evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors

PATCH In review Nicolas Bouchinet 3 participants 7 messages Nov 25, 2022 – Nov 29, 2022

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BPF Security (LSM) Keys-trusted Integrity measurement architecture (IMA) +1 more subsystems

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Nicolas Bouchinet

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2022-11-25 15:57 UTC #0 lore raw

PATCH v5 1/1 evm: Correct inode_init_security hooks behaviors

From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>

Fixes a NULL pointer dereference occurring in the evm_protected_xattr_common function of the EVM LSM. The bug is triggered if a inode_init_security hook returns 0 without initializing the given struct xattr fields (which is the case of BPF) and if no other LSM overrides thoses fields after. This also leads to memory leaks.

The call_int_hook_xattr macro has been inlined into the security_inode_init_security hook in order to check hooks return values and skip ones who doesn't init xattrs.

Modify evm_init_hmac function to init the EVM hmac using every entry of the given xattr array.

The MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR value is now based on the security modules compiled in, which gives room for SMACK, SELinux, Apparmor, BPF and IMA/EVM security attributes.

Changes the default return value of the inode_init_security hook definition to -EOPNOTSUPP.

Changes the hook documentation to match the behavior of the LSMs using it (only xattr->value is initialised with kmalloc and thus is the only one that should be kfreed by the caller).

Cc [email protected]

Signed-off-by Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>

---
Changes since v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1lElHVQGT%2F1Pa6O@archlinux/
* Updated the security_inode_init_security() hook documentation.
* Moved the NULL pointer dereference check from evm_protected_xattr_common() inside the LSM hook calls loop of the security_inode_init_security() function (as suggested by Roberto Sassu).
* Fixes the error return conditions of the hlist_for_each_entry()
loop in the security_inode_init_security() function (as suggested by Roberto Sassu).
* Fixes the evm_xattr pointer calculation before the evm_inode_init_security() call (as suggested by Roberto Sassu).

Changes since v3:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1fu4jofqLHVDprT@archlinux/
* Fixes compilation error reported by the kernel test robot.

Changes since v2:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1K3bf+dtNnVe7DG@archlinux/
* The evm_init_hmacs has been merged with evm_init_hmac (as suggested by Mimi Zohar).
* The commit message has been updated to match the patch changes.

Changes since v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/Y1FTSIo+1x+4X0LS@archlinux/
* The call_int_hook_xattr macro has been inlined into the security_inode_init_security hook (as suggested by Paul Moor, Mickaël Salaün and Casey Schaufler).
* The MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR value is processed based on compiled LSMs (as proposed by Casey Schaufler).
* Various typos and cosmetic changes has been fixed (as suggested by Mickaël Salaün)
* A MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR test has been wrapped in a WARN_ON_ONCE macro (as suggested by Mickaël Salaün).

---
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  2 +-
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h           |  6 ++---
 security/integrity/evm/evm.h        |  1 +
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c |  9 +++++--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   |  5 ++--
 security/security.c                 | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 6 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)

include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +1 -1

index ec119da1d89b4..0ba396f08c4f1 100644
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, path_notify, const struct path *path, u64 mask,
 	 unsigned int obj_type)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_alloc_security, struct inode *inode)
 LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security, struct inode *inode)
-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
+LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
 	 struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
 	 void **value, size_t *len)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode,

include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +3 -3

index 4ec80b96c22e7..8a2762f7e75f5 100644
@@ -229,15 +229,15 @@
  *	This hook is called by the fs code as part of the inode creation
  *	transaction and provides for atomic labeling of the inode, unlike
  *	the post_create/mkdir/... hooks called by the VFS.  The hook function
- *	is expected to allocate the name and value via kmalloc, with the caller
- *	being responsible for calling kfree after using them.
+ *	is expected to allocate the value via kmalloc, with the caller
+ *	being responsible for calling kfree after using it.
  *	If the security module does not use security attributes or does
  *	not wish to put a security attribute on this particular inode,
  *	then it should return -EOPNOTSUPP to skip this processing.
  *	@inode contains the inode structure of the newly created inode.
  *	@dir contains the inode structure of the parent directory.
  *	@qstr contains the last path component of the new object
- *	@name will be set to the allocated name suffix (e.g. selinux).
+ *	@name will be set to a name suffix (e.g. selinux).
  *	@value will be set to the allocated attribute value.
  *	@len will be set to the length of the value.
  *	Returns 0 if @name and @value have been successfully set,

security/integrity/evm/evm.h +1 -0

index f8b8c5004fc7c..6d9628ca7c246 100644
@@ -61,5 +61,6 @@ int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name,
 int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr,
 		  char *hmac_val);
 int evm_init_secfs(void);
+int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name);
 
