CIFS posix acl permission checking
RFC PATCH 1/1 CIFS posix acl permission checking
Hello
Early this weak I sent a patch implementing posix acl permission checking in the linux cifs filesystem module. Unfortunately I only sent it to linux-fsdev as I was unaware of the linux-cifs-client list. I later tried to submit it to linux-cifs-client as well, but my message seems to have been lost in the moderation queue, so I subscribed and am trying again.
I don't believe my patch is perfect, but I think it's a good start, and would like some comments from more experienced cifs developers to be able to get it into shape for inclusion in the kernel.
I did get some comments from Matthew Wilcox at linux-fsdev, but unfortunately he never followed up on my response, so I'm including some unresolved questions I still have, as well as attaching the patch for further comments.
Best Regards
Jon Severinsson
Quoted 36 lines · Jon Severinsson
Quoted 3 lines · Matthew Wilcox
You've included ifdefs around the
check_aclentry ininode_operations, *and* inside the definition ofcifs_check_acl. You only need to do one or the other, and opinion is divided on which is better.While I did recognize the redundancy, I decided to follow the same convention the other functions in
xattr.cdid, and include ifdefs at both locations.I also considered the possible reasons for the existing functions to do both, and and came up with two reasons. The first simply being the paradigm of defensive programming, always check before doing a call, but never assume that the check has been done before being called. The second one is that of performance. The ifdefs has to be in
cifs_check_aclto protect against other callers (while this patch doesn't introduce any, it doesn't prevent further patches from adding them), and not including the ifdefs ininode_operationswould mean a completely useless function call when a feature was turned off at compile time. The second one is a micro-optimization I don't really care fore, but defensive programming I do respect.With this in mind, what do you recommend, double protection, breaking convention or changing the existing code?
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
(quoted diff) +4
-0+int cifs_check_acl(struct inode *inode, int mask) +{ + int rc = -EOPNOTSUPP; +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_XATTRQuoted 8 lines
Review
Quoted 6 lines
(quoted diff) +6
-0+#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + struct dentry *dentry; + size_t buf_size; + void *ea_value = NULL; + ssize_t ea_size; + struct posix_acl *acl = NULL;I don't think you need to initialise
ea_value, do you?
Quoted 7 lines
While currently correct, I find it a good idea to immediately null any pointer that is freed in the exit section. Otherwise it is very easy to forget to do that the day someone adds a goto prior to the first assignment, and not nulling then can have unintended consequences in unrelated code. That being said, if you say that the kernel community frowns upon that kind of defensive programming I will definitely remove it.
commit fa0b9415cda17b31966542101bc4ceb0c97c87cb
Author: Jon Severinsson <[email protected]> Date: Mon Mar 1 19:24:30 2010 +0100
[CIFS] Adds support for permision checking vs. posix acl.
CIFS already supports getting and setting acls through getfacl and setfacl, but prior to this patch, any acls was ignored when doing permission checking.
fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +10 -1
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int cifs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)on the client (above and beyond ACL on servers) for servers which do not support setting and viewing mode bits, so allowing client to check permissions is useful */ -return generic_permission (inode, mask,NULL ); +return generic_permission (inode, mask, inode->i_op->check_acl); }static struct kmem_cache *cifs_inode_cachep;
@@ -702,6 +702,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_dir_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };
@@ -716,6 +719,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_file_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };
@@ -732,6 +738,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_symlink_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };
fs/cifs/cifsfs.h +4 -0
@@ -102,11 +102,15 @@ extern int cifs_readlink(struct dentry *direntry, char __user *buffer, int buflen);extern int cifs_symlink (struct inode *inode,struct dentry *direntry,const char *symname); + +/* Functions related to extended attributes */ extern int cifs_removexattr (struct dentry *,const char *);extern int cifs_setxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,const void *,size_t ,int );extern ssize_t cifs_getxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,void *,size_t );extern ssize_t cifs_listxattr (struct dentry *,char *,size_t ); +extern int cifs_check_acl (struct inode *inode,int mask); +extern long cifs_ioctl (struct file *filep,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg);#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL
fs/cifs/xattr.c +68 -0
71 lines not on this page · raw message
_______________________________________________
linux-cifs-client mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.samba.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-cifs-client
Quoted 8 lines · Jon Severinsson
Hello
Early this weak I sent a patch implementing posix acl permission checking in the linux cifs filesystem module. Unfortunately I only sent it to linux-fsdev as I was unaware of the linux-cifs-client list. I later tried to submit it to linux-cifs-client as well, but my message seems to have been lost in the moderation queue, so I subscribed and am trying again.
Quoted 7 lines
I don't believe my patch is perfect, but I think it's a good start, and would like some comments from more experienced cifs developers to be able to get it into shape for inclusion in the kernel.
I did get some comments from Matthew Wilcox at linux-fsdev, but unfortunately he never followed up on my response, so I'm including some unresolved questions I still have, as well as attaching the patch for further comments.
Hi Jon,
although you did a good job with the code itself, I have to say that I think the approach is just wrong. Checking ACLs on the client is simply the wrong way to go. It is just racy and it is not authoritative anyway.
It is like trying to look up a path using a cached directory listing and then try to open by inode. It simply doesn't work, by the time you do that, things may have been completely changed on the server.
And we are not counting the problem that with CIFS (and samba in particular) the client have no way to know what are the real credentials assigned to the session and that the client may have no idea what the users and groups in the ACL are (if client and server do not use exactly the same user database).
The right way is to let the server enforce ACLs, and use multisessions mounts if multiple users are involved. Time would be better spent working in that direction IMO.
Simo.
Signature · 3 lines
Simo Sorce Samba Team GPL Compliance Officer <[email protected]> Principal Software Engineer at Red Hat, Inc. <[email protected]>
Den Thursday 04 March 2010 14:44:22 skrev du:
Quoted 3 lines
although you did a good job with the code itself, I have to say that I think the approach is just wrong. Checking ACLs on the client is simply the wrong way to go. It is just racy and it is not authoritative anyway.
