IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data
Subsystems (7)
v9 cover IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data
IMA measures files and buffer data such as keys, command-line arguments passed to the kernel on kexec system call, etc. While these measurements are necessary for monitoring and validating the integrity of the system, they are not sufficient. Various data structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system. Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data - e.g. LSMs like SELinux, AppArmor etc. or device-mapper targets like dm-crypt, dm-verity, dm-integrity etc. These kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Their integrity critical data is not expected to change frequently during run-time. Some of these structures cannot be defined as __ro_after_init, because they are initialized later.
For a given device, various external services/infrastructure tools (including the attestation service) interact with it - both during the setup and during rest of the device run-time. They share sensitive data and/or execute critical workload on that device. The external services may want to verify the current run-time state of the relevant kernel subsystems before fully trusting the device with business critical data/workload. For instance, verifying that SELinux is in "enforce" mode along with the expected policy, disks are encrypted with a certain configuration, secure boot is enabled etc.
This series provides the necessary IMA functionality for kernel subsystems to ensure their configuration can be measured:
- by kernel subsystems themselves,
- in a tamper resistant way,
- and re-measured - triggered on state/configuration change.
This patch set:
- defines a new IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to measure integrity critical data,
- limits the critical data being measured based on a label,
- defines a builtin critical data measurement policy,
- and includes an SELinux consumer of the new IMA critical data hook.
This series is based on the following repo/branch:
repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity.git
branch: next-integrity
commit 207cdd565dfc ("ima: Don't modify file descriptor mode on the fly")
Change Log v9:
Incorporated feedback from Tyler on v8 of this series.
- Moved rule->data_source logic from Patch #4 to Patch #5.
- Removed unnecessary variable event_name from selinux_event_name() in Patch #8.
Change Log v8:
Incorporated feedback from Tyler on v7 of this series.
- Removed unnecessary 'else' clauses in ima_match_rule_data().
- Fixed ima_store_template() to pass the buffer hash in case the buffer is large.
- fixed function description for ima_measure_critical_data().
- Moved some usage of CRITICAL_DATA from Patch #3 to Patch #4.
- Moved IMA_DATA_SOURCE from Patch #4 to Patch #5.
- Removed unnecessary pr_err() from ima_measure_critical_data() and selinux_event_name().
- Fixed log formatting in selinux_measure_state() to be consistent with other messages in that file.
Change Log v7:
Incorporated feedback from Mimi on v6 of this series.
- Updated cover letter and patch descriptions as per Mimi's feedback.
- Changed references to variable names and policy documentation from plural "data_sources" to singular "data_source".
- Updated SELinux patch to measure only policy, instead of policy and state. The state measurement will be upstreamed through a separate patch.
- Updated admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt to document support for critical_data in builtin policy.
Change Log v6:
Incorporated feedback from Mimi on v5 of this series.
- Got rid of patch 5 from the v5 of the series.(the allow list for data sources)
- Updated function descriptions, changed variable names etc.
- Moved the input param event_data_source in ima_measure_critical_data() to a new patch. (patch 6/8 of this series)
- Split patch 4 from v5 of the series into two patches (patch 4/8 and patch 5/8)
- Updated cover letter and patch descriptions as per feedback.
Change Log v5:
(1) Incorporated feedback from Stephen on the last SeLinux patch. SeLinux Patch: https://patchwork.kernel.org/patch/11801585/
- Freed memory in the reverse order of allocation in selinux_measure_state().
- Used scnprintf() instead of snprintf() to create the string for selinux state.
- Allocated event name passed to ima_measure_critical_data() before gathering selinux state and policy information for measuring.
(2) Incorporated feedback from Mimi on v4 of this series.
V4 of this Series: https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-integrity/list/?series=354437
- Removed patch "[v4,2/6] IMA: conditionally allow empty rule data"
- Reversed the order of following patches.
[v4,4/6] IMA: add policy to measure critical data from kernel components [v4,5/6] IMA: add hook to measure critical data from kernel components
and renamed them to remove "from kernel components"
- Added a new patch to this series -
IMA: add critical_data to built-in policy rules
- Added the next version of SeLinux patch (mentioned above) to this series
selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA
- Updated cover-letter description to give broader perspective of the feature, rearranging paragraphs, removing unnecessary info, clarifying terms etc.
- Got rid of opt_list param from ima_match_rule_data().
- Updated the documentation to remove sources that don't yet exist.
- detailed IMA hook description added to ima_measure_critical_data(), as well as elaborating terms event_name, event_data_source.
- "data_sources:=" is not a mandatory policy option for func=CRITICAL_DATA anymore. If not present, all the data sources specified in __ima_supported_kernel_data_sources will be measured.
Lakshmi Ramasubramanian (2):
IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy
selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
Tushar Sugandhi (6):
IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs
IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the measurement based on a
label
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 5 +- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 +- include/linux/ima.h | 8 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 8 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 81 ++++++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 118 ++++++++++++++---- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 3 +- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 11 +- security/selinux/measure.c | 79 ++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++-- 14 files changed, 352 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
Signature · 6 lines
2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
PATCH v9 1/8 IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs
IMA functions such as ima_match_keyring(), process_buffer_measurement(), ima_match_policy() etc. handle data specific to keyrings. Currently, these constructs are not generic to handle any func specific data. This makes it harder to extend them without code duplication.
Refactor the keyring specific measurement constructs to be generic and reusable in other measurement scenarios.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 ++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++----------- 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +3 -3
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, -const char *keyring); +const char *func_data);int ima_must_measure (struct inode *inode,int mask,enum ima_hooks func); int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring); +int pcr,const char *func_data);void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);int ima_match_policy (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,enum ima_hooks func,int mask,int flags,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, -const char *keyring); +const char *func_data);void ima_init_policy (void );void ima_update_policy (void );void ima_update_policy_flag (void );
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +3 -3
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* @func: caller identifier * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr= * @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template= -* @keyring: keyring name used to determine the action +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. * * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
@@ -186,14 +186,14 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,int ima_get_action (struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,int mask,enum ima_hooks func,int *pcr,struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, -const char *keyring) +const char *func_data) {int flags =IMA_MEASURE |IMA_AUDIT |IMA_APPRAISE |IMA_HASH ; flags &= ima_policy_flag;return ima_match_policy (inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, - template_desc, keyring); + template_desc, func_data); }/*
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +3 -3
@@ -786,13 +786,13 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. * @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement -* @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. * * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. */ void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring) +int pcr,const char *func_data) {int ret =0 ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;
@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,if (func) {security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); action =ima_get_action (inode,current_cred (), secid,0 , func, - &pcr, &template, keyring); + &pcr, &template, func_data);if (!(action &IMA_MEASURE ))return ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +28 -18
100 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 6 lines
2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, · line 789
Quoted 11 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-1@@ -786,13 +786,13 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. * @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement -* @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL.
This can be simplified to "func specific data, may be NULL". Please
update in all places.
Quoted 24 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +2
-2* * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. */ void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring) +int pcr,const char *func_data) {int ret =0 ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,if (func) {security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); action =ima_get_action (inode,current_cred (), secid,0 , func, - &pcr, &template, keyring); + &pcr, &template, func_data);if (!(action &IMA_MEASURE ))return ; }security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-0
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, · line 457
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2
-3@@ -453,30 +453,41 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, }/** -* ima_match_keyring - determine whether the keyring matches the measure rule -* @rule: a pointer to a rule -* @keyring: name of the keyring to match against the measure rule +* ima_match_rule_data - determine whether the given func_data matches +* the measure rule data
After the function_name is a brief description of the function, which should not span multiple lines. Refer to Documentation/doc- guide/kernel-doc.rst for details.
Please trim the function description to:
determine whether func_data matches the policy rule
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, · line 458
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-0+* @rule: IMA policy rule
This patch should be limited to renaming "keyring" to "func_data". It
shouldn't make other changes, even simple ones like this.
Quoted 44 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +19
-8+* @func_data: data to match against the measure rule data * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation * -* Returns true if keyring matches one in the rule, false otherwise. +* Returns true if func_data matches one in the rule, false otherwise. */ -static bool ima_match_keyring (struct ima_rule_entry *rule, -const char *keyring,const struct cred *cred) +static bool ima_match_rule_data (struct ima_rule_entry *rule, +const char *func_data, +const struct cred *cred) { +const struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list =NULL ;bool matched = false;size_t i;if ((rule->flags &IMA_UID ) && !rule->uid_op (cred->uid, rule->uid))return false; -if (!rule->keyrings) -return true; +switch (rule->func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +if (!rule->keyrings) +return true; + + opt_list = rule->keyrings; +break ; +default : +return false; + } -if (!keyring) +if (!func_data)return false; -for (i =0 ; i < rule->keyrings->count; i++) { -if (!strcmp (rule->keyrings->items[i], keyring)) { +for (i =0 ; i < opt_list->count; i++) { +if (!strcmp (opt_list->items[i], func_data)) { matched = true;break ; }
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, · line 507
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-1@@ -493,20 +504,20 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,* @secid: the secid of the task to be validated * @func: LIM hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) -* @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL.
Update as previously suggested.
Quoted 19 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2
-2* * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules (struct ima_rule_entry *rule,struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, -const char *keyring) +const char *func_data) {int i;if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) {return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); +ima_match_rule_data (rule, func_data, cred); }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) · line 624
Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-2@@ -610,8 +621,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend * @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule -* @keyring: the keyring name, if given, to be used to check in the policy. -* keyring can be NULL if func is anything other than KEY_CHECK. +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL.
And again here.
thanks,
Mimi
Re: [PATCH v9 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs
Hello Mimi,
Sorry for the late response. I was on vacation last week.
Quoted 16 lines · Mimi Zohar
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, · line 789
Quoted 11 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-1@@ -786,13 +786,13 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. * @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement -* @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. This can be simplified to "func specific data, may be NULL". Please
update in all places.
Ok, will do.
Quoted 37 lines
Quoted 24 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +2
-2* * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. */ void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *keyring) +int pcr,const char *func_data) {int ret =0 ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;@@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,if (func) {security_task_getsecid (current, &secid); action =ima_get_action (inode,current_cred (), secid,0 , func, - &pcr, &template, keyring); + &pcr, &template, func_data);if (!(action &IMA_MEASURE ))return ; }security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +0
-0security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, · line 457
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2
-3@@ -453,30 +453,41 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, }/** -* ima_match_keyring - determine whether the keyring matches the measure rule -* @rule: a pointer to a rule -* @keyring: name of the keyring to match against the measure rule +* ima_match_rule_data - determine whether the given func_data matches +* the measure rule data After the
function_nameis a brief description of the function, which should not span multiple lines. Refer toDocumentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rstfor details.
Quoted 3 lines
Please trim the function description to:
determine whetherfunc_datamatches the policy rule
Thanks, will do.
