Support TDX guests on Hyper-V
Subsystems (6)
Dexuan Cui
maintainerv6 cover Support TDX guests on Hyper-V
The patchset adds the Hyper-V specific code so that a TDX guest can run on Hyper-V. Please review.
The v6 patchset is based on today's mainline (a1fd058b07d5).
The v6 patchset addressed Michael's comments on patch 5:
Removed 2 unnecessary lines of messages from the commit log. Fixed the error handling path for hv_synic_alloc()/free(). Printed the 'ret' in hv_synic_alloc()/free().
@Michael Kelley: Can you please review patch 5?
@x86 maintainers:
If the patches look good to you, can you please take patch 1 and 2
into the tip tree?
@Wei Liu: I think patch 3, 4, 5, 6 should go through the Hyper-V tree since they change the Hyper-V code.
If you want to view the patches on github, it is here:
https://github.com/dcui/tdx/commits/decui/mainline/v6
FYI, v1-v5 are here:
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/[email protected]/
Thanks,
Dexuan
Dexuan Cui (6):
x86/tdx: Retry TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA() when needed x86/tdx: Support vmalloc() for tdx_enc_status_changed() x86/hyperv: Add hv_isolation_type_tdx() to detect TDX guests x86/hyperv: Support hypercalls for TDX guests
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Support TDX guests
x86/hyperv: Fix serial console interrupts for TDX guests
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c | 6 +- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 27 ++++++- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 20 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 20 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 43 ++++++++++ drivers/hv/hv.c | 65 ++++++++++++++- drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 30 +++++++ include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 1 + 10 files changed, 300 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Dexuan Cui
maintainerPATCH v6 1/6 x86/tdx: Retry TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA() when needed
GHCI spec for TDX 1.0 says that the MapGPA call may fail with the R10 error code = TDG.VP.VMCALL_RETRY (1), and the guest must retry this operation for the pages in the region starting at the GPA specified in R11.
When a TDX guest runs on Hyper-V, Hyper-V returns the retry error when hyperv_init() -> swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() -> set_memory_decrypted() decrypts up to 1GB of swiotlb bounce buffers.
---
Changes in v2:
Used __tdx_hypercall() directly in tdx_map_gpa(). Added a max_retry_cnt of 1000.
Renamed a few variables, e.g., r11 -> map_fail_paddr.
Changes in v3:
Changed max_retry_cnt from 1000 to 3.
Changes in v4:
__tdx_hypercall(&args, TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT) -> __tdx_hypercall_ret() Added Kirill's Acked-by.
Changes in v5:
Added Michael's Reviewed-by.
Changes in v6: None.
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +52 -12
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@#define TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA 0x10001#define TDVMCALL_REPORT_FATAL_ERROR 0x10003 +#define TDVMCALL_STATUS_RETRY 1 +/* MMIO direction */ #define EPT_READ 0#define EPT_WRITE 1
@@ -788,14 +790,15 @@ static bool try_accept_one(phys_addr_t *start, unsigned long len, }/* -* Inform the VMM of the guest's intent for this physical page: shared with -* the VMM or private to the guest. The VMM is expected to change its mapping -* of the page in response. +* Notify the VMM about page mapping conversion. More info about ABI +* can be found in TDX Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI), +* section "TDG.VP.VMCALL<MapGPA>". */ -static bool tdx_enc_status_changed (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages,bool enc) +static bool tdx_map_gpa (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end,bool enc) { -phys_addr_t start =__pa (vaddr); -phys_addr_t end =__pa (vaddr + numpages *PAGE_SIZE ); +int max_retry_cnt =3 , retry_cnt =0 ; +struct tdx_hypercall_args args; +u64 map_fail_paddr, ret;if (!enc) {/* Set the shared (decrypted) bits: */
@@ -803,12 +806,49 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc) end |=cc_mkdec (0 ); } -/* -* Notify the VMM about page mapping conversion. More info about ABI -* can be found in TDX Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI), -* section "TDG.VP.VMCALL<MapGPA>" -*/ -if (_tdx_hypercall (TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA , start, end - start,0 ,0 )) +while (1 ) { +memset (&args,0 ,sizeof (args)); + args.r10 =TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD ; + args.r11 =TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA ; + args.r12 = start; + args.r13 = end - start; + + ret =__tdx_hypercall_ret (&args); +if (ret !=TDVMCALL_STATUS_RETRY ) +break ; +/* +* The guest must retry the operation for the pages in the +* region starting at the GPA specified in R11. Make sure R11 +* contains a sane value. +*/ + map_fail_paddr = args.r11; +if (map_fail_paddr < start || map_fail_paddr >= end) +return false; + +if (map_fail_paddr == start) { + retry_cnt++; +if (retry_cnt > max_retry_cnt) +return false; + }else { + retry_cnt =0 ; + start = map_fail_paddr; + } + } + +return !ret; +} + +/* +* Inform the VMM of the guest's intent for this physical page: shared with +* the VMM or private to the guest. The VMM is expected to change its mapping +* of the page in response. +*/ +static bool tdx_enc_status_changed (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages,bool enc) +{ +phys_addr_t start =__pa (vaddr); +phys_addr_t end =__pa (vaddr + numpages *PAGE_SIZE ); + +if (!tdx_map_gpa (start, end, enc))return false;/* private->shared conversion requires only MapGPA call */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v6 1/6] x86/tdx: Retry TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA() when needed
Quoted 9 lines · Dexuan Cui
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +8
-1-if (_tdx_hypercall (TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA , start, end - start,0 ,0 )) +while (1 ) { +memset (&args,0 ,sizeof (args)); + args.r10 =TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD ; + args.r11 =TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA ; + args.r12 = start; + args.r13 = end - start; + + ret =__tdx_hypercall_ret (&args);
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc) · line 826
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +10
-0+if (ret !=TDVMCALL_STATUS_RETRY ) +break ; +/* +* The guest must retry the operation for the pages in the +* region starting at the GPA specified in R11. Make sure R11 +* contains a sane value. +*/ + map_fail_paddr = args.r11; +if (map_fail_paddr < start || map_fail_paddr >= end) +return false;
This should probably also say: "r11" comes from the untrusted VMM. Sanity check it.
Should this *really* be "map_fail_paddr >= end"? Or is "map_fail_paddr
Quoted 1 line
end" sufficient. In other words, is it really worth failing this if a
VMM said to retry a 0-byte region at the end?
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc) · line 830
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +3
-0+if (map_fail_paddr == start) { + retry_cnt++; +if (retry_cnt > max_retry_cnt)
I think we can spare two bytes in a few spots to make these 'count' instead of 'cnt'.
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc) · line 836
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +6
-0+return false; + }else { + retry_cnt =0 ; + start = map_fail_paddr; + } + }
this fails the "normal operation should be at the lowest indentation" rule. How about this:
while (retry_count < max_retries) {
...
/* "Consume" a retry without forward progress: */
if (map_fail_paddr == start) {
retry_count++;
continue;
}
start = map_fail_paddr;
retry_count = 0;
}
// plus maybe a wee bit different 'ret' processing'max_retries' also ends up being a misnomer. You can have as many retries as there are pages plus 'max_retries'. It's really "maximum allowed consecutive failures". Maybe it should be "max_retries_per_page".
