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wpa-supplicant: Upgrade 2.10 -> 2.11

PATCH In review Siddharth 4 participants 7 messages Aug 22, 2024 – Aug 23, 2024

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PATCH 1/1 wpa-supplicant: Upgrade 2.10 -> 2.11

From: Siddharth Doshi <[email protected]>

License-Update:
===============
- README: Change in copyright years as per https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/README?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c: Change in copyright years as per https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

CVE's Fixed:
===========
- CVE-2024-5290 wpa_supplicant: wpa_supplicant loading arbitrary shared objects allowing privilege escalation
- CVE-2023-52160 wpa_supplicant: potential authorization bypass

Changes between 2.10 -> 2.11:
============================
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

Note:
=====
Patches 0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch, 0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch, 0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch, 0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch (CVE-2023-52160) are already fixed and hence removing them.

---
 ...all-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch |  33 ---
 ...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ------------------
 ...options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch |  73 ------
 ...oval-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch |  26 ---
 ...plicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} |  10 +-
 5 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 352 deletions(-)
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch
 rename meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/{wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} (90%)
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch deleted +0 -33
deleted file mode 100644
index c04c608bde..0000000000
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 57b12a1e43605f71239a21488cb9b541f0751dda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Kiernan <[email protected]>
-Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 10:15:29 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Install wpa_passphrase when not disabled
-
-As part of fixing CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE, whilst wpa_passphrase gets
-built, its not installed during `make install`.
-
-Fixes: cb41c214b78d ("build: Re-enable options for libwpa_client.so and wpa_passphrase")
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan <[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan <[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Submitted [http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2022-April/040448.html]
----
- wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-index 0bab313f2355..12787c0c7d0f 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/%: %
- 
- install: $(addprefix $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/,$(BINALL))
- 	$(MAKE) -C ../src install
-+ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
-+	install -D wpa_passphrase $(DESTDIR)/$(BINDIR)/wpa_passphrase
-+endif
- ifdef CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
- 	install -m 0644 -D libwpa_client.so $(DESTDIR)/$(LIBDIR)/libwpa_client.so
- 	install -m 0644 -D ../src/common/wpa_ctrl.h $(DESTDIR)/$(INCDIR)/wpa_ctrl.h
--- 
-2.35.1
-
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch deleted +0 -213

213 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch deleted +0 -73

73 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch deleted +0 -26
deleted file mode 100644
index 53b0fcdf53..0000000000
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From d001b301ba7987f4b39453a211631b85c48f2ff8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
-Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 13:26:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix removal of wpa_passphrase on 'make clean'
-
-Fixes: 0430bc8267b4 ("build: Add a common-clean target")
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan <[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan <[email protected]>
----
- wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-index c456825ae75f..4b4688931b1d 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-@@ -2077,3 +2077,4 @@ clean: common-clean
- 	rm -f libwpa_client.a
- 	rm -f libwpa_client.so
- 	rm -f libwpa_test1 libwpa_test2
-+	rm -f wpa_passphrase
--- 
-2.35.1
-
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +3 -7
similarity index 90%
rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb
rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb
index 8113bcab09..321dedc58a 100644
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ BUGTRACKER = "http://w1.fi/security/"
 SECTION = "network"
 LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
 LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://COPYING;md5=5ebcb90236d1ad640558c3d3cd3035df \
-                    file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=e3d2f6c2948991e37c1ca4960de84747 \
-                    file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=76306a95306fee9a976b0ac1be70f705"
+                    file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=6e4b25e7d74bfc44a32ba37bdf5210a6 \
+                    file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=f5ccd57ea91e04800edb88267bf8eae4"
 
 DEPENDS = "dbus libnl"
 
@@ -15,12 +15,8 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf \
            file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \
            file://99_wpa_supplicant \
-           file://0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch \
-           file://0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch \
-           file://0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch \
-           file://0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch \
            "
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "912ea06f74e30a8e36fbb68064d6cdff218d8d591db0fc5d75dee6c81ac7fc0a"
 
 S = "${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant-${PV}"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

For scarthgap, it's good but not mandatory to have Steve on the To/CC list.

Quoted 7 lines · Siddharth Doshi via lists.openembedded.org

From: Siddharth Doshi<[email protected]>

License-Update:
===============
- README: Change in copyright years as perhttps://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/README?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c: Change in copyright years as perhttps://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

Quoted 8 lines

CVE's Fixed:
===========
- CVE-2024-5290 wpa_supplicant: wpa_supplicant loading arbitrary shared objects allowing privilege escalation
- CVE-2023-52160 wpa_supplicant: potential authorization bypass

Changes between 2.10 -> 2.11:
============================
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

Hello Siddharth,

This update make sense for the master brnanch but likely not for scarthgap unless you can show that this is a bug fix only release.

It certainly does not look like a small bug fix only update based on:

❯ git diff hostap_2_10 hostap_2_11 | diffstat | tail -1

 534 files changed, 85965 insertions(+), 16847 deletions(-)

❯ git log --oneline hostap_2_10..hostap_2_11 | wc -l 2295

and the hostap and wpa-supplicant ChangeLogs which mention adding features below (1).

Since the repo ( git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git ) doesn't have a stable branch for 2.10:

❯ git branch -a
* master
  remotes/origin/HEAD -> origin/master
  remotes/origin/android-jb
  remotes/origin/android-kk
  remotes/origin/android-l
  remotes/origin/android-m
  remotes/origin/aosp-jb
  remotes/origin/aosp-kk
  remotes/origin/main
  remotes/origin/master
  remotes/origin/pending

you'll have to backport any CVE fixes that you're interested in unless someone explains why this is a sensible update for scarthgap.

Thanks,

../Randy

1)

❯ git diff hostap_2_10 hostap_2_11 hostapd/ChangeLog | cat

hostapd/ChangeLog +0 -0
index 279298e4d..1c8240d33 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,42 @@

 ChangeLog for hostapd

+2024-07-20 - v2.11
+    * Wi-Fi Easy Connect
+      - add support for DPP release 3
+      - allow Configurator parameters to be provided during config exchange +    * HE/IEEE 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6
+      - various fixes
+    * EHT/IEEE 802.11be/Wi-Fi 7
+      - add preliminary support
+    * SAE: add support for fetching the password from a RADIUS server +    * support OpenSSL 3.0 API changes
+    * support background radar detection and CAC with some additional +      drivers
+    * support RADIUS ACL/PSK check during 4-way handshake (wpa_psk_radius=3) +    * EAP-SIM/AKA: support IMSI privacy
+    * improve 4-way handshake operations
+      - use Secure=1 in message 3 during PTK rekeying
+    * OCV: do not check Frequency Segment 1 Channel Number for 160 MHz cases +      to avoid interoperability issues
+    * support new SAE AKM suites with variable length keys
+    * support new AKM for 802.1X/EAP with SHA384
+    * extend PASN support for secure ranging
+    * FT: Use SHA256 to derive PMKID for AKM 00-0F-AC:3 (FT-EAP) +      - this is based on additional details being added in the IEEE 802.11 +        standard
+      - the new implementation is not backwards compatible
+    * improved ACS to cover additional channel types/bandwidths +    * extended Multiple BSSID support
+    * fix beacon protection with FT protocol (incorrect BIGTK was provided) +    * support unsynchronized service discovery (USD)
+    * add preliminary support for RADIUS/TLS
+    * add support for explicit SSID protection in 4-way handshake +      (a mitigation for CVE-2023-52424; disabled by default for now, can be +      enabled with ssid_protection=1)
+    * fix SAE H2E rejected groups validation to avoid downgrade attacks +    * use stricter validation for some RADIUS messages
+    * a large number of other fixes, cleanup, and extensions
+
 2022-01-16 - v2.10
     * SAE changes
       - improved protection against side channel attacks

