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5.10.25-rc1 review

PATCH In review Greg Kroah-Hartman 6 participants 20 messages Mar 19, 2021 – Mar 21, 2021 Stable branch

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Greg Kroah-Hartman

author maintainer
#0 lore raw

cover 5.10.25-rc1 review

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.25 release. There are 13 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Mar 2021 12:17:37 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.25-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>

    Linux 5.10.25-rc1

Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>
net: dsa: b53: Support setting learning on port

Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>
ALSA: usb-audio: Don't avoid stopping the stream at disconnection

J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
Revert "nfsd4: a client's own opens needn't prevent delegations"

J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>
Revert "nfsd4: remove check_conflicting_opens warning"

Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>
fuse: fix live lock in fuse_iget()

Nicolas Morey-Chaisemartin <[email protected]>
RDMA/srp: Fix support for unpopulated and unbalanced NUMA nodes

Piotr Krysiuk <[email protected]>
bpf, selftests: Fix up some test_verifier cases for unprivileged

Piotr Krysiuk <[email protected]>
bpf: Add sanity check for upper ptr_limit

Piotr Krysiuk <[email protected]>
bpf: Simplify alu_limit masking for pointer arithmetic

Piotr Krysiuk <[email protected]>
bpf: Fix off-by-one for area size in creating mask to left

Piotr Krysiuk <[email protected]>
bpf: Prohibit alu ops for pointer types not defining ptr_limit

Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
crypto: x86/aes-ni-xts - use direct calls to and 4-way stride

Uros Bizjak <[email protected]>
crypto: aesni - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg

-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S                  | 133 ++++++++++++---------
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S           |  20 ++--
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c                 |  25 ++--
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c                | 110 +++++++----------
 drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_common.c                   |  18 +++
 drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_regs.h                     |   1 +
 drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c                          |  15 +--
 fs/fuse/fuse_i.h                                   |   1 +
 fs/locks.c                                         |   3 -
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c                                |  53 +++-----
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c                              |  33 +++--
 sound/usb/endpoint.c                               |   3 -
 sound/usb/pcm.c                                    |   5 +-
 .../selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_deduction.c      |  27 +++--
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_ptr.c     |   4 +
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c      |  15 ++-
 .../selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c       |  23 +++-
 18 files changed, 266 insertions(+), 227 deletions(-)
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/13 crypto: aesni - Use TEST %reg,%reg instead of CMP $0,%reg

From: Uros Bizjak <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 032d049ea0f45b45c21f3f02b542aa18bc6b6428 ]

CMP $0,%reg can't set overflow flag, so we can use shorter TEST %reg,%reg instruction when only zero and sign flags are checked (E,L,LE,G,GE conditions).

Cc Herbert Xu <[email protected]>
Cc Borislav Petkov <[email protected]>
Cc "H. Peter Anvin" <[email protected]>
---
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S        | 20 ++++++++++----------
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S | 20 ++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S +10 -10
index 1852b19a73a0..d1436c37008b 100644
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ _initial_blocks_\@:
 
 	# Main loop - Encrypt/Decrypt remaining blocks
 
-	cmp	$0, %r13
+	test	%r13, %r13
 	je	_zero_cipher_left_\@
 	sub	$64, %r13
 	je	_four_cipher_left_\@
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ _multiple_of_16_bytes_\@:
 
 	mov PBlockLen(%arg2), %r12
 
-	cmp $0, %r12
+	test %r12, %r12
 	je _partial_done\@
 
 	GHASH_MUL %xmm8, %xmm13, %xmm9, %xmm10, %xmm11, %xmm5, %xmm6
@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ _T_8_\@:
 	add	$8, %r10
 	sub	$8, %r11
 	psrldq	$8, %xmm0
-	cmp	$0, %r11
+	test	%r11, %r11
 	je	_return_T_done_\@
 _T_4_\@:
 	movd	%xmm0, %eax
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@ _T_4_\@:
 	add	$4, %r10
 	sub	$4, %r11
 	psrldq	$4, %xmm0
-	cmp	$0, %r11
+	test	%r11, %r11
 	je	_return_T_done_\@
 _T_123_\@:
 	movd	%xmm0, %eax
@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ _get_AAD_blocks\@:
 
 	/* read the last <16B of AAD */
 _get_AAD_rest\@:
-	cmp	   $0, %r11
+	test	   %r11, %r11
 	je	   _get_AAD_done\@
 
 	READ_PARTIAL_BLOCK %r10, %r11, \TMP1, \TMP7
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@ _get_AAD_done\@:
 .macro PARTIAL_BLOCK CYPH_PLAIN_OUT PLAIN_CYPH_IN PLAIN_CYPH_LEN DATA_OFFSET \
 	AAD_HASH operation
 	mov 	PBlockLen(%arg2), %r13
-	cmp	$0, %r13
+	test	%r13, %r13
 	je	_partial_block_done_\@	# Leave Macro if no partial blocks
 	# Read in input data without over reading
 	cmp	$16, \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN
@@ -692,7 +692,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_1_\@:
 	pshufb	%xmm2, %xmm3
 	pxor	%xmm3, \AAD_HASH
 
-	cmp	$0, %r10
+	test	%r10, %r10
 	jl	_partial_incomplete_1_\@
 
 	# GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_2_\@:
 	pshufb	%xmm2, %xmm9
 	pxor	%xmm9, \AAD_HASH
 
-	cmp	$0, %r10
+	test	%r10, %r10
 	jl	_partial_incomplete_2_\@
 
 	# GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
@@ -747,7 +747,7 @@ _encode_done_\@:
 	pshufb	%xmm2, %xmm9
 .endif
 	# output encrypted Bytes
-	cmp	$0, %r10
+	test	%r10, %r10
 	jl	_partial_fill_\@
 	mov	%r13, %r12
 	mov	$16, %r13
@@ -2720,7 +2720,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_ctr_enc)
  */
 SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_crypt8)
 	FRAME_BEGIN
-	cmpb $0, %cl
+	testb %cl, %cl
 	movl $0, %ecx
 	movl $240, %r10d
 	leaq _aesni_enc4, %r11
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_avx-x86_64.S +10 -10
index 5fee47956f3b..2cf8e94d986a 100644
@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ _initial_num_blocks_is_0\@:
 
