xen/usb: harden xen_hcd against malicious backends
Subsystems (2)
Juergen Gross
maintainerPATCH 1/1 xen/usb: harden xen_hcd against malicious backends
Make sure a malicious backend can't cause any harm other than wrong I/O data.
Missing are verification of the request id in a response, sanitizing the reported actual I/O length, and protection against interrupt storms from the backend.
--- drivers/usb/host/xen-hcd.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
drivers/usb/host/xen-hcd.c +43 -14
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ struct vdevice_status {struct usb_shadow {struct xenusb_urb_request req;struct urb *urb; +bool in_flight; };struct xenhcd_info {
@@ -720,6 +721,12 @@ static void xenhcd_gnttab_done(struct xenhcd_info *info, unsigned int id)int nr_segs =0 ;int i; +if (!shadow->in_flight) { +xenhcd_set_error (info,"Illegal request id" ); +return ; + } + shadow->in_flight = false; + nr_segs = shadow->req.nr_buffer_segs;if (xenusb_pipeisoc (shadow->req.pipe))
@@ -803,6 +810,7 @@ static int xenhcd_do_request(struct xenhcd_info *info, struct urb_priv *urbp) info->urb_ring.req_prod_pvt++; info->shadow[id].urb = urb; + info->shadow[id].in_flight = true;RING_PUSH_REQUESTS_AND_CHECK_NOTIFY (&info->urb_ring, notify);if (notify)
@@ -931,10 +939,27 @@ static int xenhcd_unlink_urb(struct xenhcd_info *info, struct urb_priv *urbp)return ret; } -static int xenhcd_urb_request_done (struct xenhcd_info *info) +static void xenhcd_res_to_urb (struct xenhcd_info *info, +struct xenusb_urb_response *res,struct urb *urb) +{ +if (unlikely (!urb)) +return ; + +if (res->actual_length > urb->transfer_buffer_length) + urb->actual_length = urb->transfer_buffer_length; +else if (res->actual_length <0 ) + urb->actual_length =0 ; +else + urb->actual_length = res->actual_length; + urb->error_count = res->error_count; + urb->start_frame = res->start_frame; +xenhcd_giveback_urb (info, urb, res->status); +} + +static int xenhcd_urb_request_done (struct xenhcd_info *info, +unsigned int *eoiflag) {struct xenusb_urb_response res; -struct urb *urb;RING_IDX i, rp;__u16 id;int more_to_do =0 ;
@@ -961,16 +986,12 @@ static int xenhcd_urb_request_done(struct xenhcd_info *info)xenhcd_gnttab_done (info, id);if (info->error) goto err; - urb = info->shadow[id].urb; -if (likely (urb)) { - urb->actual_length = res.actual_length; - urb->error_count = res.error_count; - urb->start_frame = res.start_frame; -xenhcd_giveback_urb (info, urb, res.status); - } +xenhcd_res_to_urb (info, &res, info->shadow[id].urb); }xenhcd_add_id_to_freelist (info, id); + + *eoiflag =0 ; } info->urb_ring.rsp_cons = i;
@@ -988,7 +1009,7 @@ static int xenhcd_urb_request_done(struct xenhcd_info *info)return 0 ; } -static int xenhcd_conn_notify (struct xenhcd_info *info) +static int xenhcd_conn_notify (struct xenhcd_info *info,unsigned int *eoiflag) {struct xenusb_conn_response res;struct xenusb_conn_request *req;
@@ -1033,6 +1054,8 @@ static int xenhcd_conn_notify(struct xenhcd_info *info) info->conn_ring.req_prod_pvt); req->id = id; info->conn_ring.req_prod_pvt++; + + *eoiflag =0 ; }if (rc != info->conn_ring.req_prod_pvt)
@@ -1055,14 +1078,19 @@ static int xenhcd_conn_notify(struct xenhcd_info *info)static irqreturn_t xenhcd_int (int irq,void *dev_id) {struct xenhcd_info *info = (struct xenhcd_info *)dev_id; +unsigned int eoiflag =XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS ; -if (unlikely (info->error)) +if (unlikely (info->error)) { +xen_irq_lateeoi (irq,XEN_EOI_FLAG_SPURIOUS );return IRQ_HANDLED ; + } -while (xenhcd_urb_request_done (info) |xenhcd_conn_notify (info)) +while (xenhcd_urb_request_done (info, &eoiflag) | +xenhcd_conn_notify (info, &eoiflag))/* Yield point for this unbounded loop. */ cond_resched (); +xen_irq_lateeoi (irq, eoiflag);return IRQ_HANDLED ; }
@@ -1139,9 +1167,9 @@ static int xenhcd_setup_rings(struct xenbus_device *dev, goto fail; } - err =bind_evtchn_to_irq (info->evtchn); + err =bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi (info->evtchn);if (err <=0 ) { -xenbus_dev_fatal (dev, err,"bind_evtchn_to_irq" ); +xenbus_dev_fatal (dev, err,"bind_evtchn_to_irq_lateeoi" ); goto fail; }
@@ -1494,6 +1522,7 @@ static struct usb_hcd *xenhcd_create_hcd(struct xenbus_device *dev)for (i =0 ; i <XENUSB_URB_RING_SIZE ; i++) { info->shadow[i].req.id = i +1 ; info->shadow[i].urb =NULL ; + info->shadow[i].in_flight = false; } info->shadow[XENUSB_URB_RING_SIZE -1 ].req.id =0x0fff ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Juergen Gross
Make sure a malicious backend can't cause any harm other than wrong I/O data.