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, · line 458
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-0+* @rule: IMA policy rule This patch should be limited to renaming "keyring" to "
func_data". It
shouldn't make other changes, even simple ones like this.
Agreed. I will revert the rule description to the old one.
Quoted 36 lines
Quoted 36 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +17
-6+* @func_data: data to match against the measure rule data * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation * -* Returns true if keyring matches one in the rule, false otherwise. +* Returns true if func_data matches one in the rule, false otherwise. */ -static bool ima_match_keyring (struct ima_rule_entry *rule, -const char *keyring,const struct cred *cred) +static bool ima_match_rule_data (struct ima_rule_entry *rule, +const char *func_data, +const struct cred *cred) { +const struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list =NULL ;bool matched = false;size_t i;if ((rule->flags &IMA_UID ) && !rule->uid_op (cred->uid, rule->uid))return false; -if (!rule->keyrings) -return true; +switch (rule->func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +if (!rule->keyrings) +return true; + + opt_list = rule->keyrings; +break ; +default : +return false; + } -if (!keyring) +if (!func_data)return false;
Quoted 16 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, · line 507
Quoted 13 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +3
-3-for (i =0 ; i < rule->keyrings->count; i++) { -if (!strcmp (rule->keyrings->items[i], keyring)) { +for (i =0 ; i < opt_list->count; i++) { +if (!strcmp (opt_list->items[i], func_data)) { matched = true;break ; }@@ -493,20 +504,20 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,* @secid: the secid of the task to be validated * @func: LIM hook identifier * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) -* @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. Update as previously suggested.
Yes.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-1* * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. */ static bool ima_match_rules (struct ima_rule_entry *rule,struct inode *inode,const struct cred *cred,u32 secid,enum ima_hooks func,int mask, -const char *keyring) +const char *func_data) {int i;
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-1if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) {return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_keyring (rule, keyring, cred); +ima_match_rule_data (rule, func_data, cred); }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) · line 624
Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +1
-2@@ -610,8 +621,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)* @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) * @pcr: set the pcr to extend * @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule -* @keyring: the keyring name, if given, to be used to check in the policy. -* keyring can be NULL if func is anything other than KEY_CHECK. +* @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. And again here.
Yes.
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
Mimi
Thanks,
Tushar
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PATCH v9 2/8 IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
In reply to Tushar SugandhiThe original IMA buffer data measurement sizes were small (e.g. boot command line), but the new buffer data measurement use cases have data sizes that are a lot larger. Just as IMA measures the file data hash, not the file data, IMA should similarly support the option for measuring the hash of the buffer data.
Measuring in-memory buffer-data/buffer-data-hash is different than measuring file-data/file-data-hash. For the file, IMA stores the measurements in both measurement log and the file's extended attribute - which can later be used for appraisal as well. For buffer, the measurements are only stored in the IMA log, since the buffer has no extended attributes associated with it.
Introduce a boolean parameter measure_buf_hash to support measuring hash of a buffer, which would be much smaller, instead of the buffer itself.
--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 3 +- 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2 -1
@@ -268,7 +268,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *func_data); +int pcr,const char *func_data, +bool measure_buf_hash);void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1 -1
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,if ((rc == -EPERM ) && (iint->flags &IMA_MEASURE ))process_buffer_measurement (NULL , digest, digestsize,"blacklisted-hash" ,NONE , - pcr,NULL ); + pcr,NULL , false); }return rc;
security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +1 -1
@@ -60,5 +60,5 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,*/ process_buffer_measurement (NULL , payload, payload_len, keyring->description,KEY_CHECK ,0 , - keyring->description); + keyring->description, false); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +33 -5
@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, }/* -* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. +* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK) * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
@@ -787,12 +787,23 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,* @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. +* @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash * -* Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. +* Measure the buffer into the IMA log, and extend the @pcr. +* +* Determine what buffers are allowed to be measured, based on the policy rules +* and the IMA hook passed using @func. +* +* Use @func_data, if provided, to match against the measurement policy rule +* data for @func. +* +* If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, +* else measure the buffer data itself. */ void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *func_data) +int pcr,const char *func_data, +bool measure_buf_hash) {int ret =0 ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;
@@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,struct ima_digest_data hdr;char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; } hash = {}; +char buf_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +int buf_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];int violation =0 ;int action =0 ;u32 secid;
@@ -849,13 +862,27 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; } +if (measure_buf_hash) { +memcpy (buf_hash, hash.hdr.digest, buf_hash_len); + + ret =ima_calc_buffer_hash (buf_hash, buf_hash_len, + iint.ima_hash); +if (ret <0 ) { + audit_cause ="measure_buf_hash_error" ; + goto out; + } + + event_data.buf = buf_hash; + event_data.buf_len = buf_hash_len; + } + ret =ima_alloc_init_template (&event_data, &entry, template);if (ret <0 ) { audit_cause ="alloc_entry" ; goto out; } - ret =ima_store_template (entry, violation,NULL , buf, pcr); + ret =ima_store_template (entry, violation,NULL , event_data.buf, pcr);if (ret <0 ) { audit_cause ="store_entry" ;ima_free_template_entry (entry);
@@ -890,7 +917,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)return ;process_buffer_measurement (file_inode (f.file), buf, size, -"kexec-cmdline" ,KEXEC_CMDLINE ,0 ,NULL ); +"kexec-cmdline" ,KEXEC_CMDLINE ,0 ,NULL , + false);fdput (f); }
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +2 -1
@@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) entry->payload_len, entry->keyring_name,KEY_CHECK ,0 , - entry->keyring_name); + entry->keyring_name, + false);list_del (&entry->list);ima_free_key_entry (entry); }
Signature · 6 lines
2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
Quoted 6 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
The original IMA buffer data measurement sizes were small (e.g. boot command line), but the new buffer data measurement use cases have data sizes that are a lot larger. Just as IMA measures the file data hash, not the file data, IMA should similarly support the option for measuring the hash of the buffer data.
Quoted 6 lines
Measuring in-memory buffer-data/buffer-data-hash is different than measuring file-data/file-data-hash. For the file, IMA stores the measurements in both measurement log and the file's extended attribute - which can later be used for appraisal as well. For buffer, the measurements are only stored in the IMA log, since the buffer has no extended attributes associated with it.
By definition, buffer data is only measured. Nothing new is added by the above paragraph. Please remove it.
Quoted 4 lines
Introduce a boolean parameter
measure_buf_hashto support measuring hash of a buffer, which would be much smaller, instead of the buffer itself.
Like the patch Subject line use "the buffer data hash" instead of the "hash of a buffer".
There's no need to include the boolean parameter name "measure_buf_hash". Please remove it.
Quoted 16 lines
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 3 +- 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)security/integrity/ima/ima.h +0
-0
security/integrity/ima/ima.h void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, · line 272
Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2
-1@@ -268,7 +268,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *func_data); +int pcr,const char *func_data, +bool measure_buf_hash);
Please abbreviate the boolean name to "hash". The test would then be
"if (hash == true)" or "if (hash)".
Quoted 41 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +0
-0void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1
-1@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,if ((rc == -EPERM ) && (iint->flags &IMA_MEASURE ))process_buffer_measurement (NULL , digest, digestsize,"blacklisted-hash" ,NONE , - pcr,NULL ); + pcr,NULL , false); }return rc;security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +1
-1@@ -60,5 +60,5 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,*/ process_buffer_measurement (NULL , payload, payload_len, keyring->description,KEY_CHECK ,0 , - keyring->description); + keyring->description, false); }security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-1@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, }/* -* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. +* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK) * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. * @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, · line 790
Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0@@ -787,12 +787,23 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,* @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. +* @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash
^@hash: measure buffer data hash
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, · line 792
Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-1* -* Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. +* Measure the buffer into the IMA log, and extend the @pcr.
IMA always measures/appraises files and measures buffer data based on policy. The above sentence succintly summarizes whatprocess_buffer_measurement() does. This patch adds support for
measuring the "buffer data hash". The following would be an
appropriate change.
* Based on policy, either the buffer data or buffer data hash is measured
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, · line 801
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +9
-0+* +* Determine what buffers are allowed to be measured, based on the policy rules +* and the IMA hook passed using @func. +* +* Use @func_data, if provided, to match against the measurement policy rule +* data for @func. +* +* If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, +* else measure the buffer data itself.
This patch should be limited to adding "buffer data hash" support. These changes don't belong in this patch. Please remove.
Quoted 19 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +4
-1*/ void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *func_data) +int pcr,const char *func_data, +bool measure_buf_hash) {int ret =0 ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;@@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,struct ima_digest_data hdr;char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; } hash = {}; +char buf_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +int buf_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];int violation =0 ;int action =0 ;u32 secid;
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, · line 865
Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0@@ -849,13 +862,27 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; } +if (measure_buf_hash) {
^ if (hash) {
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, · line 871
Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +6
-0+memcpy (buf_hash, hash.hdr.digest, buf_hash_len); + + ret =ima_calc_buffer_hash (buf_hash, buf_hash_len, + iint.ima_hash); +if (ret <0 ) { + audit_cause ="measure_buf_hash_error" ;
I don't see a good no reason for defining a new audit cause. Use the existing "hashing_error".
thanks,
Mimi
Quoted 42 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +10
-2+ goto out; + } + + event_data.buf = buf_hash; + event_data.buf_len = buf_hash_len; + } + ret =ima_alloc_init_template (&event_data, &entry, template);if (ret <0 ) { audit_cause ="alloc_entry" ; goto out; } - ret =ima_store_template (entry, violation,NULL , buf, pcr); + ret =ima_store_template (entry, violation,NULL , event_data.buf, pcr);if (ret <0 ) { audit_cause ="store_entry" ;ima_free_template_entry (entry);@@ -890,7 +917,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)return ;process_buffer_measurement (file_inode (f.file), buf, size, -"kexec-cmdline" ,KEXEC_CMDLINE ,0 ,NULL ); +"kexec-cmdline" ,KEXEC_CMDLINE ,0 ,NULL , + false);fdput (f); }security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +2
-1@@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) entry->payload_len, entry->keyring_name,KEY_CHECK ,0 , - entry->keyring_name); + entry->keyring_name, + false);list_del (&entry->list);ima_free_key_entry (entry); }
Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
Quoted 14 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 6 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
The original IMA buffer data measurement sizes were small (e.g. boot command line), but the new buffer data measurement use cases have data sizes that are a lot larger. Just as IMA measures the file data hash, not the file data, IMA should similarly support the option for measuring the hash of the buffer data.
Quoted 6 lines
Measuring in-memory buffer-data/buffer-data-hash is different than measuring file-data/file-data-hash. For the file, IMA stores the measurements in both measurement log and the file's extended attribute - which can later be used for appraisal as well. For buffer, the measurements are only stored in the IMA log, since the buffer has no extended attributes associated with it.
