Add PCI pass-thru support to Hyper-V Confidential VMs
Subsystems (10)
v5 cover Add PCI pass-thru support to Hyper-V Confidential VMs
This patch series adds support for PCI pass-thru devices to Hyper-V Confidential VMs (also called "Isolation VMs"). But in preparation, it first changes how private (encrypted) vs. shared (decrypted) memory is handled in Hyper-V SEV-SNP guest VMs. The new approach builds on the confidential computing (coco) mechanisms introduced in the 5.19 kernel for TDX support and significantly reduces the amount of Hyper-V specific code. Furthermore, with this new approach a proposed RFC patch set for generic DMA layer functionality[1] is no longer necessary.
Background
==========
Hyper-V guests on AMD SEV-SNP hardware have the option of using the "virtual Top Of Memory" (vTOM) feature specified by the SEV-SNP architecture. With vTOM, shared vs. private memory accesses are controlled by splitting the guest physical address space into two halves. vTOM is the dividing line where the uppermost bit of the physical address space is set; e.g., with 47 bits of guest physical address space, vTOM is 0x400000000000 (bit 46 is set). Guest physical memory is accessible at two parallel physical addresses -- one below vTOM and one above vTOM. Accesses below vTOM are private (encrypted) while accesses above vTOM are shared (decrypted). In this sense, vTOM is like the GPA.SHARED bit in Intel TDX.
In Hyper-V's use of vTOM, the normal guest OS runs at VMPL2, while a Hyper-V provided "paravisor" runs at VMPL0 in the guest VM. (VMPL is Virtual Machine Privilege Level. See AMD's SEV-SNP spec for more details.) The paravisor provides emulation for various system devices like the IO-APIC and virtual TPM as part of the guest VM. Accesses to such devices made by the normal guest OS trap to the paravisor and are emulated in the guest VM context instead of in the Hyper-V host. This emulation is invisible to the normal guest OS, but with the quirk that memory mapped I/O accesses to these devices must be treated as private, not shared as would be the case for other device accesses.
Support for Hyper-V guests using vTOM was added to the Linux kernel in two patch sets[2][3]. This support treats the vTOM bit as part of the physical address. For accessing shared (decrypted) memory, the core approach is to create a second kernel virtual mapping that maps to parallel physical addresses above vTOM, while leaving the original mapping unchanged. Most of the code for creating that second virtual mapping is confined to Hyper-V specific areas, but there are are also changes to generic swiotlb code.
Changes in this patch set
=========================
In preparation for supporting PCI pass-thru devices, this patch set changes the core approach for handling vTOM. In the new approach, the vTOM bit is treated as a protection flag, and not as part of the physical address. This new approach is like the approach for the GPA.SHARED bit in Intel TDX. Furthermore, there's no need to create a second kernel virtual mapping. When memory is changed between private and shared using set_memory_decrypted() and set_memory_encrypted(), the PTEs for the existing kernel mapping are changed to add or remove the vTOM bit just as with TDX. The hypercalls to change the memory status on the host side are made using the existing callback mechanism. Everything just works, with tweaks to map the IO-APIC and vTPM to use private accesses as mentioned above.
With the new handling of vTOM in place, existing Hyper-V code that creates the second kernel virtual mapping still works, but it is now redundant as the original kernel virtual mapping (as updated) maps to the same physical address. To simplify things going forward, this patch set removes the code that creates the second kernel virtual mapping. And since a second kernel virtual mapping is no longer needed, changes to the DMA layer proposed as an RFC[1] are no longer needed.
Finally, to support PCI pass-thru in a Confidential VM, Hyper-V requires that all accesses to PCI config space be emulated using a hypercall. This patch set adds functions to invoke those hypercalls and uses them in the config space access functions in the Hyper-V PCI driver. Lastly, the Hyper-V PCI driver is marked as allowed to be used in a Confidential VM. The Hyper-V PCI driver has been hardened against a malicious Hyper-V in a previous patch set.[4]
Patch Organization
==================
Patches 1 thru 6 are prepatory patches that account for slightly different assumptions when running in a Hyper-V VM with vTOM, fix some minor bugs, and make temporary tweaks to avoid needing a single large patch to make the transition from the old approach to the new approach.
Patch 7 enables the new approach to handling vTOM for Hyper-V guest VMs. This is the core patch after which the new approach is in effect.
Patches 8 thru 11 remove existing code for creating the second kernel virtual mapping that is no longer necessary with the new approach.
Patch 12 updates existing code so that it no longer assumes that the vTOM bit is part of the physical address.
Patches 13 and 14 add new hypercalls for accessing MMIO space and use those hypercalls for PCI config space. They also enable the Hyper-V vPCI driver to be used in a Confidential VM.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[3] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[4] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
---
Changes in v5:
* Add new Patch 6 and update hv_vtom_init() in Patch 7 so that the virtual TPM in the guest is mapped as encrypted
* Update commit messages for Patches 1 thru 4, and 13 [Boris Petkov]
* Remove the Fixes tag in Patch 4 after discussion upstream [Boris Petkov, Tom Lendacky, others]
* Use PAGE_KERNEL instead of PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC in arch independent Hyper-V code. PAGE_KERNEL_NOENC doesn't exist for ARM64, so it causes compile errors. Using PAGE_KERNEL means or'ing in sme_me_mask when on x86, but it will be zero for vTOM VMs.
* In Patch 7, break out amd_cc_platform_has() handling of vTOM into a separate helper function [Boris Petkov]
Changes in v4:
* Remove previous Patch 1 from this series and submit separately [Dave Hansen & Boris Petkov]
* Patch 1: Change the name of the new CC_ATTR that controls whether the IO-APIC is mapped decrypted [Boris Petkov]
* Patch 4: Use sme_me_mask directly instead of calling the getter function. Add Fixes: tag. [Tom Lendacky]
* Patch 6: Remove CC_VENDOR_HYPERV and merge associated vTOM functionality under CC_VENDOR_AMD. [Boris Petkov]
* Patch 8: Use bitwise OR to pick up the vTOM bit in shared_gpa_boundary rather than adding it
Changes in v3:
* Patch 1: Tweak the code fix to cleanly separate the page alignment and physical address masking [Dave Hansen]
* Patch 2: Change the name of the new CC_ATTR that controls whether the IO-APIC is mapped decrypted [Dave Hansen]
* Patch 5 (now patch 7): Add CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT to what Hyper-V vTOM reports as 'true'. With the addition, Patches 5 and 6 are new to accomodate working correctly with Hyper-V VMs using vTOM. [Tom Lendacky]
Changes in v2:
* Patch 11: Include more detail in the error message if an MMIO hypercall fails. [Bjorn Helgaas]
* Patch 12: Restore removed memory barriers. It seems like these barriers should not be needed because of the spin_unlock() calls, but commit bdd74440d9e8 indicates that they are. This patch series will leave the barriers unchanged; whether they are really needed can be sorted out separately. [Boqun Feng]
Michael Kelley (14):
x86/ioapic: Gate decrypted mapping on cc_platform_has() attribute x86/hyperv: Reorder code to facilitate future work
Drivers: hv: Explicitly request decrypted in vmap_pfn() calls x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of bss_decrypted consistently
init: Call mem_encrypt_init() after Hyper-V hypercall init is done x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted x86/hyperv: Change vTOM handling to use standard coco mechanisms
swiotlb: Remove bounce buffer remapping for Hyper-V
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second mapping of VMBus monitor pages
Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second way of mapping ring buffers
hv_netvsc: Remove second mapping of send and recv buffers
Drivers: hv: Don't remap addresses that are above shared_gpa_boundary
PCI: hv: Add hypercalls to read/write MMIO space
PCI: hv: Enable PCI pass-thru devices in Confidential VMs
arch/x86/coco/core.c | 43 +++++-- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 18 +-- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 134 +++++++++++---------- arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h | 1 - arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 8 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 22 ++-- arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 27 ++++- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 10 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 3 - drivers/hv/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 2 +- drivers/hv/connection.c | 113 +++++------------- drivers/hv/hv.c | 23 ++-- drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 11 -- drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h | 2 - drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c | 62 ++++------ drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 1 - drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h | 2 - drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c | 48 +------- drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c | 232 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h | 22 ++++ include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 4 +- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 12 ++ include/linux/swiotlb.h | 2 - init/main.c | 19 +-- kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 45 +------ 30 files changed, 440 insertions(+), 436 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 1/14 x86/ioapic: Gate decrypted mapping on cc_platform_has() attribute
Current code always maps the IO-APIC as shared (decrypted) in a confidential VM. But Hyper-V guest VMs on AMD SEV-SNP with vTOM enabled use a paravisor running in VMPL0 to emulate the IO-APIC.
In such a case, the IO-APIC must be accessed as private (encrypted) because the paravisor emulates the IO-APIC at an address below vTOM, where all accesses are encrypted.
Add a new CC attribute which determines how the IO-APIC MMIO mapping should be established depending on the platform the kernel is running on as a guest.
--- arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c | 3 ++- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 12 ++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +2 -1
@@ -2686,7 +2686,8 @@ static void io_apic_set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx, phys_addr_t phys)* Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot * bits, just like normal ioremap(): */ - flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags); +if (!cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED )) + flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags);__set_fixmap (idx, phys, flags); }
include/linux/cc_platform.h +12 -0
@@ -90,6 +90,18 @@ enum cc_attr {* Examples include TDX Guest. */ CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED , + +/** +* @CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED: Guest VM IO-APIC is encrypted +* +* The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine with +* an IO-APIC that is emulated by a paravisor running in the +* guest VM context. As such, the IO-APIC is accessed in the +* encrypted portion of the guest physical address space. +* +* Examples include Hyper-V SEV-SNP guests using vTOM. +*/ + CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED, };#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 2/14 x86/hyperv: Reorder code to facilitate future work
In reply to Michael KelleyReorder some code to facilitate future work. No functional change.
--- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------- 1 file changed, 34 insertions(+), 34 deletions(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +34 -34
@@ -235,40 +235,6 @@ void hv_ghcb_msr_read(u64 msr, u64 *value)EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_ghcb_msr_read);#endif -enum hv_isolation_type hv_get_isolation_type (void ) -{ -if (!(ms_hyperv.priv_high &HV_ISOLATION )) -return HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE ; -return FIELD_GET (HV_ISOLATION_TYPE , ms_hyperv.isolation_config_b); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_get_isolation_type); - -/* -* hv_is_isolation_supported - Check system runs in the Hyper-V -* isolation VM. -*/ -bool hv_is_isolation_supported (void ) -{ -if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR )) -return false; - -if (!hypervisor_is_type (X86_HYPER_MS_HYPERV )) -return false; - -return hv_get_isolation_type () !=HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE ; -} - -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (isolation_type_snp); - -/* -* hv_isolation_type_snp - Check system runs in the AMD SEV-SNP based -* isolation VM. -*/ -bool hv_isolation_type_snp (void ) -{ -return static_branch_unlikely (&isolation_type_snp); -} -/* * hv_mark_gpa_visibility - Set pages visible to host via hvcall. *
@@ -387,3 +353,37 @@ void hv_unmap_memory(void *addr) {vunmap (addr); } + +enum hv_isolation_type hv_get_isolation_type (void ) +{ +if (!(ms_hyperv.priv_high &HV_ISOLATION )) +return HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE ; +return FIELD_GET (HV_ISOLATION_TYPE , ms_hyperv.isolation_config_b); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_get_isolation_type); + +/* +* hv_is_isolation_supported - Check system runs in the Hyper-V +* isolation VM. +*/ +bool hv_is_isolation_supported (void ) +{ +if (!cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR )) +return false; + +if (!hypervisor_is_type (X86_HYPER_MS_HYPERV )) +return false; + +return hv_get_isolation_type () !=HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE ; +} + +DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (isolation_type_snp); + +/* +* hv_isolation_type_snp - Check system runs in the AMD SEV-SNP based +* isolation VM. +*/ +bool hv_isolation_type_snp (void ) +{ +return static_branch_unlikely (&isolation_type_snp); +}
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 3/14 Drivers: hv: Explicitly request decrypted in vmap_pfn() calls
In reply to Michael KelleyUpdate vmap_pfn() calls to explicitly request that the mapping be for decrypted access to the memory. There's no change in functionality since the PFNs passed to vmap_pfn() are above the shared_gpa_boundary, implicitly producing a decrypted mapping. But explicitly requesting "decrypted" allows the code to work before and after changes that cause vmap_pfn() to mask the PFNs to being below the shared_gpa_boundary.
--- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 2 +- drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +1 -1
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ void *hv_map_memory(void *addr, unsigned long size) pfns[i] =vmalloc_to_pfn (addr + i *PAGE_SIZE ) + (ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary >>PAGE_SHIFT ); - vaddr =vmap_pfn (pfns, size /PAGE_SIZE ,PAGE_KERNEL_IO ); + vaddr =vmap_pfn (pfns, size /PAGE_SIZE ,pgprot_decrypted (PAGE_KERNEL ));kfree (pfns);return vaddr;
drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c +1 -1
@@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ int hv_ringbuffer_init(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info, ring_info->ring_buffer = (struct hv_ring_buffer *)vmap_pfn (pfns_wraparound, page_cnt *2 -1 , -PAGE_KERNEL ); +pgprot_decrypted (PAGE_KERNEL ));kfree (pfns_wraparound);if (!ring_info->ring_buffer)
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 4/14 x86/mm: Handle decryption/re-encryption of bss_decrypted consistently
In reply to Michael Kelleysme_postprocess_startup() decrypts the bss_decrypted section when sme_me_mask is non-zero.
mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem() re-encrypts the unused portion based on CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT.
In a Hyper-V guest VM using vTOM, these conditions are not equivalent as sme_me_mask is always zero when using vTOM. Consequently, mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem() attempts to re-encrypt memory that was never decrypted.
So check sme_me_mask in mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem() too.
Hyper-V guests using vTOM don't need the bss_decrypted section to be decrypted, so skipping the decryption/re-encryption doesn't cause a problem.
--- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 10 +++++++--- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +7 -3
@@ -513,10 +513,14 @@ void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) npages = (vaddr_end - vaddr) >>PAGE_SHIFT ;/* -* The unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption -* attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it. +* If the unused memory range was mapped decrypted, change the encryption +* attribute from decrypted to encrypted before freeing it. Base the +* re-encryption on the same condition used for the decryption in +* sme_postprocess_startup(). Higher level abstractions, such as +* CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT, aren't necessarily equivalent in a Hyper-V VM +* using vTOM, where sme_me_mask is always zero. */ -if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT )) { +if (sme_me_mask) { r =set_memory_encrypted (vaddr, npages);if (r) {pr_warn ("failed to free unused decrypted pages\n" );
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 5/14 init: Call mem_encrypt_init() after Hyper-V hypercall init is done
In reply to Michael KelleyFull Hyper-V initialization, including support for hypercalls, is done as an apic_post_init callback via late_time_init(). mem_encrypt_init() needs to make hypercalls when it marks swiotlb memory as decrypted. But mem_encrypt_init() is currently called a few lines before late_time_init(), so the hypercalls don't work.
Fix this by moving mem_encrypt_init() after late_time_init() and related clock initializations. The intervening initializations don't do any I/O that requires the swiotlb, so moving mem_encrypt_init() slightly later has no impact.