 
 _initial_blocks_encrypted\@:
-        cmp     $0, %r13
+        test    %r13, %r13
         je      _zero_cipher_left\@
 
         sub     $128, %r13
@@ -528,7 +528,7 @@ _multiple_of_16_bytes\@:
         vmovdqu HashKey(arg2), %xmm13
 
         mov PBlockLen(arg2), %r12
-        cmp $0, %r12
+        test %r12, %r12
         je _partial_done\@
 
 	#GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
@@ -573,7 +573,7 @@ _T_8\@:
         add     $8, %r10
         sub     $8, %r11
         vpsrldq $8, %xmm9, %xmm9
-        cmp     $0, %r11
+        test    %r11, %r11
         je     _return_T_done\@
 _T_4\@:
         vmovd   %xmm9, %eax
@@ -581,7 +581,7 @@ _T_4\@:
         add     $4, %r10
         sub     $4, %r11
         vpsrldq     $4, %xmm9, %xmm9
-        cmp     $0, %r11
+        test    %r11, %r11
         je     _return_T_done\@
 _T_123\@:
         vmovd     %xmm9, %eax
@@ -625,7 +625,7 @@ _get_AAD_blocks\@:
 	cmp     $16, %r11
 	jge     _get_AAD_blocks\@
 	vmovdqu \T8, \T7
-	cmp     $0, %r11
+	test    %r11, %r11
 	je      _get_AAD_done\@
 
 	vpxor   \T7, \T7, \T7
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@ _get_AAD_rest8\@:
 	vpxor   \T1, \T7, \T7
 	jmp     _get_AAD_rest8\@
 _get_AAD_rest4\@:
-	cmp     $0, %r11
+	test    %r11, %r11
 	jle      _get_AAD_rest0\@
 	mov     (%r10), %eax
 	movq    %rax, \T1
@@ -749,7 +749,7 @@ _done_read_partial_block_\@:
 .macro PARTIAL_BLOCK GHASH_MUL CYPH_PLAIN_OUT PLAIN_CYPH_IN PLAIN_CYPH_LEN DATA_OFFSET \
         AAD_HASH ENC_DEC
         mov 	PBlockLen(arg2), %r13
-        cmp	$0, %r13
+        test	%r13, %r13
         je	_partial_block_done_\@	# Leave Macro if no partial blocks
         # Read in input data without over reading
         cmp	$16, \PLAIN_CYPH_LEN
@@ -801,7 +801,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_1_\@:
         vpshufb	%xmm2, %xmm3, %xmm3
         vpxor	%xmm3, \AAD_HASH, \AAD_HASH
 
-        cmp	$0, %r10
+        test	%r10, %r10
         jl	_partial_incomplete_1_\@
 
         # GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
@@ -836,7 +836,7 @@ _no_extra_mask_2_\@:
         vpshufb %xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9
         vpxor	%xmm9, \AAD_HASH, \AAD_HASH
 
-        cmp	$0, %r10
+        test	%r10, %r10
         jl	_partial_incomplete_2_\@
 
         # GHASH computation for the last <16 Byte block
@@ -856,7 +856,7 @@ _encode_done_\@:
         vpshufb	%xmm2, %xmm9, %xmm9
 .endif
         # output encrypted Bytes
-        cmp	$0, %r10
+        test	%r10, %r10
         jl	_partial_fill_\@
         mov	%r13, %r12
         mov	$16, %r13
Signature · 1 line
2.30.1
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/13 crypto: x86/aes-ni-xts - use direct calls to and 4-way stride

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 86ad60a65f29dd862a11c22bb4b5be28d6c5cef1 ]

The XTS asm helper arrangement is a bit odd: the 8-way stride helper consists of back-to-back calls to the 4-way core transforms, which are called indirectly, based on a boolean that indicates whether we are performing encryption or decryption.

Given how costly indirect calls are on x86, let's switch to direct calls, and given how the 8-way stride doesn't really add anything substantial, use a 4-way stride instead, and make the asm core routine deal with any multiple of 4 blocks. Since 512 byte sectors or 4 KB blocks are the typical quantities XTS operates on, increase the stride exported to the glue helper to 512 bytes as well.

As a result, the number of indirect calls is reduced from 3 per 64 bytes of in/output to 1 per 512 bytes of in/output, which produces a 65% speedup when operating on 1 KB blocks (measured on a Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-8650U CPU)

Fixes 9697fa39efd3f ("x86/retpoline/crypto: Convert crypto assembler indirect jumps")
---
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S  | 115 ++++++++++++++++++-----------
 arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c |  25 ++++---
 2 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_asm.S +70 -45
index d1436c37008b..57aef3f5a81e 100644
@@ -2715,25 +2715,18 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_ctr_enc)
 	pxor CTR, IV;
 
 /*
- * void aesni_xts_crypt8(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
- *			 const u8 *src, bool enc, le128 *iv)
+ * void aesni_xts_encrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+ *			  const u8 *src, unsigned int len, le128 *iv)
  */
-SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_crypt8)
+SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_encrypt)
 	FRAME_BEGIN
-	testb %cl, %cl
-	movl $0, %ecx
-	movl $240, %r10d
-	leaq _aesni_enc4, %r11
-	leaq _aesni_dec4, %rax
-	cmovel %r10d, %ecx
-	cmoveq %rax, %r11
 
 	movdqa .Lgf128mul_x_ble_mask, GF128MUL_MASK
 	movups (IVP), IV
 
 	mov 480(KEYP), KLEN
-	addq %rcx, KEYP
 
+.Lxts_enc_loop4:
 	movdqa IV, STATE1
 	movdqu 0x00(INP), INC
 	pxor INC, STATE1
@@ -2757,71 +2750,103 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_crypt8)
 	pxor INC, STATE4
 	movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP)
 
-	CALL_NOSPEC r11
+	call _aesni_enc4
 
 	movdqu 0x00(OUTP), INC
 	pxor INC, STATE1
 	movdqu STATE1, 0x00(OUTP)
 