Quoted 3 lines
By definition, buffer data is only measured. Nothing new is added by the above paragraph. Please remove it.
Sure. Will remove.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Introduce a boolean parameter
measure_buf_hashto support measuring hash of a buffer, which would be much smaller, instead of the buffer itself.Like the patch Subject line use "the buffer data hash" instead of the "hash of a buffer".
Will do.
Quoted 3 lines
There's no need to include the boolean parameter name "
measure_buf_hash". Please remove it.
Will do.
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>--- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++--- security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c | 3 +- 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Quoted 15 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima.h void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, · line 272
Quoted 11 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +2
-1@@ -268,7 +268,8 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, struct ima_template_desc *template_desc);void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *func_data); +int pcr,const char *func_data, +bool measure_buf_hash);Please abbreviate the boolean name to "hash". The test would then be
"if (hash == true)" or "if (hash)".
Will do.
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 34 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +0
-0void ima_audit_measurement (struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,const unsigned char *filename); int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data,security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +1
-1@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ int ima_check_blacklist(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,if ((rc == -EPERM ) && (iint->flags &IMA_MEASURE ))process_buffer_measurement (NULL , digest, digestsize,"blacklisted-hash" ,NONE , - pcr,NULL ); + pcr,NULL , false); }return rc;security/integrity/ima/ima_asymmetric_keys.c +1
-1@@ -60,5 +60,5 @@ void ima_post_key_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key,*/ process_buffer_measurement (NULL , payload, payload_len, keyring->description,KEY_CHECK ,0 , - keyring->description); + keyring->description, false); }security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +0
-0@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, }
Quoted 14 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, · line 790
Quoted 11 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +2
-1/* -* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer to ima log. +* process_buffer_measurement - Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash * @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL for KEY_CHECK) * @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log. * @size: size of buffer(in bytes). @@ -787,12 +787,23 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size,* @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. +* @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash ^@hash: measure buffer data hash
Agreed. Will fix.
Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, · line 792
Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-1* -* Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. +* Measure the buffer into the IMA log, and extend the @pcr.
Quoted 9 lines
IMA always measures/appraises files and measures buffer data based on policy. The above sentence succintly summarizes what
process_buffer_measurement()does. This patch adds support for
measuring the "buffer data hash". The following would be an
appropriate change.* Based on policy, either the buffer data or buffer data hash is measured
Sounds good. Will update.
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, · line 801
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +9
-0+* +* Determine what buffers are allowed to be measured, based on the policy rules +* and the IMA hook passed using @func. +* +* Use @func_data, if provided, to match against the measurement policy rule +* data for @func. +* +* If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, +* else measure the buffer data itself.
Quoted 3 lines
This patch should be limited to adding "buffer data hash" support. These changes don't belong in this patch. Please remove.
Agreed. Will remove.
Quoted 22 lines
Quoted 22 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +4
-1*/ void process_buffer_measurement (struct inode *inode,const void *buf,int size,const char *eventname,enum ima_hooks func, -int pcr,const char *func_data) +int pcr,const char *func_data, +bool measure_buf_hash) {int ret =0 ;const char *audit_cause ="ENOMEM" ;@@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size,struct ima_digest_data hdr;char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; } hash = {}; +char buf_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE ]; +int buf_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];int violation =0 ;int action =0 ;u32 secid;@@ -849,13 +862,27 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; }
Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, · line 865
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0+if (measure_buf_hash) {^ if (hash) {
Yes.
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, · line 871
Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +6
-0+memcpy (buf_hash, hash.hdr.digest, buf_hash_len); + + ret =ima_calc_buffer_hash (buf_hash, buf_hash_len, + iint.ima_hash); +if (ret <0 ) { + audit_cause ="measure_buf_hash_error" ;I don't see a good no reason for defining a new audit cause. Use the existing "
hashing_error".
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
Mimi
Thanks,
Tushar
Quoted 28 lines
Quoted 28 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +10
-2+ goto out; + } + + event_data.buf = buf_hash; + event_data.buf_len = buf_hash_len; + } + ret =ima_alloc_init_template (&event_data, &entry, template);if (ret <0 ) { audit_cause ="alloc_entry" ; goto out; } - ret =ima_store_template (entry, violation,NULL , buf, pcr); + ret =ima_store_template (entry, violation,NULL , event_data.buf, pcr);if (ret <0 ) { audit_cause ="store_entry" ;ima_free_template_entry (entry);@@ -890,7 +917,8 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)return ;process_buffer_measurement (file_inode (f.file), buf, size, -"kexec-cmdline" ,KEXEC_CMDLINE ,0 ,NULL ); +"kexec-cmdline" ,KEXEC_CMDLINE ,0 ,NULL , + false);fdput (f); }
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +0
-0security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c void ima_process_queued_keys(void) · line 169
Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_queue_keys.c +2
-1@@ -162,7 +162,8 @@ void ima_process_queued_keys(void) entry->payload_len, entry->keyring_name,KEY_CHECK ,0 , - entry->keyring_name); + entry->keyring_name, + false);list_del (&entry->list);ima_free_key_entry (entry); }
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Re: [PATCH v9 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash
<snip>
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum
ima_hooksfunc,
- int pcr, const char*func_data);
+ int pcr, const char*func_data,
+ boolmeasure_buf_hash);Please abbreviate the boolean name to "hash". The test would then be "if (hash == true)" or "if (hash)".
Will do.
<snip>
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 5 lines
- *
process_buffer_measurement- Measure the buffer to ima log.
+ *process_buffer_measurement- Measure the buffer or the buffer data hash
* @inode: inode associated with the object being measured (NULL forKEY_CHECK)
* @buf: pointer to the buffer that needs to be added to the log.Quoted 9 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, · line 790
Quoted 6 lines
* @size: size of buffer(in bytes).
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0@@ -787,12 +787,23 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, * @func: IMA hook * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. + * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash^@hash: measure buffer data hash
Agreed. Will fix.
<snip>
Quoted 25 lines
Quoted 17 lines
Quoted 17 lines
void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, const char *eventname, enum
ima_hooksfunc,
- int pcr, const char*func_data)
+ int pcr, const char*func_data,
+ boolmeasure_buf_hash)
{
int ret = 0;
const char*audit_cause= "ENOMEM";security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +2
-0@@ -807,6 +818,8 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, struct ima_digest_data hdr; char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } hash = {}; + char buf_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; + int buf_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; int violation = 0; int action = 0;Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode · line 865
Quoted 6 lines
u32 secid;
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0@@ -849,13 +862,27 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, goto out; } + if (measure_buf_hash) {^ if (hash) {
Quoted 7 lines
Yes.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +6
-0+ memcpy(buf_hash, hash.hdr.digest, buf_hash_len); + + ret = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf_hash, buf_hash_len, + iint.ima_hash); + if (ret < 0) { + audit_cause = "measure_buf_hash_error";
Hi Mimi,
There already exist a local struct variable named "hash" in p_b_m(). I was thinking of using "buf_hash", but that one is taken too. Maybe I should use "buf_hash" for the input bool, and rename the existing "buf_hash" local variable to "digest_hash"?
Does it sound ok?
Thanks,
Tushar
<snip>
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PATCH v9 3/8 IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
In reply to Tushar SugandhiIMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer data. However, various data structures, policies, and states stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system. Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data. These kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Currently, IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure their integrity critical data.
Define a new IMA hook - ima_measure_critical_data to measure kernel integrity critical data.
--- include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/ima.h +6 -0
@@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,extern void ima_post_path_mknod (struct dentry *dentry);extern int ima_file_hash (struct file *file,char *buf,size_t buf_size);extern void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size); +extern void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +const void *buf,int buf_len, +bool measure_buf_hash);#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline (void );
@@ -122,6 +125,9 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) }static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size) {} +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +const void *buf,int buf_len, +bool measure_buf_hash) {}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC
security/integrity/ima/ima.h +1 -0
@@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ + hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \ hook(MAX_CHECK, none)#define __ima_hook_enumify (ENUM , str) ENUM,
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +1 -1
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,* subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK -* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK +* | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA * mask: contains the permission mask * fsmagic: hex value *
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +34 -0
@@ -922,6 +922,40 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)fdput (f); } +/** +* ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data +* @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry +* @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure +* @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) +* @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash +* +* Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, +* into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. +* +* Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. +* Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures, +* policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrity +* of the system. +* +* If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, +* else measure the buffer data itself. +* @measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured +* is too large. +* +* The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised. +*/ +void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +const void *buf,int buf_len, +bool measure_buf_hash) +{ +if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) +return ; + +process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, buf_len, event_name, +CRITICAL_DATA ,0 ,NULL , + measure_buf_hash); +} +static int __init init_ima (void ) {int error;
Signature · 6 lines
2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
Quoted 1 line · Tushar Sugandhi
IMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer
No need for the comma here.
Up to this patch set, all the patches refer to "buffer data", not "in- memory buffer data". This patch introduces the concept of measuring
"in-memory buffer data". Please remove "in-memory" above.
Quoted 1 line
data. However, various data structures, policies, and states
Here and everywhere else, there are two blanks after a period.
Quoted 3 lines
stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system. Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data. These kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Currently,
^integrity of the system.
Quoted 2 lines
IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure their integrity critical data.
The emphasis should not be on "kernel subsystems". Simplify to "for measuring kernel integrity critical data".
Quoted 3 lines
Define a new IMA hook -
ima_measure_critical_datato measure kernel integrity critical data.
Either "ima_measure_critical_data" is between hyphens or without any hyphens. If not hyphenated, then you could say "named ima_measure_critical_data", but "named" isn't necessary. Or reverse "a new IMA hook" and "ima_measure_critical_data", adding comma's like:
Define ima_measure_critical_data, a new IMA hook, to ...
Any of the above options work, just not a single hyphen.
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>---
<snip>
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 927
Quoted 11 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +3
-0@@ -922,6 +922,40 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)fdput (f); } +/** +* ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data +* @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry
Why future tense? By "buffer entry" do you mean a record in the IMA
measurement list?
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 928
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0+* @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure
^pointer to buffer data
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 929
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0+* @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes)
^length of buffer data (in bytes)
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 930
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0+* @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash
As requested in 2/8, please abbreviate the boolean name to "hash". Refer to section "4) Naming" in Documentation/process/coding-style.rst for variable naming conventions.
^@hash: measure buffer data hash
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +5
-0+* +* Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, +* into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. +* +* Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change.
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 945
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +10
-0+* Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures, +* policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrity +* of the system. +* +* If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, +* else measure the buffer data itself. +* @measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured +* is too large. +* +* The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised.
The "/**" is the start of kernel-doc. Have you seen anywhere else in the kernel using the @<variable name> in the longer function
description? Have you seen this style of longer function
description? Refer to Documentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rst and other code for examples.
