Harden a few virtio bits
Subsystems (6)
cover Harden a few virtio bits
Hi,
Here are 6 patches that harden console, net and 9p drivers against various malicious host input as well as close a bounds check bypass in the split virtio ring.
Changes since previous version:
* Added Christian's R-B to 3/6
* Added a speculation fix per Michael's comment on the cover letter
* CC'ing lkml
Alexander Shishkin (3):
virtio console: Harden control message handling
virtio_net: Guard against buffer length overflow in
xdp_linearize_page()
virtio_ring: Prevent bounds check bypass on descriptor index
Andi Kleen (3):
virtio console: Harden multiport against invalid host input virtio console: Harden port adding
virtio 9p: Fix an overflow
drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 4 +++- drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c | 3 +++ net/9p/trans_virtio.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
PATCH 1/6 virtio console: Harden multiport against invalid host input
From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
It's possible for the host to set the multiport flag, but pass in 0 multiports, which results in:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in init_vqs+0x244/0x6c0 drivers/char/virtio_console.c:1878 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888001cc24a0 by task swapper/1 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-140273-gaab0bb9fbaa1-dirty #588 Call Trace: init_vqs+0x244/0x6c0 drivers/char/virtio_console.c:1878 virtcons_probe+0x1a3/0x5b0 drivers/char/virtio_console.c:2042 virtio_dev_probe+0x2b9/0x500 drivers/virtio/virtio.c:263 call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:515 really_probe+0x1c9/0x5b0 drivers/base/dd.c:601 really_probe_debug drivers/base/dd.c:694 __driver_probe_device+0x10d/0x1f0 drivers/base/dd.c:754 driver_probe_device+0x68/0x150 drivers/base/dd.c:786 __driver_attach+0xca/0x200 drivers/base/dd.c:1145 bus_for_each_dev+0x108/0x190 drivers/base/bus.c:301 driver_attach+0x30/0x40 drivers/base/dd.c:1162 bus_add_driver+0x325/0x3c0 drivers/base/bus.c:618 driver_register+0xf3/0x1d0 drivers/base/driver.c:171
...
Add a suitable sanity check.
--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +3 -0
@@ -1843,6 +1843,9 @@ static int init_vqs(struct ports_device *portdev)int err; nr_ports = portdev->max_nr_ports; +if (use_multiport (portdev) && nr_ports <1 ) +return -EINVAL ; + nr_queues =use_multiport (portdev) ? (nr_ports +1 ) *2 :2 ; vqs =kmalloc_array (nr_queues,sizeof (struct virtqueue *),GFP_KERNEL );
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 1/6] virtio console: Harden multiport against invalid host input
Quoted 53 lines · Alexander Shishkin
From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
It's possible for the host to set the multiport flag, but pass in 0 multiports, which results in:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in init_vqs+0x244/0x6c0 drivers/char/virtio_console.c:1878 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888001cc24a0 by task swapper/1 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-140273-gaab0bb9fbaa1-dirty #588 Call Trace: init_vqs+0x244/0x6c0 drivers/char/virtio_console.c:1878 virtcons_probe+0x1a3/0x5b0 drivers/char/virtio_console.c:2042 virtio_dev_probe+0x2b9/0x500 drivers/virtio/virtio.c:263 call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:515 really_probe+0x1c9/0x5b0 drivers/base/dd.c:601 really_probe_debug drivers/base/dd.c:694 __driver_probe_device+0x10d/0x1f0 drivers/base/dd.c:754 driver_probe_device+0x68/0x150 drivers/base/dd.c:786 __driver_attach+0xca/0x200 drivers/base/dd.c:1145 bus_for_each_dev+0x108/0x190 drivers/base/bus.c:301 driver_attach+0x30/0x40 drivers/base/dd.c:1162 bus_add_driver+0x325/0x3c0 drivers/base/bus.c:618 driver_register+0xf3/0x1d0 drivers/base/driver.c:171...
Add a suitable sanity check.
Signed-off-by Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>Cc Amit Shah <[email protected]>Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)drivers/char/virtio_console.c +3
-0@@ -1843,6 +1843,9 @@ static int init_vqs(struct ports_device *portdev)int err; nr_ports = portdev->max_nr_ports; +if (use_multiport (portdev) && nr_ports <1 ) +return -EINVAL ; + nr_queues =use_multiport (portdev) ? (nr_ports +1 ) *2 :2 ; vqs =kmalloc_array (nr_queues,sizeof (struct virtqueue *),GFP_KERNEL );Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Why did I only get a small subset of these patches?
And why is the whole thread not on lore.kernel.org?
And the term "hardening" is marketing fluff. Just say, "properly parse
input" or something like that, as what you are doing is fixing assumptions about the data here, not causing anything to be more (or less) secure.
But, this still feels wrong. Why is this happening here, in init_vqs() and not in the calling function that already did a bunch of validation of the ports and the like? Are those checks not enough? if not, fix it there, don't spread it out all over the place...
thanks,
greg k-h
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Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] virtio console: Harden multiport against invalid host input
Quoted 14 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 13 lines · Alexander Shishkin
From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +3
-0@@ -1843,6 +1843,9 @@ static int init_vqs(struct ports_device *portdev)int err; nr_ports = portdev->max_nr_ports; +if (use_multiport (portdev) && nr_ports <1 ) +return -EINVAL ; + nr_queues =use_multiport (portdev) ? (nr_ports +1 ) *2 :2 ;
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +0
-0vqs =kmalloc_array (nr_queues,sizeof (struct virtqueue *),GFP_KERNEL );Signature · 1 line
2.39.0Why did I only get a small subset of these patches?
I did what get_maintainer told me. Would you like to be CC'd on the whole thing?
Quoted 1 line
And why is the whole thread not on lore.kernel.org?
That is a mystery, some wires got crossed between my smtp and vger. I bounced the series to lkml just now and at least some of it seems to have landed on lore.
Quoted 9 lines
And the term "hardening" is marketing fluff. Just say, "properly parse
input" or something like that, as what you are doing is fixing assumptions about the data here, not causing anything to be more (or less) secure.But, this still feels wrong. Why is this happening here, in
init_vqs()and not in the calling function that already did a bunch of validation of the ports and the like? Are those checks not enough? if not, fix it there, don't spread it out all over the place...
Good point! And there happens to already be 28962ec595d70 that takes care of exactly this case. I totally missed it.
Regards,
--
Alex
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 1/6] virtio console: Harden multiport against invalid host input
Quoted 23 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 14 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 13 lines · Alexander Shishkin
From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +3
-0@@ -1843,6 +1843,9 @@ static int init_vqs(struct ports_device *portdev)int err; nr_ports = portdev->max_nr_ports; +if (use_multiport (portdev) && nr_ports <1 ) +return -EINVAL ; + nr_queues =use_multiport (portdev) ? (nr_ports +1 ) *2 :2 ;Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +0
-0vqs =kmalloc_array (nr_queues,sizeof (struct virtqueue *),GFP_KERNEL );Signature · 1 line
2.39.0Why did I only get a small subset of these patches?
Quoted 2 lines
I did what
get_maintainertold me. Would you like to be CC'd on the whole thing?
If you only cc: me on a portion of the series, I guess you only want me to apply a portion of it? if so, why is it a longer series?