-	_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
-	movdqa IV, STATE1
-	movdqu 0x40(INP), INC
-	pxor INC, STATE1
-	movdqu IV, 0x40(OUTP)
-
 	movdqu 0x10(OUTP), INC
 	pxor INC, STATE2
 	movdqu STATE2, 0x10(OUTP)
 
-	_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
-	movdqa IV, STATE2
-	movdqu 0x50(INP), INC
-	pxor INC, STATE2
-	movdqu IV, 0x50(OUTP)
-
 	movdqu 0x20(OUTP), INC
 	pxor INC, STATE3
 	movdqu STATE3, 0x20(OUTP)
 
-	_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
-	movdqa IV, STATE3
-	movdqu 0x60(INP), INC
-	pxor INC, STATE3
-	movdqu IV, 0x60(OUTP)
-
 	movdqu 0x30(OUTP), INC
 	pxor INC, STATE4
 	movdqu STATE4, 0x30(OUTP)
 
 	_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
-	movdqa IV, STATE4
-	movdqu 0x70(INP), INC
-	pxor INC, STATE4
-	movdqu IV, 0x70(OUTP)
 
-	_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
+	add $64, INP
+	add $64, OUTP
+	sub $64, LEN
+	ja .Lxts_enc_loop4
+
 	movups IV, (IVP)
 
-	CALL_NOSPEC r11
+	FRAME_END
+	ret
+SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_xts_encrypt)
+
+/*
+ * void aesni_xts_decrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *dst,
+ *			  const u8 *src, unsigned int len, le128 *iv)
+ */
+SYM_FUNC_START(aesni_xts_decrypt)
+	FRAME_BEGIN
+
+	movdqa .Lgf128mul_x_ble_mask, GF128MUL_MASK
+	movups (IVP), IV
+
+	mov 480(KEYP), KLEN
+	add $240, KEYP
 
-	movdqu 0x40(OUTP), INC
+.Lxts_dec_loop4:
+	movdqa IV, STATE1
+	movdqu 0x00(INP), INC
 	pxor INC, STATE1
-	movdqu STATE1, 0x40(OUTP)
+	movdqu IV, 0x00(OUTP)
 
-	movdqu 0x50(OUTP), INC
+	_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
+	movdqa IV, STATE2
+	movdqu 0x10(INP), INC
+	pxor INC, STATE2
+	movdqu IV, 0x10(OUTP)
+
+	_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
+	movdqa IV, STATE3
+	movdqu 0x20(INP), INC
+	pxor INC, STATE3
+	movdqu IV, 0x20(OUTP)
+
+	_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
+	movdqa IV, STATE4
+	movdqu 0x30(INP), INC
+	pxor INC, STATE4
+	movdqu IV, 0x30(OUTP)
+
+	call _aesni_dec4
+
+	movdqu 0x00(OUTP), INC
+	pxor INC, STATE1
+	movdqu STATE1, 0x00(OUTP)
+
+	movdqu 0x10(OUTP), INC
 	pxor INC, STATE2
-	movdqu STATE2, 0x50(OUTP)
+	movdqu STATE2, 0x10(OUTP)
 
-	movdqu 0x60(OUTP), INC
+	movdqu 0x20(OUTP), INC
 	pxor INC, STATE3
-	movdqu STATE3, 0x60(OUTP)
+	movdqu STATE3, 0x20(OUTP)
 
-	movdqu 0x70(OUTP), INC
+	movdqu 0x30(OUTP), INC
 	pxor INC, STATE4
-	movdqu STATE4, 0x70(OUTP)
+	movdqu STATE4, 0x30(OUTP)
+
+	_aesni_gf128mul_x_ble()
+
+	add $64, INP
+	add $64, OUTP
+	sub $64, LEN
+	ja .Lxts_dec_loop4
+
+	movups IV, (IVP)
 
 	FRAME_END
 	ret
-SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_xts_crypt8)
+SYM_FUNC_END(aesni_xts_decrypt)
 
 #endif
arch/x86/crypto/aesni-intel_glue.c +14 -11
index f9a1d98e7534..be891fdf8d17 100644
@@ -97,6 +97,12 @@ asmlinkage void aesni_cbc_dec(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
 #define AVX_GEN2_OPTSIZE 640
 #define AVX_GEN4_OPTSIZE 4096
 
+asmlinkage void aesni_xts_encrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
+				  const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv);
+
+asmlinkage void aesni_xts_decrypt(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
+				  const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 
 static void (*aesni_ctr_enc_tfm)(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
@@ -104,9 +110,6 @@ static void (*aesni_ctr_enc_tfm)(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
 asmlinkage void aesni_ctr_enc(struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
 			      const u8 *in, unsigned int len, u8 *iv);
 
-asmlinkage void aesni_xts_crypt8(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, u8 *out,
-				 const u8 *in, bool enc, le128 *iv);
-
 /* asmlinkage void aesni_gcm_enc()
  * void *ctx,  AES Key schedule. Starts on a 16 byte boundary.
  * struct gcm_context_data.  May be uninitialized.
@@ -547,14 +550,14 @@ static void aesni_xts_dec(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
 	glue_xts_crypt_128bit_one(ctx, dst, src, iv, aesni_dec);
 }
 
-static void aesni_xts_enc8(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void aesni_xts_enc32(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
 {
-	aesni_xts_crypt8(ctx, dst, src, true, iv);
+	aesni_xts_encrypt(ctx, dst, src, 32 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, (u8 *)iv);
 }
 
-static void aesni_xts_dec8(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
+static void aesni_xts_dec32(const void *ctx, u8 *dst, const u8 *src, le128 *iv)
 {
-	aesni_xts_crypt8(ctx, dst, src, false, iv);
+	aesni_xts_decrypt(ctx, dst, src, 32 * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, (u8 *)iv);
 }
 
 static const struct common_glue_ctx aesni_enc_xts = {
@@ -562,8 +565,8 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx aesni_enc_xts = {
 	.fpu_blocks_limit = 1,
 
 	.funcs = { {
-		.num_blocks = 8,
-		.fn_u = { .xts = aesni_xts_enc8 }
+		.num_blocks = 32,
+		.fn_u = { .xts = aesni_xts_enc32 }
 	}, {
 		.num_blocks = 1,
 		.fn_u = { .xts = aesni_xts_enc }
@@ -575,8 +578,8 @@ static const struct common_glue_ctx aesni_dec_xts = {
 	.fpu_blocks_limit = 1,
 
 	.funcs = { {
-		.num_blocks = 8,
-		.fn_u = { .xts = aesni_xts_dec8 }
+		.num_blocks = 32,
+		.fn_u = { .xts = aesni_xts_dec32 }
 	}, {
 		.num_blocks = 1,
 		.fn_u = { .xts = aesni_xts_dec }
Signature · 1 line
2.30.1
author maintainer
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/13 bpf: Prohibit alu ops for pointer types not defining ptr_limit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Piotr Krysiuk <[email protected]>

commit f232326f6966cf2a1d1db7bc917a4ce5f9f55f76 upstream.