--- init/main.c | 19 +++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
init/main.c +11 -8
@@ -1088,14 +1088,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)*/ locking_selftest (); -/* -* This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA -* operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will -* mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will -* not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. -*/ -mem_encrypt_init (); -#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD if (initrd_start && !initrd_below_start_ok &&page_to_pfn (virt_to_page ((void *)initrd_start)) < min_low_pfn) {
@@ -1112,6 +1104,17 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init __no_sanitize_address start_kernel(void)late_time_init ();sched_clock_init ();calibrate_delay (); + +/* +* This needs to be called before any devices perform DMA +* operations that might use the SWIOTLB bounce buffers. It will +* mark the bounce buffers as decrypted so that their usage will +* not cause "plain-text" data to be decrypted when accessed. It +* must be called after late_time_init() so that Hyper-V x86/x64 +* hypercalls work when the SWIOTLB bounce buffers are decrypted. +*/ +mem_encrypt_init (); +pid_idr_init ();anon_vma_init ();#ifdef CONFIG_X86
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 6/14 x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
In reply to Michael KelleyIn a AMD SEV-SNP VM using vTOM, devices in MMIO space may be provided by the paravisor and need to be mapped as encrypted. Provide a function for the hypervisor to specify the address range for such devices. In __ioremap_caller(), map addresses in this range as encrypted.
Only a single range is supported. If multiple devices need to be mapped encrypted, the paravisor must place them within the single contiguous range.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h +2 -0
@@ -169,6 +169,8 @@ static inline unsigned int isa_virt_to_bus(volatile void *address) }#define isa_bus_to_virt phys_to_virt +extern void ioremap_set_encrypted_range (resource_size_t addr,unsigned long size); +/* * The default ioremap() behavior is non-cached; if you need something * else, you probably want one of the following.
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +26 -1
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ struct ioremap_desc {unsigned int flags; }; +/* Range of "other" addresses to treat as encrypted when remapping */ +resource_size_t other_encrypted_start; +resource_size_t other_encrypted_end; +/* * Fix up the linear direct mapping of the kernel to avoid cache attribute * conflicts.
@@ -108,14 +112,35 @@ static unsigned int __ioremap_check_encrypted(struct resource *res) }/* +* Allow a hypervisor to specify an additional range of addresses to +* treat as encrypted when remapping. +*/ +void ioremap_set_encrypted_range (resource_size_t addr,unsigned long size) +{ + other_encrypted_start = addr; + other_encrypted_end = addr + size -1 ; +} + +/* * The EFI runtime services data area is not covered by walk_mem_res(), but must -* be mapped encrypted when SEV is active. +* be mapped encrypted when SEV is active. Also check the hypervisor specified +* "other" address range to treat as encrypted. */ static void __ioremap_check_other (resource_size_t addr,struct ioremap_desc *desc) {if (!cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT ))return ; +/* +* Check for an address within the "other" encrypted address range. If such +* a range is set, it must include the entire space used by the device, +* so we don't need to deal with a partial fit. +*/ +if ((addr >= other_encrypted_start) && (addr <= other_encrypted_end)) { + desc->flags |=IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED ; +return ; + } +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_EFI ))return ;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 8 lines · Michael Kelley
In a AMD SEV-SNP VM using vTOM, devices in MMIO space may be provided by the paravisor and need to be mapped as encrypted. Provide a function for the hypervisor to specify the address range for such devices. In
__ioremap_caller(), map addresses in this range as encrypted.Only a single range is supported. If multiple devices need to be mapped encrypted, the paravisor must place them within the single contiguous range.
This already is starting to sound insufficient and hacky. And it also makes CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED insufficient either.
So, the situation we have is, we're a SEV-SNP VM using vTOM. Which means, MSR_AMD64_SEV[3] = 1. Or SEV_FEATURES[1], alternatively - same thing.
That MSR cannot be intercepted by the HV and we use it extensively in Linux when it runs as a SEV-* guest. And I had asked this before, during review, but why aren't you checking this bit above when you wanna do vTOM-specific work?
Because then you can do that check and
1. map the IO-APIC encrypted
2. map MMIO space of devices from the driver encrypted too
3. ...
and so on.
And you won't need those other, not as nice things...
Hmmm.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, January 20, 2023 12:15 PM
Quoted 14 lines · Michael Kelley
Quoted 8 lines
In a AMD SEV-SNP VM using vTOM, devices in MMIO space may be provided by the paravisor and need to be mapped as encrypted. Provide a function for the hypervisor to specify the address range for such devices. In
__ioremap_caller(), map addresses in this range as encrypted.Only a single range is supported. If multiple devices need to be mapped encrypted, the paravisor must place them within the single contiguous range.
This already is starting to sound insufficient and hacky. And it also makes
CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTEDinsufficient either.
Quoted 6 lines
So, the situation we have is, we're a SEV-SNP VM using vTOM. Which means, MSR_AMD64_SEV[3] = 1. Or SEV_FEATURES[1], alternatively - same thing.
That MSR cannot be intercepted by the HV and we use it extensively in Linux when it runs as a SEV-* guest. And I had asked this before, during review, but why aren't you checking this bit above when you wanna do vTOM-specific work?
Per the commit message for 009767dbf42a, it's not safe to read MSR_AMD64_SEV on all implementations of AMD processors. CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED is used in io_apic_set_fixmap(), which is called on all Intel/AMD systems without
any qualifications. Even if rdmsrl_safe() works at this point in boot, I'm a little
leery of reading a new MSR in a path that essentially every x86 bare-metal system or VM takes during boot. Or am I being overly paranoid about old processor models or hypervisor versions potentially doing something weird?
But in any case, the whole point of cc_platform_has() is to provide a level of abstraction from the hardware registers, and it's fully safe to use on every x86 bare-metal system or VM. And while I don't anticipate it now, maybe there's some future scheme where a paravisor-like entity could be used with Intel TDX. It seems like using a cc_platform_has() abstraction is better than directly accessing the MSR.
Quoted 6 lines
Because then you can do that check and
1. map the IO-APIC encrypted
2. map MMIO space of devices from the driver encrypted too
3. ...
My resolution of the TPM driver issue is admittedly a work-around. I think
of it as temporary in anticipation of future implementations of PCIe TDISP hardware, which allows PCI devices to DMA directly into guest encrypted memory. TDISP also places the device's BAR values in an encrypted portion of the GPA space. Assuming TDISP hardware comes along in the next couple of years, Linux will need a robust way to deal with a mix of PCI devices being in unencrypted and encrypted GPA space. I don't know how a specific device will be mapped correctly, but I hope it can happen in the generic PCI code, and not by modifying each device driver. It's probably premature to build that robust mechanism now, but when it comes, my work-around would be replaced.
With all that in mind, I don't want to modify the TPM driver to special-case its MMIO space being encrypted. FWIW, the TPM driver today uses devm_ioremap_resource() to do the mapping, which defaults to mapping decrypted except for the exceptions implemented in __ioremap_caller(). There's no devm_* option for specifying encrypted. Handling decrypted vs. encrypted in the driver would require extending the driver API to provide an "encrypted" option, and that seems like going in the wrong long-term direction.
Finally, I would have liked to handle the IO-APIC and the vTPM the same way. But the IO-APIC doesn't use the normal ioremap_* functions because it's done early in boot via the fixmap. I didn't see a reasonable way to unify them.
Anyway, that's my thoughts. I'm certainly open if someone has a better way to do it.
Michael
Quoted 6 lines
and so on.
And you won't need those other, not as nice things...
Hmmm.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 2 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Per the commit message for
009767dbf42a, it's not safe to readMSR_AMD64_SEVon all implementations of AMD processors.
1. Why does that matter to you? This is Hygon.
2. The MSR access is behind CPUID check.
Quoted 5 lines
CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTEDis used inio_apic_set_fixmap(), which is
called on all Intel/AMD systems without any qualifications. Even ifrdmsrl_safe()works at this point in boot, I'm a little leery of reading a new MSR in a path that essentially every x86 bare-metal system or VM takes during boot.
You read the MSR once and cache it. sme_enable() already does that. I don't see what the problem is.
Quoted 2 lines
Or am I being overly paranoid about old processor models or hypervisor versions potentially doing something weird?
Yes, you are. :)
If they're doing something weird which is out of spec, then we'll deal with them later.
Quoted 6 lines
But in any case, the whole point of
cc_platform_has()is to provide a level of abstraction from the hardware registers, and it's fully safe to use on every x86 bare-metal system or VM. And while I don't anticipate it now, maybe there's some future scheme where a paravisor-like entity could be used with Intel TDX. It seems like using acc_platform_has()abstraction is better than directly accessing the MSR.
That's fine but we're talking about this particular implementation and that is vTOM-like with the address space split. If TDX does address space split later, we can accomodate it too. (Although I think they are not interested in this).
And if you really want to use cc_platform_has(), we could do
cc_platform_has(CC_ADDRESS_SPACE_SPLIT_ON_A_PARAVISOR)
or something with a better name.
The point is, you want to do things which are specific for this particular implementation. If so, then check for it. Do not do hacky things which get the work done for your case but can very easily be misused by others.
Quoted 4 lines
My resolution of the TPM driver issue is admittedly a work-around. I think
of it as temporary in anticipation of future implementations of PCIe TDISP hardware, which allows PCI devices to DMA directly into guest encrypted memory.
Yap, that sounds real nice.
Quoted 6 lines
TDISP also places the device's BAR values in an encrypted portion of the GPA space. Assuming TDISP hardware comes along in the next couple of years, Linux will need a robust way to deal with a mix of PCI devices being in unencrypted and encrypted GPA space. I don't know how a specific device will be mapped correctly, but I hope it can happen in the generic PCI code, and not by modifying each device driver.
I guess those devices would advertize that capability somehow so that code can query it and act accordingly.
Quoted 2 lines
It's probably premature to build that robust mechanism now, but when it comes, my work-around would be replaced.
It would be replaced if it doesn't have any users. By the looks of it, it'll soon grow others and then good luck removing it.
Quoted 5 lines
With all that in mind, I don't want to modify the TPM driver to special-case its MMIO space being encrypted. FWIW, the TPM driver today uses
devm_ioremap_resource()to do the mapping, which defaults to mapping decrypted except for the exceptions implemented in__ioremap_caller(). There's no devm_* option for specifying encrypted.
You mean, it is hard to add a DEVM_IOREMAP_ENCRYPTED type which will have __devm_ioremap() call ioremap_encrypted()?
Or define a IORESOURCE_ENCRYPTED and pass it through the ioresource flags?
Why is that TPM driver so precious that it can be touched and the arch code would have to accept hacks?
Quoted 3 lines
Handling decrypted vs. encrypted in the driver would require extending the driver API to provide an "encrypted" option, and that seems like going in the wrong long-term direction.
Sorry, I can't follow here.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2023 6:56 AM
Quoted 2 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
[snip]
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 7 lines
But in any case, the whole point of
cc_platform_has()is to provide a level of abstraction from the hardware registers, and it's fully safe to use on every x86 bare-metal system or VM. And while I don't anticipate it now, maybe there's some future scheme where a paravisor-like entity could be used with Intel TDX. It seems like using acc_platform_has()abstraction is better than directly accessing the MSR.That's fine but we're talking about this particular implementation and that is vTOM-like with the address space split. If TDX does address space split later, we can accomodate it too. (Although I think they are not interested in this).
Quoted 5 lines
And if you really want to use
cc_platform_has(), we could do
cc_platform_has(CC_ADDRESS_SPACE_SPLIT_ON_A_PARAVISOR)or something with a better name.
I do think it makes sense to use the cc_platform_has() abstraction. It's then a question of agreeing on how to name the attribute. We've discussed various approaches in different versions of this patch series:
v1 & v2: CC_ATTR_HAS_PARAVISOR
v3: CC_ATTR_EMULATED_IOAPIC
v4 & v5: CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED
I could do:
1. CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_SPLIT_ADDRESS_SPACE, which is similar to
what I had for v1 & v2. At the time, somebody commented that
this might be a bit too general.
2. Keep CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED and add CC_ATTR_ACCESS_TPM_ENCRYPTED, which would decouple them
3. CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_AND_TPM_ENCRYPTED, which is very narrow and specific.
I have weak preference for #1 above, but I could go with any of them. What's your preference?
Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 4 lines
My resolution of the TPM driver issue is admittedly a work-around. I think
of it as temporary in anticipation of future implementations of PCIe TDISP hardware, which allows PCI devices to DMA directly into guest encrypted memory.Yap, that sounds real nice.
Quoted 6 lines
TDISP also places the device's BAR values in an encrypted portion of the GPA space. Assuming TDISP hardware comes along in the next couple of years, Linux will need a robust way to deal with a mix of PCI devices being in unencrypted and encrypted GPA space. I don't know how a specific device will be mapped correctly, but I hope it can happen in the generic PCI code, and not by modifying each device driver.
I guess those devices would advertize that capability somehow so that code can query it and act accordingly.
Quoted 2 lines
It's probably premature to build that robust mechanism now, but when it comes, my work-around would be replaced.
It would be replaced if it doesn't have any users. By the looks of it, it'll soon grow others and then good luck removing it.
Quoted 5 lines
With all that in mind, I don't want to modify the TPM driver to special-case its MMIO space being encrypted. FWIW, the TPM driver today uses
devm_ioremap_resource()to do the mapping, which defaults to mapping decrypted except for the exceptions implemented in__ioremap_caller(). There's no devm_* option for specifying encrypted.You mean, it is hard to add a
DEVM_IOREMAP_ENCRYPTEDtype which will have__devm_ioremap()callioremap_encrypted()?Or define a
IORESOURCE_ENCRYPTEDand pass it through the ioresource flags?
Quoted 9 lines
Why is that TPM driver so precious that it can be touched and the arch code would have to accept hacks?
Quoted 3 lines
Handling decrypted vs. encrypted in the driver would require extending the driver API to provide an "encrypted" option, and that seems like going in the wrong long-term direction.
Sorry, I can't follow here.
For v6 of the patch series, I've coded devm_ioremap_resource_enc() to call __devm_ioremap(), which then calls ioremap_encrypted(). I've updated the TPM driver to use cc_platform_has() with whatever attribute name we agree on to decide between devm_ioremap_resource_enc() and devm_ioremap_resource().
If this approach is OK with the TPM driver maintainers, I'm good with it. More robust handling of a mix of encrypted and decrypted devices can get sorted out later.
Michael
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 11 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
I could do:
1.CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_SPLIT_ADDRESS_SPACE, which is similar to
what I had for v1 & v2. At the time, somebody commented that
this might be a bit too general.
2. KeepCC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTEDand addCC_ATTR_ACCESS_TPM_ENCRYPTED, which would decouple them
3.CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_AND_TPM_ENCRYPTED, which is very narrow and specific.I have weak preference for #1 above, but I could go with any of them. What's your preference?
Either 1. but a shorter name or something which works with the TDX side too.
Or are there no similar TDX solutions planned where the guest runs unmodified and under a paravisor?
Quoted 9 lines
For v6 of the patch series, I've coded
devm_ioremap_resource_enc()to call__devm_ioremap(), which then callsioremap_encrypted(). I've updated the TPM driver to usecc_platform_has()with whatever attribute name we agree on to decide betweendevm_ioremap_resource_enc()anddevm_ioremap_resource().If this approach is OK with the TPM driver maintainers, I'm good with it. More robust handling of a mix of encrypted and decrypted devices can get sorted out later.
Makes sense to me...
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, February 7, 2023 4:41 AM
Quoted 11 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Quoted 9 lines
I could do:
1.CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_SPLIT_ADDRESS_SPACE, which is similar to
what I had for v1 & v2. At the time, somebody commented that
this might be a bit too general.
2. KeepCC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTEDand addCC_ATTR_ACCESS_TPM_ENCRYPTED, which would decouple them
3.CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_AND_TPM_ENCRYPTED, which is very narrow and specific.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
I have weak preference for #1 above, but I could go with any of them. What's your preference?
Either 1. but a shorter name or something which works with the TDX side too.
Unless there are objections, I'll go with CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_DEVICES, which is shorter. The full details of the meaning will be in a comment where this is defined with all the other CC_ATTR_* values.