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 1 line
And why is the whole thread not on lore.kernel.org?
That is a mystery, some wires got crossed between my smtp and vger. I bounced the series to lkml just now and at least some of it seems to have landed on lore.
Quoted 5 lines
And the term "hardening" is marketing fluff. Just say, "properly parse
input" or something like that, as what you are doing is fixing assumptions about the data here, not causing anything to be more (or less) secure.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
But, this still feels wrong. Why is this happening here, in
init_vqs()and not in the calling function that already did a bunch of validation of the ports and the like? Are those checks not enough? if not, fix it there, don't spread it out all over the place...Good point! And there happens to already be
28962ec595d70that takes care of exactly this case. I totally missed it.
So this series is not needed? Or just this one?
greg k-h
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Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] virtio console: Harden multiport against invalid host input
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 6 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 1 line · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Why did I only get a small subset of these patches?
I did what
get_maintainertold me. Would you like to be CC'd on the whole thing?If you only cc: me on a portion of the series, I guess you only want me to apply a portion of it? if so, why is it a longer series?
I was expecting that this series will eventually go in via the virtio maintainers, assuming you can give your acks to the char bits.
Or, I can split off the char bits and send them to you separately. Whichever makes the most sense.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
But, this still feels wrong. Why is this happening here, in
init_vqs()and not in the calling function that already did a bunch of validation of the ports and the like? Are those checks not enough? if not, fix it there, don't spread it out all over the place...Good point! And there happens to already be
28962ec595d70that takes care of exactly this case. I totally missed it.So this series is not needed? Or just this one?
Just this one.
Regards,
--
Alex
Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 1/6] virtio console: Harden multiport against invalid host input
In reply to Alexander ShishkinQuoted 41 lines · Alexander Shishkin
From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
It's possible for the host to set the multiport flag, but pass in 0 multiports, which results in:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in init_vqs+0x244/0x6c0 drivers/char/virtio_console.c:1878 Write of size 8 at addr ffff888001cc24a0 by task swapper/1 CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.15.0-rc1-140273-gaab0bb9fbaa1-dirty #588 Call Trace: init_vqs+0x244/0x6c0 drivers/char/virtio_console.c:1878 virtcons_probe+0x1a3/0x5b0 drivers/char/virtio_console.c:2042 virtio_dev_probe+0x2b9/0x500 drivers/virtio/virtio.c:263 call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:515 really_probe+0x1c9/0x5b0 drivers/base/dd.c:601 really_probe_debug drivers/base/dd.c:694 __driver_probe_device+0x10d/0x1f0 drivers/base/dd.c:754 driver_probe_device+0x68/0x150 drivers/base/dd.c:786 __driver_attach+0xca/0x200 drivers/base/dd.c:1145 bus_for_each_dev+0x108/0x190 drivers/base/bus.c:301 driver_attach+0x30/0x40 drivers/base/dd.c:1162 bus_add_driver+0x325/0x3c0 drivers/base/bus.c:618 driver_register+0xf3/0x1d0 drivers/base/driver.c:171...
Add a suitable sanity check.
Signed-off-by Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>Cc Amit Shah <[email protected]>Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)drivers/char/virtio_console.c +0
-0
drivers/char/virtio_console.c static int init_vqs(struct ports_device *portdev) · line 1851
Quoted 9 lines
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +3
-0@@ -1843,6 +1843,9 @@ static int init_vqs(struct ports_device *portdev)int err; nr_ports = portdev->max_nr_ports; +if (use_multiport (portdev) && nr_ports <1 ) +return -EINVAL ; + nr_queues =use_multiport (portdev) ? (nr_ports +1 ) *2 :2 ; vqs =kmalloc_array (nr_queues,sizeof (struct virtqueue *),GFP_KERNEL );
Weird. Don't we already check for that?
/* Don't test MULTIPORT at all if we're rproc: not a valid feature! */
if (!is_rproc_serial(vdev) &&
virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_CONSOLE_F_MULTIPORT,
struct virtio_console_config, max_nr_ports,
&portdev->max_nr_ports) == 0) {
if (portdev->max_nr_ports == 0 ||
portdev->max_nr_ports > VIRTCONS_MAX_PORTS) {
dev_err(&vdev->dev,
"Invalidate max_nr_ports %d",
portdev->max_nr_ports);
err = -EINVAL;
goto free;
}
multiport = true;
}Quoted 2 lines
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
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Re: [PATCH v1 1/6] virtio console: Harden multiport against invalid host input
Quoted 17 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Weird. Don't we already check for that?
/* Don't test MULTIPORT at all if we're rproc: not a valid feature! */ if (!is_rproc_serial(vdev) && virtio_cread_feature(vdev, VIRTIO_CONSOLE_F_MULTIPORT, struct virtio_console_config, max_nr_ports, &portdev->max_nr_ports) == 0) { if (portdev->max_nr_ports == 0 || portdev->max_nr_ports > VIRTCONS_MAX_PORTS) { dev_err(&vdev->dev, "Invalidate max_nr_ports %d", portdev->max_nr_ports); err = -EINVAL; goto free; } multiport = true; }
Yes, I missed this earlier. I'll drop this patch.
Thanks,
--
Alex
PATCH 2/6 virtio console: Harden port adding
In reply to Alexander ShishkinFrom: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
The ADD_PORT operation reads and sanity checks the port id multiple times from the untrusted host. This is not safe because a malicious host could change it between reads.
Read the port id only once and cache it for subsequent uses.
--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +6 -4
@@ -1563,10 +1563,13 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,struct port *port;size_t name_size;int err; +unsigned id; cpkt = (struct virtio_console_control *)(buf->buf + buf->offset); - port =find_port_by_id (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id)); +/* Make sure the host cannot change id under us */ + id =virtio32_to_cpu (vdev,READ_ONCE (cpkt->id)); + port =find_port_by_id (portdev, id);if (!port && cpkt->event !=cpu_to_virtio16 (vdev,VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_ADD )) {/* No valid header at start of buffer. Drop it. */
@@ -1583,15 +1586,14 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,send_control_msg (port,VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_READY ,1 );break ; } -if (virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id) >= - portdev->max_nr_ports) { +if (id >= portdev->max_nr_ports) {dev_warn (&portdev->vdev->dev,"Request for adding port with " "out-of-bound id %u, max. supported id: %u\n" , cpkt->id, portdev->max_nr_ports -1 );break ; } -add_port (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id)); +add_port (portdev, id);break ;case VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_REMOVE :unplug_port (port);
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 22 lines · Alexander Shishkin
From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
The
ADD_PORToperation reads and sanity checks the port id multiple times from the untrusted host. This is not safe because a malicious host could change it between reads.Read the port id only once and cache it for subsequent uses.
Signed-off-by Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>Cc Amit Shah <[email protected]>Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)drivers/char/virtio_console.c +0
-0
drivers/char/virtio_console.c static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev, · line 1571
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +3
-1@@ -1563,10 +1563,13 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,struct port *port;size_t name_size;int err; +unsigned id; cpkt = (struct virtio_console_control *)(buf->buf + buf->offset); - port =find_port_by_id (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id)); +/* Make sure the host cannot change id under us */ + id =virtio32_to_cpu (vdev,READ_ONCE (cpkt->id));
Why READ_ONCE()?
