KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data
Subsystems (5)
PATCH v6 1/1 KEYS: encrypted: fix key instantiation with user-provided data
Commit cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data. The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead.
Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a small shell script, e.g.:
BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32)
keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @u
However, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long.
The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input range to hex-ascii and using memcpy() instead of hex2bin(). It could have been fixed either by allowing binary input or using hex2bin() (and doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter.
The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been fixed (see link below).
---
Changes
=======
v6: - fix checkpatch warnings
v5: - explain security issue in commit message, add Reviewd-by
v4: - change "Link:" address
v3: - use generated random key in example, reformat commit message
v2: - clarify commit message, add example to recover old/broken keys
- improve example in Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
- add link to ltp patch
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 3 ++- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +2 -1
@@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob:: Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data:: - $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 `cat evm_decrypted_data.blob`" @u + $ evmkey=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 | xxd -c32 -p) + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 $evmkey" @u 794890253 $ keyctl print 794890253
security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +3 -3
@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,pr_err ("encrypted key: instantiation of keys using provided decrypted data is disabled since CONFIG_USER_DECRYPTED_DATA is set to false\n" );return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } -if (strlen (decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) { +if (strlen (decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen *2 ) {pr_err ("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n" );return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); }
@@ -791,8 +791,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, ret =encrypted_key_decrypt (epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv); }else if (decrypted_data) {get_random_bytes (epayload->iv, ivsize); -memcpy (epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data, - epayload->decrypted_datalen); + ret =hex2bin (epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data, + epayload->decrypted_datalen); }else {get_random_bytes (epayload->iv, ivsize);get_random_bytes (epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Mimi Zohar
maintainerQuoted 24 lines · Nikolaus Voss
Commit
cd3bc044af48("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data. The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead.Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a small shell script, e.g.:
BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32)
keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @uHowever, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long.
The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input range to hex-ascii and using
memcpy()instead ofhex2bin(). It could have been fixed either by allowing binary input or usinghex2bin()(and doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter.
Quoted 8 lines
The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been fixed (see link below).
Fixes cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data")Reviewed-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Nikolaus Voss <[email protected]>
Thanks! This patch is now queued in next-integrity/next-integrity- testing.
Signature · 3 lines
thanks, Mimi
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 28 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 27 lines · Nikolaus Voss
Commit
cd3bc044af48("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data. The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead.Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a small shell script, e.g.:
BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32)
keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @uHowever, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long.
The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input range to hex-ascii and using
memcpy()instead ofhex2bin(). It could have been fixed either by allowing binary input or usinghex2bin()(and doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter.The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been fixed (see link below).
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Fixes cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data")Reviewed-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Nikolaus Voss <[email protected]>Thanks! This patch is now queued in next-integrity/next-integrity- testing.
Did you check the checkpatch.pl because earlier versions did not pass.
BR, Jarkko
Jarkko Sakkinen
maintainerQuoted 88 lines · Nikolaus Voss
Commit
cd3bc044af48("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data") added key instantiation with user provided decrypted data. The user data is hex-ascii-encoded but was just memcpy'ed to the binary buffer. Fix this to use hex2bin instead.Old keys created from user provided decrypted data saved with "keyctl pipe" are still valid, however if the key is recreated from decrypted data the old key must be converted to the correct format. This can be done with a small shell script, e.g.:
BROKENKEY=abcdefABCDEF1234567890aaaaaaaaaa NEWKEY=$(echo -ne $BROKENKEY | xxd -p -c32)
keyctl add user masterkey "$(cat masterkey.bin)" @u keyctl add encrypted testkey "new user:masterkey 32 $NEWKEY" @uHowever, NEWKEY is still broken: If for BROKENKEY 32 bytes were specified, a brute force attacker knowing the key properties would only need to try at most 2^(16*8) keys, as if the key was only 16 bytes long.
The security issue is a result of the combination of limiting the input range to hex-ascii and using
memcpy()instead ofhex2bin(). It could have been fixed either by allowing binary input or usinghex2bin()(and doubling the ascii input key length). This patch implements the latter.The corresponding test for the Linux Test Project ltp has also been fixed (see link below).
Fixes cd3bc044af48 ("KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data")Reviewed-by Mimi Zohar <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Nikolaus Voss <[email protected]>---
Changes
=======
v6: - fix checkpatch warnings
v5: - explain security issue in commit message, add Reviewd-by
v4: - change "Link:" address
v3: - use generated random key in example, reformat commit message
v2: - clarify commit message, add example to recover old/broken keys
- improve example inDocumentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
- add link to ltp patchDocumentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst | 3 ++- security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 6 +++--- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst +2
-1@@ -350,7 +350,8 @@ Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob:: Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data:: - $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 `cat evm_decrypted_data.blob`" @u + $ evmkey=$(dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1 count=32 | xxd -c32 -p) + $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 $evmkey" @u 794890253 $ keyctl print 794890253security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +3
-3@@ -627,7 +627,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,pr_err ("encrypted key: instantiation of keys using provided decrypted data is disabled since CONFIG_USER_DECRYPTED_DATA is set to false\n" );return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); } -if (strlen (decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) { +if (strlen (decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen *2 ) {pr_err ("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n" );return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); }@@ -791,8 +791,8 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload, ret =encrypted_key_decrypt (epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv); }else if (decrypted_data) {get_random_bytes (epayload->iv, ivsize); -memcpy (epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data, - epayload->decrypted_datalen); + ret =hex2bin (epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data, + epayload->decrypted_datalen); }else {get_random_bytes (epayload->iv, ivsize);get_random_bytes (epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen);Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Did you check that this passes "checkpatch.pl --strict"?
Your earlier version did not.
BR, Jarkko