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KVM: nVMX: Add IBPB between L2 and L1 to

PATCH Applied Jim Mattson 2 participants 7 messages Oct 19, 2022 – Dec 2, 2022

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#0 lore raw

v2 cover KVM: nVMX: Add IBPB between L2 and L1 to

Since L1 and L2 share branch prediction modes (guest {kernel,user}), the hardware will not protect indirect branches in L1 from steering by a malicious agent in L2. However, IBRS guarantees this protection. (For basic IBRS, a value of 1 must be written to IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after the transition from L2 to L1.)

Fix the regression introduced in commit 5c911beff20a ("KVM: nVMX: Skip IBPB when switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02") by issuing an IBPB when emulating a VM-exit from L2 to L1.

This is CVE-2022-2196.

v2: Reworded some comments [Sean].

Jim Mattson (2):
KVM: VMX: Guest usage of IA32_SPEC_CTRL is likely
KVM: VMX: Execute IBPB on emulated VM-exit when guest has IBRS

 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 10 ++++++----
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0.413.g74048e4d9e-goog
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/2 KVM: VMX: Guest usage of IA32_SPEC_CTRL is likely

At this point in time, most guests (in the default, out-of-the-box configuration) are likely to use IA32_SPEC_CTRL. Therefore, drop the compiler hint that it is unlikely for KVM to be intercepting WRMSR of IA32_SPEC_CTRL.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -1
index 9dba04b6b019..b092f61b8258 100644
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ unsigned int __vmx_vcpu_run_flags(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	 * to change it directly without causing a vmexit.  In that case read
 	 * it after vmexit and store it in vmx->spec_ctrl.
 	 */
-	if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
+	if (!msr_write_intercepted(vmx, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL))
 		flags |= VMX_RUN_SAVE_SPEC_CTRL;
 
 	return flags;
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0.413.g74048e4d9e-goog
maintainer Reviewed-by on v2 1/2
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 1/2] KVM: VMX: Guest usage of IA32_SPEC_CTRL is likely

Quoted 7 lines · Jim Mattson

At this point in time, most guests (in the default, out-of-the-box configuration) are likely to use IA32_SPEC_CTRL. Therefore, drop the compiler hint that it is unlikely for KVM to be intercepting WRMSR of IA32_SPEC_CTRL.

---

#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/2 KVM: VMX: Execute IBPB on emulated VM-exit when guest has IBRS

In reply to Jim Mattson

According to Intel's document on Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation, "Enabling IBRS does not prevent software from controlling the predicted targets of indirect branches of unrelated software executed later at the same predictor mode (for example, between two different user applications, or two different virtual machines). Such isolation can be ensured through use of the Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) command." This applies to both basic and enhanced IBRS.

Since L1 and L2 VMs share hardware predictor modes (guest-user and guest-kernel), hardware IBRS is not sufficient to virtualize IBRS. (The way that basic IBRS is implemented on pre-eIBRS parts, hardware IBRS is actually sufficient in practice, even though it isn't sufficient architecturally.)

For virtual CPUs that support IBRS, add an indirect branch prediction barrier on emulated VM-exit, to ensure that the predicted targets of indirect branches executed in L1 cannot be controlled by software that was executed in L2.

Since we typically don't intercept guest writes to IA32_SPEC_CTRL, perform the IBPB at emulated VM-exit regardless of the current IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS value, even though the IBPB could technically be deferred until L1 sets IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS, if IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS is clear at emulated VM-exit.

This is CVE-2022-2196.

Fixes 5c911beff20a ("KVM: nVMX: Skip IBPB when switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02")
Cc Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    |  6 ++++--
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +11 -0
index 0c62352dda6a..cd70ab63e919 100644
@@ -4767,6 +4767,17 @@ void nested_vmx_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 vm_exit_reason,
 
 	vmx_switch_vmcs(vcpu, &vmx->vmcs01);
 
+	/*
+	 * If IBRS is advertised to the vCPU, KVM must flush the indirect
+	 * branch predictors when transitioning from L2 to L1, as L1 expects
+	 * hardware (KVM in this case) to provide separate predictor modes.
+	 * Bare metal isolates VMX root (host) from VMX non-root (guest), but
+	 * doesn't isolate different VMCSs, i.e. in this case, doesn't provide
+	 * separate modes for L2 vs L1.
+	 */
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
+		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+
 	/* Update any VMCS fields that might have changed while L2 ran */
 	vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.host.nr);
 	vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, vmx->msr_autoload.guest.nr);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +4 -2
index b092f61b8258..c12fd0ca3ad6 100644
@@ -1348,8 +1348,10 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
 
