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keys: Handle missing Authority Key Identifier X509 extension

PATCH In review Andrew Zaborowski 2 participants 8 messages Jan 4, 2021 – Jan 14, 2021

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 keys: Handle missing Authority Key Identifier X509 extension

In a self-signed certificate the subject and issuer are the same and so the Authority Key Identifier X.509 v3 extension is explicitly made optional in RFC5280 section 4.2.1.1. crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c can't handle this and makes (at least) the restrict.c functions refuse to work with certificates that don't include the AKID. Fix this by filling in the missing cert->sig->auth_ids with the certificate's own IDs after parsing and determinig the certificate is self-signed.

The asymmetric_key_generate_id return value is not checked because it's already succeeded once at this point.

There are root X.509 v3 certificates in use where this is the case, mostly oldish ones.

---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +19 -0
index 26ec20ef489..a5a2f93e242 100644
@@ -136,6 +136,25 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto error_decode;
 
+	if (cert->self_signed) {
+		if (!cert->sig->auth_ids[0]) {
+			/* Duplicate cert->id */
+			kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
+							 cert->raw_serial_size,
+							 cert->raw_issuer,
+							 cert->raw_issuer_size);
+			cert->sig->auth_ids[0] = kid;
+		}
+
+		if (!cert->sig->auth_ids[1] && cert->skid) {
+			/* Duplicate cert->skid */
+			kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_skid,
+							 cert->raw_skid_size,
+							 "", 0);
+			cert->sig->auth_ids[1] = kid;
+		}
+	}
+
 	kfree(ctx);
 	return cert;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH RESEND 1/1 keys: Update comment for restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain

Add the bit of information that makes restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain different from restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring to the inline docs comment.

---
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
crypto/asymmetric_keys/restrict.c +4 -3
index 77ebebada29..84cefe3b358 100644
@@ -244,9 +244,10 @@ int restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring(struct key *dest_keyring,
  * @payload: The payload of the new key.
  * @trusted: A key or ring of keys that can be used to vouch for the new cert.
  *
- * Check the new certificate only against the key or keys passed in the data
- * parameter. If one of those is the signing key and validates the new
- * certificate, then mark the new certificate as being ok to link.
+ * Check the new certificate against the key or keys passed in the data
+ * parameter and against the keys already linked to the destination keyring. If
+ * one of those is the signing key and validates the new certificate, then mark
+ * the new certificate as being ok to link.
  *
  * Returns 0 if the new certificate was accepted, -ENOKEY if we
  * couldn't find a matching parent certificate in the trusted list,
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
maintainer
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH][RESEND] keys: Update comment for restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain

Quoted 6 lines · Andrew Zaborowski

Add the bit of information that makes restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring_chain different from restrict_link_by_key_or_keyring to the inline docs comment.

Picked to git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git

/Jarkko

maintainer
#3 lore raw
In reply to Andrew Zaborowski
Quoted 9 lines · Andrew Zaborowski

In a self-signed certificate the subject and issuer are the same and so the Authority Key Identifier X.509 v3 extension is explicitly made optional in RFC5280 section 4.2.1.1. crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c can't handle this and makes (at least) the restrict.c functions refuse to work with certificates that don't include the AKID. Fix this by filling in the missing cert->sig->auth_ids with the certificate's own IDs after parsing and determinig the certificate is self-signed.

Quoted 8 lines

The asymmetric_key_generate_id return value is not checked because it's already succeeded once at this point.

There are root X.509 v3 certificates in use where this is the case, mostly oldish ones.

I'll take active role with these.

I don't think that adding field data that does not exist is a great idea.

I think that a more sane way to fix this issue, would be to add field 'self_signed' to 'struct public_key_signature', and remove the equivalent field from 'struct x509_certificate'.

Minor updates are required to:

- x509_check_for_self_signed()
- pkcs7_verify_sig_chain()

Then you can use then new field to refine the check in restrict_link_by_signature().

/Jarkko

#4 lore raw

Hi,

Quoted 13 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 12 lines · Andrew Zaborowski

In a self-signed certificate the subject and issuer are the same and so the Authority Key Identifier X.509 v3 extension is explicitly made optional in RFC5280 section 4.2.1.1. crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c can't handle this and makes (at least) the restrict.c functions refuse to work with certificates that don't include the AKID. Fix this by filling in the missing cert->sig->auth_ids with the certificate's own IDs after parsing and determinig the certificate is self-signed.

The asymmetric_key_generate_id return value is not checked because it's already succeeded once at this point.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

There are root X.509 v3 certificates in use where this is the case, mostly oldish ones.

I'll take active role with these.

Great!

Quoted 7 lines

I don't think that adding field data that does not exist is a great idea.