Quoted 3 lines
Or are there no similar TDX solutions planned where the guest runs unmodified and under a paravisor?
The TDX plans are still being sorted out. But if we end up with such an approach, CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_DEVICES will be correct for TDX also.
Michael
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 10 lines
For v6 of the patch series, I've coded
devm_ioremap_resource_enc()to call__devm_ioremap(), which then callsioremap_encrypted(). I've updated the TPM driver to usecc_platform_has()with whatever attribute name we agree on to decide betweendevm_ioremap_resource_enc()anddevm_ioremap_resource().If this approach is OK with the TPM driver maintainers, I'm good with it. More robust handling of a mix of encrypted and decrypted devices can get sorted out later.
Makes sense to me...
Thx.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 1 line · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Unless there are objections, I'll go with
CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_DEVICES,
What does "DEVICES" mean in this context?
You need to think about !virt people too who are already confused by the word "paravisor". :-)
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, February 7, 2023 11:33 AM
Quoted 9 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Quoted 1 line
Unless there are objections, I'll go with
CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_DEVICES,What does "DEVICES" mean in this context?
You need to think about !virt people too who are already confused by the word "paravisor". :-)
Maybe I misunderstood your previous comment about "Either 1". We can
avoid "PARAVISOR" entirely by going with two attributes:
CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTEDCC_ATTR_ACCESS_TPM_ENCRYPTED
These are much more specific, and relatively short, and having two allows decoupling the handling of the IO-APIC and TPM. Combining into the single
CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_AND_TPM_ENCRYPTED
also works but is longer.
Capturing the full meaning in the string names is probably impossible. Referring to the comment for the definition will be required for a full understanding.
Michael
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 5 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, February 7, 2023 11:33 AM
Quoted 4 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Quoted 1 line
Unless there are objections, I'll go with
CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_DEVICES,
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
What does "DEVICES" mean in this context?
You need to think about !virt people too who are already confused by the word "paravisor". :-)
Maybe I misunderstood your previous comment about "Either 1". We can
avoid "PARAVISOR" entirely by going with two attributes:
No, I'm fine with CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR. Why would you have to have CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_DEVICES? I.e., the string "_DEVICES" appended after "PARAVISOR". Isn't CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR enough?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, February 7, 2023 11:55 AM
Quoted 13 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Quoted 11 lines
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, February 7, 2023 11:33 AM
Quoted 9 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Quoted 1 line
Unless there are objections, I'll go with
CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_DEVICES,What does "DEVICES" mean in this context?
You need to think about !virt people too who are already confused by the word "paravisor". :-)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Maybe I misunderstood your previous comment about "Either 1". We can
avoid "PARAVISOR" entirely by going with two attributes:No, I'm fine with
CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR. Why would you have to haveCC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_DEVICES? I.e., the string "_DEVICES" appended after "PARAVISOR". Isn'tCC_ATTR_PARAVISORenough?
Works for me. :-)
Michael
RE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
In reply to Borislav PetkovFrom: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, February 7, 2023 11:55 AM
Quoted 13 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Quoted 11 lines
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Tuesday, February 7, 2023 11:33 AM
Quoted 9 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Quoted 1 line
Unless there are objections, I'll go with
CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_DEVICES,What does "DEVICES" mean in this context?
You need to think about !virt people too who are already confused by the word "paravisor". :-)
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Maybe I misunderstood your previous comment about "Either 1". We can
avoid "PARAVISOR" entirely by going with two attributes:No, I'm fine with
CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR. Why would you have to haveCC_ATTR_PARAVISOR_DEVICES? I.e., the string "_DEVICES" appended after "PARAVISOR". Isn'tCC_ATTR_PARAVISORenough?
Dave --
In v2 of this patch series, you had concerns about CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR being too
generic. [1] After some back-and-forth discussion in this thread, Boris is back to
preferring it. Can you live with CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR? Just trying to reach
consensus ...
Michael
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 4 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
In v2 of this patch series, you had concerns about
CC_ATTR_PARAVISORbeing too
generic. [1] After some back-and-forth discussion in this thread, Boris is back to
preferring it. Can you live withCC_ATTR_PARAVISOR? Just trying to reach
consensus ...
I still think it's too generic. Even the comment was trying to be too generic:
Review
Quoted 12 lines
(quoted diff) +12
-0+ /** + * @CC_ATTR_HAS_PARAVISOR: Guest VM is running with a paravisor + * + * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine with + * a paravisor in VMPL0. Having a paravisor affects things + * like whether the I/O APIC is emulated and operates in the + * encrypted or decrypted portion of the guest physical address + * space. + * + * Examples include Hyper-V SEV-SNP guests using vTOM. + */ + CC_ATTR_HAS_PARAVISOR,
This doesn't help me figure out when I should use CC_ATTR_HAS_PARAVISOR really at all. It "operates in the encrypted or decrypted portion..." Which one is it? Should I be adding or removing encryption on the mappings for paravisors?
That's opposed to:
Review
Quoted 11 lines
(quoted diff) +11
-0+ /** + * @CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED: Guest VM IO-APIC is encrypted + * + * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine with + * an IO-APIC that is emulated by a paravisor running in the + * guest VM context. As such, the IO-APIC is accessed in the + * encrypted portion of the guest physical address space. + * + * Examples include Hyper-V SEV-SNP guests using vTOM. + */ + CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED,
Which makes this code almost stupidly obvious:
Review
Quoted 3 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-1- flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags); + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED)) + flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
"Oh, if it's access is not encrypted, then get the decrypted version of the flags."
Compare that to:
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR)) flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
Which is a big fat WTF. Because a paravisor "operates in the encrypted or decrypted portion..." So is this if() condition correct or inverted? It's utterly impossible to tell because of how generic the option is.
The only way to make sense of the generic thing is to do:
/* Paravisors have a decrypted IO-APIC mapping: */ if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR)) flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
at every site to state the assumption and make the connection between paravisors and the behavior. If you want to go do _that_, then fine by me. But, at that point, the naming is pretty worthless because you could also have said "goldfish" instead of "paravisor" and it makes an equal amount of sense:
/* Goldfish have a decrypted IO-APIC mapping: */ if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GOLDFISH)) flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
I get it, naming is hard.
RE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 7:10 AM
Quoted 72 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Quoted 4 lines
In v2 of this patch series, you had concerns about
CC_ATTR_PARAVISORbeing too
generic. [1] After some back-and-forth discussion in this thread, Boris is back to
preferring it. Can you live withCC_ATTR_PARAVISOR? Just trying to reach
consensus ...I still think it's too generic. Even the comment was trying to be too generic:
Review
Quoted 12 lines
(quoted diff) +12
-0+ /** + * @CC_ATTR_HAS_PARAVISOR: Guest VM is running with a paravisor + * + * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine with + * a paravisor in VMPL0. Having a paravisor affects things + * like whether the I/O APIC is emulated and operates in the + * encrypted or decrypted portion of the guest physical address + * space. + * + * Examples include Hyper-V SEV-SNP guests using vTOM. + */ + CC_ATTR_HAS_PARAVISOR,This doesn't help me figure out when I should use
CC_ATTR_HAS_PARAVISORreally at all. It "operates in the encrypted or decrypted portion..." Which one is it? Should I be adding or removing encryption on the mappings for paravisors?That's opposed to:
Review
Quoted 11 lines
(quoted diff) +11
-0+ /** + * @CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED: Guest VM IO-APIC is encrypted + * + * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine with + * an IO-APIC that is emulated by a paravisor running in the + * guest VM context. As such, the IO-APIC is accessed in the + * encrypted portion of the guest physical address space. + * + * Examples include Hyper-V SEV-SNP guests using vTOM. + */ + CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED,Which makes this code almost stupidly obvious:
Review
Quoted 3 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-1- flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags); + if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED)) + flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);"Oh, if it's access is not encrypted, then get the decrypted version of the flags."
Compare that to:
if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR)) flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);Which is a big fat WTF. Because a paravisor "operates in the encrypted or decrypted portion..." So is this
if()condition correct or inverted? It's utterly impossible to tell because of how generic the option is.The only way to make sense of the generic thing is to do:
/* Paravisors have a decrypted IO-APIC mapping: */ if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR)) flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);at every site to state the assumption and make the connection between paravisors and the behavior. If you want to go do _that_, then fine by me. But, at that point, the naming is pretty worthless because you could also have said "goldfish" instead of "paravisor" and it makes an equal amount of sense:
Quoted 5 lines
/* Goldfish have a decrypted IO-APIC mapping: */ if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GOLDFISH)) flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);I get it, naming is hard.
Boris --
Any further comments? Trying to reach consensus. A solution aligned with Dave's arguments would keep the current CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED, and add CC_ATTR_ACCESS_TPM_ENCRYPTED to cover the TPM case, which decouples the two.
Yes, naming is hard. Reaching consensus on naming is even harder. :-)
Michael
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 2 lines · Borislav Petkov
Or are there no similar TDX solutions planned where the guest runs unmodified and under a paravisor?
I actually don't think paravisors make *ANY* sense for Linux. If you have to modify the guest, then just modify it to talk to the hypervisor directly. This code is... modifying the guest. What does putting a paravisor in the middle do for you?
It might help with binary drivers, but we don't do upstream kernel work to make silly binary Linux drivers happy.
So, no, there's no similar TDX solutions planned, at least for Linux guests. Unless I missed the memo. Kirill?
RE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 9:24 AM
Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines
Or are there no similar TDX solutions planned where the guest runs unmodified and under a paravisor?
I actually don't think paravisors make *ANY* sense for Linux. If you have to modify the guest, then just modify it to talk to the hypervisor directly. This code is... modifying the guest. What does putting a paravisor in the middle do for you?
One of the original goals of the paravisor was to make fewer modifications to the guest, especially in areas that aren't directly related to the hypervisor. It's arguable as to whether that goal played out in reality.
But another significant goal is to be able to move some device emulation from the hypervisor/VMM to the guest context. In a CoCo VM, this move is from outside the TCB to inside the TCB. A great example is a virtual TPM. Per the CoCo VM threat model, a guest can't rely on a vTPM provided by the host. But a guest *can* rely on a vTPM implemented in a more privileged layer of the guest context. With CoCo VMs in the Azure public cloud, the paravisor also provides other device emulation, like the IO-APIC to solve some of the ugly interrupt delivery issues. In a complete solution, it should be possible for a customer to provide his own paravisor, or at least to inspect/audit the vendor-provided paravisor code so that it can be certified against whatever security standards the customer requires. For Azure CoCo VMs, this part is a work-in-progress.
This could turn into an extended discussion, and I've given only a
fairly high-level answer. There are architects at Microsoft who could
probably give a better rendition of why we've pursued the paravisor approach with SEV-SNP guests.
Michael
Quoted 6 lines
It might help with binary drivers, but we don't do upstream kernel work to make silly binary Linux drivers happy.
So, no, there's no similar TDX solutions planned, at least for Linux guests. Unless I missed the memo. Kirill?
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Wearing my KVM hat and not my Google hat...
Quoted 7 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Sent: Wednesday, February 8, 2023 9:24 AM
Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines
Or are there no similar TDX solutions planned where the guest runs unmodified and under a paravisor?
I actually don't think paravisors make *ANY* sense for Linux.
I 100% agree, but Intel made what I think almost entirely irrelevant by refusing to allow third party code to run in SEAM.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 3 lines
If you have to modify the guest, then just modify it to talk to the hypervisor directly. This code is... modifying the guest. What does putting a paravisor in the middle do for you?
One of the original goals of the paravisor was to make fewer modifications to the guest, especially in areas that aren't directly related to the hypervisor. It's arguable as to whether that goal played out in reality.
Quoted 5 lines
But another significant goal is to be able to move some device emulation from the hypervisor/VMM to the guest context. In a CoCo VM, this move is from outside the TCB to inside the TCB. A great example is a virtual TPM. Per the CoCo VM threat model, a guest can't rely on a vTPM provided by the host.
I vehemently disagree with this assertion. It's kinda sorta true, but only because Intel and AMD have gone down the road of not providing the mechanisms and ability for the hypervisor to run and attest to the integrity, functionality, etc. of (a subset of) the hypervisor's own code.
Taking SEAM/TDX as an example, if the code running in SEAM were an extension of KVM instead of a hypervisor-agnostic nanny, then there would be no need for a "paravisor" to provide a vTPM. It would be very feasible to teach the SEAM-protected bits of KVM to forward vTPM accesses to a host-provided, signed, attested, and open source software running in a helper TD.
I fully realize you meant "untrusted host", but statements like "the host can't be trusted" subconciously reinforce the, IMO, flawed model of hardware vendors and _only_ hardware vendors providing the trusted bits.
The idea that firmware/software written by hardware vendors is somehow more trustworthy than fully open source software is simultaneously laughable and infuriating.
Anyways, tying things back to the actual code being discussed, I vote against CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR. Being able to trust device emulation is not unique to a paravisor. A single flag also makes too many assumptions about what is trusted and thus should be accessed encrypted.
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 4 lines · Sean Christopherson
Anyways, tying things back to the actual code being discussed, I vote against
CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR. Being able to trust device emulation is not unique to a paravisor. A single flag also makes too many assumptions about what is trusted and thus should be accessed encrypted.
Did you like the more wordy per-device flags better? Or did you have something else in mind entirely?
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 4 lines · Sean Christopherson
Anyways, tying things back to the actual code being discussed, I vote against
CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR. Being able to trust device emulation is not unique to a paravisor. A single flag also makes too many assumptions about what is trusted and thus should be accessed encrypted.
I'm not crazy about the alternative either: one flag per access type:
IO APIC, vTPM, and soon.
Soon this will become an unmaintainable zoo of different guest types people want the kernel to support. I don't think I want that madness in kernel proper.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 11:04 AM
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 4 lines
Anyways, tying things back to the actual code being discussed, I vote against
CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR. Being able to trust device emulation is not unique to a paravisor. A single flag also makes too many assumptions about what is trusted and thus should be accessed encrypted.I'm not crazy about the alternative either: one flag per access type:
IO APIC, vTPM, and soon.
FWIW, I don't think the list of devices to be accessed encrypted is likely to grow significantly. Is one or two more possible? Perhaps. Does it become a list of ten? I doubt it.
One approach is to go with the individual device attributes for now. If the list does grow significantly, there will probably be patterns or groupings that we can't discern now. We could restructure into larger buckets at that point based on those patterns/groupings.
Michael
Quoted 5 lines
Soon this will become an unmaintainable zoo of different guest types people want the kernel to support. I don't think I want that madness in kernel proper.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 3 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
FWIW, I don't think the list of devices to be accessed encrypted is likely to grow significantly. Is one or two more possible? Perhaps. Does it become a list of ten? I doubt it.
What happens if the next silly HV guest scheme comes along and they do need more and different ones?
Do I say, but but, Michael said that he doubted at the time that that list would grow... ;-\
And then all our paths are sprinkled with
if (cc_platform_has())
and we can't change sh*t anymore out of fear that some weird guest type will break.
Quoted 4 lines
One approach is to go with the individual device attributes for now. If the list does grow significantly, there will probably be patterns or groupings that we can't discern now. We could restructure into larger buckets at that point based on those patterns/groupings.
There's a reason the word "platform" is in cc_platform_has(). Initially we wanted to distinguish attributes of the different platforms. So even if y'all don't like CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR, that is what distinguishes this platform and it *is* one platform.
So call it CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM as it uses that technology or whatever. But call it like the platform, not to mean "I need this functionality".
And yes, we could do the regroupings later because, yeah, those things are not exposed to userspace so it's not like they're cast in stone but I fear that we will do regroupings and we will break guests.
Now if you had CC_ATTR_<PLATFORM_TYPE> then you break (or not) only that platform.
