x86/cpu, kvm: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
Subsystems (5)
v9 cover x86/cpu, kvm: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS (Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation).
Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present. It typically provides greater performance over the incumbent generic retpolines mitigation.
Patch 1 [unchanged from v7] Adds support for the leaf that contains the AutoIBRS feature bit.
Patch 2 moves the leaf's open-coded code from __do_cpuid_func() to kvm_set_cpu_caps() in preparation for adding the features in their native leaf.
Patches 3-6 introduce the new leaf's supported bits one by one.
Patch 7 [unchanged from v7] Adds support for AutoIBRS by turning its EFER enablement bit on at startup if the feature is available.
Patch 8 [unchanged from v7] Adds support for propagating AutoIBRS to the guest.
v9: Address comments from Sean Christopherson:
- Patch 1: "KVM guests", not "VM guests"
- Patches 2 & 8:
- Subject prefix change to "KVM: x86: "
- Patch 2:
- Added Sean's blurb about the synthetic features to the commit message
- Added BIT(2) /* LFENCE always serializing */ to kvm_cpu_cap_mask() in kvm_set_cpu_caps() to mirror true code movement
- Patch 4: Removed the kvm_cpu_cap_set for LFENCE_RDTSC since the previous set_cpu_cap()s and kvm_cpu_cap_mask() presence will effectively synthesize the feature now that the feature bit is in its proper place.
v8: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Address comments from Sean Christopherson, Boris:
- Move open-coded cpuid leaf 0x80000021 EAX bit propagation code in a single step/patch to avoid CPUID bits getting cleared by the open-coded ANDs coming after cpuid_entry_override().
- Includes changes Boris made when committing v7 to tip/x86-cpu, i.e.:
- Removing "AMD" prefix from feature comment text in cpufeatures.h
- Convert test in check_null_seg_clears_base() too.
- commit message changes
v7: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
- Add Dave Hansen's Acked-by to unchanged patch 6/7
- Change patch 3/7 to not bother to set MSR DE_CFG[1]
if X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC is already set [Boris]
- v6 went out with two 1/1's, try to not do that again
v6: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Address v5 comment from Boris:
- Move CPUID leaf 0x8000021 EAX feature bits from scattered to the new whole leaf since the majority of the features will be used in the kernel and thus a separate leaf is appropriate.
v5: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Address v4 comments from Dave Hansen, Pawan Gupta, and Boris:
- Don't add new user-visible 'autoibrs' command line
options that have to be documented: reuse 'eibrs'
- Update Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
- Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to Hygon as well
- Re-word commit texts to not use words like 'us'
v4: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Moved some kvm bits that had crept into patch 6/7 back into 7/7, and addressed v3 comments:
- Don't put ", kvm" in titles of patches that don't touch kvm. [SeanC]
- () after function names, i.e. kvm_set_cpu_caps(). [SeanC]
- follow the established kvm_cpu_cap_init_scattered() style [SeanC]
- Add using cpu_feature_enabled() instead of static_cpu_has() to commit text [SeanC]
- Pawan Gupta mentioned that the ordering of enabling the Intel feature bit past Intel EIBRS bug detection could be avoided by setting NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to cpu_vuln_whitelist, so did that which allowed regrouping all EIBRS related code to one place in cpu_set_bug_bits().
v3: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
- Remove Co-developed-bys. They require signed-off-bys,
so co-developers need to add them themselves.
- update check_null_seg_clears_base() [Boris]
- Made the feature bit additions separate patches
because v2 patch was clearly doing too many things at once.
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/11/23/1690
- Use synthetic/scattered bits instead of introducing new leaf [Boris]
- Combine the rest of the leaf's bits being used [Paolo]
Note: Bits not used by the host can be moved to kvm/cpuid.c if maintainers do not want them in cpufeatures.h.
- Hoist bitsetting code to kvm_set_cpu_caps(), and use cpuid_entry_override() in __do_cpuid_func() [Paolo]
- Reuse SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum [Boris, PeterZ, D.Hansen]
- Change from Boris' diff:
Moved setting X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED to after BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB so PBRSB mitigations wouldn't be enabled.
- Allow for users to specify "autoibrs,lfence/retpoline" instead of actively preventing the extra protections. AutoIBRS doesn't require the extra protection, but allow it anyway.
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
Kim Phillips (8):
x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX x86/cpu, kvm: Move open-coded cpuid leaf 0x80000021 EAX bit
propagation code
x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature
x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
x86/cpu, kvm: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 ++-- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 11 +++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 ++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 26 +++++++++------- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 30 +++++++------------ arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++ 14 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
--
2.34.1
Kim Phillips (8):
x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX
KVM: x86: Move open-coded cpuid leaf 0x80000021 EAX bit propagation
code
x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature
x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
KVM: x86: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 ++-- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 11 ++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 +++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 26 +++++++++-------- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 28 ++++++------------- arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++ 14 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v9 1/8 x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX
Add support for CPUID leaf 80000021, EAX. The majority of the features will be used in the kernel and thus a separate leaf is appropriate.
Include KVM's reverse_cpuid entry because features are used by KVM guests, too.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +5 -2
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafsCPUID_8000_0007_EBX ,CPUID_7_EDX ,CPUID_8000_001F_EAX , + CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, };#define X86_CAP_FMT_NUM "%d:%d"
@@ -94,8 +95,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21))#define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET (feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \
@@ -118,8 +120,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21))#define cpu_has (c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -1
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@/* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 20/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 21/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 1/* N 32-bit bug flags */ /*
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +2 -1
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@#define DISABLED_MASK17 0#define DISABLED_MASK18 0#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) +#define DISABLED_MASK20 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +2 -1
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@#define REQUIRED_MASK17 0#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0#define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) +#define REQUIRED_MASK20 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)#endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +3 -0
@@ -1093,6 +1093,9 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f ) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX ] =cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ); +if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x80000021 ) + c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] =cpuid_eax (0x80000021 ); +init_scattered_cpuid_features (c);init_speculation_control (c);
arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h +1 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_12_EAX] = {0x00000012, 0, CPUID_EAX}, [CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 0, CPUID_EAX}, [CPUID_7_1_EDX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EDX}, + [CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = {0x80000021, 0, CPUID_EAX}, };/*
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/cpu] x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 8415a74852d7c24795007ee9862d25feb519007c Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/8415a74852d7c24795007ee9862d25feb519007c Author: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 16:46:37 -06:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 12:33:06 +01:00
x86/cpu, kvm: Add support for CPUID_80000021_EAX
Add support for CPUID leaf 80000021, EAX. The majority of the features will be used in the kernel and thus a separate leaf is appropriate.
Include KVM's reverse_cpuid entry because features are used by VM guests, too.
[ bp: Massage commit message. ]
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h | 1 + 6 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h +5 -2
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ enum cpuid_leafsCPUID_8000_0007_EBX ,CPUID_7_EDX ,CPUID_8000_001F_EAX , + CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, };#define X86_CAP_FMT_NUM "%d:%d"
@@ -94,8 +95,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(REQUIRED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \ REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21))#define DISABLED_MASK_BIT_SET (feature_bit) \ ( CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 0, feature_bit) || \
@@ -118,8 +120,9 @@ extern const char * const x86_bug_flags[NBUGINTS*32]; CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 17, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 18, feature_bit) || \ CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 19, feature_bit) || \ + CHECK_BIT_IN_MASK_WORD(DISABLED_MASK, 20, feature_bit) || \ DISABLED_MASK_CHECK || \ - BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20)) + BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21))#define cpu_has (c, bit) \ (__builtin_constant_p(bit) && REQUIRED_MASK_BIT_SET(bit) ? 1 : \
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -1
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@/* * Defines x86 CPU feature bits */ -#define NCAPINTS 20/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ +#define NCAPINTS 21/* N 32-bit words worth of info */ #define NBUGINTS 1/* N 32-bit bug flags */ /*
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +2 -1
@@ -124,6 +124,7 @@#define DISABLED_MASK17 0#define DISABLED_MASK18 0#define DISABLED_MASK19 0 -#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) +#define DISABLED_MASK20 0 +#define DISABLED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)#endif /* _ASM_X86_DISABLED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h +2 -1
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@#define REQUIRED_MASK17 0#define REQUIRED_MASK18 0#define REQUIRED_MASK19 0 -#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 20) +#define REQUIRED_MASK20 0 +#define REQUIRED_MASK_CHECK BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(NCAPINTS != 21)#endif /* _ASM_X86_REQUIRED_FEATURES_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +3 -0
@@ -1093,6 +1093,9 @@ void get_cpu_cap(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x8000001f ) c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_001F_EAX ] =cpuid_eax (0x8000001f ); +if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x80000021 ) + c->x86_capability[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] =cpuid_eax (0x80000021 ); +init_scattered_cpuid_features (c);init_speculation_control (c);
arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h +1 -0
@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = { [CPUID_12_EAX] = {0x00000012, 0, CPUID_EAX}, [CPUID_8000_001F_EAX] = {0x8000001f, 0, CPUID_EAX}, [CPUID_7_1_EDX] = { 7, 1, CPUID_EDX}, + [CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] = {0x80000021, 0, CPUID_EAX}, };/*
PATCH v9 2/8 KVM: x86: Move open-coded cpuid leaf 0x80000021 EAX bit propagation code
In reply to Kim PhillipsMove code from __do_cpuid_func() to kvm_set_cpu_caps() in preparation for adding the features in their native leaf.