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 948
Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +3
-0+*/ +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, + const void *buf, int buf_len,
As "buf_len" should always be >= 0, it should not be defined as a signed variable.
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 956
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +8
-0+ bool measure_buf_hash) +{ +if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) +return ; + +process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, buf_len, event_name, +CRITICAL_DATA ,0 ,NULL , + measure_buf_hash);
^hash
thanks,
Mimi
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +2
-0+} +static int __init init_ima (void ) {int error;
Re: [PATCH v9 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
Quoted 9 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 1 line · Tushar Sugandhi
IMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer
No need for the comma here.
Up to this patch set, all the patches refer to "buffer data", not "in- memory buffer data". This patch introduces the concept of measuring
"in-memory buffer data". Please remove "in-memory" above.
Will update the description accordingly.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
data. However, various data structures, policies, and states
Here and everywhere else, there are two blanks after a period.
I checked this patch file in multiple text editors, but couldn’t find
any instance of period followed by two spaces. I will double check again all the patches for multiple spaces, and remove them if any.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system. Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data. These kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Currently,
^integrity of the system.
Will do.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure their integrity critical data.
The emphasis should not be on "kernel subsystems". Simplify to "for measuring kernel integrity critical data".
Will do.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Define a new IMA hook -
ima_measure_critical_datato measure kernel integrity critical data.
Quoted 8 lines
Either "
ima_measure_critical_data" is between hyphens or without any hyphens. If not hyphenated, then you could say "namedima_measure_critical_data", but "named" isn't necessary. Or reverse "a new IMA hook" and "ima_measure_critical_data", adding comma's like:
Defineima_measure_critical_data, a new IMA hook, to ...Any of the above options work, just not a single hyphen.
Thanks for the suggestion.
I will use “Define ima_measure_critical_data, a new IMA hook, to ...”
Quoted 15 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>---
<snip>
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +0
-0@@ -922,6 +922,40 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)fdput (f); }
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 927
Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +3
-0+/** +* ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data +* @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry Why future tense?
I simply used the description from p_b_m()
* @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry.
By "buffer entry" do you mean a record in the IMA
Quoted 2 lines
measurement list?
Yes, a record in the IMA measurement list.
Will remove the future tense and reword it to something like:
* @event_name: event name for the buffer measurement entry
-or-
* @event_name: event name for the record in the IMA measurement list
Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 928
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0+* @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure ^pointer to buffer data
will do.
Quoted 4 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 929
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0+* @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) ^length of buffer data (in bytes)
will do.
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 930
Quoted 1 line
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +1
-0+* @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash As requested in 2/8, please abbreviate the boolean name to "hash". Refer to section "4) Naming" in
Documentation/process/coding-style.rstfor variable naming conventions.^@hash: measure buffer data hash
Sounds good. Will do.
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +5
-0+* +* Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, +* into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. +* +* Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 945
Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +10
-0+* Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures, +* policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrity +* of the system. +* +* If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, +* else measure the buffer data itself. +* @measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured +* is too large. +* +* The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised.
Quoted 1 line
The "/**" is the start of kernel-doc. Have you seen anywhere else in
My impression was the hooks in ima_main.c e.g. ima_file_free() ima_file_mmap() required the double-asterisk ("/**"), and internal functions like ima_rdwr_violation_check() require a single-asterisk ("/*")
kernel-doc.rst suggest the double-asterisk ("/**") for function comment as well.
Function documentation
----------------------
The general format of a function and function-like macro kernel-doc comment is::
/**
* function_name() - Brief description of function.
Please let me know if you still want me to remove the double-asterisk ("/**") here.
Quoted 5 lines
the kernel using the @<variable name> in the longer function
description? Have you seen this style of longer function
description? Refer toDocumentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rstand other code for examples.
Thanks. I will remove the prefix "@" from <variable name> in the longer function description.
Quoted 7 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 948
Quoted 3 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +3
-0+*/ +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, + const void *buf, int buf_len,As "
buf_len" should always be >= 0, it should not be defined as a signed variable.
Good point. I will switch to either size_t or unsigned int.
Quoted 11 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 956
Quoted 8 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +8
-0+ bool measure_buf_hash) +{ +if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) +return ; + +process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, buf_len, event_name, +CRITICAL_DATA ,0 ,NULL , + measure_buf_hash);^hash
Will do.
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
Mimi
Thanks,
Tushar
Quoted 6 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) · line 961
Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +2
-0+} +static int __init init_ima (void ) {int error;
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Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
Quoted 8 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
data. However, various data structures, policies, and states
Here and everywhere else, there are two blanks after a period.
I checked this patch file in multiple text editors, but couldn’t find any instance of period followed by two spaces. I will double check again all the patches for multiple spaces, and remove them if any.
There should be two blanks after a period, not one blank.
<snip>
Quoted 28 lines
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 7 lines
+ *
+ * Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel,
+ * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr.
+ *
+ * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change.
+ * Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures,
+ * policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrityQuoted 8 lines
+ * of the system.
+ *
+ * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data,
+ * else measure the buffer data itself.
+ * @measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured
+ * is too large.
+ *
+ * The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised.Quoted 1 line
The "/**" is the start of kernel-doc. Have you seen anywhere else in
My impression was the hooks in
ima_main.ce.g.ima_file_free()ima_file_mmap()required the double-asterisk ("/**"), and internal functions likeima_rdwr_violation_check()require a single-asterisk ("/*")
kernel-doc.rstsuggest the double-asterisk ("/**") for function comment as well.Function documentation
----------------------
Quoted 8 lines
The general format of a function and function-like macro kernel-doc comment is::
/**
*function_name()- Brief description of function.Please let me know if you still want me to remove the double-asterisk ("/**") here.
Yes, of course this needs to be kernel-doc and requires "/**"
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
the kernel using the @<variable name> in the longer function
description? Have you seen this style of longer function
description? Refer toDocumentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rstand other code for examples.Thanks. I will remove the prefix "@" from <variable name> in the longer function description.
Removing the @<variable name> isn't sufficient. Please look at other examples of longer function definitions before reposting.
thanks,
Mimi
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Re: [PATCH v9 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data
Quoted 45 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 8 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
data. However, various data structures, policies, and states
Here and everywhere else, there are two blanks after a period.
I checked this patch file in multiple text editors, but couldn’t find any instance of period followed by two spaces. I will double check again all the patches for multiple spaces, and remove them if any.
There should be two blanks after a period, not one blank.
<snip>
Quoted 31 lines
Quoted 16 lines
Quoted 7 lines
+ *
+ * Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel,
+ * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr.
+ *
+ * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change.
+ * Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures,
+ * policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrityQuoted 8 lines
+ * of the system.
+ *
+ * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data,
+ * else measure the buffer data itself.
+ * @measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured
+ * is too large.
+ *
+ * The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised.Quoted 1 line
The "/**" is the start of kernel-doc. Have you seen anywhere else in
My impression was the hooks in
ima_main.ce.g.ima_file_free()ima_file_mmap()required the double-asterisk ("/**"), and internal functions likeima_rdwr_violation_check()require a single-asterisk ("/*")
kernel-doc.rstsuggest the double-asterisk ("/**") for function comment as well.Function documentation
----------------------The general format of a function and function-like macro kernel-doc comment is::
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
/**
*function_name()- Brief description of function.Please let me know if you still want me to remove the double-asterisk ("/**") here.
Yes, of course this needs to be kernel-doc and requires "/**"
Thanks for confirming.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
the kernel using the @<variable name> in the longer function
description? Have you seen this style of longer function
description? Refer toDocumentation/doc-guide/kernel-doc.rstand other code for examples.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Thanks. I will remove the prefix "@" from <variable name> in the longer function description.
Removing the @<variable name> isn't sufficient. Please look at other examples of longer function definitions before reposting.
Yes. Agreed. I will go as per the guidance in kernel-doc.rst
Thanks again,
Tushar
Quoted 4 lines
thanks,
Mimi
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PATCH v9 4/8 IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
In reply to Tushar SugandhiA new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() and the corresponding func CRITICAL_DATA for measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements.
Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +1 -1
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Description: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK]MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] - [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +25 -4
@@ -479,6 +479,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, opt_list = rule->keyrings;break ; +case CRITICAL_DATA : +return true;default :return false; }
@@ -515,13 +517,19 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; -if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) { -return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_rule_data (rule, func_data, cred); - }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false; + +switch (func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +case CRITICAL_DATA : +return ((rule->func == func) && +ima_match_rule_data (rule, func_data, cred)); +default : +break ; + } +if ((rule->flags &IMA_MASK ) && (rule->mask != mask && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;
@@ -1116,6 +1124,17 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))return false; +break ; +case CRITICAL_DATA : +if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE )) +return false; + +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_UID |IMA_PCR )) +return false; + +if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry)) +return false; +break ;default :return false;
@@ -1248,6 +1267,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS ) &&strcmp (args[0 ].from,"KEY_CHECK" ) ==0 ) entry->func =KEY_CHECK ; +else if (strcmp (args[0 ].from,"CRITICAL_DATA" ) ==0 ) + entry->func =CRITICAL_DATA ;else result = -EINVAL ;if (!result)
Signature · 6 lines
2.17.1 -- dm-devel mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
Quoted 11 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data()and the corresponding funcCRITICAL_DATAfor measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements.Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements.
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>
This looks nice. Thanks for the changes!
Tyler
Quoted 85 lines
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---- 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +1
-1@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Description: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK]MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] - [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA] mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex valuesecurity/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +25
-4@@ -479,6 +479,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, opt_list = rule->keyrings;break ; +case CRITICAL_DATA : +return true;default :return false; }@@ -515,13 +517,19 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, {int i; -if (func ==KEY_CHECK ) { -return (rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func == func) && -ima_match_rule_data (rule, func_data, cred); - }if ((rule->flags &IMA_FUNC ) && (rule->func != func && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false; + +switch (func) { +case KEY_CHECK : +case CRITICAL_DATA : +return ((rule->func == func) && +ima_match_rule_data (rule, func_data, cred)); +default : +break ; + } +if ((rule->flags &IMA_MASK ) && (rule->mask != mask && func !=POST_SETATTR ))return false;@@ -1116,6 +1124,17 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))return false; +break ; +case CRITICAL_DATA : +if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE )) +return false; + +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_UID |IMA_PCR )) +return false; + +if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry)) +return false; +break ;default :return false;@@ -1248,6 +1267,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry)else if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS ) &&strcmp (args[0 ].from,"KEY_CHECK" ) ==0 ) entry->func =KEY_CHECK ; +else if (strcmp (args[0 ].from,"CRITICAL_DATA" ) ==0 ) + entry->func =CRITICAL_DATA ;else result = -EINVAL ;if (!result)Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
Quoted 11 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 10 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data()and the corresponding funcCRITICAL_DATAfor measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements.Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>This looks nice. Thanks for the changes!
Reviewed-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>Tyler
Thanks for the detailed review on this series Tyler. We really appreciate it.
~Tushar
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Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
In reply to Tushar SugandhiHi Tushar,
Please update the Subject line as, "Add policy rule support for measuring critical data".
Quoted 11 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data()and the corresponding funcCRITICAL_DATAfor measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements.Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements.
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>
This patch does not restrict measuring critical data, but adds policy rule support for measuring critical data. please update the patch description accordingly.
Other than that,
Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure critical data
Quoted 13 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Tushar,
Please update the Subject line as, "Add policy rule support for measuring critical data".
Quoted 7 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
A new IMA policy rule is needed for the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data()and the corresponding funcCRITICAL_DATAfor measuring the input buffer. The policy rule should ensure the buffer would get measured only when the policy rule allows the action. The policy rule should also support the necessary constraints (flags etc.) for integrity critical buffer data measurements.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Add a policy rule to define the constraints for restricting integrity critical data measurements.
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>This patch does not restrict measuring critical data, but adds policy rule support for measuring critical data. please update the patch description accordingly.
Will do. Will update the patch description accordingly.
Quoted 4 lines
Other than that,
Reviewed-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Thanks a lot for the Reviewed-by tag. :)
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PATCH v9 5/8 IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
In reply to Tushar SugandhiSystem administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data based on a label for the given subsystems.
Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_source:=" to the IMA func CRITICAL_DATA to allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the measurement to the labels listed in "data_source:=".
Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_source:=". If "data_sources:=" is not provided with the func CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the supported kernel subsystems is measured.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +2 -0
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ Description: template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value + data_source:= [label] + label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data. default policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +34 -3
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@#define IMA_PCR 0x0100#define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200#define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCE 0x0800#define UNKNOWN 0#define MEASURE 0x0001/* same as IMA_MEASURE */
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES ];char *fsname;struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings;/* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ +struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source;/* Measure data from this source */ struct ima_template_desc *template; };
@@ -480,7 +482,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, opt_list = rule->keyrings;break ;case CRITICAL_DATA : -return true; +if (!rule->data_source) +return true; + + opt_list = rule->data_source; +break ;default :return false; }
@@ -925,7 +931,7 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, - Opt_err + Opt_data_source, Opt_err }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {
@@ -962,6 +968,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, + {Opt_data_source, "data_source=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} };
@@ -1129,7 +1136,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE ))return false; -if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_UID |IMA_PCR )) +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_UID |IMA_PCR | +IMA_DATA_SOURCE ))return false;if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))
@@ -1339,6 +1347,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->flags |=IMA_KEYRINGS ;break ; +case Opt_data_source: +ima_log_string (ab,"data_source" , args[0 ].from); + +if (entry->data_source) { + result = -EINVAL ; +break ; + } + + entry->data_source =ima_alloc_rule_opt_list (args); +if (IS_ERR (entry->data_source)) { + result =PTR_ERR (entry->data_source); + entry->data_source =NULL ; +break ; + } + + entry->flags |=IMA_DATA_SOURCE ; +break ;case Opt_fsuuid:ima_log_string (ab,"fsuuid" , args[0 ].from);
@@ -1719,6 +1744,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)seq_puts (m," " ); } +if (entry->flags &IMA_DATA_SOURCE ) { +seq_puts (m,"data_source=" ); +ima_show_rule_opt_list (m, entry->data_source); +seq_puts (m," " ); + } +if (entry->flags &IMA_PCR ) {snprintf (tbuf,sizeof (tbuf),"%d" , entry->pcr);seq_printf (m,pt (Opt_pcr), tbuf);
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Re: [PATCH v9 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
Quoted 11 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data based on a label for the given subsystems.
Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_source:=" to the IMA func
CRITICAL_DATAto allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the measurement to the labels listed in "data_source:=".
Quoted 6 lines
Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_source:=". If "data_sources:=" is not provided with the func
CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the supported kernel subsystems is measured.Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>
Tyler
Quoted 118 lines
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +2
-0@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ Description: template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value + data_source:= [label] + label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data. default policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGICsecurity/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +34
-3@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@#define IMA_PCR 0x0100#define IMA_FSNAME 0x0200#define IMA_KEYRINGS 0x0400 +#define IMA_DATA_SOURCE 0x0800#define UNKNOWN 0#define MEASURE 0x0001/* same as IMA_MEASURE */ @@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry { } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES ];char *fsname;struct ima_rule_opt_list *keyrings;/* Measure keys added to these keyrings */ +struct ima_rule_opt_list *data_source;/* Measure data from this source */ struct ima_template_desc *template; };@@ -480,7 +482,11 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, opt_list = rule->keyrings;break ;case CRITICAL_DATA : -return true; +if (!rule->data_source) +return true; + + opt_list = rule->data_source; +break ;default :return false; }@@ -925,7 +931,7 @@ enum { Opt_uid_lt, Opt_euid_lt, Opt_fowner_lt, Opt_appraise_type, Opt_appraise_flag, Opt_permit_directio, Opt_pcr, Opt_template, Opt_keyrings, - Opt_err + Opt_data_source, Opt_err }; static const match_table_t policy_tokens = {@@ -962,6 +968,7 @@ static const match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_pcr, "pcr=%s"}, {Opt_template, "template=%s"}, {Opt_keyrings, "keyrings=%s"}, + {Opt_data_source, "data_source=%s"}, {Opt_err, NULL} };@@ -1129,7 +1136,8 @@ static bool ima_validate_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)if (entry->action & ~(MEASURE |DONT_MEASURE ))return false; -if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_UID |IMA_PCR )) +if (entry->flags & ~(IMA_FUNC |IMA_UID |IMA_PCR | +IMA_DATA_SOURCE ))return false;if (ima_rule_contains_lsm_cond (entry))@@ -1339,6 +1347,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->flags |=IMA_KEYRINGS ;break ; +case Opt_data_source: +ima_log_string (ab,"data_source" , args[0 ].from); + +if (entry->data_source) { + result = -EINVAL ; +break ; + } + + entry->data_source =ima_alloc_rule_opt_list (args); +if (IS_ERR (entry->data_source)) { + result =PTR_ERR (entry->data_source); + entry->data_source =NULL ; +break ; + } + + entry->flags |=IMA_DATA_SOURCE ; +break ;case Opt_fsuuid:ima_log_string (ab,"fsuuid" , args[0 ].from);@@ -1719,6 +1744,12 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)seq_puts (m," " ); } +if (entry->flags &IMA_DATA_SOURCE ) { +seq_puts (m,"data_source=" ); +ima_show_rule_opt_list (m, entry->data_source); +seq_puts (m," " ); + } +if (entry->flags &IMA_PCR ) {snprintf (tbuf,sizeof (tbuf),"%d" , entry->pcr);seq_printf (m,pt (Opt_pcr), tbuf);Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
Re: [PATCH v9 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
Quoted 17 lines · Tyler Hicks
Quoted 16 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data based on a label for the given subsystems.
Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_source:=" to the IMA func
CRITICAL_DATAto allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the measurement to the labels listed in "data_source:=".Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_source:=". If "data_sources:=" is not provided with the func
CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the supported kernel subsystems is measured.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>Tyler
Thanks again Tyler.
~Tushar
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Mimi Zohar
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
In reply to Tushar SugandhiHi Tushar,
Quoted 5 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data based on a label for the given subsystems.
Restricting which kernel integrity critical data is measured is not
only of interest to system administrators. Why single them out?
Limiting which critical data is measured is based on a label, making it flexible. In your use case scenario, you're grouping the label based on kernel subsystem, but is that really necessary? In the broader picture, there could be cross subsystem critical data being measured based on a single label.
Please think about the broader picture and re-write the patch descirption more generically.
Quoted 2 lines
Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_source:=" to the IMA func
What is with "add"? You're "adding support for" or "defining" a new policy condition. Remove the single hyphen, as explained in 3/8.
Please replace "data_source" with something more generic (e.g. label).
thanks,
Mimi
Quoted 10 lines
CRITICAL_DATAto allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the measurement to the labels listed in "data_source:=".Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_source:=". If "data_sources:=" is not provided with the func
CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the supported kernel subsystems is measured.Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCH v9 5/8] IMA: limit critical data measurement based on a label
Quoted 12 lines · Mimi Zohar
Hi Tushar,
Quoted 5 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
System administrators should be able to limit which kernel subsystems they want to measure the critical data for. To enable that, an IMA policy condition to choose specific kernel subsystems is needed. This policy condition would constrain the measurement of the critical data based on a label for the given subsystems.
Restricting which kernel integrity critical data is measured is not
only of interest to system administrators. Why single them out?
system administrators are usually responsible for system policies/configurations.They own modifications in the config files like ima-policy. That's why we wanted to address them to begin with. But you
are correct. This is not only of interest to sysadmins. I will make the description more generic.
Quoted 9 lines
Limiting which critical data is measured is based on a label, making it flexible. In your use case scenario, you're grouping the label based on kernel subsystem, but is that really necessary? In the broader picture, there could be cross subsystem critical data being measured based on a single label.
Please think about the broader picture and re-write the patch descirption more generically.
Makes sense. Will make the patch description more generic.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Add a new IMA policy condition - "data_source:=" to the IMA func
What is with "add"? You're "adding support for" or "defining" a new policy condition. Remove the single hyphen, as explained in 3/8.
Please replace "
data_source" with something more generic (e.g. label).
Sounds good. Would you prefer "label" or something else like "data_label"?
In the policy file the "label" looks logical and more generic than "data_label".
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA label=selinux
For the time being, I will stick with "label", please let me know if you prefer something else.
Thanks,
Tushar
Quoted 14 lines
thanks,
Mimi
Quoted 10 lines
CRITICAL_DATAto allow measurement of various kernel subsystems. This policy condition would enable the system administrators to restrict the measurement to the labels listed in "data_source:=".Limit the measurement to the labels that are specified in the IMA policy - CRITICAL_DATA+"data_source:=". If "data_sources:=" is not provided with the func
CRITICAL_DATA, the data from all the supported kernel subsystems is measured.Signed-off-by Tushar Sugandhi <[email protected]>
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PATCH v9 6/8 IMA: extend critical data hook to limit the measurement based on a label
In reply to Tushar SugandhiThe IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() does not support a way to specify the source of the critical data provider. Thus, the data measurement cannot be constrained based on the data source label in the IMA policy.
Extend the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data() to support passing the data source label as an input parameter, so that the policy rule can be used to limit the measurements based on the label.