Oh, and then there's the thing that this is kernel proper - that code still runs on real hardware, for now, and is not only guests. And not everything is a damn cloud.
So I don't want a zoo here and we'd have to agree to distinguish by platform and not by different functionality required.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines
One approach is to go with the individual device attributes for now.>> If the list does grow significantly, there will probably be patterns or groupings that we can't discern now. We could restructure into
larger buckets at that point based on those patterns/groupings.There's a reason the word "platform" is in
cc_platform_has(). Initially we wanted to distinguish attributes of the different platforms. So even if y'all don't likeCC_ATTR_PARAVISOR, that is what distinguishes this platform and it *is* one platform.So call it
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOMas it uses that technology or whatever. But call it like the platform, not to mean "I need this functionality".
I can live with that. There's already a CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP, so it would at least not be too much of a break from what we already have.
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines
One approach is to go with the individual device attributes for now.>> If the list does grow significantly, there will probably be patterns or groupings that we can't discern now. We could restructure into
larger buckets at that point based on those patterns/groupings.There's a reason the word "platform" is in
cc_platform_has(). Initially we wanted to distinguish attributes of the different platforms. So even if y'all don't likeCC_ATTR_PARAVISOR, that is what distinguishes this platform and it *is* one platform.
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So call it
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOMas it uses that technology or whatever. But call it like the platform, not to mean "I need this functionality".I can live with that. There's already a
CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP, so it would at least not be too much of a break from what we already have.
I'm fine with CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM, assuming the proposal is to have something like:
static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr)
{
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM))
return is_address_below_vtom(addr);
return false;
}i.e. not have SEV_VTOM mean "I/O APIC and vTPM are private". Though I don't see the point in making it SEV vTOM specific or using a flag. Despite what any of us think about TDX paravisors, it's completely doable within the confines of TDX to have an emulated device reside in the private address space. E.g. why not something like this?
static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr)
{
return addr < cc_platform_private_end;
}where SEV fills in "cc_platform_private_end" when vTOM is enabled, and TDX does the same. Or wrap cc_platform_private_end in a helper, etc.
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 32 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines
One approach is to go with the individual device attributes for now.>> If the list does grow significantly, there will probably be patterns or groupings that we can't discern now. We could restructure into
larger buckets at that point based on those patterns/groupings.There's a reason the word "platform" is in
cc_platform_has(). Initially we wanted to distinguish attributes of the different platforms. So even if y'all don't likeCC_ATTR_PARAVISOR, that is what distinguishes this platform and it *is* one platform.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So call it
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOMas it uses that technology or whatever. But call it like the platform, not to mean "I need this functionality".I can live with that. There's already a
CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP, so it would at least not be too much of a break from what we already have.I'm fine with
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM, assuming the proposal is to have something like:static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr) { if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM)) return is_address_below_vtom(addr); return false; }i.e. not have
SEV_VTOMmean "I/O APIC and vTPM are private". Though I don't see the point in making it SEV vTOM specific or using a flag. Despite what any of us think about TDX paravisors, it's completely doable within the confines of TDX to have an emulated device reside in the private address space. E.g. why not something like this?
Quoted 7 lines
static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr) { return addr < cc_platform_private_end; }where SEV fills in "
cc_platform_private_end" when vTOM is enabled, and TDX does the same. Or wrapcc_platform_private_endin a helper, etc.
Gah, forgot that the intent with TDX is to enumerate devices in their legacy address spaces. So a TDX guest couldn't do this by default, but if/when Hyper-V or some other hypervisor moves I/O APIC, vTPM, etc... into the TCB, the common code would just work and only the hypervisor-specific paravirt code would need to change.
Probably need a more specific name than is_address_range_private() though, e.g. is_mmio_address_range_private()?
RE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 12:58 PM
Quoted 43 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 3 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 2 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
One approach is to go with the individual device attributes for now.>> If the list
does grow significantly, there will probably be patterns
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
or groupings that we can't discern now. We could restructure into larger buckets at that point based on those patterns/groupings.
There's a reason the word "platform" is in
cc_platform_has(). Initially we wanted to distinguish attributes of the different platforms. So even if y'all don't likeCC_ATTR_PARAVISOR, that is what distinguishes this platform and it *is* one platform.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So call it
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOMas it uses that technology or whatever. But call it like the platform, not to mean "I need this functionality".I can live with that. There's already a
CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP, so it would at least not be too much of a break from what we already have.I'm fine with
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM, assuming the proposal is to have something like:static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr) { if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM)) return is_address_below_vtom(addr); return false; }i.e. not have
SEV_VTOMmean "I/O APIC and vTPM are private". Though I don't see the point in making it SEV vTOM specific or using a flag. Despite what any of us think about TDX paravisors, it's completely doable within the confines of TDX to have an emulated device reside in the private address space. E.g. why not something like this?Quoted 7 lines
static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr) { return addr < cc_platform_private_end; }where SEV fills in "
cc_platform_private_end" when vTOM is enabled, and TDX does the same. Or wrapcc_platform_private_endin a helper, etc.
Quoted 8 lines
Gah, forgot that the intent with TDX is to enumerate devices in their legacy address spaces. So a TDX guest couldn't do this by default, but if/when Hyper-V or some other hypervisor moves I/O APIC, vTPM, etc... into the TCB, the common code would just work and only the hypervisor-specific paravirt code would need to change.
Probably need a more specific name than
is_address_range_private()though, e.g.is_mmio_address_range_private()?
Maybe I'm not understanding what you are proposing, but in an SEV-SNP VM using vTOM, devices like the IO-APIC and TPM live at their usual guest physical addresses. The question is whether the kernel virtual mapping
should be set up with encryption enabled or disabled. That question can't
be answered by looking at the device's address. Whether to map a particular device with encryption enabled really is a property of the "platform" because it depends on whether the paravisor is emulating the device. Having the paravisor emulate the device does not change its guest physical address.
While there's a duality, it's better to think of the vTOM bit as the "encryption" flag in the PTE rather than part of the guest physical address. A key part of this patch series is about making that shift in how the vTOM bit is treated. With the change, the vTOM bit is treated pretty much the same as the TDX SHARED flag.
Michael
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 50 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 12:58 PM
Quoted 49 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 3 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 2 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
One approach is to go with the individual device attributes for now.>> If the list
does grow significantly, there will probably be patterns
Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
or groupings that we can't discern now. We could restructure into larger buckets at that point based on those patterns/groupings.
There's a reason the word "platform" is in
cc_platform_has(). Initially we wanted to distinguish attributes of the different platforms. So even if y'all don't likeCC_ATTR_PARAVISOR, that is what distinguishes this platform and it *is* one platform.Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So call it
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOMas it uses that technology or whatever. But call it like the platform, not to mean "I need this functionality".I can live with that. There's already a
CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP, so it would at least not be too much of a break from what we already have.I'm fine with
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM, assuming the proposal is to have something like:static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr) { if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM)) return is_address_below_vtom(addr); return false; }i.e. not have
SEV_VTOMmean "I/O APIC and vTPM are private". Though I don't see the point in making it SEV vTOM specific or using a flag. Despite what any of us think about TDX paravisors, it's completely doable within the confines of TDX to have an emulated device reside in the private address space. E.g. why not something like this?Quoted 7 lines
static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr) { return addr < cc_platform_private_end; }where SEV fills in "
cc_platform_private_end" when vTOM is enabled, and TDX does the same. Or wrapcc_platform_private_endin a helper, etc.Gah, forgot that the intent with TDX is to enumerate devices in their legacy address spaces. So a TDX guest couldn't do this by default, but if/when Hyper-V or some other hypervisor moves I/O APIC, vTPM, etc... into the TCB, the common code would just work and only the hypervisor-specific paravirt code would need to change.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Probably need a more specific name than
is_address_range_private()though, e.g.is_mmio_address_range_private()?Maybe I'm not understanding what you are proposing, but in an SEV-SNP VM using vTOM, devices like the IO-APIC and TPM live at their usual guest physical addresses.
Ah, so as the cover letter says, the intent really is to treat vTOM as an attribute bit. Sorry, I got confused by Boris's comment:
: What happens if the next silly HV guest scheme comes along and they do : need more and different ones?
Based on that comment, I assumed the proposal to use CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM was intended to be a generic range-based thing, but it sounds like that's not the case.
IMO, using CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM to infer anything about the state of I/O APIC or vTPM is wrong. vTOM as a platform feature effectively says "physical address bit X controls private vs. shared" (ignoring weird usage of vTOM). vTOM does not mean I/O APIC and vTPM are private, that's very much a property of Hyper-V's current generation of vTOM-based VMs.
Hardcoding this in the guest feels wrong. Ideally, we would have a way to enumerate that a device is private/trusted, e.g. through ACPI. I'm guessing we already missed the boat on that, so the next best thing is to do something like Michael originally proposed in this patch and shove the "which devices are private" logic into hypervisor-specific code, i.e. let Hyper-V figure out how to enumerate to its guests which devices are shared.
I agree with Boris' comment that a one-off "other encrypted range" is a hack, but that's just an API problem. The kernel already has hypervisor specific hooks (and for SEV-ES even), why not expand that? That way figuring out which devices are private is wholly contained in Hyper-V code, at least until there's a generic solution for enumerating private devices, though that seems unlikely to happen and will be a happy problem to solve if it does come about.
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +10 -5
@@ -2682,11 +2682,16 @@ static void io_apic_set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx, phys_addr_t phys) {pgprot_t flags =FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE ; -/* -* Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot -* bits, just like normal ioremap(): -*/ - flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags); +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT )) { +/* +* Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot +* bits, just like normal ioremap(): +*/ +if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio (phys)) + flags =pgprot_encrypted (flags); +else + flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags); + }__set_fixmap (idx, phys, flags); }
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +3 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desif (!cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT ))return ; +if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio (addr)) + desc->flags |=IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED ; +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_EFI ))return ;
RE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023 3:47 PM
Quoted 85 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Quoted 1 line
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Sent: Friday, February 10, 2023
12:58 PM
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 13 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 3 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 2 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line
One approach is to go with the individual device attributes for now.>> If the list
does grow significantly, there will probably be patterns
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
or groupings that we can't discern now. We could restructure into larger buckets at that point based on those patterns/groupings.
There's a reason the word "platform" is in
cc_platform_has(). Initially we wanted to distinguish attributes of the different platforms. So even if y'all don't likeCC_ATTR_PARAVISOR, that is what distinguishes this platform and it *is* one platform.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
So call it
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOMas it uses that technology or whatever. But call it like the platform, not to mean "I need this functionality".I can live with that. There's already a
CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP, so it would at least not be too much of a break from what we already have.I'm fine with
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM, assuming the proposal is to have somethinglike:
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr) { if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOM)) return is_address_below_vtom(addr); return false; }i.e. not have
SEV_VTOMmean "I/O APIC and vTPM are private". Though I don'tsee
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 19 lines
Quoted 5 lines
the point in making it SEV vTOM specific or using a flag. Despite what any of us think about TDX paravisors, it's completely doable within the confines of TDX to have an emulated device reside in the private address space. E.g. why not something like this?
Quoted 7 lines
static inline bool is_address_range_private(resource_size_t addr) { return addr < cc_platform_private_end; }where SEV fills in "
cc_platform_private_end" when vTOM is enabled, and TDX does the same. Or wrapcc_platform_private_endin a helper, etc.Gah, forgot that the intent with TDX is to enumerate devices in their legacy address spaces. So a TDX guest couldn't do this by default, but if/when Hyper-V or some other hypervisor moves I/O APIC, vTPM, etc... into the TCB, the common code would just work and only the hypervisor-specific paravirt code would need to change.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Probably need a more specific name than
is_address_range_private()though, e.g.is_mmio_address_range_private()?Maybe I'm not understanding what you are proposing, but in an SEV-SNP VM using vTOM, devices like the IO-APIC and TPM live at their usual guest physical addresses.
Ah, so as the cover letter says, the intent really is to treat vTOM as an attribute bit. Sorry, I got confused by Boris's comment:
: What happens if the next silly HV guest scheme comes along and they do : need more and different ones?
Based on that comment, I assumed the proposal to use
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOMwas intended
to be a generic range-based thing, but it sounds like that's not the case.IMO, using
CC_ATTR_SEV_VTOMto infer anything about the state of I/O APIC or vTPM is wrong. vTOM as a platform feature effectively says "physical address bit X controls private vs. shared" (ignoring weird usage of vTOM). vTOM does not mean I/O APIC and vTPM are private, that's very much a property of Hyper-V's current generation of vTOM-based VMs.Hardcoding this in the guest feels wrong. Ideally, we would have a way to enumerate that a device is private/trusted, e.g. through ACPI. I'm guessing we already missed the boat on that, so the next best thing is to do something like Michael originally proposed in this patch and shove the "which devices are private" logic into hypervisor-specific code, i.e. let Hyper-V figure out how to enumerate to its guests which devices are shared.
Quoted 6 lines
I agree with Boris' comment that a one-off "other encrypted range" is a hack, but that's just an API problem. The kernel already has hypervisor specific hooks (and for SEV-ES even), why not expand that? That way figuring out which devices are private is wholly contained in Hyper-V code, at least until there's a generic solution for enumerating private devices, though that seems unlikely to happen and will be a happy problem to solve if it does come about.
Yes, this is definitely a cleaner way to implement what I was originally proposing. I can make it work if there's agreement to take this approach.
Michael
Quoted 43 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +10
-5@@ -2682,11 +2682,16 @@ static void io_apic_set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx, phys_addr_t phys) {pgprot_t flags =FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE ; -/* -* Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot -* bits, just like normal ioremap(): -*/ - flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags); +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT )) { +/* +* Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot +* bits, just like normal ioremap(): +*/ +if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio (phys)) + flags =pgprot_encrypted (flags); +else + flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags); + }__set_fixmap (idx, phys, flags);}
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +0
-0@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct
ioremap_desc*desif (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return;arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +3
-0+if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio (addr)) + desc->flags |=IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED ; +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_EFI ))return ;
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 6 lines · Sean Christopherson
I agree with Boris' comment that a one-off "other encrypted range" is a hack, but that's just an API problem. The kernel already has hypervisor specific hooks (and for SEV-ES even), why not expand that? That way figuring out which devices are private is wholly contained in Hyper-V code, at least until there's a generic solution for enumerating private devices, though that seems unlikely to happen and will be a happy problem to solve if it does come about.
I feel ya and this all makes sense and your proposals look clean enough to me but we still need some way of determining whether this is a vTOM on hyperv because there's the next crapola with
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
because apparently hyperv does PAT but disables MTRRs for such vTOM SEV-SNP guests and ... madness.
But that's not the only example - Xen has been doing this thing too.
And Jürgen has been trying to address this in a clean way but it is a pain.
What I don't want to have is a gazillion ways to check what needs to happen for which guest type. Because people who change the kernel to run on baremetal, will break them. And I can't blame them. We try to support all kinds of guests in the x86 code but this support should be plain and simple.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2023 5:33 AM
Quoted 9 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 6 lines
I agree with Boris' comment that a one-off "other encrypted range" is a hack, but that's just an API problem. The kernel already has hypervisor specific hooks (and for SEV-ES even), why not expand that? That way figuring out which devices are private is wholly contained in Hyper-V code, at least until there's a generic solution for enumerating private devices, though that seems unlikely to happen and will be a happy problem to solve if it does come about.
Quoted 3 lines
I feel ya and this all makes sense and your proposals look clean enough to me but we still need some way of determining whether this is a vTOM on hyperv
Historically, callbacks like Sean proposed default to NULL and do nothing unless they are explicitly set. The Hyper-V vTOM code would set the callback. Is that not sufficient? Or in the two places where the callback would be made, do you want to bracket with a test for being in a Hyper-V vTOM VM? If so, then we're back to needing something like CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR on which to gate the callbacks.
Or do you mean something else entirely?
Michael
Quoted 18 lines
because there's the next crapola with
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
because apparently hyperv does PAT but disables MTRRs for such vTOM SEV-SNP guests and ... madness.
But that's not the only example - Xen has been doing this thing too.
And Jürgen has been trying to address this in a clean way but it is a pain.
What I don't want to have is a gazillion ways to check what needs to happen for which guest type. Because people who change the kernel to run on baremetal, will break them. And I can't blame them. We try to support all kinds of guests in the x86 code but this support should be plain and simple.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 8 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Historically, callbacks like Sean proposed default to NULL and do nothing unless they are explicitly set. The Hyper-V vTOM code would set the callback. Is that not sufficient? Or in the two places where the callback would be made, do you want to bracket with a test for being in a Hyper-V vTOM VM? If so, then we're back to needing something like
CC_ATTR_PARAVISORon which to gate the callbacks.Or do you mean something else entirely?
See the second part of my reply.
This thing...
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 9 lines
because there's the next crapola with
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
because apparently hyperv does PAT but disables MTRRs for such vTOM SEV-SNP guests and ... madness.
But that's not the only example - Xen has been doing this thing too.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 8 lines
And Jürgen has been trying to address this in a clean way but it is a pain.
What I don't want to have is a gazillion ways to check what needs to happen for which guest type. Because people who change the kernel to run on baremetal, will break them. And I can't blame them. We try to support all kinds of guests in the x86 code but this support should be plain and simple.
... here.
We need a single way to test for this guest type and stick with it.
I'd like for all guest types we support to be queried in a plain and simple way.
Not:
* CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT
* x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio(addr)
* CC_ATTR_PARAVISOR
to mean three different aspects of SEV-SNP guests using vTOM on Hyper-V.
This is going to be a major mess which we won't support.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, February 16, 2023 9:07 AM
Quoted 12 lines
... here.
We need a single way to test for this guest type and stick with it.
I'd like for all guest types we support to be queried in a plain and simple way.
Not:
*
CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT
Quoted 8 lines
*
x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio(addr)*
CC_ATTR_PARAVISORto mean three different aspects of SEV-SNP guests using vTOM on Hyper-V.
This is going to be a major mess which we won't support.
OK, I'm trying to figure out where to go next. I've been following the pattern set by the SEV/SEV-ES/SEV-SNP and TDX platforms in the cc_platform_has()
function. Each platform returns "true" for multiple CC_ATTR_* values,
and those CC_ATTR_* values are tested in multiple places throughout kernel code. Some CC_ATTR_* values are shared by multiple platforms (like CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) and some are unique to a particular platform (like CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED). For the CC_ATTR_* values that are shared, the logic of which platforms they apply to occurs once in cc_platform_has() rather than scattered and duplicated throughout the kernel, which makes sense. Any given platform is not represented by a single CC_ATTR_* value, but by multiple ones. Each CC_ATTR_* value essentially represents a chunk of kernel functionality that one or more platforms need, and the platform indicates its need by cc_platform_has() returning "true" for that value.
So I've been trying to apply the same pattern to the SNP vTOM sub-case
of SEV-SNP. Is that consistent with your thinking, or is the wholecc_platform_has() approach problematic, including for the existing SEV flavors and for TDX?
Michael
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 3 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Is that consistent with your thinking, or is the whole
cc_platform_has()approach problematic, including for the existing SEV flavors and for TDX?
The confidential computing attributes are, yes, features. I've been preaching since the very beginning that vTOM *is* *also* one such feature. It is a feature bit in sev_features, for chrissakes. So by that logic, those SEV-SNP HyperV guests should return true when
cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP_VTOM);
is tested.
But Sean doesn't like that.
If the access method to the IO-APIC and vTPM are specific to the HyperV's vTOM implementation, then I don't mind if this were called
cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_HYPERV_VTOM);
Frankly, I don't see any other enlightened guest using vTOM except HyperV's but virt folks have managed to surprise me in the past too.
In any case, a single flag which is specific to that guest type is fine too.
It feels like we're running in circles by now... ;-\
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Is that consistent with your thinking, or is the whole
cc_platform_has()approach problematic, including for the existing SEV flavors and for TDX?The confidential computing attributes are, yes, features. I've been preaching since the very beginning that vTOM *is* *also* one such feature. It is a feature bit in
sev_features, for chrissakes. So by that logic, those SEV-SNP HyperV guests should return true when
Quoted 5 lines
cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP_VTOM);is tested.
But Sean doesn't like that.
Because vTOM is a hardware feature, whereas the IO-APIC and vTPM being accessible via private memory are software features. It's very possible to emulate the IO-APIC in trusted code without vTOM.
Quoted 4 lines
If the access method to the IO-APIC and vTPM are specific to the HyperV's vTOM implementation, then I don't mind if this were called
cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_HYPERV_VTOM);
I still think that's likely to caused problems in the future, e.g. if Hyper-V moves more stuff into the paravisor or if Hyper-V ends up with similar functionality for TDX. But it's not a sticking point, the only thing I'm fiercely resistant to is conflating hardware features with software features.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson
Because vTOM is a hardware feature, whereas the IO-APIC and vTPM being accessible via private memory are software features. It's very possible to emulate the IO-APIC in trusted code without vTOM.
I know, but their use case is dictated by the fact that they're using a SNP guest *with* vTOM as a SEV feature. And so their guest does IO-APIC and vTPM *with* the vTOM SEV feature. That's what I'm trying to model.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
If the access method to the IO-APIC and vTPM are specific to the HyperV's vTOM implementation, then I don't mind if this were called
cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_HYPERV_VTOM);I still think that's likely to caused problems in the future, e.g. if Hyper-V moves more stuff into the paravisor or if Hyper-V ends up with similar functionality for TDX.
Yah, reportedly, TDX folks are not very interested in this case.
Quoted 2 lines
But it's not a sticking point, the only thing I'm fiercely resistant to is conflating hardware features with software features.
So you and I need to find a common ground...
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Sean Christopherson
Because vTOM is a hardware feature, whereas the IO-APIC and vTPM being accessible via private memory are software features. It's very possible to emulate the IO-APIC in trusted code without vTOM.
I know, but their use case is dictated by the fact that they're using a SNP guest *with* vTOM as a SEV feature. And so their guest does IO-APIC and vTPM *with* the vTOM SEV feature. That's what I'm trying to model.
Why? I genuinely don't understand the motivation for bundling all of this stuff under a single "feature". To me, that's like saying Haswell or Zen2 is a "feature", but outside of a very few cases where the exact uarch truly matters, nothing pivots on FMS because the CPU type is not a single feature.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 2 lines · Sean Christopherson
Why? I genuinely don't understand the motivation for bundling all of this stuff under a single "feature".
It is called "sanity".
See here:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y%[email protected]
We support SEV, SEV-ES, SEV-SNP, TDX, HyperV... guests and whatever's coming down the pipe. And all that goes into arch/x86/ kernel proper code.
The CC_ATTR stuff is clean-ish in the sense that we have separation by confidential computing platform - AMD's and Intel's. Hyper-V comes along and wants to define a different subset of that. And that's only the SEV-SNP side - there's a TDX patchset too.
And then some other hypervisor will come along and say, but but, I wanna have X and Y and a pink pony too.
Oh, and there's this other fun with MTRRs where each HV decides to do whatever it wants.
So, we have a zoo brewing on the horizon already!
If there's no clean definition of what each guest is and requires and that stuff isn't documented properly and if depending on which "feature" I need to check, I need to call a different function or query a different variable, then it won't go anywhere as far as guest support goes.
The cc_platform_has() thing gives us a relatively clean way to abstract all those differences away and keep the code sane-ish.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 19 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Sean Christopherson
Why? I genuinely don't understand the motivation for bundling all of this stuff under a single "feature".
It is called "sanity".
See here:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/Y%[email protected]
We support SEV, SEV-ES, SEV-SNP, TDX, HyperV... guests and whatever's coming down the pipe. And all that goes into
arch/x86/kernel proper code.The
CC_ATTRstuff is clean-ish in the sense that we have separation by confidential computing platform - AMD's and Intel's. Hyper-V comes along and wants to define a different subset of that. And that's only the SEV-SNP side - there's a TDX patchset too.
Quoted 5 lines
And then some other hypervisor will come along and say, but but, I wanna have X and Y and a pink pony too.
Oh, and there's this other fun with MTRRs where each HV decides to do whatever it wants.
The MTRR mess isn't unique to coco guests, e.g. KVM explicitly "supports" VMMs hiding MTTRs from the guest by defaulting to WB if MTTRs aren't exposed to the guest. Why on earth Hyper-V suddenly needs to enlighten the guest is beyond me, but whatever the reason, it's not unique to coco VMs.
Quoted 10 lines
So, we have a zoo brewing on the horizon already!
If there's no clean definition of what each guest is and requires and that stuff isn't documented properly and if depending on which "feature" I need to check, I need to call a different function or query a different variable, then it won't go anywhere as far as guest support goes.
The
cc_platform_has()thing gives us a relatively clean way to abstract all those differences away and keep the code sane-ish.
For features that are inherent to the platform, I agree, or at least I don't hate the interface. But defining a platform to have specific devices runs counter to pretty much the entire x86 ecosystem. At some point, there _will_ be more devices in private memory than just IO-APIC and TPM, and conversely there will be "platforms" that support a trusted TPM but not a trusted IO-APIC, and probably even vice versa.
All I'm advocating is that for determining whether or not a device should be mapped private vs. shared, provide an API so that the hypervisor-specific enlightened code can manage that insanity without polluting common code. If we are ever fortunate enough to have common enumeration, e.g. through ACPI or something, the enlightened code can simply reroute to the common code. This is a well established pattern for many paravirt features, I don't see why it wouldn't work here.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 4 lines · Sean Christopherson
The MTRR mess isn't unique to coco guests, e.g. KVM explicitly "supports" VMMs hiding MTTRs from the guest by defaulting to WB if MTTRs aren't exposed to the guest. Why on earth Hyper-V suddenly needs to enlighten the guest is beyond me, but whatever the reason, it's not unique to coco VMs.
Well, TDX can't stomach MTRRs either, reportedly, and I hear we should try to avoid #VEs for them too.
And this is the problem: all those guest "enlightening" efforts come up with the weirdest stuff they need to sprinkle around arch/x86/. And if we let that without paying attention to the big picture, that will become an unmaintanable mess.
And I'm not proud of some of the stuff we did in arch/x86/ already and some day they'll get on my nerves just enough...
Quoted 6 lines
All I'm advocating is that for determining whether or not a device should be mapped private vs. shared, provide an API so that the hypervisor-specific enlightened code can manage that insanity without polluting common code. If we are ever fortunate enough to have common enumeration, e.g. through ACPI or something, the enlightened code can simply reroute to the common code. This is a well established pattern for many paravirt features, I don't see why it wouldn't work here.
Yah, that would be good. If the device can know upfront how it needs to ioremap its address range, then that is fine - we already have ioremap_encrypted() for example.
What I don't like is hooking conditionals into the common code to figure out what to do depending on what we're running on.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2023 2:45 AM
Quoted 11 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 7 lines
All I'm advocating is that for determining whether or not a device should be mapped private vs. shared, provide an API so that the hypervisor-specific enlightened code can manage that insanity without polluting common code. If we are ever fortunate enough to have common enumeration, e.g. through ACPI or something, the enlightened code can simply reroute to the common code. This is a well established pattern for many paravirt features, I don't see why it wouldn't work here.
Yah, that would be good.
Just so I'm clear, are you saying you are good with the proposal that Sean
sketched out with code here? [1] With his proposal, the device driver
is not involved in deciding whether to map encrypted or decrypted. That decision is made in the hypervisor-specific callback function based on
the physical address. The callback has to be made in two places in common
code. But then as Sean said, " the hypervisor-specific enlightened code can manage that insanity without polluting common code". :-)
I like Sean's proposal, so if you are good with it, I'll do v6 of the patch set with that approach.
Dave Hansen: Are you also OK with Sean's proposal? Looking for consensus here ....
Quoted 4 lines
If the device can know upfront how it needs to ioremap its address range, then that is fine - we already have
ioremap_encrypted()for example.
Again, the device driver would not be involved in Sean's proposal.
Michael
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 2 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Dave Hansen: Are you also OK with Sean's proposal? Looking for consensus here ....
Yeah, I'm generally OK with it as long as Borislav is.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 5 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 2 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Dave Hansen: Are you also OK with Sean's proposal? Looking for consensus here ....
Yeah, I'm generally OK with it as long as Borislav is.
Right, I think we're ok with the following basic rules:
- pure arch/x86/ code should use the x86_platform function pointers to query hypervisor capabilities/peculiarities
- cc_platform_has() should be used in generic/driver code as it abstracts away the underlying platform better. IOW, querying x86_platform.... in generic, platform-agnostic driver code looks weird to say the least
The hope is that those two should be enough to support most guest types and not let the zoo get too much out of hand...
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 17 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 5 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 2 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Dave Hansen: Are you also OK with Sean's proposal? Looking for consensus here ....
Yeah, I'm generally OK with it as long as Borislav is.
Right, I think we're ok with the following basic rules:
- pure
arch/x86/code should use thex86_platformfunction pointers to query hypervisor capabilities/peculiarities-
cc_platform_has()should be used in generic/driver code as it abstracts away the underlying platform better. IOW, queryingx86_platform.... in generic, platform-agnostic driver code looks weird to say the least
Quoted 4 lines
The hope is that those two should be enough to support most guest types and not let the zoo get too much out of hand...
Thx.
In
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
I added an sev_es_active() helper for x86 code.
Is that consistent with the vision here, or should I do something different?
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
First of all,
thanks for proactively pointing that out instead of simply using what's there and we get to find out later, only by chance.
Much appreciated. :-)
Quoted 13 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 13 lines
Right, I think we're ok with the following basic rules:
- pure
arch/x86/code should use thex86_platformfunction pointers to query hypervisor capabilities/peculiarities-
cc_platform_has()should be used in generic/driver code as it abstracts away the underlying platform better. IOW, queryingx86_platform.... in generic, platform-agnostic driver code looks weird to say the leastThe hope is that those two should be enough to support most guest types and not let the zoo get too much out of hand...
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thx.
In
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
I added ansev_es_active()helper for x86 code.Is that consistent with the vision here, or should I do something different?
So looking at sev_es_init_vc_handling() where we set that key, I'm *thinking* that key can be removed now and the code should check
cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)
instead.
Because if some of the checks in that function below fail, the guest will terminate anyway.
Jörg, Tom?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov
So looking at
sev_es_init_vc_handling()where we set that key, I'm *thinking* that key can be removed now and the code should check
Quoted 8 lines
cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)instead.
Because if some of the checks in that function below fail, the guest will terminate anyway.
Jörg, Tom?
Hrm... the implication of that is that I should do something like this in my own code. Is this really your intent?
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c +7 -14
@@ -1519,24 +1519,17 @@ void __init smp_prepare_cpus_common(void)*/ static bool prepare_parallel_bringup (void ) { -bool has_sev_es =sev_es_active (); +/* +* The "generic" CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT actually means specifically +* SEV-ES, and only SEV-ES, and always shall mean that. If it's present, +* that means the AP startup code should use the hard-coded SEV-ES GHCB +* call to find its APIC ID (STARTUP_APICID_SEV_ES). +*/ +bool has_sev_es =cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT );if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_32 ))return false; -/* -* Encrypted guests other than SEV-ES (in the future) will need to -* implement an early way of finding the APIC ID, since they will -* presumably block direct CPUID too. Be kind to our future selves -* by warning here instead of just letting them break. Parallel -* startup doesn't have to be in the first round of enabling patches -* for any such technology. -*/ -if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT ) && !has_sev_es) { -pr_info ("Disabling parallel bringup due to guest memory encryption\n" ); -return false; - } -if (x2apic_mode || has_sev_es) {if (boot_cpu_data.cpuid_level <0x0b )return false;
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 32 lines · Borislav Petkov
First of all,
thanks for proactively pointing that out instead of simply using what's there and we get to find out later, only by chance.
