virtiofsd: Drop membership of all supplementary groups (CVE-2022-0358)
PATCH 1/1 virtiofsd: Drop membership of all supplementary groups (CVE-2022-0358)
At the start, drop membership of all supplementary groups. This is not required.
If we have membership of "root" supplementary group and when we switch uid/gid using setresuid/setsgid, we still retain membership of existing supplemntary groups. And that can allow some operations which are not normally allowed.
For example, if root in guest creates a dir as follows.
$ mkdir -m 03777 test_dir
This sets SGID on dir as well as allows unprivileged users to write into this dir.
And now as unprivileged user open file as follows.
$ su test
$ fd = open("test_dir/priviledge_id", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 02755);This will create SGID set executable in test_dir/.
And that's a problem because now an unpriviliged user can execute it, get egid=0 and get access to resources owned by "root" group. This is privilege escalation.
--- tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +26 -0
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@#include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/xattr.h> #include <syslog.h> +#include <grp.h> #include "qemu/cutils.h" #include "passthrough_helpers.h"
@@ -1161,6 +1162,29 @@ static void lo_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fu#define OURSYS_setresuid SYS_setresuid#endif +static void drop_supplementary_groups (void ) +{ +int ret; + + ret =getgroups (0 ,NULL ); +if (ret ==-1 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"getgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\n" , + errno,strerror (errno)); +exit (1 ); + } + +if (!ret) +return ; + +/* Drop all supplementary groups. We should not need it */ + ret =setgroups (0 ,NULL ); +if (ret ==-1 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"setgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\n" , + errno,strerror (errno)); +exit (1 ); + } +} +/* * Change to uid/gid of caller so that file is created with * ownership of caller.
@@ -3926,6 +3950,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])qemu_init_exec_dir (argv[0 ]); +drop_supplementary_groups (); +pthread_mutex_init (&lo.mutex,NULL ); lo.inodes =g_hash_table_new (lo_key_hash, lo_key_equal); lo.root.fd =-1 ;
Stefan Hajnoczi
AppliedQuoted 81 lines · Vivek Goyal
At the start, drop membership of all supplementary groups. This is not required.
If we have membership of "root" supplementary group and when we switch uid/gid using setresuid/setsgid, we still retain membership of existing supplemntary groups. And that can allow some operations which are not normally allowed.
For example, if root in guest creates a dir as follows.
$ mkdir -m 03777 test_dirThis sets SGID on dir as well as allows unprivileged users to write into this dir.
And now as unprivileged user open file as follows.
$ su test $ fd = open("test_dir/priviledge_id", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 02755);This will create SGID set executable in test_dir/.
And that's a problem because now an unpriviliged user can execute it, get egid=0 and get access to resources owned by "root" group. This is privilege escalation.
Fixes CVE-2022-0358Reported-by JIETAO XIAO <[email protected]>Suggested-by Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>--- tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)Index:
rhvgoyal-qemu/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
===================================================================tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +24
-0@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@#include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/xattr.h> #include <syslog.h> +#include <grp.h> #include "qemu/cutils.h" #include "passthrough_helpers.h" @@ -1161,6 +1162,29 @@ static void lo_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fu#define OURSYS_setresuid SYS_setresuid#endif +static void drop_supplementary_groups (void ) +{ +int ret; + + ret =getgroups (0 ,NULL ); +if (ret ==-1 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"getgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\n" , + errno,strerror (errno)); +exit (1 ); + } + +if (!ret) +return ; + +/* Drop all supplementary groups. We should not need it */ + ret =setgroups (0 ,NULL ); +if (ret ==-1 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"setgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\n" , + errno,strerror (errno)); +exit (1 ); + } +} +/* * Change to uid/gid of caller so that file is created with * ownership of caller.
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 3957
Quoted 8 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +2
-0@@ -3926,6 +3950,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])qemu_init_exec_dir (argv[0 ]); +drop_supplementary_groups (); +pthread_mutex_init (&lo.mutex,NULL ); lo.inodes =g_hash_table_new (lo_key_hash, lo_key_equal); lo.root.fd =-1 ;
Thanks, applied to my block tree:
https://gitlab.com/stefanha/qemu/commits/block
Stefan
Quoted 84 lines · * Stefan Hajnoczi ([email protected]) wrote:
Quoted 83 lines · Vivek Goyal
At the start, drop membership of all supplementary groups. This is not required.
If we have membership of "root" supplementary group and when we switch uid/gid using setresuid/setsgid, we still retain membership of existing supplemntary groups. And that can allow some operations which are not normally allowed.
For example, if root in guest creates a dir as follows.
$ mkdir -m 03777 test_dirThis sets SGID on dir as well as allows unprivileged users to write into this dir.
And now as unprivileged user open file as follows.
$ su test $ fd = open("test_dir/priviledge_id", O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 02755);This will create SGID set executable in test_dir/.
And that's a problem because now an unpriviliged user can execute it, get egid=0 and get access to resources owned by "root" group. This is privilege escalation.
Fixes CVE-2022-0358Reported-by JIETAO XIAO <[email protected]>Suggested-by Miklos Szeredi <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Vivek Goyal <[email protected]>--- tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)Index:
rhvgoyal-qemu/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
===================================================================tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +24
-0@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@#include <sys/wait.h> #include <sys/xattr.h> #include <syslog.h> +#include <grp.h> #include "qemu/cutils.h" #include "passthrough_helpers.h" @@ -1161,6 +1162,29 @@ static void lo_lookup(fuse_req_t req, fu#define OURSYS_setresuid SYS_setresuid#endif +static void drop_supplementary_groups (void ) +{ +int ret; + + ret =getgroups (0 ,NULL ); +if (ret ==-1 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"getgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\n" , + errno,strerror (errno)); +exit (1 ); + } + +if (!ret) +return ; + +/* Drop all supplementary groups. We should not need it */ + ret =setgroups (0 ,NULL ); +if (ret ==-1 ) { +fuse_log (FUSE_LOG_ERR ,"setgroups() failed with error=%d:%s\n" , + errno,strerror (errno)); +exit (1 ); + } +} +/* * Change to uid/gid of caller so that file is created with * ownership of caller. @@ -3926,6 +3950,8 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])qemu_init_exec_dir (argv[0 ]);
Quoted 9 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 3957
Quoted 6 lines
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c +2
-0+drop_supplementary_groups (); +pthread_mutex_init (&lo.mutex,NULL ); lo.inodes =g_hash_table_new (lo_key_hash, lo_key_equal); lo.root.fd =-1 ;Thanks, applied to my block tree:
https://gitlab.com/stefanha/qemu/commits/block
Actually, I just posted it as a separate pull by itself.
(I added {}'s around the if (!ret) { return; } to meet Qemu style guides).
Dave
Quoted 1 line
Stefan
Signature · 1 line
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK