let CONFIG_SECCOMP default to n
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Quoted 9 lines · Ingo Molnar
Quoted 6 lines · Jeff Dike
Now, there were a couple of ways to legitimately escape from UML, and they *did* involve ptrace. Things like single-stepping a system call instruction or putting a breakpoint on a system call instruction and single-stepping from the breakpoint. As far as I know, these were discovered and fixed by UML developers before there was any outside awareness of these bugs.
Quoted 5 lines
also, UML 'ptrace clients' are allowed alot more leeway than what a seccomp-alike ptrace/utrace based syscall filter would allow. It would clearly exclude activities like 'setting a breakpoint' or 'single-stepping' - valid syscalls would be limited to read/write/sigreturn/exit.
So instead of breakpointing (using int3), you'd have to write 'mv flag I_AM_HERE;self:jmp self' and resort to polling? This would not prevent (ab)use except for some corner cases.
Signature · 4 lines
Ich danke GMX dafür, die Verwendung meiner Adressen mittels per SPF verbreiteten Lügen zu sabotieren. http://david.woodhou.se/why-not-spf.html