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9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)

PATCH Superseded Christian Schoenebeck 3 participants 3 messages Jun 7, 2023

v3 of 4 Superseded Latest is v4 →

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PATCH v3 1/1 9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)

The 9p protocol does not specifically define how server shall behave when client tries to open a special file, however from security POV it does make sense for 9p server to prohibit opening any special file on host side in general. A sane Linux 9p client for instance would never attempt to open a special file on host side, it would always handle those exclusively on its guest side. A malicious client however could potentially escape from the exported 9p tree by creating and opening a device file on host side.

With QEMU this could only be exploited in the following unsafe setups:

- Running QEMU binary as root AND 9p 'local' fs driver AND 'passthrough' security model.

or

- Using 9p 'proxy' fs driver (which is running its helper daemon as

    root).

These setups were already discouraged for safety reasons before, however for obvious reasons we are now tightening behaviour on this.

---
v2 -> v3:
- Drop O_CREAT check and its comment.
- Eliminate code duplication.

 fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 hw/9pfs/9p-util.h           | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c +24 -2
index 5cafcd7703..256d7bfcec 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include "qemu/xattr.h"
 #include "9p-iov-marshal.h"
 #include "hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.h"
+#include "hw/9pfs/9p-util.h"
 #include "fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.h"
 
 #define PROGNAME "virtfs-proxy-helper"
@@ -338,6 +339,27 @@ static void resetugid(int suid, int sgid)
     }
 }
 
+/*
+ * Open regular file or directory. Attempts to open any special file are
+ * rejected.
+ *
+ * returns file descriptor or -1 on error
+ */
+static int open_regular(const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode) {
+    int fd;
+
+    fd = open(pathname, flags, mode);
+    if (fd < 0) {
+        return fd;
+    }
+
+    if (check_is_regular_file_or_dir(fd) < 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return fd;
+}
+
 /*
  * send response in two parts
  * 1) ProxyHeader
@@ -682,7 +704,7 @@ static int do_create(struct iovec *iovec)
     if (ret < 0) {
         goto unmarshal_err_out;
     }
-    ret = open(path.data, flags, mode);
+    ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, mode);
     if (ret < 0) {
         ret = -errno;
     }
@@ -707,7 +729,7 @@ static int do_open(struct iovec *iovec)
     if (ret < 0) {
         goto err_out;
     }
-    ret = open(path.data, flags);
+    ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, 0);
     if (ret < 0) {
         ret = -errno;
     }
hw/9pfs/9p-util.h +33 -0
index c314cf381d..9b0a9e5878 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 #ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
 #define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
 
+#include "qemu/error-report.h"
+
 #ifdef O_PATH
 #define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
 #else
@@ -95,6 +97,7 @@ static inline int errno_to_dotl(int err) {
 #endif
 
 #define qemu_openat     openat
+#define qemu_fstat      fstat
 #define qemu_fstatat    fstatat
 #define qemu_mkdirat    mkdirat
 #define qemu_renameat   renameat
@@ -108,6 +111,32 @@ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
     errno = serrno;
 }
 
+/* CVE-2023-2861: Prohibit opening any special file directly on host
+ * (especially device files), as a compromised client could potentially gain
+ * access outside exported tree under certain, unsafe setups. We expect
+ * client to handle I/O on special files exclusively on guest side.
+ */
+static inline int check_is_regular_file_or_dir(int fd)
+{
+    struct stat stbuf;
+
+    if (qemu_fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) {
+        close_preserve_errno(fd);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(stbuf.st_mode)) {
+        error_report_once(
+            "9p: broken or compromised client detected; attempt to open "
+            "special file (i.e. neither regular file, nor directory)"
+        );
+        close(fd);
+        errno = ENXIO;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
 {
     return qemu_openat(dirfd, name,
@@ -142,6 +171,10 @@ again:
         return -1;
     }
 
+    if (check_is_regular_file_or_dir(fd) < 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     serrno = errno;
     /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
      * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
Signature · 1 line
2.30.2
Reviewed-by on v3 1/1
#1 lore raw
Quoted 121 lines · On Wed, 7 Jun 2023 15:50:01 +0200 Christian Schoenebeck…

The 9p protocol does not specifically define how server shall behave when client tries to open a special file, however from security POV it does make sense for 9p server to prohibit opening any special file on host side in general. A sane Linux 9p client for instance would never attempt to open a special file on host side, it would always handle those exclusively on its guest side. A malicious client however could potentially escape from the exported 9p tree by creating and opening a device file on host side.

With QEMU this could only be exploited in the following unsafe setups:

- Running QEMU binary as root AND 9p 'local' fs driver AND 'passthrough' security model.

or

- Using 9p 'proxy' fs driver (which is running its helper daemon as

    root).

These setups were already discouraged for safety reasons before, however for obvious reasons we are now tightening behaviour on this.

