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Implement rdtscp emulation and rdtscp_aux "support"

PATCH In review Dan Magenheimer 3 participants 8 messages Nov 25, 2009 – Nov 26, 2009

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PATCH 1/1 Implement rdtscp emulation and rdtscp_aux "support"

Implement rdtscp emulation and rdtscp_aux "support"

The rdtscp instruction (and the associated TSC_AUX msr) are present on most recent AMD processors, and on the Nehalem and future Intel processors. Cpuid has a bit to detect the presence of this feature.

Xen intentionally does not expose the cpuid rdtscp bit to PV OS's or to HVM guests, but PV apps can see this bit and, as a result, may choose to use the rdtscp instruction. When a PV guest with such an app is migrated to a machine that does not have rdtscp support, the app will get killed due to an invalid op. Fix this by emulating the rdtscp instruction. We also need to emulate rdtscp in the case where the machine has rdtscp support, but rdtsc emulation is enabled (which is unfortunately a different path: a privileged op).

The rdtscp instruction reads the TSC_AUX register which presumably is set by the OS (and, in the case of tsc_mode==pvrdtscp, will be set by Xen). HV Linux and PV Linux will not set TSC_AUX because the cpuid rdtscp bit is not propogated by Xen; I'm told that Windows always sets TSC_AUX to zero. So for PV guests running on rdtscp-capable hardware (that don't use tsc_mode==pvrdtscp), always set TSC_AUX to zero.

xen/arch/x86/time.c +13 -5
diff -r c0e32941ee69 xen/arch/x86/time.c
@@ -851,9 +851,13 @@ static void __update_vcpu_system_time(st
     else
         tsc_stamp = t->local_tsc_stamp;
 
-    if ( d->arch.tsc_mode ==  TSC_MODE_PVRDTSCP &&
-              boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) )
-        write_rdtscp_aux(d->arch.incarnation);
+    if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) )
+    {
+        if ( d->arch.tsc_mode ==  TSC_MODE_PVRDTSCP )
+            write_rdtscp_aux(d->arch.incarnation);
+        else
+            write_rdtscp_aux(0);
+    }
 
     /* Don't bother unless timestamps have changed or we are forced. */
     if ( !force && (u->tsc_timestamp == tsc_stamp) )
@@ -1608,7 +1612,7 @@ void tsc_check_reliability(void)
  * PV SoftTSC Emulation.
  */
 
-void pv_soft_rdtsc(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+void pv_soft_rdtsc(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs, int rdtscp)
 {
     s_time_t now = get_s_time();
     struct domain *d = v->domain;
@@ -1633,6 +1637,10 @@ void pv_soft_rdtsc(struct vcpu *v, struc
 
     regs->eax = (uint32_t)now;
     regs->edx = (uint32_t)(now >> 32);
+
+    if ( rdtscp )
+         regs->ecx =
+             (d->arch.tsc_mode == TSC_MODE_PVRDTSCP) ?  d->arch.incarnation : 0;
 }
 
 static int host_tsc_is_safe(void)
@@ -1826,7 +1834,7 @@ static void dump_softtsc(unsigned char k
             printk(",khz=%"PRIu32"",d->arch.tsc_khz);
         if ( d->arch.incarnation )
             printk(",inc=%"PRIu32"",d->arch.incarnation);
-        if ( !d->arch.vtsc )
+        if ( !(d->arch.vtsc_kerncount | d->arch.vtsc_usercount) )
         {
             printk("\n");
             continue;
xen/arch/x86/traps.c +32 -4
diff -r c0e32941ee69 xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -831,6 +831,26 @@ static void pv_cpuid(struct cpu_user_reg
     regs->edx = d;
 }
 
+static int emulate_invalid_rdtscp(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+{
+    char opcode[3];
+    unsigned long eip, rc;
+    struct vcpu *v = current;
+
+    eip = regs->eip;
+    if ( (rc = copy_from_user(opcode, (char *)eip, sizeof(opcode))) != 0 )
+    {
+        propagate_page_fault(eip + sizeof(opcode) - rc, 0);
+        return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
+    }
+    if ( memcmp(opcode, "\xf\x1\xf9", sizeof(opcode)) )
+        return 0;
+    eip += sizeof(opcode);
+    pv_soft_rdtsc(v, regs, 1);
+    instruction_done(regs, eip, 0);
+    return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
+}
+
 static int emulate_forced_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     char sig[5], instr[2];
@@ -879,7 +899,8 @@ asmlinkage void do_invalid_op(struct cpu
 