Much appreciated. :-)
Quoted 13 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 13 lines
Right, I think we're ok with the following basic rules:
- pure
arch/x86/code should use thex86_platformfunction pointers to query hypervisor capabilities/peculiarities-
cc_platform_has()should be used in generic/driver code as it abstracts away the underlying platform better. IOW, queryingx86_platform.... in generic, platform-agnostic driver code looks weird to say the leastThe hope is that those two should be enough to support most guest types and not let the zoo get too much out of hand...
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Thx.
In
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
I added ansev_es_active()helper for x86 code.Is that consistent with the vision here, or should I do something different?
So looking at
sev_es_init_vc_handling()where we set that key, I'm *thinking* that key can be removed now and the code should check
Quoted 8 lines
cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)instead.
Because if some of the checks in that function below fail, the guest will terminate anyway.
Jörg, Tom?
I believe Joerg added that key for performance reasons, since it is used on the exception path and can avoid all the calls to cc_platform_has(). I think that key should stay.
Maybe David can introduce an CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_ES attribute that returns true if the guest is an ES or SNP guest. Or do we introduce a CC_ATTR_PARALLEL_BOOT attribute that returns true for any SEV guest.
Then the "if cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT) && !has_sev_es" check in arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c can be removed and the following check can become if (x2apic_mode || cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_PARALLEL_BOOT))
Not sure how that affects a TDX guest, though.
Thanks,
Tom
Quoted 1 line
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 3 lines · Tom Lendacky
I believe Joerg added that key for performance reasons, since it is used on the exception path and can avoid all the calls to
cc_platform_has(). I think that key should stay.
Yes, that is right. The key is mainly for the NMI entry path which can be performance relevant in some situations. For SEV-ES some special handling is needed there to re-enable NMIs and adjust the #VC stack in case it was raised on the VC-handlers entry path.
Regards,
Joerg
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 4 lines · Jörg Rödel
Yes, that is right. The key is mainly for the NMI entry path which can be performance relevant in some situations. For SEV-ES some special handling is needed there to re-enable NMIs and adjust the #VC stack in case it was raised on the VC-handlers entry path.
So the performance argument is meh. That key will be replaced by
if (cc_vendor == CC_VENDOR_AMD && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)
which is something like 4 insns or so. Tops.
Haven't looked yet but it should be cheap.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Jörg Rödel
Yes, that is right. The key is mainly for the NMI entry path which can be performance relevant in some situations. For SEV-ES some special handling is needed there to re-enable NMIs and adjust the #VC stack in case it was raised on the VC-handlers entry path.
Quoted 8 lines
So the performance argument is meh. That key will be replaced by
if (
cc_vendor==CC_VENDOR_AMD&&cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)which is something like 4 insns or so. Tops.
Haven't looked yet but it should be cheap.
cc_vendor isn't yet exposed. As we discussed this in IRC, I've been updating the parallel bringup support for SEV-ES, including adding a cc_get_vendor() function, in the top of my tree at
https://git.infradead.org/users/dwmw2/linux.git/commitdiff/parallel-6.2-v15
and it now looks like this:
/*
* Encrypted guests other than SEV-ES (in the future) will need to
* implement an early way of finding the APIC ID, since they will
* presumably block direct CPUID too. Be kind to our future selves
* by warning here instead of just letting them break. Parallel
* startup doesn't have to be in the first round of enabling patches
* for any such technology.
*/
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT)) {
switch (cc_get_vendor()) {
case CC_VENDOR_AMD:
has_sev_es = true;
break;
default:
pr_info("Disabling parallel bringup due to guest state encryption\n");
return false;
}
}Using an explicit CC_ATTR_NO_EARLY_CPUID flag instead of CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT which is merely an approximation of that, might be interesting.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 1 line · David Woodhouse
cc_vendorisn't yet exposed. As we discussed this in IRC, I've been
Right, and we might just as well expose it because having a setter/getter is kinda silly for a __ro_after_init variable, see below.
So here's what I was able to scratch up quickly to remove the static key.
The asm looks like this:
# ./arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h:156: if (cc_vendor == CC_VENDOR_AMD &&
cmpl $1, cc_vendor(%rip) #, cc_vendor je .L204 #,
...
.L204:
# ./arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h:157: cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT))
movl $3, %edi #,
call cc_platform_has #
# ./arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h:156: if (cc_vendor == CC_VENDOR_AMD &&
testb %al, %al # tmp134
je .L158 #,
and so I doubt that this is at all measureable comparing that to the rest of the code that gets executed in the NMI handler. And it lets us get rid of yet another static key and use only the CC APIs.
Oh, and it bitches because cc_platform_has() is being called in noinstr region but we can mark it noinstr or add the drop-noinstr markers around it, if needed. Not that important as that function and what it calls don't do anything magical.
Thx.
---
arch/x86/coco/core.c +5 -5
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@#include <asm/coco.h> #include <asm/processor.h> -static enum cc_vendor vendor__ro_after_init ; +enum cc_vendor cc_vendor__ro_after_init ;static u64 cc_mask__ro_after_init ;static bool intel_cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr)
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ static bool hyperv_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)bool cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr) { -switch (vendor) { +switch (cc_vendor) {case CC_VENDOR_AMD :return amd_cc_platform_has (attr);case CC_VENDOR_INTEL :
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val)* - for AMD, bit *set* means the page is encrypted * - for Intel *clear* means encrypted. */ -switch (vendor) { +switch (cc_vendor) {case CC_VENDOR_AMD :return val | cc_mask;case CC_VENDOR_INTEL :
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val)u64 cc_mkdec (u64 val) {/* See comment in cc_mkenc() */ -switch (vendor) { +switch (cc_vendor) {case CC_VENDOR_AMD :return val & ~cc_mask;case CC_VENDOR_INTEL :
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_mkdec);__init void cc_set_vendor (enum cc_vendor v) { - vendor = v; + cc_vendor = v; }__init void cc_set_mask (u64 mask)
arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h +2 -0
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ enum cc_vendor { CC_VENDOR_INTEL, }; +extern enum cc_vendor cc_vendor; +void cc_set_vendor (enum cc_vendor v);void cc_set_mask (u64 mask);
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +7 -4
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#include <asm/insn.h> #include <asm/sev-common.h> #include <asm/bootparam.h> +#include <asm/coco.h> #define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MIN 1ULL#define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX 2ULL
@@ -134,24 +135,26 @@ struct snp_secrets_page_layout { } __packed;#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT -extern struct static_key_false sev_es_enable_key;extern void __sev_es_ist_enter (struct pt_regs *regs);extern void __sev_es_ist_exit (void ); static __always_inline void sev_es_ist_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { -if (static_branch_unlikely (&sev_es_enable_key)) +if (cc_vendor ==CC_VENDOR_AMD && +cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT ))__sev_es_ist_enter (regs); } static __always_inline void sev_es_ist_exit(void) { -if (static_branch_unlikely (&sev_es_enable_key)) +if (cc_vendor ==CC_VENDOR_AMD && +cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT ))__sev_es_ist_exit (); }extern int sev_es_setup_ap_jump_table (struct real_mode_header *rmh);extern void __sev_es_nmi_complete (void ); static __always_inline void sev_es_nmi_complete(void) { -if (static_branch_unlikely (&sev_es_enable_key)) +if (cc_vendor ==CC_VENDOR_AMD && +cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_STATE_ENCRYPT ))__sev_es_nmi_complete (); }extern int __init sev_es_efi_map_ghcbs (pgd_t *pgd);
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +0 -4
@@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ struct ghcb_state { }; static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_runtime_data*, runtime_data); -DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE (sev_es_enable_key); static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct sev_es_save_area *, sev_vmsa);
@@ -1393,9 +1392,6 @@ void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void)sev_es_terminate (SEV_TERM_SET_GEN ,GHCB_SNP_UNSUPPORTED ); } -/* Enable SEV-ES special handling */ -static_branch_enable (&sev_es_enable_key); -/* Initialize per-cpu GHCB pages */ for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) {alloc_runtime_data (cpu);
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 11 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · David Woodhouse
cc_vendorisn't yet exposed. As we discussed this in IRC, I've beenRight, and we might just as well expose it because having a setter/getter is kinda silly for a
__ro_after_initvariable, see below.So here's what I was able to scratch up quickly to remove the static key.
The asm looks like this:
Seems reasonable. I might just let you iterate on that, drop the SNP-ES part from the parallel boot series, then let Tom or someone send it in later once the dust settles.
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
In reply to Sean ChristophersonQuoted 13 lines · Sean Christopherson
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +0
-5@@ -2682,11 +2682,16 @@ static void io_apic_set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx, phys_addr_t phys) {pgprot_t flags =FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE ; -/* -* Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot -* bits, just like normal ioremap(): -*/ - flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags);
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c static void io_apic_set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx, phys_addr_t phys) · line 2694
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +10
-0+if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT )) { +/* +* Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot +* bits, just like normal ioremap(): +*/ +if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio (phys)) + flags =pgprot_encrypted (flags); +else + flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags); + }
I don't completely hate this. Thinking to the future, I'd hope that future platforms will include information about which physical addresses are shared or private. This might even vary per device, but this interface would still work.
I _think_ it would be nicer to wrap both checks up in a helper where the comments can be more detailed, like:
if (cc_private_mmio(phys)) flags = pgprot_encrypted(flags); else flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
but I honestly don't feel that strongly about it.
It does seem a bit odd that there's a new CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT check wrapping this whole thing. I guess the trip through pgprot_decrypted() is harmless on normal platforms, though.
Quoted 14 lines
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +3
-0@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static void __ioremap_check_other(resource_size_t addr, struct ioremap_desc *desif (!cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT ))return ; +if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio (addr)) + desc->flags |=IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED ; +if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_EFI ))return ;
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +10
-0+if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT )) { +/* +* Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot +* bits, just like normal ioremap(): +*/ +if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio (phys)) + flags =pgprot_encrypted (flags); +else + flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags); + }
...
Quoted 3 lines
It does seem a bit odd that there's a new
CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPTcheck wrapping this whole thing. I guess the trip throughpgprot_decrypted()is harmless on normal platforms, though.
Yeah, that's _really_ odd. Sean, were you trying to optimize away the indirect call or something?
I would just expect the Hyper-V/vTOM code to leave x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio alone unless
it *knows* the platform has private MMIO *and* CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT.
Is there ever a case where CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT==0 and he Hyper-V/vTOM code would need to set x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio?
RE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2023 12:42 PM
Quoted 17 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +10
-0+if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT )) { +/* +* Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot +* bits, just like normal ioremap(): +*/ +if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio (phys)) + flags =pgprot_encrypted (flags); +else + flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags); + }...
Quoted 3 lines
It does seem a bit odd that there's a new
CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPTcheck wrapping this whole thing. I guess the trip throughpgprot_decrypted()is harmless on normal platforms, though.
Quoted 6 lines
Yeah, that's _really_ odd. Sean, were you trying to optimize away the indirect call or something?
I would just expect the Hyper-V/vTOM code to leave x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio alone unless
it *knows* the platform has private MMIO *and*CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT.
Agreed.
Quoted 3 lines
Is there ever a case where CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT==0 and he Hyper-V/vTOM code would need to set x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio?
There's no such case.
I agree that gating with CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT isn't really necessary. Current upstream code always does the pgprot_decrypted(), and as you said, that's a no-op on platforms with no memory encryption.
Michael
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 20 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2023 12:42 PM
Quoted 19 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +10
-0+if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT )) { +/* +* Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot +* bits, just like normal ioremap(): +*/ +if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio (phys)) + flags =pgprot_encrypted (flags); +else + flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags); + }...
Quoted 3 lines
It does seem a bit odd that there's a new
CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPTcheck wrapping this whole thing. I guess the trip throughpgprot_decrypted()is harmless on normal platforms, though.Yeah, that's _really_ odd. Sean, were you trying to optimize away the indirect call or something?
No, my thought was simply to require platforms that support GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT to implement x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio, e.g. to avoid having to check if is_private_mmio is NULL, to explicit document that non-Hyper-V encrypted guests don't (yet) support private MMIO, and to add a bit of documentation around the {de,en}crypted logic.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I would just expect the Hyper-V/vTOM code to leave x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio alone unless it *knows* the platform has private MMIO *and*
CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT.Agreed.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Is there ever a case where CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT==0 and he Hyper-V/vTOM code would need to set x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio?
There's no such case.
I agree that gating with
CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPTisn't really necessary. Current upstream code always does thepgprot_decrypted(), and as you said, that's a no-op on platforms with no memory encryption.
Right, but since is_private_mmio can be NULL, unless I'm missing something we'll need an extra check no matter what, i.e. the alternative would be
if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio && x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio(phys)) flags = pgprot_encrypted(flags); else flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
I have no objection to that approach. It does have the advantage of not needing an indirect call for encrypted guests that don't support private MMIO, though I can't imagine this code is performance sensitive.
RE: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2023 1:08 PM
Quoted 56 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Quoted 1 line
From: Dave Hansen <[email protected]> Sent: Thursday, February 23, 2023
12:42 PM
Quoted 12 lines
Quoted 12 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +10
-0+if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT )) { +/* +* Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot +* bits, just like normal ioremap(): +*/ +if (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio (phys)) + flags =pgprot_encrypted (flags); +else + flags =pgprot_decrypted (flags); + }Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
...
Quoted 3 lines
It does seem a bit odd that there's a new
CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPTcheck wrapping this whole thing. I guess the trip throughpgprot_decrypted()is harmless on normal platforms, though.Yeah, that's _really_ odd. Sean, were you trying to optimize away the indirect call or something?
No, my thought was simply to require platforms that support
GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPTto
implement x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio, e.g. to avoid having to check ifis_private_mmiois NULL, to explicit document that non-Hyper-V encrypted guests don't (yet) support private MMIO, and to add a bit of documentation around the {de,en}crypted logic.Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
I would just expect the Hyper-V/vTOM code to leave x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio alone unless it *knows* the platform has private MMIO *and*
CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT.Agreed.
Quoted 1 line
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Is there ever a case where CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT==0 and he Hyper-V/vTOM code would need to set x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio?
There's no such case.
I agree that gating with
CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPTisn't really necessary. Current upstream code always does thepgprot_decrypted(), and as you said, that's a no-op on platforms with no memory encryption.Right, but since
is_private_mmiocan be NULL, unless I'm missing something we'll need an extra check no matter what, i.e. the alternative would beif (x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio && x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio(phys)) flags = pgprot_encrypted(flags); else flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
Quoted 3 lines
I have no objection to that approach. It does have the advantage of not needing an indirect call for encrypted guests that don't support private MMIO, though I can't imagine this code is performance sensitive.
Or statically set a default stub function for is_private_mmio() that returns "false". Then there's no need to check for NULL, and only platforms that want to use it have to code anything. Several other entries in x86_platform have such defaults.
Michael
Re: [PATCH v5 06/14] x86/ioremap: Support hypervisor specified range to map as encrypted
Quoted 3 lines · Michael Kelley (LINUX)
Or statically set a default stub function for
is_private_mmio()that returns "false". Then there's no need to check for NULL, and only platforms that want to use it have to code anything. Several other entries inx86_platformhave such defaults.