Also drop the bit description comments as it will be more self- describing once the individual features are added.
Whilst there, switch to using the more efficient cpu_feature_enabled() instead of static_cpu_has().
Note, LFENCE_RDTSC and "NULL selector clears base" are currently synthetic, Linux-defined feature flags as Linux tracking of the features predates AMD's definition. Keep the manual propagation of the flags from their synthetic counterparts until the kernel fully converts to AMD's definition, otherwise KVM would stop synthesizing the flags as intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 31 ++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +12 -19
@@ -741,6 +741,17 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)0 /* SME */ |F (SEV ) |0 /* VM_PAGE_FLUSH */ |F (SEV_ES ) | F(SME_COHERENT)); +kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX , +BIT (0 )/* NO_NESTED_DATA_BP */ | +BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ | +BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ + ); +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC )) + kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ ; +if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG )) + kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ ; + kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (9 )/* NO_SMM_CTL_MSR */ ; + kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_C000_0001_EDX, F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) | F(ACE2) | F(ACE2_EN) | F(PHE) | F(PHE_EN) |
@@ -1222,25 +1233,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)break ;case 0x80000021 : entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ; -/* -* Pass down these bits: -* EAX 0 NNDBP, Processor ignores nested data breakpoints -* EAX 2 LAS, LFENCE always serializing -* EAX 6 NSCB, Null selector clear base -* -* Other defined bits are for MSRs that KVM does not expose: -* EAX 3 SPCL, SMM page configuration lock -* EAX 13 PCMSR, Prefetch control MSR -* -* KVM doesn't support SMM_CTL. -* EAX 9 SMM_CTL MSR is not supported -*/ - entry->eax &=BIT (0 ) |BIT (2 ) |BIT (6 ); - entry->eax |=BIT (9 ); -if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC )) - entry->eax |=BIT (2 ); -if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG )) - entry->eax |=BIT (6 ); +cpuid_entry_override (entry,CPUID_8000_0021_EAX );break ;/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/ case 0xC0000000 :
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/cpu] KVM: x86: Move open-coded CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX bit propagation code
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
Commit-ID: c35ac8c4bf600ee23bacb20f863aa7830efb23fb Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/c35ac8c4bf600ee23bacb20f863aa7830efb23fb Author: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 10:33:13 -06:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 12:33:13 +01:00
KVM: x86: Move open-coded CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX bit propagation code
Move code from __do_cpuid_func() to kvm_set_cpu_caps() in preparation for adding the features in their native leaf.
Also drop the bit description comments as it will be more self-describing once the individual features are added.
Whilst there, switch to using the more efficient cpu_feature_enabled() instead of static_cpu_has().
Note, LFENCE_RDTSC and "NULL selector clears base" are currently synthetic, Linux-defined feature flags as Linux tracking of the features predates AMD's definition. Keep the manual propagation of the flags from their synthetic counterparts until the kernel fully converts to AMD's definition, otherwise KVM would stop synthesizing the flags as intended.
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 31 ++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +12 -19
@@ -741,6 +741,17 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)0 /* SME */ |F (SEV ) |0 /* VM_PAGE_FLUSH */ |F (SEV_ES ) | F(SME_COHERENT)); +kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX , +BIT (0 )/* NO_NESTED_DATA_BP */ | +BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ | +BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ + ); +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC )) + kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ ; +if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG )) + kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ ; + kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (9 )/* NO_SMM_CTL_MSR */ ; + kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_C000_0001_EDX, F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) | F(ACE2) | F(ACE2_EN) | F(PHE) | F(PHE_EN) |
@@ -1222,25 +1233,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)break ;case 0x80000021 : entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx =0 ; -/* -* Pass down these bits: -* EAX 0 NNDBP, Processor ignores nested data breakpoints -* EAX 2 LAS, LFENCE always serializing -* EAX 6 NSCB, Null selector clear base -* -* Other defined bits are for MSRs that KVM does not expose: -* EAX 3 SPCL, SMM page configuration lock -* EAX 13 PCMSR, Prefetch control MSR -* -* KVM doesn't support SMM_CTL. -* EAX 9 SMM_CTL MSR is not supported -*/ - entry->eax &=BIT (0 ) |BIT (2 ) |BIT (6 ); - entry->eax |=BIT (9 ); -if (static_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC )) - entry->eax |=BIT (2 ); -if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG )) - entry->eax |=BIT (6 ); +cpuid_entry_override (entry,CPUID_8000_0021_EAX );break ;/*Add support for Centaur's CPUID instruction*/ case 0xC0000000 :
PATCH v9 3/8 x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature
In reply to Kim PhillipsThe "Processor ignores nested data breakpoints" feature was being open-coded for KVM. Add the feature to its newly introduced CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX proper.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +3 -0
@@ -430,6 +430,9 @@#define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX (19*32+ 9)/* "" Virtual TSC_AUX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10)/* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ +/* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ +/* * BUG word(s) */
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) F(SME_COHERENT));kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX , -BIT (0 )/* NO_NESTED_DATA_BP */ | +F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) |BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ |BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ );
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/cpu] x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
Commit-ID: a9dc9ec5a1fafc3d2fe7a7b594eefaeaccf89a6b Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/a9dc9ec5a1fafc3d2fe7a7b594eefaeaccf89a6b Author: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 10:33:14 -06:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 12:36:34 +01:00
x86/cpu, kvm: Add the NO_NESTED_DATA_BP feature
The "Processor ignores nested data breakpoints" feature was being open-coded for KVM. Add the feature to its newly introduced CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX proper.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +3 -0
@@ -427,6 +427,9 @@#define X86_FEATURE_V_TSC_AUX (19*32+ 9)/* "" Virtual TSC_AUX */ #define X86_FEATURE_SME_COHERENT (19*32+10)/* "" AMD hardware-enforced cache coherency */ +/* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ +#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ +/* * BUG word(s) */
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
@@ -742,7 +742,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) F(SME_COHERENT));kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX , -BIT (0 )/* NO_NESTED_DATA_BP */ | +F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) |BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ |BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ );
PATCH v9 4/8 x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf
In reply to Kim PhillipsThe LFENCE always serializing feature bit was defined as scattered LFENCE_RDTSC and its native leaf bit position open-coded for KVM. Add it to its newly added CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX proper. With LFENCE_RDTSC is in its proper place, the kernel's set_cpu_cap() will effectively sythesize the feature for KVM going forward.
Drop the bit description comments now it's more self-describing.
Also, in amd_init(), don't bother setting DE_CFG[1] any more.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 +---- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -1
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15)/* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16)/* REP microcode works well */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2 ( 3*32+17)/* AMD Last Branch Record Extension Version 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18)/* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ +/* FREE, was #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18) "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19)/* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */ #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20)/* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS ( 3*32+21)/* "" Always-present feature */
@@ -432,6 +432,7 @@/* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ +#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2)/* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ /* * BUG word(s)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +1 -1
@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)init_amd_cacheinfo (c); -if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_XMM2 )) { +if (!cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ) &&cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_XMM2 )) {/* * Use LFENCE for execution serialization. On families which * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing.
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -4
@@ -742,12 +742,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) F(SME_COHERENT));kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX , -F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) | -BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ | +F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) |F (LFENCE_RDTSC ) |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ |BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ ); -if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC )) - kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ ;if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG )) kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ ; kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (9 )/* NO_SMM_CTL_MSR */ ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Sean Christopherson
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 4/8] x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf
Quoted 56 lines · Kim Phillips
The LFENCE always serializing feature bit was defined as scattered
LFENCE_RDTSCand its native leaf bit position open-coded for KVM. Add it to its newly added CPUID leaf0x80000021EAX proper. WithLFENCE_RDTSCis in its proper place, the kernel'sset_cpu_cap()will effectively sythesize the feature for KVM going forward.Drop the bit description comments now it's more self-describing.
Also, in
amd_init(), don't bother setting DE_CFG[1] any more.Signed-off-by Kim Phillips <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 5 +---- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2
-1@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15)/* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16)/* REP microcode works well */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2 ( 3*32+17)/* AMD Last Branch Record Extension Version 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18)/* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ +/* FREE, was #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18) "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19)/* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */ #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20)/* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS ( 3*32+21)/* "" Always-present feature */ @@ -432,6 +432,7 @@/* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ +#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2)/* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ /* * BUG word(s) arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +1
-1@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)init_amd_cacheinfo (c); -if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_XMM2 )) { +if (!cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ) &&cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_XMM2 )) {/* * Use LFENCE for execution serialization. On families which * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing. arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +0
-0
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) · line 750
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1
-4@@ -742,12 +742,9 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) F(SME_COHERENT));kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX , -F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) | -BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ | +F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) |F (LFENCE_RDTSC ) |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ |BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ ); -if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC )) - kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ ;
Gah, I was wrong. I lost track of the fact that kvm_cpu_cap_mask() does an actual CPUID, i.e. the oddball code is necessary to manual synthesize the flag.