Dexuan Cui
maintainerRE: [PATCH v6 1/6] x86/tdx: Retry TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA() when needed
Quoted 18 lines
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
Sent: Tuesday, May 23, 2023 2:13 PM
...Quoted 14 lines · Dexuan Cui
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +13
-1-if (_tdx_hypercall (TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA , start, end - start,0 ,0 )) +while (1 ) { +memset (&args,0 ,sizeof (args)); + args.r10 =TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD ; + args.r11 =TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA ; + args.r12 = start; + args.r13 = end - start; + + ret =__tdx_hypercall_ret (&args); +if (ret !=TDVMCALL_STATUS_RETRY ) +break ; +/* +* The guest must retry the operation for the pages in the +* region starting at the GPA specified in R11. Make sure R11
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc) · line 826
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +5
-0+* contains a sane value. +*/ + map_fail_paddr = args.r11; +if (map_fail_paddr < start || map_fail_paddr >= end) +return false;This should probably also say: "r11" comes from the untrusted VMM. Sanity check it.
Thanks! I'll use the wording you recommended in the next version.
Quoted 3 lines
Should this *really* be "
map_fail_paddr>= end"? Or is "map_fail_paddr> end" sufficient. In other words, is it really worth failing this if a VMM said to retry a 0-byte region at the end?
According to the GHCI spec, R13 "must be a multiple of 4KB". My understanding is that R13 should not be 0, and a hypervisor is not supposed to tell the guest to retry a 0-byte region at the end.
IMHO it should be a hypervisor bug if a hypervisor returns TDVMCALL_STATUS_RETRY and the returned 'map_fail_paddr' equals 'end' (Note: the valid page range is [start, end - 1]).
Hyper-V returns "invalid parameter" if the length (i.e. args.r13) is 0, so "retry a 0-byte region at the end" would fail anyway. I guess other hypervisors may also return an error if the length is 0.
So I'd like to keep the comparison as-is.
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc) · line 830
Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +3
-0+if (map_fail_paddr == start) { + retry_cnt++; +if (retry_cnt > max_retry_cnt)I think we can spare two bytes in a few spots to make these 'count' instead of 'cnt'.
Ok, I'll rename the variable 'max_retry_cnt' to 'max_retries_per_page', and 'retry_cnt' to 'retry_count'.
Quoted 26 lines
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc) · line 836
Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +6
-0+return false; + }else { + retry_cnt =0 ; + start = map_fail_paddr; + } + }this fails the "normal operation should be at the lowest indentation" rule. How about this:
while (retry_count < max_retries) { ... /* "Consume" a retry without forward progress: */ if (map_fail_paddr == start) { retry_count++; continue; } start = map_fail_paddr; retry_count = 0; } // plus maybe a wee bit different 'ret' processing
Quoted 3 lines
'
max_retries' also ends up being a misnomer. You can have as many retries as there are pages plus 'max_retries'. It's really "maximum allowed consecutive failures". Maybe it should be "max_retries_per_page".
Thanks, I'll raname 'max_retries" to 'max_retries_per_page'.
I'll use the beow in the next version.
I added "const" to "int max_retries_per_page".
Please let me know if I missed anything.
+static bool tdx_map_gpa(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end, bool enc) +{
+ const int max_retries_per_page = 3;
+ struct tdx_hypercall_args args;
+ u64 map_fail_paddr, ret;
+ int retry_count = 0;
+
+ if (!enc) {
+ /* Set the shared (decrypted) bits: */
+ start |= cc_mkdec(0);
+ end |= cc_mkdec(0);
+ }
+
+ while (retry_count < max_retries_per_page) {
+ memset(&args, 0, sizeof(args));
+ args.r10 = TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD;
+ args.r11 = TDVMCALL_MAP_GPA;
+ args.r12 = start;
+ args.r13 = end - start;
+
+ ret = __tdx_hypercall_ret(&args);
+ if (ret != TDVMCALL_STATUS_RETRY)
+ return !ret;
+ /*
+ * The guest must retry the operation for the pages in the
+ * region starting at the GPA specified in R11. R11 comes
+ * from the untrusted VMM. Sanity check it.
+ */
+ map_fail_paddr = args.r11;
+ if (map_fail_paddr < start || map_fail_paddr >= end)
+ return false;
+
+ /* "Consume" a retry without forward progress */
+ if (map_fail_paddr == start) {
+ retry_count++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ start = map_fail_paddr;
+ retry_count = 0;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
Dexuan Cui
maintainerPATCH v6 2/6 x86/tdx: Support vmalloc() for tdx_enc_status_changed()
In reply to Dexuan CuiWhen a TDX guest runs on Hyper-V, the hv_netvsc driver's netvsc_init_buf() allocates buffers using vzalloc(), and needs to share the buffers with the host OS by calling set_memory_decrypted(), which is not working for vmalloc() yet. Add the support by handling the pages one by one.
---
Changes in v2:
Changed tdx_enc_status_changed() in place.
Hi, Dave, I checked the huge vmalloc mapping code, but still don't know how to get the underlying huge page info (if huge page is in use) and try to use PG_LEVEL_2M/1G in try_accept_page() for vmalloc: I checked is_vm_area_hugepages() and __vfree() -> __vunmap(), and I think the underlying page allocation info is internal to the mm code, and there is no mm API to for me get the info in tdx_enc_status_changed().
Changes in v3:
No change since v2.
Changes in v4:
Added Kirill's Co-developed-by since Kirill helped to improve the
code by adding tdx_enc_status_changed_phys().
Thanks Kirill for the clarification on load_unaligned_zeropad()!
The vzalloc() usage in drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c: netvsc_init_buf()
remains the same. It may not worth it to "allocate a vmalloc region, allocate pages manually", because we have to consider the worst case where the system is sufferiing from severe memory fragmentation and we can only allocate multiple single pages. We may not want to complicate the code in netvsc_init_buf(). We'll support NIC SR-IOV for TDX VMs on Hyper-V, so the netvsc send/recv buffers won't be used when the VF NIC is up.
Changes in v5:
Added Kirill's Signed-off-by.
Added Michael's Reviewed-by.
Changes in v6: None.
