v5 more sampling fun 3
Subsystems (4)
PATCH 3/4 v5 more sampling fun 3
From: mark gross <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] x86/speculation: Special Register Buffer Data Sampling
(SRBDS) mitigation control.
SRBDS is an MDS-like speculative side channel that can leak bits from the RNG across cores and threads. New microcode serializes the processor access during the execution of RDRAND and RDSEED. This ensures that the shared buffer is overwritten before it is released for reuse.
While it is present on all affected CPU models, the microcode mitigation is not needed on models that enumerate ARCH_CAPABILITIES[MDS_NO] in the cases where TSX is not supported or has been disabled with TSX_CTRL.
The mitigation is activated by default on affected processors and it increases latency for RDRAND and RDSEED instructions. Among other effects this will reduce throughput from /dev/urandom.
* enable administrator to configure the mitigation off when desired using either mitigations=off or srbds=off.
* export vulnerability status via sysfs
* rename file scoped macros to apply for non-whitelist table initializations.
--- .../ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu | 1 + .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 20 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 116 ++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 43 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 2 + drivers/base/cpu.c | 8 ++ 8 files changed, 196 insertions(+)
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu +1 -0
@@ -492,6 +492,7 @@ What: /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/l1tf /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds + /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/srbds /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/tsx_async_abort /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/itlb_multihit Date: January 2018
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +20 -0
@@ -4753,6 +4753,26 @@ the kernel will oops in either "warn" or "fatal" mode. + srbds= [X86,INTEL] + Control mitigation for the Special Register + Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) mitigation. + + Certain CPUs are vulnerable to an MDS-like + exploit which can leak bits from the random + number generator. + + By default, this issue is mitigated by + microcode. However, the microcode fix can cause + the RDRAND and RDSEED instructions to become + much slower. Among other effects, this will + result in reduced throughput from /dev/urandom. + + The microcode mitigation can be disabled with + the following option: + + off: Disable mitigation and remove + performance impact to RDRAND and RDSEED + srcutree.counter_wrap_check [KNL] Specifies how frequently to check for grace-period sequence counter wrap for the
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -0
@@ -362,6 +362,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_4FMAPS (18*32+ 3)/* AVX-512 Multiply Accumulation Single precision */ #define X86_FEATURE_FSRM (18*32+ 4)/* Fast Short Rep Mov */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_VP2INTERSECT (18*32+ 8)/* AVX-512 Intersect for D/Q */ +#define X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL (18*32+ 9)/* "" SRBDS mitigation MSR available */ #define X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR (18*32+10)/* VERW clears CPU buffers */ #define X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT (18*32+13)/* "" TSX_FORCE_ABORT */ #define X86_FEATURE_PCONFIG (18*32+18)/* Intel PCONFIG */
@@ -407,5 +408,6 @@#define X86_BUG_SWAPGS X86_BUG(21)/* CPU is affected by speculation through SWAPGS */ #define X86_BUG_TAA X86_BUG(22)/* CPU is affected by TSX Async Abort(TAA) */ #define X86_BUG_ITLB_MULTIHIT X86_BUG(23)/* CPU may incur MCE during certain page attribute changes */ +#define X86_BUG_SRBDS X86_BUG(24)/* CPU may leak RNG bits if not mitigated */ #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +4 -0
@@ -128,6 +128,10 @@#define TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE BIT(0)/* Disable RTM feature */ #define TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR BIT(1)/* Disable TSX enumeration */ +/* SRBDS support */ +#define MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL 0x00000123 +#define RNGDS_MITG_DIS BIT(0) +#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS 0x00000174#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP 0x00000175#define MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP 0x00000176
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +116 -0
150 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +43 -0
61 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +2 -0
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ struct _tlb_table {extern const struct cpu_dev *const __x86_cpu_dev_start[], *const __x86_cpu_dev_end[]; +void update_srbds_msr (void ); +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL enum tsx_ctrl_states { TSX_CTRL_ENABLE,
drivers/base/cpu.c +8 -0
@@ -562,6 +562,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_itlb_multihit(struct device *dev,return sprintf (buf,"Not affected\n" ); } +ssize_t __weak cpu_show_srbds (struct device *dev, +struct device_attribute *attr,char *buf) +{ +return sprintf (buf,"Not affected\n" ); +} + static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -570,6 +576,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(l1tf, 0444, cpu_show_l1tf, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(mds, 0444, cpu_show_mds, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(tsx_async_abort, 0444, cpu_show_tsx_async_abort, NULL); static DEVICE_ATTR(itlb_multihit, 0444, cpu_show_itlb_multihit, NULL); +static DEVICE_ATTR(srbds, 0444, cpu_show_srbds, NULL);static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -580,6 +587,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = { &dev_attr_mds.attr, &dev_attr_tsx_async_abort.attr, &dev_attr_itlb_multihit.attr, + &dev_attr_srbds.attr, NULL };
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1