Boris, can you fold this in?
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +13 -0
@@ -745,6 +745,19 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) |F (LFENCE_RDTSC ) |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ |BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ ); + +/* +* Synthesize "LFENCE is serializing" into the AMD-defined entry in +* KVM's supported CPUID if the feature is reported as supported by the +* kernel. LFENCE_RDTSC was a Linux-defined synthetic feature long +* before AMD joined the bandwagon, e.g. LFENCE is serializing on most +* CPUs that support SSE2. On CPUs that don't support AMD's leaf, +* kvm_cpu_cap_mask() will unfortunately drop the flag due to ANDing +* the mask with the raw host CPUID, and reporting support in AMD's +* leaf can make it easier for userspace to detect the feature. +*/ +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC )) +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC );if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG )) kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ ; kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (9 )/* NO_SMM_CTL_MSR */ ;
base-commit: f607476ee37397a72a2abb687bc170ce0bbec780
Signature · 22 lines
I.e. end up with this as of this patch: kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0021_EAX, F(NO_NESTED_DATA_BP) | F(LFENCE_RDTSC) | 0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ | BIT(6) /* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ | 0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ ); /* * Synthesize "LFENCE is serializing" into the AMD-defined entry in * KVM's supported CPUID if the feature is reported as supported by the * kernel. LFENCE_RDTSC was a Linux-defined synthetic feature long * before AMD joined the bandwagon, e.g. LFENCE is serializing on most * CPUs that support SSE2. On CPUs that don't support AMD's leaf, * kvm_cpu_cap_mask() will unfortunately drop the flag due to ANDing * the mask with the raw host CPUID, and reporting support in AMD's * leaf can make it easier for userspace to detect the feature. */ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC); if (!static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_NULL_SEG)) kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] |= BIT(6) /* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */; kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX] |= BIT(9) /* NO_SMM_CTL_MSR */;
Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf
Quoted 1 line · Sean Christopherson
Boris, can you fold this in?
Sure, see below.
---
From: Kim Phillips <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 10:33:15 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf
The LFENCE always serializing feature bit was defined as scattered LFENCE_RDTSC and its native leaf bit position open-coded for KVM. Add it to its newly added CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX proper. With LFENCE_RDTSC in its proper place, the kernel's set_cpu_cap() will effectively synthesize the feature for KVM going forward.
Also, DE_CFG[1] doesn't need to be set on such CPUs anymore.
[ bp: Massage and merge diff from Sean. ]
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -1
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15)/* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16)/* REP microcode works well */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2 ( 3*32+17)/* AMD Last Branch Record Extension Version 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18)/* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ +/* FREE, was #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18) "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19)/* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */ #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20)/* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS ( 3*32+21)/* "" Always-present feature */
@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@/* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ +#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2)/* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ /* * BUG word(s)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +1 -1
@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)init_amd_cacheinfo (c); -if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_XMM2 )) { +if (!cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ) &&cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_XMM2 )) {/* * Use LFENCE for execution serialization. On families which * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing.
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +13 -3
@@ -742,12 +742,22 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) F(SME_COHERENT));kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX , -F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) | -BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ | +F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) |F (LFENCE_RDTSC ) |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ |BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ ); + +/* +* Synthesize "LFENCE is serializing" into the AMD-defined entry in +* KVM's supported CPUID if the feature is reported as supported by the +* kernel. LFENCE_RDTSC was a Linux-defined synthetic feature long +* before AMD joined the bandwagon, e.g. LFENCE is serializing on most +* CPUs that support SSE2. On CPUs that don't support AMD's leaf, +* kvm_cpu_cap_mask() will unfortunately drop the flag due to ANDing +* the mask with the raw host CPUID, and reporting support in AMD's +* leaf can make it easier for userspace to detect the feature. +*/ if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC )) - kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ ; +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC );if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG )) kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ ; kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (9 )/* NO_SMM_CTL_MSR */ ;
Signature · 7 lines
2.35.1
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette[tip: x86/cpu] x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf
In reply to Kim PhillipsThe following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 84168ae786f8a15a7eb0f79d34f20b8d261ce2f5 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/84168ae786f8a15a7eb0f79d34f20b8d261ce2f5 Author: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 10:33:15 -06:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 13:06:13 +01:00
x86/cpu, kvm: Move X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC to its native leaf
The LFENCE always serializing feature bit was defined as scattered LFENCE_RDTSC and its native leaf bit position open-coded for KVM. Add it to its newly added CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX proper. With LFENCE_RDTSC in its proper place, the kernel's set_cpu_cap() will effectively synthesize the feature for KVM going forward.
Also, DE_CFG[1] doesn't need to be set on such CPUs anymore.
[ bp: Massage and merge diff from Sean. ]
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -1
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_SYSENTER32 ( 3*32+15)/* "" sysenter in IA32 userspace */ #define X86_FEATURE_REP_GOOD ( 3*32+16)/* REP microcode works well */ #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2 ( 3*32+17)/* AMD Last Branch Record Extension Version 2 */ -#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18)/* "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ +/* FREE, was #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ( 3*32+18) "" LFENCE synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_ACC_POWER ( 3*32+19)/* AMD Accumulated Power Mechanism */ #define X86_FEATURE_NOPL ( 3*32+20)/* The NOPL (0F 1F) instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS ( 3*32+21)/* "" Always-present feature */
@@ -429,6 +429,7 @@/* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ +#define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2)/* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ /* * BUG word(s)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +1 -1
@@ -956,7 +956,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)init_amd_cacheinfo (c); -if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_XMM2 )) { +if (!cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ) &&cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_XMM2 )) {/* * Use LFENCE for execution serialization. On families which * don't have that MSR, LFENCE is already serializing.
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +13 -3
@@ -742,12 +742,22 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) F(SME_COHERENT));kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX , -F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) | -BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ | +F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) |F (LFENCE_RDTSC ) |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ |BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ ); + +/* +* Synthesize "LFENCE is serializing" into the AMD-defined entry in +* KVM's supported CPUID if the feature is reported as supported by the +* kernel. LFENCE_RDTSC was a Linux-defined synthetic feature long +* before AMD joined the bandwagon, e.g. LFENCE is serializing on most +* CPUs that support SSE2. On CPUs that don't support AMD's leaf, +* kvm_cpu_cap_mask() will unfortunately drop the flag due to ANDing +* the mask with the raw host CPUID, and reporting support in AMD's +* leaf can make it easier for userspace to detect the feature. +*/ if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC )) - kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (2 )/* LFENCE Always serializing */ ; +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC );if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG )) kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ ; kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (9 )/* NO_SMM_CTL_MSR */ ;
PATCH v9 5/8 x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature
In reply to Kim PhillipsThe Null Selector Clears Base feature was being open-coded for KVM. Add it to its newly added native CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX proper.
Also drop the bit description comments now it's more self-describing.
[ bp: Convert test in check_null_seg_clears_base() too. ]
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 +--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -433,6 +433,7 @@/* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2)/* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ +#define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE (20*32+ 6)/* "" Null Selector Clears Base */ /* * BUG word(s)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +1 -3
@@ -1685,9 +1685,7 @@ void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))return ; -/* Zen3 CPUs advertise Null Selector Clears Base in CPUID. */ -if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x80000021 && -cpuid_eax (0x80000021 ) &BIT (6 )) +if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ))return ;/*
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -2
@@ -743,10 +743,10 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ,F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) |F (LFENCE_RDTSC ) |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ | -BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ +F (NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ) |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ );if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG )) - kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ ; +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ); kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (9 )/* NO_SMM_CTL_MSR */ ; kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_C000_0001_EDX,
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/cpu] x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 5b909d4ae59aedc711b7a432da021be0e82c95a0 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/5b909d4ae59aedc711b7a432da021be0e82c95a0 Author: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 10:33:16 -06:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 16:25:46 +01:00
x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature
The Null Selector Clears Base feature was being open-coded for KVM. Add it to its newly added native CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX proper.
Also drop the bit description comments now it's more self-describing.
[ bp: Convert test in check_null_seg_clears_base() too. ]
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 4 +--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 4 ++-- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -430,6 +430,7 @@/* AMD-defined Extended Feature 2 EAX, CPUID level 0x80000021 (EAX), word 20 */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2)/* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ +#define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE (20*32+ 6)/* "" Null Selector Clears Base */ /* * BUG word(s)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +1 -3
@@ -1685,9 +1685,7 @@ void check_null_seg_clears_base(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)if (!IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_X86_64 ))return ; -/* Zen3 CPUs advertise Null Selector Clears Base in CPUID. */ -if (c->extended_cpuid_level >=0x80000021 && -cpuid_eax (0x80000021 ) &BIT (6 )) +if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ))return ;/*
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +2 -2
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ,F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) |F (LFENCE_RDTSC ) |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ | -BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ +F (NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ) |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ );/*
@@ -759,7 +759,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC ))kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC );if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG )) - kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (6 )/* NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE */ ; +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ); kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (9 )/* NO_SMM_CTL_MSR */ ; kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_C000_0001_EDX,
PATCH v9 6/8 x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature
In reply to Kim PhillipsThe SMM_CTL MSR not present feature was being open-coded for KVM. Add it to its newly added CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX proper.
Also drop the bit description comments now the code is more self-describing.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2)/* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE (20*32+ 6)/* "" Null Selector Clears Base */ +#define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR (20*32+ 9)/* "" SMM_CTL MSR is not present */ /* * BUG word(s)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void) );if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG ))kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ); - kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (9 )/* NO_SMM_CTL_MSR */ ; +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR ); kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_C000_0001_EDX, F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) |
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/cpu] x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
Commit-ID: faabfcb194a8d0686396e3fff6a5b42911f65191 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/faabfcb194a8d0686396e3fff6a5b42911f65191 Author: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 10:33:17 -06:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 16:37:20 +01:00
x86/cpu, kvm: Add the SMM_CTL MSR not present feature
The SMM_CTL MSR not present feature was being open-coded for KVM. Add it to its newly added CPUID leaf 0x80000021 EAX proper.
Also drop the bit description comments now the code is more self-describing.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -431,6 +431,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2)/* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE (20*32+ 6)/* "" Null Selector Clears Base */ +#define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR (20*32+ 9)/* "" SMM_CTL MSR is not present */ /* * BUG word(s)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC );if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG ))kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ); - kvm_cpu_caps[CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ] |=BIT (9 )/* NO_SMM_CTL_MSR */ ; +kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR ); kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_C000_0001_EDX, F(XSTORE) | F(XSTORE_EN) | F(XCRYPT) | F(XCRYPT_EN) |
PATCH v9 7/8 x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
In reply to Kim PhillipsThe AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS.
It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like Intel's Enhanced IBRS, h/w manages its IBRS mitigation resources automatically across CPL transitions.
The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is enabled by setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21.
Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present. It typically provides greater performance over the incumbent generic retpolines mitigation.
Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum. AMD Automatic IBRS and Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar enablement. Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to cpu_vuln_whitelist, since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS.
The kernel command line option spectre_v2=eibrs is used to select AMD Automatic IBRS, if available.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 +++--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 +++--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 +++++++++++-------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 19 ++++++++++-------- 6 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +3 -3
@@ -610,9 +610,9 @@ kernel command line. retpoline,generic Retpolines retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence - eibrs enhanced IBRS - eibrs,retpoline enhanced IBRS + Retpolines - eibrs,lfence enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + eibrs Enhanced/Auto IBRS + eibrs,retpoline Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines + eibrs,lfence Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE ibrs use IBRS to protect kernel Not specifying this option is equivalent to
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -3
@@ -5729,9 +5729,9 @@ retpoline,generic - Retpolines retpoline,lfence - LFENCE; indirect branch retpoline,amd - alias for retpoline,lfence - eibrs - enhanced IBRS - eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines - eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + eibrs - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + eibrs,retpoline - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines + eibrs,lfence - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel Not specifying this option is equivalent to
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2)/* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE (20*32+ 6)/* "" Null Selector Clears Base */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS (20*32+ 8)/* "" Automatic IBRS */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR (20*32+ 9)/* "" SMM_CTL MSR is not present */ /*
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +2 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@#define _EFER_SVME 12/* Enable virtualization */ #define _EFER_LMSLE 13/* Long Mode Segment Limit Enable */ #define _EFER_FFXSR 14/* Enable Fast FXSAVE/FXRSTOR */ +#define _EFER_AUTOIBRS 21/* Enable Automatic IBRS */ #define EFER_SCE (1<<_EFER_SCE)#define EFER_LME (1<<_EFER_LME)
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@#define EFER_SVME (1<<_EFER_SVME)#define EFER_LMSLE (1<<_EFER_LMSLE)#define EFER_FFXSR (1<<_EFER_FFXSR) +#define EFER_AUTOIBRS (1<<_EFER_AUTOIBRS)/* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +12 -8
@@ -1238,9 +1238,9 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines", [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE", - [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", - [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE", - [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + LFENCE", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + Retpolines", [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", };
@@ -1309,7 +1309,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) { -pr_err ("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n" , +pr_err ("%s selected but CPU doesn't have Enhanced or Automatic IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n" , mitigation_options[i].option);return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO ; }
@@ -1495,8 +1495,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)pr_err (SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG );if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode (mode)) { - x86_spec_ctrl_base |=SPEC_CTRL_IBRS ; -update_spec_ctrl (x86_spec_ctrl_base); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) { +msr_set_bit (MSR_EFER , _EFER_AUTOIBRS); + }else { + x86_spec_ctrl_base |=SPEC_CTRL_IBRS ; +update_spec_ctrl (x86_spec_ctrl_base); + } }switch (mode) {
@@ -1580,8 +1584,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)/* * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around -* firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise -* enabled. +* firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced / Automatic IBRS aren't +* otherwise enabled. * * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +11 -8
@@ -1229,8 +1229,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {VULNWL_AMD (0x12 ,NO_MELTDOWN |NO_SSB |NO_L1TF |NO_MDS |NO_SWAPGS |NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT |NO_MMIO ),/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */ -VULNWL_AMD (X86_FAMILY_ANY ,NO_MELTDOWN |NO_L1TF |NO_MDS |NO_SWAPGS |NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT |NO_MMIO ), -VULNWL_HYGON (X86_FAMILY_ANY ,NO_MELTDOWN |NO_L1TF |NO_MDS |NO_SWAPGS |NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT |NO_MMIO ), +VULNWL_AMD (X86_FAMILY_ANY ,NO_MELTDOWN |NO_L1TF |NO_MDS |NO_SWAPGS |NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT |NO_MMIO |NO_EIBRS_PBRSB ), +VULNWL_HYGON (X86_FAMILY_ANY ,NO_MELTDOWN |NO_L1TF |NO_MDS |NO_SWAPGS |NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT |NO_MMIO |NO_EIBRS_PBRSB ),/* Zhaoxin Family 7 */ VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO),
@@ -1341,8 +1341,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))setup_force_cpu_bug (X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS ); -if (ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL ) +/* +* AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature +* flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist. +*/ +if ((ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL ) ||cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) {setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ); +if (!cpu_matches (cpu_vuln_whitelist,NO_EIBRS_PBRSB ) && + !(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO )) +setup_force_cpu_bug (X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB ); + }if (!cpu_matches (cpu_vuln_whitelist,NO_MDS ) && !(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO )) {
@@ -1404,11 +1412,6 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)setup_force_cpu_bug (X86_BUG_RETBLEED ); } -if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ) && - !cpu_matches (cpu_vuln_whitelist,NO_EIBRS_PBRSB ) && - !(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO )) -setup_force_cpu_bug (X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB ); -if (cpu_matches (cpu_vuln_whitelist,NO_MELTDOWN ))return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/cpu] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
Commit-ID: e7862eda309ecfccc36bb5558d937ed3ace07f3f Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/e7862eda309ecfccc36bb5558d937ed3ace07f3f Author: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 10:33:18 -06:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 17:16:01 +01:00
x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
The AMD Zen4 core supports a new feature called Automatic IBRS.
It is a "set-and-forget" feature that means that, like Intel's Enhanced IBRS, h/w manages its IBRS mitigation resources automatically across CPL transitions.
The feature is advertised by CPUID_Fn80000021_EAX bit 8 and is enabled by setting MSR C000_0080 (EFER) bit 21.
Enable Automatic IBRS by default if the CPU feature is present. It typically provides greater performance over the incumbent generic retpolines mitigation.
Reuse the SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS spectre_v2_mitigation enum. AMD Automatic IBRS and Intel Enhanced IBRS have similar enablement. Add NO_EIBRS_PBRSB to cpu_vuln_whitelist, since AMD Automatic IBRS isn't affected by PBRSB-eIBRS.
The kernel command line option spectre_v2=eibrs is used to select AMD Automatic IBRS, if available.
--- Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 ++--- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++--- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 +++++++++------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 19 ++++++++------- 6 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst +3 -3
@@ -610,9 +610,9 @@ kernel command line. retpoline,generic Retpolines retpoline,lfence LFENCE; indirect branch retpoline,amd alias for retpoline,lfence - eibrs enhanced IBRS - eibrs,retpoline enhanced IBRS + Retpolines - eibrs,lfence enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + eibrs Enhanced/Auto IBRS + eibrs,retpoline Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines + eibrs,lfence Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE ibrs use IBRS to protect kernel Not specifying this option is equivalent to
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -3
@@ -5729,9 +5729,9 @@ retpoline,generic - Retpolines retpoline,lfence - LFENCE; indirect branch retpoline,amd - alias for retpoline,lfence - eibrs - enhanced IBRS - eibrs,retpoline - enhanced IBRS + Retpolines - eibrs,lfence - enhanced IBRS + LFENCE + eibrs - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + eibrs,retpoline - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + Retpolines + eibrs,lfence - Enhanced/Auto IBRS + LFENCE ibrs - use IBRS to protect kernel Not specifying this option is equivalent to
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
@@ -431,6 +431,7 @@#define X86_FEATURE_NO_NESTED_DATA_BP (20*32+ 0)/* "" No Nested Data Breakpoints */ #define X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC (20*32+ 2)/* "" LFENCE always serializing / synchronizes RDTSC */ #define X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE (20*32+ 6)/* "" Null Selector Clears Base */ +#define X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS (20*32+ 8)/* "" Automatic IBRS */ #define X86_FEATURE_NO_SMM_CTL_MSR (20*32+ 9)/* "" SMM_CTL MSR is not present */ /*
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +2 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@#define _EFER_SVME 12/* Enable virtualization */ #define _EFER_LMSLE 13/* Long Mode Segment Limit Enable */ #define _EFER_FFXSR 14/* Enable Fast FXSAVE/FXRSTOR */ +#define _EFER_AUTOIBRS 21/* Enable Automatic IBRS */ #define EFER_SCE (1<<_EFER_SCE)#define EFER_LME (1<<_EFER_LME)
@@ -33,6 +34,7 @@#define EFER_SVME (1<<_EFER_SVME)#define EFER_LMSLE (1<<_EFER_LMSLE)#define EFER_FFXSR (1<<_EFER_FFXSR) +#define EFER_AUTOIBRS (1<<_EFER_AUTOIBRS)/* Intel MSRs. Some also available on other CPUs */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +12 -8
@@ -1238,9 +1238,9 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_strings[] = { [SPECTRE_V2_NONE] = "Vulnerable", [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Retpolines", [SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: LFENCE", - [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS", - [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE", - [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + LFENCE", + [SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE] = "Mitigation: Enhanced / Automatic IBRS + Retpolines", [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: IBRS", };
@@ -1309,7 +1309,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void) cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) && !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) { -pr_err ("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n" , +pr_err ("%s selected but CPU doesn't have Enhanced or Automatic IBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n" , mitigation_options[i].option);return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO ; }
@@ -1495,8 +1495,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)pr_err (SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG );if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode (mode)) { - x86_spec_ctrl_base |=SPEC_CTRL_IBRS ; -update_spec_ctrl (x86_spec_ctrl_base); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) { +msr_set_bit (MSR_EFER , _EFER_AUTOIBRS); + }else { + x86_spec_ctrl_base |=SPEC_CTRL_IBRS ; +update_spec_ctrl (x86_spec_ctrl_base); + } }switch (mode) {
@@ -1580,8 +1584,8 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)/* * Retpoline protects the kernel, but doesn't protect firmware. IBRS * and Enhanced IBRS protect firmware too, so enable IBRS around -* firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced IBRS aren't otherwise -* enabled. +* firmware calls only when IBRS / Enhanced / Automatic IBRS aren't +* otherwise enabled. * * Use "mode" to check Enhanced IBRS instead of boot_cpu_has(), because * the user might select retpoline on the kernel command line and if
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c +11 -8
@@ -1229,8 +1229,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {VULNWL_AMD (0x12 ,NO_MELTDOWN |NO_SSB |NO_L1TF |NO_MDS |NO_SWAPGS |NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT |NO_MMIO ),/* FAMILY_ANY must be last, otherwise 0x0f - 0x12 matches won't work */ -VULNWL_AMD (X86_FAMILY_ANY ,NO_MELTDOWN |NO_L1TF |NO_MDS |NO_SWAPGS |NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT |NO_MMIO ), -VULNWL_HYGON (X86_FAMILY_ANY ,NO_MELTDOWN |NO_L1TF |NO_MDS |NO_SWAPGS |NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT |NO_MMIO ), +VULNWL_AMD (X86_FAMILY_ANY ,NO_MELTDOWN |NO_L1TF |NO_MDS |NO_SWAPGS |NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT |NO_MMIO |NO_EIBRS_PBRSB ), +VULNWL_HYGON (X86_FAMILY_ANY ,NO_MELTDOWN |NO_L1TF |NO_MDS |NO_SWAPGS |NO_ITLB_MULTIHIT |NO_MMIO |NO_EIBRS_PBRSB ),/* Zhaoxin Family 7 */ VULNWL(CENTAUR, 7, X86_MODEL_ANY, NO_SPECTRE_V2 | NO_SWAPGS | NO_MMIO),
@@ -1341,8 +1341,16 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSB_NO))setup_force_cpu_bug (X86_BUG_SPEC_STORE_BYPASS ); -if (ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL ) +/* +* AMD's AutoIBRS is equivalent to Intel's eIBRS - use the Intel feature +* flag and protect from vendor-specific bugs via the whitelist. +*/ +if ((ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_IBRS_ALL ) ||cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) {setup_force_cpu_cap (X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ); +if (!cpu_matches (cpu_vuln_whitelist,NO_EIBRS_PBRSB ) && + !(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO )) +setup_force_cpu_bug (X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB ); + }if (!cpu_matches (cpu_vuln_whitelist,NO_MDS ) && !(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO )) {
@@ -1404,11 +1412,6 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)setup_force_cpu_bug (X86_BUG_RETBLEED ); } -if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED ) && - !cpu_matches (cpu_vuln_whitelist,NO_EIBRS_PBRSB ) && - !(ia32_cap &ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO )) -setup_force_cpu_bug (X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB ); -if (cpu_matches (cpu_vuln_whitelist,NO_MELTDOWN ))return ;
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
In reply to Kim Phillipsarch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void) · line 1499
Quoted 8 lines · Kim Phillips
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2
-2@@ -1495,8 +1495,12 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)pr_err (SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_EBPF_MSG );if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode (mode)) { - x86_spec_ctrl_base |=SPEC_CTRL_IBRS ; -update_spec_ctrl (x86_spec_ctrl_base); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) { +msr_set_bit (MSR_EFER , _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
Doesn't this only enable it on the boot CPU?
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
Quoted 1 line · Josh Poimboeuf
Doesn't this only enable it on the boot CPU?
Whoops, you might be right.
Lemme fix it.
Thx!
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteJosh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
Quoted 8 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Josh Poimboeuf
Doesn't this only enable it on the boot CPU?
Whoops, you might be right.
Lemme fix it.
Thx!
BTW, I wasn't copied on the patch set, despite having dedicated years of my life that file ;-)
Can we add bugs.c and friends to MAINTAINERS?
---8<---
From: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Subject: [PATCH] MAINTAINERS: Add x86 hardware vulnerabilities section
--- MAINTAINERS | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
MAINTAINERS +10 -0
@@ -22553,6 +22553,16 @@ S: Maintained T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86/asm F: arch/x86/entry/ +X86 HARDWARE VULNERABILITIES +M: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> +M: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> +M: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> +M: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> +S: Maintained +F: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ +F: arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +F: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c + X86 MCE INFRASTRUCTURE M: Tony Luck <[email protected]> M: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1
Re: [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
Quoted 2 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
BTW, I wasn't copied on the patch set, despite having dedicated years of my life that file ;-)
... and yet, even after all that pain, you're still willing to self-inflict moar. :-P
Quoted 1 line
Can we add
bugs.cand friends toMAINTAINERS?
Sure, might as well.
I'll queue it after the MW is over.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRE: [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Can we add
bugs.cand friends toMAINTAINERS?Sure, might as well.
I'll queue it after the MW is over.
Should also include Pawan as another unfortunate soul sucked into keeping that file up to date with the latest wreckage. If not as "M", at least as "R":
R: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
-Tony
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
Quoted 5 lines · Tony
Should also include Pawan as another unfortunate soul sucked into keeping that file up to date with the latest wreckage. If not as "M", at least as "R":
R: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
We probably should hear from him before you offer his soul into the purgatory of hardware speculation.
:-P
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette[email protected]
reviewerRe: [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
Quoted 9 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 5 lines · Tony
Should also include Pawan as another unfortunate soul sucked into keeping that file up to date with the latest wreckage. If not as "M", at least as "R":
R: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]>
We probably should hear from him before you offer his soul into the purgatory of hardware speculation.
I will be happy to review what I can.