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------- 1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +52 -24
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@#include <linux/cpufeature.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/mm.h> #include <asm/coco.h> #include <asm/tdx.h> #include <asm/vmx.h>
@@ -789,6 +790,34 @@ static bool try_accept_one(phys_addr_t *start, unsigned long len,return true; } +static bool try_accept_page (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end) +{ +/* +* For shared->private conversion, accept the page using +* TDX_ACCEPT_PAGE TDX module call. +*/ +while (start < end) { +unsigned long len = end - start; + +/* +* Try larger accepts first. It gives chance to VMM to keep +* 1G/2M SEPT entries where possible and speeds up process by +* cutting number of hypercalls (if successful). +*/ + +if (try_accept_one (&start, len,PG_LEVEL_1G )) +continue ; + +if (try_accept_one (&start, len,PG_LEVEL_2M )) +continue ; + +if (!try_accept_one (&start, len,PG_LEVEL_4K )) +return false; + } + +return true; +} +/* * Notify the VMM about page mapping conversion. More info about ABI * can be found in TDX Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI),
@@ -838,6 +867,19 @@ static bool tdx_map_gpa(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end, bool enc)return !ret; } +static bool tdx_enc_status_changed_phys (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end, +bool enc) +{ +if (!tdx_map_gpa (start, end, enc)) +return false; + +/* private->shared conversion requires only MapGPA call */ +if (!enc) +return true; + +return try_accept_page (start, end); +} +/* * Inform the VMM of the guest's intent for this physical page: shared with * the VMM or private to the guest. The VMM is expected to change its mapping
@@ -845,37 +887,23 @@ static bool tdx_map_gpa(phys_addr_t start, phys_addr_t end, bool enc)*/ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages,bool enc) { -phys_addr_t start =__pa (vaddr); -phys_addr_t end =__pa (vaddr + numpages *PAGE_SIZE ); +unsigned long start = vaddr; +unsigned long end = start + numpages *PAGE_SIZE ; -if (!tdx_map_gpa (start, end, enc)) +if (offset_in_page (start) !=0 )return false; -/* private->shared conversion requires only MapGPA call */ -if (!enc) -return true; +if (!is_vmalloc_addr ((void *)start)) +return tdx_enc_status_changed_phys (__pa (start),__pa (end), enc); -/* -* For shared->private conversion, accept the page using -* TDX_ACCEPT_PAGE TDX module call. -*/ while (start < end) { -unsigned long len = end - start; +phys_addr_t start_pa =slow_virt_to_phys ((void *)start); +phys_addr_t end_pa = start_pa +PAGE_SIZE ; -/* -* Try larger accepts first. It gives chance to VMM to keep -* 1G/2M SEPT entries where possible and speeds up process by -* cutting number of hypercalls (if successful). -*/ - -if (try_accept_one (&start, len,PG_LEVEL_1G )) -continue ; - -if (try_accept_one (&start, len,PG_LEVEL_2M )) -continue ; - -if (!try_accept_one (&start, len,PG_LEVEL_4K )) +if (!tdx_enc_status_changed_phys (start_pa, end_pa, enc))return false; + + start +=PAGE_SIZE ; }return true;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] x86/tdx: Support vmalloc() for tdx_enc_status_changed()
Quoted 4 lines · Dexuan Cui
When a TDX guest runs on Hyper-V, the
hv_netvscdriver'snetvsc_init_buf()allocates buffers usingvzalloc(), and needs to share the buffers with the host OS by callingset_memory_decrypted(), which is not working forvmalloc()yet. Add the support by handling the pages one by one.
I think this sets a bad precedent.
There are consequences for converting pages between shared and private. Doing it on a vmalloc() mapping is guaranteed to fracture the underlying EPT/SEPT mappings.
How does this work with load_unaligned_zeropad()? Couldn't it be running around poking at one of these vmalloc()'d pages via the direct map during a shared->private conversion before the page has been accepted?
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] x86/tdx: Support vmalloc() for tdx_enc_status_changed()
Quoted 7 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 4 lines · Dexuan Cui
When a TDX guest runs on Hyper-V, the
hv_netvscdriver'snetvsc_init_buf()allocates buffers usingvzalloc(), and needs to share the buffers with the host OS by callingset_memory_decrypted(), which is not working forvmalloc()yet. Add the support by handling the pages one by one.I think this sets a bad precedent.
+1
Quoted 7 lines
There are consequences for converting pages between shared and private. Doing it on a
vmalloc()mapping is guaranteed to fracture the underlying EPT/SEPT mappings.How does this work with
load_unaligned_zeropad()? Couldn't it be running around poking at one of these vmalloc()'d pages via the direct map during ashared->privateconversion before the page has been accepted?
Would it be feasible and sensible to add a GFP_SHARED or whatever, to communicate to the core allocators that the page is destined to be converted to a shared page? I assume that would provide a common place (or two) for initiating conversions, and would hopefully allow for future optimizations, e.g. to keep shared allocation in the same pool or whatever. Sharing memory without any intelligence as to what memory is converted is going to make both the guest and host sad.
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] x86/tdx: Support vmalloc() for tdx_enc_status_changed()
Quoted 7 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 7 lines
There are consequences for converting pages between shared and private. Doing it on a
vmalloc()mapping is guaranteed to fracture the underlying EPT/SEPT mappings.How does this work with
load_unaligned_zeropad()? Couldn't it be running around poking at one of these vmalloc()'d pages via the direct map during ashared->privateconversion before the page has been accepted?
Quoted 6 lines
Would it be feasible and sensible to add a
GFP_SHAREDor whatever, to communicate to the core allocators that the page is destined to be converted to a shared page? I assume that would provide a common place (or two) for initiating conversions, and would hopefully allow for future optimizations, e.g. to keep shared allocation in the same pool or whatever. Sharing memory without any intelligence as to what memory is converted is going to make both the guest and host sad.
I don't think we want a GFP flag. This is still way too specialized to warrant one of those.
It sounds like a similar problem to what folks want for modules or BPF. There are a bunch of allocations that are related and can have some of their setup/teardown costs amortized if they can be clumped together.
For BPF, the costs are from doing RW=>RO in the kernel direct map, and fracturing it in the process.
Here, the costs are from the private->shared conversions and fracturing both the direct map and the EPT/SEPT.
I just don't know if there's anything that we can reuse from the BPF effort.
Edgecombe, Rick P
maintainerRe: [PATCH v6 2/6] x86/tdx: Support vmalloc() for tdx_enc_status_changed()
Quoted 38 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 11 lines
There are consequences for converting pages between shared and private.
Doing it on avmalloc()mapping is guaranteed to fracture the underlying
EPT/SEPT mappings.How does this work with load_unaligned_zeropad()? Couldn't it be running around poking at one of these vmalloc()'d pages via the direct
map during ashared->privateconversion before the page has been accepted?Quoted 11 lines
Would it be feasible and sensible to add a
GFP_SHAREDor whatever, to communicate
to the core allocators that the page is destined to be converted to a shared page?
I assume that would provide a common place (or two) for initiating conversions,
and would hopefully allow for future optimizations, e.g. to keep shared allocation
in the same pool or whatever. Sharing memory without any intelligence as to what
memory is converted is going to make both the guest and host sad.I don't think we want a GFP flag. This is still way too specialized to
warrant one of those.It sounds like a similar problem to what folks want for modules or BPF.
There are a bunch of allocations that are related and can have some of
their setup/teardown costs amortized if they can be clumped together.For BPF, the costs are from doing RW=>RO in the kernel direct map, and
fracturing it in the process.
Quoted 6 lines
Here, the costs are from the
private->sharedconversions and fracturing
both the direct map and the EPT/SEPT.I just don't know if there's anything that we can reuse from the BPF effort.
Last I saw the BPF allocator was focused on module space memory and packing multiple allocations into pages. So that would probably have to be generalized to support this.
But also, a lot of the efforts around improving direct map modification efficiency have sort of assumed all of the types of special permissions could be grouped together on the direct map and just mapped elsewhere in whatever permission they needed. This does seem like a special case where it really needs to be grouped together only with similar permissions.
If a GFP flag is too precious, what about something like PKS tables[0] tried. It kind of had a similar problem with respect to preferring physically contiguous special permissioned memory on the direct map. It did this with a cache of converted pages outside the page allocator and a separate alloc() function to get at it. This one could be vmalloc_shared() or something. Don't know, just tossing it out there.