The purpose of this patch is to streamline error propagation and in particular to propagate retrieve_ptr_limit() errors for pointer types that are not defining a ptr_limit such that register-based alu ops against these types can be rejected.

The main rationale is that a gap has been identified by Piotr in the existing protection against speculatively out-of-bounds loads, for example, in case of ctx pointers, unprivileged programs can still perform pointer arithmetic. This can be abused to execute speculatively out-of-bounds loads without restrictions and thus extract contents of kernel memory.

Fix this by rejecting unprivileged programs that attempt any pointer arithmetic on unprotected pointer types. The two affected ones are pointer to ctx as well as pointer to map. Field access to a modified ctx' pointer is rejected at a later point in time in the verifier, and 7c6967326267 ("bpf: Permit map_ptr arithmetic with opcode add and offset 0") only relevant for root-only use cases. Risk of unprivileged program breakage is considered very low.

Fixes 7c6967326267 ("bpf: Permit map_ptr arithmetic with opcode add and offset 0")
Fixes b2157399cc98 ("bpf: prevent out-of-bounds speculation")
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   16 ++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +10 -6
@@ -5406,6 +5406,7 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_v
 	u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
 	struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
 	bool ret;
+	int err;
 
 	if (can_skip_alu_sanitation(env, insn))
 		return 0;
@@ -5421,10 +5422,13 @@ static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_v
 	alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
 		     BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
 
-	if (retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg))
-		return 0;
-	if (update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit))
-		return -EACCES;
+	err = retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
+
+	err = update_alu_sanitation_state(aux, alu_state, alu_limit);
+	if (err < 0)
+		return err;
 do_sim:
 	/* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
 	 * speculative execution from truncation as a result of
@@ -5540,7 +5544,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	case BPF_ADD:
 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0);
 		if (ret < 0) {
-			verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different maps or paths\n", dst);
+			verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
 			return ret;
 		}
 		/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
@@ -5595,7 +5599,7 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struc
 	case BPF_SUB:
 		ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0);
 		if (ret < 0) {
-			verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different maps or paths\n", dst);
+			verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types\n", dst);
 			return ret;
 		}
 		if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/13 bpf: Fix off-by-one for area size in creating mask to left

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Piotr Krysiuk <[email protected]>

commit 10d2bb2e6b1d8c4576c56a748f697dbeb8388899 upstream.

retrieve_ptr_limit() computes the ptr_limit for registers with stack and map_value type. ptr_limit is the size of the memory area that is still valid / in-bounds from the point of the current position and direction of the operation (add / sub). This size will later be used for masking the operation such that attempting out-of-bounds access in the speculative domain is redirected to remain within the bounds of the current map value.

When masking to the right the size is correct, however, when masking to the left, the size is off-by-one which would lead to an incorrect mask and thus incorrect arithmetic operation in the non-speculative domain. Piotr found that if the resulting alu_limit value is zero, then the BPF_MOV32_IMM() from the fixup_bpf_calls() rewrite will end up loading 0xffffffff into AX instead of sign-extending to the full 64 bit range, and as a result, this allows abuse for executing speculatively out-of- bounds loads against 4GB window of address space and thus extracting the contents of kernel memory via side-channel.

Fixes 979d63d50c0c ("bpf: prevent out of bounds speculation on pointer arithmetic")
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |    4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +2 -2
@@ -5342,13 +5342,13 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const stru
 		 */
 		off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
 		if (mask_to_left)
-			*ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
+			*ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off + 1;
 		else
 			*ptr_limit = -off;
 		return 0;
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
 		if (mask_to_left) {
-			*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
+			*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off + 1;
 		} else {
 			off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
 			*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off;
author maintainer
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/13 bpf: Simplify alu_limit masking for pointer arithmetic

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Piotr Krysiuk <[email protected]>

commit b5871dca250cd391885218b99cc015aca1a51aea upstream.

Instead of having the mov32 with aux->alu_limit - 1 immediate, move this operation to retrieve_ptr_limit() instead to simplify the logic and to allow for subsequent sanity boundary checks inside retrieve_ptr_limit(). This avoids in future that at the time of the verifier masking rewrite we'd run into an underflow which would not sign extend due to the nature of mov32 instruction.

---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +5 -5
@@ -5342,16 +5342,16 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const stru
 		 */
 		off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
 		if (mask_to_left)
-			*ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off + 1;
+			*ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
 		else
-			*ptr_limit = -off;
+			*ptr_limit = -off - 1;
 		return 0;
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
 		if (mask_to_left) {
-			*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off + 1;
+			*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
 		} else {
 			off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
-			*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off;
+			*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1;
 		}
 		return 0;
 	default:
@@ -10946,7 +10946,7 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_ve
 			off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg;
 			if (isneg)
 				*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
-			*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit - 1);
+			*patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit);
 			*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
 			*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
 			*patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/13 bpf: Add sanity check for upper ptr_limit

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Piotr Krysiuk <[email protected]>

commit 1b1597e64e1a610c7a96710fc4717158e98a08b3 upstream.

Given we know the max possible value of ptr_limit at the time of retrieving the latter, add basic assertions, so that the verifier can bail out if anything looks odd and reject the program. Nothing triggered this so far, but it also does not hurt to have these.