The problem with this approach is that the server checks the permissions using the credentials of the user doing the mount, not the user trying to access the file. This leaves a big gaping security hole on any multiuser system, and even on single user systems you sill loose any benefits from privilege separation (such as running system daemons as an unprivileged user).
So while it is possible to do it that way (by including the noperm mount option when mounting), it is generally a bad idea to do so.
As you are going to do permission checking on the client side anyway, I do not see the problem consulting the acl when doing so. As not consulting the acl only restricts access to files I'm supposed to have access to (and indeed has access to if using smbclient), it only results in me being forced to use the uid, gid, file_mode, and/or dir_mode mount options, at witch point I can't see whether I have access or not other than by trying to do the access, as it will always look as if I have access.
Quoted 3 lines
It is like trying to look up a path using a cached directory listing and then try to open by inode. It simply doesn't work, by the time you do that, things may have been completely changed on the server.
I'm afraid I'm not sure exactly what you mean by this section, could you please clarify.
Quoted 5 lines
And we are not counting the problem that with CIFS (and samba in particular) the client have no way to know what are the real credentials assigned to the session and that the client may have no idea what the users and groups in the ACL are (if client and server do not use exactly the same user database).
Of course this only works as intended if the client and server shares the same user database. In my case that is through ldap, but could as well be nis, winbind or some other similar nss module. However, that is the case already, without any acl, as UNIX permission bits have exactly the same problem. If you are mounting something from a server with a different user database, you'll need to use the uid, gid, file_mode, and/or dir_mode mount options, but that is no different from the situation without this patch.
Quoted 3 lines
The right way is to let the server enforce ACLs, and use multisessions mounts if multiple users are involved. Time would be better spent working in that direction IMO.
If by multisession mounts you mean something like nfs, where the client tells the server what user is trying to do the access, that can only work if either the server blindly trusts the client (as in nfs3) or with some complex cryptographic token infrastructure (as in nfs4 with kerberos authentication). The first case is simply not very secure, and a cryptographic token infrastructure is needlessly complex. If someone were to work on making setting up a cryptographic token infrastructure simpler I would love that, but I'm not even remotely qualified to do so, and in the meantime the current samba infrastructure fulfils all my need, except that the cifs module erroneously refuses me the rights I'm granted through an acl.
Quoted 1 line
Simo.
Regards
Jon Severinsson
Quoted 10 lines · Jon Severinsson
Den Thursday 04 March 2010 14:44:22 skrev du:
Quoted 3 lines
although you did a good job with the code itself, I have to say that I think the approach is just wrong. Checking ACLs on the client is simply the wrong way to go. It is just racy and it is not authoritative anyway.
The problem with this approach is that the server checks the permissions using the credentials of the user doing the mount, not the user trying to access the file. This leaves a big gaping security hole on any multiuser system, and even on single user systems you sill loose any benefits from privilege separation (such as running system daemons as an unprivileged user).
Letting a different user access the mount point *is* a security violation in itself. The CIFS security model lies in per user sessions. The right way to fix the problem is multi-session mounts. Allowing a different user to use a user session is a violation of the security model of CIFS.
Trying to put a bandaid on a gross policy and security violation is not really useful :)
Quoted 4 lines
So while it is possible to do it that way (by including the noperm mount option when mounting), it is generally a bad idea to do so.
As you are going to do permission checking on the client side anyway,
This is the problem, you shouldn't. CIFS is not NFS, you are abusing your access credentials simply because they are stored in the kernel.
Quoted 7 lines
I do not
see the problem consulting the acl when doing so. As not consulting the acl only restricts access to files I'm supposed to have access to (and indeed has access to if using smbclient), it only results in me being forced to use the uid, gid,file_mode, and/ordir_modemount options, at witch point I can't see whether I have access or not other than by trying to do the access, as it will always look as if I have access.
Sorry, but just piling up errors on top of other errors does not really make the situation better.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 5 lines
And we are not counting the problem that with CIFS (and samba in particular) the client have no way to know what are the real credentials assigned to the session and that the client may have no idea what the users and groups in the ACL are (if client and server do not use exactly the same user database).
Quoted 7 lines
Of course this only works as intended if the client and server shares the same user database. In my case that is through ldap, but could as well be nis, winbind or some other similar nss module. However, that is the case already, without any acl, as UNIX permission bits have exactly the same problem. If you are mounting something from a server with a different user database, you'll need to use the uid, gid,
file_mode, and/ordir_modemount options, but that is no different from the situation without this patch.
Yes, the current situation is not right either, and definitely need fixing.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
The right way is to let the server enforce ACLs, and use multisessions mounts if multiple users are involved. Time would be better spent working in that direction IMO.
If by multisession mounts you mean something like nfs, where the client tells the server what user is trying to do the access, that can only work if either the server blindly trusts the client (as in nfs3) or with some complex cryptographic token infrastructure (as in nfs4 with kerberos authentication).
No, you cannot "tell" the server who you are like in NFS, this is the main point. CIFS has a security model that is different from (old) NFS. In CIFS each session is authenticated, that's why you should have multi-session if you want to access the same mount point as different users. Like NFSv4 you should authenticate each user first, create it's own session and then let him in, or deny access completely (or degrade access to the guest user if the remote server allow you so).
Quoted 1 line
The first case is simply not very secure,
The first case is simply not possible with CIFS.
Quoted 1 line
and a cryptographic token infrastructure is needlessly complex.
Yet there is no real alternative, short of changing the CIFS model to allow the server to trust the client machine.
Quoted 5 lines
If someone were to work on making
setting up a cryptographic token infrastructure simpler I would love that, but I'm not even remotely qualified to do so, and in the meantime the current samba infrastructure fulfils all my need, except that the cifs module erroneously refuses me the rights I'm granted through an acl.
We already have the cifs.upcall thing, which is the prerequisite to get multi-session work at least with kerberos. And it can be easily extended to allow also to use NTLM cached credentials.