Soulfully yours,
Pawan
[tip: x86/misc] MAINTAINERS: Add x86 hardware vulnerabilities section
In reply to Josh PoimboeufThe following commit has been merged into the x86/misc branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/misc branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 5910f06503aae3cc4890e562683abc3e38857ff9 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/5910f06503aae3cc4890e562683abc3e38857ff9 Author: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 13:35:22 -08:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Fri, 10 Mar 2023 11:13:30 +01:00
MAINTAINERS: Add x86 hardware vulnerabilities section
Add the bunch of losers who have to deal with this to MAINTAINERS so that they can get explicitly CCed on more hw nightmares.
[ bp: Add commit message. ]
--- MAINTAINERS | 11 +++++++++++ 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
MAINTAINERS +11 -0
@@ -22660,6 +22660,17 @@ S: Maintained T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git x86/asm F: arch/x86/entry/ +X86 HARDWARE VULNERABILITIES +M: Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]> +M: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]> +M: Peter Zijlstra <[email protected]> +M: Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]> +R: Pawan Gupta <[email protected]> +S: Maintained +F: Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/ +F: arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h +F: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c + X86 MCE INFRASTRUCTURE M: Tony Luck <[email protected]> M: Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Josh Poimboeuf
Doesn't this only enable it on the boot CPU?
Whoops, you might be right.
Actually, we stick that MSR - EFER - into the trampoline header and then each AP gets it written to in arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S
But this is only from code staring - I'll confirm this tomorrow.
And if so, we should at least put comments in that trampoline code so that people do not remove the MSR writes.
Or, actually, we should simply write it again because it is the init path and not really a hot path but it should damn well make sure that that bit gets set.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteBorislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
Quoted 3 lines · Borislav Petkov
Or, actually, we should simply write it again because it is the init path and not really a hot path but it should damn well make sure that that bit gets set.
Yeah, we have this fancy msr_set_bit() interface which saves us the MSR write when not needed. And it also tells us that. :-)
So we can do:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +6 -0
@@ -996,6 +996,12 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)msr_set_bit (MSR_K7_HWCR ,MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT );check_null_seg_clears_base (c); + +if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) { +int ret =msr_set_bit (MSR_EFER , _EFER_AUTOIBRS); + +pr_info ("%s: CPU%d, ret: %d\n" , __func__,smp_processor_id (), ret); + } }#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
---
and the output looks like this:
[ 3.046607] x86: Booting SMP configuration: [ 3.046609] .... node #0, CPUs: #1 [ 2.874768] init_amd: CPU1, ret: 0 [ 3.046873] #2 [ 2.874768] init_amd: CPU2, ret: 0 [ 3.049155] #3 [ 2.874768] init_amd: CPU3, ret: 0 [ 3.050834] #4 [ 2.874768] init_amd: CPU4, ret: 0
...
which says that the bit was already set - which confirms the trampoline setting thing.
And doing the write again serves as a guard when in the future we decide to not set EFER anymore - I doubt it - but we can't allow ourselves to not set the autoibrs bit so one more RDMSR on init doesn't matter.
Proper patch tomorrow.
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteJosh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH v9 7/8] x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
In reply to Borislav PetkovQuoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 4 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Josh Poimboeuf
Doesn't this only enable it on the boot CPU?
Whoops, you might be right.
Actually, we stick that MSR - EFER - into the trampoline header and then each AP gets it written to in
arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.SBut this is only from code staring - I'll confirm this tomorrow.
Ah, I had to stare it that for a bit to figure out how it works. setup_real_mode() reads MSR_EFER from the boot CPU and stores it in trampoline_header->efer. Then the other CPUs read that stored value in startup_32() and write it into their MSR.
Quoted 6 lines
And if so, we should at least put comments in that trampoline code so that people do not remove the MSR writes.
Or, actually, we should simply write it again because it is the init path and not really a hot path but it should damn well make sure that that bit gets set.
Yeah, I think that would be good. Otherwise it's rather magical. That EFER MSR is a surprising place to put that bit.
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Borislav Petkov
maintainerPATCH 1/1 x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 1 line · Josh Poimboeuf
Ah, I had to stare it that for a bit to figure out how it works.
Yeah, it is a bit "hidden". :)
Quoted 3 lines
setup_real_mode()readsMSR_EFERfrom the boot CPU and stores it intrampoline_header->efer. Then the other CPUs read that stored value instartup_32()and write it into their MSR.
Exactly.
Quoted 1 line
Yeah, I think that would be good. Otherwise it's rather magical.
Yap, see below.
Quoted 1 line
That EFER MSR is a surprising place to put that bit.
That MSR is very important on AMD. Consider it AMD's CR4. :-)
Thx.
---
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2023 01:11:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
The AutoIBRS bit gets set only on the BSP as part of determining which mitigation to enable on AMD. Setting on the APs relies on the circumstance that the APs get booted through the trampoline and EFER
- the MSR which contains that bit - gets replicated on every AP from the BSP.
However, this can change in the future and considering the security implications of this bit not being set on every CPU, make sure it is set by verifying EFER later in the boot process and on every AP.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +10 -0
@@ -996,6 +996,16 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)msr_set_bit (MSR_K7_HWCR ,MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT );check_null_seg_clears_base (c); + +/* +* Make sure EFER[AIBRSE - Automatic IBRS Enable] is set. The APs are brought up +* using the trampoline code and as part of it, EFER gets prepared there in order +* to be replicated onto them. Regardless, set it here again, if not set, to protect +* against any future refactoring/code reorganization which might miss setting +* this important bit. +*/ +if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) +msr_set_bit (MSR_EFER , _EFER_AUTOIBRS); }#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
Signature · 9 lines
2.35.1
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquettePawan Gupta
reviewerRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 51 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Josh Poimboeuf
Ah, I had to stare it that for a bit to figure out how it works.
Yeah, it is a bit "hidden". :)
Quoted 3 lines
setup_real_mode()readsMSR_EFERfrom the boot CPU and stores it intrampoline_header->efer. Then the other CPUs read that stored value instartup_32()and write it into their MSR.Exactly.
Quoted 1 line
Yeah, I think that would be good. Otherwise it's rather magical.
Yap, see below.
Quoted 1 line
That EFER MSR is a surprising place to put that bit.
That MSR is very important on AMD. Consider it AMD's CR4. :-)
Thx.
---
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2023 01:11:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is setThe AutoIBRS bit gets set only on the BSP as part of determining which mitigation to enable on AMD. Setting on the APs relies on the circumstance that the APs get booted through the trampoline and EFER
- the MSR which contains that bit - gets replicated on every AP from the BSP.However, this can change in the future and considering the security implications of this bit not being set on every CPU, make sure it is set by verifying EFER later in the boot process and on every AP.
Reported-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +0
-0@@ -996,6 +996,16 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)msr_set_bit (MSR_K7_HWCR ,MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT );check_null_seg_clears_base (c);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 1008
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +10
-0+ +/* +* Make sure EFER[AIBRSE - Automatic IBRS Enable] is set. The APs are brought up +* using the trampoline code and as part of it, EFER gets prepared there in order +* to be replicated onto them. Regardless, set it here again, if not set, to protect +* against any future refactoring/code reorganization which might miss setting +* this important bit. +*/ +if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) +msr_set_bit (MSR_EFER , _EFER_AUTOIBRS);
Is it intended to be set regardless of the spectre_v2 mitigation status?
Josh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 51 lines · Pawan Gupta
Quoted 50 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 1 line · Josh Poimboeuf
Ah, I had to stare it that for a bit to figure out how it works.
Yeah, it is a bit "hidden". :)
Quoted 3 lines
setup_real_mode()readsMSR_EFERfrom the boot CPU and stores it intrampoline_header->efer. Then the other CPUs read that stored value instartup_32()and write it into their MSR.Exactly.
Quoted 1 line
Yeah, I think that would be good. Otherwise it's rather magical.
Yap, see below.
Quoted 1 line
That EFER MSR is a surprising place to put that bit.
That MSR is very important on AMD. Consider it AMD's CR4. :-)
Thx.
---
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2023 01:11:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is setThe AutoIBRS bit gets set only on the BSP as part of determining which mitigation to enable on AMD. Setting on the APs relies on the circumstance that the APs get booted through the trampoline and EFER
- the MSR which contains that bit - gets replicated on every AP from the BSP.However, this can change in the future and considering the security implications of this bit not being set on every CPU, make sure it is set by verifying EFER later in the boot process and on every AP.
Reported-by Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +0
-0@@ -996,6 +996,16 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)msr_set_bit (MSR_K7_HWCR ,MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT );
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 1008
Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +10
-0check_null_seg_clears_base (c); + +/* +* Make sure EFER[AIBRSE - Automatic IBRS Enable] is set. The APs are brought up +* using the trampoline code and as part of it, EFER gets prepared there in order +* to be replicated onto them. Regardless, set it here again, if not set, to protect +* against any future refactoring/code reorganization which might miss setting +* this important bit. +*/ +if (cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) +msr_set_bit (MSR_EFER , _EFER_AUTOIBRS);Is it intended to be set regardless of the
spectre_v2mitigation status?
Right, it needs to check spectre_v2_enabled.