 #endif

security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +7 -2

index 708de9656bbd2..06639f3cfb383 100644
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	return rc;
 }
 
-int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
+int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattrs,
 		  char *hmac_val)
 {
 	struct shash_desc *desc;

@@ -396,7 +396,12 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr,
 		return PTR_ERR(desc);
 	}
 
-	crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len);
+	for (int i = 0; lsm_xattrs[i].value != NULL; i++) {
+		if (evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattrs[i].name))
+			crypto_shash_update(desc,
+					    lsm_xattrs[i].value,
+					    lsm_xattrs[i].value_len);
+	}
 	hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val);
 	kfree(desc);
 	return 0;

security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +2 -3

index 23d484e05e6f2..35a060a6124c5 100644
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static int evm_protected_xattr_common(const char *req_xattr_name,
 	return found;
 }
 
-static int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
+int evm_protected_xattr(const char *req_xattr_name)
 {
 	return evm_protected_xattr_common(req_xattr_name, false);
 }

@@ -852,8 +852,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode,
 	struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) ||
-	    !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name))
+	if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC))
 		return 0;
 
 	xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS);

security/security.c +30 -9

index 79d82cb6e4696..6cdd3fdc08fbc 100644
@@ -30,7 +30,11 @@
 #include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <net/flow.h>
 
-#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR	2
+#define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR                                \
+	((IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EVM) ? 1 : 0) +              \
+	 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) ? 1 : 0) + \
+	 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) ? 1 : 0) +   \
+	 (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) ? 1 : 0))
 
 /* How many LSMs were built into the kernel? */
 #define LSM_COUNT (__end_lsm_info - __start_lsm_info)

@@ -1093,9 +1097,11 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				 const struct qstr *qstr,
 				 const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
 {
+	int initialized_lsms = 0;
+	int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	struct xattr new_xattrs[MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR + 1];
 	struct xattr *lsm_xattr, *evm_xattr, *xattr;
-	int ret;
+	struct security_hook_list *hook_ptr;
 
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
 		return 0;

@@ -1105,15 +1111,30 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
 				     dir, qstr, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 	memset(new_xattrs, 0, sizeof(new_xattrs));
 	lsm_xattr = new_xattrs;
-	ret = call_int_hook(inode_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode, dir, qstr,
-						&lsm_xattr->name,
-						&lsm_xattr->value,
-						&lsm_xattr->value_len);
-	if (ret)
+	hlist_for_each_entry(hook_ptr, &security_hook_heads.inode_init_security,
+			     list) {
+		ret = hook_ptr->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+				&lsm_xattr->name,
+				&lsm_xattr->value,
+				&lsm_xattr->value_len);
+		if (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP)
+			continue;
+		if (ret != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(initialized_lsms >= MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR ||
+						     !lsm_xattr->name ||
+						     !lsm_xattr->value)) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		lsm_xattr++;
+		initialized_lsms++;
+	}
+	if (!initialized_lsms)
 		goto out;
 
-	evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
-	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
+	evm_xattr = lsm_xattr;
+	ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs, evm_xattr);
 	if (ret)
 		goto out;
 	ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);

Signature · 1 line

2.38.1

Mimi Zohar

maintainer

2022-11-29 11:29 UTC #1 lore raw

Quoted 23 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet

From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
Fixes a NULL pointer dereference occurring in the evm_protected_xattr_common function of the EVM LSM. The bug is triggered if a inode_init_security hook returns 0 without initializing the given struct xattr fields (which is the case of BPF) and if no other LSM overrides thoses fields after. This also leads to memory leaks.
The call_int_hook_xattr macro has been inlined into the security_inode_init_security hook in order to check hooks return values and skip ones who doesn't init xattrs.
Modify evm_init_hmac function to init the EVM hmac using every entry of the given xattr array.
The MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR value is now based on the security modules compiled in, which gives room for SMACK, SELinux, Apparmor, BPF and IMA/EVM security attributes.
Changes the default return value of the inode_init_security hook definition to -EOPNOTSUPP.