---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c |   11 ++++++++---
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +8 -3
@@ -5333,10 +5333,14 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const stru
 {
 	bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD &&  off_is_neg) ||
 			    (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
-	u32 off;
+	u32 off, max;
 
 	switch (ptr_reg->type) {
 	case PTR_TO_STACK:
+		/* Offset 0 is out-of-bounds, but acceptable start for the
+		 * left direction, see BPF_REG_FP.
+		 */
+		max = MAX_BPF_STACK + mask_to_left;
 		/* Indirect variable offset stack access is prohibited in
 		 * unprivileged mode so it's not handled here.
 		 */
@@ -5345,15 +5349,16 @@ static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const stru
 			*ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
 		else
 			*ptr_limit = -off - 1;
-		return 0;
+		return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0;
 	case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+		max = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size;
 		if (mask_to_left) {
 			*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
 		} else {
 			off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
 			*ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off - 1;
 		}
-		return 0;
+		return *ptr_limit >= max ? -ERANGE : 0;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
author maintainer
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/13 bpf, selftests: Fix up some test_verifier cases for unprivileged

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Piotr Krysiuk <[email protected]>

commit 0a13e3537ea67452d549a6a80da3776d6b7dedb3 upstream.

Fix up test_verifier error messages for the case where the original error message changed, or for the case where pointer alu errors differ between privileged and unprivileged tests. Also, add alternative tests for keeping coverage of the original verifier rejection error message (fp alu), and newly reject map_ptr += rX where rX == 0 given we now forbid alu on these types for unprivileged. All test_verifier cases pass after the change. The test case fixups were kept separate to ease backporting of core changes.

---
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_deduction.c |   27 +++++++++++-----
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_ptr.c          |    4 ++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c           |   15 ++++++++
 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c  |   23 +++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/bounds_deduction.c +19 -8
@@ -6,8 +6,9 @@
 		BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 	.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+	.result = REJECT,
 },
 {
 	"check deducing bounds from const, 2",
@@ -20,6 +21,8 @@
 		BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
 		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.retval = 1,
 },
@@ -31,8 +34,9 @@
 		BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 	.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+	.result = REJECT,
 },
 {
 	"check deducing bounds from const, 4",
@@ -45,6 +49,8 @@
 		BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0),
 		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
 {
@@ -55,8 +61,9 @@
 		BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 	.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+	.result = REJECT,
 },
 {
 	"check deducing bounds from const, 6",
@@ -67,8 +74,9 @@
 		BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 	.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+	.result = REJECT,
 },
 {
 	"check deducing bounds from const, 7",
@@ -80,8 +88,9 @@
 			    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
 		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 	.errstr = "dereference of modified ctx ptr",
+	.result = REJECT,
 	.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
 },
 {
@@ -94,8 +103,9 @@
 			    offsetof(struct __sk_buff, mark)),
 		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 	.errstr = "dereference of modified ctx ptr",
+	.result = REJECT,
 	.flags = F_NEEDS_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS,
 },
 {
@@ -106,8 +116,9 @@
 		BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.result = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R0 tried to sub from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 	.errstr = "R0 tried to subtract pointer from scalar",
+	.result = REJECT,
 },
 {
 	"check deducing bounds from const, 10",
@@ -119,6 +130,6 @@
 		BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
 		BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
-	.result = REJECT,
 	.errstr = "math between ctx pointer and register with unbounded min value is not allowed",
+	.result = REJECT,
 },
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/map_ptr.c +4 -0
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
 	.fixup_map_hash_16b = { 4 },
+	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
 {
@@ -90,5 +92,7 @@
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
 	.fixup_map_hash_16b = { 4 },
+	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/unpriv.c +14 -1
@@ -495,7 +495,7 @@
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 },
 {
-	"unpriv: adding of fp",
+	"unpriv: adding of fp, reg",
 	.insns = {
 	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
 	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0),
@@ -503,6 +503,19 @@
 	BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, -8),
 	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
 	},
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R1 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
+	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
+	.result = ACCEPT,
+},
+{
+	"unpriv: adding of fp, imm",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_10),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_1, 0),
+	BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_1, BPF_REG_0, -8),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
 	.errstr_unpriv = "R1 stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range",
 	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
 	.result = ACCEPT,
tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/value_ptr_arith.c +22 -1
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@
 	.fixup_map_array_48b = { 1 },
 	.result = ACCEPT,
 	.result_unpriv = REJECT,
-	.errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different maps or paths",
+	.errstr_unpriv = "R2 tried to add from different maps, paths, or prohibited types",
 	.retval = 0,
 },
 {
@@ -517,6 +517,27 @@
 	.retval = 0xabcdef12,
 },
 {
+	"map access: value_ptr += N, value_ptr -= N known scalar",
+	.insns = {
+	BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
+	BPF_MOV64_REG(BPF_REG_2, BPF_REG_10),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_2, -8),
+	BPF_LD_MAP_FD(BPF_REG_1, 0),
+	BPF_RAW_INSN(BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL, 0, 0, 0, BPF_FUNC_map_lookup_elem),
+	BPF_JMP_IMM(BPF_JEQ, BPF_REG_0, 0, 6),
+	BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 0x12345678),
+	BPF_STX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1, 0),
+	BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ADD, BPF_REG_0, 2),
+	BPF_MOV64_IMM(BPF_REG_1, 2),
+	BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_1),
+	BPF_LDX_MEM(BPF_W, BPF_REG_0, BPF_REG_0, 0),
+	BPF_EXIT_INSN(),
+	},
+	.fixup_map_array_48b = { 3 },
+	.result = ACCEPT,
+	.retval = 0x12345678,
+},
+{
 	"map access: unknown scalar += value_ptr, 1",
 	.insns = {
 	BPF_ST_MEM(BPF_DW, BPF_REG_10, -8, 0),
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/13 RDMA/srp: Fix support for unpopulated and unbalanced NUMA nodes

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Nicolas Morey-Chaisemartin <[email protected]>

commit 2b5715fc17386a6223490d5b8f08d031999b0c0b upstream.

The current code computes a number of channels per SRP target and spreads them equally across all online NUMA nodes. Each channel is then assigned a CPU within this node.

In the case of unbalanced, or even unpopulated nodes, some channels do not get a CPU associated and thus do not get connected. This causes the SRP connection to fail.

This patch solves the issue by rewriting channel computation and allocation:

- Drop channel to node/CPU association as it had no real effect on locality but added unnecessary complexity.