❯  git diff hostap_2_10 hostap_2_11 wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog | cat

wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog +0 -0
index efcc6cd9c..3f4162eb0 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,55 @@

 ChangeLog for wpa_supplicant

+2024-07-20 - v2.11
+    * Wi-Fi Easy Connect
+      - add support for DPP release 3
+      - allow Configurator parameters to be provided during config exchange +    * MACsec
+      - add support for GCM-AES-256 cipher suite
+      - remove incorrect EAP Session-Id length constraint
+      - add hardware offload support for additional drivers
+    * HE/IEEE 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6
+      - support BSS color updates
+      - various fixes
+    * EHT/IEEE 802.11be/Wi-Fi 7
+      - add preliminary support
+    * support OpenSSL 3.0 API changes
+    * improve EAP-TLS support for TLSv1.3
+    * EAP-SIM/AKA: support IMSI privacy
+    * improve mitigation against DoS attacks when PMF is used
+    * improve 4-way handshake operations
+      - discard unencrypted EAPOL frames in additional cases
+      - use Secure=1 in message 2 during PTK rekeying
+    * OCV: do not check Frequency Segment 1 Channel Number for 160 MHz cases +      to avoid interoperability issues
+    * support new SAE AKM suites with variable length keys
+    * support new AKM for 802.1X/EAP with SHA384
+    * improve cross-AKM roaming with driver-based SME/BSS selection +    * PASN
+      - extend support for secure ranging
+      - allow PASN implementation to be used with external programs for +        Wi-Fi Aware
+    * FT: Use SHA256 to derive PMKID for AKM 00-0F-AC:3 (FT-EAP) +      - this is based on additional details being added in the IEEE 802.11 +        standard
+      - the new implementation is not backwards compatible, but PMKSA +        caching with FT-EAP was, and still is, disabled by default +    * support a pregenerated MAC (mac_addr=3) as an alternative mechanism +      for using per-network random MAC addresses
+    * EAP-PEAP: require Phase 2 authentication by default (phase2_auth=1) +      to improve security for still unfortunately common invalid +      configurations that do not set ca_cert
+    * extend SCS support for QoS Characteristics
+    * extend MSCS support
+    * support unsynchronized service discovery (USD)
+    * add support for explicit SSID protection in 4-way handshake +      (a mitigation for CVE-2023-52424; disabled by default for now, can be +      enabled with ssid_protection=1)
+      - in addition, verify SSID after key setup when beacon protection is +        used
+    * fix SAE H2E rejected groups validation to avoid downgrade attacks +    * a large number of other fixes, cleanup, and extensions
+
 2022-01-16 - v2.10
     * SAE changes
       - improved protection against side channel attacks

Quoted 426 lines

Note:
=====
Patches 0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch, 0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch, 0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch, 0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch (CVE-2023-52160) are already fixed and hence removing them.

---
  ...all-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch |  33 ---
  ...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ------------------
  ...options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch |  73 ------
  ...oval-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch |  26 ---
  ...plicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} |  10 +-
  5 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 352 deletions(-)

delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch rename meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/{wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} (90%)