That is a goal that would be better pursuing.
Simo.
Signature · 3 lines
Simo Sorce Samba Team GPL Compliance Officer <[email protected]> Principal Software Engineer at Red Hat, Inc. <[email protected]>
Quoted 6 lines · simo
Letting a different user access the mount point *is* a security violation in itself. The CIFS security model lies in per user sessions. The right way to fix the problem is multi-session mounts. Allowing a different user to use a user session is a violation of the security model of CIFS.
Multi-session mounts are the only sane fix. This is what Windows does in their redirectory (when a process with different credentials traverses into a mount point a new sessionsetup is done to get remote credentials).
Jeremy.
Quoted 12 lines · On Thu, 4 Mar 2010 11:50:04 +0100 Jon Severinsson <[email protected]> wrote:
Hello
Early this weak I sent a patch implementing posix acl permission checking in the linux cifs filesystem module. Unfortunately I only sent it to linux-fsdev as I was unaware of the linux-cifs-client list. I later tried to submit it to linux-cifs-client as well, but my message seems to have been lost in the moderation queue, so I subscribed and am trying again.
I don't believe my patch is perfect, but I think it's a good start, and would like some comments from more experienced cifs developers to be able to get it into shape for inclusion in the kernel.
Quoted 7 lines
I did get some comments from Matthew Wilcox at linux-fsdev, but unfortunately he never followed up on my response, so I'm including some unresolved questions I still have, as well as attaching the patch for further comments.
Best Regards
Jon Severinsson
(cc'ing Michael Adam since he's been working on a similar patch)
I've looked over the patch and it's pretty good for a first attempt. There are a few minor problems with it, but it's a reasonable first pass.
The issues I have are with the approach -- you've stepped into a bit of a minefield with regards to CIFS' design. The issues that Simo brings up however are quite valid. Let me just state outright that permission checking on the client is a completely bogus concept. There are a couple of problems with this approach:
1) Someone could change the permissions on the server between the time you check them and when you do your operation. Yes, I know that CIFS already does this for permission bits, but that's dumb too.
2) Ownership matters. This patch will have no effect on how files get created. They still get created with the owner set to the user who's credentials were used, and you can't change them afterward (since users can't "chown" files to other users). Now, it is possible to mount a samba server with root's credentials. Then you can use the "setuids" mount option to make chown's work and you *might* get files created the way you intend. I really, really do not recommend this though -- it's a bad idea to allow any user to share root's server credentials.
I'm convinced, after working on it for more than 3 years that the *only* proper fix for the nightmare that is CIFS permissions is to make CIFS use proper credentials in the first place. CIFS is currently completely broken in this regard -- it's designed such that all accesses to the mount use the same set of credentials, and that's just plain wrong.
Fixing this entails establishing new SMB sessions on the fly whenever a user wants to do an on the wire operation. Obviously, we can't prompt for passwords for this, so we need to limit this to krb5 creds or come up with a way for people to stash credentials for the kernel to use for this purpose. I'm about 1/3 of the way into a first draft of a patchset to do this, but it won't be fixed anytime soon and may not be suitable for CIFS with SMB2 getting development focus now.
Now, all of that said...I don't have a specific issue with adding a patch to do this. I think this approach is completely ass-backwards and broken, but we do already attempt to enforce permission bits on the client currently. Adding checks for POSIX acl's don't make this (much) worse.
The one thing I don't think we want though is to turn this on by default since it means an extra round trip to the server every time you want to check permissions. This needs to be "switchable" somehow -- possibly via mount option (maybe -o checkposixacls or something?)
Quoted 86 lines
commit
fa0b9415cda17b31966542101bc4ceb0c97c87cbAuthor: Jon Severinsson <[email protected]> Date: Mon Mar 1 19:24:30 2010 +0100[CIFS] Adds support for permision checking vs. posix acl.
CIFS already supports getting and setting acls through getfacl and setfacl, but prior to this patch, any acls was ignored when doing permission checking.
fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +10
-1@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int cifs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)on the client (above and beyond ACL on servers) for servers which do not support setting and viewing mode bits, so allowing client to check permissions is useful */ -return generic_permission (inode, mask,NULL ); +return generic_permission (inode, mask, inode->i_op->check_acl); }static struct kmem_cache *cifs_inode_cachep;@@ -702,6 +702,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_dir_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };@@ -716,6 +719,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_file_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };@@ -732,6 +738,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_symlink_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };fs/cifs/cifsfs.h +4
-0@@ -102,11 +102,15 @@ extern int cifs_readlink(struct dentry *direntry, char __user *buffer, int buflen);extern int cifs_symlink (struct inode *inode,struct dentry *direntry,const char *symname); + +/* Functions related to extended attributes */ extern int cifs_removexattr (struct dentry *,const char *);extern int cifs_setxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,const void *,size_t ,int );extern ssize_t cifs_getxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,void *,size_t );extern ssize_t cifs_listxattr (struct dentry *,char *,size_t ); +extern int cifs_check_acl (struct inode *inode,int mask); +extern long cifs_ioctl (struct file *filep,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg);#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL fs/cifs/xattr.c +6
-0@@ -374,3 +374,71 @@ ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size)#endif return rc; } + +int cifs_check_acl (struct inode *inode,int mask) +{ +int rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ; +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_XATTR +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX
fs/cifs/xattr.c ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size) · line 392
Quoted 10 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +10
-0+struct dentry *dentry; +size_t buf_size; +void *ea_value =NULL ; +ssize_t ea_size; +struct posix_acl *acl =NULL ; + +/* CIFS gets acl from server by path, and thus needs a dentry rather than +an inode. Note that the path of each dentry will point to the same inode +on the backing fs at the server, so their acls will be the same, and it +doesn't matter which one we pick, so just pick the fist. */
^^^ comments should follow kernel coding styles. Be sure to run your patch through scripts/checkpatch.pl too.
fs/cifs/xattr.c ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size) · line 394
Quoted 2 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +2
-0+if (!list_empty (&inode->i_dentry)) + dentry = list_first_entry(&inode->i_dentry, struct dentry, d_alias);
^^^^ you should probably dget this dentry to take a reference to it and then put it when you're finished with it. It could vanish out of the cache before you have a chance to use it otherwise.