Also, this code might be a better fit in identify_secondary_cpu() with the other MSR-writing bug-related code.
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 3 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 1 line
Is it intended to be set regardless of the
spectre_v2mitigation status?Right, it needs to check
spectre_v2_enabled.
Right, I realized this too this morning, while sleeping, so I made me a note on the nightstand to fix it... :-)
Quoted 2 lines
Also, this code might be a better fit in
identify_secondary_cpu()with the other MSR-writing bug-related code.
Same path:
identify_secondary_cpu->identify_cpu->this_cpu->c_init(c)->init_amd
Plus, it keeps the vendor code where it belongs.
v2 below, still untested.
---
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
Date: Sat, 25 Feb 2023 01:11:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
The AutoIBRS bit gets set only on the BSP as part of determining which mitigation to enable on AMD. Setting on the APs relies on the circumstance that the APs get booted through the trampoline and EFER
- the MSR which contains that bit - gets replicated on every AP from the BSP.
However, this can change in the future and considering the security implications of this bit not being set on every CPU, make sure it is set by verifying EFER later in the boot process and on every AP.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 14 ++------------ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 10 ++++++++++ 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +11 -0
@@ -996,6 +996,17 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)msr_set_bit (MSR_K7_HWCR ,MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT );check_null_seg_clears_base (c); + +/* +* Make sure EFER[AIBRSE - Automatic IBRS Enable] is set. The APs are brought up +* using the trampoline code and as part of it, EFER gets prepared there in order +* to be replicated onto them. Regardless, set it here again, if not set, to protect +* against any future refactoring/code reorganization which might miss setting +* this important bit. +*/ +if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode (spectre_v2_enabled) && +cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) +msr_set_bit (MSR_EFER , _EFER_AUTOIBRS); }#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +2 -12
@@ -784,8 +784,7 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) }early_param ("nospectre_v1" , nospectre_v1_cmdline); -static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled__ro_after_init = -SPECTRE_V2_NONE ; +enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled__ro_after_init =SPECTRE_V2_NONE ;#undef pr_fmt#define pr_fmt (fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt
@@ -1133,16 +1132,7 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO ; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode (enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) -{ -return mode ==SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || - mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || - mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || - mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ; -} - -static void __init -spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation (void ) +static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation (void ) {enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation mode =SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE ;bool smt_possible =IS_ENABLED (CONFIG_SMP );
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +10 -0
@@ -83,4 +83,14 @@ unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap (void );extern void update_srbds_msr (void ); +extern enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled; + +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode (enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ +return mode ==SPECTRE_V2_IBRS || + mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || + mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ; +} +#endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
Signature · 7 lines
2.35.1
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteJosh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 8 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 3 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Quoted 1 line
Is it intended to be set regardless of the
spectre_v2mitigation status?Right, it needs to check
spectre_v2_enabled.Right, I realized this too this morning, while sleeping, so I made me a note on the nightstand to fix it... :-)
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 2 lines
Also, this code might be a better fit in
identify_secondary_cpu()with the other MSR-writing bug-related code.Same path:
identify_secondary_cpu->identify_cpu->this_cpu->c_init(c)->init_amd
Plus, it keeps the vendor code where it belongs.
All the other "bug" code in identify_secondary_cpu() *is* vendor-specific.
And for that matter, so is most of the code in bugs.c.
I'm thinking we should just move all this MSR-writing bug-related code into a new cpu_init_bugs() function in bugs.c which can be called by identify_secondary_cpu().
Then we have more "bug" code together and all the local variables/functions like spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode() can remain local.
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 2 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
All the other "bug" code in
identify_secondary_cpu()*is* vendor-specific.
I meant "vendor-specific" in the sense that AMD code goes to amd.c, etc.
As to the identify_secondary_cpu() code - I didn't like it being slapped there either but it got stuck in there hastily during the mitigations upstreaming as back then we had bigger fish to fry than paying too much attention to clean design...
Quoted 5 lines
And for that matter, so is most of the code in
bugs.c.I'm thinking we should just move all this MSR-writing bug-related code into a new
cpu_init_bugs()function inbugs.cwhich can be called byidentify_secondary_cpu().
I guess.
Quoted 2 lines
Then we have more "bug" code together and all the local variables/functions like
spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode()can remain local.
They're still local, more or less. Note the special cpu.h header which is private to arch/x86/kernel/cpu/
Thx.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteJosh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 5 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
All the other "bug" code in
identify_secondary_cpu()*is* vendor-specific.I meant "vendor-specific" in the sense that AMD code goes to
amd.c, etc.
Hm? So code in bugs.c is not vendor-specific? That seems circular and I don't get your point.
Quoted 4 lines
As to the
identify_secondary_cpu()code - I didn't like it being slapped there either but it got stuck in there hastily during the mitigations upstreaming as back then we had bigger fish to fry than paying too much attention to clean design...
Right, so rather than spreading all the bug-related MSR logic around, just do it in one spot.
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 2 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
Hm? So code in
bugs.cis not vendor-specific? That seems circular and I don't get your point.
Lemme try that again...
So there's an obvious benefit of keeping vendor-specific CPU code in one
place: Intel stuff in cpu/intel*, AMD stuff in cpu/amd.c
The sekjority stuff is still vendor-specific CPU code.
Now, if you wanna add a function pointer ->bugs_init or so, say, to
struct cpu_dev
and keep the respective code in amd.c or intel.c, then we get the best of both worlds:
- vendor-specific code remains in the respective file
- you have a vendor-specific function which does hw vuln-specific work *without* vendor checks and so on
Quoted 2 lines
Right, so rather than spreading all the bug-related MSR logic around, just do it in one spot.
It is all CPU init code and I'm wondering if splitting stuff by vendor wouldn't make all that maze in bugs.c a lot more palatable. And get rid of
$ git grep VENDOR arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | wc -l 11
those, for starters.
There's this trade-off of
1. keeping bugs setup code in one place - but then you need to do vendor checks and the other CPU setup code is somewhere else and it is probably related, MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BIT in amd.c for example.
or
2. separating it into their respective files. Then the respective vendor code is simple because you don't need vendor checks. It would need to be done in a slick way, though, so that it remains maintainable.
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteJosh Poimboeuf
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 19 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines
Right, so rather than spreading all the bug-related MSR logic around, just do it in one spot.
It is all CPU init code and I'm wondering if splitting stuff by vendor wouldn't make all that maze in
bugs.ca lot more palatable. And get rid of$ git grep VENDOR arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | wc -l 11those, for starters.
There's this trade-off of
1. keeping bugs setup code in one place - but then you need to do vendor checks and the other CPU setup code is somewhere else and it is probably related,
MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG_LFENCE_SERIALIZE_BITinamd.cfor example.
Quoted 5 lines
or
2. separating it into their respective files. Then the respective vendor code is simple because you don't need vendor checks. It would need to be done in a slick way, though, so that it remains maintainable.
At least now it's a (mostly) self-contained hornets nest. I'm not sure we want to poke it :-)
And I'm not sure spreading the mess around would be an improvement.
Signature · 1 line
Josh
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 4 lines · Josh Poimboeuf
At least now it's a (mostly) self-contained hornets nest. I'm not sure we want to poke it :-)
And I'm not sure spreading the mess around would be an improvement.
Yah, if anything, I wanna see the change first and it has to be an obvious and good one.
What I think we should finish doing, though, is documenting it. Because there are aspects/mitigations that are missing, e.g., there's no retbleed.rst in Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
In reply to Borislav Petkovarch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) · line 1010
Quoted 11 lines · Borislav Petkov
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +10
-0+/* +* Make sure EFER[AIBRSE - Automatic IBRS Enable] is set. The APs are brought up +* using the trampoline code and as part of it, EFER gets prepared there in order +* to be replicated onto them. Regardless, set it here again, if not set, to protect +* against any future refactoring/code reorganization which might miss setting +* this important bit. +*/ +if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode (spectre_v2_enabled) && +cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) +msr_set_bit (MSR_EFER , _EFER_AUTOIBRS); }
I guess the belt and suspenders could be justified here by how important the bit is.
But, if EFER[AIBRSE] gets clear somehow shouldn't we also dump a warning out here so the fool who botched it can fix it? Even if AIBRSE is fixed up, some less important bit could still be botched.
It will freak some users out, but it does seem like the kind of thing we _want_ a bug report for.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 2 lines · Dave Hansen
It will freak some users out, but it does seem like the kind of thing we _want_ a bug report for.
You mean, something like:
if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) WARN_ON_ONCE(msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS));
?
Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 10 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 2 lines · Dave Hansen
It will freak some users out, but it does seem like the kind of thing we _want_ a bug report for.
You mean, something like:
if (spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled) && cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS)) WARN_ON_ONCE(msr_set_bit(MSR_EFER, _EFER_AUTOIBRS));?
Yep, that looks sane.
