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TDX Guest: TDX core support

PATCH Superseded Kirill A. Shutemov 4 participants 55 messages Mar 18, 2022 – Apr 8, 2022

Subsystems (8)
Documentation x86 ACPI KVM x86 +4 more subsystems

v7 of 8 Superseded Latest is v8 →

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v7 cover TDX Guest: TDX core support

Hi All,

Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects confidential guest VMs from the host and physical attacks by isolating the guest register state and by encrypting the guest memory. In TDX, a special TDX module sits between the host and the guest, and runs in a special mode and manages the guest/host separation.

Please review and consider applying.

More details of TDX guests can be found in Documentation/x86/tdx.rst.

Dependencies:
-------------

The patchset depends on:
- changes in x86/cc branch of the current TIP tree[1]
- changes in swiotlb-init-cleanup branch of the Christoph's misc tree[2]

I'm not sure how to approach applying patches for such cases.

[1] git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip.git
[2] git://git.infradead.org/users/hch/misc

SEV/TDX comparison:
-------------------

TDX has a lot of similarities to SEV. It enhances confidentiality of guest memory and state (like registers) and includes a new exception (#VE) for the same basic reasons as SEV-ES. Like SEV-SNP (not merged yet), TDX limits the host's ability to make changes in the guest physical address space.

TDX/VM comparison:
------------------

Some of the key differences between TD and regular VM is,

1. Multi CPU bring-up is done using the ACPI MADT wake-up table.
2. A new #VE exception handler is added. The TDX module injects #VE exception to the guest TD in cases of instructions that need to be emulated, disallowed MSR accesses, etc.
3. By default memory is marked as private, and TD will selectively share it with VMM based on need.

You can find TDX related documents in the following link.

https://software.intel.com/content/www/br/pt/develop/articles/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html

Git tree:

https://github.com/intel/tdx.git guest-upstream

Previous version:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Changes from v6:
- Drop unused early_is_tdx_guest() and tdx_guest_detected;
- Drop unused port I/O callback in pio_ops;
- Restructure code around TDX_GET_INFO, cc_mask and physical_mask;
- Drop unneeded mailbox_lock in ACPI wake up code;
- Use memory barrier for serialzation around acpi_mp_wake_mailbox;
- Update comments and commit messages;
- Add Reviewed-bys and Suggested-by;
- Fix few nits from checkpatch;
Changes from v5:
- Drop paranoid check against TDX_IDENT;
- Move files around;
- Clarify why TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID has the value it has;
- Better diagnostics for TDVMCALL failure;
- WARN() instead of BUG() for confused instruction decoder for MMIO;
- Rework port I/O in decompression code to avoid "pio_ops." at all call sites

    of I/O helpers;

- Refactor code around tdx_enc_status_changed()
- Utilize updated swiotlb code to initialize it for TDX (swiotlb-init-cleanup branch)
- io_apic_set_fixmap_nocache() -> io_apic_set_fixmap();
- Updates to comments and commit messages;
Changes from v4:
- Update comments for TDX_MODULE_CALL()
- Clarify how TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID is defined
- Updated comments in __tdx_hypercall()
- Get rid of td_info
- Move exc_general_protection() refactoring into a separate patch
- Updates comments around #VE handling
- Add hcall_func() to differenciate exit reason from hypercalls
- Only allow hypervisor CPUID leaves to be handled with #VE
- Update MMIO handling comments and commit message
- Update commit messages from port I/O related pateches
- Rename init_io_ops() to init_default_io_ops()
- Refactor handle_io()
- Fold warning fix from a stand along patch to patch that make the warning triggerable
- Do not flush cache on entering sleep state for any virtual machine, not only TDX
- Documentation is updated
Changes from v3:
- Rebased on top of merged x86/coco patches
- Sanity build-time check for TDX detection (Cyrill Gorcunov)
- Correction in the documentation regarding #VE for CPUID
Changes from v2:
- Move TDX-Guest-specific code under arch/x86/coco/
- Code shared between host and guest is under arch/x86/virt/
- Fix handling CR4.MCE for !CONFIG_X86_MCE
- A separate patch to clarify CR0.NE situation
- Use u8/u16/u32 for port I/O handler
- Rework TDCALL helpers:
+ consolidation between guest and host
+ clearer interface
+ A new tdx_module_call() panic() if TDCALL fails
- Rework MMIO handling to imporove readability
- New generic API to deal encryption masks
- Move tdx_early_init() before copy_bootdata() (again)
- Rework #VE handing to share more code with #GP handler
- Rework __set_memory_enc_pgtable() to provide proper abstruction for both SME/SEV and TDX cases.
- Fix warning on build with X86_MEM_ENCRYPT=y
- ... and more
Changes from v1:
- Rebased to tip/master (94985da003a4).
- Address feedback from Borislav and Josh.
- Wire up KVM hypercalls. Needed to send IPI.
Andi Kleen (1):
x86/tdx: Port I/O: add early boot support

Isaku Yamahata (1):
x86/tdx: ioapic: Add shared bit for IOAPIC base address

Kirill A. Shutemov (18):
x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers x86/tdx: Extend the confidential computing API to support TDX guests x86/tdx: Exclude shared bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK x86/traps: Refactor exc_general_protection()
x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest
x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests
x86/tdx: Add MSR support for TDX guests
x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE
x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO
x86: Adjust types used in port I/O helpers
x86: Consolidate port I/O helpers
x86/boot: Port I/O: allow to hook up alternative helpers x86/boot: Port I/O: add decompression-time support for TDX x86/boot: Set CR0.NE early and keep it set during the boot x86/tdx: Make pages shared in ioremap()
x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory
x86/mm: Make DMA memory shared for TD guest
ACPICA: Avoid cache flush inside virtual machines

Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan (8):
x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper
functions
x86/tdx: Detect TDX at early kernel decompression time x86/tdx: Port I/O: add runtime hypercalls
x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls
x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support x86/topology: Disable CPU online/offline control for TDX guests Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture

Sean Christopherson (2):
x86/boot: Add a trampoline for booting APs via firmware handoff x86/boot: Avoid #VE during boot for TDX platforms

 Documentation/x86/index.rst              |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/tdx.rst                | 214 +++++++
 arch/x86/Kconfig                         |  15 +
 arch/x86/boot/boot.h                     |  37 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile        |   1 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S       |  27 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c          |  12 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h          |   4 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable.h       |   2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdcall.S        |   3 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.c           |  77 +++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.h           |  13 +
 arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c                 |   3 +-
 arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.h                 |   1 +
 arch/x86/boot/io.h                       |  41 ++
 arch/x86/boot/main.c                     |   4 +
 arch/x86/coco/Makefile                   |   2 +
 arch/x86/coco/core.c                     |  22 +-
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/Makefile               |   3 +
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdcall.S               | 204 +++++++
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c                  | 710 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h             |  14 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h              |   7 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h       |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |   8 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h          |   4 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/io.h                |  42 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h          |  22 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h       |   6 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h          |   1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/shared/io.h         |  34 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h        |  40 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h               |  90 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c              | 115 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c              |  10 +
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c           |  18 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c            |  17 +
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c                 |   7 +
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S                |  28 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/idt.c                    |   3 +
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c                |   4 +
 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c                |  12 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c                  | 143 ++++-
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c                    |   5 +
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c                |   9 +-
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S            |   1 +
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S     |  57 +-
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_common.S |  12 +-
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakemain.c          |   4 +
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S          |  94 +++
 include/linux/cc_platform.h              |  10 +
 kernel/cpu.c                             |   7 +
 52 files changed, 2103 insertions(+), 118 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/tdx.rst
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdcall.S
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/io.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/tdx/Makefile
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdcall.S
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/shared/io.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#1 lore raw

PATCH v7 1/30 x86/tdx: Detect running as a TDX guest in early boot

From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>

In preparation of extending cc_platform_has() API to support TDX guest, use CPUID instruction to detect support for TDX guests in the early boot code (via tdx_early_init()). Since copy_bootdata() is the first user of cc_platform_has() API, detect the TDX guest status before it.

Define a synthetic feature flag (X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST) and set this bit in a valid TDX guest platform.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                         | 12 ++++++++++++
 arch/x86/coco/Makefile                   |  2 ++
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/Makefile               |  3 +++
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c                  | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h       |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h |  8 +++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h               | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c                 |  4 ++++
 8 files changed, 72 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/tdx/Makefile
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h
arch/x86/Kconfig +12 -0
index 57a4e0285a80..c346d66b51fc 100644
@@ -880,6 +880,18 @@ config ACRN_GUEST
 	  IOT with small footprint and real-time features. More details can be
 	  found in https://projectacrn.org/.
 
+config INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+	bool "Intel TDX (Trust Domain Extensions) - Guest Support"
+	depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	depends on X86_X2APIC
+	help
+	  Support running as a guest under Intel TDX.  Without this support,
+	  the guest kernel can not boot or run under TDX.
+	  TDX includes memory encryption and integrity capabilities
+	  which protect the confidentiality and integrity of guest
+	  memory contents and CPU state. TDX guests are protected from
+	  some attacks from the VMM.
+
 endif #HYPERVISOR_GUEST
 
 source "arch/x86/Kconfig.cpu"
arch/x86/coco/Makefile +2 -0
index c1ead00017a7..c816acf78b6a 100644
@@ -4,3 +4,5 @@ KASAN_SANITIZE_core.o	:= n
 CFLAGS_core.o		+= -fno-stack-protector
 
 obj-y += core.o
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST)	+= tdx/
arch/x86/coco/tdx/Makefile new file +3 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c929d53ee059
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+obj-y += tdx.o
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c new file +22 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..97674471fd1e
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 2021-2022 Intel Corporation */
+
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)     "tdx: " fmt
+
+#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
+
+void __init tdx_early_init(void)
+{
+	u32 eax, sig[3];
+
+	cpuid_count(TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID, 0, &eax, &sig[0], &sig[2],  &sig[1]);
+
+	if (memcmp(TDX_IDENT, sig, sizeof(sig)))
+		return;
+
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST);
+
+	pr_info("Guest detected\n");
+}
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -0
index 5cd22090e53d..cacc8dde854b 100644
@@ -238,6 +238,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_VMW_VMMCALL		( 8*32+19) /* "" VMware prefers VMMCALL hypercall instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_PVUNLOCK		( 8*32+20) /* "" PV unlock function */
 #define X86_FEATURE_VCPUPREEMPT		( 8*32+21) /* "" PV vcpu_is_preempted function */
+#define X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST		( 8*32+22) /* Intel Trust Domain Extensions Guest */
 
 /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (EBX), word 9 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE		( 9*32+ 0) /* RDFSBASE, WRFSBASE, RDGSBASE, WRGSBASE instructions*/
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h +7 -1
index 1231d63f836d..b37de8268c9a 100644
@@ -68,6 +68,12 @@
 # define DISABLE_SGX	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_SGX & 31))
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+# define DISABLE_TDX_GUEST	0
+#else
+# define DISABLE_TDX_GUEST	(1 << (X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST & 31))
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Make sure to add features to the correct mask
  */
@@ -79,7 +85,7 @@
 #define DISABLED_MASK5	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK6	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK7	(DISABLE_PTI)
-#define DISABLED_MASK8	0
+#define DISABLED_MASK8	(DISABLE_TDX_GUEST)
 #define DISABLED_MASK9	(DISABLE_SMAP|DISABLE_SGX)
 #define DISABLED_MASK10	0
 #define DISABLED_MASK11	0
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h new file +21 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ba8042ce61c2
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* Copyright (C) 2021-2022 Intel Corporation */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_TDX_H
+#define _ASM_X86_TDX_H
+
+#include <linux/init.h>
+
+#define TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID	0x21
+#define TDX_IDENT		"IntelTDX    "
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+
+void __init tdx_early_init(void);
+
+#else
+
+static inline void tdx_early_init(void) { };
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST */
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_TDX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +4 -0
index 4f5ecbbaae77..6dff50c3edd6 100644
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 #include <asm/extable.h>
 #include <asm/trapnr.h>
 #include <asm/sev.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
 
 /*
  * Manage page tables very early on.
@@ -514,6 +515,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init x86_64_start_kernel(char * real_mode_data)
 
 	idt_setup_early_handler();
 
+	/* Needed before cc_platform_has() can be used for TDX */
+	tdx_early_init();
+
 	copy_bootdata(__va(real_mode_data));
 
 	/*
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#2 lore raw

PATCH v7 2/30 x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) is an extension of VMX architecture. It defines a new VMX root operation (SEAM VMX root) and a new VMX non-root operation (SEAM VMX non-root) which are both isolated from the legacy VMX operation where the host kernel runs.

