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KVM SGX virtualization support

RFC PATCH In review Kai Huang 4 participants 35 messages Feb 26, 2021 – Mar 8, 2021

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Kai Huang

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v6 cover KVM SGX virtualization support

--- Disclaimer ---

These patches were originally written by Sean Christopherson while at Intel. Now that Sean has left Intel, I (Kai) have taken over getting them upstream. This series needs more review before it can be merged. It is being posted publicly and under RFC so Sean and others can review it. X86 Maintainers are safe ignoring it for now.

------------------

Hi all,

This series adds KVM SGX virtualization support. The first 14 patches starting with x86/sgx or x86/cpu.. are necessary changes to x86 and SGX core/driver to support KVM SGX virtualization, while the rest are patches to KVM subsystem.

Please help to review this series. Any feedback is highly appreciated. Please let me know if I forgot to CC anyone, or anyone wants to be removed from CC. Thanks in advance!

This series is based against latest kvm/queue branch (+4 SGX patches reside on tip/x86/sgx to avoid conflict on x86 part patches), since patch (KVM: VMX:
Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union) in previous version (v5) has already been merged via another series. Some other recent KVM patches also requires KVM patches in this series to be rebased.

You can also get the code from upstream branch of kvm-sgx repo on github:

https://github.com/intel/kvm-sgx.git upstream

It also requires Qemu changes to create VM with SGX support. You can find Qemu repo here:

https://github.com/intel/qemu-sgx.git upstream

Please refer to README.md of above qemu-sgx repo for detail on how to create guest with SGX support. At meantime, for your quick reference you can use below command to create SGX guest:

	#qemu-system-x86_64 -smp 4 -m 2G -drive file=<your_vm_image>,if=virtio \
		-cpu host,+sgx_provisionkey \
		-sgx-epc id=epc1,memdev=mem1 \
		-object memory-backend-epc,id=mem1,size=64M,prealloc

Please note that the SGX relevant part is:

		-cpu host,+sgx_provisionkey \
		-sgx-epc id=epc1,memdev=mem1 \
		-object memory-backend-epc,id=mem1,size=64M,prealloc

And you can change other parameters of your qemu command based on your needs.

=========
Changelog:

(Changelog here is for global changes. Please see each patch's changelog for
changes made to specific patch.)

v5->v6:

- Main change for x86 part patches is asm/sgx_arch.h is removed and merged to asm/sgx.h, based on Boris's suggestion, and this caused some minor changes to other patches due to header file name being different.
- For KVM part patches, removed patch (KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union), since it has already been merged to upstream KVM. Also rebased rest of KVM part patches based on latest KVM upstream code.

v4->v5 (No big update from v4):

- Updated commit message of patch 4, per Jarkko.
- Updated comments and commit msg for patch 3, per Dave and Sean.

v3->v4:

- Removed Jarkko's first patch, which removes WARN() against EPC page's SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED flag. Dave and Sean were not convinced, and Sean "tripped more than once in the past during one of the many rebases of the virtual EPC and EPC cgroup branches".
- Switched the patch to introduce SGX1/SGX2 feature bits, and the patch to move SGX_LC to cpuid_deps[] table, per Jarkko. Now SGX_LC patch can be applied to existing upstream code directly, if needed.
- Fixed two problems in one KVM patch (trap ECREATE) after review from Rick and Sean.
- Some other minor changes, i.e. update new file's copyright to 2021.

Hi Dave, Sean, Paolo, Rick, and others,

Btw, in last review, we identified that malicious guest can cause KVM to access EPC, which will trigger "page abort", which drops on write, and returns all ones on read. If I understand correctly, we agreed that a better option is to make memremap() deny EPC. However so far this series doesn't contain this work, since looks more discussion is required, and this work can be done independently from KVM SGX series.

v2->v3:

- Split original "x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features" patch into two patches, by splitting moving SGX_LC bit also into cpuid-deps table logic into a separate patch 2:
[RFC PATCH v3 01/27] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features [RFC PATCH v3 02/27] x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit
- Changed from /dev/sgx_virt_epc to /dev/sgx_vepc, per Jarkko. And accordingly, changed prefix 'sgx_virt_epc_xx' to 'sgx_vepc_xx' in various functions and structures.
- Changed CONFIG_X86_SGX_VIRTUALIZATION to CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM, per Dave. Couple of x86 patches and KVM patches are changed too due to the renaming.

v1->v2:

- Refined this cover letter by addressing comments from Dave and Jarkko.
- The original patch which introduced new X86_FEATURE_SGX1/SGX2 were replaced
by 3 new patches from Sean, following Boris and Sean's discussion.
[RFC PATCH v2 01/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features
[RFC PATCH v2 18/26] KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features [RFC PATCH v2 19/26] KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features
- The original patch 1
x86/sgx: Split out adding EPC page to free list to separate helper
was replaced with 2 new patches from Jarkko
[RFC PATCH v2 02/26] x86/sgx: Remove a warn from sgx_free_epc_page()
[RFC PATCH v2 03/26] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()
addressing Jarkko's comments.
- Moved modifying sgx_init() to always initialize sgx_virt_epc_init() out of
patch
x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests
to a separate patch:
[RFC PATCH v2 07/26] x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled
to address Dave's comment that patch ordering can be improved due to before patch "Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support", all SGX, including SGX virtualization, is actually disabled when SGX LC is not
present.

=========
KVM SGX virtualization Overview

- Virtual EPC

SGX enclave memory is special and is reserved specifically for enclave use. In bare-metal SGX enclaves, the kernel allocates enclave pages, copies data into the pages with privileged instructions, then allows the enclave to start. In this scenario, only initialized pages already assigned to an enclave are mapped to userspace.

In virtualized environments, the hypervisor still needs to do the physical enclave page allocation. The guest kernel is responsible for the data copying (among other things). This means that the job of starting an enclave is now split between hypervisor and guest.

This series introduces a new misc device: /dev/sgx_vepc. This device allows the host to map *uninitialized* enclave memory into userspace, which can then be passed into a guest.

While it might be *possible* to start a host-side enclave with /dev/sgx_enclave and pass its memory into a guest, it would be wasteful and convoluted.

Implement the *raw* EPC allocation in the x86 core-SGX subsystem via /dev/sgx_vepc rather than in KVM. Doing so has two major advantages:

- Does not require changes to KVM's uAPI, e.g. EPC gets handled as just another memory backend for guests.

- EPC management is wholly contained in the SGX subsystem, e.g. SGX does not have to export any symbols, changes to reclaim flows don't need to be routed through KVM, SGX's dirty laundry doesn't have to get aired out for the world to see, and so on and so forth.

The virtual EPC pages allocated to guests are currently not reclaimable. Reclaiming EPC page used by enclave requires a special reclaim mechanism separate from normal page reclaim, and that mechanism is not supported for virutal EPC pages. Due to the complications of handling reclaim conflicts between guest and host, reclaiming virtual EPC pages is significantly more complex than basic support for SGX virtualization.

- Support SGX virtualization without SGX Flexible Launch Control

SGX hardware supports two "launch control" modes to limit which enclaves can run. In the "locked" mode, the hardware prevents enclaves from running unless they are blessed by a third party. In the unlocked mode, the kernel is in full control of which enclaves can run. The bare-metal SGX code refuses to launch enclaves unless it is in the unlocked mode.

This sgx_virt_epc driver does not have such a restriction. This allows guests which are OK with the locked mode to use SGX, even if the host kernel refuses to.

- Support exposing SGX2

Due to the same reason above, SGX2 feature detection is added to core SGX code to allow KVM to expose SGX2 to guest, even currently SGX driver doesn't support SGX2, because SGX2 can work just fine in guest w/o any interaction to host SGX driver.

- Restricit SGX guest access to provisioning key

To grant guest being able to fully use SGX, guest needs to be able to access provisioning key. The provisioning key is sensitive, and accessing to it should be restricted. In bare-metal driver, allowing enclave to access provisioning key is restricted by being able to open /dev/sgx_provision.

Add a new KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE to KVM uAPI to extend above mechanism to KVM guests as well. When userspace hypervisor creates a new VM, the new cap is only added to VM when userspace hypervisior is able to open /dev/sgx_provision, following the same role as in bare-metal driver. KVM then traps ECREATE from guest, and only allows ECREATE with provisioning key bit to run when guest supports KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE.

Jarkko Sakkinen (1):
x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()

Kai Huang (3):
x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is
disabled
x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs

Sean Christopherson (21):
x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features
x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx.h
x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT) x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper
x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver
KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX)
KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit
KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features
KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features
KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave
KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization
KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions
KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs
KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC)
KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC
KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX
attribute

 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst                |  23 +
 arch/x86/Kconfig                              |  12 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h            |   2 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h               |   5 +
 .../cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx.h}      |  50 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h                    |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h               |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c              |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c                |  69 ++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c               |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile              |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c              |  17 -
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c                |  28 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h               |  30 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c               |  23 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c                |  92 +++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h                 |  13 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c                | 355 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile                         |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c                          |  89 +++-
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h                          |  50 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c                     |  28 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h                     |   5 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c                        | 465 ++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h                        |  34 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c                     |   1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h                     |   4 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c                        | 102 +++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h                        |   2 +
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                            |  23 +
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |   1 +
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h         |   2 +-
 32 files changed, 1419 insertions(+), 116 deletions(-)
 rename arch/x86/{kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx.h} (89%)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#1 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 1/25 x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit

Move SGX_LC feature bit to CPUID dependency table to make clearing all SGX feature bits easier. Also remove clear_sgx_caps() since it is just a wrapper of setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX) now.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c   | 12 +++---------
 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c +1 -0
index 42af31b64c2c..d40f8e0a54ce 100644
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AVX512_FP16,		X86_FEATURE_AVX512BW  },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,			X86_FEATURE_XSAVES    },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA,		X86_FEATURE_MBA       },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC,			X86_FEATURE_SGX	      },
 	{}
 };
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +3 -9
index 3b1b01f2b248..27533a6e04fa 100644
@@ -93,15 +93,9 @@ static void init_vmx_capabilities(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_VMX_FEATURE_NAMES */
 
-static void clear_sgx_caps(void)
-{
-	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
-	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
-}
-
 static int __init nosgx(char *str)
 {
-	clear_sgx_caps();
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -116,7 +110,7 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) {
 		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
-		clear_sgx_caps();
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
 		return;
 	}
 
@@ -177,6 +171,6 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	    !(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) || !enable_sgx) {
 		if (enable_sgx)
 			pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS\n");
-		clear_sgx_caps();
+		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
 	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#2 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 2/25 x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add SGX1 and SGX2 feature flags, via CPUID.0x12.0x0.EAX, as scattered features, since adding a new leaf for only two bits would be wasteful. As part of virtualizing SGX, KVM will expose the SGX CPUID leafs to its guest, and to do so correctly needs to query hardware and kernel support for SGX1 and SGX2.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c   | 2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c    | 2 ++
 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +2 -0
index 9ac7ad4d8239..6ab99deb6772 100644
@@ -292,6 +292,8 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_FENCE_SWAPGS_KERNEL	(11*32+ 5) /* "" LFENCE in kernel entry SWAPGS path */
 #define X86_FEATURE_SPLIT_LOCK_DETECT	(11*32+ 6) /* #AC for split lock */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA	(11*32+ 7) /* "" Per-thread Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX1		(11*32+ 8) /* "" Basic SGX */
+#define X86_FEATURE_SGX2        	(11*32+ 9) /* SGX Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM) */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI		(12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/cpuid-deps.c +2 -0
index d40f8e0a54ce..defda61f372d 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ static const struct cpuid_dep cpuid_deps[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_ENQCMD,			X86_FEATURE_XSAVES    },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA,		X86_FEATURE_MBA       },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC,			X86_FEATURE_SGX	      },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX1,			X86_FEATURE_SGX       },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX2,			X86_FEATURE_SGX1      },
 	{}
 };
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +2 -0
index 236924930bf0..fea0df867d18 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,8 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CDP_L2,		CPUID_ECX,  2, 0x00000010, 2 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_MBA,		CPUID_EBX,  3, 0x00000010, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PER_THREAD_MBA,	CPUID_ECX,  0, 0x00000010, 3 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX1,		CPUID_EAX,  0, 0x00000012, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_SGX2,		CPUID_EAX,  1, 0x00000012, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE,	CPUID_EDX,  7, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_CPB,		CPUID_EDX,  9, 0x80000007, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PROC_FEEDBACK,    CPUID_EDX, 11, 0x80000007, 0 },
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#3 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 3/25 x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>

EREMOVE takes a pages and removes any association between that page and an enclave. It must be run on a page before it can be added into another enclave. Currently, EREMOVE is run as part of pages being freed into the SGX page allocator. It is not expected to fail.