     if ( likely(guest_mode(regs)) )
     {
-        if ( !emulate_forced_invalid_op(regs) )
+        if ( !emulate_invalid_rdtscp(regs) &&
+             !emulate_forced_invalid_op(regs) )
             do_guest_trap(TRAP_invalid_op, regs, 0);
         return;
     }
@@ -2009,11 +2030,12 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct 
 
  twobyte_opcode:
     /*
-     * All two-byte opcodes, except RDTSC (0x31) are executable only from
-     * guest kernel mode (virtual ring 0).
+     * All 2 and 3 byte opcodes, except RDTSC (0x31) and RDTSCP (0x1,0xF9)
+     * are executable only from guest kernel mode (virtual ring 0).
      */
     opcode = insn_fetch(u8, code_base, eip, code_limit);
     if ( !guest_kernel_mode(v, regs) &&
+         (opcode != 0x1) && /* always emulate rdtscp */
          !((opcode == 0x31) && v->domain->arch.vtsc) )
         goto fail;
 
@@ -2021,6 +2043,12 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct 
         goto fail;
     switch ( opcode )
     {
+    case 0x1: /* RDTSCP */
+        if ( insn_fetch(u8, code_base, eip, code_limit) != 0xf9 )
+            goto fail;
+        pv_soft_rdtsc(v, regs, 1);
+        break;
+
     case 0x06: /* CLTS */
         (void)do_fpu_taskswitch(0);
         break;
@@ -2269,7 +2297,7 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct 
     }
 
     case 0x31: /* RDTSC */
-        pv_soft_rdtsc(v, regs);
+        pv_soft_rdtsc(v, regs, 0);
         break;
 
     case 0x32: /* RDMSR */
xen/include/asm-x86/time.h +1 -1
diff -r c0e32941ee69 xen/include/asm-x86/time.h
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ uint64_t acpi_pm_tick_to_ns(uint64_t tic
 uint64_t acpi_pm_tick_to_ns(uint64_t ticks);
 uint64_t ns_to_acpi_pm_tick(uint64_t ns);
 
-void pv_soft_rdtsc(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
+void pv_soft_rdtsc(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs, int rdtscp);
 
 void tsc_set_info(struct domain *d, uint32_t tsc_mode, uint64_t elapsed_nsec,
                   uint32_t gtsc_khz, uint32_t incarnation);
xen/arch/x86/time.c +13 -5
diff -r c0e32941ee69 xen/arch/x86/time.c
@@ -851,9 +851,13 @@ static void __update_vcpu_system_time(st
     else
         tsc_stamp = t->local_tsc_stamp;
 
-    if ( d->arch.tsc_mode ==  TSC_MODE_PVRDTSCP &&
-              boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) )
-        write_rdtscp_aux(d->arch.incarnation);
+    if ( boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP) )
+    {
+        if ( d->arch.tsc_mode ==  TSC_MODE_PVRDTSCP )
+            write_rdtscp_aux(d->arch.incarnation);
+        else
+            write_rdtscp_aux(0);
+    }
 
     /* Don't bother unless timestamps have changed or we are forced. */
     if ( !force && (u->tsc_timestamp == tsc_stamp) )
@@ -1608,7 +1612,7 @@ void tsc_check_reliability(void)
  * PV SoftTSC Emulation.
  */
 
-void pv_soft_rdtsc(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+void pv_soft_rdtsc(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs, int rdtscp)
 {
     s_time_t now = get_s_time();
     struct domain *d = v->domain;
@@ -1633,6 +1637,10 @@ void pv_soft_rdtsc(struct vcpu *v, struc
 
     regs->eax = (uint32_t)now;
     regs->edx = (uint32_t)(now >> 32);
+
+    if ( rdtscp )
+         regs->ecx =
+             (d->arch.tsc_mode == TSC_MODE_PVRDTSCP) ?  d->arch.incarnation : 0;
 }
 
 static int host_tsc_is_safe(void)
@@ -1826,7 +1834,7 @@ static void dump_softtsc(unsigned char k
             printk(",khz=%"PRIu32"",d->arch.tsc_khz);
         if ( d->arch.incarnation )
             printk(",inc=%"PRIu32"",d->arch.incarnation);
-        if ( !d->arch.vtsc )
+        if ( !(d->arch.vtsc_kerncount | d->arch.vtsc_usercount) )
         {
             printk("\n");
             continue;
xen/arch/x86/traps.c +32 -4
diff -r c0e32941ee69 xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -831,6 +831,26 @@ static void pv_cpuid(struct cpu_user_reg
     regs->edx = d;
 }
 