Missing are verification of the request id in a response, sanitizing the reported actual I/O length, and protection against interrupt storms from the backend.
Signed-off-by Juergen Gross <[email protected]>--- drivers/usb/host/xen-hcd.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
Fails to apply to my tree:
checking file drivers/usb/host/xen-hcd.c
Hunk #2 succeeded at 720 (offset -1 lines).
Hunk #3 succeeded at 807 (offset -3 lines).
Hunk #4 succeeded at 934 (offset -5 lines).
Hunk #5 FAILED at 986.
Hunk #6 succeeded at 1003 with fuzz 1 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #7 succeeded at 1048 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #8 succeeded at 1072 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #9 succeeded at 1161 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #10 succeeded at 1516 (offset -10 lines).
1 out of 10 hunks FAILED
Any hints?
thanks,
greg k-h
Juergen Gross
maintainerQuoted 27 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 11 lines · Juergen Gross
Make sure a malicious backend can't cause any harm other than wrong I/O data.
Missing are verification of the request id in a response, sanitizing the reported actual I/O length, and protection against interrupt storms from the backend.
Signed-off-by Juergen Gross <[email protected]>--- drivers/usb/host/xen-hcd.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)Fails to apply to my tree:
checking file
drivers/usb/host/xen-hcd.c
Hunk #2 succeeded at 720 (offset -1 lines).
Hunk #3 succeeded at 807 (offset -3 lines).
Hunk #4 succeeded at 934 (offset -5 lines).
Hunk #5 FAILED at 986.
Hunk #6 succeeded at 1003 with fuzz 1 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #7 succeeded at 1048 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #8 succeeded at 1072 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #9 succeeded at 1161 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #10 succeeded at 1516 (offset -10 lines).
1 out of 10 hunks FAILED
Quoted 1 line
Any hints?
Rebase your tree to v5.17-rc8? It is missing the recent security patches which modified drivers/usb/host/xen-hcd.c.
Juergen
Greg Kroah-Hartman
maintainerQuoted 28 lines · Juergen Gross
Quoted 27 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 11 lines · Juergen Gross
Make sure a malicious backend can't cause any harm other than wrong I/O data.
Missing are verification of the request id in a response, sanitizing the reported actual I/O length, and protection against interrupt storms from the backend.
Signed-off-by Juergen Gross <[email protected]>--- drivers/usb/host/xen-hcd.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)Fails to apply to my tree:
checking file
drivers/usb/host/xen-hcd.c
Hunk #2 succeeded at 720 (offset -1 lines).
Hunk #3 succeeded at 807 (offset -3 lines).
Hunk #4 succeeded at 934 (offset -5 lines).
Hunk #5 FAILED at 986.
Hunk #6 succeeded at 1003 with fuzz 1 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #7 succeeded at 1048 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #8 succeeded at 1072 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #9 succeeded at 1161 (offset -10 lines). Hunk #10 succeeded at 1516 (offset -10 lines).
1 out of 10 hunks FAILED
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 1 line
Any hints?
Rebase your tree to v5.17-rc8? It is missing the recent security patches which modified
drivers/usb/host/xen-hcd.c.
I can't rebase, but I can merge. I'll do that, thanks.
greg k-h