return false;for (i =0 ; i <MAX_LSM_RULES ; i++) {int rc =0 ; -u32 osid;struct lsmblob lsmdata;if (!ima_lsm_isset (rule->lsm[i].rules)) {
@@ -512,8 +511,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_OBJ_USER :case LSM_OBJ_ROLE :case LSM_OBJ_TYPE : -security_inode_getsecid (inode, &osid); -lsmblob_init (&lsmdata, osid); +security_inode_getsecid (inode, &lsmdata); rc =ima_filter_rule_match (&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules);
security/security.c +9 -2
@@ -1442,9 +1442,16 @@ int security_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_listsecurity); -void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,u32 *secid) +void security_inode_getsecid (struct inode *inode,struct lsmblob *blob) { -call_void_hook (inode_getsecid, inode, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.inode_getsecid (inode, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }int security_inode_copy_up (struct dentry *src,struct cred **new)
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v20 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the
security_inode_getsecid()interface to fill in a lsmblob structure instead of a u32 secid. This allows for its callers to gather data from all registered LSMs. Data is provided for IMA and audit.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines
--- include/linux/security.h | 7 ++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 6 +++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 +--- security/security.c | 11 +++++++++-- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 11/23 LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_cred_getsecid() interface to fill in a lsmblob instead of a u32 secid. The associated data elements in the audit sub-system are changed from a secid to a lsmblob to accommodate multiple possible LSM audit users.
--- include/linux/security.h | 2 +- kernel/audit.c | 25 +++++++---------------- kernel/audit.h | 5 +++-- kernel/auditsc.c | 33 +++++++++++-------------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 8 ++++---- security/security.c | 12 ++++++++--- 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
include/linux/security.h +1 -1
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ int security_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp);void security_cred_free (struct cred *cred);int security_prepare_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old,gfp_t gfp);void security_transfer_creds (struct cred *new,const struct cred *old); -void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid); +void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_kernel_act_as (struct cred *new,struct lsmblob *blob);int security_kernel_create_files_as (struct cred *new,struct inode *inode);int security_kernel_module_request (char *kmod_name);
kernel/audit.c +7 -18
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ static u32 audit_backlog_wait_time = AUDIT_BACKLOG_WAIT_TIME;/* The identity of the user shutting down the audit system. */ kuid_t audit_sig_uid =INVALID_UID ;pid_t audit_sig_pid =-1 ; -u32 audit_sig_sid =0 ; +struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;/* Records can be lost in several ways: 0) [suppressed in audit_alloc]
@@ -1442,29 +1442,21 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) }case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : len =0 ; -if (audit_sig_sid) { -struct lsmblob blob; - -/* -* lsmblob_init sets all values in the lsmblob -* to audit_sig_sid. This is temporary until -* audit_sig_sid is converted to a lsmblob, which -* happens later in this patch set. -*/ -lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_sig_sid); - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len); +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx, + &len);if (err)return err; } sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (audit_sig_sid) +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm))security_release_secctx (ctx, len);return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid; -if (audit_sig_sid) { +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) {memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);security_release_secctx (ctx, len); }
@@ -2350,7 +2342,6 @@ int audit_set_loginuid(kuid_t loginuid)int audit_signal_info (int sig,struct task_struct *t) {kuid_t uid =current_uid (), auid; -struct lsmblob blob; if (auditd_test_task(t) && (sig == SIGTERM || sig == SIGHUP ||
@@ -2361,9 +2352,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t) audit_sig_uid = auid; else audit_sig_uid = uid; -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until audit_sig_sid is converted */ - audit_sig_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_sig_lsm); }return audit_signal_info_syscall (t);
kernel/audit.h +3 -2
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/audit.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> +#include <linux/security.h> #include <uapi/linux/mqueue.h> #include <linux/tty.h>
@@ -134,7 +135,7 @@ struct audit_context {kuid_t target_auid;kuid_t target_uid;unsigned int target_sessionid; -u32 target_sid; +struct lsmblob target_lsm;char target_comm[TASK_COMM_LEN ];struct audit_tree_refs *trees, *first_trees;
@@ -329,7 +330,7 @@ extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);extern pid_t audit_sig_pid;extern kuid_t audit_sig_uid; -extern u32 audit_sig_sid; +extern struct lsmblob audit_sig_lsm;extern int audit_filter (int msgtype,unsigned int listtype);
kernel/auditsc.c +12 -21
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ struct audit_aux_data_pids {kuid_t target_auid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];kuid_t target_uid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];unsigned int target_sessionid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ]; -u32 target_sid[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ]; +struct lsmblob target_lsm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ];char target_comm[AUDIT_AUX_PIDS ][TASK_COMM_LEN ];int pid_count; };
@@ -993,14 +993,14 @@ static inline void audit_free_context(struct audit_context *context) }static int audit_log_pid_context (struct audit_context *context,pid_t pid, -kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid,unsigned int sessionid, -u32 sid,char *comm) +kuid_t auid,kuid_t uid, +unsigned int sessionid, +struct lsmblob *blob,char *comm) {struct audit_buffer *ab;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ; -struct lsmblob blob; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );if (!ab)
@@ -1009,9 +1009,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,audit_log_format (ab,"opid=%d oauid=%d ouid=%d oses=%d" , pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid),from_kuid (&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid); -if (sid) { -lsmblob_init (&blob, sid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &ctx, &len)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {
@@ -1582,7 +1581,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) axs->target_auid[i], axs->target_uid[i], axs->target_sessionid[i], - axs->target_sid[i], + &axs->target_lsm[i], axs->target_comm[i])) call_panic = 1; }
@@ -1591,7 +1590,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void)audit_log_pid_context (context, context->target_pid, context->target_auid, context->target_uid, context->target_sessionid, - context->target_sid, context->target_comm)) + &context->target_lsm, context->target_comm)) call_panic = 1;if (context->pwd.dentry && context->pwd.mnt) {
@@ -1769,7 +1768,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) context->aux =NULL ; context->aux_pids =NULL ; context->target_pid =0 ; - context->target_sid =0 ; +lsmblob_init (&context->target_lsm,0 ); context->sockaddr_len =0 ; context->type =0 ; context->fds[0 ] =-1 ;
@@ -2435,15 +2434,12 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) {struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); -struct lsmblob blob; context->target_pid =task_tgid_nr (t); context->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); context->target_uid =task_uid (t); context->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding - until target_sid is converted */ - context->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &context->target_lsm);memcpy (context->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); }
@@ -2459,7 +2455,6 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;struct audit_context *ctx =audit_context ();kuid_t t_uid =task_uid (t); -struct lsmblob blob;if (!audit_signals ||audit_dummy_context ())return 0 ;
@@ -2471,9 +2466,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) ctx->target_auid =audit_get_loginuid (t); ctx->target_uid = t_uid; ctx->target_sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ - ctx->target_sid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &ctx->target_lsm);memcpy (ctx->target_comm, t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN );return 0 ; }
@@ -2494,9 +2487,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t) axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_loginuid (t); axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid; axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] =audit_get_sessionid (t); -security_task_getsecid (t, &blob); -/* scaffolding until target_sid is converted */ - axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (t, &axp->target_lsm[axp->pid_count]);memcpy (axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm,TASK_COMM_LEN ); axp->pid_count++;
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +4 -4
@@ -463,7 +463,6 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)int ima_bprm_check (struct linux_binprm *bprm) {int ret; -u32 secid;struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);
@@ -473,9 +472,10 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)if (ret)return ret; -security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &secid); -return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid,NULL ,0 , -MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); +security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &blob); +/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ +return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0 ], +NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); }/**
security/security.c +9 -3
@@ -1692,10 +1692,16 @@ void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)call_void_hook (cred_transfer, new, old); } -void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,u32 *secid) +void security_cred_getsecid (const struct cred *c,struct lsmblob *blob) { - *secid =0 ; -call_void_hook (cred_getsecid, c, secid); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +lsmblob_init (blob,0 ); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.cred_getsecid, list) { +if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot)) +continue ; + hp->hook.cred_getsecid (c, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); + } }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_cred_getsecid);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 12/23 IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
In reply to Casey SchauflerThe IMA interfaces ima_get_action() and ima_match_policy() call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 +++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 35 +++++++++++---------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 +++++------ 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +6 -5
@@ -252,9 +252,9 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_QUEUE_EARLY_BOOT_KEYS */ /* LIM API function definitions */ -int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr, -struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, +int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,int mask,enum ima_hooks func, +int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,const char *keyring);int ima_must_measure (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
@@ -280,8 +280,9 @@ void ima_free_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry);const char *ima_d_path (const struct path *path,char **pathbuf,char *filename);/* IMA policy related functions */ -int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr, +int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, +int flags,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,const char *keyring);void ima_init_policy (void );
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +5 -5
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* ima_get_action - appraise & measure decision based on policy. * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate -* @secid: secid of the task being validated +* @blob: LSM data of the task being validated * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC, * MAY_APPEND) * @func: caller identifier
@@ -183,16 +183,16 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* Returns IMA_MEASURE, IMA_APPRAISE mask. * */ -int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr, -struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, +int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,int mask,enum ima_hooks func, +int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,const char *keyring) {int flags =IMA_MEASURE |IMA_AUDIT |IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ; flags &= ima_policy_flag; -return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, +return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, blob, func, mask, flags, pcr, template_desc, keyring); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +2 -4
@@ -60,10 +60,8 @@ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func)return 0 ;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding the .secid[0] */ -return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], func, - mask,IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL , -NULL ); +return ima_match_policy (inode,current_cred (), &blob, func, mask, +IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ,NULL ,NULL ,NULL ); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry,
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +14 -21
@@ -188,8 +188,8 @@ void ima_file_free(struct file *file) }static int process_measurement (struct file *file,const struct cred *cred, -u32 secid,char *buf,loff_t size,int mask, -enum ima_hooks func) +struct lsmblob *blob,char *buf,loff_t size, +int mask,enum ima_hooks func) {struct inode *inode =file_inode (file);struct integrity_iint_cache *iint =NULL ;
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,* bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy. * Included is the appraise submask. */ - action =ima_get_action (inode, cred, secid, mask, func, &pcr, + action =ima_get_action (inode, cred, blob, mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc,NULL ); violation_check = ((func ==FILE_CHECK || func ==MMAP_CHECK ) && (ima_policy_flag &IMA_MEASURE ));
@@ -386,8 +386,7 @@ int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)if (file && (prot &PROT_EXEC )) {security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding - until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,MMAP_CHECK ); }
@@ -426,8 +425,7 @@ int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot)security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); inode =file_inode (vma->vm_file); -/* scaffolding */ - action =ima_get_action (NULL ,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ],0 , + action =ima_get_action (NULL ,current_cred (), &blob,0 ,MMAP_CHECK , &pcr, &template,0 );/* Is the mmap'ed file in policy? */
@@ -466,16 +464,14 @@ int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ - ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], -NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK ); + ret =process_measurement (bprm->file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 , +MAY_EXEC ,BPRM_CHECK );if (ret)return ret;security_cred_getsecid (bprm->cred, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, blob.secid[0 ], -NULL ,0 ,MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); +return process_measurement (bprm->file, bprm->cred, &blob,NULL ,0 , +MAY_EXEC ,CREDS_CHECK ); }/**
@@ -493,8 +489,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)struct lsmblob blob;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ],NULL ,0 , +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob,NULL ,0 , mask & (MAY_READ |MAY_WRITE |MAY_EXEC |MAY_APPEND ),FILE_CHECK ); }
@@ -675,9 +670,8 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, func = read_idmap[read_id] ?:FILE_CHECK ;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until process_measurement changes */ -return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], buf, - size,MAY_READ , func); +return process_measurement (file,current_cred (), &blob, buf, size, +MAY_READ , func); }/**
@@ -775,9 +769,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,*/ if (func) {security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding */ - action =ima_get_action (inode,current_cred (), blob.secid[0 ], -0 , func, &pcr, &template, keyring); + action =ima_get_action (inode,current_cred (), &blob,0 , func, + &pcr, &template, keyring);if (!(action &IMA_MEASURE ))return ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +7 -7
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,* @rule: a pointer to a rule * @inode: a pointer to an inode * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation -* @secid: the secid of the task to be validated +* @blob: the lsm data of the task to be validated * @func: LIM hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func
@@ -454,7 +454,7 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,* Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules (struct ima_rule_entry *rule,struct inode *inode, -const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, +const struct cred *cred,struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask,const char *keyring) {
@@ -519,7 +519,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : -lsmblob_init (&lsmdata, secid); rc =ima_filter_rule_match (&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules);
@@ -562,7 +561,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is * being made -* @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated +* @blob: LSM data of the task to be validated * @func: IMA hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend
@@ -577,8 +576,9 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* list when walking it. Reads are many orders of magnitude more numerous * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate. */ -int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid, -enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr, +int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred, +struct lsmblob *blob,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, +int flags,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,const char *keyring) {
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid,if (!(entry->action & actmask))continue ; -if (!ima_match_rules (entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, +if (!ima_match_rules (entry, inode, cred, blob, func, mask, keyring))continue ;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs
Quoted 17 lines · Casey Schaufler
The IMA interfaces
ima_get_action()andima_match_policy()call LSM functions that use lsmblobs. Change the IMA functions to pass the lsmblob to be compatible with the LSM functions.Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 11 +++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 10 ++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 6 ++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 35 +++++++++++---------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 14 +++++------ 5 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
...
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, · line 524
Quoted 12 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-1@@ -519,7 +519,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,case LSM_SUBJ_USER :case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE :case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE : -lsmblob_init (&lsmdata, secid); rc =ima_filter_rule_match (&lsmdata, rule->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, rule->lsm[i].rules);
I'm jumping across patches in this patchset so I may have missed something, but I think the ima_filter_rule_match() call should be using the passed "blob" pointer and not the local "lsmdata" right? If this is correct, I think this patch can also remove the local "lsmdata" as well.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 13/23 LSM: Specify which LSM to display
In reply to Casey SchauflerCreate a new entry "display" in the procfs attr directory for controlling which LSM security information is displayed for a process. A process can only read or write its own display value.
The name of an active LSM that supplies hooks for human readable data may be written to "display" to set the value. The name of the LSM currently in use can be read from "display". At this point there can only be one LSM capable of display active. A helper function lsm_task_display() is provided to get the display slot for a task_struct.
Setting the "display" requires that all security modules using setprocattr hooks allow the action. Each security module is responsible for defining its policy.