A CPU-attested software module (called 'TDX module') runs in SEAM VMX root to manage and protect VMs running in SEAM VMX non-root. SEAM VMX root is also used to host another CPU-attested software module (called 'P-SEAMLDR') to load and update the TDX module.

Host kernel transits to either P-SEAMLDR or TDX module via the new SEAMCALL instruction, which is essentially a VMExit from VMX root mode to SEAM VMX root mode. SEAMCALLs are leaf functions defined by P-SEAMLDR and TDX module around the new SEAMCALL instruction.

A guest kernel can also communicate with TDX module via TDCALL instruction.

TDCALLs and SEAMCALLs use an ABI different from the x86-64 system-v ABI. RAX is used to carry both the SEAMCALL leaf function number (input) and the completion status (output). Additional GPRs (RCX, RDX, R8-R11) may be further used as both input and output operands in individual leaf.

TDCALL and SEAMCALL share the same ABI and require the largely same code to pass down arguments and retrieve results.

Define an assembly macro that can be used to implement C wrapper for both TDCALL and SEAMCALL.

---
TDCALL wrapper will be implemented using the macro later in the series. SEAMCALL wrapper is out-of-scope for the series and will be implemented as part of TDX host enabling.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h      | 28 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c   |  9 ++++
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 131 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +28 -0
index ba8042ce61c2..2ffefe22f10a 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,33 @@
 #define TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID	0x21
 #define TDX_IDENT		"IntelTDX    "
 
+/*
+ * SW-defined error codes.
+ *
+ * Bits 47:40 == 0xFF indicate Reserved status code class that never used by
+ * TDX module.
+ */
+#define TDX_ERROR			_BITUL(63)
+#define TDX_SW_ERROR			(TDX_ERROR | GENMASK_ULL(40, 47))
+#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID	(TDX_SW_ERROR | _UL(0xFFFF0000))
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/*
+ * Used to gather the output registers values of the TDCALL and SEAMCALL
+ * instructions when requesting services from the TDX module.
+ *
+ * This is a software only structure and not part of the TDX module/VMM ABI.
+ */
+struct tdx_module_output {
+	u64 rcx;
+	u64 rdx;
+	u64 r8;
+	u64 r9;
+	u64 r10;
+	u64 r11;
+};
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
 
 void __init tdx_early_init(void);
@@ -18,4 +45,5 @@ static inline void tdx_early_init(void) { };
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST */
 
+#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_TDX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +9 -0
index 9fb0a2f8b62a..7dca52f5cfc6 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/suspend.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN
 #include <xen/interface/xen.h>
@@ -65,6 +66,14 @@ static void __used common(void)
 	OFFSET(XEN_vcpu_info_arch_cr2, vcpu_info, arch.cr2);
 #endif
 
+	BLANK();
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_rcx, tdx_module_output, rcx);
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_rdx, tdx_module_output, rdx);
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r8,  tdx_module_output, r8);
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r9,  tdx_module_output, r9);
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r10, tdx_module_output, r10);
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r11, tdx_module_output, r11);
+
 	BLANK();
 	OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
 	OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S new file +94 -0

94 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers

Quoted 37 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov

Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) is an extension of VMX architecture. It defines a new VMX root operation (SEAM VMX root) and a new VMX non-root operation (SEAM VMX non-root) which are both isolated from the legacy VMX operation where the host kernel runs.

A CPU-attested software module (called 'TDX module') runs in SEAM VMX root to manage and protect VMs running in SEAM VMX non-root. SEAM VMX root is also used to host another CPU-attested software module (called 'P-SEAMLDR') to load and update the TDX module.

Host kernel transits to either P-SEAMLDR or TDX module via the new SEAMCALL instruction, which is essentially a VMExit from VMX root mode to SEAM VMX root mode. SEAMCALLs are leaf functions defined by P-SEAMLDR and TDX module around the new SEAMCALL instruction.

A guest kernel can also communicate with TDX module via TDCALL instruction.

TDCALLs and SEAMCALLs use an ABI different from the x86-64 system-v ABI. RAX is used to carry both the SEAMCALL leaf function number (input) and the completion status (output). Additional GPRs (RCX, RDX, R8-R11) may be further used as both input and output operands in individual leaf.

TDCALL and SEAMCALL share the same ABI and require the largely same code to pass down arguments and retrieve results.

Define an assembly macro that can be used to implement C wrapper for both TDCALL and SEAMCALL.

---
TDCALL wrapper will be implemented using the macro later in the series. SEAMCALL wrapper is out-of-scope for the series and will be implemented as part of TDX host enabling.

Quoted 6 lines
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h      | 28 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c   |  9 ++++
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 131 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S

Instead of hurrying to send the set again two days after the v6 one -

[ I frankly wonder why you're even in such a hurry - it seems people
believe that hammering out the patches constantly would somehow get them upstreamed faster :-\ ]

- you should rather apply more diligence and take care of working in all the comments from last review:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/87lex9321l.ffs@tglx

Thx.

Signature · 4 lines
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

https://people.kernel.org/tglx/notes-about-netiquette
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers

Quoted 47 lines · Borislav Petkov
Quoted 37 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov

Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) is an extension of VMX architecture. It defines a new VMX root operation (SEAM VMX root) and a new VMX non-root operation (SEAM VMX non-root) which are both isolated from the legacy VMX operation where the host kernel runs.

A CPU-attested software module (called 'TDX module') runs in SEAM VMX root to manage and protect VMs running in SEAM VMX non-root. SEAM VMX root is also used to host another CPU-attested software module (called 'P-SEAMLDR') to load and update the TDX module.

Host kernel transits to either P-SEAMLDR or TDX module via the new SEAMCALL instruction, which is essentially a VMExit from VMX root mode to SEAM VMX root mode. SEAMCALLs are leaf functions defined by P-SEAMLDR and TDX module around the new SEAMCALL instruction.

A guest kernel can also communicate with TDX module via TDCALL instruction.

TDCALLs and SEAMCALLs use an ABI different from the x86-64 system-v ABI. RAX is used to carry both the SEAMCALL leaf function number (input) and the completion status (output). Additional GPRs (RCX, RDX, R8-R11) may be further used as both input and output operands in individual leaf.

TDCALL and SEAMCALL share the same ABI and require the largely same code to pass down arguments and retrieve results.

Define an assembly macro that can be used to implement C wrapper for both TDCALL and SEAMCALL.

---
TDCALL wrapper will be implemented using the macro later in the series. SEAMCALL wrapper is out-of-scope for the series and will be implemented as part of TDX host enabling.

Quoted 6 lines
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h      | 28 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c   |  9 ++++
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 131 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S

Instead of hurrying to send the set again two days after the v6 one -

Quoted 8 lines

[ I frankly wonder why you're even in such a hurry - it seems people
believe that hammering out the patches constantly would somehow get them upstreamed faster :-\ ]

- you should rather apply more diligence and take care of working in all the comments from last review:

https://lore.kernel.org/r/87lex9321l.ffs@tglx

My bad.

I clearly remember addressing these. But I lost it somehow, I donno.

Will send v7.1.

Signature · 1 line
 Kirill A. Shutemov
#5 lore raw

PATCH v7 2/30 x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers

In reply to Borislav Petkov

Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) is an extension of VMX architecture. It defines a new VMX root operation (SEAM VMX root) and a new VMX non-root operation (SEAM VMX non-root) which are both isolated from the legacy VMX operation where the host kernel runs.

A CPU-attested software module (called 'TDX module') runs in SEAM VMX root to manage and protect VMs running in SEAM VMX non-root. SEAM VMX root is also used to host another CPU-attested software module (called 'P-SEAMLDR') to load and update the TDX module.

Host kernel transits to either P-SEAMLDR or TDX module via the new SEAMCALL instruction, which is essentially a VMExit from VMX root mode to SEAM VMX root mode. SEAMCALLs are leaf functions defined by P-SEAMLDR and TDX module around the new SEAMCALL instruction.

A guest kernel can also communicate with TDX module via TDCALL instruction.

TDCALLs and SEAMCALLs use an ABI different from the x86-64 system-v ABI. RAX is used to carry both the SEAMCALL leaf function number (input) and the completion status (output). Additional GPRs (RCX, RDX, R8-R11) may be further used as both input and output operands in individual leaf.

TDCALL and SEAMCALL share the same ABI and require the largely same code to pass down arguments and retrieve results.

Define an assembly macro that can be used to implement C wrapper for both TDCALL and SEAMCALL.

---
TDCALL wrapper will be implemented using the macro later in the series. SEAMCALL wrapper is out-of-scope for the series and will be implemented as part of TDX host enabling.

v7.1:
- Actually address Thomas' feedback;

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h      | 28 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c   |  9 ++++
 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S | 96 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 133 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +28 -0
index ba8042ce61c2..2ffefe22f10a 100644
@@ -8,6 +8,33 @@
 #define TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID	0x21
 #define TDX_IDENT		"IntelTDX    "
 
+/*
+ * SW-defined error codes.
+ *
+ * Bits 47:40 == 0xFF indicate Reserved status code class that never used by
+ * TDX module.
+ */
+#define TDX_ERROR			_BITUL(63)
+#define TDX_SW_ERROR			(TDX_ERROR | GENMASK_ULL(40, 47))
+#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID	(TDX_SW_ERROR | _UL(0xFFFF0000))
+
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/*
+ * Used to gather the output registers values of the TDCALL and SEAMCALL
+ * instructions when requesting services from the TDX module.
+ *
+ * This is a software only structure and not part of the TDX module/VMM ABI.
+ */
+struct tdx_module_output {
+	u64 rcx;
+	u64 rdx;
+	u64 r8;
+	u64 r9;
+	u64 r10;
+	u64 r11;
+};
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
 
 void __init tdx_early_init(void);
@@ -18,4 +45,5 @@ static inline void tdx_early_init(void) { };
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST */
 
+#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_TDX_H */
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +9 -0
index 9fb0a2f8b62a..7dca52f5cfc6 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/suspend.h>
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN
 #include <xen/interface/xen.h>
@@ -65,6 +66,14 @@ static void __used common(void)
 	OFFSET(XEN_vcpu_info_arch_cr2, vcpu_info, arch.cr2);
 #endif
 
+	BLANK();
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_rcx, tdx_module_output, rcx);
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_rdx, tdx_module_output, rdx);
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r8,  tdx_module_output, r8);
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r9,  tdx_module_output, r9);
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r10, tdx_module_output, r10);
+	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r11, tdx_module_output, r11);
+
 	BLANK();
 	OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
 	OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S new file +96 -0

96 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7.1 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers

arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h line 19

Quoted 9 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +9 -0
+/*
+ * SW-defined error codes.
+ *
+ * Bits 47:40 == 0xFF indicate Reserved status code class that never used by
+ * TDX module.
+ */
+#define TDX_ERROR			_BITUL(63)
+#define TDX_SW_ERROR			(TDX_ERROR | GENMASK_ULL(40, 47))
+#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID	(TDX_SW_ERROR | _UL(0xFFFF0000))

Hi Kirill,

GENMASK_ULL(40, 47) should be GENMASK_ULL(47, 40), otherwise I am getting error while building TDX host code:

arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c: In function ‘seamcall’:
./include/linux/build_bug.h:16:51: error: negative width in bit-field ‘<anonymous>’
16 | #define BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(e) ((int)(sizeof(struct { int:(-!!(e)); })))

Btw, perhaps you should also explicitly include <linux/bits.h> where GENMASK_ULL() is defined in this header file.