- Tweak the number of channels allocated to reduce CPU contention when possible:
- Up to one channel per CPU (instead of up to 4 by node)
- At least 4 channels per node, unless ch_count module parameter is used.

---
 drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c |  116 ++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-)
drivers/infiniband/ulp/srp/ib_srp.c +48 -68
@@ -3624,7 +3624,7 @@ static ssize_t srp_create_target(struct
 	struct srp_rdma_ch *ch;
 	struct srp_device *srp_dev = host->srp_dev;
 	struct ib_device *ibdev = srp_dev->dev;
-	int ret, node_idx, node, cpu, i;
+	int ret, i, ch_idx;
 	unsigned int max_sectors_per_mr, mr_per_cmd = 0;
 	bool multich = false;
 	uint32_t max_iu_len;
@@ -3749,81 +3749,61 @@ static ssize_t srp_create_target(struct
 		goto out;
 
 	ret = -ENOMEM;
-	if (target->ch_count == 0)
+	if (target->ch_count == 0) {
 		target->ch_count =
-			max_t(unsigned int, num_online_nodes(),
-			      min(ch_count ?:
-					  min(4 * num_online_nodes(),
-					      ibdev->num_comp_vectors),
-				  num_online_cpus()));
+			min(ch_count ?:
+				max(4 * num_online_nodes(),
+				    ibdev->num_comp_vectors),
+				num_online_cpus());
+	}
+
 	target->ch = kcalloc(target->ch_count, sizeof(*target->ch),
 			     GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (!target->ch)
 		goto out;
 
-	node_idx = 0;
-	for_each_online_node(node) {
-		const int ch_start = (node_idx * target->ch_count /
-				      num_online_nodes());
-		const int ch_end = ((node_idx + 1) * target->ch_count /
-				    num_online_nodes());
-		const int cv_start = node_idx * ibdev->num_comp_vectors /
-				     num_online_nodes();
-		const int cv_end = (node_idx + 1) * ibdev->num_comp_vectors /
-				   num_online_nodes();
-		int cpu_idx = 0;
-
-		for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
-			if (cpu_to_node(cpu) != node)
-				continue;
-			if (ch_start + cpu_idx >= ch_end)
-				continue;
-			ch = &target->ch[ch_start + cpu_idx];
-			ch->target = target;
-			ch->comp_vector = cv_start == cv_end ? cv_start :
-				cv_start + cpu_idx % (cv_end - cv_start);
-			spin_lock_init(&ch->lock);
-			INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ch->free_tx);
-			ret = srp_new_cm_id(ch);
-			if (ret)
-				goto err_disconnect;
-
-			ret = srp_create_ch_ib(ch);
-			if (ret)
-				goto err_disconnect;
-
-			ret = srp_alloc_req_data(ch);
-			if (ret)
-				goto err_disconnect;
-
-			ret = srp_connect_ch(ch, max_iu_len, multich);
-			if (ret) {
-				char dst[64];
-
-				if (target->using_rdma_cm)
-					snprintf(dst, sizeof(dst), "%pIS",
-						 &target->rdma_cm.dst);
-				else
-					snprintf(dst, sizeof(dst), "%pI6",
-						 target->ib_cm.orig_dgid.raw);
-				shost_printk(KERN_ERR, target->scsi_host,
-					     PFX "Connection %d/%d to %s failed\n",
-					     ch_start + cpu_idx,
-					     target->ch_count, dst);
-				if (node_idx == 0 && cpu_idx == 0) {
-					goto free_ch;
-				} else {
-					srp_free_ch_ib(target, ch);
-					srp_free_req_data(target, ch);
-					target->ch_count = ch - target->ch;
-					goto connected;
-				}
+	for (ch_idx = 0; ch_idx < target->ch_count; ++ch_idx) {
+		ch = &target->ch[ch_idx];
+		ch->target = target;
+		ch->comp_vector = ch_idx % ibdev->num_comp_vectors;
+		spin_lock_init(&ch->lock);
+		INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ch->free_tx);
+		ret = srp_new_cm_id(ch);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_disconnect;
+
+		ret = srp_create_ch_ib(ch);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_disconnect;
+
+		ret = srp_alloc_req_data(ch);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err_disconnect;
+
+		ret = srp_connect_ch(ch, max_iu_len, multich);
+		if (ret) {
+			char dst[64];
+
+			if (target->using_rdma_cm)
+				snprintf(dst, sizeof(dst), "%pIS",
+					&target->rdma_cm.dst);
+			else
+				snprintf(dst, sizeof(dst), "%pI6",
+					target->ib_cm.orig_dgid.raw);
+			shost_printk(KERN_ERR, target->scsi_host,
+				PFX "Connection %d/%d to %s failed\n",
+				ch_idx,
+				target->ch_count, dst);
+			if (ch_idx == 0) {
+				goto free_ch;
+			} else {
+				srp_free_ch_ib(target, ch);
+				srp_free_req_data(target, ch);
+				target->ch_count = ch - target->ch;
+				goto connected;
 			}
-
-			multich = true;
-			cpu_idx++;
 		}
-		node_idx++;
+		multich = true;
 	}
 
 connected:
author maintainer
#9 lore raw

PATCH 9/13 fuse: fix live lock in fuse_iget()

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Amir Goldstein <[email protected]>

commit 775c5033a0d164622d9d10dd0f0a5531639ed3ed upstream.

Commit 5d069dbe8aaf ("fuse: fix bad inode") replaced make_bad_inode() in fuse_iget() with a private implementation fuse_make_bad().

The private implementation fails to remove the bad inode from inode cache, so the retry loop with iget5_locked() finds the same bad inode and marks it bad forever.

kmsg snip:

[ ] rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
...