Quoted 6 lines

Changes the hook documentation to match the behavior of the LSMs using it (only xattr->value is initialised with kmalloc and thus is the only one that should be kfreed by the caller).
Cc [email protected]
Signed-off-by Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>

What is the relationship between this patch and Roberto's patch set? Roberto, if there is an overlap, then at minimum there should be a Reported-by tag indicating that your patch set addresses a bug reported by Nicolas.

Signature · 3 lines

thanks,

Mimi

Roberto Sassu

2022-11-29 12:22 UTC #2 lore raw

Quoted 28 lines · Mimi Zohar

Quoted 27 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
Fixes a NULL pointer dereference occurring in the evm_protected_xattr_common function of the EVM LSM. The bug is triggered if a inode_init_security hook returns 0 without initializing the given struct xattr fields (which is the case of BPF) and if no other LSM overrides thoses fields after. This also leads to memory leaks.
The call_int_hook_xattr macro has been inlined into the security_inode_init_security hook in order to check hooks return values and skip ones who doesn't init xattrs.
Modify evm_init_hmac function to init the EVM hmac using every entry of the given xattr array.
The MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR value is now based on the security modules compiled in, which gives room for SMACK, SELinux, Apparmor, BPF and IMA/EVM security attributes.
Changes the default return value of the inode_init_security hook definition to -EOPNOTSUPP.
Changes the hook documentation to match the behavior of the LSMs using it (only xattr->value is initialised with kmalloc and thus is the only one that should be kfreed by the caller).

Quoted 7 lines

Quoted 2 lines
Cc [email protected]
Signed-off-by Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
What is the relationship between this patch and Roberto's patch set? Roberto, if there is an overlap, then at minimum there should be a Reported-by tag indicating that your patch set addresses a bug reported by Nicolas.

Agreed, I will add a Reported-by for the bug reported by Nicolas.

For the rest, my patch set introduces a similar functionality, with the difference that it uses the reservation mechanism instead of static allocation for xattrs, as suggested by Paul.

Roberto

Nicolas Bouchinet

author

2022-11-29 12:59 UTC #3 lore raw

In reply to Mimi Zohar

Hi Mimi,

Quoted 28 lines · Mimi Zohar

Quoted 27 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
Fixes a NULL pointer dereference occurring in the evm_protected_xattr_common function of the EVM LSM. The bug is triggered if a inode_init_security hook returns 0 without initializing the given struct xattr fields (which is the case of BPF) and if no other LSM overrides thoses fields after. This also leads to memory leaks.
The call_int_hook_xattr macro has been inlined into the security_inode_init_security hook in order to check hooks return values and skip ones who doesn't init xattrs.
Modify evm_init_hmac function to init the EVM hmac using every entry of the given xattr array.
The MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR value is now based on the security modules compiled in, which gives room for SMACK, SELinux, Apparmor, BPF and IMA/EVM security attributes.
Changes the default return value of the inode_init_security hook definition to -EOPNOTSUPP.
Changes the hook documentation to match the behavior of the LSMs using it (only xattr->value is initialised with kmalloc and thus is the only one that should be kfreed by the caller).

Quoted 7 lines

Quoted 2 lines
Cc [email protected]
Signed-off-by Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
What is the relationship between this patch and Roberto's patch set? Roberto, if there is an overlap, then at minimum there should be a Reported-by tag indicating that your patch set addresses a bug reported by Nicolas.

This patch fixes the EVM NULL pointer dereference I have reported, and additionally improves the stackability of this LSM hook. This latter improvement was originally addressed by Roberto's patchset, and thus I see no problem for my fix to be merged within his patchset.