Yeah, that's what I was thinking too, like 'x86_op_int_noop':
Quoted 3 lines
struct
x86_platform_opsx86_platform__ro_after_init= {
.calibrate_cpu =native_calibrate_cpu_early,
.calibrate_tsc =native_calibrate_tsc,
...
Quoted 1 line
.hyper.pin_vcpu =
x86_op_int_noop,
It's kinda silly to do an indirect call to a two-instruction function, but this is a pretty slow path.
PATCH v5 7/14 x86/hyperv: Change vTOM handling to use standard coco mechanisms
In reply to Michael KelleyHyper-V guests on AMD SEV-SNP hardware have the option of using the "virtual Top Of Memory" (vTOM) feature specified by the SEV-SNP architecture. With vTOM, shared vs. private memory accesses are controlled by splitting the guest physical address space into two halves. vTOM is the dividing line where the uppermost bit of the physical address space is set; e.g., with 47 bits of guest physical address space, vTOM is 0x400000000000 (bit 46 is set). Guest physical memory is accessible at two parallel physical addresses -- one below vTOM and one above vTOM. Accesses below vTOM are private (encrypted) while accesses above vTOM are shared (decrypted). In this sense, vTOM is like the GPA.SHARED bit in Intel TDX.
Support for Hyper-V guests using vTOM was added to the Linux kernel in two patch sets[1][2]. This support treats the vTOM bit as part of the physical address. For accessing shared (decrypted) memory, these patch sets create a second kernel virtual mapping that maps to physical addresses above vTOM.
A better approach is to treat the vTOM bit as a protection flag, not as part of the physical address. This new approach is like the approach for the GPA.SHARED bit in Intel TDX. Rather than creating a second kernel virtual mapping, the existing mapping is updated using recently added coco mechanisms. When memory is changed between private and shared using set_memory_decrypted() and set_memory_encrypted(), the PTEs for the existing kernel mapping are changed to add or remove the vTOM bit in the guest physical address, just as with TDX. The hypercalls to change the memory status on the host side are made using the existing callback mechanism. Everything just works, with a minor tweak to map the IO-APIC to use private accesses.
To accomplish the switch in approach, the following must be done:
* Update Hyper-V initialization to set the cc_mask based on vTOM and do other coco initialization.
* Update physical_mask so the vTOM bit is no longer treated as part of the physical address
* Remove CC_VENDOR_HYPERV and merge the associated vTOM functionality under CC_VENDOR_AMD. Update cc_mkenc() and cc_mkdec() to set/clear the vTOM bit as a protection flag.
* Code already exists to make hypercalls to inform Hyper-V about pages changing between shared and private. Update this code to run as a callback from __set_memory_enc_pgtable().
* Remove the Hyper-V special case from __set_memory_enc_dec()
* Remove the Hyper-V specific call to swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() since mem_encrypt_init() will now do it.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
--- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 11 -------- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h | 1 - arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h | 8 ++---- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 15 +++++------ arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 3 --- drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c | 1 - include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 2 ++ 10 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/core.c +33 -10
@@ -29,6 +29,19 @@ static bool intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) } } +/* Helper function for AMD SEV-SNP vTOM case */ +static __maybe_unused bool amd_cc_platform_vtom (enum cc_attr attr) +{ +switch (attr) { +case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT : +case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT : +case CC_ATTR_ACCESS_IOAPIC_ENCRYPTED : +return true; +default : +return false; + } +} +/* * SME and SEV are very similar but they are not the same, so there are * times that the kernel will need to distinguish between SME and SEV. The
@@ -41,9 +54,20 @@ static bool intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)* up under SME the trampoline area cannot be encrypted, whereas under SEV * the trampoline area must be encrypted. */ +static bool amd_cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr) {#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT + +/* +* Handle the SEV-SNP vTOM case where sme_me_mask is zero, and +* the other levels of SME/SEV functionality, including C-bit +* based SEV-SNP, are not enabled. +*/ +if (sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM_ENABLED ) +return amd_cc_platform_vtom (attr); + +/* Handle the C-bit case */ switch (attr) {case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT :return sme_me_mask;
@@ -76,11 +100,6 @@ static bool amd_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)#endif } -static bool hyperv_cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr) -{ -return attr ==CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT ; -} -bool cc_platform_has (enum cc_attr attr) {switch (vendor) {
@@ -88,8 +107,6 @@ bool cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)return amd_cc_platform_has (attr);case CC_VENDOR_INTEL :return intel_cc_platform_has (attr); -case CC_VENDOR_HYPERV : -return hyperv_cc_platform_has (attr);default :return false; }
@@ -103,11 +120,14 @@ u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val)* encryption status of the page. * * - for AMD, bit *set* means the page is encrypted -* - for Intel *clear* means encrypted. +* - for AMD with vTOM and for Intel, *clear* means encrypted */ switch (vendor) {case CC_VENDOR_AMD : -return val | cc_mask; +if (sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM_ENABLED ) +return val & ~cc_mask; +else +return val | cc_mask;case CC_VENDOR_INTEL :return val & ~cc_mask;default :
@@ -120,7 +140,10 @@ u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val)/* See comment in cc_mkenc() */ switch (vendor) {case CC_VENDOR_AMD : -return val & ~cc_mask; +if (sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM_ENABLED ) +return val | cc_mask; +else +return val & ~cc_mask;case CC_VENDOR_INTEL :return val | cc_mask;default :
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c +0 -11
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@#include <linux/syscore_ops.h> #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h> #include <linux/highmem.h> -#include <linux/swiotlb.h> int hyperv_init_cpuhp;u64 hv_current_partition_id = ~0ull ;
@@ -504,16 +503,6 @@ void __init hyperv_init(void)/* Query the VMs extended capability once, so that it can be cached. */ hv_query_ext_cap (0 ); -#ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB -/* -* Swiotlb bounce buffer needs to be mapped in extra address -* space. Map function doesn't work in the early place and so -* call swiotlb_update_mem_attributes() here. -*/ -if (hv_is_isolation_supported ()) -swiotlb_update_mem_attributes (); -#endif -return ; clean_guest_os_id:
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +47 -11
104 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/include/asm/coco.h +0 -1
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@enum cc_vendor {CC_VENDOR_NONE ,CC_VENDOR_AMD , -CC_VENDOR_HYPERV ,CC_VENDOR_INTEL , };
arch/x86/include/asm/mshyperv.h +2 -6
@@ -172,18 +172,19 @@ static inline void hv_apic_init(void) {}int hv_map_ioapic_interrupt (int ioapic_id,bool level,int vcpu,int vector,struct hv_interrupt_entry *entry);int hv_unmap_ioapic_interrupt (int ioapic_id,struct hv_interrupt_entry *entry); -int hv_set_mem_host_visibility (unsigned long addr,int numpages,bool visible);#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT void hv_ghcb_msr_write (u64 msr,u64 value);void hv_ghcb_msr_read (u64 msr,u64 *value);bool hv_ghcb_negotiate_protocol (void );void hv_ghcb_terminate (unsigned int set,unsigned int reason); +void hv_vtom_init (void );#else static inline void hv_ghcb_msr_write (u64 msr,u64 value) {}static inline void hv_ghcb_msr_read (u64 msr,u64 *value) {}static inline bool hv_ghcb_negotiate_protocol (void ) {return false; }static inline void hv_ghcb_terminate (unsigned int set,unsigned int reason) {} +static inline void hv_vtom_init (void ) {}#endif extern bool hv_isolation_type_snp (void );
@@ -239,11 +240,6 @@ static inline int hyperv_flush_guest_mapping_range(u64 as, }static inline void hv_set_register (unsigned int reg,u64 value) { }static inline u64 hv_get_register (unsigned int reg) {return 0 ; } -static inline int hv_set_mem_host_visibility (unsigned long addr,int numpages, -bool visible) -{ -return -1 ; -}#endif /* CONFIG_HYPERV */
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +1 -0
@@ -565,6 +565,7 @@#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ENABLED_BIT)#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED_BIT)#define MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED_BIT) +#define MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM_ENABLED BIT_ULL(3)#define MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL 0xc001011f
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +7 -8
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@#include <asm/nmi.h> #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h> #include <asm/numa.h> -#include <asm/coco.h> /* Is Linux running as the root partition? */ bool hv_root_partition;
@@ -325,8 +324,10 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)if (ms_hyperv.priv_high &HV_ISOLATION ) { ms_hyperv.isolation_config_a =cpuid_eax (HYPERV_CPUID_ISOLATION_CONFIG ); ms_hyperv.isolation_config_b =cpuid_ebx (HYPERV_CPUID_ISOLATION_CONFIG ); - ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary = -BIT_ULL (ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary_bits); + +if (ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary_active) + ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary = +BIT_ULL (ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary_bits);pr_info ("Hyper-V: Isolation Config: Group A 0x%x, Group B 0x%x\n" , ms_hyperv.isolation_config_a, ms_hyperv.isolation_config_b);
@@ -337,11 +338,6 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void) swiotlb_unencrypted_base = ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary;#endif } -/* Isolation VMs are unenlightened SEV-based VMs, thus this check: */ -if (IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT )) { -if (hv_get_isolation_type () !=HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_NONE ) -cc_set_vendor (CC_VENDOR_HYPERV ); - } }if (hv_max_functions_eax >=HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES ) {
@@ -410,6 +406,9 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void) i8253_clear_counter_on_shutdown = false;#if IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_HYPERV ) +if ((hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_VBS ) || + (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP )) +hv_vtom_init ();/* * Setup the hook to get control post apic initialization. */
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +0 -3
@@ -2175,9 +2175,6 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)static int __set_memory_enc_dec (unsigned long addr,int numpages,bool enc) { -if (hv_is_isolation_supported ()) -return hv_set_mem_host_visibility (addr, numpages, !enc); -if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT ))return __set_memory_enc_pgtable (addr, numpages, enc);
drivers/hv/vmbus_drv.c +0 -1
@@ -2156,7 +2156,6 @@ void vmbus_device_unregister(struct hv_device *device_obj)* VMBUS is an acpi enumerated device. Get the information we * need from DSDT. */ -#define VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS 0xfed40000static acpi_status vmbus_walk_resources (struct acpi_resource *res,void *ctx) {resource_size_t start =0 ;
include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h +2 -0
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@#include <asm/ptrace.h> #include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h> +#define VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS 0xfed40000 +struct ms_hyperv_info {u32 features;u32 priv_high;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 8/14 swiotlb: Remove bounce buffer remapping for Hyper-V
In reply to Michael KelleyWith changes to how Hyper-V guest VMs flip memory between private (encrypted) and shared (decrypted), creating a second kernel virtual mapping for shared memory is no longer necessary. Everything needed for the transition to shared is handled by set_memory_decrypted().
As such, remove swiotlb_unencrypted_base and the associated code.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c | 7 +------ include/linux/swiotlb.h | 2 -- kernel/dma/swiotlb.c | 45 +----------------------------------------- 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mshyperv.c +1 -6
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@#include <linux/kexec.h> #include <linux/i8253.h> #include <linux/random.h> -#include <linux/swiotlb.h> #include <asm/processor.h> #include <asm/hypervisor.h> #include <asm/hyperv-tlfs.h>
@@ -332,12 +331,8 @@ static void __init ms_hyperv_init_platform(void)pr_info ("Hyper-V: Isolation Config: Group A 0x%x, Group B 0x%x\n" , ms_hyperv.isolation_config_a, ms_hyperv.isolation_config_b); -if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP ) { +if (hv_get_isolation_type () ==HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP )static_branch_enable (&isolation_type_snp); -#ifdef CONFIG_SWIOTLB - swiotlb_unencrypted_base = ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary; -#endif - } }if (hv_max_functions_eax >=HYPERV_CPUID_NESTED_FEATURES ) {
include/linux/swiotlb.h +0 -2
@@ -185,6 +185,4 @@ static inline bool is_swiotlb_for_alloc(struct device *dev) }#endif /* CONFIG_DMA_RESTRICTED_POOL */ -extern phys_addr_t swiotlb_unencrypted_base; -#endif /* __LINUX_SWIOTLB_H */
kernel/dma/swiotlb.c +1 -44
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Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 9/14 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second mapping of VMBus monitor pages
In reply to Michael KelleyWith changes to how Hyper-V guest VMs flip memory between private (encrypted) and shared (decrypted), creating a second kernel virtual mapping for shared memory is no longer necessary. Everything needed for the transition to shared is handled by set_memory_decrypted().
As such, remove the code to create and manage the second mapping for VMBus monitor pages. Because set_memory_decrypted() and set_memory_encrypted() are no-ops in normal VMs, it's not even necessary to test for being in a Confidential VM (a.k.a., "Isolation VM").
--- drivers/hv/connection.c | 113 ++++++++++++---------------------------------- drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h | 2 - 2 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/connection.c +28 -85
@@ -104,8 +104,14 @@ int vmbus_negotiate_version(struct vmbus_channel_msginfo *msginfo, u32 version) vmbus_connection.msg_conn_id =VMBUS_MESSAGE_CONNECTION_ID ; } - msg->monitor_page1 = vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[0 ]; - msg->monitor_page2 = vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[1 ]; +/* +* shared_gpa_boundary is zero in non-SNP VMs, so it's safe to always +* bitwise OR it +*/ + msg->monitor_page1 =virt_to_phys (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ]) | + ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary; + msg->monitor_page2 =virt_to_phys (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ]) | + ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary; msg->target_vcpu =hv_cpu_number_to_vp_number (VMBUS_CONNECT_CPU );
@@ -219,72 +225,27 @@ int vmbus_connect(void)* Setup the monitor notification facility. The 1st page for * parent->child and the 2nd page for child->parent */ - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ] = (void *)hv_alloc_hyperv_zeroed_page (); - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ] = (void *)hv_alloc_hyperv_zeroed_page (); + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ] = (void *)hv_alloc_hyperv_page (); + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ] = (void *)hv_alloc_hyperv_page ();if ((vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ] ==NULL ) || (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ] ==NULL )) { ret = -ENOMEM ; goto cleanup; } - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0 ] - = vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ]; - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1 ] - = vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ]; - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[0 ] - =virt_to_phys (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ]); - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[1 ] - =virt_to_phys (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ]); - -if (hv_is_isolation_supported ()) { - ret =set_memory_decrypted ((unsigned long ) - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ], -1 ); - ret |=set_memory_decrypted ((unsigned long ) - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ], -1 ); -if (ret) - goto cleanup; - -/* -* Isolation VM with AMD SNP needs to access monitor page via -* address space above shared gpa boundary. -*/ -if (hv_isolation_type_snp ()) { - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[0 ] += - ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary; - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[1 ] += - ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary; - - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ] - =memremap (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[0 ], -HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE , -MEMREMAP_WB ); -if (!vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ]) { - ret = -ENOMEM ; - goto cleanup; - } - - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ] - =memremap (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_pa[1 ], -HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE , -MEMREMAP_WB ); -if (!vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ]) { - ret = -ENOMEM ; - goto cleanup; - } - } - -/* -* Set memory host visibility hvcall smears memory -* and so zero monitor pages here. -*/ -memset (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ],0x00 , -HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ); -memset (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ],0x00 , -HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ); + ret =set_memory_decrypted ((unsigned long ) + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ],1 ); + ret |=set_memory_decrypted ((unsigned long ) + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ],1 ); +if (ret) + goto cleanup; - } +/* +* Set_memory_decrypted() will change the memory contents if +* decryption occurs, so zero monitor pages here. +*/ +memset (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ],0x00 ,HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ); +memset (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ],0x00 ,HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ); msginfo = kzalloc(sizeof(*msginfo) + sizeof(struct vmbus_channel_initiate_contact),
@@ -376,31 +337,13 @@ void vmbus_disconnect(void) vmbus_connection.int_page =NULL ; } -if (hv_is_isolation_supported ()) { -/* -* memunmap() checks input address is ioremap address or not -* inside. It doesn't unmap any thing in the non-SNP CVM and -* so not check CVM type here. -*/ -memunmap (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ]); -memunmap (vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ]); - -set_memory_encrypted ((unsigned long ) - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0 ], -1 ); -set_memory_encrypted ((unsigned long ) - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1 ], -1 ); - } +set_memory_encrypted ((unsigned long )vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ],1 ); +set_memory_encrypted ((unsigned long )vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ],1 ); -hv_free_hyperv_page ((unsigned long ) - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0 ]); -hv_free_hyperv_page ((unsigned long ) - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1 ]); - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[0 ] = - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ] =NULL ; - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages_original[1 ] = - vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ] =NULL ; +hv_free_hyperv_page ((unsigned long )vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ]); +hv_free_hyperv_page ((unsigned long )vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ]); + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[0 ] =NULL ; + vmbus_connection.monitor_pages[1 ] =NULL ; }/*
drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h +0 -2
@@ -241,8 +241,6 @@ struct vmbus_connection {* is child->parent notification */ struct hv_monitor_page *monitor_pages[2 ]; -void *monitor_pages_original[2 ]; -phys_addr_t monitor_pages_pa[2 ];struct list_head chn_msg_list;spinlock_t channelmsg_lock;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 10/14 Drivers: hv: vmbus: Remove second way of mapping ring buffers
In reply to Michael KelleyWith changes to how Hyper-V guest VMs flip memory between private (encrypted) and shared (decrypted), it's no longer necessary to have separate code paths for mapping VMBus ring buffers for for normal VMs and for Confidential VMs.