--- include/linux/ima.h | 6 ++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 11 ++++++++--- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
include/linux/ima.h +4 -2
@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size,extern void ima_post_path_mknod (struct dentry *dentry);extern int ima_file_hash (struct file *file,char *buf,size_t buf_size);extern void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size); -extern void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +extern void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_data_source, +const char *event_name,const void *buf,int buf_len,bool measure_buf_hash);
@@ -125,7 +126,8 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) }static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline (int kernel_fd,const void *buf,int size) {} -static inline void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_data_source, +const char *event_name,const void *buf,int buf_len,bool measure_buf_hash) {}#endif /* CONFIG_IMA */
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +8 -3
@@ -924,6 +924,7 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)/** * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data +* @event_data_source: kernel data source being measured * @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes)
@@ -932,6 +933,9 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)* Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. * +* Use @event_data_source to describe the kernel data source for the buffer +* being measured. +* * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. * Examples of critical data (@buf) could be various data structures, * policies, and states stored in kernel memory that can impact the integrity
@@ -944,15 +948,16 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size)* * The data (@buf) can only be measured, not appraised. */ -void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_name, +void ima_measure_critical_data (const char *event_data_source, +const char *event_name,const void *buf,int buf_len,bool measure_buf_hash) { -if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) +if (!event_name || !event_data_source || !buf || !buf_len)return ;process_buffer_measurement (NULL , buf, buf_len, event_name, -CRITICAL_DATA ,0 ,NULL , +CRITICAL_DATA ,0 , event_data_source, measure_buf_hash); }
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PATCH v9 7/8 IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy
In reply to Tushar SugandhiFrom: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy is loaded.
Add critical data to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line contains "ima_policy=critical_data".
Update the documentation on kernel parameters to document the new critical data builtin policy.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 5 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +4 -1
@@ -1746,7 +1746,7 @@ ima_policy= [IMA] The builtin policies to load during IMA setup. Format: "tcb | appraise_tcb | secure_boot | - fail_securely" + fail_securely | critical_data" The "tcb" policy measures all programs exec'd, files mmap'd for exec, and all files opened with the read
@@ -1765,6 +1765,9 @@ filesystems with the SB_I_UNVERIFIABLE_SIGNATURE flag. + The "critical_data" policy measures kernel integrity + critical data. + ima_tcb [IMA] Deprecated. Use ima_policy= instead. Load a policy which meets the needs of the Trusted Computing Base. This means IMA will measure all
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +12 -0
@@ -206,6 +206,10 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry secure_boot_rules[] __ro_after_init = { .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED}, }; +static struct ima_rule_entry critical_data_rules[]__ro_after_init = { + {.action =MEASURE , .func =CRITICAL_DATA , .flags =IMA_FUNC }, +}; +/* An array of architecture specific rules */ static struct ima_rule_entry *arch_policy_entry__ro_after_init ;
@@ -228,6 +232,7 @@ __setup("ima_tcb", default_measure_policy_setup);static bool ima_use_appraise_tcb__initdata ;static bool ima_use_secure_boot__initdata ; +static bool ima_use_critical_data__initdata ;static bool ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs__ro_after_init ;static int __init policy_setup (char *str) {
@@ -242,6 +247,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) ima_use_secure_boot = true; + else if (strcmp(p, "critical_data") == 0) + ima_use_critical_data = true; else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0) ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true; else
@@ -872,6 +879,11 @@ void __init ima_init_policy(void)ARRAY_SIZE (default_appraise_rules), IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY); +if (ima_use_critical_data) +add_rules (critical_data_rules, +ARRAY_SIZE (critical_data_rules), +IMA_DEFAULT_POLICY ); +ima_update_policy_flag (); }
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Re: [PATCH v9 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy
Quoted 8 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy is loaded.
Add critical data to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line contains "ima_policy=critical_data".
This sentence isn't really necessary.
Quoted 6 lines
Update the documentation on kernel parameters to document the new critical data builtin policy.
Signed-off-by Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>
Otherwise,
thanks,
Mimi
Re: [PATCH v9 7/8] IMA: define a builtin critical data measurement policy
Quoted 12 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 8 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
Define a new critical data builtin policy to allow measuring early kernel integrity critical data before a custom IMA policy is loaded.
Add critical data to built-in IMA rules if the kernel command line contains "ima_policy=critical_data".
This sentence isn't really necessary.
Will remove.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
Update the documentation on kernel parameters to document the new critical data builtin policy.
Signed-off-by Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>Otherwise,
Reviewed-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>
Thanks again for the "Reviewed-by" tag.
Thanks,
Tushar
Quoted 5 lines
thanks,
Mimi
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PATCH v9 8/8 selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
In reply to Tushar SugandhiFrom: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate the policy contents at runtime.
Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry.
Add "selinux" to the list of supported data sources maintained by IMA to enable measuring SELinux data.
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data
2, Add the following rule to /etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA data_source=selinux
Sample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy:
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum /sys/fs/selinux/policy | cut -d' ' -f 1
grep "selinux-policy-hash" /sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6
Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe system and run the sha256sum /sys/kernel/selinux/policy there to get the expected hash.
--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 +- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 11 +++- security/selinux/measure.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 5 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +2 -1
@@ -52,8 +52,9 @@ Description: template:= name of a defined IMA template type (eg, ima-ng). Only valid when action is "measure". pcr:= decimal value - data_source:= [label] + data_source:= [selinux]|[label] label:= a unique string used for grouping and limiting critical data. + For example, "selinux" to measure critical data for SELinux. default policy: # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
security/selinux/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o + ccflags-y := -I$(srctree)/security/selinux -I$(srctree)/security/selinux/include $(addprefix $(obj)/,$(selinux-y)): $(obj)/flask.h
security/selinux/include/security.h +10 -1
@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state, struct selinux_policy *policy);int security_read_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void **data,size_t *len); - +int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len);int security_policycap_supported (struct selinux_state *state,unsigned int req_cap);
@@ -446,4 +447,12 @@ extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);extern void hashtab_cache_init (void );extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats (struct selinux_state *state,char *page); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state); +#else +static inline void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state) +{ +} +#endif +#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
security/selinux/measure.c new file +79 -0
79 lines not on this page · raw message
security/selinux/ss/services.c +62 -9
98 lines not on this page · raw message
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Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
Quoted 51 lines · Tushar Sugandhi
From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>
SELinux stores the active policy in memory, so the changes to this data at runtime would have an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring in-memory SELinux policy through IMA subsystem provides a secure way for the attestation service to remotely validate the policy contents at runtime.
Measure the hash of the loaded policy by calling the IMA hook
ima_measure_critical_data(). Since the size of the loaded policy can be large (several MB), measure the hash of the policy instead of the entire policy to avoid bloating the IMA log entry.Add "selinux" to the list of supported data sources maintained by IMA to enable measuring SELinux data.
To enable SELinux data measurement, the following steps are required:
1, Add "ima_policy=critical_data" to the kernel command line arguments
to enable measuring SELinux data at boot time.
For example,
BOOT_IMAGE=/boot/vmlinuz-5.10.0-rc1+ root=UUID=fd643309-a5d2-4ed3-b10d-3c579a5fab2f ro nomodeset security=selinux ima_policy=critical_data2, Add the following rule to
/etc/ima/ima-policy
measure func=CRITICAL_DATA data_source=selinuxSample measurement of the hash of SELinux policy:
To verify the measured data with the current SELinux policy run the following commands and verify the output hash values match.
sha256sum
/sys/fs/selinux/policy| cut -d' ' -f 1grep "selinux-policy-hash"
/sys/kernel/security/integrity/ima/ascii_runtime_measurements| tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f 6Note that the actual verification of SELinux policy would require loading the expected policy into an identical kernel on a pristine/known-safe system and run the sha256sum
/sys/kernel/selinux/policythere to get the expected hash.Signed-off-by Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <[email protected]>Suggested-by Stephen Smalley <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Tyler Hicks <[email protected]>--- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 +- security/selinux/Makefile | 2 + security/selinux/include/security.h | 11 +++- security/selinux/measure.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/selinux/ss/services.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++---- 5 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) create mode 100644 security/selinux/measure.c
...
security/selinux/Makefile selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o · line 19
Quoted 9 lines
security/selinux/Makefile +1
-0@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o +selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.o
Naming things is hard, I get that, but I would prefer if we just called this file "ima.c" or something similar. The name "measure.c" implies a level of abstraction or general use which simply doesn't exist here. Let's help make it a bit more obvious what should belong in this file.
Quoted 15 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h +2
-1@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state, struct selinux_policy *policy);int security_read_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void **data,size_t *len); - +int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len);int security_policycap_supported (struct selinux_state *state,unsigned int req_cap);
security/selinux/include/security.h extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void); · line 456
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h +7
-0@@ -446,4 +447,12 @@ extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);extern void hashtab_cache_init (void );extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats (struct selinux_state *state,char *page); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state); +#else +static inline void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state) +{ +} +#endif
If you are going to put the SELinux/IMA function(s) into a separate source file, please put the function declarations into a separate header file too. For example, look at security/selinux/include/{netif,netnode,netport,etc.}.h.
Quoted 31 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +25
-0@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* +* Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. +*/ +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include "security.h" + +/* +* This function creates a unique name by appending the timestamp to +* the given string. This string is passed as "event_name" to the IMA +* hook to measure the given SELinux data. +* +* The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have +* already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). +* But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence +* needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass a unique "event_name" +* to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. +* +* For example, +* At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. +* At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. +* At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it +* (since it was already measured) unless the event_name, for instance,
security/selinux/measure.c line 35
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +10
-0+* is different in this call. +*/ +static char *selinux_event_name (const char *name_prefix) +{ +struct timespec64 cur_time; + +ktime_get_real_ts64 (&cur_time); +return kasprintf (GFP_KERNEL ,"%s-%lld:%09ld" , name_prefix, + cur_time.tv_sec, cur_time.tv_nsec); +}
Why is this a separate function? It's three lines long and only called from selinux_measure_state(). Do you ever see the SELinux/IMA code in this file expanding to the point where this function is nice from a reuse standpoint?
Also, I assume you are not concerned about someone circumventing the IMA measurements by manipulating the time? In most systems I would expect the time to be a protected entity, but with many systems getting their time from remote systems I thought it was worth mentioning.
security/selinux/measure.c line 44
Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +8
-0+/* +* selinux_measure_state - Measure hash of the SELinux policy +* +* @state: selinux state struct +* +* NOTE: This function must be called with policy_mutex held. +*/ +void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *state)
Similar to the name of this source file, let's make it clear this is for IMA. How about calling this selinux_ima_measure_state() or similar?
security/selinux/measure.c line 50
Quoted 6 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +6
-0+{ +void *policy =NULL ; +char *policy_event_name =NULL ; +size_t policy_len; +int rc =0 ; +bool initialized =selinux_initialized (state);
Why bother with the initialized variable? Unless I'm missing something it is only used once in the code below.
security/selinux/measure.c line 62
Quoted 11 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +11
-0+/* +* Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed. +*/ +if (!initialized) + goto out; + + policy_event_name =selinux_event_name ("selinux-policy-hash" ); +if (!policy_event_name) { +pr_err ("SELinux: %s: event name for policy not allocated.\n" , + __func__); + rc = -ENOMEM ;
This function doesn't return an error code, why bother with setting the rc variable here?