[ ]  ? bit_wait_io+0x50/0x50
[ ]  ? fuse_init_file_inode+0x70/0x70
[ ]  ? find_inode.isra.32+0x60/0xb0
[ ]  ? fuse_init_file_inode+0x70/0x70
[ ]  ilookup5_nowait+0x65/0x90
[ ]  ? fuse_init_file_inode+0x70/0x70
[ ]  ilookup5.part.36+0x2e/0x80
[ ]  ? fuse_init_file_inode+0x70/0x70
[ ]  ? fuse_inode_eq+0x20/0x20
[ ]  iget5_locked+0x21/0x80
[ ]  ? fuse_inode_eq+0x20/0x20
[ ]  fuse_iget+0x96/0x1b0
Fixes 5d069dbe8aaf ("fuse: fix bad inode")
---
 fs/fuse/fuse_i.h |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/fuse/fuse_i.h +1 -0
@@ -862,6 +862,7 @@ static inline u64 fuse_get_attr_version(
 
 static inline void fuse_make_bad(struct inode *inode)
 {
+	remove_inode_hash(inode);
 	set_bit(FUSE_I_BAD, &get_fuse_inode(inode)->state);
 }
 
author maintainer
#10 lore raw

PATCH 10/13 Revert "nfsd4: remove check_conflicting_opens warning"

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>

commit 4aa5e002034f0701c3335379fd6c22d7f3338cce upstream.

This reverts commit 50747dd5e47b "nfsd4: remove check_conflicting_opens warning", as a prerequisite for reverting 94415b06eb8a, which has a serious bug.

---
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +1 -0
@@ -4957,6 +4957,7 @@ static int nfsd4_check_conflicting_opens
 		writes--;
 	if (fp->fi_fds[O_RDWR])
 		writes--;
+	WARN_ON_ONCE(writes < 0);
 	if (writes > 0)
 		return -EAGAIN;
 	spin_lock(&fp->fi_lock);
author maintainer
#11 lore raw

PATCH 11/13 Revert "nfsd4: a clients own opens neednt prevent delegations"

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: J. Bruce Fields <[email protected]>

commit 6ee65a773096ab3f39d9b00311ac983be5bdeb7c upstream.

This reverts commit 94415b06eb8aed13481646026dc995f04a3a534a.

That commit claimed to allow a client to get a read delegation when it was the only writer. Actually it allowed a client to get a read delegation when *any* client has a write open!

The main problem is that it's depending on nfs4_clnt_odstate structures that are actually only maintained for pnfs exports.

This causes clients to miss writes performed by other clients, even when there have been intervening closes and opens, violating close-to-open cache consistency.

We can do this a different way, but first we should just revert this.

I've added pynfs 4.1 test DELEG19 to test for this, as I should have done originally!

---
 fs/locks.c          |    3 --
 fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c |   54 +++++++++++++---------------------------------------
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
fs/locks.c +0 -3
@@ -1808,9 +1808,6 @@ check_conflicting_open(struct file *filp
 
 	if (flags & FL_LAYOUT)
 		return 0;
-	if (flags & FL_DELEG)
-		/* We leave these checks to the caller. */
-		return 0;
 
 	if (arg == F_RDLCK)
 		return inode_is_open_for_write(inode) ? -EAGAIN : 0;
fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c +14 -40

83 lines not on this page · raw message

author maintainer
#12 lore raw

PATCH 12/13 ALSA: usb-audio: Dont avoid stopping the stream at disconnection

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Takashi Iwai <[email protected]>

commit 257d2d7e9e798305d65825cb82b0a7d1c0511e89 upstream

In the later patch, we're going to issue the PCM sync_stop calls at disconnection. But currently the USB-audio driver can't handle it because it has a check of shutdown flag for stopping the URBs. This is basically superfluous (the stopping URBs are safe at disconnection state), so let's drop the check.

Fixes dc5eafe7787c ("ALSA: usb-audio: Support PCM sync_stop")
[sudip: adjust context]
---
 sound/usb/endpoint.c |    3 ---
 sound/usb/pcm.c      |    5 +----
 2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 7 deletions(-)
sound/usb/endpoint.c +0 -3
@@ -576,9 +576,6 @@ static int deactivate_urbs(struct snd_us
 {
 	unsigned int i;
 
-	if (!force && atomic_read(&ep->chip->shutdown)) /* to be sure... */
-		return -EBADFD;
-
 	clear_bit(EP_FLAG_RUNNING, &ep->flags);
 
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&ep->ready_playback_urbs);
sound/usb/pcm.c +1 -4
@@ -280,10 +280,7 @@ static int snd_usb_pcm_sync_stop(struct
 {
 	struct snd_usb_substream *subs = substream->runtime->private_data;
 
-	if (!snd_usb_lock_shutdown(subs->stream->chip)) {
-		sync_pending_stops(subs);
-		snd_usb_unlock_shutdown(subs->stream->chip);
-	}
+	sync_pending_stops(subs);
 	return 0;
 }
 
author maintainer
#13 lore raw

PATCH 13/13 net: dsa: b53: Support setting learning on port

In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

From: Florian Fainelli <[email protected]>

commit f9b3827ee66cfcf297d0acd6ecf33653a5f297ef upstream.

Add support for being able to set the learning attribute on port, and make sure that the standalone ports start up with learning disabled.

We can remove the code in bcm_sf2 that configured the ports learning attribute because we want the standalone ports to have learning disabled by default and port 7 cannot be bridged, so its learning attribute will not change past its initial configuration.

---
 drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_common.c |   18 ++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_regs.h   |    1 +
 drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c        |   15 +--------------
 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_common.c +18 -0
@@ -510,6 +510,19 @@ void b53_imp_vlan_setup(struct dsa_switc
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(b53_imp_vlan_setup);
 
+static void b53_port_set_learning(struct b53_device *dev, int port,
+				  bool learning)
+{
+	u16 reg;
+
+	b53_read16(dev, B53_CTRL_PAGE, B53_DIS_LEARNING, &reg);
+	if (learning)
+		reg &= ~BIT(port);
+	else
+		reg |= BIT(port);
+	b53_write16(dev, B53_CTRL_PAGE, B53_DIS_LEARNING, reg);
+}
+
 int b53_enable_port(struct dsa_switch *ds, int port, struct phy_device *phy)
 {
 	struct b53_device *dev = ds->priv;
@@ -523,6 +536,7 @@ int b53_enable_port(struct dsa_switch *d
 	cpu_port = dsa_to_port(ds, port)->cpu_dp->index;
 
 	b53_br_egress_floods(ds, port, true, true);
+	b53_port_set_learning(dev, port, false);
 
 	if (dev->ops->irq_enable)
 		ret = dev->ops->irq_enable(dev, port);
@@ -656,6 +670,7 @@ static void b53_enable_cpu_port(struct b
 	b53_brcm_hdr_setup(dev->ds, port);
 
 	b53_br_egress_floods(dev->ds, port, true, true);
+	b53_port_set_learning(dev, port, false);
 }
 
 static void b53_enable_mib(struct b53_device *dev)
@@ -1839,6 +1854,8 @@ int b53_br_join(struct dsa_switch *ds, i
 	b53_write16(dev, B53_PVLAN_PAGE, B53_PVLAN_PORT_MASK(port), pvlan);
 	dev->ports[port].vlan_ctl_mask = pvlan;
 