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] x86/tdx: Support vmalloc() for tdx_enc_status_changed()
In reply to Dave HansenQuoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 4 lines · Dexuan Cui
When a TDX guest runs on Hyper-V, the
hv_netvscdriver'snetvsc_init_buf()allocates buffers usingvzalloc(), and needs to share the buffers with the host OS by callingset_memory_decrypted(), which is not working forvmalloc()yet. Add the support by handling the pages one by one.I think this sets a bad precedent.
Quoted 7 lines
There are consequences for converting pages between shared and private. Doing it on a
vmalloc()mapping is guaranteed to fracture the underlying EPT/SEPT mappings.How does this work with
load_unaligned_zeropad()? Couldn't it be running around poking at one of these vmalloc()'d pages via the direct map during ashared->privateconversion before the page has been accepted?
Alias processing in __change_page_attr_set_clr() will change direct mapping if you call it on vmalloc()ed memory. I think we are safe wrt load_unaligned_zeropad() here.
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] x86/tdx: Support vmalloc() for tdx_enc_status_changed()
Quoted 6 lines · On 5/23/23 15:37, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 3 lines
How does this work with
load_unaligned_zeropad()? Couldn't it be running around poking at one of these vmalloc()'d pages via the direct map during ashared->privateconversion before the page has been accepted?Alias processing in
__change_page_attr_set_clr()will change direct mapping if you call it on vmalloc()ed memory. I think we are safe wrtload_unaligned_zeropad()here.
We're *eventually* OK:
Quoted 4 lines
/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */
x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc);
ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);But what about in the middle between enc_status_change_prepare() and __change_page_attr_set_clr()? Don't the direct map and the shared/private status of the page diverge in there?
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] x86/tdx: Support vmalloc() for tdx_enc_status_changed()
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines · On 5/23/23 15:37, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 3 lines
How does this work with
load_unaligned_zeropad()? Couldn't it be running around poking at one of these vmalloc()'d pages via the direct map during ashared->privateconversion before the page has been accepted?Alias processing in
__change_page_attr_set_clr()will change direct mapping if you call it on vmalloc()ed memory. I think we are safe wrtload_unaligned_zeropad()here.We're *eventually* OK:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */ x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc); ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);But what about in the middle between
enc_status_change_prepare()and__change_page_attr_set_clr()? Don't the direct map and the shared/private status of the page diverge in there?
Hmm. Maybe we would need to go through making the range in direct mapping non-present before notifying VMM about the change.
I need to look at this again in the morning.
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] x86/tdx: Support vmalloc() for tdx_enc_status_changed()
Quoted 16 lines · On Wed, May 24, 2023 at 02:28:51AM +0300, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 15 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines · On 5/23/23 15:37, [email protected] wrote:
Quoted 3 lines
How does this work with
load_unaligned_zeropad()? Couldn't it be running around poking at one of these vmalloc()'d pages via the direct map during ashared->privateconversion before the page has been accepted?Alias processing in
__change_page_attr_set_clr()will change direct mapping if you call it on vmalloc()ed memory. I think we are safe wrtload_unaligned_zeropad()here.We're *eventually* OK:
Quoted 4 lines
/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */ x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc); ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1);
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
But what about in the middle between
enc_status_change_prepare()and__change_page_attr_set_clr()? Don't the direct map and the shared/private status of the page diverge in there?Hmm. Maybe we would need to go through making the range in direct mapping non-present before notifying VMM about the change.
I need to look at this again in the morning.
Okay, I've got around to it finally.
Private->Shared conversion is safe: we first set shared bit in the direct mapping and all aliases and then call MapGPA enc_status_change_finish(). So we don't have privately mapped pages that we converted to shared with MapGPA.
Shared->Private is not safe. As with Private->Shared, we adjust direct mapping before notifying VMM and accepting the memory, so there's short window when privately mapped memory that is neither mapped into SEPT nor accepted. It is a problem as it can race with load_unaligned_zeropad().
Shared->Private conversion is rare. I only see one call total during the boot in my setup. Worth fixing anyway.
The patch below fixes the issue by hooking up enc_status_change_prepare() and doing conversion from Shared to Private there.
enc_status_change_finish() only covers Private to Shared conversion.
The patch is on top of unaccepted memory patchset. It is more convenient base. I will rebase to Linus' tree if the approach looks sane to you.
Any comments?
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +21 -4
@@ -713,16 +713,32 @@ static bool tdx_cache_flush_required(void)return true; } +static bool tdx_enc_status_change_prepare (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages, +bool enc) +{ +phys_addr_t start =__pa (vaddr); +phys_addr_t end =__pa (vaddr + numpages *PAGE_SIZE ); + +if (!enc) +return true; + +return tdx_enc_status_changed_phys (start, end, enc); +} +/* * Inform the VMM of the guest's intent for this physical page: shared with * the VMM or private to the guest. The VMM is expected to change its mapping * of the page in response. */ -static bool tdx_enc_status_changed (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages,bool enc) +static bool tdx_enc_status_change_finish (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages, +bool enc) {phys_addr_t start =__pa (vaddr);phys_addr_t end =__pa (vaddr + numpages *PAGE_SIZE ); +if (enc) +return true; +return tdx_enc_status_changed_phys (start, end, enc); }
@@ -753,9 +769,10 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)*/ physical_mask &= cc_mask -1 ; - x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = tdx_cache_flush_required; - x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = tdx_tlb_flush_required; - x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = tdx_enc_status_changed; + x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = tdx_cache_flush_required; + x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = tdx_tlb_flush_required; + x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare = tdx_enc_status_change_prepare; + x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = tdx_enc_status_change_finish;pr_info ("Guest detected\n" ); }
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h +1 -1
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {* @enc_cache_flush_required Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status */ struct x86_guest { -void (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc); +bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc);bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc);bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void );
arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c +2 -2
@@ -130,8 +130,8 @@ struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit = {static void default_nmi_init (void ) { }; -static void enc_status_change_prepare_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) { } -static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return false; } +static bool enc_status_change_prepare_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return true; } +static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return true; }static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop (bool enc) {return false; }static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop (void ) {return false; }static bool is_private_mmio_noop (u64 addr) {return false; }
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +3 -1
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc)#endif } -static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) +static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {/* * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
@@ -327,6 +327,8 @@ static void amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool*/ if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP ) && !enc)snp_set_memory_shared (vaddr, npages); + +return true; }/* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +2 -1
@@ -2151,7 +2151,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)cpa_flush (&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required ());/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */ - x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare (addr, numpages, enc); +if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare (addr, numpages, enc)) +return -EIO ; ret =__change_page_attr_set_clr (&cpa,1 );
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Re: [PATCH v6 2/6] x86/tdx: Support vmalloc() for tdx_enc_status_changed()
Quoted 2 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Shared->Privateconversion is rare. I only see one call total during the boot in my setup. Worth fixing anyway.
...
Quoted 1 line
Any comments?
So the rules are:
* Shared mapping of a private page: BAD
* Private mapping of a shared page: OK
?
The patch seems OK, other than having zero comments in it.
Dexuan Cui
maintainerPATCH v6 3/6 x86/hyperv: Add hv_isolation_type_tdx() to detect TDX guests
In reply to Dexuan CuiNo logic change to SNP/VBS guests.
hv_isolation_type_tdx() wil be used to instruct a TDX guest on Hyper-V to do some TDX-specific operations, e.g. hv_do_hypercall() should use __tdx_hypercall(), and a TDX guest on Hyper-V should handle the Hyper-V Event/Message/Monitor pages specially.
