[4.17?] x86: also zap secondary time area handles during soft reset
PATCH 1/1 [4.17?] x86: also zap secondary time area handles during soft reset
Just like domain_soft_reset() properly zaps runstate area handles, the secondary time area ones also need discarding to prevent guest memory corruption once the guest is re-started.
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To avoid another for_each_vcpu() here, domain_soft_reset() could also be made call a new arch_vcpu_soft_reset() out of its already present loop. Yet that would make the change less isolated.
In domain_soft_reset() I wonder whether, just like done here, the zapping of runstate area handles and vCPU info mappings wouldn't better be done after all operations which can fail. But perhaps for this to matter the domain is left in too inconsistent a state anyway if the function fails ... However, at the very least I wonder whether x86'es restriction to HVM shouldn't leave PV guests undisturbed if a soft-reset was attempted on them. Right now they not only have state partially clobbered, but (if the arch function is reached) they would be crashed unconditionally.
xen/arch/x86/domain.c +6 -0
@@ -951,6 +951,7 @@ int arch_domain_soft_reset(struct domainstruct page_info *page =virt_to_page (d->shared_info), *new_page;int ret =0 ;struct domain *owner; +struct vcpu *v;mfn_t mfn;gfn_t gfn;p2m_type_t p2mt;
@@ -1030,7 +1031,12 @@ int arch_domain_soft_reset(struct domain"Failed to add a page to replace %pd's shared_info frame %" PRI_gfn"\n" , d, gfn_x(gfn));free_domheap_page (new_page); + goto exit_put_gfn; } + + for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) +set_xen_guest_handle (v->arch.time_info_guest,NULL ); + exit_put_gfn:put_gfn (d,gfn_x (gfn)); exit_put_page:
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
Just like
domain_soft_reset()properly zaps runstate area handles, the secondary time area ones also need discarding to prevent guest memory corruption once the guest is re-started.Signed-off-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Quoted 10 lines
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To avoid anotherfor_each_vcpu()here,domain_soft_reset()could also be made call a newarch_vcpu_soft_reset()out of its already present loop. Yet that would make the change less isolated.In
domain_soft_reset()I wonder whether, just like done here, the zapping of runstate area handles and vCPU info mappings wouldn't better be done after all operations which can fail. But perhaps for this to matter the domain is left in too inconsistent a state anyway if the function fails ...
We would need some kind of recovery anyway, so given the current code and lack of recovery it doesn't seem to matter much.
Quoted 5 lines
However, at the very least I wonder whether x86'es restriction to HVM shouldn't leave PV guests undisturbed if a soft-reset was attempted on them. Right now they not only have state partially clobbered, but (if the arch function is reached) they would be crashed unconditionally.
It's a toolstack initiated operation by a domctl, so I'm fine with saying that it's up for the toolstack to prevent soft resets from being attempted against PV domains. Would be nice to reject the operation earlier on the hypervisor, maybe by moving arch_domain_soft_reset() earlier in domain_soft_reset() so that we can return without crashing?
In any case it's unlikely for a domain that was attempting a soft reset to survive the hypervisor rejecting the operation, so it doesn't matter much whether the domain is crashed by Xen or left as-is I would think.
Thanks, Roger.
Quoted 8 lines · Roger Pau Monné
Quoted 5 lines · Jan Beulich
Just like
domain_soft_reset()properly zaps runstate area handles, the secondary time area ones also need discarding to prevent guest memory corruption once the guest is re-started.Signed-off-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Roger Pau Monné <[email protected]>
Thanks.
Quoted 20 lines
Quoted 10 lines
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To avoid anotherfor_each_vcpu()here,domain_soft_reset()could also be made call a newarch_vcpu_soft_reset()out of its already present loop. Yet that would make the change less isolated.In
domain_soft_reset()I wonder whether, just like done here, the zapping of runstate area handles and vCPU info mappings wouldn't better be done after all operations which can fail. But perhaps for this to matter the domain is left in too inconsistent a state anyway if the function fails ...We would need some kind of recovery anyway, so given the current code and lack of recovery it doesn't seem to matter much.
Quoted 5 lines
However, at the very least I wonder whether x86'es restriction to HVM shouldn't leave PV guests undisturbed if a soft-reset was attempted on them. Right now they not only have state partially clobbered, but (if the arch function is reached) they would be crashed unconditionally.
Quoted 6 lines
It's a toolstack initiated operation by a domctl, so I'm fine with saying that it's up for the toolstack to prevent soft resets from being attempted against PV domains. Would be nice to reject the operation earlier on the hypervisor, maybe by moving
arch_domain_soft_reset()earlier indomain_soft_reset()so that we can return without crashing?
I wasn't sure about moving arch_domain_soft_reset() as a whole, but yes, if that wouldn't cause other interaction issues this might be an option.
Quoted 4 lines
In any case it's unlikely for a domain that was attempting a soft reset to survive the hypervisor rejecting the operation, so it doesn't matter much whether the domain is crashed by Xen or left as-is I would think.
I'm sorry, I don't think I understand what you're saying here. For PV I'd very much expect the guest to survive; it may of course then be crashed or destroyed by a further tool stack operation.
Jan
Quoted 6 lines · Jan Beulich
Quoted 1 line · Roger Pau Monné
On Thu, Oct 13, 2022 at 08:48:21AM +0200, Jan Beulich wrote:
I wasn't sure about moving
arch_domain_soft_reset()as a whole, but yes, if that wouldn't cause other interaction issues this might be an option.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
In any case it's unlikely for a domain that was attempting a soft reset to survive the hypervisor rejecting the operation, so it doesn't matter much whether the domain is crashed by Xen or left as-is I would think.
I'm sorry, I don't think I understand what you're saying here. For PV I'd very much expect the guest to survive; it may of course then be crashed or destroyed by a further tool stack operation.
I was expecting a domain that goes to the length of preparing for a soft reset operation to either perform such soft reset, or die as a result (and perform a non-soft reset), as recovering into the previous state won't be feasible. But maybe I'm wrong.
Thanks, Roger.
Hi Jan,
Quoted 10 lines
-----Original Message-----
From: Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH][4.17?] x86: also zap secondary time area handles during soft resetJust like
domain_soft_reset()properly zaps runstate area handles, the secondary time area ones also need discarding to prevent guest memory corruption once the guest is re-started.Signed-off-by Jan Beulich <[email protected]>
Kind regards,
Henry