And how can it change under us? Is the message still under control of the "host"? If so, that feels wrong as this is all in kernel memory, not userspace memory right?
If you are dealing with memory from a different process that you do not trust, then you need to copy EVERYTHING at once. Don't piece-meal copy bits and bobs in all different places please. Do it once and then parse the local structure properly.
Otherwise this is going to be impossible to actually maintain over time...
thanks,
greg k-h
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Re: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 36 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 22 lines · Alexander Shishkin
From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
The
ADD_PORToperation reads and sanity checks the port id multiple times from the untrusted host. This is not safe because a malicious host could change it between reads.Read the port id only once and cache it for subsequent uses.
Signed-off-by Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>Cc Amit Shah <[email protected]>Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)drivers/char/virtio_console.c +0
-0drivers/char/virtio_console.c static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev, · line 1571
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +3
-1@@ -1563,10 +1563,13 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,struct port *port;size_t name_size;int err; +unsigned id; cpkt = (struct virtio_console_control *)(buf->buf + buf->offset); - port =find_port_by_id (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id)); +/* Make sure the host cannot change id under us */ + id =virtio32_to_cpu (vdev,READ_ONCE (cpkt->id));Why
READ_ONCE()?
Quoted 8 lines
And how can it change under us? Is the message still under control of the "host"? If so, that feels wrong as this is all in kernel memory, not userspace memory right?
If you are dealing with memory from a different process that you do not trust, then you need to copy EVERYTHING at once. Don't piece-meal copy bits and bobs in all different places please. Do it once and then parse the local structure properly.
This is the device memory or the VM host memory, not userspace or another process. And it can change under us willy-nilly.
The thing is, we only need to cache two things to correctly process the request. Copying everything, on the other hand, would involve the entire buffer, not just the *cpkt, but also stuff that follows, which also differs between different event types. And we also don't care if the rest of it changes under us.
Quoted 2 lines
Otherwise this is going to be impossible to actually maintain over time...
An 'id' can't possibly be worse to maintain than multiple instances of 'virtio32_to_cpu(vdev, cpkt->id)' sprinkled around the code.
Thanks,
--
Alex
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 42 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 40 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 22 lines · Alexander Shishkin
From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
The
ADD_PORToperation reads and sanity checks the port id multiple times from the untrusted host. This is not safe because a malicious host could change it between reads.Read the port id only once and cache it for subsequent uses.
Signed-off-by Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>Cc Amit Shah <[email protected]>Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)drivers/char/virtio_console.c +0
-0drivers/char/virtio_console.c static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev, · line 1571
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +3
-1@@ -1563,10 +1563,13 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,struct port *port;size_t name_size;int err; +unsigned id; cpkt = (struct virtio_console_control *)(buf->buf + buf->offset); - port =find_port_by_id (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id)); +/* Make sure the host cannot change id under us */ + id =virtio32_to_cpu (vdev,READ_ONCE (cpkt->id));Why
READ_ONCE()?And how can it change under us? Is the message still under control of the "host"? If so, that feels wrong as this is all in kernel memory, not userspace memory right?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
If you are dealing with memory from a different process that you do not trust, then you need to copy EVERYTHING at once. Don't piece-meal copy bits and bobs in all different places please. Do it once and then parse the local structure properly.
This is the device memory or the VM host memory, not userspace or another process. And it can change under us willy-nilly.
Then you need to copy it out once, and then only deal with the local copy. Otherwise you have an incomplete snapshot.
Quoted 5 lines
The thing is, we only need to cache two things to correctly process the request. Copying everything, on the other hand, would involve the entire buffer, not just the *cpkt, but also stuff that follows, which also differs between different event types. And we also don't care if the rest of it changes under us.
That feels broken if you do not "trust" that other side. And what prevents the buffer from changing after you validated the other part?
For virtio, I thought you always implied that you did trust the other side, when has that changed? Where was that new security model for the kernel discussed?
Are you sure this is even viable? What is the threat model you are attempting to add to the driver here?
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Otherwise this is going to be impossible to actually maintain over time...
An 'id' can't possibly be worse to maintain than multiple instances of '
virtio32_to_cpu(vdev, cpkt->id)' sprinkled around the code.
Again, copy what you want out and then act on that. If it can change under you, and you do not trust it, then you have to work only on a snapshot that you have verified.
thanks,
greg k-h
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Re: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 2 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Then you need to copy it out once, and then only deal with the local copy. Otherwise you have an incomplete snapshot.
Ok, would you be partial to something like this:
From 1bc9bb84004154376c2a0cf643d53257da6d1cd7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 21:59:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] virtio console: Keep a local copy of the control structure
When handling control messages, instead of peeking at the device memory to obtain bits of the control structure, take a snapshot of it once and use it instead, to prevent it from changing under us. This avoids races between port id validation and control event decoding, which can lead to, for example, a NULL dereference in port removal of a nonexistent port.
The control structure is small enough (8 bytes) that it can be cached directly on the stack.
--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +15 -14
@@ -1559,23 +1559,24 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,struct ports_device *portdev, struct port_buffer *buf) { - struct virtio_console_control *cpkt; + struct virtio_console_control cpkt;struct port *port;size_t name_size;int err; - cpkt = (struct virtio_console_control *)(buf->buf + buf->offset); +/* Keep a local copy of the control structure */ +memcpy (&cpkt, buf->buf + buf->offset,sizeof (cpkt)); - port =find_port_by_id (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id)); + port =find_port_by_id (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt.id));if (!port && - cpkt->event !=cpu_to_virtio16 (vdev,VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_ADD )) { + cpkt.event !=cpu_to_virtio16 (vdev,VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_ADD )) {/* No valid header at start of buffer. Drop it. */ dev_dbg (&portdev->vdev->dev, -"Invalid index %u in control packet\n" , cpkt->id); +"Invalid index %u in control packet\n" , cpkt.id);return ; } -switch (virtio16_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->event)) { +switch (virtio16_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt.event)) {case VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_ADD :if (port) { dev_dbg(&portdev->vdev->dev,
@@ -1583,21 +1584,21 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,send_control_msg (port,VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_READY ,1 );break ; } -if (virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id) >= +if (virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt.id) >= portdev->max_nr_ports) {dev_warn (&portdev->vdev->dev,"Request for adding port with " "out-of-bound id %u, max. supported id: %u\n" , - cpkt->id, portdev->max_nr_ports -1 ); + cpkt.id, portdev->max_nr_ports -1 );break ; } -add_port (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id)); +add_port (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt.id));break ;case VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_REMOVE :unplug_port (port);break ;case VIRTIO_CONSOLE_CONSOLE_PORT : -if (!cpkt->value) +if (!cpkt.value)break ;if (is_console_port (port))break ;
@@ -1618,7 +1619,7 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,if (!is_console_port (port))break ; -memcpy (&size, buf->buf + buf->offset +sizeof (*cpkt), +memcpy (&size, buf->buf + buf->offset +sizeof (cpkt),sizeof (size));set_console_size (port, size.rows, size.cols);
@@ -1627,7 +1628,7 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,break ; }case VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_OPEN : - port->host_connected =virtio16_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->value); + port->host_connected =virtio16_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt.value);wake_up_interruptible (&port->waitqueue);/* * If the host port got closed and the host had any
@@ -1658,7 +1659,7 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,* Skip the size of the header and the cpkt to get the size * of the name that was sent */ - name_size = buf->len - buf->offset -sizeof (*cpkt) +1 ; + name_size = buf->len - buf->offset -sizeof (cpkt) +1 ; port->name =kmalloc (name_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!port->name) {
@@ -1666,7 +1667,7 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev, "Not enough space to store port name\n");break ; } -strncpy (port->name, buf->buf + buf->offset +sizeof (*cpkt), +strncpy (port->name, buf->buf + buf->offset +sizeof (cpkt), name_size -1 ); port->name[name_size -1 ] =0 ;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
Re: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 22 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 2 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Then you need to copy it out once, and then only deal with the local copy. Otherwise you have an incomplete snapshot.