---
Changes in v2:
Added "#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST and #endif" for
hv_isolation_type_tdx() in arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c.
Simplified the changes in ms_hyperv_init_platform().
Changes in v3:
Added Kuppuswamy's Reviewed-by.
Changes in v4:
A minor rebase to Michael's v7 DDA patchset.
Changes in v5:
Added Michael's Reviewed-by.
Changes in v6: None.
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 2 ++ drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 6 ++++++ include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +6 -0
@@ -400,6 +400,7 @@ bool hv_is_isolation_supported(void) }DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (isolation_type_snp); +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (isolation_type_tdx);/* * hv_isolation_type_snp - Check system runs in the AMD SEV-SNP based
@@ -409,3 +410,8 @@ bool hv_isolation_type_snp(void) {return static_branch_unlikely (&isolation_type_snp); } + +bool hv_isolation_type_tdx (void ) +{ +return static_branch_unlikely (&isolation_type_tdx); +}
arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h +2 -1
@@ -169,7 +169,8 @@enum hv_isolation_type {HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE =0 ,HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_VBS =1 , -HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP =2 +HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP =2 , +HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_TDX =3 };/* Hyper-V specific model specific registers (MSRs) */
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +3 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@union hv_ghcb ;DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (isolation_type_snp); +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (isolation_type_tdx); typedef int (*hyperv_fill_flush_list_func)( struct hv_guest_mapping_flush_list *flush,
@@ -47,6 +48,8 @@ extern u64 hv_current_partition_id;extern union hv_ghcb *__percpu *hv_ghcb_pg; +extern bool hv_isolation_type_tdx (void ); +int hv_call_deposit_pages (int node,u64 partition_id,u32 num_pages);int hv_call_add_logical_proc (int node,u32 lp_index,u32 acpi_id);int hv_call_create_vp (int node,u64 partition_id,u32 vp_index,u32 flags);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +2 -0
@@ -404,6 +404,8 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP )static_branch_enable (&isolation_type_snp); +else if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_TDX ) +static_branch_enable (&isolation_type_tdx); }if (hv_max_functions_eax >=HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES ) {
drivers/hv/hv_common.c +6 -0
@@ -502,6 +502,12 @@ bool __weak hv_isolation_type_snp(void) }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_isolation_type_snp); +bool __weak hv_isolation_type_tdx (void ) +{ +return false; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_isolation_type_tdx); +void __weak hv_setup_vmbus_handler (void (*handler)(void )) { }
include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h +1 -0
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ extern void * __percpu *hyperv_pcpu_output_arg;extern u64 hv_do_hypercall (u64 control,void *inputaddr,void *outputaddr);extern u64 hv_do_fast_hypercall8 (u16 control,u64 input8);extern bool hv_isolation_type_snp (void ); +extern bool hv_isolation_type_tdx (void );/* Helper functions that provide a consistent pattern for checking Hyper-V hypercall status. */ static inline int hv_result (u64 status)
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Dexuan Cui
maintainerPATCH v6 4/6 x86/hyperv: Support hypercalls for TDX guests
In reply to Dexuan CuiA TDX guest uses the GHCI call rather than hv_hypercall_pg.
In hv_do_hypercall(), Hyper-V requires that the input/output addresses must have the cc_mask.
---
Changes in v2:
Implemented hv_tdx_hypercall() in C rather than in assembly code. Renamed the parameter names of hv_tdx_hypercall(). Used cc_mkdec() directly in hv_do_hypercall().
Changes in v3:
Decrypted/encrypted hyperv_pcpu_input_arg in
hv_common_cpu_init() and hv_common_cpu_die().
Changes in v4:
__tdx_hypercall(&args, TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT) -> __tdx_hypercall_ret() hv_common_cpu_die(): explicitly ignore the error set_memory_encrypted() [Michael Kelley] Added Sathyanarayanan's Reviewed-by.
Changes in v5:
Added Michael's Reviewed-by.
Changes in v6: None.
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 8 ++++++++ arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 17 +++++++++++++++++ drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c +8 -0
@@ -432,6 +432,10 @@ void __init hyperv_init(void)/* Hyper-V requires to write guest os id via ghcb in SNP IVM. */ hv_ghcb_msr_write (HV_X64_MSR_GUEST_OS_ID , guest_id); +/* A TDX guest uses the GHCI call rather than hv_hypercall_pg. */ +if (hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) + goto skip_hypercall_pg_init; + hv_hypercall_pg = __vmalloc_node_range(PAGE_SIZE, 1, VMALLOC_START, VMALLOC_END, GFP_KERNEL, PAGE_KERNEL_ROX, VM_FLUSH_RESET_PERMS, NUMA_NO_NODE,
@@ -471,6 +475,7 @@ void __init hyperv_init(void)wrmsrl (HV_X64_MSR_HYPERCALL , hypercall_msr.as_uint64); } +skip_hypercall_pg_init:/* * hyperv_init() is called before LAPIC is initialized: see * apic_intr_mode_init() -> x86_platform.apic_post_init() and
@@ -594,6 +599,9 @@ bool hv_is_hyperv_initialized(void)if (x86_hyper_type !=X86_HYPER_MS_HYPERV )return false; +/* A TDX guest uses the GHCI call rather than hv_hypercall_pg. */ +if (hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) +return true;/* * Verify that earlier initialization succeeded by checking * that the hypercall page is setup
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +14 -0
@@ -415,3 +415,17 @@ bool hv_isolation_type_tdx(void) {return static_branch_unlikely (&isolation_type_tdx); } + +u64 hv_tdx_hypercall (u64 control,u64 param1,u64 param2) +{ +struct tdx_hypercall_args args = { }; + + args.r10 = control; + args.rdx = param1; + args.r8 = param2; + + (void )__tdx_hypercall_ret (&args); + +return args.r11; +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_tdx_hypercall);
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +17 -0
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> #include <asm/paravirt.h> #include <asm/mshyperv.h> +#include <asm/coco.h> /* * Hyper-V always provides a single IO-APIC at this MMIO address.