Quoted 40 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +40
-0+else +return -EINVAL ; + +/* Try to fit the extended attribute corresponding to the posix acl in 4k +memory. 4k was chosen because it always fits in a single page, and is +the maximum on a default ext2/3/4 backing fs. */ + buf_size =4096 ; + ea_value =kmalloc (buf_size,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ea_value) { + rc = -EAGAIN ; + goto check_acl_exit; + } + ea_size =cifs_getxattr (dentry,POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS , ea_value, buf_size); + +/* If 4k wasn't enough, try 64k, the maximum on any current backing fs. */ +if (ea_size == -ERANGE ) { +kfree (ea_value); + buf_size =65536 ; + ea_value =kmalloc (buf_size,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ea_value) { + rc = -EAGAIN ; + goto check_acl_exit; + } + ea_size =cifs_getxattr (dentry,POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS , ea_value, buf_size); + } + +/* If we didn't get any extended attribute, set the error code and exit */ +if (ea_size <=0 ) { + rc = -EAGAIN ; +if (ea_size == -EOPNOTSUPP || ea_size == -EIO || ea_size == -ENOTDIR || ea_size == -ENOENT || ea_size == -EFAULT || ea_size == -EACCES ) + rc = ea_size; + goto check_acl_exit; + } + +/* Set the appropriate return value. Adapted from ext4. */ + acl =posix_acl_from_xattr (ea_value, ea_size); +if (IS_ERR (acl)) + rc =PTR_ERR (acl); +else if (acl) + rc =posix_acl_permission (inode, acl, mask);
fs/cifs/xattr.c ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size) · line 444
Quoted 10 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +10
-0+ else + rc = -EAGAIN ; + +check_acl_exit: +posix_acl_release (acl); +kfree (ea_value); +#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX */ +#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_XATTR */ +return rc; +}
The rest of the patch looks reasonable but I agree with Simo that all of our time would be better spent working to make CIFS use proper credentials on the wire.
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Hi,
yes, the coincidence is really funny!
I have been working on a similar patch, which I attach just for reference. It is just in a proof-of-concept stage with some printk calls for my personal debugging, and the code is not yet conditional.
The main difference is that I used the CIFSSMBGetPosixACL call instead of handcrafting the reading of the xtended attribute.
I have been chatting extensively chatting with Jeff about the implementation of multi session/user mounts, which is definitely the way to go but much more coding work.
I also noticed the problem of file ownership, which should in principle be solvabel by useing the "setuids" mount option, but this seemd to have no effect in my test setup with uml linux running from a 2.6.32 git checkout.
Cheers - Michael
Quoted 227 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 12 lines · On Thu, 4 Mar 2010 11:50:04 +0100 Jon Severinsson <[email protected]> wrote:
Hello
Early this weak I sent a patch implementing posix acl permission checking in the linux cifs filesystem module. Unfortunately I only sent it to linux-fsdev as I was unaware of the linux-cifs-client list. I later tried to submit it to linux-cifs-client as well, but my message seems to have been lost in the moderation queue, so I subscribed and am trying again.
I don't believe my patch is perfect, but I think it's a good start, and would like some comments from more experienced cifs developers to be able to get it into shape for inclusion in the kernel.
Quoted 7 lines
I did get some comments from Matthew Wilcox at linux-fsdev, but unfortunately he never followed up on my response, so I'm including some unresolved questions I still have, as well as attaching the patch for further comments.
Best Regards
Jon Severinsson(cc'ing Michael Adam since he's been working on a similar patch)
I've looked over the patch and it's pretty good for a first attempt. There are a few minor problems with it, but it's a reasonable first pass.
The issues I have are with the approach -- you've stepped into a bit of a minefield with regards to CIFS' design. The issues that Simo brings up however are quite valid. Let me just state outright that permission checking on the client is a completely bogus concept. There are a couple of problems with this approach:
1) Someone could change the permissions on the server between the time you check them and when you do your operation. Yes, I know that CIFS already does this for permission bits, but that's dumb too.
2) Ownership matters. This patch will have no effect on how files get created. They still get created with the owner set to the user who's credentials were used, and you can't change them afterward (since users can't "chown" files to other users). Now, it is possible to mount a samba server with root's credentials. Then you can use the "setuids" mount option to make chown's work and you *might* get files created the way you intend. I really, really do not recommend this though -- it's a bad idea to allow any user to share root's server credentials.
I'm convinced, after working on it for more than 3 years that the *only* proper fix for the nightmare that is CIFS permissions is to make CIFS use proper credentials in the first place. CIFS is currently completely broken in this regard -- it's designed such that all accesses to the mount use the same set of credentials, and that's just plain wrong.
Fixing this entails establishing new SMB sessions on the fly whenever a user wants to do an on the wire operation. Obviously, we can't prompt for passwords for this, so we need to limit this to krb5 creds or come up with a way for people to stash credentials for the kernel to use for this purpose. I'm about 1/3 of the way into a first draft of a patchset to do this, but it won't be fixed anytime soon and may not be suitable for CIFS with SMB2 getting development focus now.
Now, all of that said...I don't have a specific issue with adding a patch to do this. I think this approach is completely ass-backwards and broken, but we do already attempt to enforce permission bits on the client currently. Adding checks for POSIX acl's don't make this (much) worse.
The one thing I don't think we want though is to turn this on by default since it means an extra round trip to the server every time you want to check permissions. This needs to be "switchable" somehow -- possibly via mount option (maybe -o checkposixacls or something?)
Quoted 86 lines
commit
fa0b9415cda17b31966542101bc4ceb0c97c87cbAuthor: Jon Severinsson <[email protected]> Date: Mon Mar 1 19:24:30 2010 +0100[CIFS] Adds support for permision checking vs. posix acl.