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch deleted +0 -33
deleted file mode 100644
index c04c608bde..0000000000
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 57b12a1e43605f71239a21488cb9b541f0751dda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 10:15:29 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Install wpa_passphrase when not disabled
-
-As part of fixing CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE, whilst wpa_passphrase gets
-built, its not installed during `make install`.
-
-Fixes: cb41c214b78d ("build: Re-enable options for libwpa_client.so and wpa_passphrase")
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Submitted [http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2022-April/040448.html]
----
- wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-index 0bab313f2355..12787c0c7d0f 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/%: %
-
- install: $(addprefix $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/,$(BINALL))
- 	$(MAKE) -C ../src install
-+ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
-+	install -D wpa_passphrase $(DESTDIR)/$(BINDIR)/wpa_passphrase
-+endif
- ifdef CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
- 	install -m 0644 -D libwpa_client.so $(DESTDIR)/$(LIBDIR)/libwpa_client.so
- 	install -m 0644 -D ../src/common/wpa_ctrl.h $(DESTDIR)/$(INCDIR)/wpa_ctrl.h
---
-2.35.1
-
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch deleted +0 -213
deleted file mode 100644
index 620560d3c7..0000000000
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-From f6f7cead3661ceeef54b21f7e799c0afc98537ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements
-
-The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
-authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
-during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
-specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
-is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
-the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
-unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
-devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
-user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
-
-Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
-authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
-resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
-configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
-authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
-strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
-issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
-session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
-
-Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
-configuration parameter option:
-'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
- * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
- * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-   (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-   not used (default)
- * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-52160
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c]
-
-Signed-off-by: Claus Stovgaard<[email protected]>
-
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_config.h          |  8 ++++++
- src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c            | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c      |  6 +++++
- src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h      |  5 ++++
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf |  7 ++++++
- 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-index 3238f74..047eec2 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config {
- 	 * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
- 	 * 2 = require cryptobinding
- 	 *
-+	 * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-+	 * tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
-+	 * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
-+	 * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-+	 *  (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-+	 *  not used (default)
-+	 * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
-+	 *
- 	 * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and
- 	 * uuid=Device_UUID
- 	 *
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-index 12e30df..6080697 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data {
- 	u8 cmk[20];
- 	int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP)
- 		  * is enabled. */
-+	enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth;
- };
-
-
-@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data,
- 		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding");
- 	}
-
-+	if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) {
-+		data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH;
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+			   "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication");
-+	} else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) {
-+		data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+			   "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection");
-+	} else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) {
-+		data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS;
-+		wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+			   "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases");
-+	}
- #ifdef EAP_TNC
- 	if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) {
- 		data->soh = 2;
-@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
- 	data->force_peap_version = -1;
- 	data->peap_outer_success = 2;
- 	data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING;
-+	data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
-
- 	if (config && config->phase1)
- 		eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1);
-@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm,
- }
-
-
-+static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm,
-+				   struct eap_peap_data *data)
-+{
-+	if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS ||
-+	     (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL &&
-+	      !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
-+	      !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) ||
-+	     data->phase2_eap_started) &&
-+	    !data->phase2_eap_success)
-+		return false;
-+	return true;
-+}
-+
-+
- /**
-  * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response
-  * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init()
-@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data,
- 					   " - force failed Phase 2");
- 				resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
- 				ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
-+			} else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
-+				wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+					   "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed");
-+				resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
-+				ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
- 			} else {
- 				resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS;
- 				ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
-@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req:
- 			/* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate
- 			 * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has
- 			 * been completed. */
--			if (data->phase2_eap_started &&
--			    !data->phase2_eap_success) {
-+			if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
- 				wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 "
- 					   "Success used to indicate success, "
- 					   "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet "
-@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
- {
- 	struct eap_peap_data *data = priv;
-+
- 	return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
--		data->phase2_success;
-+		data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS;
- }
-
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-index c1837db..a53eeb1 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm,
-
- 	sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK);
-
-+	if (!phase2)
-+		data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert ||
-+			params->client_cert_blob ||
-+			params->private_key ||
-+			params->private_key_blob;
-+
- 	return 0;
- }
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-index 9ac0012..3348634 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data {
- 	 * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used
- 	 */
- 	int tls_v13;
-+
-+	/**
-+	 * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured
-+	 */
-+	bool client_cert_conf;
- };
-
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-index 6619d6b..d63f73c 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-@@ -1321,6 +1321,13 @@ fast_reauth=1
- #	 * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default)
- #	 * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
- #	 * 2 = require cryptobinding
-+#	'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-+#	tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
-+#	 * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
-+#	 * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-+#	   (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-+#	   not used (default)
-+#	 * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
- #	EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or
- #	pbc=1.
- #
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch deleted +0 -73
deleted file mode 100644
index 6e930fc98d..0000000000
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From cb41c214b78d6df187a31950342e48a403dbd769 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sergey Matyukevich<[email protected]>
-Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 11:52:19 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] build: Re-enable options for libwpa_client.so and
- wpa_passphrase
-
-Commit a41a29192e5d ("build: Pull common fragments into a build.rules
-file") introduced a regression into wpa_supplicant build process. The
-build target libwpa_client.so is not built regardless of whether the
-option CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO is set or not. This happens because
-this config option is used before it is imported from the configuration
-file. Moving its use after including build.rules does not help: the
-variable ALL is processed by build.rules and further changes are not
-applied. Similarly, option CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE also does not work
-as expected: wpa_passphrase is always built regardless of whether the
-option is set or not.
-
-Re-enable these options by adding both build targets to _all
-dependencies.
-
-Fixes: a41a29192e5d ("build: Pull common fragments into a build.rules file")
-Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich<[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
----
- wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 19 ++++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-index cb66defac7c8..c456825ae75f 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-@@ -1,24 +1,29 @@
- BINALL=wpa_supplicant wpa_cli
-
--ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
--BINALL += wpa_passphrase
--endif
--
- ALL = $(BINALL)
- ALL += systemd/wpa_supplicant.service
- ALL +=systemd/[email protected]
- ALL +=systemd/[email protected]
- ALL +=systemd/[email protected]
- ALL += dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service
--ifdef CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
--ALL += libwpa_client.so
--endif
-
- EXTRA_TARGETS=dynamic_eap_methods
-
- CONFIG_FILE=.config
- include ../src/build.rules
-
-+ifdef CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
-+# add the dependency this way to allow CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
-+# being set in the config which is read by build.rules
-+_all: libwpa_client.so
-+endif
-+
-+ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
-+# add the dependency this way to allow CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
-+# being set in the config which is read by build.rules
-+_all: wpa_passphrase
-+endif
-+
- ifdef LIBS
- # If LIBS is set with some global build system defaults, clone those for
- # LIBS_c and LIBS_p to cover wpa_passphrase and wpa_cli as well.
---
-2.35.1
-
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch deleted +0 -26
deleted file mode 100644
index 53b0fcdf53..0000000000
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From d001b301ba7987f4b39453a211631b85c48f2ff8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 13:26:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix removal of wpa_passphrase on 'make clean'
-
-Fixes: 0430bc8267b4 ("build: Add a common-clean target")
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
----
- wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-index c456825ae75f..4b4688931b1d 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-@@ -2077,3 +2077,4 @@ clean: common-clean
- 	rm -f libwpa_client.a
- 	rm -f libwpa_client.so
- 	rm -f libwpa_test1 libwpa_test2
-+	rm -f wpa_passphrase
---
-2.35.1
-
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +0 -0
similarity index 90%
rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb
rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb
index 8113bcab09..321dedc58a 100644
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ BUGTRACKER ="http://w1.fi/security/"
  SECTION = "network"
  LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
  LIC_FILES_CHKSUM ="file://COPYING;md5=5ebcb90236d1ad640558c3d3cd3035df \ - 

file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=e3d2f6c2948991e37c1ca4960de84747 \ - file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=76306a95306fee9a976b0ac1be70f705"

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +2 -0
+file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=6e4b25e7d74bfc44a32ba37bdf5210a6 \
+file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=f5ccd57ea91e04800edb88267bf8eae4"
 
  DEPENDS = "dbus libnl"
@@ -15,12 +15,8 @@ SRC_URI ="http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ 

file://wpa_supplicant.conf \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ - file://0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch \ - file://0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch \ - file://0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch \ - file://0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch \ "

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +1 -2
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "912ea06f74e30a8e36fbb68064d6cdff218d8d591db0fc5d75dee6c81ac7fc0a"
 
  S = "${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant-${PV}"
 
 
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Signature · 2 lines
# Randy MacLeod
# Wind River Linux
#2 lore raw

Hello Randy,

2.11 version of wpa-supplicant/hostapd are released almost after 2.5 Years. 2-10 released on 2022-01-16. A lot of people are eagerly waiting for this release since a long time. 2.11 has crucial HE/IEEE 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6 support and preliminary support for EHT/IEEE 802.11be/Wi-Fi 7. This also supports WPA3 which is a mandatory certification for Wi-Fi CERTIFIED™ devices.

I do accept this release missed the Sacrthgap cutoff of Yocto community. But considering the longevity of Scarthgap (a good 3.5 years from now) & number of people interested in Scarthgap, it is best if wpa-supplicant/hostapd are switched to 2.11.

// Viswanath

Quoted 604 lines · Randy MacLeod via lists.openembedded.org

For scarthgap, it's good but not mandatory to have Steve on the To/CC list.

Quoted 7 lines · Siddharth Doshi via lists.openembedded.org

From: Siddharth Doshi<[email protected]>

License-Update:
===============
- README: Change in copyright years as perhttps://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/README?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c: Change in copyright years as perhttps://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

Quoted 8 lines

CVE's Fixed:
===========
- CVE-2024-5290 wpa_supplicant: wpa_supplicant loading arbitrary shared objects allowing privilege escalation
- CVE-2023-52160 wpa_supplicant: potential authorization bypass

Changes between 2.10 -> 2.11:
============================
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

Hello Siddharth,

This update make sense for the master brnanch but likely not for scarthgap unless you can show that this is a bug fix only release.