@@ -54,6 +55,12 @@ int hv_call_deposit_pages(int node, u64 partition_id, u32 num_pages);int hv_call_add_logical_proc (int node,u32 lp_index,u32 acpi_id);int hv_call_create_vp (int node,u64 partition_id,u32 vp_index,u32 flags); +u64 hv_tdx_hypercall (u64 control,u64 param1,u64 param2); + +/* +* If the hypercall involves no input or output parameters, the hypervisor +* ignores the corresponding GPA pointer. +*/ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall (u64 control,void *input,void *output) {u64 input_address = input ?virt_to_phys (input) :0 ;
@@ -61,6 +68,10 @@ static inline u64 hv_do_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output)u64 hv_status;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +if (hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) +return hv_tdx_hypercall (control, +cc_mkdec (input_address), +cc_mkdec (output_address));if (!hv_hypercall_pg)return U64_MAX ;
@@ -104,6 +115,9 @@ static inline u64 _hv_do_fast_hypercall8(u64 control, u64 input1)u64 hv_status;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +if (hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) +return hv_tdx_hypercall (control, input1,0 ); + { __asm__ __volatile__(CALL_NOSPEC : "=a" (hv_status), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT,
@@ -149,6 +163,9 @@ static inline u64 _hv_do_fast_hypercall16(u64 control, u64 input1, u64 input2)u64 hv_status;#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 +if (hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) +return hv_tdx_hypercall (control, input1, input2); + { __asm__ __volatile__("mov %4, %%r8\n" CALL_NOSPEC
drivers/hv/hv_common.c +24 -0
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@#include <linux/kmsg_dump.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/dma-map-ops.h> +#include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h> #include <asm/mshyperv.h>
@@ -359,6 +360,7 @@ int hv_common_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)u64 msr_vp_index;gfp_t flags;int pgcount = hv_root_partition ?2 :1 ; +int ret;/* hv_cpu_init() can be called with IRQs disabled from hv_resume() */ flags =irqs_disabled () ?GFP_ATOMIC :GFP_KERNEL ;
@@ -368,6 +370,17 @@ int hv_common_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)if (!(*inputarg))return -ENOMEM ; +if (hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) { + ret =set_memory_decrypted ((unsigned long )*inputarg, pgcount); +if (ret) { +/* It may be unsafe to free *inputarg */ + *inputarg =NULL ; +return ret; + } + +memset (*inputarg,0x00 , pgcount *HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ); + } +if (hv_root_partition) { outputarg = (void **)this_cpu_ptr (hyperv_pcpu_output_arg); *outputarg = (char *)(*inputarg) +HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ;
@@ -388,6 +401,8 @@ int hv_common_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu)unsigned long flags;void **inputarg, **outputarg;void *mem; +int pgcount = hv_root_partition ?2 :1 ; +int ret;local_irq_save (flags);
@@ -402,6 +417,15 @@ int hv_common_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu)local_irq_restore (flags); +if (hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) { + ret =set_memory_encrypted ((unsigned long )mem, pgcount); +if (ret) +pr_warn ("Hyper-V: Failed to encrypt input arg on cpu%d: %d\n" , + cpu, ret); +/* It's unsafe to free 'mem'. */ +return 0 ; + } +kfree (mem);return 0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Dexuan Cui
maintainerPATCH v6 5/6 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Support TDX guests
In reply to Dexuan CuiAdd Hyper-V specific code so that a TDX guest can run on Hyper-V:
No need to use hv_vp_assist_page.
Don't use the unsafe Hyper-V TSC page.
Don't try to use HV_REGISTER_CRASH_CTL.
Don't trust Hyper-V's TLB-flushing hypercalls.
Don't use lazy EOI.
---
Changes in v2:
Used a new function hv_set_memory_enc_dec_needed() in
__set_memory_enc_pgtable().
Added the missing set_memory_encrypted() in hv_synic_free().
Changes in v3:
Use pgprot_decrypted(PAGE_KERNEL)in hv_ringbuffer_init(). (Do not use PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC, which doesn't exist for ARM64).
Used cc_mkdec() in hv_synic_enable_regs().
ms_hyperv_init_platform():
Explicitly do not use HV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED. Explicitly do not use HV_X64_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED.
Enabled __send_ipi_mask() and __send_ipi_one() for TDX guests.
Changes in v4:
A minor rebase to Michael's v7 DDA patchset. I'm very happy that
I can drop my v3 change to arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c due to Michael's work.
Changes in v5:
Added memset() to clear synic_message_page and synic_event_page()
after set_memory_decrypted().
Rebased the patch since "post_msg_page" has been removed in
hyperv-next.
Improved the error handling in hv_synic_alloc()/free() [Michael
Kelley]
Changes in v6:
Adressed Michael Kelley's comments on patch 5:
Removed 2 unnecessary lines of messages from the commit log. Fixed the error handling path for hv_synic_alloc()/free(). Printed the 'ret' in hv_synic_alloc()/free().
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c | 6 ++-- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 19 +++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 21 ++++++++++- drivers/hv/hv.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c +4 -2
@@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ static bool __send_ipi_mask(const struct cpumask *mask, int vector, (exclude_self && weight == 1 && cpumask_test_cpu(this_cpu, mask)))return true; -if (!hv_hypercall_pg) +/* A TDX guest doesn't use hv_hypercall_pg. */ +if (!hv_isolation_type_tdx () && !hv_hypercall_pg)return false;if ((vector <HV_IPI_LOW_VECTOR ) || (vector >HV_IPI_HIGH_VECTOR ))
@@ -231,7 +232,8 @@ static bool __send_ipi_one(int cpu, int vector)trace_hyperv_send_ipi_one (cpu, vector); -if (!hv_hypercall_pg || (vp ==VP_INVAL )) +/* A TDX guest doesn't use hv_hypercall_pg. */ +if ((!hv_isolation_type_tdx () && !hv_hypercall_pg) || (vp ==VP_INVAL ))return false;if ((vector <HV_IPI_LOW_VECTOR ) || (vector >HV_IPI_HIGH_VECTOR ))
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c +15 -4
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int hyperv_init_ghcb(void)static int hv_cpu_init (unsigned int cpu) {union hv_vp_assist_msr_contents msr = {0 }; -struct hv_vp_assist_page **hvp = &hv_vp_assist_page[cpu]; +struct hv_vp_assist_page **hvp;int ret; ret =hv_common_cpu_init (cpu);
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static int hv_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)if (!hv_vp_assist_page)return 0 ; + hvp = &hv_vp_assist_page[cpu];if (hv_root_partition) {/* * For root partition we get the hypervisor provided VP assist
@@ -398,11 +399,21 @@ void __init hyperv_init(void)if (hv_common_init ())return ; - hv_vp_assist_page =kcalloc (num_possible_cpus (), -sizeof (*hv_vp_assist_page),GFP_KERNEL ); +/* +* The VP assist page is useless to a TDX guest: the only use we +* would have for it is lazy EOI, which can not be used with TDX. +*/ +if (hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) + hv_vp_assist_page =NULL ; +else + hv_vp_assist_page =kcalloc (num_possible_cpus (), +sizeof (*hv_vp_assist_page), +GFP_KERNEL );if (!hv_vp_assist_page) { ms_hyperv.hints &= ~HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED ; - goto common_free; + +if (!hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) + goto common_free; }if (hv_isolation_type_snp ()) {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +20 -1
@@ -404,8 +404,27 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP )static_branch_enable (&isolation_type_snp); -else if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_TDX ) +else if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_TDX ) {static_branch_enable (&isolation_type_tdx); + +/* +* The GPAs of SynIC Event/Message pages and VMBus +* Moniter pages need to be added by this offset. +*/ + ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary =cc_mkdec (0 ); + +/* Don't use the unsafe Hyper-V TSC page */ + ms_hyperv.features &= ~HV_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC_AVAILABLE ; + +/* HV_REGISTER_CRASH_CTL is unsupported */ + ms_hyperv.misc_features &= ~HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE ; + +/* Don't trust Hyper-V's TLB-flushing hypercalls */ + ms_hyperv.hints &= ~HV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED ; + +/* A TDX VM must use x2APIC and doesn't use lazy EOI */ + ms_hyperv.hints &= ~HV_X64_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED ; + } }if (hv_max_functions_eax >=HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES ) {
drivers/hv/hv.c +62 -3
115 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
RE: [PATCH v6 5/6] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Support TDX guests
From: Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
Quoted 7 lines
Add Hyper-V specific code so that a TDX guest can run on Hyper-V:
No need to usehv_vp_assist_page.