KVM does not track how guest pages are used, which means that SGX virtualization use of EREMOVE might fail.

Break out the EREMOVE call from the SGX page allocator. This will allow the SGX virtualization code to use the allocator directly. (SGX/KVM will also introduce a more permissive EREMOVE helper).

---
v5->v6:

- Make sgx_reset_epc_page() to return int from void, and only call sgx_free_epc_page() when ret is successful. Because original behavior
was: if EREMOVE failed, the page won't be put back into free EPC page pool. This patch doesn't intend to add functional change.

v4->v5:

- Refined the comment of sgx_reset_epc_page(), per Dave.
- Refined the commit msg (which I missed in v4), per Dave.
- Refined the grammar of the comment of sgx_free_epc_page() (which I missed in v4), per Dave.

v3->v4:

- Moved WARN() on SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED flag to sgx_reset_epc_page(), since the patch to remove the WARN() in v3 was removed. Dave and Sean were not convinced, and Sean "tripped more than once in the past during one of the many rebases of the virtual EPC and EPC cgroup branches".
- Added a comment in sgx_reset_epc_page() to explain sgx_free_epc_page() now won't do EREMOVE and is expecting EPC page already in clean slate, per Dave.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 12 ++++--------
 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +23 -3
index 20a2dd5ba2b4..7a09a98fe68d 100644
@@ -381,6 +381,23 @@ const struct vm_operations_struct sgx_vm_ops = {
 	.access = sgx_vma_access,
 };
 
+
+/*
+ * Place the page in uninitialized state.  Only usable by callers that
+ * know the page is in a clean state in which EREMOVE will succeed.
+ */
+static int sgx_reset_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(epc_page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED);
+
+	ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+	WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /**
  * sgx_encl_release - Destroy an enclave instance
  * @kref:	address of a kref inside &sgx_encl
@@ -404,7 +421,8 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
 			if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page))
 				continue;
 
-			sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
+			if (!sgx_reset_epc_page(entry->epc_page))
+				sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
 			encl->secs_child_cnt--;
 			entry->epc_page = NULL;
 		}
@@ -415,7 +433,8 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
 	xa_destroy(&encl->page_array);
 
 	if (!encl->secs_child_cnt && encl->secs.epc_page) {
-		sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
+		if (!sgx_reset_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page))
+			sgx_free_epc_page(encl->secs.epc_page);
 		encl->secs.epc_page = NULL;
 	}
 
@@ -423,7 +442,8 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
 		va_page = list_first_entry(&encl->va_pages, struct sgx_va_page,
 					   list);
 		list_del(&va_page->list);
-		sgx_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page);
+		if (!sgx_reset_epc_page(va_page->epc_page))
+			sgx_free_epc_page(va_page->epc_page);
 		kfree(va_page);
 	}
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +4 -8
index 8df81a3ed945..44fe91a5bfb3 100644
@@ -598,18 +598,14 @@ struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim)
  * sgx_free_epc_page() - Free an EPC page
  * @page:	an EPC page
  *
- * Call EREMOVE for an EPC page and insert it back to the list of free pages.
+ * Put the EPC page back to the list of free pages. It's the caller's
+ * responsibility to make sure that the page is in uninitialized state. In other
+ * words, do EREMOVE, EWB or whatever operation is necessary before calling
+ * this function.
  */
 void sgx_free_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *page)
 {
 	struct sgx_epc_section *section = &sgx_epc_sections[page->section];
-	int ret;
-
-	WARN_ON_ONCE(page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED);
-
-	ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(page));
-	if (WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret))
-		return;
 
 	spin_lock(&section->lock);
 	list_add_tail(&page->list, &section->page_list);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
Acked-by on v6 3/25
#4 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v6 03/25] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()

Quoted 20 lines · Kai Huang
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +16 -0
+/*
+ * Place the page in uninitialized state.  Only usable by callers that
+ * know the page is in a clean state in which EREMOVE will succeed.
+ */
+static int sgx_reset_epc_page(struct sgx_epc_page *epc_page)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(epc_page->flags & SGX_EPC_PAGE_RECLAIMER_TRACKED);
+
+	ret = __eremove(sgx_get_epc_virt_addr(epc_page));
+	WARN_ONCE(ret, "EREMOVE returned %d (0x%x)", ret, ret);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 /**
  * sgx_encl_release - Destroy an enclave instance
  * @kref:	address of a kref inside &sgx_encl

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref) · line 425

Quoted 6 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +2 -1
@@ -404,7 +421,8 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
 			if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page))
 				continue;
 
-			sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
+			if (!sgx_reset_epc_page(entry->epc_page))
+				sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);

Won't this leak the page?

I think that's fine; the page *IS* unusable if this happens. But, the error message that will show up isn't super informative. If this happened to a bunch of EPC pages, we'd be out of EPC with nothing to show for it.

We must give a more informative message saying that the page is leaked.
Ideally, we'd also make this debuggable by dumping out how many of
these pages there have been somewhere. That can wait, though, until we have some kind of stats coming out of the code (there's nothing now). A comment to remind us to do this would be nice.

Anyway, these are in decent shape and only getting better. It's time to get some more eyeballs on them and get the RFC tag off, so assuming that a better error message gets stuck in here:

#5 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v6 03/25] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()

Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref) · line 425

Quoted 7 lines · Kai Huang
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +2 -1
@@ -404,7 +421,8 @@ void sgx_encl_release(struct kref *ref)
 			if (sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(entry->epc_page))
 				continue;
 
-			sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);
+			if (!sgx_reset_epc_page(entry->epc_page))
+				sgx_free_epc_page(entry->epc_page);

Won't this leak the page?

Yep.

Quoted 10 lines

I think that's fine; the page *IS* unusable if this happens. But, the error message that will show up isn't super informative. If this happened to a bunch of EPC pages, we'd be out of EPC with nothing to show for it.

We must give a more informative message saying that the page is leaked.
Ideally, we'd also make this debuggable by dumping out how many of
these pages there have been somewhere. That can wait, though, until we have some kind of stats coming out of the code (there's nothing now). A comment to remind us to do this would be nice.

Eh, having debugged these several times, the WARN_ONCE in sgx_reset_epc_page() is probably sufficient. IIRC, when I hit this, things were either laughably broken and every page was failing, or there was another ENCLS failure somewhere else that provided additional info. Not saying don't add more debug info, rather that it's probably not a priority.

Quoted 5 lines

Anyway, these are in decent shape and only getting better. It's time to get some more eyeballs on them and get the RFC tag off, so assuming that a better error message gets stuck in here:

#6 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v6 03/25] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()

Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 5 lines

We must give a more informative message saying that the page is leaked.
Ideally, we'd also make this debuggable by dumping out how many of
these pages there have been somewhere. That can wait, though, until we have some kind of stats coming out of the code (there's nothing now). A comment to remind us to do this would be nice.

Eh, having debugged these several times, the WARN_ONCE in sgx_reset_epc_page() is probably sufficient. IIRC, when I hit this, things were either laughably broken and every page was failing, or there was another ENCLS failure somewhere else that provided additional info. Not saying don't add more debug info, rather that it's probably not a priority.

Minimally, I just want a warning that says, "Whoops, I leaked a page". Or EREMOVE could even say, "whoops, this *MIGHT* leak a page".

My beef is mostly that "EREMOVE failed" doesn't tell and end user squat about what this means for their system. At least if we say "leaked", they have some inclination that they've got to reboot to get the page back.

#7 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v6 03/25] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()

Quoted 12 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 5 lines

We must give a more informative message saying that the page is leaked.
Ideally, we'd also make this debuggable by dumping out how many of
these pages there have been somewhere. That can wait, though, until we have some kind of stats coming out of the code (there's nothing now). A comment to remind us to do this would be nice.

Eh, having debugged these several times, the WARN_ONCE in sgx_reset_epc_page() is probably sufficient. IIRC, when I hit this, things were either laughably broken and every page was failing, or there was another ENCLS failure somewhere else that provided additional info. Not saying don't add more debug info, rather that it's probably not a priority.

Quoted 6 lines

Minimally, I just want a warning that says, "Whoops, I leaked a page". Or EREMOVE could even say, "whoops, this *MIGHT* leak a page".

My beef is mostly that "EREMOVE failed" doesn't tell and end user squat about what this means for their system. At least if we say "leaked", they have some inclination that they've got to reboot to get the page back.

Oh yeah, no argument there.

author
#8 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v6 03/25] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page()

In reply to Dave Hansen
Quoted 12 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 5 lines

We must give a more informative message saying that the page is leaked. Ideally, we'd also make this debuggable by dumping out how many of these pages there have been somewhere. That can wait, though, until we have some kind of stats coming out of the code (there's nothing now). A comment to remind us to do this would be nice.

Eh, having debugged these several times, the WARN_ONCE in sgx_reset_epc_page() is probably sufficient. IIRC, when I hit this, things were either laughably broken and every page was failing, or there was another ENCLS failure somewhere else that provided additional info. Not saying don't add more debug info, rather that it's probably not a priority.

Quoted 6 lines

Minimally, I just want a warning that says, "Whoops, I leaked a page". Or EREMOVE could even say, "whoops, this *MIGHT* leak a page".

My beef is mostly that "EREMOVE failed" doesn't tell and end user squat about what this means for their system. At least if we say "leaked", they have some inclination that they've got to reboot to get the page back.

Agreed that a msg to say EPC page is leaked is useful. However I found with current sgx_reset_epc_page() I cannot find a suitable place to add:

Theoretically, it's not that right to add "EPC page is leaked", or even *might* (btw, I don't think we should use *might* since it is vague), in to sgx_reset_epc_page(), since whether leak or not is controlled by whether to call sgx_free_epc_page() upon error, which is not in sgx_reset_epc_page(). And

	if (!sgx_reset_epc_page())
		sgx_free_epc_page();

is called 3 times so I don't want to add a msg for each of them.

I ended up with this solution:

1) Rename existing sgx_free_epc_page() to sgx_encl_free_epc_page() to make it more specific that it is used to free EPC page that is assigned to an enclave. 2) Wrap non-EREMOVE part (putting back to free EPC pool) to sgx_free_epc_page() so it can be used by virtual EPC.

In this way we can just put the error msg in sgx_encl_free_epc_page().

And as you said it's time to get RFC tag off, so I'll send out formal patch with above solution, but w/o your Acked-by on this particular patch. Thanks :)

author
#9 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 4/25 x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

SGX driver can accurately track how enclave pages are used. This enables SECS to be specifically targeted and EREMOVE'd only after all child pages have been EREMOVE'd. This ensures that SGX driver will never encounter SGX_CHILD_PRESENT in normal operation.

Virtual EPC is different. The host does not track how EPC pages are used by the guest, so it cannot guarantee EREMOVE success. It might, for instance, encounter a SECS with a non-zero child count.