It certainly does not look like a small bug fix only update based on:

❯ git diff hostap_2_10 hostap_2_11 | diffstat | tail -1

 534 files changed, 85965 insertions(+), 16847 deletions(-)

❯ git log --oneline hostap_2_10..hostap_2_11 | wc -l 2295

and the hostap and wpa-supplicant ChangeLogs which mention adding features below (1).

Since the repo ( git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git ) doesn't have a stable branch for 2.10:

❯ git branch -a
* master
  remotes/origin/HEAD -> origin/master
  remotes/origin/android-jb
  remotes/origin/android-kk
  remotes/origin/android-l
  remotes/origin/android-m
  remotes/origin/aosp-jb
  remotes/origin/aosp-kk
  remotes/origin/main
  remotes/origin/master
  remotes/origin/pending

you'll have to backport any CVE fixes that you're interested in unless someone explains why this is a sensible update for scarthgap.

Thanks,

../Randy

1)

❯ git diff hostap_2_10 hostap_2_11 hostapd/ChangeLog | cat

hostapd/ChangeLog +0 -0
index 279298e4d..1c8240d33 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,42 @@

 ChangeLog for hostapd

+2024-07-20 - v2.11
+    * Wi-Fi Easy Connect
+      - add support for DPP release 3
+      - allow Configurator parameters to be provided during config exchange +    * HE/IEEE 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6
+      - various fixes
+    * EHT/IEEE 802.11be/Wi-Fi 7
+      - add preliminary support
+    * SAE: add support for fetching the password from a RADIUS server +    * support OpenSSL 3.0 API changes
+    * support background radar detection and CAC with some additional +      drivers
+    * support RADIUS ACL/PSK check during 4-way handshake (wpa_psk_radius=3) +    * EAP-SIM/AKA: support IMSI privacy
+    * improve 4-way handshake operations
+      - use Secure=1 in message 3 during PTK rekeying
+    * OCV: do not check Frequency Segment 1 Channel Number for 160 MHz cases +      to avoid interoperability issues
+    * support new SAE AKM suites with variable length keys
+    * support new AKM for 802.1X/EAP with SHA384
+    * extend PASN support for secure ranging
+    * FT: Use SHA256 to derive PMKID for AKM 00-0F-AC:3 (FT-EAP) +      - this is based on additional details being added in the IEEE 802.11 +        standard
+      - the new implementation is not backwards compatible
+    * improved ACS to cover additional channel types/bandwidths +    * extended Multiple BSSID support
+    * fix beacon protection with FT protocol (incorrect BIGTK was provided) +    * support unsynchronized service discovery (USD)
+    * add preliminary support for RADIUS/TLS
+    * add support for explicit SSID protection in 4-way handshake +      (a mitigation for CVE-2023-52424; disabled by default for now, can be +      enabled with ssid_protection=1)
+    * fix SAE H2E rejected groups validation to avoid downgrade attacks +    * use stricter validation for some RADIUS messages
+    * a large number of other fixes, cleanup, and extensions
+
 2022-01-16 - v2.10
     * SAE changes
       - improved protection against side channel attacks

❯  git diff hostap_2_10 hostap_2_11 wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog | cat

wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog +0 -0
index efcc6cd9c..3f4162eb0 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,55 @@

 ChangeLog for wpa_supplicant

+2024-07-20 - v2.11
+    * Wi-Fi Easy Connect
+      - add support for DPP release 3
+      - allow Configurator parameters to be provided during config exchange +    * MACsec
+      - add support for GCM-AES-256 cipher suite
+      - remove incorrect EAP Session-Id length constraint
+      - add hardware offload support for additional drivers
+    * HE/IEEE 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6
+      - support BSS color updates
+      - various fixes
+    * EHT/IEEE 802.11be/Wi-Fi 7
+      - add preliminary support
+    * support OpenSSL 3.0 API changes
+    * improve EAP-TLS support for TLSv1.3
+    * EAP-SIM/AKA: support IMSI privacy
+    * improve mitigation against DoS attacks when PMF is used
+    * improve 4-way handshake operations
+      - discard unencrypted EAPOL frames in additional cases
+      - use Secure=1 in message 2 during PTK rekeying
+    * OCV: do not check Frequency Segment 1 Channel Number for 160 MHz cases +      to avoid interoperability issues
+    * support new SAE AKM suites with variable length keys
+    * support new AKM for 802.1X/EAP with SHA384
+    * improve cross-AKM roaming with driver-based SME/BSS selection +    * PASN
+      - extend support for secure ranging
+      - allow PASN implementation to be used with external programs for +        Wi-Fi Aware
+    * FT: Use SHA256 to derive PMKID for AKM 00-0F-AC:3 (FT-EAP) +      - this is based on additional details being added in the IEEE 802.11 +        standard
+      - the new implementation is not backwards compatible, but PMKSA +        caching with FT-EAP was, and still is, disabled by default +    * support a pregenerated MAC (mac_addr=3) as an alternative mechanism +      for using per-network random MAC addresses
+    * EAP-PEAP: require Phase 2 authentication by default (phase2_auth=1) +      to improve security for still unfortunately common invalid +      configurations that do not set ca_cert
+    * extend SCS support for QoS Characteristics
+    * extend MSCS support
+    * support unsynchronized service discovery (USD)
+    * add support for explicit SSID protection in 4-way handshake +      (a mitigation for CVE-2023-52424; disabled by default for now, can be +      enabled with ssid_protection=1)
+      - in addition, verify SSID after key setup when beacon protection is +        used
+    * fix SAE H2E rejected groups validation to avoid downgrade attacks +    * a large number of other fixes, cleanup, and extensions
+
 2022-01-16 - v2.10
     * SAE changes
       - improved protection against side channel attacks

Quoted 410 lines

Note:
=====
Patches 0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch, 0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch, 0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch, 0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch (CVE-2023-52160) are already fixed and hence removing them.

---

  ...all-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch |  33 ---
  ...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ------------------
  ...options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch |  73 ------
  ...oval-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch |  26 ---
  ...plicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} |  10 +-
  5 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 352 deletions(-)

  delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch rename meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/{wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} (90%)

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch deleted +0 -33
deleted file mode 100644
index c04c608bde..0000000000
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 57b12a1e43605f71239a21488cb9b541f0751dda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 10:15:29 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Install wpa_passphrase when not disabled
-
-As part of fixing CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE, whilst wpa_passphrase gets
-built, its not installed during `make install`.
-
-Fixes: cb41c214b78d ("build: Re-enable options for libwpa_client.so and wpa_passphrase")
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Submitted [http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2022-April/040448.html]
----
- wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-index 0bab313f2355..12787c0c7d0f 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/%: %
-
- install: $(addprefix $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/,$(BINALL))
-     $(MAKE) -C ../src install
-+ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
-+    install -D wpa_passphrase $(DESTDIR)/$(BINDIR)/wpa_passphrase
-+endif
- ifdef CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
-     install -m 0644 -D libwpa_client.so $(DESTDIR)/$(LIBDIR)/libwpa_client.so
-     install -m 0644 -D ../src/common/wpa_ctrl.h $(DESTDIR)/$(INCDIR)/wpa_ctrl.h
---
-2.35.1
-
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch deleted +0 -213
deleted file mode 100644
index 620560d3c7..0000000000
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-From f6f7cead3661ceeef54b21f7e799c0afc98537ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements
-
-The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
-authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
-during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
-specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
-is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
-the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
-unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
-devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
-user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
-
-Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
-authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
-resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
-configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
-authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
-strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
-issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
-session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
-
-Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
-configuration parameter option:
-'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
- * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
- * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-   (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-   not used (default)
- * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-52160
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c]
-
-Signed-off-by: Claus Stovgaard<[email protected]>
-
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_config.h          |  8 ++++++
- src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c            | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c      |  6 +++++
- src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h      |  5 ++++
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf |  7 ++++++
- 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-index 3238f74..047eec2 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config {
-      * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
-      * 2 = require cryptobinding
-      *
-+     * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-+     * tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
-+     * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
-+     * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-+     *  (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-+     *  not used (default)
-+     * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
-+     *
-      * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and
-      * uuid=Device_UUID
-      *
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-index 12e30df..6080697 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data {
-     u8 cmk[20];
-     int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP)
-           * is enabled. */
-+    enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth;
- };
-
-
-@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data,
-         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding");
-     }
-
-+    if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) {
-+        data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH;
-+        wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+               "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication");
-+    } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) {
-+        data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
-+        wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+               "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection");
-+    } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) {
-+        data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS;
-+        wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+               "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases");
-+    }
- #ifdef EAP_TNC
-     if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) {
-         data->soh = 2;
-@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
-     data->force_peap_version = -1;
-     data->peap_outer_success = 2;
-     data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING;
-+    data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
-
-     if (config && config->phase1)
-         eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1);
-@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm,
- }
-
-
-+static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm,
-+                   struct eap_peap_data *data)
-+{
-+    if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS ||
-+         (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL &&
-+          !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
-+          !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) ||
-+         data->phase2_eap_started) &&
-+        !data->phase2_eap_success)
-+        return false;
-+    return true;
-+}
-+
-+
- /**
-  * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response
-  * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init()
-@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data,
-                        " - force failed Phase 2");
-                 resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
-                 ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
-+            } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
-+                wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                       "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed");
-+                resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
-+                ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
-             } else {
-                 resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS;
-                 ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
-@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req:
-             /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate
-              * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has
-              * been completed. */
--            if (data->phase2_eap_started &&
--                !data->phase2_eap_success) {
-+            if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
-                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 "
-                        "Success used to indicate success, "
-                        "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet "
-@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
- {
-     struct eap_peap_data *data = priv;
-+
-     return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
--        data->phase2_success;
-+        data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS;
- }
-
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-index c1837db..a53eeb1 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm,
-
-     sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK);
-
-+    if (!phase2)
-+        data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert ||
-+            params->client_cert_blob ||
-+            params->private_key ||
-+            params->private_key_blob;
-+
-     return 0;
- }
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-index 9ac0012..3348634 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data {
-      * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used
-      */
-     int tls_v13;
-+
-+    /**
-+     * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured
-+     */
-+    bool client_cert_conf;
- };
-
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-index 6619d6b..d63f73c 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-@@ -1321,6 +1321,13 @@ fast_reauth=1
- #     * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default)
- #     * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
- #     * 2 = require cryptobinding
-+#    'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-+#    tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
-+#     * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
-+#     * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-+#       (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-+#       not used (default)
-+#     * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
- #    EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or
- #    pbc=1.
- #
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch deleted +0 -73
deleted file mode 100644
index 6e930fc98d..0000000000
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From cb41c214b78d6df187a31950342e48a403dbd769 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sergey Matyukevich<[email protected]>
-Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 11:52:19 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] build: Re-enable options for libwpa_client.so and
- wpa_passphrase
-
-Commit a41a29192e5d ("build: Pull common fragments into a build.rules
-file") introduced a regression into wpa_supplicant build process. The
-build target libwpa_client.so is not built regardless of whether the
-option CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO is set or not. This happens because
-this config option is used before it is imported from the configuration
-file. Moving its use after including build.rules does not help: the
-variable ALL is processed by build.rules and further changes are not
-applied. Similarly, option CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE also does not work
-as expected: wpa_passphrase is always built regardless of whether the
-option is set or not.
-
-Re-enable these options by adding both build targets to _all
-dependencies.
-
-Fixes: a41a29192e5d ("build: Pull common fragments into a build.rules file")
-Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich<[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
----
- wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 19 ++++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-index cb66defac7c8..c456825ae75f 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-@@ -1,24 +1,29 @@
- BINALL=wpa_supplicant wpa_cli
-
--ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
--BINALL += wpa_passphrase
--endif
-- 
- ALL = $(BINALL)
- ALL += systemd/wpa_supplicant.service
- ALL +=systemd/[email protected]
- ALL +=systemd/[email protected]
- ALL +=systemd/[email protected]
- ALL += dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service
--ifdef CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
--ALL += libwpa_client.so
--endif
-
- EXTRA_TARGETS=dynamic_eap_methods
-
- CONFIG_FILE=.config
- include ../src/build.rules
-
-+ifdef CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
-+# add the dependency this way to allow CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
-+# being set in the config which is read by build.rules
-+_all: libwpa_client.so
-+endif
-+
-+ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
-+# add the dependency this way to allow CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
-+# being set in the config which is read by build.rules
-+_all: wpa_passphrase
-+endif
-+
- ifdef LIBS
- # If LIBS is set with some global build system defaults, clone those for
- # LIBS_c and LIBS_p to cover wpa_passphrase and wpa_cli as well.
---
-2.35.1
-
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch deleted +0 -26
deleted file mode 100644
index 53b0fcdf53..0000000000
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From d001b301ba7987f4b39453a211631b85c48f2ff8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 13:26:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix removal of wpa_passphrase on 'make clean'
-
-Fixes: 0430bc8267b4 ("build: Add a common-clean target")
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
----
- wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-index c456825ae75f..4b4688931b1d 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-@@ -2077,3 +2077,4 @@ clean: common-clean
-     rm -f libwpa_client.a
-     rm -f libwpa_client.so
-     rm -f libwpa_test1 libwpa_test2
-+    rm -f wpa_passphrase
---
-2.35.1
-
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +0 -0
similarity index 90%
rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb
rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb
index 8113bcab09..321dedc58a 100644
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ BUGTRACKER ="http://w1.fi/security/"

  SECTION = "network"
  LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
  LIC_FILES_CHKSUM ="file://COPYING;md5=5ebcb90236d1ad640558c3d3cd3035df \ - file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=e3d2f6c2948991e37c1ca4960de84747 \ - file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=76306a95306fee9a976b0ac1be70f705"

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +2 -0
+file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=6e4b25e7d74bfc44a32ba37bdf5210a6 \
+file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=f5ccd57ea91e04800edb88267bf8eae4"

    DEPENDS = "dbus libnl"
  @@ -15,12 +15,8 @@ SRC_URI ="http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ - file://0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch \ - file://0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch \ - file://0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch \ - file://0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch \ "

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +1 -1
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "912ea06f74e30a8e36fbb68064d6cdff218d8d591db0fc5d75dee6c81ac7fc0a"
Quoted 4 lines

    S = "${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant-${PV}"

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#3 lore raw

Sorry, no. This same argument can be made for any other component in scarthgap where a major new release happened after scarthgap was released. The correct way to provide updated component versions in LTS is via this layer:
https://git.yoctoproject.org/meta-lts-mixins/

So please send a patch for that.