CIFS already supports getting and setting acls through getfacl and setfacl, but prior to this patch, any acls was ignored when doing permission checking.
fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +10
-1@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int cifs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)on the client (above and beyond ACL on servers) for servers which do not support setting and viewing mode bits, so allowing client to check permissions is useful */ -return generic_permission (inode, mask,NULL ); +return generic_permission (inode, mask, inode->i_op->check_acl); }static struct kmem_cache *cifs_inode_cachep;@@ -702,6 +702,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_dir_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };@@ -716,6 +719,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_file_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };@@ -732,6 +738,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_symlink_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };fs/cifs/cifsfs.h +4
-0@@ -102,11 +102,15 @@ extern int cifs_readlink(struct dentry *direntry, char __user *buffer, int buflen);extern int cifs_symlink (struct inode *inode,struct dentry *direntry,const char *symname); + +/* Functions related to extended attributes */ extern int cifs_removexattr (struct dentry *,const char *);extern int cifs_setxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,const void *,size_t ,int );extern ssize_t cifs_getxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,void *,size_t );extern ssize_t cifs_listxattr (struct dentry *,char *,size_t ); +extern int cifs_check_acl (struct inode *inode,int mask); +extern long cifs_ioctl (struct file *filep,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg);#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL fs/cifs/xattr.c +6
-0@@ -374,3 +374,71 @@ ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size)#endif return rc; } + +int cifs_check_acl (struct inode *inode,int mask) +{ +int rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ; +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_XATTR +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX fs/cifs/xattr.c ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size) · line 392
Quoted 10 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +10
-0+struct dentry *dentry; +size_t buf_size; +void *ea_value =NULL ; +ssize_t ea_size; +struct posix_acl *acl =NULL ; + +/* CIFS gets acl from server by path, and thus needs a dentry rather than +an inode. Note that the path of each dentry will point to the same inode +on the backing fs at the server, so their acls will be the same, and it +doesn't matter which one we pick, so just pick the fist. */ ^^^ comments should follow kernel coding styles. Be sure to run your patch through
scripts/checkpatch.pltoo.fs/cifs/xattr.c ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size) · line 394
Quoted 2 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +2
-0+if (!list_empty (&inode->i_dentry)) + dentry = list_first_entry(&inode->i_dentry, struct dentry, d_alias);^^^^ you should probably dget this dentry to take a reference to it and then put it when you're finished with it. It could vanish out of the cache before you have a chance to use it otherwise.
Quoted 46 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +46
-0+else +return -EINVAL ; + +/* Try to fit the extended attribute corresponding to the posix acl in 4k +memory. 4k was chosen because it always fits in a single page, and is +the maximum on a default ext2/3/4 backing fs. */ + buf_size =4096 ; + ea_value =kmalloc (buf_size,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ea_value) { + rc = -EAGAIN ; + goto check_acl_exit; + } + ea_size =cifs_getxattr (dentry,POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS , ea_value, buf_size); + +/* If 4k wasn't enough, try 64k, the maximum on any current backing fs. */ +if (ea_size == -ERANGE ) { +kfree (ea_value); + buf_size =65536 ; + ea_value =kmalloc (buf_size,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ea_value) { + rc = -EAGAIN ; + goto check_acl_exit; + } + ea_size =cifs_getxattr (dentry,POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS , ea_value, buf_size); + } + +/* If we didn't get any extended attribute, set the error code and exit */ +if (ea_size <=0 ) { + rc = -EAGAIN ; +if (ea_size == -EOPNOTSUPP || ea_size == -EIO || ea_size == -ENOTDIR || ea_size == -ENOENT || ea_size == -EFAULT || ea_size == -EACCES ) + rc = ea_size; + goto check_acl_exit; + } + +/* Set the appropriate return value. Adapted from ext4. */ + acl =posix_acl_from_xattr (ea_value, ea_size); +if (IS_ERR (acl)) + rc =PTR_ERR (acl); +else if (acl) + rc =posix_acl_permission (inode, acl, mask); +else + rc = -EAGAIN ; + +check_acl_exit: +posix_acl_release (acl); +kfree (ea_value);
Quoted 16 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size) · line 444
Quoted 4 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +4
-0+#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX */ +#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_XATTR */ +return rc; +}The rest of the patch looks reasonable but I agree with Simo that all of our time would be better spent working to make CIFS use proper credentials on the wire.
Signature · 6 lines
Jeff Layton <[email protected]> -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to [email protected] More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
From 159de5f89c010dd2fe082d8b8109e5e3c8633462 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Michael Adam <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 25 Feb 2010 17:06:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] cifs: prototype implementation of client-side posix acl checks.