Ok, would you be partial to something like this:
Quoted 1 line
From
1bc9bb84004154376c2a0cf643d53257da6d1cd7Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 21:59:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] virtio console: Keep a local copy of the control structureWhen handling control messages, instead of peeking at the device memory to obtain bits of the control structure, take a snapshot of it once and use it instead, to prevent it from changing under us. This avoids races between port id validation and control event decoding, which can lead to, for example, a NULL dereference in port removal of a nonexistent port.
The control structure is small enough (8 bytes) that it can be cached directly on the stack.
Quoted 7 lines
Signed-off-by Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Cc Amit Shah <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
Yes, this looks much better, thanks!
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Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
In reply to Alexander ShishkinQuoted 7 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 2 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Then you need to copy it out once, and then only deal with the local copy. Otherwise you have an incomplete snapshot.
Ok, would you be partial to something like this:
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
From
1bc9bb84004154376c2a0cf643d53257da6d1cd7Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001From: Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 19 Jan 2023 21:59:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] virtio console: Keep a local copy of the control structureWhen handling control messages, instead of peeking at the device memory to obtain bits of the control structure,
Except the message makes it seem that we are getting data from device memory, when we do nothing of the kind.
Quoted 8 lines
take a snapshot of it once and
use it instead, to prevent it from changing under us. This avoids races between port id validation and control event decoding, which can lead to, for example, a NULL dereference in port removal of a nonexistent port.The control structure is small enough (8 bytes) that it can be cached directly on the stack.
I still have no real idea why we want a copy here.
If device can poke anywhere at memory then it can crash kernel anyway. If there's a bounce buffer or an iommu or some other protection in place, then this memory can no longer change by the time we look at it.
Quoted 107 lines
Signed-off-by Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Cc Amit Shah <[email protected]>--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 29 +++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)drivers/char/virtio_console.c +15
-14@@ -1559,23 +1559,24 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,struct ports_device *portdev, struct port_buffer *buf) { - struct virtio_console_control *cpkt; + struct virtio_console_control cpkt;struct port *port;size_t name_size;int err; - cpkt = (struct virtio_console_control *)(buf->buf + buf->offset); +/* Keep a local copy of the control structure */ +memcpy (&cpkt, buf->buf + buf->offset,sizeof (cpkt)); - port =find_port_by_id (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id)); + port =find_port_by_id (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt.id));if (!port && - cpkt->event !=cpu_to_virtio16 (vdev,VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_ADD )) { + cpkt.event !=cpu_to_virtio16 (vdev,VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_ADD )) {/* No valid header at start of buffer. Drop it. */ dev_dbg (&portdev->vdev->dev, -"Invalid index %u in control packet\n" , cpkt->id); +"Invalid index %u in control packet\n" , cpkt.id);return ; } -switch (virtio16_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->event)) { +switch (virtio16_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt.event)) {case VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_ADD :if (port) { dev_dbg(&portdev->vdev->dev,@@ -1583,21 +1584,21 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,send_control_msg (port,VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_READY ,1 );break ; } -if (virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id) >= +if (virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt.id) >= portdev->max_nr_ports) {dev_warn (&portdev->vdev->dev,"Request for adding port with " "out-of-bound id %u, max. supported id: %u\n" , - cpkt->id, portdev->max_nr_ports -1 ); + cpkt.id, portdev->max_nr_ports -1 );break ; } -add_port (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id)); +add_port (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt.id));break ;case VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_REMOVE :unplug_port (port);break ;case VIRTIO_CONSOLE_CONSOLE_PORT : -if (!cpkt->value) +if (!cpkt.value)break ;if (is_console_port (port))break ;@@ -1618,7 +1619,7 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,if (!is_console_port (port))break ; -memcpy (&size, buf->buf + buf->offset +sizeof (*cpkt), +memcpy (&size, buf->buf + buf->offset +sizeof (cpkt),sizeof (size));set_console_size (port, size.rows, size.cols);@@ -1627,7 +1628,7 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,break ; }case VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_OPEN : - port->host_connected =virtio16_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->value); + port->host_connected =virtio16_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt.value);wake_up_interruptible (&port->waitqueue);/* * If the host port got closed and the host had any @@ -1658,7 +1659,7 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,* Skip the size of the header and the cpkt to get the size * of the name that was sent */ - name_size = buf->len - buf->offset -sizeof (*cpkt) +1 ; + name_size = buf->len - buf->offset -sizeof (cpkt) +1 ; port->name =kmalloc (name_size,GFP_KERNEL );if (!port->name) {@@ -1666,7 +1667,7 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev, "Not enough space to store port name\n");break ; } -strncpy (port->name, buf->buf + buf->offset +sizeof (*cpkt), +strncpy (port->name, buf->buf + buf->offset +sizeof (cpkt), name_size -1 ); port->name[name_size -1 ] =0 ;Signature · 1 line
2.39.0
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Re: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 6 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 2 lines · Alexander Shishkin
When handling control messages, instead of peeking at the device memory to obtain bits of the control structure,
Except the message makes it seem that we are getting data from device memory, when we do nothing of the kind.
We can be, see below.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
take a snapshot of it once and
use it instead, to prevent it from changing under us. This avoids races between port id validation and control event decoding, which can lead to, for example, a NULL dereference in port removal of a nonexistent port.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The control structure is small enough (8 bytes) that it can be cached directly on the stack.
I still have no real idea why we want a copy here.
If device can poke anywhere at memory then it can crash kernel anyway. If there's a bounce buffer or an iommu or some other protection in place, then this memory can no longer change by the time we look at it.
We can have shared pages between the host and guest without bounce buffers in between, so they can be both looking directly at the same page.
Regards,
--
Alex
Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 26 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 6 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 2 lines · Alexander Shishkin
When handling control messages, instead of peeking at the device memory to obtain bits of the control structure,
Except the message makes it seem that we are getting data from device memory, when we do nothing of the kind.
We can be, see below.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
take a snapshot of it once and
use it instead, to prevent it from changing under us. This avoids races between port id validation and control event decoding, which can lead to, for example, a NULL dereference in port removal of a nonexistent port.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The control structure is small enough (8 bytes) that it can be cached directly on the stack.
I still have no real idea why we want a copy here.
If device can poke anywhere at memory then it can crash kernel anyway. If there's a bounce buffer or an iommu or some other protection in place, then this memory can no longer change by the time we look at it.
Quoted 5 lines
We can have shared pages between the host and guest without bounce buffers in between, so they can be both looking directly at the same page.
Regards,
How does this configuration work? What else is in this page?