Alex

Quoted 617 lines · Viswanath Kraleti via lists.openembedded.org

Hello Randy,

2.11 version of wpa-supplicant/hostapd are released almost after 2.5 Years. 2-10 released on 2022-01-16. A lot of people are eagerly waiting for this release since a long time. 2.11 has crucial HE/IEEE 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6 support and preliminary support for EHT/IEEE 802.11be/Wi-Fi 7. This also supports WPA3 which is a mandatory certification for Wi-Fi CERTIFIED™ devices.

I do accept this release missed the Sacrthgap cutoff of Yocto community. But considering the longevity of Scarthgap (a good 3.5 years from now) & number of people interested in Scarthgap, it is best if wpa-supplicant/hostapd are switched to 2.11.

// Viswanath

Quoted 585 lines · Randy MacLeod via lists.openembedded.org

For scarthgap, it's good but not mandatory to have Steve on the To/CC list.

Quoted 7 lines · Siddharth Doshi via lists.openembedded.org

From: Siddharth Doshi<[email protected]>

License-Update:
===============
- README: Change in copyright years as perhttps://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/README?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c: Change in copyright years as perhttps://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

Quoted 8 lines

CVE's Fixed:
===========
- CVE-2024-5290 wpa_supplicant: wpa_supplicant loading arbitrary shared objects allowing privilege escalation
- CVE-2023-52160 wpa_supplicant: potential authorization bypass

Changes between 2.10 -> 2.11:
============================
https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog?id=d945ddd368085f255e68328f2d3b020ceea359af

Hello Siddharth,

This update make sense for the master brnanch but likely not for scarthgap unless you can show that this is a bug fix only release.

It certainly does not look like a small bug fix only update based on:

❯ git diff hostap_2_10 hostap_2_11 | diffstat | tail -1

 534 files changed, 85965 insertions(+), 16847 deletions(-)

❯ git log --oneline hostap_2_10..hostap_2_11 | wc -l 2295

and the hostap and wpa-supplicant ChangeLogs which mention adding features below (1).

Since the repo ( git://w1.fi/srv/git/hostap.git ) doesn't have a stable branch for 2.10:

❯ git branch -a
* master
remotes/origin/HEAD -> origin/master
remotes/origin/android-jb
remotes/origin/android-kk
remotes/origin/android-l
remotes/origin/android-m
remotes/origin/aosp-jb
remotes/origin/aosp-kk
remotes/origin/main
remotes/origin/master
remotes/origin/pending

you'll have to backport any CVE fixes that you're interested in unless someone explains why this is a sensible update for scarthgap.

Thanks,

../Randy

1)

❯ git diff hostap_2_10 hostap_2_11 hostapd/ChangeLog | cat

hostapd/ChangeLog +37 -0
index 279298e4d..1c8240d33 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,42 @@
 ChangeLog for hostapd
 
+2024-07-20 - v2.11
+    * Wi-Fi Easy Connect
+      - add support for DPP release 3
+      - allow Configurator parameters to be provided during config exchange
+    * HE/IEEE 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6
+      - various fixes
+    * EHT/IEEE 802.11be/Wi-Fi 7
+      - add preliminary support
+    * SAE: add support for fetching the password from a RADIUS server
+    * support OpenSSL 3.0 API changes
+    * support background radar detection and CAC with some additional
+      drivers
+    * support RADIUS ACL/PSK check during 4-way handshake (wpa_psk_radius=3)
+    * EAP-SIM/AKA: support IMSI privacy
+    * improve 4-way handshake operations
+      - use Secure=1 in message 3 during PTK rekeying
+    * OCV: do not check Frequency Segment 1 Channel Number for 160 MHz cases
+      to avoid interoperability issues
+    * support new SAE AKM suites with variable length keys
+    * support new AKM for 802.1X/EAP with SHA384
+    * extend PASN support for secure ranging
+    * FT: Use SHA256 to derive PMKID for AKM 00-0F-AC:3 (FT-EAP)
+      - this is based on additional details being added in the IEEE 802.11
+        standard
+      - the new implementation is not backwards compatible
+    * improved ACS to cover additional channel types/bandwidths
+    * extended Multiple BSSID support
+    * fix beacon protection with FT protocol (incorrect BIGTK was provided)
+    * support unsynchronized service discovery (USD)
+    * add preliminary support for RADIUS/TLS
+    * add support for explicit SSID protection in 4-way handshake
+      (a mitigation for CVE-2023-52424; disabled by default for now, can be
+      enabled with ssid_protection=1)
+    * fix SAE H2E rejected groups validation to avoid downgrade attacks
+    * use stricter validation for some RADIUS messages
+    * a large number of other fixes, cleanup, and extensions
+
 2022-01-16 - v2.10
     * SAE changes
       - improved protection against side channel attacks

❯ git diff hostap_2_10 hostap_2_11 wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog | cat

wpa_supplicant/ChangeLog +50 -0
index efcc6cd9c..3f4162eb0 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,55 @@
 ChangeLog for wpa_supplicant
 
+2024-07-20 - v2.11
+    * Wi-Fi Easy Connect
+      - add support for DPP release 3
+      - allow Configurator parameters to be provided during config exchange
+    * MACsec
+      - add support for GCM-AES-256 cipher suite
+      - remove incorrect EAP Session-Id length constraint
+      - add hardware offload support for additional drivers
+    * HE/IEEE 802.11ax/Wi-Fi 6
+      - support BSS color updates
+      - various fixes
+    * EHT/IEEE 802.11be/Wi-Fi 7
+      - add preliminary support
+    * support OpenSSL 3.0 API changes
+    * improve EAP-TLS support for TLSv1.3
+    * EAP-SIM/AKA: support IMSI privacy
+    * improve mitigation against DoS attacks when PMF is used
+    * improve 4-way handshake operations
+      - discard unencrypted EAPOL frames in additional cases
+      - use Secure=1 in message 2 during PTK rekeying
+    * OCV: do not check Frequency Segment 1 Channel Number for 160 MHz cases
+      to avoid interoperability issues
+    * support new SAE AKM suites with variable length keys
+    * support new AKM for 802.1X/EAP with SHA384
+    * improve cross-AKM roaming with driver-based SME/BSS selection
+    * PASN
+      - extend support for secure ranging
+      - allow PASN implementation to be used with external programs for
+        Wi-Fi Aware
+    * FT: Use SHA256 to derive PMKID for AKM 00-0F-AC:3 (FT-EAP)
+      - this is based on additional details being added in the IEEE 802.11
+        standard
+      - the new implementation is not backwards compatible, but PMKSA
+        caching with FT-EAP was, and still is, disabled by default
+    * support a pregenerated MAC (mac_addr=3) as an alternative mechanism
+      for using per-network random MAC addresses
+    * EAP-PEAP: require Phase 2 authentication by default (phase2_auth=1)
+      to improve security for still unfortunately common invalid
+      configurations that do not set ca_cert
+    * extend SCS support for QoS Characteristics
+    * extend MSCS support
+    * support unsynchronized service discovery (USD)
+    * add support for explicit SSID protection in 4-way handshake
+      (a mitigation for CVE-2023-52424; disabled by default for now, can be
+      enabled with ssid_protection=1)
+      - in addition, verify SSID after key setup when beacon protection is
+        used
+    * fix SAE H2E rejected groups validation to avoid downgrade attacks
+    * a large number of other fixes, cleanup, and extensions
+
 2022-01-16 - v2.10
     * SAE changes
       - improved protection against side channel attacks
Quoted 408 lines