Btw, I previous suggested perhaps we can just use -1ULL instead of above value for TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID, but didn't get response. The reason is this value will only be used when detecting P-SEAMLDR using P-SEAMLDR's SEAMLDR.INFO SEAMCALL. Note your above SW-defined error codes is based on error code definition for TDX module, but actually P-SEAMLDR has different error code definition:

"The Intel P-SEAMLDR module returns error codes in the format 0x80000000_cccceeee, where the value cccc specifies the error class, and the value eeee specifies the error code within that class"

The above value happens to work for P-SEAMLDR but it doesn't follow P-SEAMLDR's error code definition.

More information:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#m5242e88e58a52a7e1da69dde3b63f19a717d3118

Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
-Kai
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7.1 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers

Quoted 35 lines · Kai Huang

arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h line 19

Quoted 9 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +9 -0
+/*
+ * SW-defined error codes.
+ *
+ * Bits 47:40 == 0xFF indicate Reserved status code class that never used by
+ * TDX module.
+ */
+#define TDX_ERROR			_BITUL(63)
+#define TDX_SW_ERROR			(TDX_ERROR | GENMASK_ULL(40, 47))
+#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID	(TDX_SW_ERROR | _UL(0xFFFF0000))

Hi Kirill,

GENMASK_ULL(40, 47) should be GENMASK_ULL(47, 40), otherwise I am getting error while building TDX host code:

arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c: In function ‘seamcall’:
./include/linux/build_bug.h:16:51: error: negative width in bit-field ‘<anonymous>’
16 | #define BUILD_BUG_ON_ZERO(e) ((int)(sizeof(struct { int:(-!!(e)); })))

Btw, perhaps you should also explicitly include <linux/bits.h> where GENMASK_ULL() is defined in this header file.

Btw, I previous suggested perhaps we can just use -1ULL instead of above value for TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID, but didn't get response. The reason is this value will only be used when detecting P-SEAMLDR using P-SEAMLDR's SEAMLDR.INFO SEAMCALL. Note your above SW-defined error codes is based on error code definition for TDX module, but actually P-SEAMLDR has different error code definition:

"The Intel P-SEAMLDR module returns error codes in the format 0x80000000_cccceeee, where the value cccc specifies the error class, and the value eeee specifies the error code within that class"

Quoted 7 lines

The above value happens to work for P-SEAMLDR but it doesn't follow P-SEAMLDR's error code definition.

More information:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#m5242e88e58a52a7e1da69dde3b63f19a717d3118

Sorry forgot to add, how TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID is used to detect P-SEAMLDR and TDX module is here:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#m0b0896572bc79546045d03d6af65897b05ba89a4

Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
-Kai
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7.1 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers

In reply to Kai Huang
Quoted 6 lines · Kai Huang

Btw, I previous suggested perhaps we can just use -1ULL instead of above value for TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID, but didn't get response. The reason is this value will only be used when detecting P-SEAMLDR using P-SEAMLDR's SEAMLDR.INFO SEAMCALL. Note your above SW-defined error codes is based on error code definition for TDX module, but actually P-SEAMLDR has different error code definition:

I suggested moving away from the -1 because it didn't really carry any additional information. For folks that have the spec open day in and day out, it's easy for you to go look up what the components of that -1 _mean_.

It sounds like there's a bug here (mixing up the P-SEAMLDR and TDX module error ABIs), but that doesn't mean that moving to -1 is the right answer.

Please just build up an error value the same way it was done for the software-defined TDX module error codes.

#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7.1 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers

Quoted 8 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 6 lines · Kai Huang

Btw, I previous suggested perhaps we can just use -1ULL instead of above value for TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID, but didn't get response. The reason is this value will only be used when detecting P-SEAMLDR using P-SEAMLDR's SEAMLDR.INFO SEAMCALL. Note your above SW-defined error codes is based on error code definition for TDX module, but actually P-SEAMLDR has different error code definition:

Quoted 8 lines

I suggested moving away from the -1 because it didn't really carry any additional information. For folks that have the spec open day in and day out, it's easy for you to go look up what the components of that -1 _mean_.

It sounds like there's a bug here (mixing up the P-SEAMLDR and TDX module error ABIs), but that doesn't mean that moving to -1 is the right answer.

I think it doesn't need to carry any additional information. The error code is used to represent VMfailInvalid, which happens before any P-SEAMLDR and TDX module internal functionality is reached. We just need a value which will *never* conflict with actual error code returned by P-SEAMLDR and TDX module to represent this case.

Both error code formats defined by P-SEAMLDR and TDX module has some reserved bits which will never be set to 1. I think we can just add a simple comment explaining that and choose a value which has 1 set for those reserved bits (even doesn't have to be -1). For example:

/*
* Use -1ULL which will never conflict with any actual error code
* returned by both the P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module to represent
* VMfailInvalid. Both error code definitions defined by the
* P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module have some reserved bits which will
* never be set to 1.
*/
#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID GENMASK_ULL(63, 0)

Quoted 3 lines

Please just build up an error value the same way it was done for the software-defined TDX module error codes.

In this way the assembly code will need to set different value based on whether %rax is a P-SEAMLDR leaf function and TDX module leaf function. I think it's unnecessary. As I said above, I think this error doesn't need to have any additional information. We just need a value which will never conflict with any actual error code from P-SEAMLDR and TDX module.

Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
-Kai
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7.1 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers

Quoted 5 lines · Kai Huang

Both error code formats defined by P-SEAMLDR and TDX module has some reserved bits which will never be set to 1. I think we can just add a simple comment explaining that and choose a value which has 1 set for those reserved bits (even doesn't have to be -1). For example:

Quoted 8 lines

/*
* Use -1ULL which will never conflict with any actual error code
* returned by both the P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module to represent
* VMfailInvalid. Both error code definitions defined by the
* P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module have some reserved bits which will
* never be set to 1.
*/
#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID GENMASK_ULL(63, 0)

The vague "some reserved bits" magic works for exactly *one* error code.
If you ever want to make it two, then you subject some some poor future
dope to a trip to TDX documentation purgatory.

All I'm asking is that this code stand on its own. Just declare what the *ACTUAL* reserved bits are. Not some vague reference to "some bits". There are *REAL* documented bits. Use them, please.

#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7.1 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers

Quoted 15 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 5 lines · Kai Huang

Both error code formats defined by P-SEAMLDR and TDX module has some reserved bits which will never be set to 1. I think we can just add a simple comment explaining that and choose a value which has 1 set for those reserved bits (even doesn't have to be -1). For example:

Quoted 8 lines

/*
* Use -1ULL which will never conflict with any actual error code
* returned by both the P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module to represent
* VMfailInvalid. Both error code definitions defined by the
* P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module have some reserved bits which will
* never be set to 1.
*/
#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID GENMASK_ULL(63, 0)

Quoted 7 lines

The vague "some reserved bits" magic works for exactly *one* error code.
If you ever want to make it two, then you subject some some poor future
dope to a trip to TDX documentation purgatory.

All I'm asking is that this code stand on its own. Just declare what the *ACTUAL* reserved bits are. Not some vague reference to "some bits". There are *REAL* documented bits. Use them, please.

OK. How about below:

/*
* VMfailInvalid happens before any actual internal logic of the
* P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module is reached. Use a unique value which
* will never conflict with any actual error code returned by both the
* P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module to represent this case.
*
* Both error code definitions of the P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module have
* some reserved bits (bits 61:48 for the TDX module and bits 62:32 for
* the P-SEAMLDR) which will never be set to 1. Choose -1ULL as it
will

	 * never be returned as error code by both of them.
	 */
	#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID	GENMASK_ULL(63, 0)
Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
-Kai
#12 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7.1 02/30] x86/tdx: Provide common base for SEAMCALL and TDCALL C wrappers

Quoted 19 lines · Kai Huang
Quoted 7 lines

The vague "some reserved bits" magic works for exactly *one* error code.
If you ever want to make it two, then you subject some some poor future
dope to a trip to TDX documentation purgatory.

All I'm asking is that this code stand on its own. Just declare what the *ACTUAL* reserved bits are. Not some vague reference to "some bits". There are *REAL* documented bits. Use them, please.

OK. How about below:

/*
* VMfailInvalid happens before any actual internal logic of the
* P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module is reached. Use a unique value which
* will never conflict with any actual error code returned by both the
* P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module to represent this case.
*
* Both error code definitions of the P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module have
* some reserved bits (bits 61:48 for the TDX module and bits 62:32 for
* the P-SEAMLDR) which will never be set to 1. Choose -1ULL as it
will

Quoted 3 lines
	 * never be returned as error code by both of them.
	 */
	#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID	GENMASK_ULL(63, 0)

Kai, I think I've failed horribly in explaining myself.

Here's what I want:

#define TDX_ERROR_RSVD_P_SEAMLDR GENMASK_ULL(62, 32)
#define TDX_ERROR_RSVD_MODULE GENMASK_ULL(61, 48)

The P-SEAMLDR and the TDX module itself each define reserved bits in their error codes. These bits will never be set after a SEAMCALL to those two entities. Define a error code which can be returned by software which uses those reserved bits and can be used for either the P-SEAMLDR or the TDX module:

#define TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID (TDX_ERROR_RSVD_P_SEAMLDR &
TDX_ERROR_RSVD_MODULE)

See what that does? It does what you said in english, but does it in code. Take two things from the specs (the reserved masks), and find a value that satisfies both entities.

Now, I'm not sure why you *need* TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID, but this is how I'd like it to be defined. Sure, -1 *works*, but it's basically an opaque value. It's also not *obviously* correct.

#13 lore raw

PATCH v7 3/30 x86/tdx: Add __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>

Guests communicate with VMMs with hypercalls. Historically, these are implemented using instructions that are known to cause VMEXITs like VMCALL, VMLAUNCH, etc. However, with TDX, VMEXITs no longer expose the guest state to the host. This prevents the old hypercall mechanisms from working. So, to communicate with VMM, TDX specification defines a new instruction called TDCALL.

In a TDX based VM, since the VMM is an untrusted entity, an intermediary layer -- TDX module -- facilitates secure communication between the host and the guest. TDX module is loaded like a firmware into a special CPU mode called SEAM. TDX guests communicate with the TDX module using the TDCALL instruction.

A guest uses TDCALL to communicate with both the TDX module and VMM. The value of the RAX register when executing the TDCALL instruction is used to determine the TDCALL type. A leaf of TDCALL used to communicate with the VMM is called TDVMCALL.

Add generic interfaces to communicate with the TDX module and VMM (using the TDCALL instruction).

__tdx_module_call() - Used to communicate with the TDX module (via
TDCALL instruction).
__tdx_hypercall() - Used by the guest to request services from
the VMM (via TDVMCALL leaf of TDCALL).

Also define an additional wrapper _tdx_hypercall(), which adds error handling support for the TDCALL failure.

The __tdx_module_call() and __tdx_hypercall() helper functions are implemented in assembly in a .S file. The TDCALL ABI requires shuffling arguments in and out of registers, which proved to be awkward with inline assembly.