Quoted 2 lines
--
Alex
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Re: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 27 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 26 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 6 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 2 lines · Alexander Shishkin
When handling control messages, instead of peeking at the device memory to obtain bits of the control structure,
Except the message makes it seem that we are getting data from device memory, when we do nothing of the kind.
We can be, see below.
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 8 lines
take a snapshot of it once and
use it instead, to prevent it from changing under us. This avoids races between port id validation and control event decoding, which can lead to, for example, a NULL dereference in port removal of a nonexistent port.The control structure is small enough (8 bytes) that it can be cached directly on the stack.
I still have no real idea why we want a copy here.
If device can poke anywhere at memory then it can crash kernel anyway. If there's a bounce buffer or an iommu or some other protection in place, then this memory can no longer change by the time we look at it.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
We can have shared pages between the host and guest without bounce buffers in between, so they can be both looking directly at the same page.
Regards,
How does this configuration work? What else is in this page?
So, for example in TDX, you have certain pages as "shared", as in between guest and hypervisor. You can have virtio ring(s) in such pages. It's likely that there'd be a swiotlb buffer there instead, but sharing pages between host virtio and guest virtio drivers is possible.
Apologies if the language is confusing, I hope I'm answering the question.
Regards,
--
Alex
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 33 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 31 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 30 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 6 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 2 lines · Alexander Shishkin
When handling control messages, instead of peeking at the device memory to obtain bits of the control structure,
Except the message makes it seem that we are getting data from device memory, when we do nothing of the kind.
We can be, see below.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
take a snapshot of it once and
use it instead, to prevent it from changing under us. This avoids races between port id validation and control event decoding, which can lead to, for example, a NULL dereference in port removal of a nonexistent port.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The control structure is small enough (8 bytes) that it can be cached directly on the stack.
I still have no real idea why we want a copy here.
If device can poke anywhere at memory then it can crash kernel anyway. If there's a bounce buffer or an iommu or some other protection in place, then this memory can no longer change by the time we look at it.We can have shared pages between the host and guest without bounce buffers in between, so they can be both looking directly at the same page.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Regards,
How does this configuration work? What else is in this page?
So, for example in TDX, you have certain pages as "shared", as in between guest and hypervisor. You can have virtio ring(s) in such pages. It's likely that there'd be a swiotlb buffer there instead, but sharing pages between host virtio and guest virtio drivers is possible.
If it is shared, then what does this mean? Do we then need to copy everything out of that buffer first before doing anything with it because the data could change later on? Or do we not trust anything in it at all and we throw it away? Or something else (trust for a short while and then we don't?)
Please be specific as to what you want to see happen here, and why.
thanks,
greg k-h
Re: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 17 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 7 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 5 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 4 lines · Alexander Shishkin
We can have shared pages between the host and guest without bounce buffers in between, so they can be both looking directly at the same page.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Regards,
How does this configuration work? What else is in this page?
So, for example in TDX, you have certain pages as "shared", as in between guest and hypervisor. You can have virtio ring(s) in such pages. It's likely that there'd be a swiotlb buffer there instead, but sharing pages between host virtio and guest virtio drivers is possible.
Quoted 5 lines
If it is shared, then what does this mean? Do we then need to copy everything out of that buffer first before doing anything with it because the data could change later on? Or do we not trust anything in it at all and we throw it away? Or something else (trust for a short while and then we don't?)
The first one, we need a consistent view of the metadata (the ckpt in this case), so we take a snapshot of it. Then, we validate it (because we don't trust it) to be correct. If it is not, we discard it, otherwise we act on it. Since this is a ring, we just move on to the next record if there is one.
Meanwhile, in the shared page, it can change from correct to incorrect, but it won't affect us because we have this consistent view at the moment the snapshot was taken.
Quoted 1 line
Please be specific as to what you want to see happen here, and why.
For example, if we get a control message to add a port and cpkt->event==PORT_ADD, we skip validation of cpkt->id (port id), because we're intending to add a new one. At this point, the device can change cpkt->event to PORT_REMOVE, which does require a valid cpkt->id and the subsequent code runs into a NULL dereference on the port value, which should have been looked up from cpkt->id.
Now, if we take a snapshot of cpkt, we naturally don't have this problem, because we're looking at a consistent state of cpkt: it's either PORT_ADD or PORT_REMOVE all the way. Which is what this patch does.
Does this answer your question?
Thanks,
--
Alex
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 25 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 17 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 7 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 5 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 4 lines · Alexander Shishkin
We can have shared pages between the host and guest without bounce buffers in between, so they can be both looking directly at the same page.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Regards,
How does this configuration work? What else is in this page?
So, for example in TDX, you have certain pages as "shared", as in between guest and hypervisor. You can have virtio ring(s) in such pages. It's likely that there'd be a swiotlb buffer there instead, but sharing pages between host virtio and guest virtio drivers is possible.
Quoted 5 lines
If it is shared, then what does this mean? Do we then need to copy everything out of that buffer first before doing anything with it because the data could change later on? Or do we not trust anything in it at all and we throw it away? Or something else (trust for a short while and then we don't?)
Quoted 5 lines
The first one, we need a consistent view of the metadata (the ckpt in this case), so we take a snapshot of it. Then, we validate it (because we don't trust it) to be correct. If it is not, we discard it, otherwise we act on it. Since this is a ring, we just move on to the next record if there is one.
So you do an additional extra copy of everything, making the bounce buffer useless? :)
Quoted 3 lines
Meanwhile, in the shared page, it can change from correct to incorrect, but it won't affect us because we have this consistent view at the moment the snapshot was taken.
Wonderful, copy everything out then, the whole page, don't do it piecemeal field by field. And then justify it to everyone whose throughput you just tanked...
good luck!
greg k-h
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Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
In reply to Alexander ShishkinQuoted 49 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 17 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 7 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 5 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 4 lines · Alexander Shishkin
We can have shared pages between the host and guest without bounce buffers in between, so they can be both looking directly at the same page.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Regards,
How does this configuration work? What else is in this page?
So, for example in TDX, you have certain pages as "shared", as in between guest and hypervisor. You can have virtio ring(s) in such pages. It's likely that there'd be a swiotlb buffer there instead, but sharing pages between host virtio and guest virtio drivers is possible.
Quoted 5 lines
If it is shared, then what does this mean? Do we then need to copy everything out of that buffer first before doing anything with it because the data could change later on? Or do we not trust anything in it at all and we throw it away? Or something else (trust for a short while and then we don't?)
The first one, we need a consistent view of the metadata (the ckpt in this case), so we take a snapshot of it. Then, we validate it (because we don't trust it) to be correct. If it is not, we discard it, otherwise we act on it. Since this is a ring, we just move on to the next record if there is one.
Meanwhile, in the shared page, it can change from correct to incorrect, but it won't affect us because we have this consistent view at the moment the snapshot was taken.
Quoted 1 line
Please be specific as to what you want to see happen here, and why.
For example, if we get a control message to add a port and cpkt->event==PORT_ADD, we skip validation of
cpkt->id(port id), because we're intending to add a new one. At this point, the device can changecpkt->eventtoPORT_REMOVE, which does require a validcpkt->idand the subsequent code runs into a NULL dereference on the port value, which should have been looked up fromcpkt->id.Now, if we take a snapshot of cpkt, we naturally don't have this problem, because we're looking at a consistent state of cpkt: it's either
PORT_ADDorPORT_REMOVEall the way. Which is what this patch does.