+	b53_port_set_learning(dev, port, true);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(b53_br_join);
@@ -1886,6 +1903,7 @@ void b53_br_leave(struct dsa_switch *ds,
 		vl->untag |= BIT(port) | BIT(cpu_port);
 		b53_set_vlan_entry(dev, pvid, vl);
 	}
+	b53_port_set_learning(dev, port, false);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(b53_br_leave);
 
drivers/net/dsa/b53/b53_regs.h +1 -0
@@ -115,6 +115,7 @@
 #define B53_UC_FLOOD_MASK		0x32
 #define B53_MC_FLOOD_MASK		0x34
 #define B53_IPMC_FLOOD_MASK		0x36
+#define B53_DIS_LEARNING		0x3c
 
 /*
  * Override Ports 0-7 State on devices with xMII interfaces (8 bit)
drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c +1 -14
@@ -222,23 +222,10 @@ static int bcm_sf2_port_setup(struct dsa
 	reg &= ~P_TXQ_PSM_VDD(port);
 	core_writel(priv, reg, CORE_MEM_PSM_VDD_CTRL);
 
-	/* Enable learning */
-	reg = core_readl(priv, CORE_DIS_LEARN);
-	reg &= ~BIT(port);
-	core_writel(priv, reg, CORE_DIS_LEARN);
-
 	/* Enable Broadcom tags for that port if requested */
-	if (priv->brcm_tag_mask & BIT(port)) {
+	if (priv->brcm_tag_mask & BIT(port))
 		b53_brcm_hdr_setup(ds, port);
 
-		/* Disable learning on ASP port */
-		if (port == 7) {
-			reg = core_readl(priv, CORE_DIS_LEARN);
-			reg |= BIT(port);
-			core_writel(priv, reg, CORE_DIS_LEARN);
-		}
-	}
-
 	/* Configure Traffic Class to QoS mapping, allow each priority to map
 	 * to a different queue number
 	 */
Tested-by on the v1 series
#14 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman

Hi!

Quoted 4 lines

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.25 release. There are 13 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

CIP testing did not find any problems here:

https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/-/tree/linux-5.10.y

Best regards,
Pavel

Signature · 2 lines
DENX Software Engineering GmbH,      Managing Director: Wolfgang Denk
HRB 165235 Munich, Office: Kirchenstr.5, D-82194 Groebenzell, Germany
Tested-by Linux Kernel Functional Testing on the v1 series
#15 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 10 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.25 release. There are 13 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Mar 2021 12:17:37 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
        https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.25-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 5.10.25-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-5.10.y
git commit: b05da84e91a81ee89c814d51c18cc6f5b077256a
git describe: v5.10.24-14-gb05da84e91a8
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-5.10.y/build/v5.10.24-14-gb05da84e91a8

No regressions (compared to build v5.10.24)

No fixes (compared to build v5.10.24)

Ran 57572 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- arc
- arm
- arm64
- dragonboard-410c
- hi6220-hikey
- i386
- juno-r2
- juno-r2-compat
- juno-r2-kasan
- mips
- parisc
- powerpc
- qemu-arm-clang
- qemu-arm-debug
- qemu-arm64-clang
- qemu-arm64-debug
- qemu-arm64-kasan
- qemu-i386-clang
- qemu-i386-debug
- qemu-x86_64-clang
- qemu-x86_64-debug
- qemu-x86_64-kasan
- qemu-x86_64-kcsan
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_arm64-compat
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- qemu_x86_64-compat
- riscv
- s390
- sh
- sparc
- x15
- x86
- x86-kasan
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* linux-log-parser
* igt-gpu-tools
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* network-basic-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* kvm-unit-tests
* perf
* v4l2-compliance
* fwts
* kselftest-
* kselftest-lkdtm
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-sysctl
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-zram
* kunit
* kselftest-bpf
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-net
* kselftest-netfilter
* kselftest-nsfs
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-tc-testing
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-x86
* rcutorture
* timesync-off

Signature · 2 lines
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
Tested-by on the v1 series
#16 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.25 release. There are 13 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Mar 2021 12:17:37 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 8 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.25-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels:

Signature · 1 line
Florian
author maintainer
#17 lore raw
Quoted 17 lines · Florian Fainelli
Quoted 14 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.25 release. There are 13 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Mar 2021 12:17:37 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.25-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

thanks,

greg k-h

On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels:

thanks for testing 2 of these and letting me know.

greg k-h

Tested-by on the v1 series
#18 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.25 release. There are 13 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Mar 2021 12:17:37 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

Build results:

	total: 156 pass: 156 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 432 pass: 432 fail: 0

Guenter

Tested-by Hulk Robot on the v1 series
#19 lore raw
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.10.25 release. There are 13 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.

Responses should be made by Sun, 21 Mar 2021 12:17:37 +0000. Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:

Quoted 9 lines
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v5.x/stable-review/patch-5.10.25-rc1.gz

or in the git tree and branch at:
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-5.10.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

Tested on arm64 and x86 for 5.10.25,

Kernel repo:
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
Branch: linux-5.10.y
Version: 5.10.25
Commit: 3ba56f490c7ab26974806f8c2f14fc49652efe10
Compiler: gcc version 7.3.0 (GCC)

arm64:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Testcase Result Summary:
total: 4721
passed: 4721
failed: 0
timeout: 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------

x86:
--------------------------------------------------------------------
Testcase Result Summary:
total: 4721
passed: 4721
failed: 0
timeout: 0
--------------------------------------------------------------------