Just like syscalls, not all TDVMCALL use cases need to use the same number of argument registers. The implementation here picks the current worst-case scenario for TDCALL (4 registers). For TDCALLs with fewer than 4 arguments, there will end up being a few superfluous (cheap) instructions. But, this approach maximizes code reuse.

For registers used by the TDCALL instruction, please check TDX GHCI specification, the section titled "TDCALL instruction" and "TDG.VP.VMCALL Interface".

Based on previous patch by Sean Christopherson.

---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/Makefile    |   2 +-
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdcall.S    | 191 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c       |  24 +++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h    |  30 ++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c |   8 ++
 5 files changed, 254 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdcall.S
arch/x86/coco/tdx/Makefile +1 -1
index c929d53ee059..46c55998557d 100644
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
-obj-y += tdx.o
+obj-y += tdx.o tdcall.o
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdcall.S new file +191 -0

191 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +24 -0
index 97674471fd1e..4b57880e45b0 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,30 @@
 #include <linux/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/tdx.h>
 
+/*
+ * Wrapper for standard use of __tdx_hypercall with no output aside from
+ * return code.
+ */
+static inline u64 _tdx_hypercall(u64 fn, u64 r12, u64 r13, u64 r14, u64 r15)
+{
+	struct tdx_hypercall_args args = {
+		.r10 = TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD,
+		.r11 = fn,
+		.r12 = r12,
+		.r13 = r13,
+		.r14 = r14,
+		.r15 = r15,
+	};
+
+	return __tdx_hypercall(&args, 0);
+}
+
+/* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */
+void __tdx_hypercall_failed(void)
+{
+	panic("TDVMCALL failed. TDX module bug?");
+}
+
 void __init tdx_early_init(void)
 {
 	u32 eax, sig[3];
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +30 -0
index 2ffefe22f10a..0fd34019416a 100644
@@ -3,11 +3,16 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_TDX_H
 #define _ASM_X86_TDX_H
 
+#include <linux/bits.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 
 #define TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID	0x21
 #define TDX_IDENT		"IntelTDX    "
 
+#define TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD  0
+
+#define TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT	BIT(0)
+
 /*
  * SW-defined error codes.
  *
@@ -35,10 +40,35 @@ struct tdx_module_output {
 	u64 r11;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Used in __tdx_hypercall() to pass down and get back registers' values of
+ * the TDCALL instruction when requesting services from the VMM.
+ *
+ * This is a software only structure and not part of the TDX module/VMM ABI.
+ */
+struct tdx_hypercall_args {
+	u64 r10;
+	u64 r11;
+	u64 r12;
+	u64 r13;
+	u64 r14;
+	u64 r15;
+};
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
 
 void __init tdx_early_init(void);
 
+/* Used to communicate with the TDX module */
+u64 __tdx_module_call(u64 fn, u64 rcx, u64 rdx, u64 r8, u64 r9,
+		      struct tdx_module_output *out);
+
+/* Used to request services from the VMM */
+u64 __tdx_hypercall(struct tdx_hypercall_args *args, unsigned long flags);
+
+/* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */
+void __tdx_hypercall_failed(void);
+
 #else
 
 static inline void tdx_early_init(void) { };
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c +8 -0
index 7dca52f5cfc6..437308004ef2 100644
@@ -74,6 +74,14 @@ static void __used common(void)
 	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r10, tdx_module_output, r10);
 	OFFSET(TDX_MODULE_r11, tdx_module_output, r11);
 
+	BLANK();
+	OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r10, tdx_hypercall_args, r10);
+	OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r11, tdx_hypercall_args, r11);
+	OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r12, tdx_hypercall_args, r12);
+	OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r13, tdx_hypercall_args, r13);
+	OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r14, tdx_hypercall_args, r14);
+	OFFSET(TDX_HYPERCALL_r15, tdx_hypercall_args, r15);
+
 	BLANK();
 	OFFSET(BP_scratch, boot_params, scratch);
 	OFFSET(BP_secure_boot, boot_params, secure_boot);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#14 lore raw

PATCH v7 4/30 x86/tdx: Extend the confidential computing API to support TDX guests

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Confidential Computing (CC) features (like string I/O unroll support, memory encryption/decryption support, etc) are conditionally enabled in the kernel using cc_platform_has() API. Since TDX guests also need to use these CC features, extend cc_platform_has() API and add TDX guest-specific CC attributes support.

CC API also provides an interface to deal with encryption mask. Extend it to cover TDX.

Details about which bit in the page table entry to be used to indicate shared/private state is determined by using the TDINFO TDCALL.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig        |  1 +
 arch/x86/coco/core.c    | 12 +++++++++++
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
index c346d66b51fc..93e67842e369 100644
@@ -884,6 +884,7 @@ config INTEL_TDX_GUEST
 	bool "Intel TDX (Trust Domain Extensions) - Guest Support"
 	depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL
 	depends on X86_X2APIC
+	select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
 	help
 	  Support running as a guest under Intel TDX.  Without this support,
 	  the guest kernel can not boot or run under TDX.
arch/x86/coco/core.c +12 -0
index fc1365dd927e..3f3008783e05 100644
@@ -87,9 +87,18 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cc_platform_has);
 
 u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val)
 {
+	/*
+	 * Both AMD and Intel use a bit in the page table to indicate
+	 * encryption status of the page.
+	 *
+	 * - for AMD, bit *set* means the page is encrypted
+	 * - for Intel *clear* means encrypted.
+	 */
 	switch (vendor) {
 	case CC_VENDOR_AMD:
 		return val | cc_mask;
+	case CC_VENDOR_INTEL:
+		return val & ~cc_mask;
 	default:
 		return val;
 	}
@@ -97,9 +106,12 @@ u64 cc_mkenc(u64 val)
 
 u64 cc_mkdec(u64 val)
 {
+	/* See comment in cc_mkenc() */
 	switch (vendor) {
 	case CC_VENDOR_AMD:
 		return val & ~cc_mask;
+	case CC_VENDOR_INTEL:
+		return val | cc_mask;
 	default:
 		return val;
 	}
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +47 -0

68 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#15 lore raw

PATCH v7 5/30 x86/tdx: Exclude shared bit from __PHYSICAL_MASK

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

In TDX guests, by default memory is protected from host access. If a guest needs to communicate with the VMM (like the I/O use case), it uses a single bit in the physical address to communicate the protected/shared attribute of the given page.

In the x86 ARCH code, __PHYSICAL_MASK macro represents the width of the physical address in the given architecture. It is used in creating physical PAGE_MASK for address bits in the kernel. Since in TDX guest, a single bit is used as metadata, it needs to be excluded from valid physical address bits to avoid using incorrect addresses bits in the kernel.

Enable DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK to support updating the __PHYSICAL_MASK.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig        | 1 +
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 8 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+)
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
index 93e67842e369..d2f45e58e846 100644
@@ -885,6 +885,7 @@ config INTEL_TDX_GUEST
 	depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL
 	depends on X86_X2APIC
 	select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
+	select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
 	help
 	  Support running as a guest under Intel TDX.  Without this support,
 	  the guest kernel can not boot or run under TDX.
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +8 -0
index 96b2611baac5..e84f6dd3ed2a 100644
@@ -89,5 +89,13 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void)
 	cc_mask = get_cc_mask();
 	cc_set_mask(cc_mask);
 
+	/*
+	 * All bits above GPA width are reserved and kernel treats shared bit
+	 * as flag, not as part of physical address.
+	 *
+	 * Adjust physical mask to only cover valid GPA bits.
+	 */
+	physical_mask &= cc_mask - 1;
+
 	pr_info("Guest detected\n");
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#16 lore raw

PATCH v7 6/30 x86/traps: Refactor exc_general_protection()

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

TDX brings a new exception -- Virtualization Exception (#VE). Handling of #VE structurally very similar to handling #GP.

Extract two helpers from exc_general_protection() that can be reused for handling #VE.

No functional changes.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +31 -26
index 7ef00dee35be..bb02faf5a50c 100644
@@ -611,13 +611,40 @@ static bool try_fixup_enqcmd_gp(void)
 #endif
 }
 
+static bool gp_try_fixup_and_notify(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+				    unsigned long error_code, const char *str)
+{
+	if (fixup_exception(regs, trapnr, error_code, 0))
+		return true;
+
+	current->thread.error_code = error_code;
+	current->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;
+
+	/*
+	 * To be potentially processing a kprobe fault and to trust the result
+	 * from kprobe_running(), we have to be non-preemptible.
+	 */
+	if (!preemptible() && kprobe_running() &&
+	    kprobe_fault_handler(regs, trapnr))
+		return true;
+
+	return notify_die(DIE_GPF, str, regs, error_code, trapnr, SIGSEGV) == NOTIFY_STOP;
+}
+
+static void gp_user_force_sig_segv(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr,
+				   unsigned long error_code, const char *str)
+{
+	current->thread.error_code = error_code;
+	current->thread.trap_nr = trapnr;
+	show_signal(current, SIGSEGV, "", str, regs, error_code);
+	force_sig(SIGSEGV);
+}
+
 DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection)
 {
 	char desc[sizeof(GPFSTR) + 50 + 2*sizeof(unsigned long) + 1] = GPFSTR;
 	enum kernel_gp_hint hint = GP_NO_HINT;
-	struct task_struct *tsk;
 	unsigned long gp_addr;
-	int ret;
 
 	if (user_mode(regs) && try_fixup_enqcmd_gp())
 		return;
@@ -636,40 +663,18 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_ERRORCODE(exc_general_protection)
 		return;
 	}
 
-	tsk = current;
-
 	if (user_mode(regs)) {
 		if (fixup_iopl_exception(regs))
 			goto exit;
 
-		tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
-		tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_GP;
-
 		if (fixup_vdso_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_GP, error_code, 0))
 			goto exit;
 
-		show_signal(tsk, SIGSEGV, "", desc, regs, error_code);
-		force_sig(SIGSEGV);
+		gp_user_force_sig_segv(regs, X86_TRAP_GP, error_code, desc);
 		goto exit;
 	}
 
-	if (fixup_exception(regs, X86_TRAP_GP, error_code, 0))
-		goto exit;
-
-	tsk->thread.error_code = error_code;
-	tsk->thread.trap_nr = X86_TRAP_GP;
-
-	/*
-	 * To be potentially processing a kprobe fault and to trust the result
-	 * from kprobe_running(), we have to be non-preemptible.
-	 */
-	if (!preemptible() &&
-	    kprobe_running() &&
-	    kprobe_fault_handler(regs, X86_TRAP_GP))
-		goto exit;
-
-	ret = notify_die(DIE_GPF, desc, regs, error_code, X86_TRAP_GP, SIGSEGV);
-	if (ret == NOTIFY_STOP)
+	if (gp_try_fixup_and_notify(regs, X86_TRAP_GP, error_code, desc))
 		goto exit;
 
 	if (error_code)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#17 lore raw

PATCH v7 7/30 x86/traps: Add #VE support for TDX guest

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Virtualization Exceptions (#VE) are delivered to TDX guests due to specific guest actions which may happen in either user space or the kernel:

* Specific instructions (WBINVD, for example)
* Specific MSR accesses
* Specific CPUID leaf accesses
* Access to specific guest physical addresses

Syscall entry code has a critical window where the kernel stack is not yet set up. Any exception in this window leads to hard to debug issues and can be exploited for privilege escalation. Exceptions in the NMI entry code also cause issues. Returning from the exception handler with IRET will re-enable NMIs and nested NMI will corrupt the NMI stack.

For these reasons, the kernel avoids #VEs during the syscall gap and the NMI entry code. Entry code paths do not access TD-shared memory, MMIO regions, use #VE triggering MSRs, instructions, or CPUID leaves that might generate #VE. VMM can remove memory from TD at any point, but access to unaccepted (or missing) private memory leads to VM termination, not to #VE.