AppArmor hook provided by John Johansen <[email protected]> SELinux hook provided by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>
--- fs/proc/base.c | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 17 +++ security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h | 3 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 32 +++++ security/security.c | 167 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--- security/selinux/hooks.c | 11 ++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 7 ++ 8 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
fs/proc/base.c +1 -0
@@ -2803,6 +2803,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {ATTR (NULL ,"fscreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"keycreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"sockcreate" ,0666 ), +ATTR (NULL ,"display" ,0666 ), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACKDIR ("smack" ,0555 , proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +17 -0
@@ -1647,4 +1647,21 @@ static inline void security_delete_hooks(struct security_hook_list *hooks,extern int lsm_inode_alloc (struct inode *inode); +/** +* lsm_task_display - the "display" LSM for this task +* @task: The task to report on +* +* Returns the task's display LSM slot. +*/ +static inline int lsm_task_display (struct task_struct *task) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +int *display = task->security; + +if (display) +return *display; +#endif +return LSMBLOB_INVALID ; +} +#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +2 -1
@@ -28,8 +28,9 @@#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10#define AA_CLASS_NET 14#define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16 +#define AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM 17 -#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL +#define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM/* Control parameters settable through module/boot flags */ extern enum audit_mode aa_g_audit;
security/apparmor/lsm.c +32 -0
@@ -612,6 +612,25 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,return error; } + +static int profile_display_lsm (struct aa_profile *profile, +struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ +struct aa_perms perms = { }; +unsigned int state; + + state =PROFILE_MEDIATES (profile,AA_CLASS_DISPLAY_LSM ); +if (state) { +aa_compute_perms (profile->policy.dfa, state, &perms); +aa_apply_modes_to_perms (profile, &perms); +aad (sa)->label = &profile->label; + +return aa_check_perms (profile, &perms,AA_MAY_WRITE , sa,NULL ); + } + +return 0 ; +} +static int apparmor_setprocattr (const char *name,void *value,size_t size) {
@@ -623,6 +642,19 @@ static int apparmor_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value,if (size ==0 )return -EINVAL ; +/* LSM infrastructure does actual setting of display if allowed */ +if (!strcmp (name,"display" )) { +struct aa_profile *profile; +struct aa_label *label; + +aad (&sa)->info ="set display lsm" ; + label =begin_current_label_crit_section (); + error =fn_for_each_confined (label, profile, +profile_display_lsm (profile, &sa)); +end_current_label_crit_section (label); +return error; + } +/* AppArmor requires that the buffer must be null terminated atm */ if (args[size -1 ] !='\0' ) {/* null terminate */
security/security.c +150 -17
266 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/hooks.c +11 -0
@@ -6335,6 +6335,17 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)/* * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all. */ + +/* +* For setting display, we only perform a permission check; +* the actual update to the display value is handled by the +* LSM framework. +*/ +if (!strcmp (name,"display" )) +return avc_has_perm (&selinux_state, + mysid, mysid,SECCLASS_PROCESS2 , +PROCESS2__SETDISPLAY ,NULL ); +if (!strcmp (name,"exec" )) error = avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
security/selinux/include/classmap.h +1 -1
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {"execmem" ,"execstack" ,"execheap" ,"setkeycreate" , "setsockcreate", "getrlimit", NULL } }, {"process2" , - { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", NULL } }, + { "nnp_transition", "nosuid_transition", "setdisplay", NULL } }, {"system" , { "ipc_info", "syslog_read", "syslog_mod", "syslog_console", "module_request", "module_load", NULL } },
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +7 -0
@@ -3494,6 +3494,13 @@ static int smack_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;int rc; +/* +* Allow the /proc/.../attr/current and SO_PEERSEC "display" +* to be reset at will. +*/ +if (strcmp (name,"display" ) ==0 ) +return 0 ; +if (!smack_privileged (CAP_MAC_ADMIN ) &&list_empty (&tsp->smk_relabel))return -EPERM ;
Signature · 6 lines
2.24.1 -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 14/23 LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information about a "security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry in a list that never goes away.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++--- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 ++++- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++-- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++-- include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/net/scm.h | 5 +++- kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++--- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++- security/security.c | 11 ++++---- 15 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +7 -3
@@ -2861,6 +2861,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,int t_debug_id =atomic_inc_return (&binder_last_id);char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_sz =0 ; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ e =binder_transaction_log_add (&binder_transaction_log); e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3163,7 +3164,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->security_ctx =0 ;WARN_ON (1 ); } -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_sz); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); secctx =NULL ; } t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id;
@@ -3496,8 +3498,10 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_alloc_free_buf (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer); err_binder_alloc_buf_failed: err_bad_extra_size: -if (secctx) -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_sz); +if (secctx) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + } err_get_secctx_failed:kfree (tcomplete);binder_stats_deleted (BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE );
fs/ceph/xattr.c +5 -1
@@ -1272,12 +1272,16 @@ int ceph_security_init_secctx(struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode,void ceph_release_acl_sec_ctx (struct ceph_acl_sec_ctx *as_ctx) { +#ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_POSIX_ACL posix_acl_release (as_ctx->acl);posix_acl_release (as_ctx->default_acl);#endif #ifdef CONFIG_CEPH_FS_SECURITY_LABEL -security_release_secctx (as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, as_ctx->sec_ctx, as_ctx->sec_ctxlen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff);#endif if (as_ctx->pagelist)ceph_pagelist_release (as_ctx->pagelist);
fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c +6 -2
@@ -131,8 +131,12 @@ nfs4_label_init_security(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,static inline void nfs4_label_release_security (struct nfs4_label *label) { -if (label) -security_release_secctx (label->label, label->len); +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ + +if (label) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, label->label, label->len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + } }static inline u32 *nfs4_bitmask (struct nfs_server *server,struct nfs4_label *label) {
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +5 -2
@@ -2717,6 +2717,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,int err;struct nfs4_acl *acl =NULL ;#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ void *context =NULL ;int contextlen;#endif
@@ -3228,8 +3229,10 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, out:#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL -if (context) -security_release_secctx (context, contextlen); +if (context) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, context, contextlen,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */ kfree (acl);if (tempfh) {
include/linux/security.h +33 -2
@@ -131,6 +131,37 @@ enum lockdown_reason {extern const char *const lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX +1 ]; +/* +* A "security context" is the text representation of +* the information used by LSMs. +* This structure contains the string, its length, and which LSM +* it is useful for. +*/ +struct lsmcontext { +char *context;/* Provided by the module */ +u32 len; +int slot;/* Identifies the module */ +}; + +/** +* lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure. +* @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize +* @context: Initial context, or NULL +* @size: Size of context, or 0 +* @slot: Which LSM provided the context +* +* Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information. +* This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when +* lsmcontext integration is complete. +*/ +static inline void lsmcontext_init (struct lsmcontext *cp,char *context, +u32 size,int slot) +{ + cp->slot = slot; + cp->context = context; + cp->len = size; +} +/* * Data exported by the security modules *
@@ -526,7 +557,7 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name);int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob); -void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen); +void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);
@@ -1353,7 +1384,7 @@ static inline int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata,return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -static inline void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +static inline void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp) { }
include/net/scm.h +4 -1
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK static inline void scm_passec (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,struct scm_cookie *scm) { +struct lsmcontext context;char *secdata;u32 seclen;int err;
@@ -102,7 +103,9 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scif (!err) {put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +/*scaffolding*/ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); } } }
kernel/audit.c +10 -4
@@ -1193,6 +1193,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)struct audit_sig_info *sig_data;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ err =audit_netlink_ok (skb, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -1450,15 +1451,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh) } sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) {memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); }audit_send_reply (skb, seq,AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO ,0 ,0 , sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + len);
@@ -2130,6 +2134,7 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)unsigned len;int error;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))
@@ -2143,7 +2148,8 @@ int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab) }audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff);return 0 ; error_path:
kernel/auditsc.c +9 -3
@@ -998,6 +998,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;int rc =0 ;
@@ -1015,7 +1016,8 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, rc =1 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }audit_log_format (ab," ocomm=" );
@@ -1228,6 +1230,7 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)static void show_special (struct audit_context *context,int *call_panic) { +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct audit_buffer *ab;int i;
@@ -1261,7 +1264,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic) *call_panic =1 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }if (context->ipc.has_perm) {
@@ -1407,6 +1411,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,char *ctx =NULL ;u32 len;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid);if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) {
@@ -1415,7 +1420,8 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n, *call_panic =2 ; }else {audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -security_release_secctx (ctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +3 -1
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_checksum(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb,static void ip_cmsg_recv_security (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb) { +struct lsmcontext context;struct lsmblob lb;char *secdata;u32 seclen;
@@ -144,7 +145,8 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)return ;put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&context); }static void ip_cmsg_recv_dstaddr (struct msghdr *msg,struct sk_buff *skb)
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +3 -1
@@ -334,6 +334,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)int len, ret;char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context;/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob. * security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module
@@ -354,7 +355,8 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct) ret =0 ; nla_put_failure: -security_release_secctx (secctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ +security_release_secctx (&context); return ret; }#else
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +3 -1
@@ -176,6 +176,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)u32 len;char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len);
@@ -184,7 +185,8 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , secctx); - security_release_secctx(secctx, len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ + security_release_secctx(&context); }#else static inline void ct_show_secctx (struct seq_file *s,const struct nf_conn *ct)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +9 -4
@@ -398,6 +398,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;bool csum_verify; +struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ char *secdata =NULL ;u32 seclen =0 ;
@@ -628,8 +629,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, } nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len; -if (seclen) -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +if (seclen) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return skb; nla_put_failure:
@@ -637,8 +640,10 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,kfree_skb (skb);net_err_ratelimited ("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n" ); nlmsg_failure: -if (seclen) -security_release_secctx (secdata, seclen); +if (seclen) { +lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&scaff); + }return NULL ; }
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +15 -4
@@ -374,6 +374,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct net_device *dev;struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx =NULL ;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -447,7 +448,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , ret_val ==0 ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -478,6 +481,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr4 *entry;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -509,7 +513,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net, security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -546,6 +552,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_addr6 *entry;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -576,7 +583,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net, security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) == 0) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );audit_log_end (audit_buf);
@@ -1095,6 +1103,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,int ret_val = -ENOMEM ;struct netlbl_unlhsh_walk_arg *cb_arg = arg;struct net_device *dev; +struct lsmcontext context;void *data;u32 secid;char *secctx;
@@ -1165,7 +1174,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX , secctx_len, secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +/* scaffolding */ +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_release_secctx (&context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +3 -1
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf; +struct lsmcontext context;char *secctx;u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;
@@ -103,7 +104,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,if (audit_info->secid !=0 &&security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx); -security_release_secctx (secctx, secctx_len); +lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_release_secctx (&context); }return audit_buf;
security/security.c +6 -5
@@ -2227,16 +2227,17 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid); -void security_release_secctx (char *secdata,u32 seclen) +void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp) {struct security_hook_list *hp; -int display =lsm_task_display (current);hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.release_secctx, list) -if (display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) { - hp->hook.release_secctx (secdata, seclen); -return ; +if (cp->slot == hp->lsmid->slot) { + hp->hook.release_secctx (cp->context, cp->len); +break ; } + +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_release_secctx);
Signature · 6 lines
2.24.1 -- Linux-audit mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-audit
Re: [PATCH v20 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser
Quoted 24 lines · Casey Schaufler
Add a new lsmcontext data structure to hold all the information about a "security context", including the string, its size and which LSM allocated the string. The allocation information is necessary because LSMs have different policies regarding the lifecycle of these strings. SELinux allocates and destroys them on each use, whereas Smack provides a pointer to an entry in a list that never goes away.
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++--- fs/ceph/xattr.c | 6 ++++- fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 8 ++++-- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 7 +++-- include/linux/security.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++-- include/net/scm.h | 5 +++- kernel/audit.c | 14 +++++++--- kernel/auditsc.c | 12 ++++++---
Quoted 8 lines
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 4 ++- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 13 ++++++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 19 +++++++++++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 4 ++- security/security.c | 11 ++++---- 15 files changed, 121 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
One small comment below, but otherwise ...
Quoted 8 lines
include/linux/security.h +8
-0+/** +* lsmcontext_init - initialize an lsmcontext structure. +* @cp: Pointer to the context to initialize +* @context: Initial context, or NULL +* @size: Size of context, or 0 +* @slot: Which LSM provided the context +* +* Fill in the lsmcontext from the provided information.