Add a definition of SGX_CHILD_PRESENT. It will be used exclusively by the SGX virtualization driver to handle recoverable EREMOVE errors when saniziting EPC pages after they are freed.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h +2 -0
index dd7602c44c72..abf99bb71fdc 100644
@@ -26,12 +26,14 @@
  * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV
  * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED:		Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not
  *				been completed yet.
+ * %SGX_CHILD_PRESENT		SECS has child pages present in the EPC.
  * %SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN:	EINITTOKEN is invalid and enclave signer's
  *				public key does not match IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH.
  * %SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT:		An unmasked event, e.g. INTR, was received
  */
 enum sgx_return_code {
 	SGX_NOT_TRACKED			= 11,
+	SGX_CHILD_PRESENT		= 13,
 	SGX_INVALID_EINITTOKEN		= 16,
 	SGX_UNMASKED_EVENT		= 128,
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#10 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 5/25 x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add a misc device /dev/sgx_vepc to allow userspace to allocate "raw" EPC without an associated enclave. The intended and only known use case for raw EPC allocation is to expose EPC to a KVM guest, hence the 'vepc' moniker, virt.{c,h} files and X86_SGX_KVM Kconfig.

SGX driver uses misc device /dev/sgx_enclave to support userspace to create enclave. Each file descriptor from opening /dev/sgx_enclave represents an enclave. Unlike SGX driver, KVM doesn't control how guest uses EPC, therefore EPC allocated to KVM guest is not associated to an enclave, and /dev/sgx_enclave is not suitable for allocating EPC for KVM guest.

Having separate device nodes for SGX driver and KVM virtual EPC also allows separate permission control for running host SGX enclaves and KVM SGX guests.

To use /dev/sgx_vepc to allocate a virtual EPC instance with particular size, the userspace hypervisor opens /dev/sgx_vepc, and uses mmap() with the intended size to get an address range of virtual EPC. Then it may use the address range to create one KVM memory slot as virtual EPC for guest.

Implement the "raw" EPC allocation in the x86 core-SGX subsystem via /dev/sgx_vepc rather than in KVM. Doing so has two major advantages:

- Does not require changes to KVM's uAPI, e.g. EPC gets handled as just another memory backend for guests.

- EPC management is wholly contained in the SGX subsystem, e.g. SGX does not have to export any symbols, changes to reclaim flows don't need to be routed through KVM, SGX's dirty laundry doesn't have to get aired out for the world to see, and so on and so forth.

The virtual EPC pages allocated to guests are currently not reclaimable. Reclaiming EPC page used by enclave requires a special reclaim mechanism separate from normal page reclaim, and that mechanism is not supported for virutal EPC pages. Due to the complications of handling reclaim conflicts between guest and host, reclaiming virtual EPC pages is significantly more complex than basic support for SGX virtualization.

---
v5->v6:

- Fixed a typo (encalve -> enclave) in commit msg catched by Dave.
- Slight changed paragraph 4 to more explicitly call out this paragraph is to explain how to use /dev/sgx_vepc from userspace, which was requested by Jarkko.
- Added a new line before return in __sgx_vepc_fault(), per Jarkko.
- Added Dave's Acked-by.

v4->v5:

- Added explanation of adding new /dev/sgx_vepc, rather than using existing /dev/sgx_enclave in to commit message, per Jarkko. No code change.

v3->v4:

- Removed #define pr_fmt(fmt), per Dave and Jarkko.
- Added one line summary next to copyright, and also updated copyright, per Dave.
- Added comment to explain zombie_secs_pages and the lock, per Dave.
- Removed !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL) in sgx_vepc_init(), per Dave.
- Removed virt.h, per Dave, and put the declaration of sgx_vepc_init() to arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h.

v2->v3:

- Changed from /dev/sgx_virt_epc to /dev/sgx_vepc, per Jarkko. Accordingly, renamed 'sgx_virt_epc_xx' to 'sgx_vepc_xx' for various functions and structrues.
- Changed CONFIG_X86_SGX_VIRTUALIZATION to CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM, per Dave.

v1->v2:

- Added one paragraph to explain fops of virtual EPC, per Jarkko's suggestion.
- Moved change to sgx_init() out of this patch to a separate patch, as stated in cover letter.
- In sgx_virt_epc_init(), return error if VMX is not supported, or CONFIG_KVM_INTEL is not enabled, because there's no point to create /dev/sgx_virt_epc if KVM is not supported.
- Removed 'struct mm_struct *mm' in 'struct sgx_virt_epc', and related logic in sgx_virt_epc_open/release/mmap(), per Dave's comment.
- Renamed 'virtual_epc_zombie_pages' and 'virt_epc_lock' to 'zombie_secs_pages' 'zombie_secs_pages_lock', per Dave's suggestion.
- Changed __sgx_free_epc_page() to sgx_free_epc_page() due to Jarkko's patch removes EREMOVE in sgx_free_epc_page().
- Changed all struct sgx_virt_epc *epc to struct sgx_virt_epc *vepc.
- In __sgx_virt_epc_fault(), changed comment to use WARN_ON() to make sure vepc->lock has already been hold, per Dave's suggestion.
- In sgx_virt_epc_free_page(), added comments to explain SGX_ENCLAVE_ACT is not expected; and changed to use WARN_ONCE() to dump actual error code, per Dave's comment.
- Removed NULL page check in sgx_virt_epc_free_page(), per Dave's comment.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                 |  12 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile |   1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h    |   9 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c   | 260 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 282 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c
arch/x86/Kconfig +12 -0
index 21f851179ff0..ccb35d14c297 100644
@@ -1951,6 +1951,18 @@ config X86_SGX
 
 	  If unsure, say N.
 
+config X86_SGX_KVM
+	bool "Software Guard eXtensions (SGX) Virtualization"
+	depends on X86_SGX && KVM_INTEL
+	help
+
+	  Enables KVM guests to create SGX enclaves.
+
+	  This includes support to expose "raw" unreclaimable enclave memory to
+	  guests via a device node, e.g. /dev/sgx_vepc.
+
+	  If unsure, say N.
+
 config EFI
 	bool "EFI runtime service support"
 	depends on ACPI
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/Makefile +1 -0
index 91d3dc784a29..9c1656779b2a 100644
@@ -3,3 +3,4 @@ obj-y += \
 	encl.o \
 	ioctl.o \
 	main.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM)	+= virt.o
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +9 -0
index 5fa42d143feb..1bff93be7bf4 100644
@@ -83,4 +83,13 @@ void sgx_mark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 int sgx_unmark_page_reclaimable(struct sgx_epc_page *page);
 struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_epc_page(void *owner, bool reclaim);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+int __init sgx_vepc_init(void);
+#else
+static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)
+{
+	return -ENODEV;
+}
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c new file +260 -0

260 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#11 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 6/25 x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

The kernel will currently disable all SGX support if the hardware does not support launch control. Make it more permissive to allow SGX virtualization on systems without Launch Control support. This will allow KVM to expose SGX to guests that have less-strict requirements on the availability of flexible launch control.

Improve error message to distinguish between three cases. There are two cases where SGX support is completely disabled:
1) SGX has been disabled completely by the BIOS
2) SGX LC is locked by the BIOS. Bare-metal support is disabled because of LC unavailability. SGX virtualization is unavailable (because of Kconfig).
One where it is partially available:
3) SGX LC is locked by the BIOS. Bare-metal support is disabled because of LC unavailability. SGX virtualization is supported.

---
v5->v6:

- No code change. Added Dave's Acked-by.

v4->v5:

- No code change.

v3->v4:

- Removed cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX1) check in enable_sgx_any, since it logically is not related to KVM SGX series, per Sean.
- Changed declaration of variables to be in reverse-christmas tree style, per Jarkko.

v2->v3:

- Added to use 'enable_sgx_any', per Dave.
- Changed to call clear_cpu_cap() directly, rather than using clear_sgx_caps() and clear_sgx_lc().
- Changed to use CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM, instead of CONFIG_X86_SGX_VIRTUALIZATION.

v1->v2:

- Refined commit message per Dave's comments.
- Added check to only enable SGX virtualization when VMX is supported, per Dave's comment.
- Refined error msg print to explicitly call out SGX virtualization will be supported when LC is locked by BIOS, per Dave's comment.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/feat_ctl.c +44 -13
index 27533a6e04fa..96c370284913 100644
@@ -105,7 +105,8 @@ early_param("nosgx", nosgx);
 void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	bool tboot = tboot_enabled();
-	bool enable_sgx;
+	bool enable_sgx_any, enable_sgx_kvm, enable_sgx_driver;
+	bool enable_vmx;
 	u64 msr;
 
 	if (rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, &msr)) {
@@ -114,13 +115,21 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		return;
 	}
 
+	enable_vmx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) &&
+		     IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL);
+
 	/*
-	 * Enable SGX if and only if the kernel supports SGX and Launch Control
-	 * is supported, i.e. disable SGX if the LE hash MSRs can't be written.
+	 * Separate out SGX driver enabling from KVM.  This allows KVM
+	 * guests to use SGX even if the kernel SGX driver refuses to
+	 * use it.  This happens if flexible Faunch Control is not
+	 * available.
 	 */
-	enable_sgx = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) &&
-		     cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) &&
-		     IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX);
+	enable_sgx_any = cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX) &&
+			 IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX);
+	enable_sgx_driver = enable_sgx_any &&
+			    cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+	enable_sgx_kvm = enable_sgx_any && enable_vmx &&
+			  IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM);
 
 	if (msr & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED)
 		goto update_caps;
@@ -136,15 +145,18 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	 * i.e. KVM is enabled, to avoid unnecessarily adding an attack vector
 	 * for the kernel, e.g. using VMX to hide malicious code.
 	 */
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)) {
+	if (enable_vmx) {
 		msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
 
 		if (tboot)
 			msr |= FEAT_CTL_VMX_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
 	}
 
-	if (enable_sgx)
-		msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED | FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+	if (enable_sgx_kvm || enable_sgx_driver) {
+		msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
+		if (enable_sgx_driver)
+			msr |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+	}
 
 	wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL, msr);
 
@@ -167,10 +179,29 @@ void init_ia32_feat_ctl(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	}
 
 update_sgx:
-	if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED) ||
-	    !(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) || !enable_sgx) {
-		if (enable_sgx)
-			pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS\n");
+	if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED)) {
+		if (enable_sgx_kvm || enable_sgx_driver)
+			pr_err_once("SGX disabled by BIOS.\n");
 		clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * VMX feature bit may be cleared due to being disabled in BIOS,
+	 * in which case SGX virtualization cannot be supported either.
+	 */
+	if (!cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_VMX) && enable_sgx_kvm) {
+		pr_err_once("SGX virtualization disabled due to lack of VMX.\n");
+		enable_sgx_kvm = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (!(msr & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED) && enable_sgx_driver) {
+		if (!enable_sgx_kvm) {
+			pr_err_once("SGX Launch Control is locked. Disable SGX.\n");
+			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+		} else {
+			pr_err_once("SGX Launch Control is locked. Support SGX virtualization only.\n");
+			clear_cpu_cap(c, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+		}
 	}
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#12 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 7/25 x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled

In reply to Kai Huang

Modify sgx_init() to always try to initialize the virtual EPC driver, even if the SGX driver is disabled. The SGX driver might be disabled if SGX Launch Control is in locked mode, or not supported in the hardware at all. This allows (non-Linux) guests that support non-LC configurations to use SGX.

---
v5->v6:

- No code change. Added Dave's Acked-by.

v4->v5:

- No code change.

v3->v4:

- Added comment to explain virtual EPC driver can be supported in both cases that SGX driver is not supported, or failed to initialize, per Dave and Jarkko.
- Removed "virt.h" inclusion since it was removed in previous patch, per Dave.

v2->v3:

- Changed from sgx_virt_epc_init() to sgx_vepc_init().

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +9 -1
index 44fe91a5bfb3..8c922e68274d 100644
@@ -712,7 +712,15 @@ static int __init sgx_init(void)
 		goto err_page_cache;
 	}
 
-	ret = sgx_drv_init();
+	/*
+	 * Always try to initialize the native *and* KVM drivers.
+	 * The KVM driver is less picky than the native one and
+	 * can function if the native one is not supported on the
+	 * current system or fails to initialize.
+	 *
+	 * Error out only if both fail to initialize.
+	 */
+	ret = !!sgx_drv_init() & !!sgx_vepc_init();
 	if (ret)
 		goto err_kthread;
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#13 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 8/25 x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Expose SGX architectural structures, as KVM will use many of the architectural constants and structs to virtualize SGX.