---
v2 -> v3:
- Drop O_CREAT check and its comment.
- Eliminate code duplication.

 fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 hw/9pfs/9p-util.h           | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 57 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fsdev/virtfs-proxy-helper.c +24 -2
index 5cafcd7703..256d7bfcec 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
 #include "qemu/xattr.h"
 #include "9p-iov-marshal.h"
 #include "hw/9pfs/9p-proxy.h"
+#include "hw/9pfs/9p-util.h"
 #include "fsdev/9p-iov-marshal.h"
 
 #define PROGNAME "virtfs-proxy-helper"
@@ -338,6 +339,27 @@ static void resetugid(int suid, int sgid)
     }
 }
 
+/*
+ * Open regular file or directory. Attempts to open any special file are
+ * rejected.
+ *
+ * returns file descriptor or -1 on error
+ */
+static int open_regular(const char *pathname, int flags, mode_t mode) {
+    int fd;
+
+    fd = open(pathname, flags, mode);
+    if (fd < 0) {
+        return fd;
+    }
+
+    if (check_is_regular_file_or_dir(fd) < 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return fd;
+}
+
 /*
  * send response in two parts
  * 1) ProxyHeader
@@ -682,7 +704,7 @@ static int do_create(struct iovec *iovec)
     if (ret < 0) {
         goto unmarshal_err_out;
     }
-    ret = open(path.data, flags, mode);
+    ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, mode);
     if (ret < 0) {
         ret = -errno;
     }
@@ -707,7 +729,7 @@ static int do_open(struct iovec *iovec)
     if (ret < 0) {
         goto err_out;
     }
-    ret = open(path.data, flags);
+    ret = open_regular(path.data, flags, 0);
     if (ret < 0) {
         ret = -errno;
     }
hw/9pfs/9p-util.h +4 -0
index c314cf381d..9b0a9e5878 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
 #ifndef QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
 #define QEMU_9P_UTIL_H
 
+#include "qemu/error-report.h"
+
 #ifdef O_PATH
 #define O_PATH_9P_UTIL O_PATH
 #else
@@ -95,6 +97,7 @@ static inline int errno_to_dotl(int err) {
 #endif
 
 #define qemu_openat     openat
+#define qemu_fstat      fstat
 #define qemu_fstatat    fstatat
 #define qemu_mkdirat    mkdirat
 #define qemu_renameat   renameat
@@ -108,6 +111,32 @@ static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd)
     errno = serrno;
 }
 
+/* CVE-2023-2861: Prohibit opening any special file directly on host

hw/9pfs/9p-util.h static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd) · line 124

Quoted 10 lines
hw/9pfs/9p-util.h +10 -0
+ * (especially device files), as a compromised client could potentially gain
+ * access outside exported tree under certain, unsafe setups. We expect
+ * client to handle I/O on special files exclusively on guest side.
+ */
+static inline int check_is_regular_file_or_dir(int fd)
+{
+    struct stat stbuf;
+
+    if (qemu_fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) {
+        close_preserve_errno(fd);

Maybe worth to mention somewhere that this function not only checks but also closes the fd if it doesn't point to a regular file or directory. Or maybe change the name, e.g. filter_out_special_files() ?

Anyway the fix is fine enough to address the CVE.

Quoted 29 lines
hw/9pfs/9p-util.h +19 -0
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (!S_ISREG(stbuf.st_mode) && !S_ISDIR(stbuf.st_mode)) {
+        error_report_once(
+            "9p: broken or compromised client detected; attempt to open "
+            "special file (i.e. neither regular file, nor directory)"
+        );
+        close(fd);
+        errno = ENXIO;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int openat_dir(int dirfd, const char *name)
 {
     return qemu_openat(dirfd, name,
@@ -142,6 +171,10 @@ again:
         return -1;
     }
 
+    if (check_is_regular_file_or_dir(fd) < 0) {
+        return -1;
+    }
+
     serrno = errno;
     /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
      * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
Signature · 1 line
Greg
#2 lore raw
Quoted 1 line · Greg Kurz

On Wed, 7 Jun 2023 15:50:01 +0200

..

Quoted 11 lines

hw/9pfs/9p-util.h static inline void close_preserve_errno(int fd) · line 124

Quoted 6 lines
hw/9pfs/9p-util.h +6 -0
+static inline int check_is_regular_file_or_dir(int fd)
+{
+    struct stat stbuf;
+
+    if (qemu_fstat(fd, &stbuf) < 0) {
+        close_preserve_errno(fd);

Maybe worth to mention somewhere that this function not only checks but also closes the fd if it doesn't point to a regular file or directory. Or maybe change the name, e.g. filter_out_special_files() ?

I realized this after sent initial comment, - my suggestion for the name was awful. It is either check_is_regular() and close after it failed, or it is ensure_regular_or_close().. But I didn't sent a correction, hoping it's easy to spot the awful suggestion.. :)

I don't like it when such a simple thing, especially when reviewed without good care like in my case, generates so much ping-pong.. :(

Quoted 1 line

Anyway the fix is fine enough to address the CVE.

Yeah.

/mjt