--- fs/cifs/cifsfs.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 1 deletions(-)
fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +113 -1
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@#include <linux/key-type.h> #include "dns_resolve.h" #include "cifs_spnego.h" +#include <linux/posix_acl.h> +#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> #define CIFS_MAGIC_NUMBER 0xFF534D42/* the first four bytes of SMB PDUs */ #ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_QUOTA
@@ -269,6 +271,116 @@ cifs_statfs(struct dentry *dentry, struct kstatfs *buf)return 0 ; } +static int cifs_check_acl (struct inode *inode,int mask) +{ +ssize_t rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ; +struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb; +struct super_block *sb; +struct cifsTconInfo *pTcon; +int xid; +char *full_path; +void *ea_value =NULL ; +size_t buf_size =0 ; +struct dentry *dentry; +struct posix_acl *acl; + +printk (KERN_NOTICE "cifs_check_acl: entering\n" ); + + sb = inode->i_sb; +if (sb ==NULL ) { +return -EIO ; + } + + cifs_sb =CIFS_SB (sb); + pTcon = cifs_sb->tcon; + + xid =GetXid (); + +if (inode->i_dentry.next ==NULL ) { +/* no dentry found - deny access */ +FreeXid (xid); +return -EACCES ; + } + + dentry = list_first_entry(&(inode->i_dentry), struct dentry, d_alias); +if (dentry ==NULL ) { +FreeXid (xid); +return -EACCES ; + } + +printk (KERN_NOTICE "cifs_check_acl: got first dentry\n" ); + + full_path =build_path_from_dentry (dentry); +if (full_path ==NULL ) { + rc = -ENOMEM ; +FreeXid (xid); +return rc; + } + +printk (KERN_NOTICE "cifs_check_acl: got path '%s'\n" , full_path); + +if (!(sb->s_flags &MS_POSIXACL )) { + rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ; + goto out; + } + + ea_value =kmalloc (4096 ,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (ea_value ==NULL ) { + rc = -ENOMEM ; + goto out; + } + buf_size = (size_t )4096 ; + +printk (KERN_NOTICE "cifs_check_acl: allocated ea buffer (4096)\n" ); + + rc =CIFSSMBGetPosixACL (xid, pTcon, full_path, ea_value, + buf_size,ACL_TYPE_ACCESS , + cifs_sb->local_nls, + cifs_sb->mnt_cifs_flags &CIFS_MOUNT_MAP_SPECIAL_CHR ); +if (rc ==-1 ) { +printk (KERN_NOTICE "cifs_check_acl: error calling CIFSSMBGetPosixACL\n" ); + goto out; + } + +printk (KERN_NOTICE "cifs_check_ack: CIFSSMBGetPosixACL returned %d\n" , rc); + + acl =posix_acl_from_xattr (ea_value, rc); + +if (acl ==NULL ) { +printk (KERN_NOTICE "cifs_check_acl: error converting acl from ea buffer: NULL ACL\n" ); + rc = -EAGAIN ; + goto out; + } + +if (IS_ERR (acl)) { +printk (KERN_NOTICE "cifs_check_acl: error converting acl from ea buffer: IS_ERR(acl): %d\n" , -PTR_ERR (acl)); + rc =PTR_ERR (acl); + goto out; + } + + rc =posix_acl_valid (acl); +if (rc !=0 ) { +printk (KERN_NOTICE "cifs_check_acl: acl is invalid\n" ); + goto out; + } + + rc =posix_acl_permission (inode, acl, mask); +posix_acl_release (acl); + +printk (KERN_NOTICE "cifs_check_acl: posix_acl_permission check gave: %d\n" , rc); + +out: +kfree (full_path); +FreeXid (xid); +if (ea_value !=NULL ) { +kfree (ea_value); + } + +printk (KERN_NOTICE "cifs_check_acl: done, returning %d\n" , rc); + +return rc; +} +static int cifs_permission (struct inode *inode,int mask) {struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb;
@@ -284,7 +396,7 @@ static int cifs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)on the client (above and beyond ACL on servers) for servers which do not support setting and viewing mode bits, so allowing client to check permissions is useful */ -return generic_permission (inode, mask,NULL ); +return generic_permission (inode, mask, cifs_check_acl); }static struct kmem_cache *cifs_inode_cachep;
Signature · 1 line
1.6.3.3
_______________________________________________
linux-cifs-client mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.samba.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-cifs-client
Quoted 29 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 9 lines · On Thu, 4 Mar 2010 11:50:04 +0100 Jon Severinsson <[email protected]> wrote:
Hello
Early this weak I sent a patch implementing posix acl permission checking in the linux cifs filesystem module. Unfortunately I only sent it to linux-fsdev as I was unaware of the linux-cifs-client list. I later tried to submit it to linux-cifs-client as well, but my message seems to have been lost in the moderation queue, so I subscribed and am trying again.
...
(cc'ing Michael Adam since he's been working on a similar patch)
I've looked over the patch and it's pretty good for a first attempt. There are a few minor problems with it, but it's a reasonable first pass.
The issues I have are with the approach -- you've stepped into a bit of a minefield with regards to CIFS' design. The issues that Simo brings up however are quite valid. Let me just state outright that permission checking on the client is a completely bogus concept. There are a couple of problems with this approach:
1) Someone could change the permissions on the server between the time you check them and when you do your operation. Yes, I know that CIFS already does this for permission bits, but that's dumb too.
Quoted 8 lines
2) Ownership matters. This patch will have no effect on how files get created. They still get created with the owner set to the user who's credentials were used, and you can't change them afterward (since users can't "chown" files to other users). Now, it is possible to mount a samba server with root's credentials. Then you can use the "setuids" mount option to make chown's work and you *might* get files created the way you intend. I really, really do not recommend this though -- it's a bad idea to allow any user to share root's server credentials.
I completely agree that client side checking is bogus. And as already mentioned in a different mail, the "setuids" option seems to be broken currently (in my test cases at least).
Quoted 11 lines
I'm convinced, after working on it for more than 3 years that the *only* proper fix for the nightmare that is CIFS permissions is to make CIFS use proper credentials in the first place. CIFS is currently completely broken in this regard -- it's designed such that all accesses to the mount use the same set of credentials, and that's just plain wrong.
Fixing this entails establishing new SMB sessions on the fly whenever a user wants to do an on the wire operation. Obviously, we can't prompt for passwords for this, so we need to limit this to krb5 creds or come up with a way for people to stash credentials for the kernel to use for this purpose.
So this method of "stashing" creds would usually involve some kind of upcall to e.g. query the winbindd credential cache or some static text file, right?
When discussing this with Volker today, he had a different idea:
One could implement a trans2 impersonate call in samba (as a new call in the unix extensions) that could be used to transfer the session established by the privileged user (root, say) to a different user specified as an argument to the call -- without the need to give credentials! Then this call could be used in the multi user mount scenario: when uid 1000 accesse the cifs mount then the root-dispatcher mount would create a new session initially as root and issue an impersonate call to user 1000 directly afterwards.
Wouldn't that be something worth considering?
Quoted 3 lines
I'm about 1/3 of the way into a first draft of a patchset to do this, but it won't be fixed anytime soon and may not be suitable for CIFS with SMB2 getting development focus now.
Sorry, what do you mean? Is SMB2 somehow contradictory to multi session mounts?