Name the new header file as asm/sgx.h, rather than asm/sgx_arch.h, to have single header to provide SGX facilities to share with other kernel componments.

---
v5->v6:

- Renamed asm/sgx_arch.h to asm/sgx.h, which will contain both archiitectural definitions and Linux defined sofware structures and functions, suggested by Boris.
- Removed the comment saying "Data structures defined by Linux software stack should not be placed here", since it is not valid anymore. Added comments to explain asm/sgx.h is for both architectural and non-architectural definitions. Added a comment to split the two parts, suggested by Boris.
- Added one more sentence in commit msg to explain asm/sgx.h is intended for single header file for sharing with other kernel componments.

v4->v5:

- No code change.

v3->v4:

- No code change.
- Added Jarkko's Acked-by. Restored Dave's Acked-by.

v2->v3:

- Added "Expose SGX architectural structures, as..." to commit message, per Jarkko.

---
 .../cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx.h}      | 20 ++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c                |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h                 |  2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h         |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
 rename arch/x86/{kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h => include/asm/sgx.h} (95%)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h renamed from arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h +15 -5
similarity index 95%
rename from arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h
rename to arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h
index abf99bb71fdc..d4ad35f6319a 100644
@@ -2,15 +2,20 @@
 /**
  * Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation.
  *
- * Contains data structures defined by the SGX architecture.  Data structures
- * defined by the Linux software stack should not be placed here.
+ * Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) support.
  */
-#ifndef _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H
-#define _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_SGX_H
+#define _ASM_X86_SGX_H
 
 #include <linux/bits.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 
+/*
+ * This file contains both data structures defined by SGX architecture and Linux
+ * defined software data structures and functions.  The two should not be mixed
+ * together for better readibility.  The architectural definitions come first.
+ */
+
 /* The SGX specific CPUID function. */
 #define SGX_CPUID		0x12
 /* EPC enumeration. */
@@ -337,4 +342,9 @@ struct sgx_sigstruct {
 
 #define SGX_LAUNCH_TOKEN_SIZE 304
 
-#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_ARCH_H */
+/*
+ * Do not put any hardware-defined SGX structure representations below this
+ * line!
+ */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c +1 -1
index 7a09a98fe68d..e023c7a2d062 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 #include <linux/shmem_fs.h>
 #include <linux/suspend.h>
 #include <linux/sched/mm.h>
-#include "arch.h"
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
 #include "encl.h"
 #include "encls.h"
 #include "sgx.h"
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +1 -1
index 1bff93be7bf4..5d71c9c8644d 100644
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/rwsem.h>
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
-#include "arch.h"
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "sgx: " fmt
tools/testing/selftests/sgx/defines.h +1 -1
index 592c1ccf4576..0bd73428d2f3 100644
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
 #define __aligned(x) __attribute__((__aligned__(x)))
 #define __packed __attribute__((packed))
 
-#include "../../../../arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/arch.h"
+#include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h"
 #include "../../../../arch/x86/include/asm/enclu.h"
 #include "../../../../arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/sgx.h"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
Acked-by on v6 8/25
#14 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v6 08/25] x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel

Quoted 5 lines · Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Expose SGX architectural structures, as KVM will use many of the architectural constants and structs to virtualize SGX.

Quoted 7 lines

Name the new header file as asm/sgx.h, rather than asm/sgx_arch.h, to have single header to provide SGX facilities to share with other kernel componments.

Looks fine:

author
#15 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 9/25 x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx.h

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Move the ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx.h so that they can be used by KVM. And because they're architectural.

---
v5->v6:

- Code change due to sgx_arch.h merged to sgx.h.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h      | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 15 ---------------
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +15 -0
index d4ad35f6319a..48f0c42027c0 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,21 @@
 /* The bitmask for the EPC section type. */
 #define SGX_CPUID_EPC_MASK	GENMASK(3, 0)
 
+enum sgx_encls_function {
+	ECREATE	= 0x00,
+	EADD	= 0x01,
+	EINIT	= 0x02,
+	EREMOVE	= 0x03,
+	EDGBRD	= 0x04,
+	EDGBWR	= 0x05,
+	EEXTEND	= 0x06,
+	ELDU	= 0x08,
+	EBLOCK	= 0x09,
+	EPA	= 0x0A,
+	EWB	= 0x0B,
+	ETRACK	= 0x0C,
+};
+
 /**
  * enum sgx_return_code - The return code type for ENCLS, ENCLU and ENCLV
  * %SGX_NOT_TRACKED:		Previous ETRACK's shootdown sequence has not
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +0 -15
index 443188fe7e70..be5c49689980 100644
@@ -11,21 +11,6 @@
 #include <asm/traps.h>
 #include "sgx.h"
 
-enum sgx_encls_function {
-	ECREATE	= 0x00,
-	EADD	= 0x01,
-	EINIT	= 0x02,
-	EREMOVE	= 0x03,
-	EDGBRD	= 0x04,
-	EDGBWR	= 0x05,
-	EEXTEND	= 0x06,
-	ELDU	= 0x08,
-	EBLOCK	= 0x09,
-	EPA	= 0x0A,
-	EWB	= 0x0B,
-	ETRACK	= 0x0C,
-};
-
 /**
  * ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG - flag signifying an ENCLS return code is a trapnr
  *
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#16 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 10/25 x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT)

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Define the ENCLS leafs that are available with SGX2, also referred to as Enclave Dynamic Memory Management (EDMM). The leafs will be used by KVM to conditionally expose SGX2 capabilities to guests.

---
v5->v6:

- Code change due to sgx_arch.h merged to sgx.h.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +3 -0
index 48f0c42027c0..0db1e47a90c5 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ enum sgx_encls_function {
 	EPA	= 0x0A,
 	EWB	= 0x0B,
 	ETRACK	= 0x0C,
+	EAUG	= 0x0D,
+	EMODPR	= 0x0E,
+	EMODT	= 0x0F,
 };
 
 /**
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#17 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 11/25 x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add a helper to extract the fault indicator from an encoded ENCLS return value. SGX virtualization will also need to detect ENCLS faults.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h | 15 ++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c |  2 +-
 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encls.h +14 -1
index be5c49689980..3219d011ee28 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,19 @@
 	} while (0);							  \
 }
 
+/*
+ * encls_faulted() - Check if an ENCLS leaf faulted given an error code
+ * @ret 	the return value of an ENCLS leaf function call
+ *
+ * Return:
+ * - true:	ENCLS leaf faulted.
+ * - false:	Otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool encls_faulted(int ret)
+{
+	return ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG;
+}
+
 /**
  * encls_failed() - Check if an ENCLS function failed
  * @ret:	the return value of an ENCLS function call
@@ -50,7 +63,7 @@
  */
 static inline bool encls_failed(int ret)
 {
-	if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG)
+	if (encls_faulted(ret))
 		return ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret) != X86_TRAP_PF;
 
 	return !!ret;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +1 -1
index 90a5caf76939..e5977752c7be 100644
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
 		}
 	}
 
-	if (ret & ENCLS_FAULT_FLAG) {
+	if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
 		if (encls_failed(ret))
 			ENCLS_WARN(ret, "EINIT");
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#18 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 12/25 x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs

In reply to Kai Huang

Add a helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs. SGX virtualization also needs to update those MSRs based on guest's "virtual" SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn before EINIT from guest.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c |  5 ++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c  | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h   |  2 ++
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2 -3
index e5977752c7be..1bae754268d1 100644
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
 			 void *token)
 {
 	u64 mrsigner[4];
-	int i, j, k;
+	int i, j;
 	void *addr;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -544,8 +544,7 @@ static int sgx_encl_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, struct sgx_sigstruct *sigstruct,
 
 			preempt_disable();
 
-			for (k = 0; k < 4; k++)
-				wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 + k, mrsigner[k]);
+			sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(mrsigner);
 
 			ret = __einit(sigstruct, token, addr);
 
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +15 -0
index 8c922e68274d..276220d0e4b5 100644
@@ -696,6 +696,21 @@ static bool __init sgx_page_cache_init(void)
 	return true;
 }
 
+
+/*
+ * Update the SGX_LEPUBKEYHASH MSRs to the values specified by caller.
+ * Bare-metal driver requires to update them to hash of enclave's signer
+ * before EINIT. KVM needs to update them to guest's virtual MSR values
+ * before doing EINIT from guest.
+ */
+void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(u64 *lepubkeyhash)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 + i, lepubkeyhash[i]);
+}
+
 static int __init sgx_init(void)
 {
 	int ret;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/sgx.h +2 -0
index 5d71c9c8644d..d4b19e5cca16 100644
@@ -92,4 +92,6 @@ static inline int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)
 }
 #endif
 
+void sgx_update_lepubkeyhash(u64 *lepubkeyhash);
+
 #endif /* _X86_SGX_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#19 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 13/25 x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

The host kernel must intercept ECREATE to be able to impose policies on guests. When it does this, the host kernel runs ECREATE against the userspace mapping of the virtualized EPC.

Provide wrappers around __ecreate() and __einit() to hide the ugliness of overloading the ENCLS return value to encode multiple error formats in a single int. KVM will trap-and-execute ECREATE and EINIT as part of SGX virtualization, and on an exception, KVM needs the trapnr so that it can inject the correct fault into the guest.

---
v5->v6:

- Code change due to sgx_arch.h merged to sgx.h.
- Added a new empty line before return in __sgx_virt_einit() per Jarkko.

v4->v5:

- No code change.

v3->v4:

- Added one new line before last return in sgx_virt_einit(), per Jarkko.

v2->v3:

- Added kdoc for sgx_virt_ecreate() and sgx_virt_einit(), per Jarkko.
- Changed to use CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h     |  7 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 102 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +7 -0
index 0db1e47a90c5..d2e1f9a6dd4d 100644
@@ -365,4 +365,11 @@ struct sgx_sigstruct {
  * line!
  */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs,
+		     int *trapnr);
+int sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token,
+		   void __user *secs, u64 *lepubkeyhash, int *trapnr);
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +95 -0

98 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
#20 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v6 13/25] x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)

Quoted 8 lines · Kai Huang
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +8 -0
+int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs,
+		     int *trapnr)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * @secs is userspace address, and it's not guaranteed @secs points at
+	 * an actual EPC page. 

There are four cases that I can think of:
1. @secs points to an EPC page. Good, return 0 and go on with life.
2. @secs points to a non-EPC page. It will fault and permanently error out
3. @secs points to a Present=0 PTE. It will fault, but we need to call the fault handler to get a page in here.
4. @secs points to a kernel address

#1 and #2 are handled and described.

#4 is probably impossible because the address comes out of some gpa_to_hva() KVM code. But, it still _looks_ wonky here. I wouldn't hate an access_ok() check on it.

/*
* @secs is an untrusted, userspace-provided address. It comes
* from KVM and is assumed to point somewhere in userspace.
* This can fault and call SGX or other fault handlers.

	 */

You can also spend a moment to describe the kinds of faults that are handled and what is fatal.

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c int __init sgx_vepc_init(void) · line 286

Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +3 -0
+	 * to physical EPC page by resolving PFN but using __uaccess_xx() is
+	 * simpler.
+	 */

I'd leave the justification for the changelog.

Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +8 -0
+	__uaccess_begin();
+	ret = __ecreate(pageinfo, (void *)secs);
+	__uaccess_end();
+
+	if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
+		*trapnr = ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
author
#21 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v6 13/25] x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM

Quoted 24 lines · On Fri, 5 Mar 2021 09:51:56 -0800 Dave Hansen wrote:

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c int __init sgx_vepc_init(void)

Quoted 8 lines · Kai Huang
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +8 -0
+int sgx_virt_ecreate(struct sgx_pageinfo *pageinfo, void __user *secs,
+		     int *trapnr)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * @secs is userspace address, and it's not guaranteed @secs points at
+	 * an actual EPC page. 