include/linux/security.h enum lockdown_reason { · line 163
Quoted 10 lines
include/linux/security.h +10
-0+* This is a scaffolding function that will be removed when +* lsmcontext integration is complete. +*/ +static inline void lsmcontext_init (struct lsmcontext *cp,char *context, +u32 size,int slot) +{ + cp->slot = slot; + cp->context = context; + cp->len = size; +}
Here is another case where some of the intermediate code, and perhaps some of the final code, can probably be simplified if lsmcontext_init() returns the lsmcontext pointer.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 15/23 LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerReplace the (secctx,seclen) pointer pair with a single lsmcontext pointer to allow return of the LSM identifier along with the context and context length. This allows security_release_secctx() to know how to release the context. Callers have been modified to use or save the returned data from the new structure.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 26 +++++++--------- include/linux/security.h | 4 +-- include/net/scm.h | 10 ++----- kernel/audit.c | 39 +++++++++++------------- kernel/auditsc.c | 31 +++++++------------ net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 7 ++--- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 18 +++++------ net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 7 ++--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 5 +++- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 40 ++++++++----------------- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 7 ++--- security/security.c | 10 +++++-- 12 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 124 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +10 -16
@@ -2859,9 +2859,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_size_t last_fixup_min_off =0 ;struct binder_context *context = proc->context;int t_debug_id =atomic_inc_return (&binder_last_id); -char *secctx =NULL ; -u32 secctx_sz =0 ; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +struct lsmcontext lsmctx = { }; e =binder_transaction_log_add (&binder_transaction_log); e->debug_id = t_debug_id;
@@ -3115,14 +3113,14 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,size_t added_size;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_sz); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx);if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret; return_error_line = __LINE__; goto err_get_secctx_failed; } - added_size =ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); + added_size =ALIGN (lsmctx.len,sizeof (u64)); extra_buffers_size += added_size;if (extra_buffers_size < added_size) {/* integer overflow of extra_buffers_size */
@@ -3149,24 +3147,22 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, t->buffer =NULL ; goto err_binder_alloc_buf_failed; } -if (secctx) { +if (lsmctx.context) {int err;size_t buf_offset =ALIGN (tr->data_size,sizeof (void *)) +ALIGN (tr->offsets_size,sizeof (void *)) +ALIGN (extra_buffers_size,sizeof (void *)) - -ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); +ALIGN (lsmctx.len,sizeof (u64)); t->security_ctx = (uintptr_t )t->buffer->user_data + buf_offset; err =binder_alloc_copy_to_buffer (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer, buf_offset, - secctx, secctx_sz); + lsmctx.context, lsmctx.len);if (err) { t->security_ctx =0 ;WARN_ON (1 ); } -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - secctx =NULL ; +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } t->buffer->debug_id = t->debug_id; t->buffer->transaction = t;
@@ -3222,7 +3218,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc, off_end_offset = off_start_offset + tr->offsets_size; sg_buf_offset =ALIGN (off_end_offset,sizeof (void *)); sg_buf_end_offset = sg_buf_offset + extra_buffers_size - -ALIGN (secctx_sz,sizeof (u64)); +ALIGN (lsmctx.len,sizeof (u64)); off_min =0 ;for (buffer_offset = off_start_offset; buffer_offset < off_end_offset; buffer_offset +=sizeof (binder_size_t)) {
@@ -3498,10 +3494,8 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,binder_alloc_free_buf (&target_proc->alloc, t->buffer); err_binder_alloc_buf_failed: err_bad_extra_size: -if (secctx) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secctx, secctx_sz,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (lsmctx.context) +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); err_get_secctx_failed:kfree (tcomplete);binder_stats_deleted (BINDER_STAT_TRANSACTION_COMPLETE );
include/linux/security.h +2 -2
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1372,7 +1372,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, -char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +struct lsmcontext *cp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/scm.h +3 -7
@@ -93,18 +93,14 @@ static __inline__ int scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,static inline void scm_passec (struct socket *sock,struct msghdr *msg,struct scm_cookie *scm) {struct lsmcontext context; -char *secdata; -u32 seclen;int err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &secdata, - &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context);if (!err) { -put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -/*scaffolding*/ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 ); +put_cmsg (msg,SOL_SOCKET ,SCM_SECURITY , + context.len, context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); } }
kernel/audit.c +17 -22
@@ -1191,9 +1191,6 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)struct audit_buffer *ab;u16 msg_type = nlh->nlmsg_type;struct audit_sig_info *sig_data; -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ err =audit_netlink_ok (skb, msg_type);if (err)
@@ -1441,33 +1438,34 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)kfree (new);break ; } -case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : - len =0 ; +case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO : { +struct lsmcontext context = { }; +int len =0 ; +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, &ctx, - &len); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, + &context);if (err)return err; } - sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + len,GFP_KERNEL ); + sig_data =kmalloc (sizeof (*sig_data) + context.len,GFP_KERNEL );if (!sig_data) { -if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) +security_release_secctx (&context);return -ENOMEM ; } sig_data->uid =from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_sig_uid); sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { -memcpy (sig_data->ctx, ctx, len); -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); + len = context.len; +memcpy (sig_data->ctx, context.context, len); +security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_send_reply (skb, seq,AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO ,0 ,0 , sig_data,sizeof (*sig_data) + len);kfree (sig_data);break ; + }case AUDIT_TTY_GET : {struct audit_tty_status s;unsigned int t;
@@ -2130,26 +2128,23 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -unsigned len;int error;struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ +struct lsmcontext context;security_task_getsecid (current, &blob);if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob))return 0 ; - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len); + error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (error) {if (error != -EINVAL ) goto error_path;return 0 ; } -audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, ctx, len,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); +audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , context.context); +security_release_secctx (&context);return 0 ; error_path:
kernel/auditsc.c +11 -20
@@ -998,9 +998,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid, struct lsmblob *blob, char *comm) { struct audit_buffer *ab; -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt; -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; +struct lsmcontext lsmctx;int rc =0 ; ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_OBJ_PID );
@@ -1011,13 +1009,12 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx)) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ -security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmctx.context); +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } }audit_log_format (ab," ocomm=" );
@@ -1230,7 +1227,6 @@ static void audit_log_fcaps(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct audit_names *name)static void show_special (struct audit_context *context,int *call_panic) { -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct audit_buffer *ab;int i;
@@ -1254,17 +1250,15 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)from_kgid (&init_user_ns, context->ipc.gid), context->ipc.mode);if (osid) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len; +struct lsmcontext lsmcxt;struct lsmblob blob;lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 ); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmcxt.context);security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); } }
@@ -1408,20 +1402,17 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,MAJOR (n->rdev), MINOR(n->rdev));if (n->osid !=0 ) { -char *ctx =NULL ; -u32 len;struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext lsmcxt; +struct lsmcontext lsmctx;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &ctx, &len)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx)) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ; }else { -audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , ctx); -lsmcontext_init (&lsmcxt, ctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ -security_release_secctx (&lsmcxt); +audit_log_format (ab," obj=%s" , lsmctx.context); +security_release_secctx (&lsmctx); } }
net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +2 -5
@@ -132,20 +132,17 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb) {struct lsmcontext context;struct lsmblob lb; -char *secdata; -u32 seclen;int err; err =security_socket_getpeersec_dgram (NULL , skb, &lb);if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &secdata, &seclen); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context);if (err)return ; -put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , seclen, secdata); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secdata, seclen,0 );/* scaffolding */ +put_cmsg (msg,SOL_IP ,SCM_SECURITY , context.len, context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +8 -10
@@ -331,8 +331,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_mark(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,const struct nf_conn *ct) {struct nlattr *nest_secctx; -int len, ret; -char *secctx; +int ret;struct lsmblob blob;struct lsmcontext context;
@@ -340,7 +339,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module * to use to create the secctx. */ lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -349,13 +348,12 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)if (!nest_secctx) goto nla_put_failure; -if (nla_put_string (skb,CTA_SECCTX_NAME , secctx)) +if (nla_put_string (skb,CTA_SECCTX_NAME , context.context)) goto nla_put_failure;nla_nest_end (skb, nest_secctx); ret =0 ; nla_put_failure: -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ security_release_secctx (&context);return ret; }
@@ -655,15 +653,15 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)#ifdef CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK int len, ret;struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context; -/* lsmblob_init() puts ct->secmark into all of the secids in blob. -* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module -* to use to create the secctx. */ -lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob,NULL , &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return 0 ; + len = context.len; +security_release_secctx (&context); +return nla_total_size (0 )/* CTA_SECCTX */ +nla_total_size (sizeof (char ) * len);/* CTA_SECCTX_NAME */ #else
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +2 -5
@@ -173,19 +173,16 @@ static void ct_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)static void ct_show_secctx (struct seq_file *s,const struct nf_conn *ct) {int ret; -u32 len; -char *secctx;struct lsmblob blob;struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &len); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret)return ; -seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , secctx); +seq_printf (s,"secctx=%s " , context.context); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, len,0 );/* scaffolding */ security_release_secctx (&context); }#else
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +4 -1
@@ -306,6 +306,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK )struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmcontext context = { };if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;
@@ -317,10 +318,12 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security * module to use to create the secctx. */ lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); - security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, secdata, &seclen); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + *secdata = context.context; }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); + seclen = context.len;#endif return seclen; }
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +12 -28
@@ -375,8 +375,6 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,struct netlbl_unlhsh_iface *iface;struct audit_buffer *audit_buf =NULL ;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx =NULL ; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob; if (addr_len != sizeof(struct in_addr) &&
@@ -444,12 +442,9 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module * to use to create the secctx. */ lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, - &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , ret_val ==0 ?1 :0 );
@@ -482,8 +477,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -510,11 +503,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,if (entry !=NULL )lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );
@@ -553,8 +544,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct net_device *dev;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;spin_lock (&netlbl_unlhsh_lock);
@@ -580,10 +569,9 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,if (entry !=NULL )lsmblob_init (&blob, entry->secid);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, - &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , secctx); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }audit_log_format (audit_buf," res=%u" , entry !=NULL ?1 :0 );
@@ -1106,8 +1094,6 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,struct lsmcontext context;void *data;u32 secid; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob; data = genlmsg_put(cb_arg->skb, NETLINK_CB(cb_arg->nl_cb->skb).portid,
@@ -1167,15 +1153,13 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd,* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module * to use to create the secctx. */ lsmblob_init (&blob, secid); - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val =nla_put (cb_arg->skb,NLBL_UNLABEL_A_SECCTX , - secctx_len, - secctx); -/* scaffolding */ -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 ); + context.len, + context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +2 -5
@@ -85,8 +85,6 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf;struct lsmcontext context; -char *secctx; -u32 secctx_len;struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )
@@ -102,9 +100,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid);if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &secctx, &secctx_len) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , secctx); -lsmcontext_init (&context, secctx, secctx_len,0 );/*scaffolding*/ +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { +audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context); }
security/security.c +7 -3
@@ -2191,18 +2191,22 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,char **secdata,u32 *seclen) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp) {struct security_hook_list *hp;int display =lsm_task_display (current); +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ; -if (display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) +if (display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID || display == hp->lsmid->slot) { + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot;return hp->hook.secid_to_secctx ( blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], - secdata, seclen); + &cp->context, &cp->len); + } }return LSM_RET_DEFAULT (secid_to_secctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 16/23 LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange the security_inode_getsecctx() interface to fill a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers. This provides the information about which LSM created the context so that security_release_secctx() can use the correct hook.
--- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++-------------- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c +9 -14
@@ -2600,11 +2600,11 @@ nfsd4_encode_layout_types(struct xdr_stream *xdr, u32 layout_types)#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL static inline __be32 nfsd4_encode_security_label (struct xdr_stream *xdr,struct svc_rqst *rqstp, -void *context,int len) +struct lsmcontext *context) {__be32 *p; - p =xdr_reserve_space (xdr, len +4 +4 +4 ); + p =xdr_reserve_space (xdr, context->len +4 +4 +4 );if (!p)return nfserr_resource;
@@ -2614,13 +2614,13 @@ nfsd4_encode_security_label(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_rqst *rqstp,*/ *p++ =cpu_to_be32 (0 );/* lfs */ *p++ =cpu_to_be32 (0 );/* pi */ - p =xdr_encode_opaque (p, context, len); + p =xdr_encode_opaque (p, context->context, context->len); return 0; }#else static inline __be32 nfsd4_encode_security_label (struct xdr_stream *xdr,struct svc_rqst *rqstp, -void *context,int len) +struct lsmcontext *context) {return 0 ; }#endif
@@ -2717,9 +2717,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,int err;struct nfs4_acl *acl =NULL ;#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ -void *context =NULL ; -int contextlen; +struct lsmcontext context = { };#endif bool contextsupport = false;struct nfsd4_compoundres *resp = rqstp->rq_resp;
@@ -2777,7 +2775,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, bmval0 & FATTR4_WORD0_SUPPORTED_ATTRS) {if (exp->ex_flags &NFSEXP_SECURITY_LABEL ) err =security_inode_getsecctx (d_inode (dentry), - &context, &contextlen); + &context);else err = -EOPNOTSUPP ; contextsupport = (err ==0 );
@@ -3207,8 +3205,7 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp,#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL if (bmval2 &FATTR4_WORD2_SECURITY_LABEL ) { - status =nfsd4_encode_security_label (xdr, rqstp, context, - contextlen); + status =nfsd4_encode_security_label (xdr, rqstp, &context);if (status) goto out; }
@@ -3229,10 +3226,8 @@ nfsd4_encode_fattr(struct xdr_stream *xdr, struct svc_fh *fhp, out:#ifdef CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL -if (context) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, context, contextlen,0 );/*scaffolding*/ -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (context.context) +security_release_secctx (&context);#endif /* CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL */ kfree (acl);if (tempfh) {
include/linux/security.h +3 -2
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ void security_release_secctx(struct lsmcontext *cp);void security_inode_invalidate_secctx (struct inode *inode);int security_inode_notifysecctx (struct inode *inode,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen);int security_inode_setsecctx (struct dentry *dentry,void *ctx,u32 ctxlen); -int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen); +int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsmcontext *cp);int security_locked_down (enum lockdown_reason what);#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
@@ -1400,7 +1400,8 @@ static inline int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; } -static inline int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +static inline int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode, +struct lsmcontext *cp) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
security/security.c +11 -2
@@ -2263,9 +2263,18 @@ int security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_setsecctx); -int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,void **ctx,u32 *ctxlen) +int security_inode_getsecctx (struct inode *inode,struct lsmcontext *cp) { -return call_int_hook (inode_getsecctx, -EOPNOTSUPP , inode, ctx, ctxlen); +struct security_hook_list *hp; + +memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.inode_getsecctx, list) { + cp->slot = hp->lsmid->slot; +return hp->hook.inode_getsecctx (inode, (void **)&cp->context, + &cp->len); + } +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_inode_getsecctx);
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v20 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx
Quoted 7 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change the
security_inode_getsecctx()interface to fill a lsmcontext structure instead of data and length pointers. This provides the information about which LSM created the context so thatsecurity_release_secctx()can use the correct hook.
Quoted 7 lines
Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- fs/nfsd/nfs4xdr.c | 23 +++++++++-------------- include/linux/security.h | 5 +++-- security/security.c | 13 +++++++++++-- 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 17/23 LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
In reply to Casey SchauflerChange netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext pointers, and remove scaffolding.
--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 31 ++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +12 -19
@@ -301,12 +301,10 @@ static int nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)return -1 ; } -static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,char **secdata) +static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (struct sk_buff *skb,struct lsmcontext *context) { -u32 seclen =0 ;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK )struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext context = { };if (!skb || !sk_fullsock (skb->sk))return 0 ;
@@ -318,14 +316,14 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, char **secdata)* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security * module to use to create the secctx. */ lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); - *secdata = context.context; + security_secid_to_secctx(&blob, context); }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock); - seclen = context.len; +return context->len; +#else +return 0 ;#endif -return seclen; }static u32 nfqnl_get_bridge_size (struct nf_queue_entry *entry)
@@ -401,8 +399,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;bool csum_verify; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ -char *secdata =NULL ; +struct lsmcontext context = { };u32 seclen =0 ; size =nlmsg_total_size (sizeof (struct nfgenmsg ))
@@ -469,7 +466,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, }if ((queue->flags &NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX ) && entskb->sk) { - seclen =nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &secdata); + seclen =nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &context);if (seclen) size +=nla_total_size (seclen); }
@@ -604,7 +601,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, nfqnl_put_sk_uidgid(skb, entskb->sk) < 0) goto nla_put_failure; -if (seclen &&nla_put (skb,NFQA_SECCTX , seclen, secdata)) +if (seclen &&nla_put (skb,NFQA_SECCTX , context.len, context.context)) goto nla_put_failure;if (ct && nfnl_ct->build (skb, ct, ctinfo,NFQA_CT ,NFQA_CT_INFO ) <0 )
@@ -632,10 +629,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, } nlh->nlmsg_len = skb->len; -if (seclen) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (seclen) +security_release_secctx (&context);return skb; nla_put_failure:
@@ -643,10 +638,8 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,kfree_skb (skb);net_err_ratelimited ("nf_queue: error creating packet message\n" ); nlmsg_failure: -if (seclen) { -lsmcontext_init (&scaff, secdata, seclen,0 ); -security_release_secctx (&scaff); - } +if (seclen) +security_release_secctx (&context);return NULL ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
Quoted 12 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext pointers, and remove scaffolding.
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 31 ++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
...
Quoted 15 lines
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +1
-2@@ -401,8 +399,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;bool csum_verify; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ -char *secdata =NULL ; +struct lsmcontext context = { };u32 seclen =0 ; size =nlmsg_total_size (sizeof (struct nfgenmsg ))
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, · line 472
Quoted 8 lines
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +1
-1@@ -469,7 +466,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, }if ((queue->flags &NFQA_CFG_F_SECCTX ) && entskb->sk) { - seclen =nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &secdata); + seclen =nfqnl_get_sk_secctx (entskb, &context);if (seclen) size +=nla_total_size (seclen); }
I think we can get rid of the local "seclen" variable, right? We can embed the nfqnl_get_sk_secctx() in the conditional and then simply reference "context.len" everywhere else, yes? For example:
if (nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(..., &context))
size += nla_total_size(context.len);Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter
In reply to Casey SchauflerQuoted 12 lines · Casey Schaufler
Change netlink netfilter interfaces to use lsmcontext pointers, and remove scaffolding.
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 31 ++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
[...]
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue, · line 403
Quoted 9 lines
static u32
nfqnl_get_bridge_size(struct nf_queue_entry *entry)net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +1
-2@@ -401,8 +399,7 @@ nfqnl_build_packet_message(struct net *net, struct nfqnl_instance *queue,enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;bool csum_verify; -struct lsmcontext scaff;/* scaffolding */ -char *secdata =NULL ; +struct lsmcontext context = { };u32 seclen =0 ;
While at it, please introduce reverse xmas tree in variable definitions incrementally:
struct lsmcontext context = { }; enum ip_conntrack_info ctinfo;
struct nfnl_ct_hook *nfnl_ct;
bool csum_verify;
u32 seclen = 0;
And Cc: [email protected] for patches that update the Netfilter codebase.
Thanks.
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 18/23 NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
In reply to Casey SchauflerNetlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and the internal storage is used to pass information between these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the correct secid when using netlabel.
--- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +-- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 27 ++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 79 +++++++++-------------------- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +- security/smack/smack.h | 1 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +- security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 ++-- 12 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
include/net/netlabel.h +4 -4
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap {* @attr.mls: MLS sensitivity label * @attr.mls.cat: MLS category bitmap * @attr.mls.lvl: MLS sensitivity level -* @attr.secid: LSM specific secid token +* @attr.lsmblob: LSM specific data * * Description: * This structure is used to pass security attributes between NetLabel and the
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr {struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cat;u32 lvl; } mls; -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob lsmblob; } attr; };
@@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info); int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(struct net *net, const char *dev_name,
@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ static inline int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { return -ENOSYS;
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c +17 -10
@@ -106,15 +106,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag). * Tag definition (may change between kernel versions) * -* 0 8 16 24 32 -* +----------+----------+----------+----------+ -* | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value | -* +----------+----------+----------+----------+ -* | in (host byte order)| -* +----------+----------+ -* +* 0 8 16 16 + sizeof(struct lsmblob) +* +----------+----------+---------------------+ +* | 10000000 | 00000110 | LSM blob data | +* +----------+----------+---------------------+ +* +* All secid and flag fields are in host byte order. +* The lsmblob structure size varies depending on which +* Linux security modules are built in the kernel. +* The data is opaque. */ -#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6 +#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsmblob))/* * Helper Functions
@@ -1469,7 +1471,12 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, buffer[0 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL ; buffer[1 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; - *(u32 *)&buffer[2 ] = secattr->attr.secid; +/* Ensure that there is sufficient space in the CIPSO header +* for the LSM data. This should never become an issue. +* The check is made from an abundance of caution. */ +BUILD_BUG_ON (CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN >CIPSO_V4_OPT_LEN_MAX ); +memcpy (&buffer[2 ], &secattr->attr.lsmblob, +sizeof (secattr->attr.lsmblob));return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; }
@@ -1489,7 +1496,7 @@ static int cipso_v4_parsetag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def,const unsigned char *tag, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr) { - secattr->attr.secid = *(u32 *)&tag[2]; + memcpy(&secattr->attr.lsmblob, &tag[2], sizeof(secattr->attr.lsmblob)); secattr->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;return 0 ;
net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c +3 -3
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(const char *domain,* @addr: IP address in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr) * @mask: address mask in network byte order (struct in[6]_addr) * @family: address family -* @secid: LSM secid value for the entry +* @lsmblob: LSM data value for the entry * @audit_info: NetLabel audit information * * Description:
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u16 family, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { u32 addr_len;
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(struct net *net,return netlbl_unlhsh_add (net, dev_name, addr, mask, addr_len, - secid, audit_info); + lsmblob, audit_info); }/**
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +24 -55
227 lines not on this page · raw message
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h +1 -1
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net,const void *addr, const void *mask, u32 addr_len, - u32 secid, + struct lsmblob *lsmblob, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info); int netlbl_unlhsh_remove(struct net *net, const char *dev_name,
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -1
@@ -6945,7 +6945,7 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event) }#endif -static struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { +struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lsm ="selinux" , .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
security/selinux/include/security.h +1 -0
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@struct netlbl_lsm_secattr ;extern int selinux_enabled_boot; +extern struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid;/* Policy capabilities */ enum {
security/selinux/netlabel.c +1 -1
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr(return NULL ;if ((secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) && - (secattr->attr.secid == sid)) + (secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] == sid))return secattr;return NULL ;
security/selinux/ss/services.c +2 -2
@@ -3637,7 +3637,7 @@ int security_netlbl_secattr_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_CACHE ) *sid = *(u32 *)secattr->cache->data;else if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ) - *sid = secattr->attr.secid; + *sid = secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot];else if (secattr->flags &NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL ) { rc = -EIDRM ; ctx =sidtab_search (sidtab,SECINITSID_NETMSG );
@@ -3710,7 +3710,7 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state,if (secattr->domain ==NULL ) goto out; - secattr->attr.secid = sid; + secattr->attr.lsmblob.secid[selinux_lsmid.slot] = sid; secattr->flags |=NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN_CPY |NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID ;mls_export_netlbl_lvl (policydb, ctx, secattr); rc =mls_export_netlbl_cat (policydb, ctx, secattr);
security/smack/smack.h +1 -0
@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);* Shared data. */ extern int smack_enabled; +extern struct lsm_id smack_lsmid;extern int smack_cipso_direct;extern int smack_cipso_mapped;extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +3 -2
@@ -3751,7 +3751,8 @@ static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,/* * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid. */ -return smack_from_secid (sap->attr.secid); +return smack_from_secid ( + sap->attr.lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot]);/* * Without guidance regarding the smack value * for the packet fall back on the network
@@ -4656,7 +4657,7 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct socket_smack), }; -static struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { +struct lsm_id smack_lsmid __lsm_ro_after_init = { .lsm ="smack" , .slot =LSMBLOB_NEEDED };
security/smack/smackfs.c +7 -3
@@ -1136,6 +1136,7 @@ static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr (struct file *file,const char __user *buf,size_t count,loff_t *ppos) { +struct lsmblob lsmblob;struct smk_net4addr *snp;struct sockaddr_in newname;char *smack;
@@ -1267,10 +1268,13 @@ static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,* this host so that incoming packets get labeled. * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option */ -if (rc ==0 && skp !=NULL ) +if (rc ==0 && skp !=NULL ) { +lsmblob_init (&lsmblob,0 ); + lsmblob.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = snp->smk_label->smk_secid; rc =netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add (&init_net,NULL , - &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,PF_INET , - snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info); + &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,PF_INET , &lsmblob, + &audit_info); + }if (rc ==0 ) rc = count;
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v20 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob
Quoted 14 lines · Casey Schaufler
Netlabel uses LSM interfaces requiring an lsmblob and the internal storage is used to pass information between these interfaces, so change the internal data from a secid to a lsmblob. Update the netlabel interfaces and their callers to accommodate the change. This requires that the modules using netlabel use the lsm_id.slot to access the correct secid when using netlabel.
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Reviewed-by John Johansen <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Quoted 14 lines
--- include/net/netlabel.h | 8 +-- net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c | 27 ++++++---- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 6 +-- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 79 +++++++++-------------------- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.h | 2 +- security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- security/selinux/include/security.h | 1 + security/selinux/netlabel.c | 2 +- security/selinux/ss/services.c | 4 +- security/smack/smack.h | 1 + security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 5 +- security/smack/smackfs.c | 10 ++-- 12 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 82 deletions(-)
Minor change suggested to a comment below, but looks good otherwise.
Quoted 31 lines
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c +10
-8@@ -106,15 +106,17 @@ int cipso_v4_rbm_strictvalid = 1;/* Base length of the local tag (non-standard tag). * Tag definition (may change between kernel versions) * -* 0 8 16 24 32 -* +----------+----------+----------+----------+ -* | 10000000 | 00000110 | 32-bit secid value | -* +----------+----------+----------+----------+ -* | in (host byte order)| -* +----------+----------+ -* +* 0 8 16 16 + sizeof(struct lsmblob) +* +----------+----------+---------------------+ +* | 10000000 | 00000110 | LSM blob data | +* +----------+----------+---------------------+ +* +* All secid and flag fields are in host byte order. +* The lsmblob structure size varies depending on which +* Linux security modules are built in the kernel. +* The data is opaque. */ -#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN 6 +#define CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN (2 + sizeof(struct lsmblob))/* * Helper Functions
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, · line 1477
Quoted 8 lines
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c +4
-1@@ -1469,7 +1471,12 @@ static int cipso_v4_gentag_loc(const struct cipso_v4_doi *doi_def, buffer[0 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL ; buffer[1 ] =CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; - *(u32 *)&buffer[2 ] = secattr->attr.secid; +/* Ensure that there is sufficient space in the CIPSO header +* for the LSM data. This should never become an issue. +* The check is made from an abundance of caution. */ +BUILD_BUG_ON (CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN >CIPSO_V4_OPT_LEN_MAX );
I like the BUILD_BUG_ON() check, but for reasons very similar to the unix_skb_params changes I don't really like the "should never become an issue" commentary. Granted, it is unlikely, but I don't think it is wise to thumb our nose at fate.
Quoted 5 lines
net/ipv4/cipso_ipv4.c +2
-0+memcpy (&buffer[2 ], &secattr->attr.lsmblob, +sizeof (secattr->attr.lsmblob));return CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOC_BLEN ; }
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 19/23 LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
In reply to Casey SchauflerVerify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction use the same "display" security module. This prevents confusion of security "contexts".
--- security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
security/security.c +29 -0
@@ -788,9 +788,38 @@ int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)return call_int_hook (binder_set_context_mgr,0 , mgr); } +/** +* security_binder_transaction - Binder driver transaction check +* @from: source of the transaction +* @to: destination of the transaction +* +* Verify that the tasks have the same LSM "display", then +* call the security module hooks. +* +* Returns -EINVAL if the displays don't match, or the +* result of the security module checks. +*/ int security_binder_transaction (struct task_struct *from,struct task_struct *to) { +int from_display =lsm_task_display (from); +int to_display =lsm_task_display (to); + +/* +* If the display is LSMBLOB_INVALID the first module that has +* an entry is used. This will be in the 0 slot. +* +* This is currently only required if the server has requested +* peer contexts, but it would be unwieldly to have too much of +* the binder driver detail here. +*/ +if (from_display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID ) + from_display =0 ; +if (to_display ==LSMBLOB_INVALID ) + to_display =0 ; +if (from_display != to_display) +return -EINVAL ; +return call_int_hook (binder_transaction,0 , from, to); }
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Re: [PATCH v20 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
Verify that the tasks on the ends of a binder transaction use the same "display" security module. This prevents confusion of security "contexts".
Reviewed-by Kees Cook <[email protected]>Acked-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- security/security.c | 29 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+)
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 20/23 Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes
In reply to Casey SchauflerCreate a new audit record type to contain the subject information when there are multiple security modules that require such data. This record is linked with the same timestamp and serial number. The record is produced only in cases where there is more than one security module with a process "context".
Before this change the only audit events that required multiple records were syscall events. Several non-syscall events include subject contexts, so the use of audit_context data has been expanded as necessary.
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 13 +++- include/linux/security.h | 18 ++++- include/net/netlabel.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 3 +- include/net/xfrm.h | 4 +- include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++------- kernel/auditfilter.c | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 16 ++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 12 ++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 73 +++++++++++++++----- security/smack/smackfs.c | 3 +- 20 files changed, 259 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-)
drivers/android/binder.c +1 -1
@@ -3113,7 +3113,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,size_t added_size;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;
include/linux/audit.h +11 -2
@@ -186,7 +186,9 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation);extern void audit_log_lost (const char *message); -extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab); +extern void audit_log_lsm (struct lsmblob *blob,bool exiting); +extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab, +struct lsmblob *blob);extern void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );
@@ -246,7 +248,10 @@ static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key) { }static inline void audit_log_path_denied (int type,const char *operation) { } -static inline int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) +static inline void audit_log_lsm (struct lsmblob *blob,bool exiting) +{ } +static inline int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab, +struct lsmblob *blob); {return 0 ; }
@@ -305,6 +310,7 @@ extern void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code);extern void audit_seccomp_actions_logged (const char *names,const char *old_names,int res);extern void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t); +extern void audit_stamp_context (struct audit_context *ctx);static inline void audit_set_context (struct task_struct *task,struct audit_context *ctx) {
@@ -682,6 +688,9 @@ static inline void audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)static inline void audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) { } +static inline void audit_stamp_context (struct audit_context *ctx) +{ } +static inline void audit_log_nfcfg (const char *name,u8 af,unsigned int nentries,enum audit_nfcfgop op,gfp_t gfp)
include/linux/security.h +16 -2
@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ struct lsmblob {#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1/* Not a valid LSM slot number */ #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */ +#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4/* Use the "display" slot */ +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5/* Use the default "display" slot */ /** * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure.
@@ -242,6 +244,17 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)return 0 ; } +const char *security_lsm_slot_name (int slot); + +static inline bool lsm_multiple_contexts (void ) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +return security_lsm_slot_name (1 ) !=NULL ; +#else +return false; +#endif +} +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);
@@ -554,7 +567,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp, +int display);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);
@@ -1372,7 +1386,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, -struct lsmcontext *cp) +struct lsmcontext *cp,int display) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }
include/net/netlabel.h +1 -1
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ struct calipso_doi;/* NetLabel audit information */ struct netlbl_audit { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob lsmdata;kuid_t loginuid;unsigned int sessionid; };
include/net/scm.h +2 -1
@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (!err) { put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,
include/net/xfrm.h +3 -1
@@ -675,11 +675,13 @@ static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(const char *op)if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); audit_buf =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT );if (audit_buf ==NULL )return NULL ;audit_log_format (audit_buf,"op=%s" , op); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , false);return audit_buf; }
@@ -693,7 +695,7 @@ static inline void xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(bool task_valid,AUDIT_SID_UNSET ;audit_log_format (audit_buf," auid=%u ses=%u" , auid, ses); -audit_log_task_context (audit_buf); +audit_log_task_context (audit_buf,NULL ); }void xfrm_audit_policy_add (struct xfrm_policy *xp,int result,bool task_valid);
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1 -0
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417/* NetLabel: del a static label */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418/* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419/* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */ +#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420/* Multiple LSM contexts */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
kernel/audit.c +66 -23
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kernel/auditfilter.c +1 -1
@@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int reif (!ab)return ;audit_log_session_info (ab); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );audit_log_format (ab," op=%s" , action);audit_log_key (ab, rule->filterkey);audit_log_format (ab," list=%d res=%d" , rule->listnr, res);
kernel/auditsc.c +80 -7
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net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1 -1
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (err)return ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2 -2
@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module * to use to create the secctx. */ lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;
@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmblob blob;struct lsmcontext context; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;
net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +1 -1
@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return ;
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +1 -1
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security * module to use to create the secctx. */ lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY ); }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);
net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +8 -8
@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -492,7 +493,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -552,7 +554,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);
@@ -1122,7 +1125,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,
@@ -1521,14 +1524,11 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)int ret_val;struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;struct netlbl_audit audit_info; -struct lsmblob blob;/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */ - audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info.lsmdata); audit_info.loginuid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ; audit_info.sessionid =0 ;
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +4 -8
@@ -84,12 +84,12 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf; -struct lsmcontext context; -struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); + audit_buf =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC , type);if (audit_buf ==NULL )return NULL ;
@@ -98,12 +98,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid), audit_info->sessionid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid); -if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , context.context); -security_release_secctx (&context); - } +audit_log_task_context (audit_buf, &audit_info->lsmdata); +audit_log_lsm (&audit_info->lsmdata, false);return audit_buf; }
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +1 -5
@@ -34,11 +34,7 @@static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo (struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { -struct lsmblob blob; - -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until secid is converted */ - audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info->lsmdata); audit_info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); audit_info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); }
security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +1 -1
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,from_kuid (&init_user_ns,current_cred ()->uid),from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );audit_log_format (ab," op=%s cause=%s comm=" , op, cause);audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (name, current));if (fname) {
security/security.c +56 -17
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security/smack/smackfs.c +2 -1
@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap) nap->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); nap->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); - nap->secid = skp->smk_secid; +lsmblob_init (&nap->lsmdata,0 ); + nap->lsmdata.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = skp->smk_secid; }/*
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
James Morris
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes
Quoted 6 lines · Casey Schaufler
Create a new audit record type to contain the subject information when there are multiple security modules that require such data. This record is linked with the same timestamp and serial number. The record is produced only in cases where there is more than one security module with a process "context".