Quoted 6 lines

Signature · 4 lines
-- 
thanks,

Mimi

Thanks for your time,

Nicolas Bouchinet

Roberto Sassu

2022-11-29 13:13 UTC #4 lore raw

Quoted 39 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet

Hi Mimi,
Quoted 28 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 27 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
Fixes a NULL pointer dereference occurring in the evm_protected_xattr_common function of the EVM LSM. The bug is triggered if a inode_init_security hook returns 0 without initializing the given struct xattr fields (which is the case of BPF) and if no other LSM overrides thoses fields after. This also leads to memory leaks.
The call_int_hook_xattr macro has been inlined into the security_inode_init_security hook in order to check hooks return values and skip ones who doesn't init xattrs.
Modify evm_init_hmac function to init the EVM hmac using every entry of the given xattr array.
The MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR value is now based on the security modules compiled in, which gives room for SMACK, SELinux, Apparmor, BPF and IMA/EVM security attributes.
Changes the default return value of the inode_init_security hook definition to -EOPNOTSUPP.
Changes the hook documentation to match the behavior of the LSMs using it (only xattr->value is initialised with kmalloc and thus is the only one that should be kfreed by the caller).
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Cc [email protected]
Signed-off-by Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
What is the relationship between this patch and Roberto's patch set? Roberto, if there is an overlap, then at minimum there should be a Reported-by tag indicating that your patch set addresses a bug reported by Nicolas.

Quoted 4 lines

This patch fixes the EVM NULL pointer dereference I have reported, and additionally improves the stackability of this LSM hook. This latter improvement was originally addressed by Roberto's patchset, and thus I see no problem for my fix to be merged within his patchset.

+ if (!num_filled_xattrs)

                goto out;

-       evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
-       ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
+       ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs,

+ new_xattrs + num_filled_xattrs);

This part of patch 4 should be enough to fix the issue, until EVM is outside the LSM infrastructure.

It prevents EVM from being called if there are no xattrs filled (the panic occurred due to xattr->name being NULL).

Then, this part of patch 6:

+ for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) {
+ if (evm_protected_xattr(xattr->name))
+ evm_protected_xattrs = true;
+ }
+
+ /* EVM xattr not needed. */
+ if (!evm_protected_xattrs)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;

should be sufficient for when EVM is managed by the LSM infrastructure.

security_check_compact_filled_xattrs() ensures that if xattr->value is not NULL, xattr->name is not NULL too.

Roberto

Quoted 9 lines

Quoted 5 lines
Signature · 3 lines
thanks,

Mimi
Thanks for your time,
Nicolas Bouchinet

Nicolas Bouchinet

author

2022-11-29 14:32 UTC #5 lore raw

Hi Roberto,

Quoted 70 lines · Roberto Sassu

Quoted 43 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet
Hi Mimi,
Quoted 28 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 27 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
Fixes a NULL pointer dereference occurring in the evm_protected_xattr_common function of the EVM LSM. The bug is triggered if a inode_init_security hook returns 0 without initializing the given struct xattr fields (which is the case of BPF) and if no other LSM overrides thoses fields after. This also leads to memory leaks.
The call_int_hook_xattr macro has been inlined into the security_inode_init_security hook in order to check hooks return values and skip ones who doesn't init xattrs.
Modify evm_init_hmac function to init the EVM hmac using every entry of the given xattr array.
The MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR value is now based on the security modules compiled in, which gives room for SMACK, SELinux, Apparmor, BPF and IMA/EVM security attributes.
Changes the default return value of the inode_init_security hook definition to -EOPNOTSUPP.
Changes the hook documentation to match the behavior of the LSMs using it (only xattr->value is initialised with kmalloc and thus is the only one that should be kfreed by the caller).
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Cc [email protected]
Signed-off-by Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
What is the relationship between this patch and Roberto's patch set? Roberto, if there is an overlap, then at minimum there should be a Reported-by tag indicating that your patch set addresses a bug reported by Nicolas.
This patch fixes the EVM NULL pointer dereference I have reported, and additionally improves the stackability of this LSM hook. This latter improvement was originally addressed by Roberto's patchset, and thus I see no problem for my fix to be merged within his patchset.
security/security.c +3 -2
+       if (!num_filled_xattrs)
                goto out;
 