There are four cases that I can think of:
1. @secs points to an EPC page. Good, return 0 and go on with life.
2. @secs points to a non-EPC page. It will fault and permanently error out
3. @secs points to a Present=0 PTE. It will fault, but we need to call the fault handler to get a page in here.
4. @secs points to a kernel address

#1 and #2 are handled and described.

#4 is probably impossible because the address comes out of some gpa_to_hva() KVM code. But, it still _looks_ wonky here. I wouldn't hate an access_ok() check on it.

Quoted 8 lines

/*
* @secs is an untrusted, userspace-provided address. It comes
* from KVM and is assumed to point somewhere in userspace.
* This can fault and call SGX or other fault handlers.

	 */

You can also spend a moment to describe the kinds of faults that are handled and what is fatal.

Thanks Dave for the comments. I'll refine accordingly.

Quoted 7 lines

arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c int __init sgx_vepc_init(void) · line 286

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +3 -0
+	 * to physical EPC page by resolving PFN but using __uaccess_xx() is
+	 * simpler.
+	 */

I'd leave the justification for the changelog.

Will do.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c +8 -0
+	__uaccess_begin();
+	ret = __ecreate(pageinfo, (void *)secs);
+	__uaccess_end();
+
+	if (encls_faulted(ret)) {
+		*trapnr = ENCLS_TRAPNR(ret);
+		return -EFAULT;
+	}
author
#22 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 14/25 x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

And extract sgx_set_attribute() out of sgx_ioc_enclave_provision() and export it as symbol for KVM to use.

Provisioning key is sensitive. SGX driver only allows to create enclave which can access provisioning key when enclave creator has permission to open /dev/sgx_provision. It should apply to VM as well, as provisioning key is platform specific, thus unrestricted VM can also potentially compromise provisioning key.

Move provisioning device creation out of sgx_drv_init() to sgx_init() as preparation for adding SGX virtualization support, so that even SGX driver is not enabled due to flexible launch control is not available, SGX virtualization can still be enabled, and use it to restrict VM's capability of being able to access provisioning key.

---
v5->v6:

- Code change (rebase) due to sgx_arch.h merged to sgx.h.

v4->v5:

- No code change.

v3->v4:

- No code change. Added Jarkko's Reviewed-by.

v2->v3:

- Added kdoc for sgx_set_attribute(), per Jarkko.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h       |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c | 17 ----------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c  | 16 ++-------
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c   | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/sgx.h +3 -0
index d2e1f9a6dd4d..c20df3b37f6c 100644
@@ -372,4 +372,7 @@ int sgx_virt_einit(void __user *sigstruct, void __user *token,
 		   void __user *secs, u64 *lepubkeyhash, int *trapnr);
 #endif
 
+int sgx_set_attribute(unsigned long *allowed_attributes,
+		      unsigned int attribute_fd);
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver.c +0 -17
index f2eac41bb4ff..4f3241109bda 100644
@@ -133,10 +133,6 @@ static const struct file_operations sgx_encl_fops = {
 	.get_unmapped_area	= sgx_get_unmapped_area,
 };
 
-const struct file_operations sgx_provision_fops = {
-	.owner			= THIS_MODULE,
-};
-
 static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = {
 	.minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
 	.name = "sgx_enclave",
@@ -144,13 +140,6 @@ static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_enclave = {
 	.fops = &sgx_encl_fops,
 };
 
-static struct miscdevice sgx_dev_provision = {
-	.minor = MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR,
-	.name = "sgx_provision",
-	.nodename = "sgx_provision",
-	.fops = &sgx_provision_fops,
-};
-
 int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
 {
 	unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
@@ -184,11 +173,5 @@ int __init sgx_drv_init(void)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	ret = misc_register(&sgx_dev_provision);
-	if (ret) {
-		misc_deregister(&sgx_dev_enclave);
-		return ret;
-	}
-
 	return 0;
 }
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c +2 -14
index 1bae754268d1..4714de12422d 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 /*  Copyright(c) 2016-20 Intel Corporation. */
 
 #include <asm/mman.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
 #include <linux/mman.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
@@ -664,24 +665,11 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_init(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
 static long sgx_ioc_enclave_provision(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
 {
 	struct sgx_enclave_provision params;
-	struct file *file;
 
 	if (copy_from_user(&params, arg, sizeof(params)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	file = fget(params.fd);
-	if (!file)
-		return -EINVAL;
-
-	if (file->f_op != &sgx_provision_fops) {
-		fput(file);
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
-	encl->attributes_mask |= SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY;
-
-	fput(file);
-	return 0;
+	return sgx_set_attribute(&encl->attributes_mask, params.fd);
 }
 
 long sgx_ioctl(struct file *filep, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/main.c +56 -1

92 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
Acked-by on v6 14/25
#23 lore raw

Re: [RFC PATCH v6 14/25] x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver

Quoted 17 lines · Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

And extract sgx_set_attribute() out of sgx_ioc_enclave_provision() and export it as symbol for KVM to use.

Provisioning key is sensitive. SGX driver only allows to create enclave which can access provisioning key when enclave creator has permission to open /dev/sgx_provision. It should apply to VM as well, as provisioning key is platform specific, thus unrestricted VM can also potentially compromise provisioning key.

Move provisioning device creation out of sgx_drv_init() to sgx_init() as preparation for adding SGX virtualization support, so that even SGX driver is not enabled due to flexible launch control is not available, SGX virtualization can still be enabled, and use it to restrict VM's capability of being able to access provisioning key.

Quoted 3 lines
author
#24 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 15/25 KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX)

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Export the gva_to_gpa() helpers for use by SGX virtualization when executing ENCLS[ECREATE] and ENCLS[EINIT] on behalf of the guest. To execute ECREATE and EINIT, KVM must obtain the GPA of the target Secure Enclave Control Structure (SECS) in order to get its corresponding HVA.

Because the SECS must reside in the Enclave Page Cache (EPC), copying the SECS's data to a host-controlled buffer via existing exported helpers is not a viable option as the EPC is not readable or writable by the kernel.

SGX virtualization will also use gva_to_gpa() to obtain HVAs for non-EPC pages in order to pass user pointers directly to ECREATE and EINIT, which avoids having to copy pages worth of data into the kernel.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +2 -0
index c1b7bdf47e7e..4d2868d0a747 100644
@@ -5979,6 +5979,7 @@ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
 	u32 access = (static_call(kvm_x86_get_cpl)(vcpu) == 3) ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
 	return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, gva, access, exception);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_read);
 
  gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_fetch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
 				struct x86_exception *exception)
@@ -5995,6 +5996,7 @@ gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
 	access |= PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
 	return vcpu->arch.walk_mmu->gva_to_gpa(vcpu, gva, access, exception);
 }
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_write);
 
 /* uses this to access any guest's mapped memory without checking CPL */
 gpa_t kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_system(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t gva,
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#25 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 16/25 KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Page faults that are signaled by the SGX Enclave Page Cache Map (EPCM), as opposed to the traditional IA32/EPT page tables, set an SGX bit in the error code to indicate that the #PF was induced by SGX. KVM will need to emulate this behavior as part of its trap-and-execute scheme for virtualizing SGX Launch Control, e.g. to inject SGX-induced #PFs if EINIT faults in the host, and to support live migration.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +2 -0
index cc376327a168..09a17575687f 100644
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
 #define PFERR_RSVD_BIT 3
 #define PFERR_FETCH_BIT 4
 #define PFERR_PK_BIT 5
+#define PFERR_SGX_BIT 15
 #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT 32
 #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT 33
 
@@ -236,6 +237,7 @@ enum x86_intercept_stage;
 #define PFERR_RSVD_MASK (1U << PFERR_RSVD_BIT)
 #define PFERR_FETCH_MASK (1U << PFERR_FETCH_BIT)
 #define PFERR_PK_MASK (1U << PFERR_PK_BIT)
+#define PFERR_SGX_MASK (1U << PFERR_SGX_BIT)
 #define PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_BIT)
 #define PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK (1ULL << PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_BIT)
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#26 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 17/25 KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Introduce a scheme that allows KVM's CPUID magic to support features that are scattered in the kernel's feature words. To advertise and/or query guest support for CPUID-based features, KVM requires the bit number of an X86_FEATURE_* to match the bit number in its associated CPUID entry. For scattered features, this does not hold true.

Add a framework to allow defining KVM-only words, stored in kvm_cpu_caps after the shared kernel caps, that can be used to gather the scattered feature bits by translating X86_FEATURE_* flags into their KVM-defined feature.

Note, because reverse_cpuid_check() effectively forces kvm_cpu_caps lookups to be resolved at compile time, there is no runtime cost for translating from kernel-defined to kvm-defined features.

More details here: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/X/[email protected]

---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +27 -5
index 6bd2f8b830e4..a0e7be9ed449 100644
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
  * Unlike "struct cpuinfo_x86.x86_capability", kvm_cpu_caps doesn't need to be
  * aligned to sizeof(unsigned long) because it's not accessed via bitops.
  */
-u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly;
+u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_cpu_caps);
 
 static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ static u32 xstate_required_size(u64 xstate_bv, bool compacted)
 }
 
 #define F feature_bit
+#define SF(name) (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_##name) ? F(name) : 0)
 
 static inline struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *cpuid_entry2_find(
 	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entries, int nent, u32 function, u32 index)
@@ -347,13 +348,13 @@ int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_get_cpuid2(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return r;
 }
 
-static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
+/* Mask kvm_cpu_caps for @leaf with the raw CPUID capabilities of this CPU. */
+static __always_inline void __kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf)
 {
 	const struct cpuid_reg cpuid = x86_feature_cpuid(leaf * 32);
 	struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 entry;
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(leaf);
-	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask;
 
 	cpuid_count(cpuid.function, cpuid.index,
 		    &entry.eax, &entry.ebx, &entry.ecx, &entry.edx);
@@ -361,6 +362,26 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
 	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= *__cpuid_entry_get_reg(&entry, cpuid.reg);
 }
 
+static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_mask(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
+{
+	/* Use the "init" variant for scattered leafs. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf >= NCAPINTS);
+
+	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] &= mask;
+
+	__kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf);
+}
+
+static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_init(enum cpuid_leafs leaf, u32 mask)
+{
+	/* Use the "mask" variant for hardwared-defined leafs. */
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(leaf < NCAPINTS);
+
+	kvm_cpu_caps[leaf] = mask;
+
+	__kvm_cpu_cap_mask(leaf);
+}
+
 void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 {
 	unsigned int f_nx = is_efer_nx() ? F(NX) : 0;
@@ -371,12 +392,13 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	unsigned int f_gbpages = 0;
 	unsigned int f_lm = 0;
 #endif
+	memset(kvm_cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps));
 
-	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) >
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)) >
 		     sizeof(boot_cpu_data.x86_capability));
 
 	memcpy(&kvm_cpu_caps, &boot_cpu_data.x86_capability,
-	       sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps));
+	       sizeof(kvm_cpu_caps) - (NKVMCAPINTS * sizeof(*kvm_cpu_caps)));
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_1_ECX,
 		/*
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +34 -5
index 2a0c5064497f..8925a929186c 100644
@@ -7,7 +7,20 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h>
 
-extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NCAPINTS] __read_mostly;
+/*
+ * Hardware-defined CPUID leafs that are scattered in the kernel, but need to
+ * be directly used by KVM.  Note, these word values conflict with the kernel's
+ * "bug" caps, but KVM doesn't use those.
+ */
+enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs {
+	NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS = NCAPINTS,
+
+	NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS,
+};
+
+#define X86_KVM_FEATURE(w, f)		((w)*32 + (f))
+
+extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
 void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void);
 
 void kvm_update_cpuid_runtime(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
@@ -100,6 +113,20 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf)
 	BUILD_BUG_ON(reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf].function == 0);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Translate feature bits that are scattered in the kernel's cpufeatures word
+ * into KVM feature words that align with hardware's definitions.
+ */
+static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature)
+{
+	return x86_feature;
+}
+
+static __always_inline u32 __feature_leaf(int x86_feature)
+{
+	return __feature_translate(x86_feature) / 32;
+}
+
 /*
  * Retrieve the bit mask from an X86_FEATURE_* definition.  Features contain
  * the hardware defined bit number (stored in bits 4:0) and a software defined
@@ -108,6 +135,8 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf)
  */
 static __always_inline u32 __feature_bit(int x86_feature)
 {
+	x86_feature = __feature_translate(x86_feature);
+
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_feature / 32);
 	return 1 << (x86_feature & 31);
 }
@@ -116,7 +145,7 @@ static __always_inline u32 __feature_bit(int x86_feature)
 
 static __always_inline struct cpuid_reg x86_feature_cpuid(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	return reverse_cpuid[x86_leaf];
@@ -308,7 +337,7 @@ static inline bool cpuid_fault_enabled(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_clear(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] &= ~__feature_bit(x86_feature);
@@ -316,7 +345,7 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_clear(unsigned int x86_feature)
 
 static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_set(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] |= __feature_bit(x86_feature);
@@ -324,7 +353,7 @@ static __always_inline void kvm_cpu_cap_set(unsigned int x86_feature)
 
 static __always_inline u32 kvm_cpu_cap_get(unsigned int x86_feature)
 {
-	unsigned int x86_leaf = x86_feature / 32;
+	unsigned int x86_leaf = __feature_leaf(x86_feature);
 
 	reverse_cpuid_check(x86_leaf);
 	return kvm_cpu_caps[x86_leaf] & __feature_bit(x86_feature);
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#27 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 18/25 KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Define a new KVM-only feature word for advertising and querying SGX sub-features in CPUID.0x12.0x0.EAX. Because SGX1 and SGX2 are scattered in the kernel's feature word, they need to be translated so that the bit numbers match those of hardware.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 13 ++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h +12 -1
index 8925a929186c..a175ff75bbbe 100644
@@ -13,13 +13,18 @@
  * "bug" caps, but KVM doesn't use those.
  */
 enum kvm_only_cpuid_leafs {
-	NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS = NCAPINTS,
+	CPUID_12_EAX	 = NCAPINTS,
+	NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS,
 
 	NKVMCAPINTS = NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS - NCAPINTS,
 };
 
 #define X86_KVM_FEATURE(w, f)		((w)*32 + (f))
 
+/* Intel-defined SGX sub-features, CPUID level 0x12 (EAX). */
+#define __X86_FEATURE_SGX1		X86_KVM_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 0)
+#define __X86_FEATURE_SGX2		X86_KVM_FEATURE(CPUID_12_EAX, 1)
+
 extern u32 kvm_cpu_caps[NR_KVM_CPU_CAPS] __read_mostly;
 void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void);
 
@@ -93,6 +98,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_reg reverse_cpuid[] = {
 	[CPUID_8000_0007_EBX] = {0x80000007, 0, CPUID_EBX},
 	[CPUID_7_EDX]         = {         7, 0, CPUID_EDX},
 	[CPUID_7_1_EAX]       = {         7, 1, CPUID_EAX},
+	[CPUID_12_EAX]        = {0x00000012, 0, CPUID_EAX},
 };
 
 /*
@@ -119,6 +125,11 @@ static __always_inline void reverse_cpuid_check(unsigned int x86_leaf)
  */
 static __always_inline u32 __feature_translate(int x86_feature)
 {
+	if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX1)
+		return __X86_FEATURE_SGX1;
+	else if (x86_feature == X86_FEATURE_SGX2)
+		return __X86_FEATURE_SGX2;
+
 	return x86_feature;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#28 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 19/25 KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add support for handling VM-Exits that originate from a guest SGX enclave. In SGX, an "enclave" is a new CPL3-only execution environment, wherein the CPU and memory state is protected by hardware to make the state inaccesible to code running outside of the enclave. When exiting an enclave due to an asynchronous event (from the perspective of the enclave), e.g. exceptions, interrupts, and VM-Exits, the enclave's state is automatically saved and scrubbed (the CPU loads synthetic state), and then reloaded when re-entering the enclave. E.g. after an instruction based VM-Exit from an enclave, vmcs.GUEST_RIP will not contain the RIP of the enclave instruction that trigered VM-Exit, but will instead point to a RIP in the enclave's untrusted runtime (the guest userspace code that coordinates entry/exit to/from the enclave).

To help a VMM recognize and handle exits from enclaves, SGX adds bits to existing VMCS fields, VM_EXIT_REASON.VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE and GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO.GUEST_INTR_STATE_ENCLAVE_INTR. Define the new architectural bits, and add a boolean to struct vcpu_vmx to cache VMX_EXIT_REASON_FROM_ENCLAVE. Clear the bit in exit_reason so that checks against exit_reason do not need to account for SGX, e.g. "if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)" continues to work.

KVM is a largely a passive observer of the new bits, e.g. KVM needs to account for the bits when propagating information to a nested VMM, but otherwise doesn't need to act differently for the majority of VM-Exits from enclaves.

The one scenario that is directly impacted is emulation, which is for all intents and purposes impossible[1] since KVM does not have access to the RIP or instruction stream that triggered the VM-Exit. The inability to emulate is a non-issue for KVM, as most instructions that might trigger VM-Exit unconditionally #UD in an enclave (before the VM-Exit check. For the few instruction that conditionally #UD, KVM either never sets the exiting control, e.g. PAUSE_EXITING[2], or sets it if and only if the feature is not exposed to the guest in order to inject a #UD, e.g. RDRAND_EXITING.

But, because it is still possible for a guest to trigger emulation, e.g. MMIO, inject a #UD if KVM ever attempts emulation after a VM-Exit from an enclave. This is architecturally accurate for instruction VM-Exits, and for MMIO it's the least bad choice, e.g. it's preferable to killing the VM. In practice, only broken or particularly stupid guests should ever encounter this behavior.

Add a WARN in skip_emulated_instruction to detect any attempt to modify the guest's RIP during an SGX enclave VM-Exit as all such flows should either be unreachable or must handle exits from enclaves before getting to skip_emulated_instruction.

[1] Impossible for all practical purposes. Not truly impossible since KVM could implement some form of para-virtualization scheme.

[2] PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING only affects CPL0 and enclaves exist only at CPL3, so we also don't need to worry about that interaction.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h      |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c       |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c          | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h +1 -0
index 358707f60d99..0ffaa3156a4e 100644
@@ -373,6 +373,7 @@ enum vmcs_field {
 #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS		0x00000002
 #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_SMI		0x00000004
 #define GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI		0x00000008
+#define GUEST_INTR_STATE_ENCLAVE_INTR	0x00000010
 
 /* GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE flags */
 #define GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE		0
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h +1 -0
index b8e650a985e3..946d761adbd3 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 
 
 #define VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY         0x80000000
+#define VMX_EXIT_REASONS_SGX_ENCLAVE_MODE	0x08000000
 
 #define EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI       0
 #define EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT  1
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +2 -0
index fdd80dd8e781..6c0dc7053658 100644
@@ -4099,6 +4099,8 @@ static void prepare_vmcs12(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12,
 {
 	/* update exit information fields: */
 	vmcs12->vm_exit_reason = vm_exit_reason;
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.enclave_mode)
+		vmcs12->vm_exit_reason |= VMX_EXIT_REASONS_SGX_ENCLAVE_MODE;
 	vmcs12->exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
 	vmcs12->vm_exit_intr_info = exit_intr_info;
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +36 -2
index 908f7a8af064..68c6731cabe6 100644
@@ -1570,12 +1570,18 @@ static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
 
 static bool vmx_can_emulate_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *insn, int insn_len)
 {
+	if (to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.enclave_mode) {
+		kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+		return false;
+	}
 	return true;
 }
 
 static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
+	union vmx_exit_reason exit_reason = to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason;
 	unsigned long rip, orig_rip;
+	u32 instr_len;
 
 	/*
 	 * Using VMCS.VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig depends on
@@ -1586,9 +1592,33 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value.
 	 */
 	if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
-	    to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+	    exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
+		instr_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+
+		/*
+		 * Emulating an enclave's instructions isn't supported as KVM
+		 * cannot access the enclave's memory or its true RIP, e.g. the
+		 * vmcs.GUEST_RIP points at the exit point of the enclave, not
+		 * the RIP that actually triggered the VM-Exit.  But, because
+		 * most instructions that cause VM-Exit will #UD in an enclave,
+		 * most instruction-based VM-Exits simply do not occur.
+		 *
+		 * There are a few exceptions, notably the debug instructions
+		 * INT1ICEBRK and INT3, as they are allowed in debug enclaves
+		 * and generate #DB/#BP as expected, which KVM might intercept.
+		 * But again, the CPU does the dirty work and saves an instr
+		 * length of zero so VMMs don't shoot themselves in the foot.
+		 * WARN if KVM tries to skip a non-zero length instruction on
+		 * a VM-Exit from an enclave.
+		 */
+		if (!instr_len)
+			goto rip_updated;
+
+		WARN(exit_reason.enclave_mode,
+		     "KVM: skipping instruction after SGX enclave VM-Exit");
+
 		orig_rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
-		rip = orig_rip + vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
+		rip = orig_rip + instr_len;
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 		/*
 		 * We need to mask out the high 32 bits of RIP if not in 64-bit
@@ -1604,6 +1634,7 @@ static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 			return 0;
 	}
 
+rip_updated:
 	/* skipping an emulated instruction also counts */
 	vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
 
@@ -5351,6 +5382,9 @@ static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	gpa_t gpa;
 
+	if (!vmx_can_emulate_instruction(vcpu, NULL, 0))
+		return 1;
+
 	/*
 	 * A nested guest cannot optimize MMIO vmexits, because we have an
 	 * nGPA here instead of the required GPA.
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#29 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 20/25 KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Introduce sgx.c and sgx.h, along with the framework for handling ENCLS VM-Exits. Add a bool, enable_sgx, that will eventually be wired up to a module param to control whether or not SGX virtualization is enabled at runtime.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/Makefile  |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h | 15 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c |  9 +++++---
 4 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h
arch/x86/kvm/Makefile +2 -0
index aeab168c5711..64c5e7655daf 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ kvm-$(CONFIG_X86_64) += mmu/tdp_iter.o mmu/tdp_mmu.o
 
 kvm-intel-y		+= vmx/vmx.o vmx/vmenter.o vmx/pmu_intel.o vmx/vmcs12.o \
 			   vmx/evmcs.o vmx/nested.o vmx/posted_intr.o
+kvm-intel-$(CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM)	+= vmx/sgx.o
+
 kvm-amd-y		+= svm/svm.o svm/vmenter.o svm/pmu.o svm/nested.o svm/avic.o svm/sev.o
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_KVM)	+= kvm.o
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c new file +50 -0

50 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h new file +15 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6e17ecd4aca3
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef __KVM_X86_SGX_H
+#define __KVM_X86_SGX_H
+
+#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx;
+
+int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+#else
+#define enable_sgx 0
+#endif
+
+#endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +6 -3
index 68c6731cabe6..c55c19d17c61 100644
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 #include "mmu.h"
 #include "nested.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
+#include "sgx.h"
 #include "trace.h"
 #include "vmcs.h"
 #include "vmcs12.h"
@@ -5610,16 +5611,18 @@ static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return 1;
 }
 
+#ifndef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
 static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
 	/*
-	 * SGX virtualization is not yet supported.  There is no software
-	 * enable bit for SGX, so we have to trap ENCLS and inject a #UD
-	 * to prevent the guest from executing ENCLS.
+	 * SGX virtualization is disabled.  There is no software enable bit for
+	 * SGX, so KVM intercepts all ENCLS leafs and injects a #UD to prevent
+	 * the guest from executing ENCLS (when SGX is supported by hardware).
 	 */
 	kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
 	return 1;
 }
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM */
 
 static int handle_bus_lock_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 {
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#30 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 21/25 KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add an ECREATE handler that will be used to intercept ECREATE for the purpose of enforcing and enclave's MISCSELECT, ATTRIBUTES and XFRM, i.e. to allow userspace to restrict SGX features via CPUID. ECREATE will be intercepted when any of the aforementioned masks diverges from hardware in order to enforce the desired CPUID model, i.e. inject #GP if the guest attempts to set a bit that hasn't been enumerated as allowed-1 in CPUID.