Similarly to page faults and breakpoints, #VEs are allowed in NMI handlers once the kernel is ready to deal with nested NMIs.

During #VE delivery, all interrupts, including NMIs, are blocked until TDGETVEINFO is called. It prevents #VE nesting until the kernel reads the VE info.

TDGETVEINFO retrieves the #VE info from the TDX module, which also clears the "#VE valid" flag. This must be done before anything else as any #VE that occurs while the valid flag is set escalates to #DF by TDX module. It will result in an oops.

Virtual NMIs are inhibited if the #VE valid flag is set. NMI will not be delivered until TDGETVEINFO is called.

For now, convert unhandled #VE's (everything, until later in this series) so that they appear just like a #GP by calling the ve_raise_fault() directly. The ve_raise_fault() function is similar to #GP handler and is responsible for sending SIGSEGV to userspace and CPU die and notifying debuggers and other die chain users.

---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c         | 38 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h |  4 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h      | 21 ++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/idt.c           |  3 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c         | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 152 insertions(+)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +38 -0
index e84f6dd3ed2a..60a3f2ff5b95 100644
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 
 /* TDX module Call Leaf IDs */
 #define TDX_GET_INFO			1
+#define TDX_GET_VEINFO			3
 
 /*
  * Wrapper for standard use of __tdx_hypercall with no output aside from
@@ -73,6 +74,43 @@ static u64 get_cc_mask(void)
 	return BIT_ULL(gpa_width - 1);
 }
 
+void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve)
+{
+	struct tdx_module_output out;
+
+	/*
+	 * Called during #VE handling to retrieve the #VE info from the
+	 * TDX module.
+	 *
+	 * This has to be called early in #VE handling.  A "nested" #VE which
+	 * occurs before this will raise a #DF and is not recoverable.
+	 *
+	 * The call retrieves the #VE info from the TDX module, which also
+	 * clears the "#VE valid" flag. This must be done before anything else
+	 * because any #VE that occurs while the valid flag is set will lead to
+	 * #DF.
+	 *
+	 * Note, the TDX module treats virtual NMIs as inhibited if the #VE
+	 * valid flag is set. It means that NMI=>#VE will not result in a #DF.
+	 */
+	tdx_module_call(TDX_GET_VEINFO, 0, 0, 0, 0, &out);
+
+	/* Transfer the output parameters */
+	ve->exit_reason = out.rcx;
+	ve->exit_qual   = out.rdx;
+	ve->gla         = out.r8;
+	ve->gpa         = out.r9;
+	ve->instr_len   = lower_32_bits(out.r10);
+	ve->instr_info  = upper_32_bits(out.r10);
+}
+
+bool tdx_handle_virt_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
+{
+	pr_warn("Unexpected #VE: %lld\n", ve->exit_reason);
+
+	return false;
+}
+
 void __init tdx_early_init(void)
 {
 	u64 cc_mask;
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h +4 -0
index 1345088e9902..8ccc81d653b3 100644
@@ -625,6 +625,10 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_XENCB(X86_TRAP_OTHER,	exc_xen_hypervisor_callback);
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_OTHER,	exc_xen_unknown_trap);
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+DECLARE_IDTENTRY(X86_TRAP_VE,		exc_virtualization_exception);
+#endif
+
 /* Device interrupts common/spurious */
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_IRQ(X86_TRAP_OTHER,	common_interrupt);
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +21 -0
index 0fd34019416a..ddbe750861f0 100644
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/bits.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
+#include <asm/ptrace.h>
 
 #define TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID	0x21
 #define TDX_IDENT		"IntelTDX    "
@@ -55,6 +56,22 @@ struct tdx_hypercall_args {
 	u64 r15;
 };
 
+/*
+ * Used by the #VE exception handler to gather the #VE exception
+ * info from the TDX module. This is a software only structure
+ * and not part of the TDX module/VMM ABI.
+ */
+struct ve_info {
+	u64 exit_reason;
+	u64 exit_qual;
+	/* Guest Linear (virtual) Address */
+	u64 gla;
+	/* Guest Physical Address */
+	u64 gpa;
+	u32 instr_len;
+	u32 instr_info;
+};
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
 
 void __init tdx_early_init(void);
@@ -69,6 +86,10 @@ u64 __tdx_hypercall(struct tdx_hypercall_args *args, unsigned long flags);
 /* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */
 void __tdx_hypercall_failed(void);
 
+void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve);
+
+bool tdx_handle_virt_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve);
+
 #else
 
 static inline void tdx_early_init(void) { };
arch/x86/kernel/idt.c +3 -0
index df0fa695bb09..1da074123c16 100644
@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@ static const __initconst struct idt_data early_idts[] = {
 	 */
 	INTG(X86_TRAP_PF,		asm_exc_page_fault),
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+	INTG(X86_TRAP_VE,		asm_exc_virtualization_exception),
+#endif
 };
 
 /*
arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +86 -0

98 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#18 lore raw

PATCH v7 8/30 x86/tdx: Add HLT support for TDX guests

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

The HLT instruction is a privileged instruction, executing it stops instruction execution and places the processor in a HALT state. It is used in kernel for cases like reboot, idle loop and exception fixup handlers. For the idle case, interrupts will be enabled (using STI) before the HLT instruction (this is also called safe_halt()).

To support the HLT instruction in TDX guests, it needs to be emulated using TDVMCALL (hypercall to VMM). More details about it can be found in Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX) Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI) specification, section TDVMCALL[Instruction.HLT].

In TDX guests, executing HLT instruction will generate a #VE, which is used to emulate the HLT instruction. But #VE based emulation will not work for the safe_halt() flavor, because it requires STI instruction to be executed just before the TDCALL. Since idle loop is the only user of safe_halt() variant, handle it as a special case.

To avoid *safe_halt() call in the idle function, define the tdx_guest_idle() and use it to override the "x86_idle" function pointer for a valid TDX guest.

Alternative choices like PV ops have been considered for adding safe_halt() support. But it was rejected because HLT paravirt calls only exist under PARAVIRT_XXL, and enabling it in TDX guest just for safe_halt() use case is not worth the cost.

---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdcall.S | 13 ++++++
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c    | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h |  4 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/process.c  |  4 ++
 4 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdcall.S +13 -0
index 662479ccf630..245888290bb6 100644
@@ -139,6 +139,19 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__tdx_hypercall)
 
 	movl $TDVMCALL_EXPOSE_REGS_MASK, %ecx
 
+	/*
+	 * For the idle loop STI needs to be called directly before the TDCALL
+	 * that enters idle (EXIT_REASON_HLT case). STI instruction enables
+	 * interrupts only one instruction later. If there is a window between
+	 * STI and the instruction that emulates the HALT state, there is a
+	 * chance for interrupts to happen in this window, which can delay the
+	 * HLT operation indefinitely. Since this is the not the desired
+	 * result, conditionally call STI before TDCALL.
+	 */
+	testq $TDX_HCALL_ISSUE_STI, %rsi
+	jz .Lskip_sti
+	sti
+.Lskip_sti:
 	tdcall
 
 	/*
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +91 -2

120 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +4 -0
index ddbe750861f0..a792096a3750 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #define TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD  0
 
 #define TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT	BIT(0)
+#define TDX_HCALL_ISSUE_STI	BIT(1)
 
 /*
  * SW-defined error codes.
@@ -90,9 +91,12 @@ void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve);
 
 bool tdx_handle_virt_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve);
 
+void tdx_safe_halt(void);
+
 #else
 
 static inline void tdx_early_init(void) { };
+static inline void tdx_safe_halt(void) { };
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST */
 
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +4 -0
index e131d71b3cae..2e90d57cf86e 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
 #include <asm/proto.h>
 #include <asm/frame.h>
 #include <asm/unwind.h>
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
 
 #include "process.h"
 
@@ -873,6 +874,9 @@ void select_idle_routine(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	} else if (prefer_mwait_c1_over_halt(c)) {
 		pr_info("using mwait in idle threads\n");
 		x86_idle = mwait_idle;
+	} else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST)) {
+		pr_info("using TDX aware idle routine\n");
+		x86_idle = tdx_safe_halt;
 	} else
 		x86_idle = default_idle;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#19 lore raw

PATCH v7 9/30 x86/tdx: Add MSR support for TDX guests

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Use hypercall to emulate MSR read/write for the TDX platform.

There are two viable approaches for doing MSRs in a TD guest:

1. Execute the RDMSR/WRMSR instructions like most VMs and bare metal do. Some will succeed, others will cause a #VE. All of those that cause a #VE will be handled with a TDCALL.
2. Use paravirt infrastructure. The paravirt hook has to keep a list of which MSRs would cause a #VE and use a TDCALL. All other MSRs execute RDMSR/WRMSR instructions directly.

The second option can be ruled out because the list of MSRs was challenging to maintain. That leaves option #1 as the only viable solution for the minimal TDX support.

Kernel relies on the exception fixup machinery to handle MSR access errors. #VE handler uses the same exception fixup code as #GP. It covers MSR accesses along with other types of fixups.

For performance-critical MSR writes (like TSC_DEADLINE), future patches will replace the WRMSR/#VE sequence with the direct TDCALL.

RDMSR and WRMSR specification details can be found in Guest-Host-Communication Interface (GHCI) for Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX) specification, sec titled "TDG.VP. VMCALL<Instruction.RDMSR>" and "TDG.VP.VMCALL<Instruction.WRMSR>".

---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +42 -0
index ed7302581cc7..00ff0a830970 100644
@@ -142,6 +142,44 @@ void __cpuidle tdx_safe_halt(void)
 		WARN_ONCE(1, "HLT instruction emulation failed\n");
 }
 
+static bool read_msr(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	struct tdx_hypercall_args args = {
+		.r10 = TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD,
+		.r11 = hcall_func(EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ),
+		.r12 = regs->cx,
+	};
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulate the MSR read via hypercall. More info about ABI
+	 * can be found in TDX Guest-Host-Communication Interface
+	 * (GHCI), section titled "TDG.VP.VMCALL<Instruction.RDMSR>".
+	 */
+	if (__tdx_hypercall(&args, TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT))
+		return false;
+
+	regs->ax = lower_32_bits(args.r11);
+	regs->dx = upper_32_bits(args.r11);
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool write_msr(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	struct tdx_hypercall_args args = {
+		.r10 = TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD,
+		.r11 = hcall_func(EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE),
+		.r12 = regs->cx,
+		.r13 = (u64)regs->dx << 32 | regs->ax,
+	};
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulate the MSR write via hypercall. More info about ABI
+	 * can be found in TDX Guest-Host-Communication Interface
+	 * (GHCI) section titled "TDG.VP.VMCALL<Instruction.WRMSR>".
+	 */
+	return !__tdx_hypercall(&args, 0);
+}
+
 void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve)
 {
 	struct tdx_module_output out;
@@ -178,6 +216,10 @@ static bool virt_exception_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
 	switch (ve->exit_reason) {
 	case EXIT_REASON_HLT:
 		return handle_halt();
+	case EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ:
+		return read_msr(regs);
+	case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
+		return write_msr(regs);
 	default:
 		pr_warn("Unexpected #VE: %lld\n", ve->exit_reason);
 		return false;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#20 lore raw

PATCH v7 10/30 x86/tdx: Handle CPUID via #VE

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

In TDX guests, most CPUID leaf/sub-leaf combinations are virtualized by the TDX module while some trigger #VE.

Implement the #VE handling for EXIT_REASON_CPUID by handing it through the hypercall, which in turn lets the TDX module handle it by invoking the host VMM.

More details on CPUID Virtualization can be found in the TDX module specification, the section titled "CPUID Virtualization".