Quoted 7 lines
Before this change the only audit events that required multiple records were syscall events. Several non-syscall events include subject contexts, so the use of
audit_contextdata has been expanded as necessary.Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>
Paul, can you review/ack the audit changes?
Quoted 904 lines
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 13 +++- include/linux/security.h | 18 ++++- include/net/netlabel.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 3 +- include/net/xfrm.h | 4 +- include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++------- kernel/auditfilter.c | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 16 ++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 12 ++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 73 +++++++++++++++----- security/smack/smackfs.c | 3 +- 20 files changed, 259 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-)drivers/android/binder.c +1
-1@@ -3113,7 +3113,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,size_t added_size;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;include/linux/audit.h +11
-2@@ -186,7 +186,9 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation);extern void audit_log_lost (const char *message); -extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab); +extern void audit_log_lsm (struct lsmblob *blob,bool exiting); +extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab, +struct lsmblob *blob);extern void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );@@ -246,7 +248,10 @@ static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key) { }static inline void audit_log_path_denied (int type,const char *operation) { } -static inline int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) +static inline void audit_log_lsm (struct lsmblob *blob,bool exiting) +{ } +static inline int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab, +struct lsmblob *blob); {return 0 ; }@@ -305,6 +310,7 @@ extern void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code);extern void audit_seccomp_actions_logged (const char *names,const char *old_names,int res);extern void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t); +extern void audit_stamp_context (struct audit_context *ctx);static inline void audit_set_context (struct task_struct *task,struct audit_context *ctx) {@@ -682,6 +688,9 @@ static inline void audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)static inline void audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) { } +static inline void audit_stamp_context (struct audit_context *ctx) +{ } +static inline void audit_log_nfcfg (const char *name,u8 af,unsigned int nentries,enum audit_nfcfgop op,gfp_t gfp)include/linux/security.h +16
-2@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ struct lsmblob {#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1/* Not a valid LSM slot number */ #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */ +#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4/* Use the "display" slot */ +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5/* Use the default "display" slot */ /** * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure. @@ -242,6 +244,17 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)return 0 ; } +const char *security_lsm_slot_name (int slot); + +static inline bool lsm_multiple_contexts (void ) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +return security_lsm_slot_name (1 ) !=NULL ; +#else +return false; +#endif +} +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);@@ -554,7 +567,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp, +int display);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);@@ -1372,7 +1386,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, -struct lsmcontext *cp) +struct lsmcontext *cp,int display) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }include/net/netlabel.h +1
-1@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ struct calipso_doi;/* NetLabel audit information */ struct netlbl_audit { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob lsmdata;kuid_t loginuid;unsigned int sessionid; };include/net/scm.h +2
-1@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (!err) { put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,include/net/xfrm.h +3
-1@@ -675,11 +675,13 @@ static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(const char *op)if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); audit_buf =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT );if (audit_buf ==NULL )return NULL ;audit_log_format (audit_buf,"op=%s" , op); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , false);return audit_buf; }@@ -693,7 +695,7 @@ static inline void xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(bool task_valid,AUDIT_SID_UNSET ;audit_log_format (audit_buf," auid=%u ses=%u" , auid, ses); -audit_log_task_context (audit_buf); +audit_log_task_context (audit_buf,NULL ); }void xfrm_audit_policy_add (struct xfrm_policy *xp,int result,bool task_valid);include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1
-0@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417/* NetLabel: del a static label */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418/* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419/* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */ +#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420/* Multiple LSM contexts */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799kernel/audit.c +66
-23@@ -394,10 +394,11 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32 old,return rc;audit_log_format (ab,"op=set %s=%u old=%u " , function_name, new, old);audit_log_session_info (ab); - rc =audit_log_task_context (ab); + rc =audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );if (rc) allow_changes =0 ;/* Something weird, deny request */ audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , allow_changes); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , false);audit_log_end (ab);return rc; }@@ -1070,13 +1071,31 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_context *context,return ;audit_log_format (*ab,"pid=%d uid=%u " , pid, uid);audit_log_session_info (*ab); -audit_log_task_context (*ab); +audit_log_task_context (*ab,NULL ); }static inline void audit_log_user_recv_msg (struct audit_buffer **ab,u16 msg_type) { -audit_log_common_recv_msg (NULL , ab, msg_type); +struct audit_context *context; + +if (!lsm_multiple_contexts ()) { +audit_log_common_recv_msg (NULL , ab, msg_type); +return ; + } + + context =audit_context (); +if (context) { +if (!context->in_syscall) +audit_stamp_context (context); +audit_log_common_recv_msg (context, ab, msg_type); +return ; + } + +audit_alloc (current); + context =audit_context (); + +audit_log_common_recv_msg (context, ab, msg_type); }int is_audit_feature_set (int i)@@ -1372,6 +1391,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)audit_log_n_untrustedstring (ab, str, data_len); }audit_log_end (ab); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , false); }break ;case AUDIT_ADD_RULE :@@ -1444,7 +1464,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, - &context); + &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (err)return err; }@@ -1572,7 +1592,7 @@ static void audit_log_multicast(int group, const char *op, int err) tty ?tty_name (tty) :"(none)" , audit_get_sessionid(current));audit_put_tty (tty); -audit_log_task_context (ab);/* subj= */ +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );/* subj= */ audit_log_format (ab," comm=" );audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current));audit_log_d_path_exe (ab, current->mm);/* exe= */ @@ -1869,6 +1889,10 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, }audit_get_stamp (ab->ctx, &t, &serial); +if (type ==AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS && ab->ctx->serial ==0 ) { +audit_stamp_context (ab->ctx); +audit_get_stamp (ab->ctx, &t, &serial); + }audit_log_format (ab,"audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): " , (unsigned long long )t.tv_sec, t.tv_nsec/1000000 , serial);@@ -2126,30 +2150,47 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)audit_log_format (ab,"(null)" ); } -int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) +int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab,struct lsmblob *blob) { +int i;int error; -struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext context; +struct lsmblob localblob; +struct lsmcontext lsmdata; -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob)) +/* +* If there is more than one security module that has a +* subject "context" it's necessary to put the subject data +* into a separate record to maintain compatibility. +*/ +if (lsm_multiple_contexts ()) { +audit_log_format (ab," subj=?" );return 0 ; + } - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); -if (error) { -if (error != -EINVAL ) - goto error_path; -return 0 ; +if (blob ==NULL ) { +security_task_getsecid (current, &localblob); +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&localblob)) { +audit_log_format (ab," subj=?" ); +return 0 ; + } + blob = &localblob; } -audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , context.context); -security_release_secctx (&context); -return 0 ; +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { +if (blob->secid[i] ==0 ) +continue ; + error =security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmdata, i); +if (error && error != -EINVAL ) { +audit_panic ("error in audit_log_task_context" ); +return error; + } -error_path: -audit_panic ("error in audit_log_task_context" ); -return error; +audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , lsmdata.context); +security_release_secctx (&lsmdata); +break ; + } + +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_log_task_context);@@ -2221,7 +2262,7 @@ void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)audit_log_format (ab," comm=" );audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current));audit_log_d_path_exe (ab, current->mm); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_log_task_info);@@ -2279,6 +2320,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,if (!audit_enabled)return ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); ab =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_LOGIN );if (!ab)return ;@@ -2289,11 +2331,12 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, tty =audit_get_tty ();audit_log_format (ab,"pid=%d uid=%u" ,task_tgid_nr (current), uid); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );audit_log_format (ab," old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d" , oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ?tty_name (tty) :"(none)" , oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);audit_put_tty (tty); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , true);audit_log_end (ab); }kernel/auditfilter.c +1
-1@@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int reif (!ab)return ;audit_log_session_info (ab); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );audit_log_format (ab," op=%s" , action);audit_log_key (ab, rule->filterkey);audit_log_format (ab," list=%d res=%d" , rule->listnr, res);kernel/auditsc.c +80
-7@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, {const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ; -struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmblob blob = { };unsigned int sessionid; cred =rcu_dereference_check (tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);@@ -962,10 +962,12 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)return 0 ;/* Return if not auditing. */ state =audit_filter_task (tsk, &key); -if (state ==AUDIT_DISABLED ) { +if (!lsm_multiple_contexts () && state ==AUDIT_DISABLED ) {clear_tsk_thread_flag (tsk,TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT );return 0 ; } +if (state ==AUDIT_DISABLED ) +clear_tsk_thread_flag (tsk,TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT );if (!(context =audit_alloc_context (state))) {kfree (key);@@ -1009,7 +1011,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {@@ -1254,7 +1256,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)struct lsmblob blob;lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt, +LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else {@@ -1406,7 +1409,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,struct lsmcontext lsmctx;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ;@@ -1483,6 +1486,52 @@ static void audit_log_proctitle(void)audit_log_end (ab); } +void audit_log_lsm (struct lsmblob *blob,bool exiting) +{ +struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsmcontext lsmdata; +struct audit_buffer *ab; +struct lsmblob localblob; +bool sep = false; +int error; +int i; + +if (!lsm_multiple_contexts ()) +return ; + +if (context && context->in_syscall && !exiting) +return ; + + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS ); +if (!ab) +return ;/* audit_panic or being filtered */ + +if (blob ==NULL ) { +security_task_getsecid (current, &localblob); +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&localblob)) +return ; + blob = &localblob; + } + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { +if (blob->secid[i] ==0 ) +continue ; + error =security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmdata, i); +if (error && error != -EINVAL ) { +audit_panic ("error in audit_log_lsm" ); +return ; + } + +audit_log_format (ab,"%ssubj_%s=%s" , sep ?" " :"" , +security_lsm_slot_name (i), lsmdata.context); + sep = true; + +security_release_secctx (&lsmdata); + } + +audit_log_end (ab); +} +static void audit_log_exit (void ) {int i, call_panic =0 ;@@ -1606,6 +1655,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) }audit_log_proctitle (); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , true);/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_EOE );@@ -2217,6 +2267,21 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__audit_inode_child); +/** +* audit_stamp_context - set the timestamp+serial in an audit context +* @ctx: audit_context to set +*/ +void audit_stamp_context (struct audit_context *ctx) +{ +/* ctx will be NULL unless lsm_multiple_contexts() is true */ +if (!ctx) +return ; + +ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64 (&ctx->ctime); + ctx->serial =audit_serial (); + ctx->current_state =AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT ; +} +/** * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values * @ctx: audit_context for the task @@ -2228,6 +2293,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);int auditsc_get_stamp (struct audit_context *ctx,struct timespec64 *t,unsigned int *serial) { +if (ctx->serial && !ctx->in_syscall) { + t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; + t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; + *serial = ctx->serial; +return 1 ; + }if (!ctx->in_syscall)return 0 ;if (!ctx->serial)@@ -2622,7 +2693,7 @@ void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries, name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s);audit_log_format (ab," pid=%u" ,task_pid_nr (current)); -audit_log_task_context (ab);/* subj= */ +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );/* subj= */ audit_log_format (ab," comm=" );audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current));audit_log_end (ab);@@ -2645,7 +2716,7 @@ static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)from_kuid (&init_user_ns, uid),from_kgid (&init_user_ns, gid), sessionid); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );audit_log_format (ab," pid=%d comm=" ,task_tgid_nr (current));audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current));audit_log_d_path_exe (ab, current->mm);@@ -2668,11 +2739,13 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)if (signr ==SIGQUIT )/* don't care for those */ return ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); ab =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND );if (unlikely (!ab))return ;audit_log_task (ab);audit_log_format (ab," sig=%ld res=1" , signr); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , true);audit_log_end (ab); }net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1
-1@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (err)return ;net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2
-2@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module * to use to create the secctx. */ lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmblob blob;struct lsmcontext context; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +1
-1@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return ;net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +1
-1@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security * module to use to create the secctx. */ lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY ); }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +8
-8@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);@@ -492,7 +493,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);@@ -552,7 +554,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);@@ -1122,7 +1125,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,@@ -1521,14 +1524,11 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)int ret_val;struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;struct netlbl_audit audit_info; -struct lsmblob blob;/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */ - audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info.lsmdata); audit_info.loginuid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ; audit_info.sessionid =0 ;net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +4
-8@@ -84,12 +84,12 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf; -struct lsmcontext context; -struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); + audit_buf =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC , type);if (audit_buf ==NULL )return NULL ;@@ -98,12 +98,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid), audit_info->sessionid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid); -if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , context.context); -security_release_secctx (&context); - } +audit_log_task_context (audit_buf, &audit_info->lsmdata); +audit_log_lsm (&audit_info->lsmdata, false);return audit_buf; }net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +1
-5@@ -34,11 +34,7 @@static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo (struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { -struct lsmblob blob; - -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until secid is converted */ - audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info->lsmdata); audit_info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); audit_info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); }security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +1
-1@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,from_kuid (&init_user_ns,current_cred ()->uid),from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );audit_log_format (ab," op=%s cause=%s comm=" , op, cause);audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (name, current));if (fname) {security/security.c +56
-17@@ -480,7 +480,31 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)* Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use. */ static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init; -static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ]; +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init; + +/** +* security_lsm_slot_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot +* @slot: index into the "display" slot list. +* +* Provide the name of the security module associated with +* a display slot. +* +* If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value +* for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL. +* +* Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL. +*/ +const char *security_lsm_slot_name (int slot) +{ +if (slot ==LSMBLOB_INVALID ) + slot =0 ; +else if (slot >=LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot <0 ) +return NULL ; + +if (lsm_slotlist[slot] ==NULL ) +return NULL ; +return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm; +}/** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. @@ -2175,7 +2199,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { rc = hp->hook.setprocattr (name, value, size); -if (rc <0 ) +if (rc <0 && rc != -EINVAL )return rc; }@@ -2220,13 +2244,32 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp, +int display) {struct security_hook_list *hp; -int display =lsm_task_display (current);memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); +/* +* display either is the slot number use for formatting +* or an instruction on which relative slot to use. +*/ +if (display ==LSMBLOB_DISPLAY ) + display =lsm_task_display (current); +else if (display ==LSMBLOB_FIRST ) + display =LSMBLOB_INVALID ; +else if (display <0 ) { +WARN_ONCE (true, +"LSM: %s unknown display\n" , __func__); + display =LSMBLOB_INVALID ; + }else if (display >= lsm_slot) { +WARN_ONCE (true, +"LSM: %s invalid display\n" , __func__); + display =LSMBLOB_INVALID ; + } + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ;@@ -2256,7 +2299,7 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid (secdata, seclen, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); } -return 0 ; +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);@@ -2757,23 +2800,17 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule) {struct security_hook_list *hp; -bool one_is_good = false; -int rc =0 ; -int trc; +int display =lsm_task_display (current);hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ; - trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init (field, op, rulestr, - &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); -if (trc ==0 ) - one_is_good = true; -else - rc = trc; +if (display !=LSMBLOB_INVALID && display != hp->lsmid->slot) +continue ; +return hp->hook.audit_rule_init (field, op, rulestr, + &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); } -if (one_is_good) -return 0 ; -return rc; +return 0 ; }int security_audit_rule_known (struct audit_krule *krule)@@ -2805,6 +2842,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,continue ;if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] ==NULL )continue ; +if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] ==NULL ) +continue ; rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match (blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], field, op, &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);security/smack/smackfs.c +2
-1@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap) nap->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); nap->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); - nap->secid = skp->smk_secid; +lsmblob_init (&nap->lsmdata,0 ); + nap->lsmdata.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = skp->smk_secid; }/*
Signature · 2 lines
James Morris <[email protected]>
John Johansen
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes
Quoted 13 lines · James Morris
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
Create a new audit record type to contain the subject information when there are multiple security modules that require such data. This record is linked with the same timestamp and serial number. The record is produced only in cases where there is more than one security module with a process "context".