Cheers - Michael
Quoted 176 lines
Now, all of that said...I don't have a specific issue with adding a patch to do this. I think this approach is completely ass-backwards and broken, but we do already attempt to enforce permission bits on the client currently. Adding checks for POSIX acl's don't make this (much) worse.
The one thing I don't think we want though is to turn this on by default since it means an extra round trip to the server every time you want to check permissions. This needs to be "switchable" somehow -- possibly via mount option (maybe -o checkposixacls or something?)
Quoted 86 lines
commit
fa0b9415cda17b31966542101bc4ceb0c97c87cbAuthor: Jon Severinsson <[email protected]> Date: Mon Mar 1 19:24:30 2010 +0100[CIFS] Adds support for permision checking vs. posix acl.
CIFS already supports getting and setting acls through getfacl and setfacl, but prior to this patch, any acls was ignored when doing permission checking.
fs/cifs/cifsfs.c +10
-1@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ static int cifs_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)on the client (above and beyond ACL on servers) for servers which do not support setting and viewing mode bits, so allowing client to check permissions is useful */ -return generic_permission (inode, mask,NULL ); +return generic_permission (inode, mask, inode->i_op->check_acl); }static struct kmem_cache *cifs_inode_cachep;@@ -702,6 +702,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_dir_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };@@ -716,6 +719,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_file_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };@@ -732,6 +738,9 @@ const struct inode_operations cifs_symlink_inode_ops = { .getxattr = cifs_getxattr, .listxattr = cifs_listxattr, .removexattr = cifs_removexattr, +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX + .check_acl = cifs_check_acl, +#endif #endif };fs/cifs/cifsfs.h +4
-0@@ -102,11 +102,15 @@ extern int cifs_readlink(struct dentry *direntry, char __user *buffer, int buflen);extern int cifs_symlink (struct inode *inode,struct dentry *direntry,const char *symname); + +/* Functions related to extended attributes */ extern int cifs_removexattr (struct dentry *,const char *);extern int cifs_setxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,const void *,size_t ,int );extern ssize_t cifs_getxattr (struct dentry *,const char *,void *,size_t );extern ssize_t cifs_listxattr (struct dentry *,char *,size_t ); +extern int cifs_check_acl (struct inode *inode,int mask); +extern long cifs_ioctl (struct file *filep,unsigned int cmd,unsigned long arg);#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_EXPERIMENTAL fs/cifs/xattr.c +6
-0@@ -374,3 +374,71 @@ ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size)#endif return rc; } + +int cifs_check_acl (struct inode *inode,int mask) +{ +int rc = -EOPNOTSUPP ; +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_XATTR +#ifdef CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX fs/cifs/xattr.c ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size) · line 392
Quoted 10 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +10
-0+struct dentry *dentry; +size_t buf_size; +void *ea_value =NULL ; +ssize_t ea_size; +struct posix_acl *acl =NULL ; + +/* CIFS gets acl from server by path, and thus needs a dentry rather than +an inode. Note that the path of each dentry will point to the same inode +on the backing fs at the server, so their acls will be the same, and it +doesn't matter which one we pick, so just pick the fist. */ ^^^ comments should follow kernel coding styles. Be sure to run your patch through
scripts/checkpatch.pltoo.fs/cifs/xattr.c ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size) · line 394
Quoted 2 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +2
-0+if (!list_empty (&inode->i_dentry)) + dentry = list_first_entry(&inode->i_dentry, struct dentry, d_alias);^^^^ you should probably dget this dentry to take a reference to it and then put it when you're finished with it. It could vanish out of the cache before you have a chance to use it otherwise.
Quoted 40 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +40
-0+else +return -EINVAL ; + +/* Try to fit the extended attribute corresponding to the posix acl in 4k +memory. 4k was chosen because it always fits in a single page, and is +the maximum on a default ext2/3/4 backing fs. */ + buf_size =4096 ; + ea_value =kmalloc (buf_size,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ea_value) { + rc = -EAGAIN ; + goto check_acl_exit; + } + ea_size =cifs_getxattr (dentry,POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS , ea_value, buf_size); + +/* If 4k wasn't enough, try 64k, the maximum on any current backing fs. */ +if (ea_size == -ERANGE ) { +kfree (ea_value); + buf_size =65536 ; + ea_value =kmalloc (buf_size,GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!ea_value) { + rc = -EAGAIN ; + goto check_acl_exit; + } + ea_size =cifs_getxattr (dentry,POSIX_ACL_XATTR_ACCESS , ea_value, buf_size); + } + +/* If we didn't get any extended attribute, set the error code and exit */ +if (ea_size <=0 ) { + rc = -EAGAIN ; +if (ea_size == -EOPNOTSUPP || ea_size == -EIO || ea_size == -ENOTDIR || ea_size == -ENOENT || ea_size == -EFAULT || ea_size == -EACCES ) + rc = ea_size; + goto check_acl_exit; + } + +/* Set the appropriate return value. Adapted from ext4. */ + acl =posix_acl_from_xattr (ea_value, ea_size); +if (IS_ERR (acl)) + rc =PTR_ERR (acl); +else if (acl) + rc =posix_acl_permission (inode, acl, mask);fs/cifs/xattr.c ssize_t cifs_listxattr(struct dentry *direntry, char *data, size_t buf_size) · line 444
Quoted 10 lines
fs/cifs/xattr.c +10
-0+ else + rc = -EAGAIN ; + +check_acl_exit: +posix_acl_release (acl); +kfree (ea_value); +#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX */ +#endif /* CONFIG_CIFS_XATTR */ +return rc; +}The rest of the patch looks reasonable but I agree with Simo that all of our time would be better spent working to make CIFS use proper credentials on the wire.