Note that VMM that handles the hypercall is not trusted. It can return data that may steer the guest kernel in wrong direct. Only allow VMM to control range reserved for hypervisor communication.

Return all-zeros for any CPUID outside the hypervisor range. It matches CPU behaviour for non-supported leaf.

---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 57 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +57 -1
index 00ff0a830970..50c3b97d6db7 100644
@@ -180,6 +180,48 @@ static bool write_msr(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	return !__tdx_hypercall(&args, 0);
 }
 
+static bool handle_cpuid(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	struct tdx_hypercall_args args = {
+		.r10 = TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD,
+		.r11 = hcall_func(EXIT_REASON_CPUID),
+		.r12 = regs->ax,
+		.r13 = regs->cx,
+	};
+
+	/*
+	 * Only allow VMM to control range reserved for hypervisor
+	 * communication.
+	 *
+	 * Return all-zeros for any CPUID outside the range. It matches CPU
+	 * behaviour for non-supported leaf.
+	 */
+	if (regs->ax < 0x40000000 || regs->ax > 0x4FFFFFFF) {
+		regs->ax = regs->bx = regs->cx = regs->dx = 0;
+		return true;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Emulate the CPUID instruction via a hypercall. More info about
+	 * ABI can be found in TDX Guest-Host-Communication Interface
+	 * (GHCI), section titled "VP.VMCALL<Instruction.CPUID>".
+	 */
+	if (__tdx_hypercall(&args, TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT))
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * As per TDX GHCI CPUID ABI, r12-r15 registers contain contents of
+	 * EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX registers after the CPUID instruction execution.
+	 * So copy the register contents back to pt_regs.
+	 */
+	regs->ax = args.r12;
+	regs->bx = args.r13;
+	regs->cx = args.r14;
+	regs->dx = args.r15;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve)
 {
 	struct tdx_module_output out;
@@ -210,6 +252,18 @@ void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve)
 	ve->instr_info  = upper_32_bits(out.r10);
 }
 
+/* Handle the user initiated #VE */
+static bool virt_exception_user(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
+{
+	switch (ve->exit_reason) {
+	case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
+		return handle_cpuid(regs);
+	default:
+		pr_warn("Unexpected #VE: %lld\n", ve->exit_reason);
+		return false;
+	}
+}
+
 /* Handle the kernel #VE */
 static bool virt_exception_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
 {
@@ -220,6 +274,8 @@ static bool virt_exception_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
 		return read_msr(regs);
 	case EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE:
 		return write_msr(regs);
+	case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
+		return handle_cpuid(regs);
 	default:
 		pr_warn("Unexpected #VE: %lld\n", ve->exit_reason);
 		return false;
@@ -231,7 +287,7 @@ bool tdx_handle_virt_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
 	bool ret;
 
 	if (user_mode(regs))
-		ret = false;
+		ret = virt_exception_user(regs, ve);
 	else
 		ret = virt_exception_kernel(regs, ve);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#21 lore raw

PATCH v7 11/30 x86/tdx: Handle in-kernel MMIO

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

In non-TDX VMs, MMIO is implemented by providing the guest a mapping which will cause a VMEXIT on access and then the VMM emulating the instruction that caused the VMEXIT. That's not possible for TDX VM.

To emulate an instruction an emulator needs two things:

- R/W access to the register file to read/modify instruction arguments and see RIP of the faulted instruction.

- Read access to memory where instruction is placed to see what to emulate. In this case it is guest kernel text.

Both of them are not available to VMM in TDX environment:

- Register file is never exposed to VMM. When a TD exits to the module, it saves registers into the state-save area allocated for that TD. The module then scrubs these registers before returning execution control to the VMM, to help prevent leakage of TD state.

- TDX does not allow guests to execute from shared memory. All executed instructions are in TD-private memory. Being private to the TD, VMMs have no way to access TD-private memory and no way to read the instruction to decode and emulate it.

In TDX the MMIO regions are instead configured by VMM to trigger a #VE exception in the guest.

Add #VE handling that emulates the MMIO instruction inside the guest and converts it into a controlled hypercall to the host.

This approach is bad for performance. But, it has (virtually) no impact on the size of the kernel image and will work for a wide variety of drivers. This allows TDX deployments to use arbitrary devices and device drivers, including virtio. TDX customers have asked for the capability to use random devices in their deployments.

In other words, even if all of the work was done to paravirtualize all x86 MMIO users and virtio, this approach would still be needed. There is essentially no way to get rid of this code.

This approach is functional for all in-kernel MMIO users current and future and does so with a minimal amount of code and kernel image bloat.

MMIO addresses can be used with any CPU instruction that accesses memory. Address only MMIO accesses done via io.h helpers, such as 'readl()' or 'writeq()'.

Any CPU instruction that accesses memory can also be used to access MMIO. However, by convention, MMIO access are typically performed via io.h helpers such as 'readl()' or 'writeq()'.

The io.h helpers intentionally use a limited set of instructions when accessing MMIO. This known, limited set of instructions makes MMIO instruction decoding and emulation feasible in KVM hosts and SEV guests today.

MMIO accesses performed without the io.h helpers are at the mercy of the compiler. Compilers can and will generate a much more broad set of instructions which can not practically be decoded and emulated. TDX guests will oops if they encounter one of these decoding failures.

This means that TDX guests *must* use the io.h helpers to access MMIO.

This requirement is not new. Both KVM hosts and AMD SEV guests have the same limitations on MMIO access.

=== Potential alternative approaches ===

== Paravirtualizing all MMIO ==

An alternative to letting MMIO induce a #VE exception is to avoid the #VE in the first place. Similar to the port I/O case, it is theoretically possible to paravirtualize MMIO accesses.

Like the exception-based approach offered here, a fully paravirtualized approach would be limited to MMIO users that leverage common infrastructure like the io.h macros.

However, any paravirtual approach would be patching approximately 120k call sites. Any paravirtual approach would need to replace a bare memory access instruction with (at least) a function call. With a conservative overhead estimation of 5 bytes per call site (CALL instruction), it leads to bloating code by 600k.

Many drivers will never be used in the TDX environment and the bloat cannot be justified.

== Patching TDX drivers ==

Rather than touching the entire kernel, it might also be possible to just go after drivers that use MMIO in TDX guests *and* are performance critical to justify the effrort. Right now, that's limited only to virtio.

All virtio MMIO appears to be done through a single function, which makes virtio eminently easy to patch.

This approach will be adopted in the future, removing the bulk of MMIO #VEs. The #VE-based MMIO will remain serving non-virtio use cases.

---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 121 insertions(+)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +121 -0
index 50c3b97d6db7..ab10bc73a7c5 100644
@@ -8,11 +8,17 @@
 #include <asm/coco.h>
 #include <asm/tdx.h>
 #include <asm/vmx.h>
+#include <asm/insn.h>
+#include <asm/insn-eval.h>
 
 /* TDX module Call Leaf IDs */
 #define TDX_GET_INFO			1
 #define TDX_GET_VEINFO			3
 
+/* MMIO direction */
+#define EPT_READ	0
+#define EPT_WRITE	1
+
 /*
  * Wrapper for standard use of __tdx_hypercall with no output aside from
  * return code.
@@ -222,6 +228,119 @@ static bool handle_cpuid(struct pt_regs *regs)
 	return true;
 }
 
+static bool mmio_read(int size, unsigned long addr, unsigned long *val)
+{
+	struct tdx_hypercall_args args = {
+		.r10 = TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD,
+		.r11 = hcall_func(EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION),
+		.r12 = size,
+		.r13 = EPT_READ,
+		.r14 = addr,
+		.r15 = *val,
+	};
+
+	if (__tdx_hypercall(&args, TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT))
+		return false;
+	*val = args.r11;
+	return true;
+}
+
+static bool mmio_write(int size, unsigned long addr, unsigned long val)
+{
+	return !_tdx_hypercall(hcall_func(EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION), size,
+			       EPT_WRITE, addr, val);
+}
+
+static bool handle_mmio(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
+{
+	char buffer[MAX_INSN_SIZE];
+	unsigned long *reg, val;
+	struct insn insn = {};
+	enum mmio_type mmio;
+	int size, extend_size;
+	u8 extend_val = 0;
+
+	/* Only in-kernel MMIO is supported */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(user_mode(regs)))
+		return false;
+
+	if (copy_from_kernel_nofault(buffer, (void *)regs->ip, MAX_INSN_SIZE))
+		return false;
+
+	if (insn_decode(&insn, buffer, MAX_INSN_SIZE, INSN_MODE_64))
+		return false;
+
+	mmio = insn_decode_mmio(&insn, &size);
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mmio == MMIO_DECODE_FAILED))
+		return false;
+
+	if (mmio != MMIO_WRITE_IMM && mmio != MMIO_MOVS) {
+		reg = insn_get_modrm_reg_ptr(&insn, regs);
+		if (!reg)
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	ve->instr_len = insn.length;
+
+	/* Handle writes first */
+	switch (mmio) {
+	case MMIO_WRITE:
+		memcpy(&val, reg, size);
+		return mmio_write(size, ve->gpa, val);
+	case MMIO_WRITE_IMM:
+		val = insn.immediate.value;
+		return mmio_write(size, ve->gpa, val);
+	case MMIO_READ:
+	case MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND:
+	case MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND:
+		/* Reads are handled below */
+		break;
+	case MMIO_MOVS:
+	case MMIO_DECODE_FAILED:
+		/*
+		 * MMIO was accessed with an instruction that could not be
+		 * decoded or handled properly. It was likely not using io.h
+		 * helpers or accessed MMIO accidentally.
+		 */
+		return false;
+	default:
+		WARN_ONCE(1, "Unknown insn_decode_mmio() decode value?");
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	/* Handle reads */
+	if (!mmio_read(size, ve->gpa, &val))
+		return false;
+
+	switch (mmio) {
+	case MMIO_READ:
+		/* Zero-extend for 32-bit operation */
+		extend_size = size == 4 ? sizeof(*reg) : 0;
+		break;
+	case MMIO_READ_ZERO_EXTEND:
+		/* Zero extend based on operand size */
+		extend_size = insn.opnd_bytes;
+		break;
+	case MMIO_READ_SIGN_EXTEND:
+		/* Sign extend based on operand size */
+		extend_size = insn.opnd_bytes;
+		if (size == 1 && val & BIT(7))
+			extend_val = 0xFF;
+		else if (size > 1 && val & BIT(15))
+			extend_val = 0xFF;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* All other cases has to be covered with the first switch() */
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		return false;
+	}
+
+	if (extend_size)
+		memset(reg, extend_val, extend_size);
+	memcpy(reg, &val, size);
+	return true;
+}
+
 void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve)
 {
 	struct tdx_module_output out;
@@ -276,6 +395,8 @@ static bool virt_exception_kernel(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve)
 		return write_msr(regs);
 	case EXIT_REASON_CPUID:
 		return handle_cpuid(regs);
+	case EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION:
+		return handle_mmio(regs, ve);
 	default:
 		pr_warn("Unexpected #VE: %lld\n", ve->exit_reason);
 		return false;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#22 lore raw

PATCH v7 12/30 x86/tdx: Detect TDX at early kernel decompression time

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>

The early decompression code does port I/O for its console output. But, handling the decompression-time port I/O demands a different approach from normal runtime because the IDT required to support #VE based port I/O emulation is not yet set up. Paravirtualizing I/O calls during the decompression step is acceptable because the decompression code doesn't have a lot of call sites to IO instruction.

To support port I/O in decompression code, TDX must be detected before the decompression code might do port I/O. Detect whether the kernel runs in a TDX guest.

Add an early_is_tdx_guest() interface to query the cached TDX guest status in the decompression code.

TDX is detected with CPUID. Make cpuid_count() accessible outside boot/cpuflags.c.