Before this change the only audit events that required multiple records were syscall events. Several non-syscall events include subject contexts, so the use of
audit_contextdata has been expanded as necessary.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>Paul, can you review/ack the audit changes?
I am working on reviewing them as well, but I can't/won't ack them.
Quoted 905 lines
Quoted 904 lines
--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 13 +++- include/linux/security.h | 18 ++++- include/net/netlabel.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 3 +- include/net/xfrm.h | 4 +- include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++------- kernel/auditfilter.c | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 16 ++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 12 ++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 73 +++++++++++++++----- security/smack/smackfs.c | 3 +- 20 files changed, 259 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-)drivers/android/binder.c +1
-1@@ -3113,7 +3113,7 @@ static void binder_transaction(struct binder_proc *proc,size_t added_size;security_task_getsecid (proc->tsk, &blob); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret) { return_error =BR_FAILED_REPLY ; return_error_param = ret;include/linux/audit.h +11
-2@@ -186,7 +186,9 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation);extern void audit_log_lost (const char *message); -extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab); +extern void audit_log_lsm (struct lsmblob *blob,bool exiting); +extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab, +struct lsmblob *blob);extern void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );@@ -246,7 +248,10 @@ static inline void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key) { }static inline void audit_log_path_denied (int type,const char *operation) { } -static inline int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) +static inline void audit_log_lsm (struct lsmblob *blob,bool exiting) +{ } +static inline int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab, +struct lsmblob *blob); {return 0 ; }@@ -305,6 +310,7 @@ extern void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code);extern void audit_seccomp_actions_logged (const char *names,const char *old_names,int res);extern void __audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t); +extern void audit_stamp_context (struct audit_context *ctx);static inline void audit_set_context (struct task_struct *task,struct audit_context *ctx) {@@ -682,6 +688,9 @@ static inline void audit_ntp_log(const struct audit_ntp_data *ad)static inline void audit_ptrace (struct task_struct *t) { } +static inline void audit_stamp_context (struct audit_context *ctx) +{ } +static inline void audit_log_nfcfg (const char *name,u8 af,unsigned int nentries,enum audit_nfcfgop op,gfp_t gfp)include/linux/security.h +16
-2@@ -180,6 +180,8 @@ struct lsmblob {#define LSMBLOB_INVALID -1/* Not a valid LSM slot number */ #define LSMBLOB_NEEDED -2/* Slot requested on initialization */ #define LSMBLOB_NOT_NEEDED -3/* Slot not requested */ +#define LSMBLOB_DISPLAY -4/* Use the "display" slot */ +#define LSMBLOB_FIRST -5/* Use the default "display" slot */ /** * lsmblob_init - initialize an lsmblob structure. @@ -242,6 +244,17 @@ static inline u32 lsmblob_value(const struct lsmblob *blob)return 0 ; } +const char *security_lsm_slot_name (int slot); + +static inline bool lsm_multiple_contexts (void ) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY +return security_lsm_slot_name (1 ) !=NULL ; +#else +return false; +#endif +} +/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */ extern int cap_capable (const struct cred *cred,struct user_namespace *ns,int cap,unsigned int opts);@@ -554,7 +567,8 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value, size_t size);int security_netlink_send (struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb);int security_ismaclabel (const char *name); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp); +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp, +int display);int security_secctx_to_secid (const char *secdata,u32 seclen,struct lsmblob *blob);void security_release_secctx (struct lsmcontext *cp);@@ -1372,7 +1386,7 @@ static inline int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }static inline int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob, -struct lsmcontext *cp) +struct lsmcontext *cp,int display) {return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }include/net/netlabel.h +1
-1@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ struct calipso_doi;/* NetLabel audit information */ struct netlbl_audit { -u32 secid; +struct lsmblob lsmdata;kuid_t loginuid;unsigned int sessionid; };include/net/scm.h +2
-1@@ -96,7 +96,8 @@ static inline void scm_passec(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scint err;if (test_bit (SOCK_PASSSEC , &sock->flags)) { - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&scm->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (!err) { put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SCM_SECURITY,include/net/xfrm.h +3
-1@@ -675,11 +675,13 @@ static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(const char *op)if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); audit_buf =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT );if (audit_buf ==NULL )return NULL ;audit_log_format (audit_buf,"op=%s" , op); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , false);return audit_buf; }@@ -693,7 +695,7 @@ static inline void xfrm_audit_helper_usrinfo(bool task_valid,AUDIT_SID_UNSET ;audit_log_format (audit_buf," auid=%u ses=%u" , auid, ses); -audit_log_task_context (audit_buf); +audit_log_task_context (audit_buf,NULL ); }void xfrm_audit_policy_add (struct xfrm_policy *xp,int result,bool task_valid);include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1
-0@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@#define AUDIT_MAC_UNLBL_STCDEL 1417/* NetLabel: del a static label */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418/* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419/* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */ +#define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420/* Multiple LSM contexts */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799kernel/audit.c +66
-23@@ -394,10 +394,11 @@ static int audit_log_config_change(char *function_name, u32 new, u32 old,return rc;audit_log_format (ab,"op=set %s=%u old=%u " , function_name, new, old);audit_log_session_info (ab); - rc =audit_log_task_context (ab); + rc =audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );if (rc) allow_changes =0 ;/* Something weird, deny request */ audit_log_format (ab," res=%d" , allow_changes); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , false);audit_log_end (ab);return rc; }@@ -1070,13 +1071,31 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_context *context,return ;audit_log_format (*ab,"pid=%d uid=%u " , pid, uid);audit_log_session_info (*ab); -audit_log_task_context (*ab); +audit_log_task_context (*ab,NULL ); }static inline void audit_log_user_recv_msg (struct audit_buffer **ab,u16 msg_type) { -audit_log_common_recv_msg (NULL , ab, msg_type); +struct audit_context *context; + +if (!lsm_multiple_contexts ()) { +audit_log_common_recv_msg (NULL , ab, msg_type); +return ; + } + + context =audit_context (); +if (context) { +if (!context->in_syscall) +audit_stamp_context (context); +audit_log_common_recv_msg (context, ab, msg_type); +return ; + } + +audit_alloc (current); + context =audit_context (); + +audit_log_common_recv_msg (context, ab, msg_type); }int is_audit_feature_set (int i)@@ -1372,6 +1391,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)audit_log_n_untrustedstring (ab, str, data_len); }audit_log_end (ab); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , false); }break ;case AUDIT_ADD_RULE :@@ -1444,7 +1464,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)if (lsmblob_is_set (&audit_sig_lsm)) { err =security_secid_to_secctx (&audit_sig_lsm, - &context); + &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (err)return err; }@@ -1572,7 +1592,7 @@ static void audit_log_multicast(int group, const char *op, int err) tty ?tty_name (tty) :"(none)" , audit_get_sessionid(current));audit_put_tty (tty); -audit_log_task_context (ab);/* subj= */ +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );/* subj= */ audit_log_format (ab," comm=" );audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current));audit_log_d_path_exe (ab, current->mm);/* exe= */ @@ -1869,6 +1889,10 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, }audit_get_stamp (ab->ctx, &t, &serial); +if (type ==AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS && ab->ctx->serial ==0 ) { +audit_stamp_context (ab->ctx); +audit_get_stamp (ab->ctx, &t, &serial); + }audit_log_format (ab,"audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): " , (unsigned long long )t.tv_sec, t.tv_nsec/1000000 , serial);@@ -2126,30 +2150,47 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)audit_log_format (ab,"(null)" ); } -int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) +int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab,struct lsmblob *blob) { +int i;int error; -struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext context; +struct lsmblob localblob; +struct lsmcontext lsmdata; -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob)) +/* +* If there is more than one security module that has a +* subject "context" it's necessary to put the subject data +* into a separate record to maintain compatibility. +*/ +if (lsm_multiple_contexts ()) { +audit_log_format (ab," subj=?" );return 0 ; + } - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); -if (error) { -if (error != -EINVAL ) - goto error_path; -return 0 ; +if (blob ==NULL ) { +security_task_getsecid (current, &localblob); +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&localblob)) { +audit_log_format (ab," subj=?" ); +return 0 ; + } + blob = &localblob; } -audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , context.context); -security_release_secctx (&context); -return 0 ; +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { +if (blob->secid[i] ==0 ) +continue ; + error =security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmdata, i); +if (error && error != -EINVAL ) { +audit_panic ("error in audit_log_task_context" ); +return error; + } -error_path: -audit_panic ("error in audit_log_task_context" ); -return error; +audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , lsmdata.context); +security_release_secctx (&lsmdata); +break ; + } + +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_log_task_context);@@ -2221,7 +2262,7 @@ void audit_log_task_info(struct audit_buffer *ab)audit_log_format (ab," comm=" );audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current));audit_log_d_path_exe (ab, current->mm); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL ); }EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_log_task_info);@@ -2279,6 +2320,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,if (!audit_enabled)return ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); ab =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_LOGIN );if (!ab)return ;@@ -2289,11 +2331,12 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, tty =audit_get_tty ();audit_log_format (ab,"pid=%d uid=%u" ,task_tgid_nr (current), uid); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );audit_log_format (ab," old-auid=%u auid=%u tty=%s old-ses=%u ses=%u res=%d" , oldloginuid, loginuid, tty ?tty_name (tty) :"(none)" , oldsessionid, sessionid, !rc);audit_put_tty (tty); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , true);audit_log_end (ab); }kernel/auditfilter.c +1
-1@@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int reif (!ab)return ;audit_log_session_info (ab); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );audit_log_format (ab," op=%s" , action);audit_log_key (ab, rule->filterkey);audit_log_format (ab," list=%d res=%d" , rule->listnr, res);kernel/auditsc.c +80
-7@@ -473,7 +473,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk, {const struct cred *cred;int i, need_sid =1 ; -struct lsmblob blob; +struct lsmblob blob = { };unsigned int sessionid; cred =rcu_dereference_check (tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);@@ -962,10 +962,12 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)return 0 ;/* Return if not auditing. */ state =audit_filter_task (tsk, &key); -if (state ==AUDIT_DISABLED ) { +if (!lsm_multiple_contexts () && state ==AUDIT_DISABLED ) {clear_tsk_thread_flag (tsk,TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT );return 0 ; } +if (state ==AUDIT_DISABLED ) +clear_tsk_thread_flag (tsk,TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT );if (!(context =audit_alloc_context (state))) {kfree (key);@@ -1009,7 +1011,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct audit_context *context, pid_t pid,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, auid), from_kuid(&init_user_ns, uid), sessionid);if (lsmblob_is_set (blob)) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," obj=(none)" ); rc =1 ; }else {@@ -1254,7 +1256,8 @@ static void show_special(struct audit_context *context, int *call_panic)struct lsmblob blob;lsmblob_init (&blob, osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmcxt, +LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , osid); *call_panic =1 ; }else {@@ -1406,7 +1409,7 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,struct lsmcontext lsmctx;lsmblob_init (&blob, n->osid); -if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx)) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &lsmctx,LSMBLOB_FIRST )) {audit_log_format (ab," osid=%u" , n->osid);if (call_panic) *call_panic =2 ;@@ -1483,6 +1486,52 @@ static void audit_log_proctitle(void)audit_log_end (ab); } +void audit_log_lsm (struct lsmblob *blob,bool exiting) +{ +struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsmcontext lsmdata; +struct audit_buffer *ab; +struct lsmblob localblob; +bool sep = false; +int error; +int i; + +if (!lsm_multiple_contexts ()) +return ; + +if (context && context->in_syscall && !exiting) +return ; + + ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS ); +if (!ab) +return ;/* audit_panic or being filtered */ + +if (blob ==NULL ) { +security_task_getsecid (current, &localblob); +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&localblob)) +return ; + blob = &localblob; + } + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { +if (blob->secid[i] ==0 ) +continue ; + error =security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmdata, i); +if (error && error != -EINVAL ) { +audit_panic ("error in audit_log_lsm" ); +return ; + } + +audit_log_format (ab,"%ssubj_%s=%s" , sep ?" " :"" , +security_lsm_slot_name (i), lsmdata.context); + sep = true; + +security_release_secctx (&lsmdata); + } + +audit_log_end (ab); +} +static void audit_log_exit (void ) {int i, call_panic =0 ;@@ -1606,6 +1655,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(void) }audit_log_proctitle (); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , true);/* Send end of event record to help user space know we are finished */ ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_EOE );@@ -2217,6 +2267,21 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__audit_inode_child); +/** +* audit_stamp_context - set the timestamp+serial in an audit context +* @ctx: audit_context to set +*/ +void audit_stamp_context (struct audit_context *ctx) +{ +/* ctx will be NULL unless lsm_multiple_contexts() is true */ +if (!ctx) +return ; + +ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64 (&ctx->ctime); + ctx->serial =audit_serial (); + ctx->current_state =AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT ; +} +/** * auditsc_get_stamp - get local copies of audit_context values * @ctx: audit_context for the task @@ -2228,6 +2293,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);int auditsc_get_stamp (struct audit_context *ctx,struct timespec64 *t,unsigned int *serial) { +if (ctx->serial && !ctx->in_syscall) { + t->tv_sec = ctx->ctime.tv_sec; + t->tv_nsec = ctx->ctime.tv_nsec; + *serial = ctx->serial; +return 1 ; + }if (!ctx->in_syscall)return 0 ;if (!ctx->serial)@@ -2622,7 +2693,7 @@ void __audit_log_nfcfg(const char *name, u8 af, unsigned int nentries, name, af, nentries, audit_nfcfgs[op].s);audit_log_format (ab," pid=%u" ,task_pid_nr (current)); -audit_log_task_context (ab);/* subj= */ +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );/* subj= */ audit_log_format (ab," comm=" );audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current));audit_log_end (ab);@@ -2645,7 +2716,7 @@ static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)from_kuid (&init_user_ns, uid),from_kgid (&init_user_ns, gid), sessionid); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );audit_log_format (ab," pid=%d comm=" ,task_tgid_nr (current));audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (comm, current));audit_log_d_path_exe (ab, current->mm);@@ -2668,11 +2739,13 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)if (signr ==SIGQUIT )/* don't care for those */ return ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); ab =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND );if (unlikely (!ab))return ;audit_log_task (ab);audit_log_format (ab," sig=%ld res=1" , signr); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , true);audit_log_end (ab); }net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c +1
-1@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static void ip_cmsg_recv_security(struct msghdr *msg, struct sk_buff *skb)if (err)return ; - err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context); + err =security_secid_to_secctx (&lb, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (err)return ;net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c +2
-2@@ -339,7 +339,7 @@ static int ctnetlink_dump_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct nf_conn *ct)* security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security module * to use to create the secctx. */ lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;@@ -655,7 +655,7 @@ static inline int ctnetlink_secctx_size(const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmblob blob;struct lsmcontext context; - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return 0 ;net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c +1
-1@@ -177,7 +177,7 @@ static void ct_show_secctx(struct seq_file *s, const struct nf_conn *ct)struct lsmcontext context;lsmblob_init (&blob, ct->secmark); - ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); + ret =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY );if (ret)return ;net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c +1
-1@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ static u32 nfqnl_get_sk_secctx(struct sk_buff *skb, struct lsmcontext *context)* blob. security_secid_to_secctx() will know which security * module to use to create the secctx. */ lsmblob_init (&blob, skb->secmark); -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context); +security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, context,LSMBLOB_DISPLAY ); }read_unlock_bh (&skb->sk->sk_callback_lock);net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c +8
-8@@ -437,7 +437,8 @@ int netlbl_unlhsh_add(struct net *net, unlhsh_add_return:rcu_read_unlock ();if (audit_buf !=NULL ) { -if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +if (security_secid_to_secctx (lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);@@ -492,7 +493,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr4(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);@@ -552,7 +554,8 @@ static int netlbl_unlhsh_remove_addr6(struct net *net,if (dev !=NULL )dev_put (dev);if (entry !=NULL && -security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context) ==0 ) { +security_secid_to_secctx (&entry->lsmblob, &context, +LSMBLOB_FIRST ) ==0 ) {audit_log_format (audit_buf," sec_obj=%s" , context.context);security_release_secctx (&context);@@ -1122,7 +1125,7 @@ static int netlbl_unlabel_staticlist_gen(u32 cmd, lsmb = (struct lsmblob *)&addr6->lsmblob; } - ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context); + ret_val =security_secid_to_secctx (lsmb, &context,LSMBLOB_FIRST );if (ret_val !=0 ) goto list_cb_failure; ret_val = nla_put(cb_arg->skb,@@ -1521,14 +1524,11 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)int ret_val;struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;struct netlbl_audit audit_info; -struct lsmblob blob;/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */ -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until audit_info.secid is converted */ - audit_info.secid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info.lsmdata); audit_info.loginuid =GLOBAL_ROOT_UID ; audit_info.sessionid =0 ;net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +4
-8@@ -84,12 +84,12 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf; -struct lsmcontext context; -struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); + audit_buf =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC , type);if (audit_buf ==NULL )return NULL ;@@ -98,12 +98,8 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type,from_kuid (&init_user_ns, audit_info->loginuid), audit_info->sessionid); -lsmblob_init (&blob, audit_info->secid); -if (audit_info->secid !=0 && -security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context) ==0 ) { -audit_log_format (audit_buf," subj=%s" , context.context); -security_release_secctx (&context); - } +audit_log_task_context (audit_buf, &audit_info->lsmdata); +audit_log_lsm (&audit_info->lsmdata, false);return audit_buf; }net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h +1
-5@@ -34,11 +34,7 @@static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo (struct sk_buff *skb,struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) { -struct lsmblob blob; - -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -/* scaffolding until secid is converted */ - audit_info->secid = blob.secid[0 ]; +security_task_getsecid (current, &audit_info->lsmdata); audit_info->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); audit_info->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); }security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +1
-1@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,from_kuid (&init_user_ns,current_cred ()->uid),from_kuid (&init_user_ns,audit_get_loginuid (current)), audit_get_sessionid(current)); -audit_log_task_context (ab); +audit_log_task_context (ab,NULL );audit_log_format (ab," op=%s cause=%s comm=" , op, cause);audit_log_untrustedstring (ab,get_task_comm (name, current));if (fname) {security/security.c +56
-17@@ -480,7 +480,31 @@ static int lsm_append(const char *new, char **result)* Pointers to the LSM id structures for local use. */ static int lsm_slot __lsm_ro_after_init; -static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ]; +static struct lsm_id *lsm_slotlist[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES] __lsm_ro_after_init; + +/** +* security_lsm_slot_name - Get the name of the security module in a slot +* @slot: index into the "display" slot list. +* +* Provide the name of the security module associated with +* a display slot. +* +* If @slot is LSMBLOB_INVALID return the value +* for slot 0 if it has been set, otherwise NULL. +* +* Returns a pointer to the name string or NULL. +*/ +const char *security_lsm_slot_name (int slot) +{ +if (slot ==LSMBLOB_INVALID ) + slot =0 ; +else if (slot >=LSMBLOB_ENTRIES || slot <0 ) +return NULL ; + +if (lsm_slotlist[slot] ==NULL ) +return NULL ; +return lsm_slotlist[slot]->lsm; +}/** * security_add_hooks - Add a modules hooks to the hook lists. @@ -2175,7 +2199,7 @@ int security_setprocattr(const char *lsm, const char *name, void *value,hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.setprocattr, list) { rc = hp->hook.setprocattr (name, value, size); -if (rc <0 ) +if (rc <0 && rc != -EINVAL )return rc; }@@ -2220,13 +2244,32 @@ int security_ismaclabel(const char *name) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_ismaclabel); -int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp) +int security_secid_to_secctx (struct lsmblob *blob,struct lsmcontext *cp, +int display) {struct security_hook_list *hp; -int display =lsm_task_display (current);memset (cp,0 ,sizeof (*cp)); +/* +* display either is the slot number use for formatting +* or an instruction on which relative slot to use. +*/ +if (display ==LSMBLOB_DISPLAY ) + display =lsm_task_display (current); +else if (display ==LSMBLOB_FIRST ) + display =LSMBLOB_INVALID ; +else if (display <0 ) { +WARN_ONCE (true, +"LSM: %s unknown display\n" , __func__); + display =LSMBLOB_INVALID ; + }else if (display >= lsm_slot) { +WARN_ONCE (true, +"LSM: %s invalid display\n" , __func__); + display =LSMBLOB_INVALID ; + } + +hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.secid_to_secctx, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ;@@ -2256,7 +2299,7 @@ int security_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen,return hp->hook.secctx_to_secid (secdata, seclen, &blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]); } -return 0 ; +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (security_secctx_to_secid);@@ -2757,23 +2800,17 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)int security_audit_rule_init (u32 field,u32 op,char *rulestr,void **lsmrule) {struct security_hook_list *hp; -bool one_is_good = false; -int rc =0 ; -int trc; +int display =lsm_task_display (current);hlist_for_each_entry (hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {if (WARN_ON (hp->lsmid->slot <0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))continue ; - trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init (field, op, rulestr, - &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); -if (trc ==0 ) - one_is_good = true; -else - rc = trc; +if (display !=LSMBLOB_INVALID && display != hp->lsmid->slot) +continue ; +return hp->hook.audit_rule_init (field, op, rulestr, + &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]); } -if (one_is_good) -return 0 ; -return rc; +return 0 ; }int security_audit_rule_known (struct audit_krule *krule)@@ -2805,6 +2842,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,continue ;if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] ==NULL )continue ; +if (lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot] ==NULL ) +continue ; rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match (blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot], field, op, &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);security/smack/smackfs.c +2
-1@@ -185,7 +185,8 @@ static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap) nap->loginuid =audit_get_loginuid (current); nap->sessionid =audit_get_sessionid (current); - nap->secid = skp->smk_secid; +lsmblob_init (&nap->lsmdata,0 ); + nap->lsmdata.secid[smack_lsmid.slot] = skp->smk_secid; }/*
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes
In reply to James MorrisQuoted 13 lines · James Morris
Quoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
Create a new audit record type to contain the subject information when there are multiple security modules that require such data. This record is linked with the same timestamp and serial number. The record is produced only in cases where there is more than one security module with a process "context".
Before this change the only audit events that required multiple records were syscall events. Several non-syscall events include subject contexts, so the use of
audit_contextdata has been expanded as necessary.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>Paul, can you review/ack the audit changes?
I did a previous version at some point in the past, I'll take a look at v20 tomorrow or this weekend.
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v20 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes
In reply to Casey SchauflerQuoted 28 lines · Casey Schaufler
Create a new audit record type to contain the subject information when there are multiple security modules that require such data. This record is linked with the same timestamp and serial number. The record is produced only in cases where there is more than one security module with a process "context".
Before this change the only audit events that required multiple records were syscall events. Several non-syscall events include subject contexts, so the use of
audit_contextdata has been expanded as necessary.Signed-off-by Casey Schaufler <[email protected]>--- drivers/android/binder.c | 2 +- include/linux/audit.h | 13 +++- include/linux/security.h | 18 ++++- include/net/netlabel.h | 2 +- include/net/scm.h | 3 +- include/net/xfrm.h | 4 +- include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 89 ++++++++++++++++++------- kernel/auditfilter.c | 2 +- kernel/auditsc.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++-- net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 2 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_netlink.c | 4 +- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_standalone.c | 2 +-
Quoted 8 lines
net/netfilter/nfnetlink_queue.c | 2 +- net/netlabel/netlabel_unlabeled.c | 16 ++--- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c | 12 ++-- net/netlabel/netlabel_user.h | 6 +- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 2 +- security/security.c | 73 +++++++++++++++----- security/smack/smackfs.c | 3 +- 20 files changed, 259 insertions(+), 84 deletions(-)
Regardless of the code, the audit folks generally ask for an example of the new audit record in the commit description; it make it easier for the people not familiar with the kernel to review the record format/information.
I've also been requiring that a test is added to the audit test suite for new features added to the kernel. I recognize this is a big ask for something like this, but it is something we have been doing for several years now and I think the benefits far outweigh the costs.
* https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite
include/linux/audit.h extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type, · line 191
Quoted 12 lines
include/linux/audit.h +3
-1@@ -186,7 +186,9 @@ extern void audit_log_path_denied(int type, const char *operation);extern void audit_log_lost (const char *message); -extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab); +extern void audit_log_lsm (struct lsmblob *blob,bool exiting); +extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab, +struct lsmblob *blob);
The audit functions tend to get abused, and this is mostly due to a rather poor design, so I'd prefer to see audit_log_task_context() remain with just a single argument: the audit buffer. I believe this covers the vast majority of the cases and should remain the preferred option for callers. This should help shrink the patch and focus it a bit more.
For the handful of callers that do need to specify a separate task context, you can create a __audit_log_task_context(ab, blob) that allows the caller to specify the blob (and obviously you can write audit_log_task_context() as a one line wrapper around this function).
include/net/xfrm.h static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(const char *op) · line 680
Quoted 11 lines
include/net/xfrm.h +1
-0@@ -675,11 +675,13 @@ static inline struct audit_buffer *xfrm_audit_start(const char *op)if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); audit_buf =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_MAC_IPSEC_EVENT );
Is audit_stamp_context() necessary here? Generally if the first argument to audit_log_start() is not NULL then you shouldn't need to create a "local" audit context.
I wonder if you might be getting mixed up in testing by not having audit properly enabled (see link below)? Make sure you don't have any audit disable rules loaded into the kernel, and you can even add "audit=1" to the kernel command line.
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-documentation/wiki/HOWTO-Fedora-Enable-Auditing
Quoted 6 lines
include/net/xfrm.h +1
-0if (audit_buf ==NULL )return NULL ;audit_log_format (audit_buf,"op=%s" , op); +audit_log_lsm (NULL , false);return audit_buf; }
...
Quoted 26 lines
kernel/audit.c +11
-2@@ -1070,13 +1071,31 @@ static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_context *context,return ;audit_log_format (*ab,"pid=%d uid=%u " , pid, uid);audit_log_session_info (*ab); -audit_log_task_context (*ab); +audit_log_task_context (*ab,NULL ); }static inline void audit_log_user_recv_msg (struct audit_buffer **ab,u16 msg_type) { -audit_log_common_recv_msg (NULL , ab, msg_type); +struct audit_context *context; + +if (!lsm_multiple_contexts ()) { +audit_log_common_recv_msg (NULL , ab, msg_type); +return ; + } + + context =audit_context (); +if (context) { +if (!context->in_syscall)
kernel/audit.c static void audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_context *context, · line 1099
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +9
-0+audit_stamp_context (context); +audit_log_common_recv_msg (context, ab, msg_type); +return ; + } + +audit_alloc (current); + context =audit_context (); + +audit_log_common_recv_msg (context, ab, msg_type); }
Hmm. Take a look at Richard's patch for adding the audit container ID record to audit user records, it should give you a better idea of how to approach this. The above changes in audit_log_user_recv_msg() are not really what we want.
kernel/audit.c struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, · line 1897
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +4
-0@@ -1869,6 +1889,10 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask, }audit_get_stamp (ab->ctx, &t, &serial); +if (type ==AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS && ab->ctx->serial ==0 ) { +audit_stamp_context (ab->ctx); +audit_get_stamp (ab->ctx, &t, &serial); + }audit_log_format (ab,"audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): " , (unsigned long long )t.tv_sec, t.tv_nsec/1000000 , serial);
Can you walk me through what you are trying to do here? This doesn't seem right to me, but I'm sure you put it here for a reason.
Quoted 23 lines
kernel/audit.c +11
-5@@ -2126,30 +2150,47 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)audit_log_format (ab,"(null)" ); } -int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab) +int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab,struct lsmblob *blob) { +int i;int error; -struct lsmblob blob; -struct lsmcontext context; +struct lsmblob localblob; +struct lsmcontext lsmdata; -security_task_getsecid (current, &blob); -if (!lsmblob_is_set (&blob)) +/* +* If there is more than one security module that has a +* subject "context" it's necessary to put the subject data +* into a separate record to maintain compatibility. +*/ +if (lsm_multiple_contexts ()) { +audit_log_format (ab," subj=?" );
kernel/audit.c void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key) · line 2171
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/audit.c +3
-5return 0 ; + } - error =security_secid_to_secctx (&blob, &context); -if (error) { -if (error != -EINVAL ) - goto error_path; -return 0 ; +if (blob ==NULL ) { +security_task_getsecid (current, &localblob);
Why is localblob necessary? You know blob is NULL here, just use it directly and skip the assignment later in this code block.
Quoted 30 lines
kernel/audit.c +19
-6+if (!lsmblob_is_set (&localblob)) { +audit_log_format (ab," subj=?" ); +return 0 ; + } + blob = &localblob; } -audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , context.context); -security_release_secctx (&context); -return 0 ; +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { +if (blob->secid[i] ==0 ) +continue ; + error =security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmdata, i); +if (error && error != -EINVAL ) { +audit_panic ("error in audit_log_task_context" ); +return error; + } -error_path: -audit_panic ("error in audit_log_task_context" ); -return error; +audit_log_format (ab," subj=%s" , lsmdata.context); +security_release_secctx (&lsmdata); +break ; + } + +return 0 ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL (audit_log_task_context);
...
kernel/audit.c static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid, · line 2326
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/audit.c +1
-0@@ -2279,6 +2320,7 @@ static void audit_log_set_loginuid(kuid_t koldloginuid, kuid_t kloginuid,if (!audit_enabled)return ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ()); ab =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_KERNEL ,AUDIT_LOGIN );if (!ab)return ;
Similar to above, I'm not sure audit_stamp_context() is what we want here.
Quoted 5 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +0
-0
kernel/auditsc.c int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk) · line 970
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +3
-1@@ -962,10 +962,12 @@ int audit_alloc(struct task_struct *tsk)return 0 ;/* Return if not auditing. */ state =audit_filter_task (tsk, &key); -if (state ==AUDIT_DISABLED ) { +if (!lsm_multiple_contexts () && state ==AUDIT_DISABLED ) {clear_tsk_thread_flag (tsk,TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT );return 0 ; } +if (state ==AUDIT_DISABLED ) +clear_tsk_thread_flag (tsk,TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT );
Hmmm. I think we've hit critical mass on the amount of hacks in the audit subsystem for this code ... Let's back up a bit and start with some basic requirements (correct me if I'm wrong on any of these):
1. This patch only deals with LSM process/task/subject contexts.
2. Multiple LSMs may, or may not exist; audit logs and behavior should remain unchanged in the single LSM case.
3. If multiple LSMs are present, the subject field in existing records should take the form of "subj=?" and a new audit record is created containing fields of the format "subj_<LSM>=<context>".