-       evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
-       ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
+       ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs,
+                                     new_xattrs + num_filled_xattrs);
This part of patch 4 should be enough to fix the issue, until EVM is outside the LSM infrastructure.
It prevents EVM from being called if there are no xattrs filled (the panic occurred due to xattr->name being NULL).
Then, this part of patch 6:
(quoted diff) +8 -0
+       for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) {
+               if (evm_protected_xattr(xattr->name))
+                       evm_protected_xattrs = true;
+       }
+
+       /* EVM xattr not needed. */
+       if (!evm_protected_xattrs)
+               return -EOPNOTSUPP;

Quoted 5 lines

should be sufficient for when EVM is managed by the LSM infrastructure.
security_check_compact_filled_xattrs() ensures that if xattr->value is not NULL, xattr->name is not NULL too.

I think a Reported-by tag should enougth then !

Quoted 12 lines

Roberto
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Signature · 3 lines
thanks,

Mimi
Thanks for your time,
Nicolas Bouchinet

Thanks !
Nicolas Bouchinet

Roberto Sassu

2022-11-29 14:34 UTC #6 lore raw

Quoted 73 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet

Hi Roberto,
Quoted 70 lines · Roberto Sassu
Quoted 43 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet
Hi Mimi,
Quoted 28 lines · Mimi Zohar
Quoted 27 lines · Nicolas Bouchinet
From: Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
Fixes a NULL pointer dereference occurring in the evm_protected_xattr_common function of the EVM LSM. The bug is triggered if a inode_init_security hook returns 0 without initializing the given struct xattr fields (which is the case of BPF) and if no other LSM overrides thoses fields after. This also leads to memory leaks.
The call_int_hook_xattr macro has been inlined into the security_inode_init_security hook in order to check hooks return values and skip ones who doesn't init xattrs.
Modify evm_init_hmac function to init the EVM hmac using every entry of the given xattr array.
The MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR value is now based on the security modules compiled in, which gives room for SMACK, SELinux, Apparmor, BPF and IMA/EVM security attributes.
Changes the default return value of the inode_init_security hook definition to -EOPNOTSUPP.
Changes the hook documentation to match the behavior of the LSMs using it (only xattr->value is initialised with kmalloc and thus is the only one that should be kfreed by the caller).
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Cc [email protected]
Signed-off-by Nicolas Bouchinet <[email protected]>
What is the relationship between this patch and Roberto's patch set? Roberto, if there is an overlap, then at minimum there should be a Reported-by tag indicating that your patch set addresses a bug reported by Nicolas.
This patch fixes the EVM NULL pointer dereference I have reported, and additionally improves the stackability of this LSM hook. This latter improvement was originally addressed by Roberto's patchset, and thus I see no problem for my fix to be merged within his patchset.
security/security.c +3 -2
+       if (!num_filled_xattrs)
                goto out;
 
-       evm_xattr = lsm_xattr + 1;
-       ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, lsm_xattr, evm_xattr);
+       ret = evm_inode_init_security(inode, new_xattrs,
+                                     new_xattrs + num_filled_xattrs);
This part of patch 4 should be enough to fix the issue, until EVM is outside the LSM infrastructure.
It prevents EVM from being called if there are no xattrs filled (the panic occurred due to xattr->name being NULL).
Then, this part of patch 6:
(quoted diff) +8 -0
+       for (xattr = xattrs; xattr->value != NULL; xattr++) {
+               if (evm_protected_xattr(xattr->name))
+                       evm_protected_xattrs = true;
+       }
+
+       /* EVM xattr not needed. */
+       if (!evm_protected_xattrs)
+               return -EOPNOTSUPP;

Quoted 6 lines

Quoted 5 lines
should be sufficient for when EVM is managed by the LSM infrastructure.
security_check_compact_filled_xattrs() ensures that if xattr->value is not NULL, xattr->name is not NULL too.
I think a Reported-by tag should enougth then !

Perfect, will do.

Thanks for reporting the issue.

Roberto

Quoted 14 lines

Quoted 11 lines
Roberto
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Signature · 3 lines
thanks,

Mimi
Thanks for your time,
Nicolas Bouchinet
Thanks !
Nicolas Bouchinet