Borislav Petkov
maintainerPATCH 1/1 x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
v2, with feedback addressed, and rediffed ontop of 6.3-rc1:
---
From: "Borislav Petkov (AMD)" <[email protected]>
The AutoIBRS bit gets set only on the BSP as part of determining which mitigation to enable on AMD. Setting on the APs relies on the circumstance that the APs get booted through the trampoline and EFER
- the MSR which contains that bit - gets replicated on every AP from the BSP.
However, this can change in the future and considering the security implications of this bit not being set on every CPU, make sure it is set by verifying EFER later in the boot process and on every AP.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 +--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +11 -0
@@ -996,6 +996,17 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)msr_set_bit (MSR_K7_HWCR ,MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT );check_null_seg_clears_base (c); + +/* +* Make sure EFER[AIBRSE - Automatic IBRS Enable] is set. The APs are brought up +* using the trampoline code and as part of it, MSR_EFER gets prepared there in +* order to be replicated onto them. Regardless, set it here again, if not set, +* to protect against any future refactoring/code reorganization which might +* miss setting this important bit. +*/ +if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode (spectre_v2_enabled) && +cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) +WARN_ON_ONCE (msr_set_bit (MSR_EFER , _EFER_AUTOIBRS)); }#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1 -9
@@ -784,8 +784,7 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) }early_param ("nospectre_v1" , nospectre_v1_cmdline); -static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled__ro_after_init = -SPECTRE_V2_NONE ; +enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled__ro_after_init =SPECTRE_V2_NONE ;#undef pr_fmt#define pr_fmt (fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt
@@ -1133,13 +1132,6 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO ; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode (enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) -{ -return mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || - mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || - mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ; -} -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode (enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) {return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode (mode) || mode ==SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +8 -0
@@ -83,4 +83,12 @@ unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap (void );extern void update_srbds_msr (void ); +extern enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled; + +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode (enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ +return mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || + mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ; +}#endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
Signature · 7 lines
2.35.1
--
Regards/Gruss,
Boris.
https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquetteRe: [PATCH -v2] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
Quoted 6 lines · Borislav Petkov
The AutoIBRS bit gets set only on the BSP as part of determining which mitigation to enable on AMD. Setting on the APs relies on the circumstance that the APs get booted through the trampoline and EFER
- the MSR which contains that bit - gets replicated on every AP from the BSP.
Quoted 7 lines
However, this can change in the future and considering the security implications of this bit not being set on every CPU, make sure it is set by verifying EFER later in the boot process and on every AP.
Looks sane, thanks for adding the warning:
[tip: x86/cpu] x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
In reply to Josh PoimboeufThe following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 8cc68c9c9e92dbaae51a711454c66eb668045508 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/8cc68c9c9e92dbaae51a711454c66eb668045508 Author: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Sat, 25 Feb 2023 01:11:31 +01:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Thu, 16 Mar 2023 11:50:00 +01:00
x86/CPU/AMD: Make sure EFER[AIBRSE] is set
The AutoIBRS bit gets set only on the BSP as part of determining which mitigation to enable on AMD. Setting on the APs relies on the circumstance that the APs get booted through the trampoline and EFER
- the MSR which contains that bit - gets replicated on every AP from the BSP.
However, this can change in the future and considering the security implications of this bit not being set on every CPU, make sure it is set by verifying EFER later in the boot process and on every AP.
--- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 11 +++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 10 +--------- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h | 8 ++++++++ 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c +11 -0
@@ -996,6 +996,17 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)msr_set_bit (MSR_K7_HWCR ,MSR_K7_HWCR_IRPERF_EN_BIT );check_null_seg_clears_base (c); + +/* +* Make sure EFER[AIBRSE - Automatic IBRS Enable] is set. The APs are brought up +* using the trampoline code and as part of it, MSR_EFER gets prepared there in +* order to be replicated onto them. Regardless, set it here again, if not set, +* to protect against any future refactoring/code reorganization which might +* miss setting this important bit. +*/ +if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode (spectre_v2_enabled) && +cpu_has (c,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) +WARN_ON_ONCE (msr_set_bit (MSR_EFER , _EFER_AUTOIBRS)); }#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +1 -9
@@ -784,8 +784,7 @@ static int __init nospectre_v1_cmdline(char *str) }early_param ("nospectre_v1" , nospectre_v1_cmdline); -static enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled__ro_after_init = -SPECTRE_V2_NONE ; +enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled__ro_after_init =SPECTRE_V2_NONE ;#undef pr_fmt#define pr_fmt (fmt) "RETBleed: " fmt
@@ -1133,13 +1132,6 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO ; } -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode (enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) -{ -return mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || - mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || - mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ; -} -static inline bool spectre_v2_in_ibrs_mode (enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) {return spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode (mode) || mode ==SPECTRE_V2_IBRS ;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpu.h +8 -0
@@ -83,4 +83,12 @@ unsigned int aperfmperf_get_khz(int cpu);extern void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap (void );extern void update_srbds_msr (void ); +extern enum spectre_v2_mitigation spectre_v2_enabled; + +static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode (enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) +{ +return mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS || + mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE || + mode ==SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE ; +}#endif /* ARCH_X86_CPU_H */
PATCH v9 8/8 KVM: x86: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest
In reply to Kim PhillipsAdd the AMD Automatic IBRS feature bit to those being propagated to the guest, and enable the guest EFER bit.
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ,F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) |F (LFENCE_RDTSC ) |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ | -F (NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ) |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ +F (NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ) |F (AUTOIBRS ) |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ );if (!static_cpu_has_bug (X86_BUG_NULL_SEG ))kvm_cpu_cap_set (X86_FEATURE_NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE );
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +3 -0
@@ -4969,6 +4969,9 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) tsc_aux_uret_slot =kvm_add_user_return_msr (MSR_TSC_AUX ); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) +kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_AUTOIBRS ); +/* Check for pause filtering support */ if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER )) { pause_filter_count =0 ;
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +3 -0
@@ -1685,6 +1685,9 @@ static int do_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data)static bool __kvm_valid_efer (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 efer) { +if (efer &EFER_AUTOIBRS && !guest_cpuid_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) +return false; +if (efer &EFER_FFXSR && !guest_cpuid_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT ))return false;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
[tip: x86/cpu] KVM: x86: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
The following commit has been merged into the x86/cpu branch of tip:
Commit-ID: 8c19b6f257fa71ed3a7a9df6ce466c6be31ca04c Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/8c19b6f257fa71ed3a7a9df6ce466c6be31ca04c Author: Kim Phillips <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 24 Jan 2023 10:33:19 -06:00 Committer: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <[email protected]> CommitterDate: Wed, 25 Jan 2023 17:21:40 +01:00
KVM: x86: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest
Add the AMD Automatic IBRS feature bit to those being propagated to the guest, and enable the guest EFER bit.
--- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)kvm_cpu_cap_mask (CPUID_8000_0021_EAX ,F (NO_NESTED_DATA_BP ) |F (LFENCE_RDTSC ) |0 /* SmmPgCfgLock */ | -F (NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ) |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ +F (NULL_SEL_CLR_BASE ) |F (AUTOIBRS ) |0 /* PrefetchCtlMsr */ );/*
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +3 -0
@@ -4969,6 +4969,9 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void) tsc_aux_uret_slot =kvm_add_user_return_msr (MSR_TSC_AUX ); +if (boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) +kvm_enable_efer_bits (EFER_AUTOIBRS ); +/* Check for pause filtering support */ if (!boot_cpu_has (X86_FEATURE_PAUSEFILTER )) { pause_filter_count =0 ;
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +3 -0
@@ -1685,6 +1685,9 @@ static int do_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned index, u64 *data)static bool __kvm_valid_efer (struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,u64 efer) { +if (efer &EFER_AUTOIBRS && !guest_cpuid_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_AUTOIBRS )) +return false; +if (efer &EFER_FFXSR && !guest_cpuid_has (vcpu,X86_FEATURE_FXSR_OPT ))return false;
Quoted 11 lines · Kim Phillips
Kim Phillips (8):
x86/cpu, kvm: Add support forCPUID_80000021_EAX
KVM: x86: Move open-coded cpuid leaf0x80000021EAX bit propagation
code
x86/cpu, kvm: Add theNO_NESTED_DATA_BPfeature
x86/cpu, kvm: MoveX86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSCto its native leaf x86/cpu, kvm: Add the Null Selector Clears Base feature x86/cpu, kvm: Add theSMM_CTLMSR not present feature x86/cpu: Support AMD Automatic IBRS
KVM: x86: Propagate the AMD Automatic IBRS feature to the guest
Quoted 17 lines
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 ++-- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 6 ++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 7 +++-- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 11 ++++++-- arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/include/asm/required-features.h | 3 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 20 +++++++------ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 26 +++++++++-------- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 28 ++++++------------- arch/x86/kvm/reverse_cpuid.h | 1 + arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 3 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 3 ++ 14 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
With my goof in the LFENCE_RDTSC patch fixed,