I think that a more sane way to fix this issue, would be to add field 'self_signed' to 'struct public_key_signature', and remove the equivalent field from 'struct x509_certificate'.

Ok, that's also an option. I went for directly adding the cert->sig->auth_ids because the name ".auth_ids" only implies that it contains the signing authority's key IDs, which is something that we have and does exist in the input file. The name doesn't imply that it should specifically be in the AKID extension. Similarly x509_key_preparse even generates a key description even though a description is not part of the x509 format.

Quoted 8 lines

Minor updates are required to:

- x509_check_for_self_signed()
- pkcs7_verify_sig_chain()

Then you can use then new field to refine the check in restrict_link_by_signature().

Ok.

Best regards

maintainer
#5 lore raw
Quoted 45 lines · Andrew Zaborowski

Hi,

Quoted 13 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 12 lines · Andrew Zaborowski

In a self-signed certificate the subject and issuer are the same and so the Authority Key Identifier X.509 v3 extension is explicitly made optional in RFC5280 section 4.2.1.1. crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c can't handle this and makes (at least) the restrict.c functions refuse to work with certificates that don't include the AKID. Fix this by filling in the missing cert->sig->auth_ids with the certificate's own IDs after parsing and determinig the certificate is self-signed.

The asymmetric_key_generate_id return value is not checked because it's already succeeded once at this point.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

There are root X.509 v3 certificates in use where this is the case, mostly oldish ones.

I'll take active role with these.

Great!

Quoted 7 lines

I don't think that adding field data that does not exist is a great idea.

I think that a more sane way to fix this issue, would be to add field 'self_signed' to 'struct public_key_signature', and remove the equivalent field from 'struct x509_certificate'.

Ok, that's also an option. I went for directly adding the cert->sig->auth_ids because the name ".auth_ids" only implies that it contains the signing authority's key IDs, which is something that we have and does exist in the input file. The name doesn't imply that it should specifically be in the AKID extension. Similarly x509_key_preparse even generates a key description even though a description is not part of the x509 format.

Quoted 3 lines

Minor updates are required to:

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines

- x509_check_for_self_signed()
- pkcs7_verify_sig_chain()

Then you can use then new field to refine the check in restrict_link_by_signature().

Ok.

I mean in common sense: kernel stores the information needed. It just needs a bit of relocation.

/Jarkko

#6 lore raw
Quoted 15 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 14 lines · Andrew Zaborowski
Quoted 3 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

I think that a more sane way to fix this issue, would be to add field 'self_signed' to 'struct public_key_signature', and remove the equivalent field from 'struct x509_certificate'.

Ok, that's also an option. I went for directly adding the cert->sig->auth_ids because the name ".auth_ids" only implies that it contains the signing authority's key IDs, which is something that we have and does exist in the input file. The name doesn't imply that it should specifically be in the AKID extension. Similarly x509_key_preparse even generates a key description even though a description is not part of the x509 format.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Minor updates are required to:

- x509_check_for_self_signed()
- pkcs7_verify_sig_chain()

Then you can use then new field to refine the check in restrict_link_by_signature().

I decided to try supporting key lookups without the AKID extension first, as I proposed in
https://marc.info/?l=linux-keyrings&m=158621913606374&w=2 , because this would make the new sig->self_signed field obsolete. It's a just slightly bigger change but fixes verification for a bigger set of certificates that are in use.

If there are arguments against it then I'm going to send a patch to add a sig->self_signed as you suggested.

Many thanks

maintainer
#7 lore raw
Quoted 31 lines · Andrew Zaborowski
Quoted 15 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen
Quoted 14 lines · Andrew Zaborowski
Quoted 3 lines · Jarkko Sakkinen

I think that a more sane way to fix this issue, would be to add field 'self_signed' to 'struct public_key_signature', and remove the equivalent field from 'struct x509_certificate'.

Ok, that's also an option. I went for directly adding the cert->sig->auth_ids because the name ".auth_ids" only implies that it contains the signing authority's key IDs, which is something that we have and does exist in the input file. The name doesn't imply that it should specifically be in the AKID extension. Similarly x509_key_preparse even generates a key description even though a description is not part of the x509 format.

Quoted 1 line
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

Minor updates are required to:

- x509_check_for_self_signed()
- pkcs7_verify_sig_chain()

Then you can use then new field to refine the check in restrict_link_by_signature().

I decided to try supporting key lookups without the AKID extension first, as I proposed in
https://marc.info/?l=linux-keyrings&m=158621913606374&w=2 , because this would make the new sig->self_signed field obsolete. It's a just slightly bigger change but fixes verification for a bigger set of certificates that are in use.

Quoted 4 lines

If there are arguments against it then I'm going to send a patch to add a sig->self_signed as you suggested.

Many thanks

OK, I'll check that one then. Thank you.

/Jarkko