Don't use the unsafe Hyper-V TSC page.
Don't try to useHV_REGISTER_CRASH_CTL.
Don't trust Hyper-V's TLB-flushing hypercalls.
Don't use lazy EOI.
Nit: Actually, you overdid the cleanup. :-( The line in v5 about "Share SynIC Event/Message pages" was correct. It was only the part about VMBus Monitor pages that no longer applied.
Quoted 276 lines
Signed-off-by Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>---
Changes in v2:
Used a new functionhv_set_memory_enc_dec_needed()in__set_memory_enc_pgtable().Added the missing
set_memory_encrypted()inhv_synic_free().Changes in v3:
Use pgprot_decrypted(PAGE_KERNEL)inhv_ringbuffer_init(). (Do not usePAGE_KERNEL_NOENC, which doesn't exist for ARM64).Used
cc_mkdec()inhv_synic_enable_regs().
ms_hyperv_init_platform():
Explicitly do not useHV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED. Explicitly do not useHV_X64_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED.Enabled
__send_ipi_mask()and__send_ipi_one()for TDX guests.Changes in v4:
A minor rebase to Michael's v7 DDA patchset. I'm very happy that
I can drop my v3 change toarch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.cdue to Michael's work.Changes in v5:
Addedmemset()to clearsynic_message_pageandsynic_event_page()
afterset_memory_decrypted().
Rebased the patch since "post_msg_page" has been removed in
hyperv-next.
Improved the error handling in hv_synic_alloc()/free() [Michael
Kelley]Changes in v6:
Adressed Michael Kelley's comments on patch 5:
Removed 2 unnecessary lines of messages from the commit log. Fixed the error handling path for hv_synic_alloc()/free(). Printed the 'ret' in hv_synic_alloc()/free().arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c | 6 ++-- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 19 +++++++--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 21 ++++++++++- drivers/hv/hv.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c +2
-1@@ -177,7 +177,8 @@ static bool __send_ipi_mask(const struct cpumask *mask, int vector, (exclude_self && weight == 1 && cpumask_test_cpu(this_cpu, mask)))return true; -if (!hv_hypercall_pg) +/* A TDX guest doesn't use hv_hypercall_pg. */ +if (!hv_isolation_type_tdx () && !hv_hypercall_pg)return false;arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c +2
-1if ((vector <HV_IPI_LOW_VECTOR ) || (vector >HV_IPI_HIGH_VECTOR ))@@ -231,7 +232,8 @@ static bool __send_ipi_one(int cpu, int vector)trace_hyperv_send_ipi_one (cpu, vector); -if (!hv_hypercall_pg || (vp ==VP_INVAL )) +/* A TDX guest doesn't use hv_hypercall_pg. */ +if ((!hv_isolation_type_tdx () && !hv_hypercall_pg) || (vp ==VP_INVAL ))return false;if ((vector <HV_IPI_LOW_VECTOR ) || (vector >HV_IPI_HIGH_VECTOR ))arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c +15
-4@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ static int hyperv_init_ghcb(void)static int hv_cpu_init (unsigned int cpu) {union hv_vp_assist_msr_contents msr = {0 }; -struct hv_vp_assist_page **hvp = &hv_vp_assist_page[cpu]; +struct hv_vp_assist_page **hvp;int ret; ret =hv_common_cpu_init (cpu);@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static int hv_cpu_init(unsigned int cpu)if (!hv_vp_assist_page)return 0 ; + hvp = &hv_vp_assist_page[cpu];if (hv_root_partition) {/* * For root partition we get the hypervisor provided VP assist @@ -398,11 +399,21 @@ void __init hyperv_init(void)if (hv_common_init ())return ; - hv_vp_assist_page =kcalloc (num_possible_cpus (), -sizeof (*hv_vp_assist_page),GFP_KERNEL ); +/* +* The VP assist page is useless to a TDX guest: the only use we +* would have for it is lazy EOI, which can not be used with TDX. +*/ +if (hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) + hv_vp_assist_page =NULL ; +else + hv_vp_assist_page =kcalloc (num_possible_cpus (), +sizeof (*hv_vp_assist_page), +GFP_KERNEL );if (!hv_vp_assist_page) { ms_hyperv.hints &= ~HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED ; - goto common_free; + +if (!hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) + goto common_free; }if (hv_isolation_type_snp ()) {arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +20
-1@@ -404,8 +404,27 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP )static_branch_enable (&isolation_type_snp); -else if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_TDX ) +else if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_TDX ) {static_branch_enable (&isolation_type_tdx); + +/* +* The GPAs of SynIC Event/Message pages and VMBus +* Moniter pages need to be added by this offset. +*/ + ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary =cc_mkdec (0 ); + +/* Don't use the unsafe Hyper-V TSC page */ + ms_hyperv.features &= ~HV_MSR_REFERENCE_TSC_AVAILABLE ; + +/* HV_REGISTER_CRASH_CTL is unsupported */ + ms_hyperv.misc_features &= ~HV_FEATURE_GUEST_CRASH_MSR_AVAILABLE ; + +/* Don't trust Hyper-V's TLB-flushing hypercalls */ + ms_hyperv.hints &= ~HV_X64_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH_RECOMMENDED ; + +/* A TDX VM must use x2APIC and doesn't use lazy EOI */ + ms_hyperv.hints &= ~HV_X64_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED ; + } }if (hv_max_functions_eax >=HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES ) {drivers/hv/hv.c +62
-4@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@#include <linux/clockchips.h> #include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> +#include <linux/set_memory.h> #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h> #include <asm/mshyperv.h> #include "hyperv_vmbus.h" @@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ int hv_synic_alloc(void) {int cpu;struct hv_per_cpu_context *hv_cpu; +int ret = -ENOMEM ;/* * First, zero all per-cpu memory areas so hv_synic_free() can @@ -120,9 +122,42 @@ int hv_synic_alloc(void) (void *)get_zeroed_page (GFP_ATOMIC );if (hv_cpu->synic_event_page ==NULL ) {pr_err ("Unable to allocate SYNIC event page\n" ); + +free_page ((unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_message_page); + hv_cpu->synic_message_page =NULL ; + goto err; } } + +/* It's better to leak the page if the decryption fails. */ +if (hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) { + ret =set_memory_decrypted ( + (unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_message_page,1 ); +if (ret) { +pr_err ("Failed to decrypt SYNIC msg page: %d\n" , ret); + hv_cpu->synic_message_page =NULL ; + +/* +* Free the event page so that a TDX VM won't +* try to encrypt the page in hv_synic_free(). +*/ +free_page ((unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_event_page); + hv_cpu->synic_event_page =NULL ; + goto err; + } + + ret =set_memory_decrypted ( + (unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_event_page,1 ); +if (ret) { +pr_err ("Failed to decrypt SYNIC event page: %d\n" , ret); + hv_cpu->synic_event_page =NULL ; + goto err; + } + +memset (hv_cpu->synic_message_page,0 ,PAGE_SIZE ); +memset (hv_cpu->synic_event_page,0 ,PAGE_SIZE ); + } }return 0 ;@@ -131,18 +166,40 @@ int hv_synic_alloc(void)* Any memory allocations that succeeded will be freed when * the caller cleans up by calling hv_synic_free() */ -return -ENOMEM ; +return ret; }void hv_synic_free (void ) {int cpu; +int ret;for_each_present_cpu (cpu) {struct hv_per_cpu_context *hv_cpu =per_cpu_ptr (hv_context.cpu_context, cpu); +/* It's better to leak the page if the encryption fails. */ +if (hv_isolation_type_tdx ()) { +if (hv_cpu->synic_message_page) { + ret =set_memory_encrypted ((unsigned long ) + hv_cpu->synic_message_page,1 ); +if (ret) { +pr_err ("Failed to encrypt SYNIC msg page: %d\n" , ret); + hv_cpu->synic_message_page =NULL ; + } + } + +if (hv_cpu->synic_event_page) { + ret =set_memory_encrypted ((unsigned long ) + hv_cpu->synic_event_page,1 ); +if (ret) { +pr_err ("Failed to encrypt SYNIC event page: %d\n" , ret); + hv_cpu->synic_event_page =NULL ; + } + } + } +free_page ((unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_event_page);free_page ((unsigned long )hv_cpu->synic_message_page); }@@ -179,7 +236,8 @@ void hv_synic_enable_regs(unsigned int cpu)if (!hv_cpu->synic_message_page)pr_err ("Fail to map synic message page.\n" ); }else { - simp.base_simp_gpa =virt_to_phys (hv_cpu->synic_message_page) + simp.base_simp_gpa = +cc_mkdec (virt_to_phys (hv_cpu->synic_message_page)) >>HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT ; }@@ -198,7 +256,8 @@ void hv_synic_enable_regs(unsigned int cpu)if (!hv_cpu->synic_event_page)pr_err ("Fail to map synic event page.\n" ); }else { - siefp.base_siefp_gpa =virt_to_phys (hv_cpu->synic_event_page) + siefp.base_siefp_gpa = +cc_mkdec (virt_to_phys (hv_cpu->synic_event_page)) >>HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT ; } --
Quoted 1 line
2.25.1
Commit message nit notwithstanding --
Dexuan Cui
maintainerRE: [PATCH v6 5/6] Drivers: hv: vmbus: Support TDX guests
Quoted 12 lines
From: Michael Kelley (LINUX) <[email protected]>
Sent: Friday, May 5, 2023 9:23 AM
...