+static int emulate_invalid_rdtscp(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
+{
+    char opcode[3];
+    unsigned long eip, rc;
+    struct vcpu *v = current;
+
+    eip = regs->eip;
+    if ( (rc = copy_from_user(opcode, (char *)eip, sizeof(opcode))) != 0 )
+    {
+        propagate_page_fault(eip + sizeof(opcode) - rc, 0);
+        return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
+    }
+    if ( memcmp(opcode, "\xf\x1\xf9", sizeof(opcode)) )
+        return 0;
+    eip += sizeof(opcode);
+    pv_soft_rdtsc(v, regs, 1);
+    instruction_done(regs, eip, 0);
+    return EXCRET_fault_fixed;
+}
+
 static int emulate_forced_invalid_op(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
 {
     char sig[5], instr[2];
@@ -879,7 +899,8 @@ asmlinkage void do_invalid_op(struct cpu
 
     if ( likely(guest_mode(regs)) )
     {
-        if ( !emulate_forced_invalid_op(regs) )
+        if ( !emulate_invalid_rdtscp(regs) &&
+             !emulate_forced_invalid_op(regs) )
             do_guest_trap(TRAP_invalid_op, regs, 0);
         return;
     }
@@ -2009,11 +2030,12 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct 
 
  twobyte_opcode:
     /*
-     * All two-byte opcodes, except RDTSC (0x31) are executable only from
-     * guest kernel mode (virtual ring 0).
+     * All 2 and 3 byte opcodes, except RDTSC (0x31) and RDTSCP (0x1,0xF9)
+     * are executable only from guest kernel mode (virtual ring 0).
      */
     opcode = insn_fetch(u8, code_base, eip, code_limit);
     if ( !guest_kernel_mode(v, regs) &&
+         (opcode != 0x1) && /* always emulate rdtscp */
          !((opcode == 0x31) && v->domain->arch.vtsc) )
         goto fail;
 
@@ -2021,6 +2043,12 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct 
         goto fail;
     switch ( opcode )
     {
+    case 0x1: /* RDTSCP */
+        if ( insn_fetch(u8, code_base, eip, code_limit) != 0xf9 )
+            goto fail;
+        pv_soft_rdtsc(v, regs, 1);
+        break;
+
     case 0x06: /* CLTS */
         (void)do_fpu_taskswitch(0);
         break;
@@ -2269,7 +2297,7 @@ static int emulate_privileged_op(struct 
     }
 
     case 0x31: /* RDTSC */
-        pv_soft_rdtsc(v, regs);
+        pv_soft_rdtsc(v, regs, 0);
         break;
 
     case 0x32: /* RDMSR */
xen/include/asm-x86/time.h +1 -1
diff -r c0e32941ee69 xen/include/asm-x86/time.h
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ uint64_t acpi_pm_tick_to_ns(uint64_t tic
 uint64_t acpi_pm_tick_to_ns(uint64_t ticks);
 uint64_t ns_to_acpi_pm_tick(uint64_t ns);
 
-void pv_soft_rdtsc(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs);
+void pv_soft_rdtsc(struct vcpu *v, struct cpu_user_regs *regs, int rdtscp);
 
 void tsc_set_info(struct domain *d, uint32_t tsc_mode, uint64_t elapsed_nsec,
                   uint32_t gtsc_khz, uint32_t incarnation);

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#1 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

Dan Magenheimer <[email protected]> 25.11.09 22:24 >>>

Xen intentionally does not expose the cpuid rdtscp bit to PV OS's or to HVM guests, but PV apps can see this bit and, as a result, may choose to use the rdtscp instruction. When a PV guest with such an app is migrated to a machine that does not have rdtscp support, the app will get killed due to an invalid op. Fix this by emulating the rdtscp instruction. We also need to emulate rdtscp in the case where the machine has rdtscp support, but rdtsc emulation is enabled (which is unfortunately a different path: a privileged op).

I realize that my comment really applies to your earlier patch introducing rdtsc emulation, but somehow that aspect slipped my attention back
then: Linux has, as a security option, a mechanism to disable rdtsc for apps, but your emulation code doesn't honor the guest setting of CR4.TSD.

Jan

#2 lore raw
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich

I realize that my comment really applies to your earlier patch introducing rdtsc emulation, but somehow that aspect slipped my attention back
then: Linux has, as a security option, a mechanism to disable rdtsc for apps, but your emulation code doesn't honor the guest setting of CR4.TSD.