TDX detection in the main kernel is very similar. Move common bits into <asm/shared/tdx.h>.

The actual port I/O paravirtualization will come later in the series.

---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile |  1 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c   |  8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h   |  2 ++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.c    | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.h    | 13 +++++++++++++
 arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c          |  3 +--
 arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.h          |  1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h |  8 ++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h        |  4 +---
 9 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.c
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.h
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile +1 -0
index 6115274fe10f..732f6b21ecbd 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 endif
 
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += $(obj)/acpi.o
+vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) += $(obj)/tdx.o
 
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_thunk_$(BITS).o
 efi-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) = $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +8 -0
index a4339cb2d247..2b1169869b96 100644
@@ -370,6 +370,14 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap,
 	lines = boot_params->screen_info.orig_video_lines;
 	cols = boot_params->screen_info.orig_video_cols;
 
+	/*
+	 * Detect TDX guest environment.
+	 *
+	 * It has to be done before console_init() in order to use
+	 * paravirtualized port I/O operations if needed.
+	 */
+	early_tdx_detect();
+
 	console_init();
 
 	/*
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +2 -0
index 16ed360b6692..0d8e275a9d96 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/desc_defs.h>
 
+#include "tdx.h"
+
 #define BOOT_CTYPE_H
 #include <linux/acpi.h>
 
arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.c new file +16 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5f6d01a2f1f4
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include "../cpuflags.h"
+#include "../string.h"
+
+#include <asm/shared/tdx.h>
+
+void early_tdx_detect(void)
+{
+	u32 eax, sig[3];
+
+	cpuid_count(TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID, 0, &eax, &sig[0], &sig[2],  &sig[1]);
+
+	if (memcmp(TDX_IDENT, sig, sizeof(sig)))
+		return;
+}
arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.h new file +13 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9055482cd35c
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef BOOT_COMPRESSED_TDX_H
+#define BOOT_COMPRESSED_TDX_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST
+void early_tdx_detect(void);
+#else
+static inline void early_tdx_detect(void) { };
+#endif
+
+#endif /* BOOT_COMPRESSED_TDX_H */
arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.c +1 -2
index a0b75f73dc63..a83d67ec627d 100644
@@ -71,8 +71,7 @@ int has_eflag(unsigned long mask)
 # define EBX_REG "=b"
 #endif
 
-static inline void cpuid_count(u32 id, u32 count,
-		u32 *a, u32 *b, u32 *c, u32 *d)
+void cpuid_count(u32 id, u32 count, u32 *a, u32 *b, u32 *c, u32 *d)
 {
 	asm volatile(".ifnc %%ebx,%3 ; movl  %%ebx,%3 ; .endif	\n\t"
 		     "cpuid					\n\t"
arch/x86/boot/cpuflags.h +1 -0
index 2e20814d3ce3..475b8fde90f7 100644
@@ -17,5 +17,6 @@ extern u32 cpu_vendor[3];
 
 int has_eflag(unsigned long mask);
 void get_cpuflags(void);
+void cpuid_count(u32 id, u32 count, u32 *a, u32 *b, u32 *c, u32 *d);
 
 #endif
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h new file +8 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8209ba9ffe1a
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_H
+#define _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_H
+
+#define TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID	0x21
+#define TDX_IDENT		"IntelTDX    "
+
+#endif /* _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +1 -3
index a792096a3750..ca23adaa6681 100644
@@ -6,9 +6,7 @@
 #include <linux/bits.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
-
-#define TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID	0x21
-#define TDX_IDENT		"IntelTDX    "
+#include <asm/shared/tdx.h>
 
 #define TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD  0
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#23 lore raw

PATCH v7 13/30 x86: Adjust types used in port I/O helpers

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Change port I/O helpers to use u8/u16/u32 instead of unsigned char/short/int for values. Use u16 instead of int for port number.

It aligns the helpers with implementation in boot stub in preparation for consolidation.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/io.h | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h +13 -13
index f6d91ecb8026..638c1a2a82e0 100644
@@ -258,37 +258,37 @@ static inline void slow_down_io(void)
 #endif
 
 #define BUILDIO(bwl, bw, type)						\
-static inline void out##bwl(unsigned type value, int port)		\
+static inline void out##bwl(type value, u16 port)			\
 {									\
 	asm volatile("out" #bwl " %" #bw "0, %w1"			\
 		     : : "a"(value), "Nd"(port));			\
 }									\
 									\
-static inline unsigned type in##bwl(int port)				\
+static inline type in##bwl(u16 port)					\
 {									\
-	unsigned type value;						\
+	type value;							\
 	asm volatile("in" #bwl " %w1, %" #bw "0"			\
 		     : "=a"(value) : "Nd"(port));			\
 	return value;							\
 }									\
 									\
-static inline void out##bwl##_p(unsigned type value, int port)		\
+static inline void out##bwl##_p(type value, u16 port)			\
 {									\
 	out##bwl(value, port);						\
 	slow_down_io();							\
 }									\
 									\
-static inline unsigned type in##bwl##_p(int port)			\
+static inline type in##bwl##_p(u16 port)				\
 {									\
-	unsigned type value = in##bwl(port);				\
+	type value = in##bwl(port);					\
 	slow_down_io();							\
 	return value;							\
 }									\
 									\
-static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count) \
+static inline void outs##bwl(u16 port, const void *addr, unsigned long count) \
 {									\
 	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO)) {		\
-		unsigned type *value = (unsigned type *)addr;		\
+		type *value = (type *)addr;				\
 		while (count) {						\
 			out##bwl(*value, port);				\
 			value++;					\
@@ -301,10 +301,10 @@ static inline void outs##bwl(int port, const void *addr, unsigned long count) \
 	}								\
 }									\
 									\
-static inline void ins##bwl(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count)	\
+static inline void ins##bwl(u16 port, void *addr, unsigned long count)	\
 {									\
 	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO)) {		\
-		unsigned type *value = (unsigned type *)addr;		\
+		type *value = (type *)addr;				\
 		while (count) {						\
 			*value = in##bwl(port);				\
 			value++;					\
@@ -317,9 +317,9 @@ static inline void ins##bwl(int port, void *addr, unsigned long count)	\
 	}								\
 }
 
-BUILDIO(b, b, char)
-BUILDIO(w, w, short)
-BUILDIO(l, , int)
+BUILDIO(b, b, u8)
+BUILDIO(w, w, u16)
+BUILDIO(l,  , u32)
 
 #define inb inb
 #define inw inw
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#24 lore raw

PATCH v7 14/30 x86: Consolidate port I/O helpers

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

There are two implementations of port I/O helpers: one in the kernel and one in the boot stub.

Move the helpers required for both to <asm/shared/io.h> and use the one implementation everywhere.

---
 arch/x86/boot/boot.h             | 35 +-------------------------------
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h  |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/io.h        | 22 ++------------------
 arch/x86/include/asm/shared/io.h | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/include/asm/shared/io.h
arch/x86/boot/boot.h +1 -34
index 34c9dbb6a47d..22a474c5b3e8 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <linux/edd.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
+#include <asm/shared/io.h>
 #include "bitops.h"
 #include "ctype.h"
 #include "cpuflags.h"
@@ -35,40 +36,6 @@ extern struct boot_params boot_params;
 
 #define cpu_relax()	asm volatile("rep; nop")
 
-/* Basic port I/O */
-static inline void outb(u8 v, u16 port)
-{
-	asm volatile("outb %0,%1" : : "a" (v), "dN" (port));
-}
-static inline u8 inb(u16 port)
-{
-	u8 v;
-	asm volatile("inb %1,%0" : "=a" (v) : "dN" (port));
-	return v;
-}
-
-static inline void outw(u16 v, u16 port)
-{
-	asm volatile("outw %0,%1" : : "a" (v), "dN" (port));
-}
-static inline u16 inw(u16 port)
-{
-	u16 v;
-	asm volatile("inw %1,%0" : "=a" (v) : "dN" (port));
-	return v;
-}
-
-static inline void outl(u32 v, u16 port)
-{
-	asm volatile("outl %0,%1" : : "a" (v), "dN" (port));
-}
-static inline u32 inl(u16 port)
-{
-	u32 v;
-	asm volatile("inl %1,%0" : "=a" (v) : "dN" (port));
-	return v;
-}
-
 static inline void io_delay(void)
 {
 	const u16 DELAY_PORT = 0x80;
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +1 -1
index 0d8e275a9d96..8a253e85f990 100644
@@ -22,11 +22,11 @@
 #include <linux/linkage.h>
 #include <linux/screen_info.h>
 #include <linux/elf.h>
-#include <linux/io.h>
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/boot.h>
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/desc_defs.h>
+#include <asm/shared/io.h>
 
 #include "tdx.h"
 
arch/x86/include/asm/io.h +2 -20
index 638c1a2a82e0..a1eb218a49f8 100644
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
 #include <asm/page.h>
 #include <asm/early_ioremap.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable_types.h>
+#include <asm/shared/io.h>
 
 #define build_mmio_read(name, size, type, reg, barrier) \
 static inline type name(const volatile void __iomem *addr) \
@@ -258,20 +259,6 @@ static inline void slow_down_io(void)
 #endif
 
 #define BUILDIO(bwl, bw, type)						\
-static inline void out##bwl(type value, u16 port)			\
-{									\
-	asm volatile("out" #bwl " %" #bw "0, %w1"			\
-		     : : "a"(value), "Nd"(port));			\
-}									\
-									\
-static inline type in##bwl(u16 port)					\
-{									\
-	type value;							\
-	asm volatile("in" #bwl " %w1, %" #bw "0"			\
-		     : "=a"(value) : "Nd"(port));			\
-	return value;							\
-}									\
-									\
 static inline void out##bwl##_p(type value, u16 port)			\
 {									\
 	out##bwl(value, port);						\
@@ -320,10 +307,8 @@ static inline void ins##bwl(u16 port, void *addr, unsigned long count)	\
 BUILDIO(b, b, u8)
 BUILDIO(w, w, u16)
 BUILDIO(l,  , u32)
+#undef BUILDIO
 
-#define inb inb
-#define inw inw
-#define inl inl
 #define inb_p inb_p
 #define inw_p inw_p
 #define inl_p inl_p
@@ -331,9 +316,6 @@ BUILDIO(l,  , u32)
 #define insw insw
 #define insl insl
 
-#define outb outb
-#define outw outw
-#define outl outl
 #define outb_p outb_p
 #define outw_p outw_p
 #define outl_p outl_p
arch/x86/include/asm/shared/io.h new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..c0ef921c0586
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#ifndef _ASM_X86_SHARED_IO_H
+#define _ASM_X86_SHARED_IO_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define BUILDIO(bwl, bw, type)						\
+static inline void __out##bwl(type value, u16 port)			\
+{									\
+	asm volatile("out" #bwl " %" #bw "0, %w1"			\
+		     : : "a"(value), "Nd"(port));			\
+}									\
+									\
+static inline type __in##bwl(u16 port)					\
+{									\
+	type value;							\
+	asm volatile("in" #bwl " %w1, %" #bw "0"			\
+		     : "=a"(value) : "Nd"(port));			\
+	return value;							\
+}
+
+BUILDIO(b, b, u8)
+BUILDIO(w, w, u16)
+BUILDIO(l,  , u32)
+#undef BUILDIO
+
+#define inb __inb
+#define inw __inw
+#define inl __inl
+#define outb __outb
+#define outw __outw
+#define outl __outl
+
+#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#25 lore raw

PATCH v7 15/30 x86/boot: Port I/O: allow to hook up alternative helpers

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Port I/O instructions trigger #VE in the TDX environment. In response to the exception, kernel emulates these instructions using hypercalls.