From: Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>Quoted 7 lines
Add Hyper-V specific code so that a TDX guest can run on Hyper-V:
No need to usehv_vp_assist_page.
Don't use the unsafe Hyper-V TSC page.
Don't try to useHV_REGISTER_CRASH_CTL.
Don't trust Hyper-V's TLB-flushing hypercalls.
Don't use lazy EOI.
Quoted 3 lines
Nit: Actually, you overdid the cleanup. :-( The line in v5 about "Share SynIC Event/Message pages" was correct. It was only the part about VMBus Monitor pages that no longer applied.
Sorry, so here we need to add a line after the line "Don't use lazy EOI":
Share SynIC Event/Message pages with the host.
I suppose the maintainer(s) can help add this line, if possible.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>---
......
Commit message nit notwithstanding --Reviewed-by Michael Kelley <[email protected]>
Thanks!
Dexuan Cui
maintainerPATCH v6 6/6 x86/hyperv: Fix serial console interrupts for TDX guests
In reply to Dexuan CuiWhen a TDX guest runs on Hyper-V, the UEFI firmware sets the HW_REDUCED flag, and consequently ttyS0 interrupts can't work. Fix the issue by overriding x86_init.acpi.reduced_hw_early_init().
---
Changes since v1:
None.
Changes in v5:
Improved the comment [Michael Kelley]
Added Michael's Reviewed-by.
Changes in v6: None.
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +22 -0
@@ -313,6 +313,26 @@ static void __init hv_smp_prepare_cpus(unsigned int max_cpus) }#endif +/* +* When a TDX guest runs on Hyper-V, the firmware sets the HW_REDUCED flag: see +* acpi_tb_create_local_fadt(). Consequently ttyS0 interrupts can't work because +* request_irq() -> ... -> irq_to_desc() returns NULL for ttyS0. This happens +* because mp_config_acpi_legacy_irqs() sees a nr_legacy_irqs() of 0, so it +* doesn't initialize the array 'mp_irqs[]', and later setup_IO_APIC_irqs() -> +* find_irq_entry() fails to find the legacy irqs from the array, and hence +* doesn't create the necessary irq description info. +* +* Clone arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c: acpi_generic_reduced_hw_init() here, +* except don't change 'legacy_pic'. It keeps its default value +* 'default_legacy_pic'. mp_config_acpi_legacy_irqs() sees a non-zero +* nr_legacy_irqs(), and eventually serial console interrupts works properly. +*/ +static void __init reduced_hw_init (void ) +{ + x86_init.timers.timer_init = x86_init_noop; + x86_init.irqs.pre_vector_init = x86_init_noop; +} +static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform (void ) {int hv_max_functions_eax;
@@ -424,6 +444,8 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)/* A TDX VM must use x2APIC and doesn't use lazy EOI */ ms_hyperv.hints &= ~HV_X64_APIC_ACCESS_RECOMMENDED ; + + x86_init.acpi.reduced_hw_early_init = reduced_hw_init; } }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Dexuan Cui
maintainerQuoted 19 lines
From: Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
Sent: Thursday, May 4, 2023 3:54 PM
To: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; Haiyang Zhang <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; KY Srinivasan <[email protected]>; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; Michael Kelley (LINUX) <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]; Tianyu Lan <[email protected]>; Dexuan Cui <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH v6 0/6] Support TDX guests on Hyper-VThe patchset adds the Hyper-V specific code so that a TDX guest can run on Hyper-V. Please review.
Quoted 8 lines
The v6 patchset is based on today's mainline (
a1fd058b07d5).The v6 patchset addressed Michael's comments on patch 5:
Removed 2 unnecessary lines of messages from the commit log. Fixed the error handling path for hv_synic_alloc()/free(). Printed the 'ret' in hv_synic_alloc()/free().@Michael Kelley: Can you please review patch 5?
Thanks Michael for your Reviewed-by on patch 5.
Quoted 3 lines
@x86 maintainers:
If the patches look good to you, can you please take patch 1 and 2
into the tip tree?
Hi Dave and all, could you please take a look at the patchset?
The patchset can also be viewed here:
https://lwn.net/ml/linux-kernel/20230504225351.10765-1-decui%40microsoft.com/
Quoted 20 lines
@Wei Liu: I think patch 3, 4, 5, 6 should go through the Hyper-V tree since they change the Hyper-V code.
If you want to view the patches on github, it is here:
https://github.com/dcui/tdx/commits/decui/mainline/v6FYI, v1-v5 are here:
<snipped> on 5/23/2023Thanks,
DexuanDexuan Cui (6):
x86/tdx: RetryTDVMCALL_MAP_GPA()when needed x86/tdx: Supportvmalloc()fortdx_enc_status_changed()x86/hyperv: Addhv_isolation_type_tdx()to detect TDX guests x86/hyperv: Support hypercalls for TDX guests
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Support TDX guests
x86/hyperv: Fix serial console interrupts for TDX guests
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 122 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_apic.c | 6 +- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 27 ++++++- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 20 +++++ arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 20 +++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 43 ++++++++++ drivers/hv/hv.c | 65 ++++++++++++++- drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 30 +++++++ include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 1 + 10 files changed, 300 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
Thanks,
-- Dexuan