Quoted 5 lines
Does this answer your question?
Thanks,
--
Alex
Not sure about Greg but it doesn't answer my question because either the bad device has access to all memory at which point it's not clear why is it changing cpkt->event and not e.g. stack. Or it's restricted to only access memory when mapped through the DMA API. Which is not the case here.
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RE: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
Quoted 57 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 49 lines
Quoted 17 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 7 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 5 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 4 lines · Alexander Shishkin
We can have shared pages between the host and guest without bounce buffers in between, so they can be both looking directly at the same page.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Regards,
How does this configuration work? What else is in this page?
So, for example in TDX, you have certain pages as "shared", as in between guest and hypervisor. You can have virtio ring(s) in such pages. It's likely that there'd be a swiotlb buffer there instead, but sharing pages between host virtio and guest virtio drivers is possible.
Quoted 5 lines
If it is shared, then what does this mean? Do we then need to copy everything out of that buffer first before doing anything with it because the data could change later on? Or do we not trust anything in it at all and we throw it away? Or something else (trust for a short while and then we don't?)
The first one, we need a consistent view of the metadata (the ckpt in this case), so we take a snapshot of it. Then, we validate it (because we don't trust it) to be correct. If it is not, we discard it, otherwise we act on it. Since this is a ring, we just move on to the next record if there is one.
Meanwhile, in the shared page, it can change from correct to incorrect, but it won't affect us because we have this consistent view at the moment the snapshot was taken.
Quoted 1 line
Please be specific as to what you want to see happen here, and why.
For example, if we get a control message to add a port and cpkt->event==PORT_ADD, we skip validation of
cpkt->id(port id), because we're intending to add a new one. At this point, the device can changecpkt->eventtoPORT_REMOVE, which does require a validcpkt->idand the subsequent code runs into a NULL dereference on the port value, which should have been looked up fromcpkt->id.Now, if we take a snapshot of cpkt, we naturally don't have this problem, because we're looking at a consistent state of cpkt: it's either
PORT_ADDorPORT_REMOVEall the way. Which is what this patch does.Quoted 5 lines
Does this answer your question?
Thanks,
--
Alex
Quoted 5 lines
Not sure about Greg but it doesn't answer my question because either the bad device has access to all memory at which point it's not clear why is it changing
cpkt->eventand not e.g. stack. Or it's restricted to only access memory when mapped through the DMA API. Which is not the case here.
We do enforce virtio usage via DMA API only for TDX guest. Alex has a patch queued for that also.
But not sure if this addresses your concern here.
Best Regards,
Elena.
Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
In reply to Alexander ShishkinQuoted 33 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 31 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 30 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 6 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 2 lines · Alexander Shishkin
When handling control messages, instead of peeking at the device memory to obtain bits of the control structure,
Except the message makes it seem that we are getting data from device memory, when we do nothing of the kind.
We can be, see below.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 6 lines
take a snapshot of it once and
use it instead, to prevent it from changing under us. This avoids races between port id validation and control event decoding, which can lead to, for example, a NULL dereference in port removal of a nonexistent port.Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The control structure is small enough (8 bytes) that it can be cached directly on the stack.
I still have no real idea why we want a copy here.
If device can poke anywhere at memory then it can crash kernel anyway. If there's a bounce buffer or an iommu or some other protection in place, then this memory can no longer change by the time we look at it.We can have shared pages between the host and guest without bounce buffers in between, so they can be both looking directly at the same page.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 1 line
Regards,
How does this configuration work? What else is in this page?
So, for example in TDX, you have certain pages as "shared", as in between guest and hypervisor. You can have virtio ring(s) in such pages.
That one's marked as dma coherent.
Quoted 2 lines
It's likely that there'd be a swiotlb buffer there instead, but sharing pages between host virtio and guest virtio drivers is possible.
It's not something console does though, does it?
Quoted 6 lines
Apologies if the language is confusing, I hope I'm answering the question.
Regards,
--
Alex
I'd like an answer to when does the console driver share the buffer in question, not when generally some pages shared.
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Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 2/6] virtio console: Harden port adding
In reply to Alexander ShishkinQuoted 6 lines · Alexander Shishkin
From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
The
ADD_PORToperation reads and sanity checks the port id multiple times from the untrusted host. This is not safe because a malicious host could change it between reads.
Quoted 7 lines
Read the port id only once and cache it for subsequent uses.
Signed-off-by Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>Cc Amit Shah <[email protected]>Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>Cc Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
I suspect anyone worried about this kind of thing already uses a bounce buffer. No? The patch itself makes the code more readable, except maybe for the READ_ONCE thing.
Quoted 43 lines
--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 10 ++++++---- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)drivers/char/virtio_console.c +6
-4@@ -1563,10 +1563,13 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,struct port *port;size_t name_size;int err; +unsigned id; cpkt = (struct virtio_console_control *)(buf->buf + buf->offset); - port =find_port_by_id (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id)); +/* Make sure the host cannot change id under us */ + id =virtio32_to_cpu (vdev,READ_ONCE (cpkt->id)); + port =find_port_by_id (portdev, id);if (!port && cpkt->event !=cpu_to_virtio16 (vdev,VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_ADD )) {/* No valid header at start of buffer. Drop it. */ @@ -1583,15 +1586,14 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,send_control_msg (port,VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_READY ,1 );break ; } -if (virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id) >= - portdev->max_nr_ports) { +if (id >= portdev->max_nr_ports) {dev_warn (&portdev->vdev->dev,"Request for adding port with " "out-of-bound id %u, max. supported id: %u\n" , cpkt->id, portdev->max_nr_ports -1 );break ; } -add_port (portdev,virtio32_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->id)); +add_port (portdev, id);break ;case VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_REMOVE :unplug_port (port);Signature · 1 line
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PATCH 3/6 virtio 9p: Fix an overflow
In reply to Alexander ShishkinFrom: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
tag_len is read as a u16 from the untrusted host. It could overflow in the memory allocation, which would lead to a too small buffer.
Some later loops use it when extended to 32bit, so they could overflow the too small buffer.
Make sure to do the arithmetic for the buffer size in 32bit to avoid wrapping.
--- net/9p/trans_virtio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
net/9p/trans_virtio.c +1 -1
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ static int p9_virtio_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) err = -EINVAL ; goto out_free_vq; } - tag =kzalloc (tag_len +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tag =kzalloc ((u32 )tag_len +1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!tag) { err = -ENOMEM ; goto out_free_vq;
Signature · 1 line
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Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 3/6] virtio 9p: Fix an overflow
Quoted 27 lines · Alexander Shishkin
From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
tag_lenis read as a u16 from the untrusted host. It could overflow in the memory allocation, which would lead to a too small buffer.Some later loops use it when extended to 32bit, so they could overflow the too small buffer.
Make sure to do the arithmetic for the buffer size in 32bit to avoid wrapping.