Note, access to the PROVISIONKEY is not yet supported.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h |   3 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c          | 247 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 250 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +3 -0
index 09a17575687f..52447d9bd8b1 100644
@@ -1035,6 +1035,9 @@ struct kvm_arch {
 
 	bool bus_lock_detection_enabled;
 
+	/* Guest can access the SGX PROVISIONKEY. */
+	bool sgx_provisioning_allowed;
+
 	struct kvm_pmu_event_filter *pmu_event_filter;
 	struct task_struct *nx_lpage_recovery_thread;
 
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +247 -0

259 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#31 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 22/25 KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Emulate the four Launch Enclave public key hash MSRs (LE hash MSRs) that exist on CPUs that support SGX Launch Control (LC). SGX LC modifies the behavior of ENCLS[EINIT] to use the LE hash MSRs when verifying the key used to sign an enclave. On CPUs without LC support, the LE hash is hardwired into the CPU to an Intel controlled key (the Intel key is also the reset value of the LE hash MSRs). Track the guest's desired hash so that a future patch can stuff the hash into the hardware MSRs when executing EINIT on behalf of the guest, when those MSRs are writable in host.

Note, KVM allows writes to the LE hash MSRs if IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL is unlocked. This is technically not architectural behavior, but it's roughly equivalent to the arch behavior of the MSRs being writable prior to activating SGX[1]. Emulating SGX activation is feasible, but adds no tangible benefits and would just create extra work for KVM and guest firmware.

[1] SGX related bits in IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL cannot be set until SGX is activated, e.g. by firmware. SGX activation is triggered by setting bit 0 in MSR 0x7a. Until SGX is activated, the LE hash MSRs are writable, e.g. to allow firmware to lock down the LE root key with a non-Intel value.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h |  6 ++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 63 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +35 -0
index 65a77dfcb043..cb8ad068807b 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,9 @@
 
 bool __read_mostly enable_sgx;
 
+/* Initial value of guest's virtual SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs */
+static u64 sgx_pubkey_hash[4] __ro_after_init;
+
 /*
  * ENCLS's memory operands use a fixed segment (DS) and a fixed
  * address size based on the mode.  Related prefixes are ignored.
@@ -295,3 +298,35 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	}
 	return 1;
 }
+
+void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Use Intel's default value for Skylake hardware if Launch Control is
+	 * not supported, i.e. Intel's hash is hardcoded into silicon, or if
+	 * Launch Control is supported and enabled, i.e. mimic the reset value
+	 * and let the guest write the MSRs at will.  If Launch Control is
+	 * supported but disabled, then use the current MSR values as the hash
+	 * MSRs exist but are read-only (locked and not writable).
+	 */
+	if (!enable_sgx || boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) ||
+	    rdmsrl_safe(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0, &sgx_pubkey_hash[0])) {
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[0] = 0xa6053e051270b7acULL;
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[1] = 0x6cfbe8ba8b3b413dULL;
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[2] = 0xc4916d99f2b3735dULL;
+		sgx_pubkey_hash[3] = 0xd4f8c05909f9bb3bULL;
+	} else {
+		/* MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 is read above */
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH1, sgx_pubkey_hash[1]);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH2, sgx_pubkey_hash[2]);
+		rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3, sgx_pubkey_hash[3]);
+	}
+}
+
+void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+
+	memcpy(vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, sgx_pubkey_hash,
+	       sizeof(sgx_pubkey_hash));
+}
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h +6 -0
index 6e17ecd4aca3..6502fa52c7e9 100644
@@ -8,8 +8,14 @@
 extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx;
 
 int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void);
+void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 #else
 #define enable_sgx 0
+
+static inline void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void) { }
+static inline void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { }
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +20 -0
index c55c19d17c61..97e9787570d5 100644
@@ -1897,6 +1897,13 @@ static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 	case MSR_IA32_FEAT_CTL:
 		msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control;
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
+			return 1;
+		msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash
+			[msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0];
+		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
 		if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
 			return 1;
@@ -2191,6 +2198,15 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
 			vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
 		break;
+	case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
+		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
+		    (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC) ||
+		    ((vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_LOCKED) &&
+		    !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control & FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED))))
+			return 1;
+		vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash
+			[msr_index - MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0] = data;
+		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
 		if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
 			return 1; /* they are read-only */
@@ -6957,6 +6973,8 @@ static int vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	else
 		memset(&vmx->nested.msrs, 0, sizeof(vmx->nested.msrs));
 
+	vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(vcpu);
+
 	vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
 	vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
 
@@ -7890,6 +7908,8 @@ static __init int hardware_setup(void)
 	if (!enable_ept || !cpu_has_vmx_intel_pt())
 		pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
 
+	setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash();
+
 	if (nested) {
 		nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_config.nested,
 					   vmx_capability.ept);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h +2 -0
index 89da5e1251f1..d0bf078b1087 100644
@@ -325,6 +325,8 @@ struct vcpu_vmx {
 	 */
 	u64 msr_ia32_feature_control;
 	u64 msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
+	/* SGX Launch Control public key hash */
+	u64 msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash[4];
 	u64 ept_pointer;
 
 	struct pt_desc pt_desc;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#32 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 23/25 KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC)

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add a VM-Exit handler to trap-and-execute EINIT when SGX LC is enabled in the host. When SGX LC is enabled, the host kernel may rewrite the hardware values at will, e.g. to launch enclaves with different signers, thus KVM needs to intercept EINIT to ensure it is executed with the correct LE hash (even if the guest sees a hardwired hash).

Switching the LE hash MSRs on VM-Enter/VM-Exit is not a viable option as writing the MSRs is prohibitively expensive, e.g. on SKL hardware each WRMSR is ~400 cycles. And because EINIT takes tens of thousands of cycles to execute, the ~1500 cycle overhead to trap-and-execute EINIT is unlikely to be noticed by the guest, let alone impact its overall SGX performance.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +55 -0
index cb8ad068807b..55be2ea90de5 100644
@@ -259,6 +259,59 @@ static int handle_encls_ecreate(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
 }
 
+static int handle_encls_einit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+	unsigned long sig_hva, secs_hva, token_hva, rflags;
+	struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
+	gva_t sig_gva, secs_gva, token_gva;
+	gpa_t sig_gpa, secs_gpa, token_gpa;
+	int ret, trapnr;
+
+	if (sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rbx_read(vcpu), 1808, 4096, &sig_gva) ||
+	    sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rcx_read(vcpu), 4096, 4096, &secs_gva) ||
+	    sgx_get_encls_gva(vcpu, kvm_rdx_read(vcpu), 304, 512, &token_gva))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Translate the SIGSTRUCT, SECS and TOKEN pointers from GVA to GPA.
+	 * Resume the guest on failure to inject a #PF.
+	 */
+	if (sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, sig_gva, false, &sig_gpa) ||
+	    sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, secs_gva, true, &secs_gpa) ||
+	    sgx_gva_to_gpa(vcpu, token_gva, false, &token_gpa))
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * ...and then to HVA.  The order of accesses isn't architectural, i.e.
+	 * KVM doesn't have to fully process one address at a time.  Exit to
+	 * userspace if a GPA is invalid.  Note, all structures are aligned and
+	 * cannot split pages.
+	 */
+	if (sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, sig_gpa, &sig_hva) ||
+	    sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, secs_gpa, &secs_hva) ||
+	    sgx_gpa_to_hva(vcpu, token_gpa, &token_hva))
+		return 0;
+
+	ret = sgx_virt_einit((void __user *)sig_hva, (void __user *)token_hva,
+			     (void __user *)secs_hva,
+			     vmx->msr_ia32_sgxlepubkeyhash, &trapnr);
+
+	if (ret == -EFAULT)
+		return sgx_inject_fault(vcpu, secs_gva, trapnr);
+
+	rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & ~(X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_PF |
+					  X86_EFLAGS_AF | X86_EFLAGS_SF |
+					  X86_EFLAGS_OF);
+	if (ret)
+		rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
+	else
+		rflags &= ~X86_EFLAGS_ZF;
+	vmx_set_rflags(vcpu, rflags);
+
+	kvm_rax_write(vcpu, ret);
+	return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
+}
+
 static inline bool encls_leaf_enabled_in_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 leaf)
 {
 	if (!enable_sgx || !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX))
@@ -291,6 +344,8 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	} else {
 		if (leaf == ECREATE)
 			return handle_encls_ecreate(vcpu);
+		if (leaf == EINIT)
+			return handle_encls_einit(vcpu);
 		WARN(1, "KVM: unexpected exit on ENCLS[%u]", leaf);
 		vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_UNKNOWN;
 		vcpu->run->hw.hardware_exit_reason = EXIT_REASON_ENCLS;
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#33 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 24/25 KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Enable SGX virtualization now that KVM has the VM-Exit handlers needed to trap-and-execute ENCLS to ensure correctness and/or enforce the CPU model exposed to the guest. Add a KVM module param, "sgx", to allow an admin to disable SGX virtualization independent of the kernel.

When supported in hardware and the kernel, advertise SGX1, SGX2 and SGX LC to userspace via CPUID and wire up the ENCLS_EXITING bitmap based on the guest's SGX capabilities, i.e. to allow ENCLS to be executed in an SGX-enabled guest. With the exception of the provision key, all SGX attribute bits may be exposed to the guest. Guest access to the provision key, which is controlled via securityfs, will be added in a future patch.

Note, KVM does not yet support exposing ENCLS_C leafs or ENCLV leafs.

---
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c      | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 26 +++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h |  5 +++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c    | 80 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h    | 13 +++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c |  1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h |  4 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c    | 35 ++++++++++++++++-
 8 files changed, 212 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +55 -2
index a0e7be9ed449..a0d45607b702 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/user.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/xstate.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
 #include "cpuid.h"
 #include "lapic.h"
 #include "mmu.h"
@@ -171,6 +172,21 @@ static void kvm_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 =
 			(best->eax | ((u64)best->edx << 32)) & supported_xcr0;
 
+	/*
+	 * Bits 127:0 of the allowed SECS.ATTRIBUTES (CPUID.0x12.0x1) enumerate
+	 * the supported XSAVE Feature Request Mask (XFRM), i.e. the enclave's
+	 * requested XCR0 value.  The enclave's XFRM must be a subset of XCRO
+	 * at the time of EENTER, thus adjust the allowed XFRM by the guest's
+	 * supported XCR0.  Similar to XCR0 handling, FP and SSE are forced to
+	 * '1' even on CPUs that don't support XSAVE.
+	 */
+	best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x12, 0x1);
+	if (best) {
+		best->ecx &= vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 & 0xffffffff;
+		best->edx &= vcpu->arch.guest_supported_xcr0 >> 32;
+		best->ecx |= XFEATURE_MASK_FPSSE;
+	}
+
 	kvm_update_pv_runtime(vcpu);
 
 	vcpu->arch.maxphyaddr = cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu);
@@ -429,7 +445,7 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	);
 