Quoted 32 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +17
-0+ goto out; + } + + rc =security_read_policy_kernel (state, &policy, &policy_len); +if (rc) { +pr_err ("SELinux: %s: failed to read policy %d.\n" , __func__, rc); + goto out; + } + +ima_measure_critical_data ("selinux" , policy_event_name, + policy, policy_len, true); + +vfree (policy); + +out: +kfree (policy_event_name); +}security/selinux/ss/services.c +1
-0@@ -2180,6 +2180,7 @@ static void selinux_notify_policy_change(struct selinux_state *state,selinux_status_update_policyload (state, seqno);selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate ();selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload (); +selinux_measure_state (state); } void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state,@@ -3875,8 +3876,33 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, }#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3887
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +9
-0+/** +* security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy. +* @policy: SELinux policy +* @data: binary policy data +* @len: length of data in bytes +* +*/ +static int security_read_selinux_policy (struct selinux_policy *policy, +void *data,size_t *len)
Let's just call this "security_read_policy()".
Quoted 49 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +16
-2+{ +int rc; +struct policy_file fp; + + fp.data = data; + fp.len = *len; + + rc =policydb_write (&policy->policydb, &fp); +if (rc) +return rc; + + *len = (unsigned long )fp.data - (unsigned long )data; +return 0 ; +} +/** * security_read_policy - read the policy. +* @state: selinux_state * @data: binary policy data * @len: length of data in bytes * @@ -3885,8 +3911,6 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void **data, size_t *len) { struct selinux_policy *policy; -int rc; -struct policy_file fp; policy =rcu_dereference_protected ( state->policy,lockdep_is_held (&state->policy_mutex));@@ -3898,14 +3922,43 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, if (!*data)> --2.17.1
return -ENOMEM;security/selinux/ss/services.c +6
-5- fp.data = *data; - fp.len = *len; +return security_read_selinux_policy (policy, *data, len); +} - rc =policydb_write (&policy->policydb, &fp); -if (rc) -return rc; +/** +* security_read_policy_kernel - read the policy. +* @state: selinux_state +* @data: binary policy data
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3941
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +10
-0+* @len: length of data in bytes +* +* Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy. +* This function is for internal use only and should not +* be used for returning data to user space. +* +* This function must be called with policy_mutex held. +*/ +int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len)
Let's call this "security_read_state_kernel()".
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3944
Quoted 3 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +3
-0+{ +struct selinux_policy *policy; +int rc =0 ;
See below, the rc variable is not needed.
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3950
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +5
-2- *len = (unsigned long )fp.data - (unsigned long )*data; -return 0 ; + policy =rcu_dereference_protected ( + state->policy,lockdep_is_held (&state->policy_mutex)); +if (!policy) { + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto out;
Jumping to the out label is a little silly since it is just a return; do a "return -EINVAL;" here instead.
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3957
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +7
-0+ } + + *len = policy->policydb.len; + *data =vmalloc (*len); +if (!*data) { + rc = -ENOMEM ; + goto out;
Same as above, "return -ENOMEM;" please.
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3960
Quoted 3 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +2
-0+ } + rc =security_read_selinux_policy (policy, *data, len);
You should be able to do "return security_read_selinux_policy(...);" here.
Quoted 4 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +3
-0+ +out: +return rc; }
Signature · 2 lines
paul moore www.paul-moore.com
Re: [PATCH v9 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
On 12/23/20 1:10 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
Hi Paul,
Quoted 10 lines
...
Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/Makefile +0
-0@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o selinux-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND) += ibpkey.o
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/Makefile selinux-$(CONFIG_NETLABEL) += netlabel.o · line 19
Quoted 1 line
security/selinux/Makefile +1
-0+selinux-$(CONFIG_IMA) += measure.oNaming things is hard, I get that, but I would prefer if we just called this file "
ima.c" or something similar. The name "measure.c" implies a level of abstraction or general use which simply doesn't exist here. Let's help make it a bit more obvious what should belong in this file.
Agreed - I will rename the file to ima.c
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 19 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h +2
-1@@ -229,7 +229,8 @@ void selinux_policy_cancel(struct selinux_state *state, struct selinux_policy *policy);int security_read_policy (struct selinux_state *state,void **data,size_t *len); - +int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len);int security_policycap_supported (struct selinux_state *state,unsigned int req_cap);@@ -446,4 +447,12 @@ extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void);extern void hashtab_cache_init (void );extern int security_sidtab_hash_stats (struct selinux_state *state,char *page);
Quoted 12 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h extern void ebitmap_cache_init(void); · line 456
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/include/security.h +7
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state); +#else +static inline void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *selinux_state) +{ +} +#endif If you are going to put the SELinux/IMA function(s) into a separate source file, please put the function declarations into a separate header file too. For example, look at
security/selinux/include/{netif,netnode,netport,etc.}.h.
I will create a new header file "security/selinux/include/ima.h" and move the function declarations for IMA functions to that header.
Quoted 39 lines
Quoted 39 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +32
-0@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* +* Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. +*/ +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include "security.h" + +/* +* This function creates a unique name by appending the timestamp to +* the given string. This string is passed as "event_name" to the IMA +* hook to measure the given SELinux data. +* +* The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have +* already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). +* But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence +* needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass a unique "event_name" +* to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. +* +* For example, +* At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. +* At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. +* At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it +* (since it was already measured) unless the event_name, for instance, +* is different in this call. +*/ +static char *selinux_event_name (const char *name_prefix) +{ +struct timespec64 cur_time; + +ktime_get_real_ts64 (&cur_time);
Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/measure.c line 35
Quoted 3 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +3
-0+return kasprintf (GFP_KERNEL ,"%s-%lld:%09ld" , name_prefix, + cur_time.tv_sec, cur_time.tv_nsec); +}Why is this a separate function? It's three lines long and only called from
selinux_measure_state(). Do you ever see the SELinux/IMA code in this file expanding to the point where this function is nice from a reuse standpoint?
Earlier I had two measurements - one for SELinux configuration/state and another for SELinux policy. selinux_event_name() was used to generate event name for each of them.
In this patch set I have included only one measurement - for SELinux policy. I plan to add "SELinux configuration/state" measurement in a separate patch - I can reuse selinux_event_name() in that patch.
Also, I think the comment in the function header for selinux_event_name() is useful.
I prefer to have a separate function, if that's fine by you.
Quoted 6 lines
Also, I assume you are not concerned about someone circumventing the IMA measurements by manipulating the time? In most systems I would expect the time to be a protected entity, but with many systems getting their time from remote systems I thought it was worth mentioning.
I am using time function to generate a unique name for the IMA measurement event, such as, "selinux-policy-hash-1609790281:860232824". This is to ensure that state changes in SELinux data are always measured.
If you think time manipulation can be an issue, please let me know a better way to generate unique event names.
Quoted 13 lines
security/selinux/measure.c line 44
Quoted 9 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +8
-0+/* +* selinux_measure_state - Measure hash of the SELinux policy +* +* @state: selinux state struct +* +* NOTE: This function must be called with policy_mutex held. +*/ +void selinux_measure_state (struct selinux_state *state)Similar to the name of this source file, let's make it clear this is for IMA. How about calling this
selinux_ima_measure_state()or similar?
Sure - I will change the function name to selinux_ima_measure_state().
Quoted 10 lines
security/selinux/measure.c line 50
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +6
-0+{ +void *policy =NULL ; +char *policy_event_name =NULL ; +size_t policy_len; +int rc =0 ; +bool initialized =selinux_initialized (state);Why bother with the initialized variable? Unless I'm missing something it is only used once in the code below.
You are right - I will remove "initialized" variable and directly get the state using selinux_initialized().
Quoted 13 lines
security/selinux/measure.c line 62
Quoted 12 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +11
-0+/* +* Measure SELinux policy only after initialization is completed. +*/ +if (!initialized) + goto out; + + policy_event_name =selinux_event_name ("selinux-policy-hash" ); +if (!policy_event_name) { +pr_err ("SELinux: %s: event name for policy not allocated.\n" , + __func__); + rc = -ENOMEM ;
Quoted 2 lines
This function doesn't return an error code, why bother with setting the rc variable here?
Yes - it is not necessary. I will remove the line.
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 34 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +17
-0+ goto out; + } + + rc =security_read_policy_kernel (state, &policy, &policy_len); +if (rc) { +pr_err ("SELinux: %s: failed to read policy %d.\n" , __func__, rc); + goto out; + } + +ima_measure_critical_data ("selinux" , policy_event_name, + policy, policy_len, true); + +vfree (policy); + +out: +kfree (policy_event_name); +}security/selinux/ss/services.c +1
-0@@ -2180,6 +2180,7 @@ static void selinux_notify_policy_change(struct selinux_state *state,selinux_status_update_policyload (state, seqno);selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate ();selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload (); +selinux_measure_state (state); } void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state,@@ -3875,8 +3876,33 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, }#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */
Quoted 11 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3887
Quoted 9 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +9
-0+/** +* security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy. +* @policy: SELinux policy +* @data: binary policy data +* @len: length of data in bytes +* +*/ +static int security_read_selinux_policy (struct selinux_policy *policy, +void *data,size_t *len)Let's just call this "
security_read_policy()".
There is another function in this file with the name security_read_policy().
How about changing the above function name to "read_selinux_policy()" since this is a local/static function.
Quoted 54 lines
Quoted 54 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +16
-2+{ +int rc; +struct policy_file fp; + + fp.data = data; + fp.len = *len; + + rc =policydb_write (&policy->policydb, &fp); +if (rc) +return rc; + + *len = (unsigned long )fp.data - (unsigned long )data; +return 0 ; +} +/** * security_read_policy - read the policy. +* @state: selinux_state * @data: binary policy data * @len: length of data in bytes * @@ -3885,8 +3911,6 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, void **data, size_t *len) { struct selinux_policy *policy; -int rc; -struct policy_file fp; policy =rcu_dereference_protected ( state->policy,lockdep_is_held (&state->policy_mutex));@@ -3898,14 +3922,43 @@ int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, if (!*data)> --2.17.1
return -ENOMEM;security/selinux/ss/services.c +10
-5- fp.data = *data; - fp.len = *len; +return security_read_selinux_policy (policy, *data, len); +} - rc =policydb_write (&policy->policydb, &fp); -if (rc) -return rc; +/** +* security_read_policy_kernel - read the policy. +* @state: selinux_state +* @data: binary policy data +* @len: length of data in bytes +* +* Allocates kernel memory for reading SELinux policy. +* This function is for internal use only and should not
Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3941
Quoted 6 lines
+ * be used for returning data to user space.