Assuming all of that is true, why not simply keep the basic logic in audit_log_task_context(), but also stash a lsmblob struct in the audit_context for later use by audit_log_exit()? Stashing of the lsmblob would really only be necessary to handle the few cases where the current task is not the proper subject.
Quoted 9 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +5
-0@@ -1483,6 +1486,52 @@ static void audit_log_proctitle(void)audit_log_end (ab); } +void audit_log_lsm (struct lsmblob *blob,bool exiting) +{ +struct audit_context *context =audit_context (); +struct lsmcontext lsmdata; +struct audit_buffer *ab;
kernel/auditsc.c static void audit_log_proctitle(void) · line 1503
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +10
-0+struct lsmblob localblob; +bool sep = false; +int error; +int i; + +if (!lsm_multiple_contexts ()) +return ; + +if (context && context->in_syscall && !exiting) +return ;
I think the "!lsm_multiple_contexts()" and "!exiting" checks fit well with my comments about generating the AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXT record in audit_log_exit. This code needs a rethink.
Quoted 29 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +29
-0+ ab =audit_log_start (context,GFP_ATOMIC ,AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS ); +if (!ab) +return ;/* audit_panic or being filtered */ + +if (blob ==NULL ) { +security_task_getsecid (current, &localblob); +if (!lsmblob_is_set (&localblob)) +return ; + blob = &localblob; + } + +for (i =0 ; i <LSMBLOB_ENTRIES ; i++) { +if (blob->secid[i] ==0 ) +continue ; + error =security_secid_to_secctx (blob, &lsmdata, i); +if (error && error != -EINVAL ) { +audit_panic ("error in audit_log_lsm" ); + return; fits well with a + } + +audit_log_format (ab,"%ssubj_%s=%s" , sep ?" " :"" , +security_lsm_slot_name (i), lsmdata.context); + sep = true; + +security_release_secctx (&lsmdata); + } + +audit_log_end (ab); +}
...
Quoted 8 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +4
-0@@ -2217,6 +2267,21 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (__audit_inode_child); +/** +* audit_stamp_context - set the timestamp+serial in an audit context +* @ctx: audit_context to set +*/
kernel/auditsc.c void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent, · line 2283
Quoted 10 lines
kernel/auditsc.c +10
-0+void audit_stamp_context (struct audit_context *ctx) +{ +/* ctx will be NULL unless lsm_multiple_contexts() is true */ +if (!ctx) +return ; + +ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64 (&ctx->ctime); + ctx->serial =audit_serial (); + ctx->current_state =AUDIT_BUILD_CONTEXT ; +}
Based on previous discussions and what I *think* you are trying to do in this patchset, I believe Richard's audit_alloc_local() implementation (link below) is a better and cleaner solution. His latest revisions needs some minor tweaks (see my feeback), but I think you could probably work with him to pull that single patch into your patchset.
To be clear, I'm talking about just that one patch; I'm a firm believer that tying the LSM stacking and audit container ID patches beyond this would be a disaster. I can deal with any merge conflicts that arise whenever the different patchsets land.
* Richard's audit_alloc_local() patch (07/13 of the latest audit container ID patchset)
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-audit/21e6c4e1ac179c8dcf35803e603899ccfc69300a.1593198710.git.rgb@redhat.com
Quoted 5 lines
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +0
-0
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, · line 91
Quoted 10 lines
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +1
-2@@ -84,12 +84,12 @@ struct audit_buffer *netlbl_audit_start_common(int type, struct netlbl_audit *audit_info) {struct audit_buffer *audit_buf; -struct lsmcontext context; -struct lsmblob blob;if (audit_enabled ==AUDIT_OFF )return NULL ; +audit_stamp_context (audit_context ());
Another one.
Quoted 3 lines
net/netlabel/netlabel_user.c +0
-0audit_buf =audit_log_start (audit_context (),GFP_ATOMIC , type);if (audit_buf ==NULL )return NULL ;
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 21/23 Audit: Add a new record for multiple object LSM attributes
In reply to Casey SchauflerCreate a new audit record type to contain the object information when there are multiple security modules that require such data. This record is emitted before the other records for the event, but is linked with the same timestamp and serial number.
--- include/linux/audit.h | 2 ++ include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 + kernel/audit.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/audit.h | 4 +-- kernel/auditsc.c | 70 +++++--------------------------------- 5 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
include/linux/audit.h +2 -0
@@ -189,6 +189,8 @@ extern void audit_log_lost(const char *message);extern void audit_log_lsm (struct lsmblob *blob,bool exiting);extern int audit_log_task_context (struct audit_buffer *ab,struct lsmblob *blob); +extern int audit_log_object_context (struct audit_buffer *ab, +struct lsmblob *blob);extern void audit_log_task_info (struct audit_buffer *ab);extern int audit_update_lsm_rules (void );
include/uapi/linux/audit.h +1 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,7 @@#define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_ADD 1418/* NetLabel: add CALIPSO DOI entry */ #define AUDIT_MAC_CALIPSO_DEL 1419/* NetLabel: del CALIPSO DOI entry */ #define AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS 1420/* Multiple LSM contexts */ +#define AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS 1421/* Multiple LSM object contexts */ #define AUDIT_FIRST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1700#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
kernel/audit.c +53 -0
59 lines not on this page · raw message
kernel/audit.h +2 -2
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ struct audit_names {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;dev_t rdev; -u32 osid; +struct lsmblob oblob;struct audit_cap_data fcap;unsigned int fcap_ver;unsigned char type;/* record type */
@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ struct audit_context {kuid_t uid;kgid_t gid;umode_t mode; -u32 osid; +struct lsmblob oblob;int has_perm;uid_t perm_uid;gid_t perm_gid;
kernel/auditsc.c +9 -61
139 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 22/23 LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
In reply to Casey SchauflerAdd an entry /proc/.../attr/context which displays the full process security "context" in compound format:
lsm1\0value\0lsm2\0value\0...
This entry is not writable.
A security module may decide that its policy does not allow this information to be displayed. In this case none of the information will be displayed.
--- Documentation/security/lsm.rst | 28 ++++++++++ fs/proc/base.c | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 +++ security/apparmor/include/procattr.h | 2 +- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 8 ++- security/apparmor/procattr.c | 22 ++++---- security/security.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 2 +- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 2 +- 9 files changed, 135 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
Documentation/security/lsm.rst +28 -0
@@ -129,3 +129,31 @@ to identify it as the first security module to be registered. The capabilities security module does not use the general security blobs, unlike other modules. The reasons are historical and are based on overhead, complexity and performance concerns. + +LSM External Interfaces +======================= + +The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces. +The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they +require. + +The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma +separated list of the active security modules. + +The file ``/proc/pid/attr/display`` contains the name of the security +module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will +apply. This interface can be written to. + +The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special +case where multiple security modules provide a process context. +This is provided in compound context format. + +- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0` + +The `lsm` and `value` fields are nul terminated bytestrings. +Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters. +The nul bytes are included in the size of a compound context. +The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23. + +The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security +context of the identified process.
fs/proc/base.c +1 -0
@@ -2804,6 +2804,7 @@ static const struct pid_entry attr_dir_stuff[] = {ATTR (NULL ,"keycreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"sockcreate" ,0666 ),ATTR (NULL ,"display" ,0666 ), +ATTR (NULL ,"context" ,0444 ), #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACKDIR ("smack" ,0555 , proc_smack_attr_dir_inode_ops, proc_smack_attr_dir_ops),
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +6 -0
@@ -1359,6 +1359,12 @@* @pages contains the number of pages. * Return 0 if permission is granted. * +* @getprocattr: +* Provide the named process attribute for display in special files in +* the /proc/.../attr directory. Attribute naming and the data displayed +* is at the discretion of the security modules. The exception is the +* "context" attribute, which will contain the security context of the +* task as a nul terminated text string without trailing whitespace. * @ismaclabel: * Check if the extended attribute specified by @name * represents a MAC label. Returns 1 if name is a MAC
security/apparmor/include/procattr.h +1 -1
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@#ifndef __AA_PROCATTR_H#define __AA_PROCATTR_H -int aa_getprocattr (struct aa_label *label,char **string); +int aa_getprocattr (struct aa_label *label,char **string,bool newline);int aa_setprocattr_changehat (char *args,size_t size,int flags);#endif /* __AA_PROCATTR_H */
security/apparmor/lsm.c +6 -2
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name,const struct cred *cred =get_task_cred (task);struct aa_task_ctx *ctx =task_ctx (current);struct aa_label *label =NULL ; +bool newline = true;if (strcmp (name,"current" ) ==0 ) label =aa_get_newest_label (cred_label (cred));
@@ -600,11 +601,14 @@ static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, label =aa_get_newest_label (ctx->previous); else if (strcmp(name, "exec") == 0 && ctx->onexec) label =aa_get_newest_label (ctx->onexec); - else + else if (strcmp(name, "context") == 0) { + label = aa_get_newest_label(cred_label(cred)); + newline = false; + } else error = -EINVAL; if (label) - error =aa_getprocattr (label, value); + error = aa_getprocattr(label, value, newline); aa_put_label(label); put_cred(cred);
security/apparmor/procattr.c +12 -10
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@* aa_getprocattr - Return the profile information for @profile * @profile: the profile to print profile info about (NOT NULL) * @string: Returns - string containing the profile info (NOT NULL) +* @newline: Should a newline be added to @string. * * Returns: length of @string on success else error on failure *
@@ -30,20 +31,21 @@* * Returns: size of string placed in @string else error code on failure */ -int aa_getprocattr (struct aa_label *label,char **string) +int aa_getprocattr (struct aa_label *label,char **string,bool newline) {struct aa_ns *ns =labels_ns (label);struct aa_ns *current_ns =aa_get_current_ns (); +int flags =FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS |FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED ;int len;if (!aa_ns_visible (current_ns, ns, true)) {aa_put_ns (current_ns);return -EACCES ; } +if (newline) + flags |=FLAG_SHOW_MODE ; - len =aa_label_snxprint (NULL ,0 , current_ns, label, -FLAG_SHOW_MODE |FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | -FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED ); + len =aa_label_snxprint (NULL ,0 , current_ns, label, flags);AA_BUG (len <0 ); *string =kmalloc (len +2 ,GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -52,19 +54,19 @@ int aa_getprocattr(struct aa_label *label, char **string)return -ENOMEM ; } - len =aa_label_snxprint (*string, len +2 , current_ns, label, -FLAG_SHOW_MODE |FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS | -FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED ); + len =aa_label_snxprint (*string, len +2 , current_ns, label, flags);if (len <0 ) {aa_put_ns (current_ns);return len; } - (*string)[len] ='\n' ; - (*string)[len +1 ] =0 ; +if (newline) { + (*string)[len] ='\n' ; + (*string)[++len] =0 ; + }aa_put_ns (current_ns); -return len +1 ; +return len; }/**
security/security.c +79 -0
97 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/hooks.c +1 -1
@@ -6293,7 +6293,7 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, goto bad; } -if (!strcmp (name,"current" )) +if (!strcmp (name,"current" ) || !strcmp (name,"context" )) sid = __tsec->sid;else if (!strcmp (name,"prev" )) sid = __tsec->osid;
security/smack/smack_lsm.c +1 -1
@@ -3463,7 +3463,7 @@ static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)char *cp;int slen; -if (strcmp (name,"current" ) !=0 ) +if (strcmp (name,"current" ) !=0 &&strcmp (name,"context" ) !=0 )return -EINVAL ; cp =kstrdup (skp->smk_known,GFP_KERNEL );
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Randy Dunlap
reviewerRe: [PATCH v20 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context
Hi,
Quoted 20 lines · Casey Schaufler
Documentation/security/lsm.rst +12
-0@@ -129,3 +129,31 @@ to identify it as the first security module to be registered. The capabilities security module does not use the general security blobs, unlike other modules. The reasons are historical and are based on overhead, complexity and performance concerns. + +LSM External Interfaces +======================= + +The LSM infrastructure does not generally provide external interfaces. +The individual security modules provide what external interfaces they +require. + +The file ``/sys/kernel/security/lsm`` provides a comma +separated list of the active security modules. + +The file ``/proc/pid/attr/display`` contains the name of the security
Documentation/security/lsm.rst to identify it as the first security module to be registered. · line 153
Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/security/lsm.rst +10
-0+module for which the ``/proc/pid/attr/current`` interface will +apply. This interface can be written to. + +The infrastructure does provide an interface for the special +case where multiple security modules provide a process context. +This is provided in compound context format. + +- `lsm\0value\0lsm\0value\0` + +The `lsm` and `value` fields are nul terminated bytestrings.
Preferably NUL-terminated
Documentation/security/lsm.rst to identify it as the first security module to be registered. · line 155
Quoted 2 lines
Documentation/security/lsm.rst +2
-0+Each field may contain whitespace or non-printable characters. +The nul bytes are included in the size of a compound context.
NUL
Documentation/security/lsm.rst to identify it as the first security module to be registered. · line 159
Quoted 4 lines
Documentation/security/lsm.rst +4
-0+The context ``Bell\0Secret\0Biba\0Loose\0`` has a size of 23. + +The file ``/proc/pid/attr/context`` provides the security +context of the identified process.
thanks.
Signature · 2 lines
~Randy Reported-by: Randy Dunlap <[email protected]>
Casey Schaufler
maintainerPATCH v20 23/23 AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag
In reply to Casey SchauflerWith the inclusion of the "display" process attribute mechanism AppArmor no longer needs to be treated as an "exclusive" security module. Remove the flag that indicates it is exclusive. Remove the stub getpeersec_dgram AppArmor hook as it has no effect in the single LSM case and interferes in the multiple LSM case.
--- security/apparmor/lsm.c | 20 +------------------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 19 deletions(-)
security/apparmor/lsm.c +1 -19
@@ -1129,22 +1129,6 @@ static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,return error; } -/** -* apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram - get security label of packet -* @sock: the peer socket -* @skb: packet data -* @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet -* -* Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent -*/ -static int apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram (struct socket *sock, -struct sk_buff *skb,u32 *secid) - -{ -/* TODO: requires secid support */ -return -ENOPROTOOPT ; -} -/** * apparmor_sock_graft - Initialize newly created socket * @sk: child sock
@@ -1248,8 +1232,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {#endif LSM_HOOK_INIT (socket_getpeersec_stream, apparmor_socket_getpeersec_stream), -LSM_HOOK_INIT (socket_getpeersec_dgram, - apparmor_socket_getpeersec_dgram),LSM_HOOK_INIT (sock_graft, apparmor_sock_graft), #ifdef CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, apparmor_inet_conn_request),
@@ -1918,7 +1900,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void)DEFINE_LSM (apparmor) = { .name ="apparmor" , - .flags =LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR |LSM_FLAG_EXCLUSIVE , + .flags =LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR , .enabled = &apparmor_enabled, .blobs = &apparmor_blob_sizes, .init = apparmor_init,
Signature · 1 line
2.24.1
Casey Schaufler
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v20: Rebase to 5.9-rc1
Change the BPF security module to use the lsmblob data. (patch 0002) Repair length logic in subject label processing (patch 0015) Handle-EINVALfrom the empty BPF setprocattr hook (patch 0020) Correct length processing inappend_ctx()(patch 0022)
...https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.8-rc6-a-v19
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.9-rc1-v20
Sorry about the old URL.