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_7_0_EBX,
-		F(FSGSBASE) | F(BMI1) | F(HLE) | F(AVX2) | F(SMEP) |
+		F(FSGSBASE) | F(SGX) | F(BMI1) | F(HLE) | F(AVX2) | F(SMEP) |
 		F(BMI2) | F(ERMS) | F(INVPCID) | F(RTM) | 0 /*MPX*/ | F(RDSEED) |
 		F(ADX) | F(SMAP) | F(AVX512IFMA) | F(AVX512F) | F(AVX512PF) |
 		F(AVX512ER) | F(AVX512CD) | F(CLFLUSHOPT) | F(CLWB) | F(AVX512DQ) |
@@ -440,7 +456,8 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 		F(AVX512VBMI) | F(LA57) | F(PKU) | 0 /*OSPKE*/ | F(RDPID) |
 		F(AVX512_VPOPCNTDQ) | F(UMIP) | F(AVX512_VBMI2) | F(GFNI) |
 		F(VAES) | F(VPCLMULQDQ) | F(AVX512_VNNI) | F(AVX512_BITALG) |
-		F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/
+		F(CLDEMOTE) | F(MOVDIRI) | F(MOVDIR64B) | 0 /*WAITPKG*/ |
+		F(SGX_LC)
 	);
 	/* Set LA57 based on hardware capability. */
 	if (cpuid_ecx(7) & F(LA57))
@@ -479,6 +496,10 @@ void kvm_set_cpu_caps(void)
 		F(XSAVEOPT) | F(XSAVEC) | F(XGETBV1) | F(XSAVES)
 	);
 
+	kvm_cpu_cap_init(CPUID_12_EAX,
+		SF(SGX1) | SF(SGX2)
+	);
+
 	kvm_cpu_cap_mask(CPUID_8000_0001_ECX,
 		F(LAHF_LM) | F(CMP_LEGACY) | 0 /*SVM*/ | 0 /* ExtApicSpace */ |
 		F(CR8_LEGACY) | F(ABM) | F(SSE4A) | F(MISALIGNSSE) |
@@ -800,6 +821,38 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 			entry->edx = 0;
 		}
 		break;
+	case 0x12:
+		/* Intel SGX */
+		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_SGX)) {
+			entry->eax = entry->ebx = entry->ecx = entry->edx = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Index 0: Sub-features, MISCSELECT (a.k.a extended features)
+		 * and max enclave sizes.   The SGX sub-features and MISCSELECT
+		 * are restricted by kernel and KVM capabilities (like most
+		 * feature flags), while enclave size is unrestricted.
+		 */
+		cpuid_entry_override(entry, CPUID_12_EAX);
+		entry->ebx &= SGX_MISC_EXINFO;
+
+		entry = do_host_cpuid(array, function, 1);
+		if (!entry)
+			goto out;
+
+		/*
+		 * Index 1: SECS.ATTRIBUTES.  ATTRIBUTES are restricted a la
+		 * feature flags.  Advertise all supported flags, including
+		 * privileged attributes that require explicit opt-in from
+		 * userspace.  ATTRIBUTES.XFRM is not adjusted as userspace is
+		 * expected to derive it from supported XCR0.
+		 */
+		entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT |
+			      /* PROVISIONKEY | */ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY |
+			      SGX_ATTR_KSS;
+		entry->ebx &= 0;
+		break;
 	/* Intel PT */
 	case 0x14:
 		if (!kvm_cpu_cap_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT)) {
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c +23 -3
index 6c0dc7053658..9aeb096902db 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include "mmu.h"
 #include "nested.h"
 #include "pmu.h"
+#include "sgx.h"
 #include "trace.h"
 #include "vmx.h"
 #include "x86.h"
@@ -2300,6 +2301,9 @@ static void prepare_vmcs02_early(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
 		if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST))
 		    exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
 
+		if (exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING)
+			vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, vmcs12);
+
 		secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, exec_control);
 	}
 
@@ -5701,6 +5705,20 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	return false;
 }
 
+static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	u32 encls_leaf;
+
+	if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING))
+		return false;
+
+	encls_leaf = kvm_rax_read(vcpu);
+	if (encls_leaf > 62)
+		encls_leaf = 63;
+	return vmcs12->encls_exiting_bitmap & BIT_ULL(encls_leaf);
+}
+
 static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_vmcs_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	struct vmcs12 *vmcs12, gpa_t bitmap)
 {
@@ -5797,9 +5815,6 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l0_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	case EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC:
 		/* VM functions are emulated through L2->L0 vmexits. */
 		return true;
-	case EXIT_REASON_ENCLS:
-		/* SGX is never exposed to L1 */
-		return true;
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -5923,6 +5938,8 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	case EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE:
 		return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12,
 			SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE);
+	case EXIT_REASON_ENCLS:
+		return nested_vmx_exit_handled_encls(vcpu, vmcs12);
 	default:
 		return true;
 	}
@@ -6498,6 +6515,9 @@ void nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(struct nested_vmx_msrs *msrs, u32 ept_caps)
 		msrs->secondary_ctls_high |=
 			SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
 
+	if (enable_sgx)
+		msrs->secondary_ctls_high |= SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+
 	/* miscellaneous data */
 	rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC,
 		msrs->misc_low,
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.h +5 -0
index 197148d76b8f..184418baeb3c 100644
@@ -244,6 +244,11 @@ static inline bool nested_exit_on_intr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK;
 }
 
+static inline bool nested_cpu_has_encls_exit(struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	return nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING);
+}
+
 /*
  * if fixed0[i] == 1: val[i] must be 1
  * if fixed1[i] == 0: val[i] must be 0
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.c +79 -1

93 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kvm/vmx/sgx.h +13 -0
index 6502fa52c7e9..a400888b376d 100644
@@ -4,6 +4,9 @@
 
 #include <linux/kvm_host.h>
 
+#include "capabilities.h"
+#include "vmx_ops.h"
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
 extern bool __read_mostly enable_sgx;
 
@@ -11,11 +14,21 @@ int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
 
 void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void);
 void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
+
+void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct vmcs12 *vmcs12);
 #else
 #define enable_sgx 0
 
 static inline void setup_default_sgx_lepubkeyhash(void) { }
 static inline void vcpu_setup_sgx_lepubkeyhash(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) { }
+
+static inline void vmx_write_encls_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+					  struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do if hardware doesn't support SGX */
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
+		vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
+}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* __KVM_X86_SGX_H */
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.c +1 -0
index c8e51c004f78..034adb6404dc 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ const unsigned short vmcs_field_to_offset_table[] = {
 	FIELD64(VMREAD_BITMAP, vmread_bitmap),
 	FIELD64(VMWRITE_BITMAP, vmwrite_bitmap),
 	FIELD64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, xss_exit_bitmap),
+	FIELD64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, encls_exiting_bitmap),
 	FIELD64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS, guest_physical_address),
 	FIELD64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, vmcs_link_pointer),
 	FIELD64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, guest_ia32_debugctl),
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs12.h +3 -1
index 80232daf00ff..13494956d0e9 100644
@@ -69,7 +69,8 @@ struct __packed vmcs12 {
 	u64 vm_function_control;
 	u64 eptp_list_address;
 	u64 pml_address;
-	u64 padding64[3]; /* room for future expansion */
+	u64 encls_exiting_bitmap;
+	u64 padding64[2]; /* room for future expansion */
 	/*
 	 * To allow migration of L1 (complete with its L2 guests) between
 	 * machines of different natural widths (32 or 64 bit), we cannot have
@@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ static inline void vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets(void)
 	CHECK_OFFSET(vm_function_control, 296);
 	CHECK_OFFSET(eptp_list_address, 304);
 	CHECK_OFFSET(pml_address, 312);
+	CHECK_OFFSET(encls_exiting_bitmap, 320);
 	CHECK_OFFSET(cr0_guest_host_mask, 344);
 	CHECK_OFFSET(cr4_guest_host_mask, 352);
 	CHECK_OFFSET(cr0_read_shadow, 360);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +33 -2
index 97e9787570d5..479bdbcba94f 100644
@@ -2197,6 +2197,9 @@ static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
 		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control = data;
 		if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
 			vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
+
+		/* SGX may be enabled/disabled by guest's firmware */
+		vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL);
 		break;
 	case MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH0 ... MSR_IA32_SGXLEPUBKEYHASH3:
 		if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
@@ -4359,6 +4362,15 @@ static void vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 	if (!vcpu->kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled)
 		exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION;
 
+	if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit() && nested) {
+		if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX))
+			vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
+				SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+		else
+			vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
+				~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
+	}
+
 	vmx->secondary_exec_control = exec_control;
 }
 
@@ -4458,8 +4470,7 @@ static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
 		vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
 	}
 
-	if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
-		vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
+	vmx_write_encls_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu, NULL);
 
 	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest()) {
 		memset(&vmx->pt_desc, 0, sizeof(vmx->pt_desc));
@@ -7301,6 +7312,19 @@ static void vmx_vcpu_after_set_cpuid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 
 	set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
 
+	vmx_write_encls_bitmap(vcpu, NULL);
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX))
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |= FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
+	else
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &= ~FEAT_CTL_SGX_ENABLED;
+
+	if (guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC))
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
+			FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+	else
+		vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
+			~FEAT_CTL_SGX_LC_ENABLED;
+
 	/* Refresh #PF interception to account for MAXPHYADDR changes. */
 	vmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
 }
@@ -7321,6 +7345,13 @@ static __init void vmx_set_cpu_caps(void)
 	if (vmx_pt_mode_is_host_guest())
 		kvm_cpu_cap_check_and_set(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT);
 
+	if (!enable_sgx) {
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX_LC);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX1);
+		kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SGX2);
+	}
+
 	if (vmx_umip_emulated())
 		kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_UMIP);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2
author
#34 lore raw

RFC PATCH v6 25/25 KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute

In reply to Kai Huang

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a file handle to a valid SGX attribute file.

The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint.

To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by default.

---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c             | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h       |  1 +
 4 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst +23 -0
index aed52b0fc16e..d65016a05a8b 100644
@@ -6227,6 +6227,29 @@ KVM_RUN_BUS_LOCK flag is used to distinguish between them.
 This capability can be used to check / enable 2nd DAWR feature provided
 by POWER10 processor.
 
+7.24 KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE
+----------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] is a file handle of a SGX attribute file in securityfs
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if the file handle is invalid or if a requested
+          attribute is not supported by KVM.
+
+KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE enables a userspace VMM to grant a VM access to one or
+more priveleged enclave attributes.  args[0] must hold a file handle to a valid
+SGX attribute file corresponding to an attribute that is supported/restricted
+by KVM (currently only PROVISIONKEY).
+
+The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide
+additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. use of the PROVISIONKEY
+is restricted to deter malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to obtain a stable
+system fingerprint.  To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions
+by running an enclave in a VM, KVM prevents access to privileged attributes by
+default.
+
+See Documentation/x86/sgx/2.Kernel-internals.rst for more details.
+
 8. Other capabilities.
 ======================
 
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +1 -1
index a0d45607b702..6dc12d949f86 100644
@@ -849,7 +849,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 		 * expected to derive it from supported XCR0.
 		 */
 		entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT |
-			      /* PROVISIONKEY | */ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY |
+			      SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY | SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY |
 			      SGX_ATTR_KSS;
 		entry->ebx &= 0;
 		break;
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +21 -0
index 4d2868d0a747..20629834d2e8 100644
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/intel_pt.h>
 #include <asm/emulate_prefix.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
 #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -3791,6 +3792,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 	case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR:
 	case KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER:
 	case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID:
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE:
+#endif
 		r = 1;
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_XEN_HVM:
@@ -5367,6 +5371,23 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
 			kvm->arch.bus_lock_detection_enabled = true;
 		r = 0;
 		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: {
+		unsigned long allowed_attributes = 0;
+
+		r = sgx_set_attribute(&allowed_attributes, cap->args[0]);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		/* KVM only supports the PROVISIONKEY privileged attribute. */
+		if ((allowed_attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY) &&
+		    !(allowed_attributes & ~SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY))
+			kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed = true;
+		else
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		break;
include/uapi/linux/kvm.h +1 -0
index 8b281f722e5b..df37fcf41a74 100644
@@ -1078,6 +1078,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
 #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING 192
 #define KVM_CAP_X86_BUS_LOCK_EXIT 193
 #define KVM_CAP_PPC_DAWR1 194
+#define KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE 195
 
 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
 
Signature · 1 line
2.29.2