 		/*
 		 * No indirect branch prediction barrier needed when switching
-		 * the active VMCS within a guest, e.g. on nested VM-Enter.
-		 * The L1 VMM can protect itself with retpolines, IBPB or IBRS.
+		 * the active VMCS within a vCPU, unless IBRS is advertised to
+		 * the vCPU.  To minimize the number of IBPBs executed, KVM
+		 * performs IBPB on nested VM-Exit (a single nested transition
+		 * may switch the active VMCS multiple times).
 		 */
 		if (!buddy || WARN_ON_ONCE(buddy->vmcs != prev))
 			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
Signature · 1 line
2.38.0.413.g74048e4d9e-goog
maintainer Reviewed-by on v2 2/2
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] KVM: VMX: Execute IBPB on emulated VM-exit when guest has IBRS

Quoted 25 lines · Jim Mattson

According to Intel's document on Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation, "Enabling IBRS does not prevent software from controlling the predicted targets of indirect branches of unrelated software executed later at the same predictor mode (for example, between two different user applications, or two different virtual machines). Such isolation can be ensured through use of the Indirect Branch Predictor Barrier (IBPB) command." This applies to both basic and enhanced IBRS.

Since L1 and L2 VMs share hardware predictor modes (guest-user and guest-kernel), hardware IBRS is not sufficient to virtualize IBRS. (The way that basic IBRS is implemented on pre-eIBRS parts, hardware IBRS is actually sufficient in practice, even though it isn't sufficient architecturally.)

For virtual CPUs that support IBRS, add an indirect branch prediction barrier on emulated VM-exit, to ensure that the predicted targets of indirect branches executed in L1 cannot be controlled by software that was executed in L2.

Since we typically don't intercept guest writes to IA32_SPEC_CTRL, perform the IBPB at emulated VM-exit regardless of the current IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS value, even though the IBPB could technically be deferred until L1 sets IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS, if IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS is clear at emulated VM-exit.

Quoted 6 lines

This is CVE-2022-2196.

Fixes 5c911beff20a ("KVM: nVMX: Skip IBPB when switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02")
Cc Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

---

#5 lore raw
In reply to Jim Mattson
Quoted 19 lines · Jim Mattson

Since L1 and L2 share branch prediction modes (guest {kernel,user}), the hardware will not protect indirect branches in L1 from steering by a malicious agent in L2. However, IBRS guarantees this protection. (For basic IBRS, a value of 1 must be written to IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after the transition from L2 to L1.)

Fix the regression introduced in commit 5c911beff20a ("KVM: nVMX: Skip IBPB when switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02") by issuing an IBPB when emulating a VM-exit from L2 to L1.

This is CVE-2022-2196.

v2: Reworded some comments [Sean].

Jim Mattson (2):
KVM: VMX: Guest usage of IA32_SPEC_CTRL is likely
KVM: VMX: Execute IBPB on emulated VM-exit when guest has IBRS

Quoted 7 lines
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 10 ++++++----
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--
2.38.0.413.g74048e4d9e-goog

Ping?

maintainer Applied
#6 lore raw
In reply to Jim Mattson
Quoted 14 lines · Jim Mattson

Since L1 and L2 share branch prediction modes (guest {kernel,user}), the hardware will not protect indirect branches in L1 from steering by a malicious agent in L2. However, IBRS guarantees this protection. (For basic IBRS, a value of 1 must be written to IA32_SPEC_CTRL.IBRS after the transition from L2 to L1.)

Fix the regression introduced in commit 5c911beff20a ("KVM: nVMX: Skip IBPB when switching between vmcs01 and vmcs02") by issuing an IBPB when emulating a VM-exit from L2 to L1.

This is CVE-2022-2196.

v2: Reworded some comments [Sean].

Quoted 9 lines

Jim Mattson (2):
KVM: VMX: Guest usage of IA32_SPEC_CTRL is likely
KVM: VMX: Execute IBPB on emulated VM-exit when guest has IBRS

 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 11 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 10 ++++++----
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

Merged to kvm/queue, thanks!

https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]