Signed-off-by Andi Kleen <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Christian Schoenebeck <[email protected]>Cc Eric Van Hensbergen <[email protected]>Cc Latchesar Ionkov <[email protected]>Cc Dominique Martinet <[email protected]>--- net/9p/trans_virtio.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)net/9p/trans_virtio.c +0
-0
net/9p/trans_virtio.c static int p9_virtio_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) · line 635
Quoted 8 lines
net/9p/trans_virtio.c +1
-1@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ static int p9_virtio_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) err = -EINVAL ; goto out_free_vq; } - tag =kzalloc (tag_len +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tag =kzalloc ((u32 )tag_len +1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!tag) { err = -ENOMEM ; goto out_free_vq;
Hmm are you sure there's a difference in behaviour? I thought C will just extend the integer to int.
Quoted 2 lines
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Re: [PATCH v1 3/6] virtio 9p: Fix an overflow
Quoted 19 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 7 lines · Alexander Shishkin
From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>
net/9p/trans_virtio.c +0
-0net/9p/trans_virtio.c static int p9_virtio_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) · line 635
Quoted 8 lines
net/9p/trans_virtio.c +1
-1@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ static int p9_virtio_probe(struct virtio_device *vdev) err = -EINVAL ; goto out_free_vq; } - tag =kzalloc (tag_len +1 ,GFP_KERNEL ); + tag =kzalloc ((u32 )tag_len +1 ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!tag) { err = -ENOMEM ; goto out_free_vq;Hmm are you sure there's a difference in behaviour? I thought C will just extend the integer to int.
Actually, you're right, integer promotion would extend the original expression to int. I'll drop this patch also.
Thanks,
--
Alex
PATCH 4/6 virtio console: Harden control message handling
In reply to Alexander ShishkinIn handle_control_message(), we look at the ->event field twice, which gives a malicious VMM a window in which to switch it from PORT_ADD to PORT_REMOVE, triggering a null dereference further down the line:
RIP: 0010:spin_lock_irq ./include/linux/spinlock.h:388 RIP: 0010:unplug_port+0x9/0x150 drivers/char/virtio_console.c:1512 Call Trace: handle_control_message+0x108/0x2c0 drivers/char/virtio_console.c:1600 elfcorehdr_read+0x40/0x40 ??:? process_one_work+0x1b4/0x310 kernel/workqueue.c:2297 worker_thread+0x5c/0x3a0 kernel/workqueue.c:2444 kthread+0x120/0x140 kernel/kthread.c:319 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:295
Read the event code once instead, basing all following decisions on the same value.
--- drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 10 +++++----- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
drivers/char/virtio_console.c +5 -5
@@ -1563,22 +1563,22 @@ static void handle_control_message(struct virtio_device *vdev,struct port *port;size_t name_size;int err; -unsigned id; +unsigned id, event; cpkt = (struct virtio_console_control *)(buf->buf + buf->offset); -/* Make sure the host cannot change id under us */ +/* Make sure the host cannot change id or event under us */ id =virtio32_to_cpu (vdev,READ_ONCE (cpkt->id)); + event =virtio16_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->event); port =find_port_by_id (portdev, id); -if (!port && - cpkt->event !=cpu_to_virtio16 (vdev,VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_ADD )) { +if (!port && event !=VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_ADD ) {/* No valid header at start of buffer. Drop it. */ dev_dbg (&portdev->vdev->dev,"Invalid index %u in control packet\n" , cpkt->id);return ; } -switch (virtio16_to_cpu (vdev, cpkt->event)) { +switch (event) {case VIRTIO_CONSOLE_PORT_ADD :if (port) { dev_dbg(&portdev->vdev->dev,
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Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 4/6] virtio console: Harden control message handling
Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Shishkin
In
handle_control_message(), we look at the ->event field twice, which gives a malicious VMM a window in which to switch it fromPORT_ADDtoPORT_REMOVE, triggering a null dereference further down the line:
How is the other VMM have full control over the full message here? Shouldn't this all have been copied into our local memory if we are going to be poking around in it? Like I mentioned in my other review, copy it all once and then parse it. Don't try to mess with individual fields one at a time otherwise that way lies madness...
thanks,
greg k-h
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Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 4/6] virtio console: Harden control message handling
Quoted 11 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Shishkin
In
handle_control_message(), we look at the ->event field twice, which gives a malicious VMM a window in which to switch it fromPORT_ADDtoPORT_REMOVE, triggering a null dereference further down the line:How is the other VMM have full control over the full message here? Shouldn't this all have been copied into our local memory if we are going to be poking around in it? Like I mentioned in my other review, copy it all once and then parse it. Don't try to mess with individual fields one at a time otherwise that way lies madness...
Quoted 3 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
I agree and in fact, it is *already* copied since with malicious device we generally use a bounce buffer.
Having said that, the patch is actually a cleanup, e.g. it's clearer to byte-swap only once.
Just don't oversell it as a security thing.
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Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] virtio console: Harden control message handling
Quoted 12 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 11 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Shishkin
In
handle_control_message(), we look at the ->event field twice, which gives a malicious VMM a window in which to switch it fromPORT_ADDtoPORT_REMOVE, triggering a null dereference further down the line:How is the other VMM have full control over the full message here? Shouldn't this all have been copied into our local memory if we are going to be poking around in it? Like I mentioned in my other review, copy it all once and then parse it. Don't try to mess with individual fields one at a time otherwise that way lies madness...
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
thanks,
greg k-h
I agree and in fact, it is *already* copied since with malicious device we generally use a bounce buffer.
Right, but the code should probably be able to handle bad input on its own, or what do you think?
Quoted 3 lines
Having said that, the patch is actually a cleanup, e.g. it's clearer to byte-swap only once.
Just don't oversell it as a security thing.
Well, security was the original motivation, so that's what it said in the commit message. But we settled on [0] yesterday with Greg, which would replace this patch and 2/6.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Regards,
--
Alex
Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 4/6] virtio console: Harden control message handling
Quoted 16 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 14 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 13 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 3 lines · Alexander Shishkin
In
handle_control_message(), we look at the ->event field twice, which gives a malicious VMM a window in which to switch it fromPORT_ADDtoPORT_REMOVE, triggering a null dereference further down the line:How is the other VMM have full control over the full message here? Shouldn't this all have been copied into our local memory if we are going to be poking around in it? Like I mentioned in my other review, copy it all once and then parse it. Don't try to mess with individual fields one at a time otherwise that way lies madness...
thanks,
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
greg k-h
I agree and in fact, it is *already* copied since with malicious device we generally use a bounce buffer.
Right, but the code should probably be able to handle bad input on its own, or what do you think?
Basically I think it's ok to look at the same field twice unless it's mapped as dma coherent. Is that what you are asking about?
Quoted 11 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Having said that, the patch is actually a cleanup, e.g. it's clearer to byte-swap only once.
Just don't oversell it as a security thing.Well, security was the original motivation, so that's what it said in the commit message. But we settled on [0] yesterday with Greg, which would replace this patch and 2/6.
[0] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Regards,
At this point I will drop this series and pls post new series with just the stuff you want included. Include acks if patches are unchanged.
Thanks!
Quoted 2 lines
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Re: [PATCH v1 4/6] virtio console: Harden control message handling
Quoted 3 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
At this point I will drop this series and pls post new series with just the stuff you want included. Include acks if patches are unchanged.
Will do, thanks for the review!
Regards,
--
Alex
PATCH 5/6 virtio_net: Guard against buffer length overflow in xdp_linearize_page()
In reply to Alexander ShishkinWhen reassembling incoming buffers to an xdp_page, there is a potential integer overflow in the buffer size test and trigger and out of bounds memcpy().