+ *
+ * This function must be called withpolicy_mutexheld.
+ */security/selinux/ss/services.c +2
-0+int security_read_policy_kernel (struct selinux_state *state, +void **data,size_t *len)Let's call this "
security_read_state_kernel()".
Sure - I will rename the function.
Quoted 26 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3944
Quoted 4 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +3
-0+{ +struct selinux_policy *policy; +int rc =0 ;See below, the rc variable is not needed.
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3950
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +5
-2- *len = (unsigned long )fp.data - (unsigned long )*data; -return 0 ; + policy =rcu_dereference_protected ( + state->policy,lockdep_is_held (&state->policy_mutex)); +if (!policy) { + rc = -EINVAL ; + goto out;Jumping to the out label is a little silly since it is just a return; do a "return
-EINVAL;" here instead.security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3957
Quoted 7 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +7
-0+ } + + *len = policy->policydb.len; + *data =vmalloc (*len); +if (!*data) { + rc = -ENOMEM ; + goto out;
Quoted 7 lines
Same as above, "return
-ENOMEM;" please.security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_read_policy(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3960
Quoted 3 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +2
-0+ } + rc =security_read_selinux_policy (policy, *data, len);You should be able to do "return
security_read_selinux_policy(...);" here.
I will remove the local variable "rc" and make the three changes you've stated above.
Thanks for reviewing the changes.
-lakshmi
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c +3
-0+ +out: +return rc; }
Paul Moore
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
Quoted 2 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
On 12/23/20 1:10 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
Hi Paul,
Hello.
Quoted 47 lines
Quoted 38 lines
Quoted 38 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +32
-0@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* +* Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. +*/ +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include "security.h" + +/* +* This function creates a unique name by appending the timestamp to +* the given string. This string is passed as "event_name" to the IMA +* hook to measure the given SELinux data. +* +* The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have +* already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). +* But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence +* needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass a unique "event_name" +* to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. +* +* For example, +* At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. +* At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. +* At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it +* (since it was already measured) unless the event_name, for instance, +* is different in this call. +*/ +static char *selinux_event_name (const char *name_prefix) +{ +struct timespec64 cur_time; + +ktime_get_real_ts64 (&cur_time);Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/measure.c line 35
Quoted 3 lines
security/selinux/measure.c new file +3
-0+return kasprintf (GFP_KERNEL ,"%s-%lld:%09ld" , name_prefix, + cur_time.tv_sec, cur_time.tv_nsec); +}Why is this a separate function? It's three lines long and only called from
selinux_measure_state(). Do you ever see the SELinux/IMA code in this file expanding to the point where this function is nice from a reuse standpoint?
Quoted 7 lines
Earlier I had two measurements - one for SELinux configuration/state and another for SELinux policy.
selinux_event_name()was used to generate event name for each of them.In this patch set I have included only one measurement - for SELinux policy. I plan to add "SELinux configuration/state" measurement in a separate patch - I can reuse
selinux_event_name()in that patch.
I'm curious about this second measurement. My apologies if you posted it previously, this patchset has gone through several iterations and simply can't recall all the different versions without digging through the list archives.
Is there a reason why the second measurement isn't included in this patch? Or this patchset if it is too big to be a single patch?
Quoted 4 lines
Also, I think the comment in the function header for
selinux_event_name()is useful.I prefer to have a separate function, if that's fine by you.
Given just this patch I would prefer if you folded selinux_event_name() into selinux_measure_state(). However, I agree with you that the comments in the selinux_event_name() header block is useful, I would suggest moving those into the body of selinux_measure_state() directly above the calls to ktime_get_real_ts64() and kasprintf().
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Also, I assume you are not concerned about someone circumventing the IMA measurements by manipulating the time? In most systems I would expect the time to be a protected entity, but with many systems getting their time from remote systems I thought it was worth mentioning.
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I am using time function to generate a unique name for the IMA measurement event, such as, "selinux-policy-hash-1609790281:860232824". This is to ensure that state changes in SELinux data are always measured.
If you think time manipulation can be an issue, please let me know a better way to generate unique event names.
Yes, I understand that you are using the time value as a way of ensuring you always have a different event name and hence a new measurement. However, I was wondering if you would be okay if the time was adjusted such that an event name was duplicated and a measurement missed? Is that a problem for you? It seems like it might be an issue, but you and Mimi know IMA better than I do.
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security/selinux/ss/services.c +0
-0@@ -3875,8 +3876,33 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, }#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ Quoted 11 lines
security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3887
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security/selinux/ss/services.c +9
-0+/** +* security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy. +* @policy: SELinux policy +* @data: binary policy data +* @len: length of data in bytes +* +*/ +static int security_read_selinux_policy (struct selinux_policy *policy, +void *data,size_t *len)Let's just call this "
security_read_policy()".
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There is another function in this file with the name
security_read_policy().How about changing the above function name to "
read_selinux_policy()" since this is a local/static function.
Ooops, sorry about that! I'm not sure what I was thinking there :)
How about "__security_read_policy()"?
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paul moore www.paul-moore.com -- dm-devel mailing list [email protected] https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
Re: [PATCH v9 8/8] selinux: include a consumer of the new IMA critical data hook
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Quoted 2 lines · Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
On 12/23/20 1:10 PM, Paul Moore wrote:
Hi Paul,Hello.
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security/selinux/measure.c new file +32
-0@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later +/* +* Measure SELinux state using IMA subsystem. +*/ +#include <linux/vmalloc.h> +#include <linux/ktime.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> +#include "security.h" + +/* +* This function creates a unique name by appending the timestamp to +* the given string. This string is passed as "event_name" to the IMA +* hook to measure the given SELinux data. +* +* The data provided by SELinux to the IMA subsystem for measuring may have +* already been measured (for instance the same state existed earlier). +* But for SELinux the current data represents a state change and hence +* needs to be measured again. To enable this, pass a unique "event_name" +* to the IMA hook so that IMA subsystem will always measure the given data. +* +* For example, +* At time T0 SELinux data to be measured is "foo". IMA measures it. +* At time T1 the data is changed to "bar". IMA measures it. +* At time T2 the data is changed to "foo" again. IMA will not measure it +* (since it was already measured) unless the event_name, for instance, +* is different in this call. +*/ +static char *selinux_event_name (const char *name_prefix) +{ +struct timespec64 cur_time; + +ktime_get_real_ts64 (&cur_time);Quoted 8 lines
security/selinux/measure.c line 35
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security/selinux/measure.c new file +3
-0+return kasprintf (GFP_KERNEL ,"%s-%lld:%09ld" , name_prefix, + cur_time.tv_sec, cur_time.tv_nsec); +}Why is this a separate function? It's three lines long and only called from
selinux_measure_state(). Do you ever see the SELinux/IMA code in this file expanding to the point where this function is nice from a reuse standpoint?Earlier I had two measurements - one for SELinux configuration/state and another for SELinux policy.
selinux_event_name()was used to generate event name for each of them.
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In this patch set I have included only one measurement - for SELinux policy. I plan to add "SELinux configuration/state" measurement in a separate patch - I can reuse
selinux_event_name()in that patch.I'm curious about this second measurement. My apologies if you posted it previously, this patchset has gone through several iterations and simply can't recall all the different versions without digging through the list archives.
The 2nd measurement is for SELinux state data such as "enforcing", "checkreqprot", policycap[__POLICYDB_CAPABILITY_MAX], etc.
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Is there a reason why the second measurement isn't included in this patch? Or this patchset if it is too big to be a single patch?
For illustrating the use of the new IMA hook, that my colleague Tushar has added for measuring kernel critical data, we have included only one SELinux measurement in this patch set - the measurement of SELinux policy. This also helped in keeping this patch smaller.
When this patch set is merged, I'll post a separate patch to add measurement of SELinux state data I have mentioned above.
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Also, I think the comment in the function header for
selinux_event_name()is useful.I prefer to have a separate function, if that's fine by you.
Given just this patch I would prefer if you folded
selinux_event_name()intoselinux_measure_state(). However, I agree with you that the comments in theselinux_event_name()header block is useful, I would suggest moving those into the body ofselinux_measure_state()directly above the calls toktime_get_real_ts64()andkasprintf().
Sure - I will make that change.
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Also, I assume you are not concerned about someone circumventing the IMA measurements by manipulating the time? In most systems I would expect the time to be a protected entity, but with many systems getting their time from remote systems I thought it was worth mentioning.
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I am using time function to generate a unique name for the IMA measurement event, such as, "selinux-policy-hash-1609790281:860232824". This is to ensure that state changes in SELinux data are always measured.
If you think time manipulation can be an issue, please let me know a better way to generate unique event names.
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Yes, I understand that you are using the time value as a way of ensuring you always have a different event name and hence a new measurement. However, I was wondering if you would be okay if the time was adjusted such that an event name was duplicated and a measurement missed? Is that a problem for you? It seems like it might be an issue, but you and Mimi know IMA better than I do.
If the system time was adjusted such that the event name is duplicated, we could miss measurements - this is not okay.
For example:
#1 Say, at time T1 SELinux state being measured is "foo" - IMA will
measure it.
#2 at time T2, the state changes to "bar" - IMA will measure it
#3 at time T3, the state changes from "bar" to "foo" again. Unless the
"event name" passed in the measurement call is different from what was passed in step #1, IMA will not measure it and hence we'll miss the state change.
If system time can be manipulated to return the same "timer tick" on every call to ktime_get_real_ts64(), we will lose measurement in Step #3 above.
But given that we are using ktime_get_real_ts64() to get the timer tick, is it possible to manipulate the system time without compromising the overall functioning of the rest of the system? If yes, then it is an issue - I mean, there is a possibility of losing some measurements.
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security/selinux/ss/services.c +0
-0@@ -3875,8 +3876,33 @@ int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, }#endif /* CONFIG_NETLABEL */ security/selinux/ss/services.c int security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(struct selinux_state *state, · line 3887
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security/selinux/ss/services.c +9
-0+/** +* security_read_selinux_policy - read the policy. +* @policy: SELinux policy +* @data: binary policy data +* @len: length of data in bytes +* +*/ +static int security_read_selinux_policy (struct selinux_policy *policy, +void *data,size_t *len)Let's just call this "
security_read_policy()".
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There is another function in this file with the name
security_read_policy().How about changing the above function name to "
read_selinux_policy()" since this is a local/static function.Ooops, sorry about that! I'm not sure what I was thinking there :)
How about "
__security_read_policy()"?
Sure - I will change the function name to "__security_read_policy()".
thanks,
-lakshmi