Policy creation RFC
Hi there.
I've been lurking on the list for a while. One of the things that's come up a couple of times is the need for some way to make creating and editing policies easier than it is at present.
I'd be interested in hearing if anyone has ideas about what this would look like, or comments on what sort of tool could make policy creation easier. There was a mention of a "meta policy configuration description" language (I think) here:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=selinux&m=101713295918487
Some comments on policy creation here:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=selinux&m=101426994210338
In addition to that, I have a couple of questions.
Firstly, is there any need for something allowing policy creation at a more abstract level? At what level or levels should a hypothetical application operate at?
For example, a point-and-click GUI is probably overkill considering the likely user base of selinux - i.e. security experts, sysadmins, and hobbyists.
Secondly, assuming some sort of tool can be written, how should it behave in relation to the use of the m4 macro language?
On one hand, reading and writing to all.te is simpler than developing yacc (or equivalent) files for parsing m4, and yet there is the question of how human-readable a resulting policy would be. all.te is clearly not the preferred place at which to write policies using a text editor...
Comments appreciated.
Ian
Signature · 8 lines
GMX - Die Kommunikationsplattform im Internet. http://www.gmx.net -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Quoted 3 lines · Ian Sollars
For example, a point-and-click GUI is probably overkill considering the likely user base of selinux - i.e. security experts, sysadmins, and hobbyists.
not at all. a great many systems do not really have a need for complicated security policies.
for example, I have a real-life system that is used as a staging server by outside personel. I'd love to restrict them to a small set of actions, e.g:
- log in via ftp and/or ssh
- read/write access to a directory or set of directories
- execution rights for a small set of binaries (user-dependent, some of them need to use telnet to access other machines on the network, most don't)
now if the configuration for such a straightforward policy could be done with a GUI tool, then I could get selinux on a production machine. the reason being this: If you work for a company, you have to make sure someone can take over for you in case of illness or holidays. your replacement is usually less skilled than you are(*).
(*) not necessarily on a general level, but usually within your areas of expertise. e.g. when I play replacement for someone else, I'm usually less skilled in whatever it is they are doing.
Signature · 9 lines
New GPG Key issued (old key expired): http://web.lemuria.org/pubkey.html pub 1024D/2D7A04F5 2002-05-16 Tom Vogt <[email protected]> Key fingerprint = C731 64D1 4BCF 4C20 48A4 29B2 BF01 9FA1 2D7A 04F5 -- You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.
Interesting you raise this issue. We've been thinking about this problem for some time, and have actually done some preliminary design work on something like a policy editor. I know others are thinking about more abstract policy languages too. We've come to the conclusion that selinux needs to have an official policy language at which point compatibility must be preserved. I believe that should the yacc/lex syntax/semantics defined for policy.conf; i.e., a policy.conf file should be the abstraction level at which we try to maintain compatibility, and one can create any tools they want to create an adequate policy.conf. I don't think we should restrict ourselves to the conventions used in the current make process (e.g., m4 macros).
We're actually in the final phases of implementing a GUI-based "user manager" (i.e., seuser) for selinux, which has proven non-trivial. We've had to use the full power of our apol analysis library to build adequate controls in the tool. This has led us to another conclusion; i.e., policy.conf should be installed (e.g., /etc/security/policy.conf) as the official policy of the system (i.e., don't force one to have the make directory on an installed system). In this case, we're struggling with "operationally dynamic" aspects of the policy (e.g., add users, change audit setting), which I would expect to vary from system to system, rather than the "organizationally static" policy aspects (e.g., the TE policy rules), which I would expect to be more static and centrally controlled.
In our seuser tool, we found ourselves wishing we could directly change the users section of an installed policy.conf, but instead, decided to support re-making the policy using the make directory with the users file (for now) to maintain capability with the current make process. Long-term, that's not a good plan for production system
After we release our seuser tool (in a couple of days), I'll make a specific proposal about installing policy.conf as the official policy.
Frank
--
You have received this message because you are subscribed to the selinux list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.