Fix this by reordering the test so that both sides are of the same signedness.
--- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
drivers/net/virtio_net.c +3 -1
@@ -751,8 +751,10 @@ static struct page *xdp_linearize_page(struct receive_queue *rq,/* guard against a misconfigured or uncooperative backend that * is sending packet larger than the MTU. +* At the same time, make sure that an especially uncooperative +* backend can't overflow the test by supplying a large buflen. */ -if ((page_off + buflen + tailroom) >PAGE_SIZE ) { +if (buflen >PAGE_SIZE - page_off - tailroom) {put_page (p); goto err_buf; }
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Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 5/6] virtio_net: Guard against buffer length overflow in xdp_linearize_page()
Quoted 26 lines · Alexander Shishkin
When reassembling incoming buffers to an
xdp_page, there is a potential integer overflow in the buffer size test and trigger and out of boundsmemcpy().Fix this by reordering the test so that both sides are of the same signedness.
Signed-off-by Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>Cc Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>Cc Daniel Borkmann <[email protected]>Cc Jesper Dangaard Brouer <[email protected]>Cc John Fastabend <[email protected]>Cc David S. Miller <[email protected]>Cc Eric Dumazet <[email protected]>Cc Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>Cc Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>--- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)drivers/net/virtio_net.c +0
-0@@ -751,8 +751,10 @@ static struct page *xdp_linearize_page(struct receive_queue *rq,
drivers/net/virtio_net.c static struct page *xdp_linearize_page(struct receive_queue *rq, · line 760
Quoted 10 lines
drivers/net/virtio_net.c +3
-1/* guard against a misconfigured or uncooperative backend that * is sending packet larger than the MTU. +* At the same time, make sure that an especially uncooperative +* backend can't overflow the test by supplying a large buflen. */ -if ((page_off + buflen + tailroom) >PAGE_SIZE ) { +if (buflen >PAGE_SIZE - page_off - tailroom) {put_page (p); goto err_buf; }
I feel the issue should be addressed in virtqueue_get_buf. In fact, when using DMA API, we already keep track of the length in vring_desc_extra.
So, isn't this just the question of passing the length and validating it e.g. in vring_unmap_one_split?
We can also use the index_nospec trick since otherwise there could be speculation concerns.
Quoted 2 lines
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PATCH 6/6 virtio_ring: Prevent bounds check bypass on descriptor index
In reply to Alexander ShishkinThe descriptor index in virtqueue_get_buf_ctx_split() comes from the device/VMM.a Use array_index_nospec() to prevent the CPU from speculating beyond the descriptor array bounds and providing a primitive for building a side channel.
--- drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c +3 -0
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/hrtimer.h> #include <linux/dma-mapping.h> #include <linux/kmsan.h>
@@ -819,6 +820,8 @@ static void *virtqueue_get_buf_ctx_split(struct virtqueue *_vq,BAD_RING (vq,"id %u out of range\n" , i);return NULL ; } + + i =array_index_nospec (i, vq->split.vring.num);if (unlikely (!vq->split.desc_state[i].data)) {BAD_RING (vq,"id %u is not a head!\n" , i);return NULL ;
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Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerRe: [PATCH v1 6/6] virtio_ring: Prevent bounds check bypass on descriptor index
Quoted 23 lines · Alexander Shishkin
The descriptor index in
virtqueue_get_buf_ctx_split()comes from the device/VMM.a Usearray_index_nospec()to prevent the CPU from speculating beyond the descriptor array bounds and providing a primitive for building a side channel.Signed-off-by Alexander Shishkin <[email protected]>--- drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c +1
-0@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@#include <linux/device.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/module.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> #include <linux/hrtimer.h> #include <linux/dma-mapping.h> #include <linux/kmsan.h>
drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c static void *virtqueue_get_buf_ctx_split(struct virtqueue *_vq, · line 824
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c +2
-0@@ -819,6 +820,8 @@ static void *virtqueue_get_buf_ctx_split(struct virtqueue *_vq,BAD_RING (vq,"id %u out of range\n" , i);return NULL ; } + + i =array_index_nospec (i, vq->split.vring.num);
I suspect plain
i &= split.vring.num - 1
is more efficient.
We know num is a power of two but compiler doesn't. And pls add a comment explaining what's going on.
Quoted 5 lines
drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c +0
-0if (unlikely (!vq->split.desc_state[i].data)) {BAD_RING (vq,"id %u is not a head!\n" , i);return NULL ;Signature · 1 line
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Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerQuoted 5 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Hi,
Here are 6 patches that harden console, net and 9p drivers against various malicious host input as well as close a bounds check bypass in the split virtio ring.
Hardening against buggy devices is one thing,
Hardening against malicious devices is another.
Which is this?
If really malicious, aren't there any spectre considerations here? I am for example surprised not to find anything addressing spectre v1 nor any uses of array_index_nospec here.
Quoted 16 lines
Changes since previous version:
* Added Christian's R-B to 3/6
* Added a speculation fix per Michael's comment on the cover letter
* CC'ing lkmlAlexander Shishkin (3):
virtio console: Harden control message handling
virtio_net: Guard against buffer length overflow in
xdp_linearize_page()
virtio_ring: Prevent bounds check bypass on descriptor indexAndi Kleen (3):
virtio console: Harden multiport against invalid host input virtio console: Harden port adding
virtio 9p: Fix an overflow
Quoted 8 lines
drivers/char/virtio_console.c | 19 ++++++++++++------- drivers/net/virtio_net.c | 4 +++- drivers/virtio/virtio_ring.c | 3 +++ net/9p/trans_virtio.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)Signature · 1 line
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Quoted 10 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 5 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Hi,
Here are 6 patches that harden console, net and 9p drivers against various malicious host input as well as close a bounds check bypass in the split virtio ring.
Hardening against buggy devices is one thing,
Hardening against malicious devices is another.
Which is this?
Well, the big difference is the intent, but buggy input is buggy input, they've got that in common and we're trying to deal with it here.
The motivation for this patchset is protecting against malicious devices.
Quoted 3 lines
If really malicious, aren't there any spectre considerations here? I am for example surprised not to find anything addressing spectre v1 nor any uses of
array_index_nospechere.
That's strange, patch 6/6 is exactly that. There's probably more coming in the future as the analysis and audit progress.
Regards,
--
Alex
Michael S. Tsirkin
maintainerQuoted 19 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Quoted 10 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 5 lines · Alexander Shishkin
Hi,
Here are 6 patches that harden console, net and 9p drivers against various malicious host input as well as close a bounds check bypass in the split virtio ring.
Hardening against buggy devices is one thing,
Hardening against malicious devices is another.
Which is this?Well, the big difference is the intent, but buggy input is buggy input, they've got that in common and we're trying to deal with it here.
The motivation for this patchset is protecting against malicious devices.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines
If really malicious, aren't there any spectre considerations here? I am for example surprised not to find anything addressing spectre v1 nor any uses of
array_index_nospechere.That's strange, patch 6/6 is exactly that. There's probably more coming in the future as the analysis and audit progress.
Regards,
Oh I see, didn't get it for some reason. Pulled it from lore now.
Quoted 2 lines
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