I'll fix this. While I'm at it, I think our PV emulation of MOV CR4,reg is broken -- should just return v->arch.guest_context.ctrlreg[4], would you agree? Otherwise guest's CR4.TSD isn't returned.

-- Keir

#3 lore raw
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

Keir Fraser <[email protected]> 26.11.09 10:31 >>>

Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich

I realize that my comment really applies to your earlier patch introducing rdtsc emulation, but somehow that aspect slipped my attention back
then: Linux has, as a security option, a mechanism to disable rdtsc for apps, but your emulation code doesn't honor the guest setting of CR4.TSD.

Quoted 3 lines

I'll fix this. While I'm at it, I think our PV emulation of MOV CR4,reg is broken -- should just return v->arch.guest_context.ctrlreg[4], would you agree? Otherwise guest's CR4.TSD isn't returned.

Indeed, with the real bit no longer necessarily being in sync with the guest specified one simply reading the physical register doesn't work anymore. I'm somewhat uncertain about returning v->arch.guest_context.ctrlreg[4] though, since there should have been a reason we used the more expensive read of the real register (but looking at the code I can't determine that hypothetical reason).

Jan

#4 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 3 lines

I'll fix this. While I'm at it, I think our PV emulation of MOV CR4,reg is broken -- should just return v->arch.guest_context.ctrlreg[4], would you agree? Otherwise guest's CR4.TSD isn't returned.

Indeed, with the real bit no longer necessarily being in sync with the guest specified one simply reading the physical register doesn't work anymore. I'm somewhat uncertain about returning v->arch.guest_context.ctrlreg[4] though, since there should have been a reason we used the more expensive read of the real register (but looking at the code I can't determine that hypothetical reason).

I expect it's old code which predates things like pv_guest_cr4_fixup(). Since you can't see any reason why we should use read_cr4() either these days, I'll change it.

-- Keir

#5 lore raw
In reply to Jan Beulich
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich

I realize that my comment really applies to your earlier patch introducing rdtsc emulation, but somehow that aspect slipped my attention back
then: Linux has, as a security option, a mechanism to disable rdtsc for apps, but your emulation code doesn't honor the guest setting of CR4.TSD.

Should now be fixed by xen-unstable:20506.

-- Keir

#6 lore raw
In reply to Jan Beulich
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

Dan Magenheimer <[email protected]> 25.11.09 22:24 >>>

Xen intentionally does not expose the cpuid rdtscp bit to PV OS's or to HVM guests, but PV apps can see this bit and, as a result, may choose to use the rdtscp instruction. When a PV guest with such an app is migrated to a machine that does not have rdtscp support, the app will get killed due to an invalid op. Fix this by emulating the rdtscp instruction. We also need to emulate rdtscp in the case where the machine has rdtscp support, but rdtsc emulation is enabled (which is unfortunately a different path: a privileged op).

Quoted 7 lines

I realize that my comment really applies to your earlier patch introducing
rdtsc emulation, but somehow that aspect slipped my attention back
then: Linux has, as a security option, a mechanism to disable rdtsc for
apps, but your emulation code doesn't honor the guest setting of CR4.TSD.

Hi Jan --

I suppose it's a moot point since Keir has patched it already anyway, but what is the mechanism for Linux to do this? Have you tried it on SuSE or any recent distro lately? Does Linux emulate rdtsc then (and, if so, could you point me to the code in the kernel that does it)?
I ask because I found that the dynamic loader uses rdtsc (harmlessly) so if CR4.TSD is turned off by Linux and Linux doesn't emulate rdtsc, I suspect turning on this security option is suicidal.

Thanks,
Dan

#7 lore raw
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line

Dan Magenheimer <[email protected]> 26.11.09 15:57 >>>

I suppose it's a moot point since Keir has patched it already anyway, but what is the mechanism for Linux to do this? Have you tried it on SuSE or any recent distro lately? Does Linux emulate rdtsc then (and, if so, could you point me to the code in the kernel that does it)?
I ask because I found that the dynamic loader uses rdtsc (harmlessly) so if CR4.TSD is turned off by Linux and Linux doesn't emulate rdtsc, I suspect turning on this security option is suicidal.

I didn't try it, I just know the code is there. See arch/x86/kernel/process.c for its handling of TIF_NOTSC, settable through sys_prctl(PR_SET_TSC, ...).

Jan