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Signature · 8 lines
i.A. Michael Adam -- Michael Adam <[email protected]> SerNet GmbH, Bahnhofsallee 1b, 37081 Göttingen phone: +49-551-370000-0, fax: +49-551-370000-9 AG Göttingen, HRB 2816, GF: Dr. Johannes Loxen http://www.SerNet.DE, mailto: Info @ SerNet.DE
_______________________________________________
linux-cifs-client mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.samba.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-cifs-client
Quoted 39 lines · On Thu, 11 Mar 2010 23:45:29 +0100 Michael Adam <[email protected]> wrote:
Quoted 29 lines · Jeff Layton
Quoted 9 lines · On Thu, 4 Mar 2010 11:50:04 +0100 Jon Severinsson <[email protected]> wrote:
Hello
Early this weak I sent a patch implementing posix acl permission checking in the linux cifs filesystem module. Unfortunately I only sent it to linux-fsdev as I was unaware of the linux-cifs-client list. I later tried to submit it to linux-cifs-client as well, but my message seems to have been lost in the moderation queue, so I subscribed and am trying again.
...
(cc'ing Michael Adam since he's been working on a similar patch)
I've looked over the patch and it's pretty good for a first attempt. There are a few minor problems with it, but it's a reasonable first pass.
The issues I have are with the approach -- you've stepped into a bit of a minefield with regards to CIFS' design. The issues that Simo brings up however are quite valid. Let me just state outright that permission checking on the client is a completely bogus concept. There are a couple of problems with this approach:
1) Someone could change the permissions on the server between the time you check them and when you do your operation. Yes, I know that CIFS already does this for permission bits, but that's dumb too.
Quoted 8 lines
2) Ownership matters. This patch will have no effect on how files get created. They still get created with the owner set to the user who's credentials were used, and you can't change them afterward (since users can't "chown" files to other users). Now, it is possible to mount a samba server with root's credentials. Then you can use the "setuids" mount option to make chown's work and you *might* get files created the way you intend. I really, really do not recommend this though -- it's a bad idea to allow any user to share root's server credentials.
Quoted 4 lines
I completely agree that client side checking is bogus. And as already mentioned in a different mail, the "setuids" option seems to be broken currently (in my test cases at least).
Ok, some investigation as to the cause there might be helpful. That said, the whole idea of mounting using root's creds seems a bit dangerous to me. I can't point to a specific attack vector that employs mounting with root creds, but it "smells" like bad practice.
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 11 lines
I'm convinced, after working on it for more than 3 years that the *only* proper fix for the nightmare that is CIFS permissions is to make CIFS use proper credentials in the first place. CIFS is currently completely broken in this regard -- it's designed such that all accesses to the mount use the same set of credentials, and that's just plain wrong.
Fixing this entails establishing new SMB sessions on the fly whenever a user wants to do an on the wire operation. Obviously, we can't prompt for passwords for this, so we need to limit this to krb5 creds or come up with a way for people to stash credentials for the kernel to use for this purpose.
Quoted 4 lines
So this method of "stashing" creds would usually involve some kind of upcall to e.g. query the winbindd credential cache or some static text file, right?
Actually, I was more envisioning using the kernel keyring to stash a username, and password or NTLM hash. The kernel can then scoop those up as needed without needing to upcall. You could do this per-user or per-session too. Eventually we want to overhaul the krb5 code to do less in userspace too.
See the keyctl_* manpages for details on that facility.
Quoted 11 lines
When discussing this with Volker today, he had a different idea:
One could implement a trans2 impersonate call in samba (as a new call in the unix extensions) that could be used to transfer the session established by the privileged user (root, say) to a different user specified as an argument to the call -- without the need to give credentials! Then this call could be used in the multi user mount scenario: when uid 1000 accesse the cifs mount then the root-dispatcher mount would create a new session initially as root and issue an impersonate call to user 1000 directly afterwards.
Quoted 2 lines
Wouldn't that be something worth considering?
I've only just read this, and haven't thought about it fully, but at first glance that looks like the wrong way to go about fixing this. For one thing, this is a samba only extension. For another, you're still allowing "credential sharing" to some degree and that scheme encourages people to mount using root's credentials.
The bottom line (IMO) is that any scheme that has multiple users sharing credentials on a single SMB session is just a bad solution. Credentials exist for a reason and really shouldn't be shared.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I'm about 1/3 of the way into a first draft of a patchset to do this, but it won't be fixed anytime soon and may not be suitable for CIFS with SMB2 getting development focus now.
Sorry, what do you mean? Is SMB2 somehow contradictory to multi session mounts?
No, but the SMB2 code is a completely separate project however. What there is of it today consists largely of code and functionality that is cut-and-pasted from CIFS. Any fixes that gets implemented in CIFS will need to be essentially duplicated for SMB2.
Signature · 1 line
Jeff Layton <[email protected]>
Quoted 12 lines · Michael Adam
When discussing this with Volker today, he had a different idea:
One could implement a trans2 impersonate call in samba (as a new call in the unix extensions) that could be used to transfer the session established by the privileged user (root, say) to a different user specified as an argument to the call -- without the need to give credentials! Then this call could be used in the multi user mount scenario: when uid 1000 accesse the cifs mount then the root-dispatcher mount would create a new session initially as root and issue an impersonate call to user 1000 directly afterwards.
Quoted 1 line
Wouldn't that be something worth considering?
This world work, but protocol cleanliness-wise it's *really* horrible :-).
Jeremy.
Quoted 13 lines · Jeremy Allison
Quoted 12 lines · Michael Adam
When discussing this with Volker today, he had a different idea:
One could implement a trans2 impersonate call in samba (as a new call in the unix extensions) that could be used to transfer the session established by the privileged user (root, say) to a different user specified as an argument to the call -- without the need to give credentials! Then this call could be used in the multi user mount scenario: when uid 1000 accesse the cifs mount then the root-dispatcher mount would create a new session initially as root and issue an impersonate call to user 1000 directly afterwards.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Wouldn't that be something worth considering?
This world work, but protocol cleanliness-wise it's *really* horrible :-).
Agreed. :-)
_______________________________________________
linux-cifs-client mailing list
[email protected]
https://lists.samba.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-cifs-client