Note:
=====
Patches 0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch, 0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch, 0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch, 0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch (CVE-2023-52160) are already fixed and hence removing them.

---
  ...all-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch |  33 ---
  ...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ------------------
  ...options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch |  73 ------
  ...oval-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch |  26 ---
  ...plicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} |  10 +-
  5 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 352 deletions(-)

delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch rename meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/{wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb => wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb} (90%)

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch deleted +0 -33
deleted file mode 100644
index c04c608bde..0000000000
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 57b12a1e43605f71239a21488cb9b541f0751dda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2022 10:15:29 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Install wpa_passphrase when not disabled
-
-As part of fixing CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE, whilst wpa_passphrase gets
-built, its not installed during `make install`.
-
-Fixes: cb41c214b78d ("build: Re-enable options for libwpa_client.so and wpa_passphrase")
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Submitted [http://lists.infradead.org/pipermail/hostap/2022-April/040448.html]
----
- wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-index 0bab313f2355..12787c0c7d0f 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/%: %
-
- install: $(addprefix $(DESTDIR)$(BINDIR)/,$(BINALL))
-     $(MAKE) -C ../src install
-+ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
-+    install -D wpa_passphrase $(DESTDIR)/$(BINDIR)/wpa_passphrase
-+endif
- ifdef CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
-     install -m 0644 -D libwpa_client.so $(DESTDIR)/$(LIBDIR)/libwpa_client.so
-     install -m 0644 -D ../src/common/wpa_ctrl.h $(DESTDIR)/$(INCDIR)/wpa_ctrl.h
---
-2.35.1
-
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch deleted +0 -213
deleted file mode 100644
index 620560d3c7..0000000000
@@ -1,213 +0,0 @@
-From f6f7cead3661ceeef54b21f7e799c0afc98537ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements
-
-The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2
-authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated
-during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP
-specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front
-is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than
-the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when
-unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed
-devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the
-user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped.
-
-Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2
-authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session
-resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been
-configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed
-authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more
-strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability
-issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS
-session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues.
-
-Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1
-configuration parameter option:
-'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
- * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
- * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-   (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-   not used (default)
- * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
-
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-
-CVE: CVE-2023-52160
-Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c]
-
-Signed-off-by: Claus Stovgaard<[email protected]>
-
----
- src/eap_peer/eap_config.h          |  8 ++++++
- src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c            | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c      |  6 +++++
- src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h      |  5 ++++
- wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf |  7 ++++++
- 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-index 3238f74..047eec2 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h
-@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config {
-      * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
-      * 2 = require cryptobinding
-      *
-+     * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-+     * tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
-+     * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
-+     * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-+     *  (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-+     *  not used (default)
-+     * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
-+     *
-      * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and
-      * uuid=Device_UUID
-      *
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-index 12e30df..6080697 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data {
-     u8 cmk[20];
-     int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP)
-           * is enabled. */
-+    enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth;
- };
-
-
-@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data,
-         wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding");
-     }
-
-+    if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) {
-+        data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH;
-+        wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+               "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication");
-+    } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) {
-+        data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
-+        wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+               "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection");
-+    } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) {
-+        data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS;
-+        wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG,
-+               "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases");
-+    }
- #ifdef EAP_TNC
-     if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) {
-         data->soh = 2;
-@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm)
-     data->force_peap_version = -1;
-     data->peap_outer_success = 2;
-     data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING;
-+    data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL;
-
-     if (config && config->phase1)
-         eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1);
-@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm,
- }
-
-
-+static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm,
-+                   struct eap_peap_data *data)
-+{
-+    if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS ||
-+         (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL &&
-+          !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
-+          !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) ||
-+         data->phase2_eap_started) &&
-+        !data->phase2_eap_success)
-+        return false;
-+    return true;
-+}
-+
-+
- /**
-  * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response
-  * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init()
-@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data,
-                        " - force failed Phase 2");
-                 resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
-                 ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
-+            } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
-+                wpa_printf(MSG_INFO,
-+                       "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed");
-+                resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE;
-+                ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL;
-             } else {
-                 resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS;
-                 ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC;
-@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req:
-             /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate
-              * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has
-              * been completed. */
--            if (data->phase2_eap_started &&
--                !data->phase2_eap_success) {
-+            if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) {
-                 wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 "
-                        "Success used to indicate success, "
-                        "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet "
-@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv,
- static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv)
- {
-     struct eap_peap_data *data = priv;
-+
-     return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) &&
--        data->phase2_success;
-+        data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS;
- }
-
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-index c1837db..a53eeb1 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c
-@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm,
-
-     sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK);
-
-+    if (!phase2)
-+        data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert ||
-+            params->client_cert_blob ||
-+            params->private_key ||
-+            params->private_key_blob;
-+
-     return 0;
- }
-
-diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-index 9ac0012..3348634 100644
---- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-+++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h
-@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data {
-      * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used
-      */
-     int tls_v13;
-+
-+    /**
-+     * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured
-+     */
-+    bool client_cert_conf;
- };
-
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-index 6619d6b..d63f73c 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf
-@@ -1321,6 +1321,13 @@ fast_reauth=1
- #     * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default)
- #     * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it
- #     * 2 = require cryptobinding
-+#    'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS
-+#    tunnel) behavior for PEAP:
-+#     * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication
-+#     * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate
-+#       (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was
-+#       not used (default)
-+#     * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases
- #    EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or
- #    pbc=1.
- #
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch deleted +0 -73
deleted file mode 100644
index 6e930fc98d..0000000000
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
-From cb41c214b78d6df187a31950342e48a403dbd769 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Sergey Matyukevich<[email protected]>
-Date: Tue, 22 Feb 2022 11:52:19 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] build: Re-enable options for libwpa_client.so and
- wpa_passphrase
-
-Commit a41a29192e5d ("build: Pull common fragments into a build.rules
-file") introduced a regression into wpa_supplicant build process. The
-build target libwpa_client.so is not built regardless of whether the
-option CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO is set or not. This happens because
-this config option is used before it is imported from the configuration
-file. Moving its use after including build.rules does not help: the
-variable ALL is processed by build.rules and further changes are not
-applied. Similarly, option CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE also does not work
-as expected: wpa_passphrase is always built regardless of whether the
-option is set or not.
-
-Re-enable these options by adding both build targets to _all
-dependencies.
-
-Fixes: a41a29192e5d ("build: Pull common fragments into a build.rules file")
-Signed-off-by: Sergey Matyukevich<[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
----
- wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 19 ++++++++++++-------
- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-index cb66defac7c8..c456825ae75f 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-@@ -1,24 +1,29 @@
- BINALL=wpa_supplicant wpa_cli
-
--ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
--BINALL += wpa_passphrase
--endif
--
- ALL = $(BINALL)
- ALL += systemd/wpa_supplicant.service
- ALL +=systemd/[email protected]
- ALL +=systemd/[email protected]
- ALL +=systemd/[email protected]
- ALL += dbus/fi.w1.wpa_supplicant1.service
--ifdef CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
--ALL += libwpa_client.so
--endif
-
- EXTRA_TARGETS=dynamic_eap_methods
-
- CONFIG_FILE=.config
- include ../src/build.rules
-
-+ifdef CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
-+# add the dependency this way to allow CONFIG_BUILD_WPA_CLIENT_SO
-+# being set in the config which is read by build.rules
-+_all: libwpa_client.so
-+endif
-+
-+ifndef CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
-+# add the dependency this way to allow CONFIG_NO_WPA_PASSPHRASE
-+# being set in the config which is read by build.rules
-+_all: wpa_passphrase
-+endif
-+
- ifdef LIBS
- # If LIBS is set with some global build system defaults, clone those for
- # LIBS_c and LIBS_p to cover wpa_passphrase and wpa_cli as well.
---
-2.35.1
-
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch deleted +0 -26
deleted file mode 100644
index 53b0fcdf53..0000000000
@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From d001b301ba7987f4b39453a211631b85c48f2ff8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-Date: Thu, 3 Mar 2022 13:26:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Fix removal of wpa_passphrase on 'make clean'
-
-Fixes: 0430bc8267b4 ("build: Add a common-clean target")
-Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen<[email protected]>
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
-Signed-off-by: Alex Kiernan<[email protected]>
----
- wpa_supplicant/Makefile | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-index c456825ae75f..4b4688931b1d 100644
---- a/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-+++ b/wpa_supplicant/Makefile
-@@ -2077,3 +2077,4 @@ clean: common-clean
-     rm -f libwpa_client.a
-     rm -f libwpa_client.so
-     rm -f libwpa_test1 libwpa_test2
-+    rm -f wpa_passphrase
---
-2.35.1
-
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +2 -0
similarity index 90%
rename from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb
rename to meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb
index 8113bcab09..321dedc58a 100644
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ BUGTRACKER ="http://w1.fi/security/"
  SECTION = "network"
  LICENSE = "BSD-3-Clause"
  LIC_FILES_CHKSUM ="file://COPYING;md5=5ebcb90236d1ad640558c3d3cd3035df \ - file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=e3d2f6c2948991e37c1ca4960de84747 \ - file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=76306a95306fee9a976b0ac1be70f705"
+file://README;beginline=1;endline=56;md5=6e4b25e7d74bfc44a32ba37bdf5210a6 \
+file://wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.c;beginline=1;endline=12;md5=f5ccd57ea91e04800edb88267bf8eae4"
Quoted 13 lines

meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb BUGTRACKER ="http://w1.fi/security/"

Quoted 8 lines
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.11.bb renamed from meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +1 -1
    DEPENDS = "dbus libnl"
  @@ -15,12 +15,8 @@ SRC_URI ="http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ - file://0001-build-Re-enable-options-for-libwpa_client.so-and-wpa.patch \ - file://0002-Fix-removal-of-wpa_passphrase-on-make-clean.patch \ - file://0001-Install-wpa_passphrase-when-not-disabled.patch \ - file://0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch \ "
-SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"
+SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "912ea06f74e30a8e36fbb68064d6cdff218d8d591db0fc5d75dee6c81ac7fc0a"
    S = "${WORKDIR}/wpa_supplicant-${PV}"

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#4 lore raw

Hi Randy and Alex,

I appreciate the feedback and your concern regarding upgrades in stable-branches.

Quoted 5 lines

This update make sense for the master brnanch but likely not for scarthgap unless you can show that
this is a bug fix only release.

- This release for sure is not a bug fix only release. It does include support to new feature and can never classify as bug fix only release.

Quoted 5 lines

you'll have to backport any CVE fixes that you're interested in unless someone explains why this is a sensible update for scarthgap.

- I do the understand that upgrades are avoided in stable/LTS branches as it might break the compatibility and result in various compilation issues.
- However, that would only take place if the backward compatibility of the new upgrade is questionable.
- Generally every new releases will have API or ABI-symbols added but if API or ABI symbols are removed from shared libraries or binaries it a matter of concern as it would be the cause of breakdown.
- For this release, there are no ABI-symbols or API removed from the binaries and shared libraries. you can cross-check it in different ways (there are open-source tools to check or can be checked by manually comparing the header files)
- I have my own script to do so and i always check the backward compatibility before submitting any upgrades and since it was all clear for wpa-supplicant, i went ahead with the upgrade.

However, if still the opinion is that upgrade should be avoided, let me know, i would submit the CVE-patch for the same.

Regards,
Siddharth

#5 lore raw

The stable branch policy isn't about API/ABI compatibility, it's rather about whether a new release has new features or only bugfixes. If there are new features it is not eligible.

Alex

Quoted 34 lines · Siddharth Doshi via lists.openembedded.org

Hi Randy and Alex,

I appreciate the feedback and your concern regarding upgrades in stable-branches.

This update make sense for the master brnanch but likely not for scarthgap unless you can show that this is a bug fix only release.

- This release for sure is not a bug fix only release. It does include support to new feature and can never classify as bug fix only release.

you'll have to backport any CVE fixes that you're interested in unless someone explains why this is a sensible update for scarthgap.

- I do the understand that upgrades are avoided in stable/LTS branches as it might break the compatibility and result in various compilation issues.
- However, that would only take place if the backward compatibility of the new upgrade is questionable.
- Generally every new releases will have API or ABI-symbols added but if API or ABI symbols are removed from shared libraries or binaries it a matter of concern as it would be the cause of breakdown.
- For this release, there are no ABI-symbols or API removed from the binaries and shared libraries. you can cross-check it in different ways (there are open-source tools to check or can be checked by manually comparing the header files)
- I have my own script to do so and i always check the backward compatibility before submitting any upgrades and since it was all clear for wpa-supplicant, i went ahead with the upgrade.

However, if still the opinion is that upgrade should be avoided, let me know, i would submit the CVE-patch for the same.

Regards,
Siddharth

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