As such, remove the code path that uses vmap_pfn(), and set the protection flags argument to vmap() to account for the difference between normal and Confidential VMs.
--- drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++-------------------------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c +20 -42
@@ -186,8 +186,6 @@ int hv_ringbuffer_init(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info, struct page *pages, u32 page_cnt, u32 max_pkt_size) { struct page **pages_wraparound; -unsigned long *pfns_wraparound; -u64 pfn;int i;BUILD_BUG_ON ((sizeof (struct hv_ring_buffer ) !=PAGE_SIZE ));
@@ -196,50 +194,30 @@ int hv_ringbuffer_init(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info,* First page holds struct hv_ring_buffer, do wraparound mapping for * the rest. */ -if (hv_isolation_type_snp ()) { - pfn =page_to_pfn (pages) + -PFN_DOWN (ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary); + pages_wraparound =kcalloc (page_cnt *2 -1 , +sizeof (struct page *), +GFP_KERNEL ); +if (!pages_wraparound) +return -ENOMEM ; - pfns_wraparound =kcalloc (page_cnt *2 -1 , -sizeof (unsigned long ),GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!pfns_wraparound) -return -ENOMEM ; - - pfns_wraparound[0 ] = pfn; -for (i =0 ; i <2 * (page_cnt -1 ); i++) - pfns_wraparound[i +1 ] = pfn + i % (page_cnt -1 ) +1 ; - - ring_info->ring_buffer = (struct hv_ring_buffer *) -vmap_pfn (pfns_wraparound, page_cnt *2 -1 , -pgprot_decrypted (PAGE_KERNEL )); -kfree (pfns_wraparound); - -if (!ring_info->ring_buffer) -return -ENOMEM ; - -/* Zero ring buffer after setting memory host visibility. */ -memset (ring_info->ring_buffer,0x00 ,PAGE_SIZE * page_cnt); - }else { - pages_wraparound =kcalloc (page_cnt *2 -1 , -sizeof (struct page *), -GFP_KERNEL ); -if (!pages_wraparound) -return -ENOMEM ; - - pages_wraparound[0 ] = pages; -for (i =0 ; i <2 * (page_cnt -1 ); i++) - pages_wraparound[i +1 ] = - &pages[i % (page_cnt -1 ) +1 ]; + pages_wraparound[0 ] = pages; +for (i =0 ; i <2 * (page_cnt -1 ); i++) + pages_wraparound[i +1 ] = + &pages[i % (page_cnt -1 ) +1 ]; - ring_info->ring_buffer = (struct hv_ring_buffer *) -vmap (pages_wraparound, page_cnt *2 -1 ,VM_MAP , -PAGE_KERNEL ); + ring_info->ring_buffer = (struct hv_ring_buffer *) +vmap (pages_wraparound, page_cnt *2 -1 ,VM_MAP , +pgprot_decrypted (PAGE_KERNEL )); -kfree (pages_wraparound); -if (!ring_info->ring_buffer) -return -ENOMEM ; - } +kfree (pages_wraparound); +if (!ring_info->ring_buffer) +return -ENOMEM ; +/* +* Ensure the header page is zero'ed since +* encryption status may have changed. +*/ +memset (ring_info->ring_buffer,0 ,HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ); ring_info->ring_buffer->read_index = ring_info->ring_buffer->write_index =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 11/14 hv_netvsc: Remove second mapping of send and recv buffers
In reply to Michael KelleyWith changes to how Hyper-V guest VMs flip memory between private (encrypted) and shared (decrypted), creating a second kernel virtual mapping for shared memory is no longer necessary. Everything needed for the transition to shared is handled by set_memory_decrypted().
As such, remove the code to create and manage the second mapping for the pre-allocated send and recv buffers. This mapping is the last user of hv_map_memory()/hv_unmap_memory(), so delete these functions as well. Finally, hv_map_memory() is the last user of vmap_pfn() in Hyper-V guest code, so remove the Kconfig selection of VMAP_PFN.
--- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 28 ------------------------ drivers/hv/Kconfig | 1 - drivers/hv/hv_common.c | 11 ---------- drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h | 2 -- drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c | 48 ++--------------------------------------- include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h | 2 -- 6 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +0 -28
@@ -362,34 +362,6 @@ void __init hv_vtom_init(void)#endif /* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */ -/* -* hv_map_memory - map memory to extra space in the AMD SEV-SNP Isolation VM. -*/ -void *hv_map_memory (void *addr,unsigned long size) -{ -unsigned long *pfns =kcalloc (size /PAGE_SIZE , -sizeof (unsigned long ),GFP_KERNEL ); -void *vaddr; -int i; - -if (!pfns) -return NULL ; - -for (i =0 ; i < size /PAGE_SIZE ; i++) - pfns[i] =vmalloc_to_pfn (addr + i *PAGE_SIZE ) + - (ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary >>PAGE_SHIFT ); - - vaddr =vmap_pfn (pfns, size /PAGE_SIZE ,pgprot_decrypted (PAGE_KERNEL )); -kfree (pfns); - -return vaddr; -} - -void hv_unmap_memory (void *addr) -{ -vunmap (addr); -} -enum hv_isolation_type hv_get_isolation_type (void ) {if (!(ms_hyperv.priv_high &HV_ISOLATION ))
drivers/hv/Kconfig +0 -1
@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ config HYPERV || (ARM64 && !CPU_BIG_ENDIAN)) select PARAVIRT select X86_HV_CALLBACK_VECTOR if X86 - select VMAP_PFN help Select this option to run Linux as a Hyper-V client operating system.
drivers/hv/hv_common.c +0 -11
@@ -308,14 +308,3 @@ u64 __weak hv_ghcb_hypercall(u64 control, void *input, void *output, u32 input_sreturn HV_STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER ; }EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_ghcb_hypercall); - -void __weak *hv_map_memory (void *addr,unsigned long size) -{ -return NULL ; -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_map_memory); - -void __weak hv_unmap_memory (void *addr) -{ -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL (hv_unmap_memory);
drivers/net/hyperv/hyperv_net.h +0 -2
@@ -1139,7 +1139,6 @@ struct netvsc_device {/* Receive buffer allocated by us but manages by NetVSP */ void *recv_buf; -void *recv_original_buf;u32 recv_buf_size;/* allocated bytes */ struct vmbus_gpadl recv_buf_gpadl_handle;u32 recv_section_cnt;
@@ -1148,7 +1147,6 @@ struct netvsc_device {/* Send buffer allocated by us */ void *send_buf; -void *send_original_buf;u32 send_buf_size;struct vmbus_gpadl send_buf_gpadl_handle;u32 send_section_cnt;
drivers/net/hyperv/netvsc.c +2 -46
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include/asm-generic/mshyperv.h +0 -2
@@ -270,8 +270,6 @@ static inline int cpumask_to_vpset_noself(struct hv_vpset *vpset,void hyperv_cleanup (void );bool hv_query_ext_cap (u64 cap_query);void hv_setup_dma_ops (struct device *dev,bool coherent); -void *hv_map_memory (void *addr,unsigned long size); -void hv_unmap_memory (void *addr);#else /* CONFIG_HYPERV */ static inline bool hv_is_hyperv_initialized (void ) {return false; }static inline bool hv_is_hibernation_supported (void ) {return false; }
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 12/14 Drivers: hv: Don't remap addresses that are above shared_gpa_boundary
In reply to Michael KelleyWith the vTOM bit now treated as a protection flag and not part of the physical address, avoid remapping physical addresses with vTOM set since technically such addresses aren't valid. Use ioremap_cache() instead of memremap() to ensure that the mapping provides decrypted access, which will correctly set the vTOM bit as a protection flag.
While this change is not required for correctness with the current implementation of memremap(), for general code hygiene it's better to not depend on the mapping functions doing something reasonable with a physical address that is out-of-range.
While here, fix typos in two error messages.
--- arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c | 7 +++++-- drivers/hv/hv.c | 23 +++++++++++++---------- 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/hyperv/hv_init.c +5 -2
@@ -63,7 +63,10 @@ static int hyperv_init_ghcb(void)* memory boundary and map it here. */ rdmsrl (MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_GHCB , ghcb_gpa); - ghcb_va =memremap (ghcb_gpa,HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ,MEMREMAP_WB ); + +/* Mask out vTOM bit. ioremap_cache() maps decrypted */ + ghcb_gpa &= ~ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary; + ghcb_va = (void *)ioremap_cache (ghcb_gpa,HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE );if (!ghcb_va)return -ENOMEM ;
@@ -217,7 +220,7 @@ static int hv_cpu_die(unsigned int cpu)if (hv_ghcb_pg) { ghcb_va = (void **)this_cpu_ptr (hv_ghcb_pg);if (*ghcb_va) -memunmap (*ghcb_va); +iounmap (*ghcb_va); *ghcb_va =NULL ; }
drivers/hv/hv.c +13 -10
@@ -217,11 +217,13 @@ void hv_synic_enable_regs(unsigned int cpu) simp.simp_enabled =1 ;if (hv_isolation_type_snp ()) { +/* Mask out vTOM bit. ioremap_cache() maps decrypted */ +u64 base = (simp.base_simp_gpa <<HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT ) & + ~ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary; hv_cpu->synic_message_page - =memremap (simp.base_simp_gpa <<HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT , -HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ,MEMREMAP_WB ); + = (void *)ioremap_cache (base,HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE );if (!hv_cpu->synic_message_page) -pr_err ("Fail to map syinc message page.\n" ); +pr_err ("Fail to map synic message page.\n" ); }else { simp.base_simp_gpa =virt_to_phys (hv_cpu->synic_message_page) >>HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT ;
@@ -234,12 +236,13 @@ void hv_synic_enable_regs(unsigned int cpu) siefp.siefp_enabled =1 ;if (hv_isolation_type_snp ()) { - hv_cpu->synic_event_page = -memremap (siefp.base_siefp_gpa <<HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT , -HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ,MEMREMAP_WB ); - +/* Mask out vTOM bit. ioremap_cache() maps decrypted */ +u64 base = (siefp.base_siefp_gpa <<HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT ) & + ~ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary; + hv_cpu->synic_event_page + = (void *)ioremap_cache (base,HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE );if (!hv_cpu->synic_event_page) -pr_err ("Fail to map syinc event page.\n" ); +pr_err ("Fail to map synic event page.\n" ); }else { siefp.base_siefp_gpa =virt_to_phys (hv_cpu->synic_event_page) >>HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT ;
@@ -316,7 +319,7 @@ void hv_synic_disable_regs(unsigned int cpu)*/ simp.simp_enabled =0 ;if (hv_isolation_type_snp ()) -memunmap (hv_cpu->synic_message_page); +iounmap (hv_cpu->synic_message_page);else simp.base_simp_gpa =0 ;
@@ -326,7 +329,7 @@ void hv_synic_disable_regs(unsigned int cpu) siefp.siefp_enabled =0 ;if (hv_isolation_type_snp ()) -memunmap (hv_cpu->synic_event_page); +iounmap (hv_cpu->synic_event_page);else siefp.base_siefp_gpa =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 13/14 PCI: hv: Add hypercalls to read/write MMIO space
In reply to Michael KelleyTo support PCI pass-thru devices in Confidential VMs, Hyper-V has added hypercalls to read and write MMIO space. Add the appropriate definitions to hyperv-tlfs.h and implement functions to make the hypercalls.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h | 3 ++ drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h | 22 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 89 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/hyperv-tlfs.h +3 -0
@@ -119,6 +119,9 @@/* Recommend using enlightened VMCS */ #define HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED BIT(14) +/* Use hypercalls for MMIO config space access */ +#define HV_X64_USE_MMIO_HYPERCALLS BIT(21) +/* * CPU management features identification. * These are HYPERV_CPUID_CPU_MANAGEMENT_FEATURES.EAX bits.
drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c +64 -0
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include/asm-generic/hyperv-tlfs.h +22 -0
@@ -168,6 +168,8 @@ struct ms_hyperv_tsc_page {#define HVCALL_FLUSH_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_SPACE 0x00af#define HVCALL_FLUSH_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_LIST 0x00b0#define HVCALL_MODIFY_SPARSE_GPA_PAGE_HOST_VISIBILITY 0x00db +#define HVCALL_MMIO_READ 0x0106 +#define HVCALL_MMIO_WRITE 0x0107/* Extended hypercalls */ #define HV_EXT_CALL_QUERY_CAPABILITIES 0x8001
@@ -795,4 +797,24 @@ struct hv_memory_hint { union hv_gpa_page_range ranges[]; } __packed; +/* Data structures for HVCALL_MMIO_READ and HVCALL_MMIO_WRITE */ +#define HV_HYPERCALL_MMIO_MAX_DATA_LENGTH 64 + +struct hv_mmio_read_input { +u64 gpa; +u32 size; +u32 reserved; +} __packed; + +struct hv_mmio_read_output { +u8 data[HV_HYPERCALL_MMIO_MAX_DATA_LENGTH ]; +} __packed; + +struct hv_mmio_write_input { +u64 gpa; +u32 size; +u32 reserved; +u8 data[HV_HYPERCALL_MMIO_MAX_DATA_LENGTH ]; +} __packed; +#endif
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
PATCH v5 14/14 PCI: hv: Enable PCI pass-thru devices in Confidential VMs
In reply to Michael KelleyFor PCI pass-thru devices in a Confidential VM, Hyper-V requires that PCI config space be accessed via hypercalls. In normal VMs, config space accesses are trapped to the Hyper-V host and emulated. But in a confidential VM, the host can't access guest memory to decode the instruction for emulation, so an explicit hypercall must be used.
Update the PCI config space access functions to use the hypercalls when such use is indicated by Hyper-V flags. Also, set the flag to allow the Hyper-V PCI driver to be loaded and used in a Confidential VM (a.k.a., "Isolation VM"). The driver has previously been hardened against a malicious Hyper-V host[1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
--- drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c | 2 +- drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c | 168 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 2 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 65 deletions(-)
drivers/hv/channel_mgmt.c +1 -1
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ { .dev_type = HV_PCIE,HV_PCIE_GUID , .perf_device = false, - .allowed_in_isolated = false, + .allowed_in_isolated = true, },/* Synthetic Frame Buffer */
drivers/pci/controller/pci-hyperv.c +104 -64
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Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1