But during early boot, on the decompression stage, it is cumbersome to deal with #VE. It is cleaner to go to hypercalls directly, bypassing #VE handling.

Add a way to hook up alternative port I/O helpers in the boot stub with a new pio_ops structure. For now, set the ops structure to just call the normal I/O operation functions.

out*()/in*() macros redefined to use pio_ops callbacks. It eliminates need in changing call sites. io_delay() changed to use port I/O helper instead of inline assembly.

---
 arch/x86/boot/boot.h            |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/io.h              | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/boot/main.c            |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakemain.c |  4 ++++
 6 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/io.h
arch/x86/boot/boot.h +2 -2
index 22a474c5b3e8..b42b91606ca8 100644
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
 #include <linux/edd.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
-#include <asm/shared/io.h>
 #include "bitops.h"
 #include "ctype.h"
 #include "cpuflags.h"
+#include "io.h"
 
 /* Useful macros */
 #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ extern struct boot_params boot_params;
 static inline void io_delay(void)
 {
 	const u16 DELAY_PORT = 0x80;
-	asm volatile("outb %%al,%0" : : "dN" (DELAY_PORT));
+	outb(0, DELAY_PORT);
 }
 
 /* These functions are used to reference data in other segments. */
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +4 -0
index 2b1169869b96..9fdef6af20a1 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n);
  */
 struct boot_params *boot_params;
 
+struct port_io_ops pio_ops;
+
 memptr free_mem_ptr;
 memptr free_mem_end_ptr;
 
@@ -370,6 +372,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap,
 	lines = boot_params->screen_info.orig_video_lines;
 	cols = boot_params->screen_info.orig_video_cols;
 
+	init_default_io_ops();
+
 	/*
 	 * Detect TDX guest environment.
 	 *
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +1 -1
index 8a253e85f990..ea71cf3d64e1 100644
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
 #include <asm/boot.h>
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/desc_defs.h>
-#include <asm/shared/io.h>
 
 #include "tdx.h"
 
@@ -35,6 +34,7 @@
 
 #define BOOT_BOOT_H
 #include "../ctype.h"
+#include "../io.h"
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 #define memptr long
arch/x86/boot/io.h new file +41 -0

41 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/boot/main.c +4 -0
index e3add857c2c9..1202d4f8a390 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 
 struct boot_params boot_params __attribute__((aligned(16)));
 
+struct port_io_ops pio_ops;
+
 char *HEAP = _end;
 char *heap_end = _end;		/* Default end of heap = no heap */
 
@@ -133,6 +135,8 @@ static void init_heap(void)
 
 void main(void)
 {
+	init_default_io_ops();
+
 	/* First, copy the boot header into the "zeropage" */
 	copy_boot_params();
 
arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakemain.c +4 -0
index 1d6437e6d2ba..a6f4d8388ad8 100644
@@ -62,8 +62,12 @@ static void send_morse(const char *pattern)
 	}
 }
 
+struct port_io_ops pio_ops;
+
 void main(void)
 {
+	init_default_io_ops();
+
 	/* Kill machine if structures are wrong */
 	if (wakeup_header.real_magic != 0x12345678)
 		while (1)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#26 lore raw

PATCH v7 15/30 x86/boot: Port I/O: allow to hook up alternative helpers

Port I/O instructions trigger #VE in the TDX environment. In response to the exception, kernel emulates these instructions using hypercalls.

But during early boot, on the decompression stage, it is cumbersome to deal with #VE. It is cleaner to go to hypercalls directly, bypassing #VE handling.

Add a way to hook up alternative port I/O helpers in the boot stub with a new pio_ops structure. For now, set the ops structure to just call the normal I/O operation functions.

out*()/in*() macros redefined to use pio_ops callbacks. It eliminates need in changing call sites. io_delay() changed to use port I/O helper instead of inline assembly.

---
v7.1:
- Rename fields of struct port_io_ops to avoid conficts with I/O

    helpers;
---
 arch/x86/boot/boot.h            |  4 ++--
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/io.h              | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/boot/main.c            |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakemain.c |  4 ++++
 6 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/io.h
arch/x86/boot/boot.h +2 -2
index 22a474c5b3e8..b42b91606ca8 100644
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
 #include <linux/edd.h>
 #include <asm/setup.h>
 #include <asm/asm.h>
-#include <asm/shared/io.h>
 #include "bitops.h"
 #include "ctype.h"
 #include "cpuflags.h"
+#include "io.h"
 
 /* Useful macros */
 #define ARRAY_SIZE(x) (sizeof(x) / sizeof(*(x)))
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ extern struct boot_params boot_params;
 static inline void io_delay(void)
 {
 	const u16 DELAY_PORT = 0x80;
-	asm volatile("outb %%al,%0" : : "dN" (DELAY_PORT));
+	outb(0, DELAY_PORT);
 }
 
 /* These functions are used to reference data in other segments. */
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +4 -0
index 2b1169869b96..9fdef6af20a1 100644
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ void *memmove(void *dest, const void *src, size_t n);
  */
 struct boot_params *boot_params;
 
+struct port_io_ops pio_ops;
+
 memptr free_mem_ptr;
 memptr free_mem_end_ptr;
 
@@ -370,6 +372,8 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, memptr heap,
 	lines = boot_params->screen_info.orig_video_lines;
 	cols = boot_params->screen_info.orig_video_cols;
 
+	init_default_io_ops();
+
 	/*
 	 * Detect TDX guest environment.
 	 *
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +1 -1
index 8a253e85f990..ea71cf3d64e1 100644
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@
 #include <asm/boot.h>
 #include <asm/bootparam.h>
 #include <asm/desc_defs.h>
-#include <asm/shared/io.h>
 
 #include "tdx.h"
 
@@ -35,6 +34,7 @@
 
 #define BOOT_BOOT_H
 #include "../ctype.h"
+#include "../io.h"
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 #define memptr long
arch/x86/boot/io.h new file +41 -0

41 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/boot/main.c +4 -0
index e3add857c2c9..1202d4f8a390 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 
 struct boot_params boot_params __attribute__((aligned(16)));
 
+struct port_io_ops pio_ops;
+
 char *HEAP = _end;
 char *heap_end = _end;		/* Default end of heap = no heap */
 
@@ -133,6 +135,8 @@ static void init_heap(void)
 
 void main(void)
 {
+	init_default_io_ops();
+
 	/* First, copy the boot header into the "zeropage" */
 	copy_boot_params();
 
arch/x86/realmode/rm/wakemain.c +4 -0
index 1d6437e6d2ba..a6f4d8388ad8 100644
@@ -62,8 +62,12 @@ static void send_morse(const char *pattern)
 	}
 }
 
+struct port_io_ops pio_ops;
+
 void main(void)
 {
+	init_default_io_ops();
+
 	/* Kill machine if structures are wrong */
 	if (wakeup_header.real_magic != 0x12345678)
 		while (1)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#27 lore raw

PATCH v7 16/30 x86/boot: Port I/O: add decompression-time support for TDX

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Port I/O instructions trigger #VE in the TDX environment. In response to the exception, kernel emulates these instructions using hypercalls.

But during early boot, on the decompression stage, it is cumbersome to deal with #VE. It is cleaner to go to hypercalls directly, bypassing #VE handling.

Hook up TDX-specific port I/O helpers if booting in TDX environment.

---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdcall.S |  3 ++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.c    | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h        | 27 --------------
 5 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdcall.S
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile +1 -1
index 732f6b21ecbd..8fd0e6ae2e1f 100644
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 endif
 
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += $(obj)/acpi.o
-vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) += $(obj)/tdx.o
+vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) += $(obj)/tdx.o $(obj)/tdcall.o
 
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_thunk_$(BITS).o
 efi-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) = $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdcall.S new file +3 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..46d0495e0d3a
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#include "../../coco/tdx/tdcall.S"
arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.c +61 -0

74 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h +32 -0
index 8209ba9ffe1a..e53f26228fbb 100644
@@ -2,7 +2,39 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_H
 #define _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_H
 
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD  0
+
+#define TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT	BIT(0)
+#define TDX_HCALL_ISSUE_STI	BIT(1)
+
 #define TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID	0x21
 #define TDX_IDENT		"IntelTDX    "
 
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/*
+ * Used in __tdx_hypercall() to pass down and get back registers' values of
+ * the TDCALL instruction when requesting services from the VMM.
+ *
+ * This is a software only structure and not part of the TDX module/VMM ABI.
+ */
+struct tdx_hypercall_args {
+	u64 r10;
+	u64 r11;
+	u64 r12;
+	u64 r13;
+	u64 r14;
+	u64 r15;
+};
+
+/* Used to request services from the VMM */
+u64 __tdx_hypercall(struct tdx_hypercall_args *args, unsigned long flags);
+
+/* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */
+void __tdx_hypercall_failed(void);
+
+#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +0 -27
index ca23adaa6681..1093a5e5f446 100644
@@ -3,16 +3,10 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_TDX_H
 #define _ASM_X86_TDX_H
 
-#include <linux/bits.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <asm/shared/tdx.h>
 
-#define TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD  0
-
-#define TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT	BIT(0)
-#define TDX_HCALL_ISSUE_STI	BIT(1)
-
 /*
  * SW-defined error codes.
  *
@@ -40,21 +34,6 @@ struct tdx_module_output {
 	u64 r11;
 };
 
-/*
- * Used in __tdx_hypercall() to pass down and get back registers' values of
- * the TDCALL instruction when requesting services from the VMM.
- *
- * This is a software only structure and not part of the TDX module/VMM ABI.
- */
-struct tdx_hypercall_args {
-	u64 r10;
-	u64 r11;
-	u64 r12;
-	u64 r13;
-	u64 r14;
-	u64 r15;
-};
-
 /*
  * Used by the #VE exception handler to gather the #VE exception
  * info from the TDX module. This is a software only structure
@@ -79,12 +58,6 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void);
 u64 __tdx_module_call(u64 fn, u64 rcx, u64 rdx, u64 r8, u64 r9,
 		      struct tdx_module_output *out);
 
-/* Used to request services from the VMM */
-u64 __tdx_hypercall(struct tdx_hypercall_args *args, unsigned long flags);
-
-/* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */
-void __tdx_hypercall_failed(void);
-
 void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve);
 
 bool tdx_handle_virt_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#28 lore raw

PATCH v7 16/30 x86/boot: Port I/O: add decompression-time support for TDX

Port I/O instructions trigger #VE in the TDX environment. In response to the exception, kernel emulates these instructions using hypercalls.

But during early boot, on the decompression stage, it is cumbersome to deal with #VE. It is cleaner to go to hypercalls directly, bypassing #VE handling.

Hook up TDX-specific port I/O helpers if booting in TDX environment.

---
v7.1:
- Explicitly use pio_ops when override port I/O callbacks

---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile |  2 +-
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdcall.S |  3 ++
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.c    | 61 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h | 32 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h        | 27 --------------
 5 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdcall.S
arch/x86/boot/compressed/Makefile +1 -1
index 732f6b21ecbd..8fd0e6ae2e1f 100644
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 endif
 
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += $(obj)/acpi.o
-vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) += $(obj)/tdx.o
+vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) += $(obj)/tdx.o $(obj)/tdcall.o
 
 vmlinux-objs-$(CONFIG_EFI_MIXED) += $(obj)/efi_thunk_$(BITS).o
 efi-obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_STUB) = $(objtree)/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/lib.a
arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdcall.S new file +3 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..46d0495e0d3a
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+
+#include "../../coco/tdx/tdcall.S"
arch/x86/boot/compressed/tdx.c +61 -0

74 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h +32 -0
index 8209ba9ffe1a..e53f26228fbb 100644
@@ -2,7 +2,39 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_H
 #define _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_H
 
+#include <linux/bits.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+
+#define TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD  0
+
+#define TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT	BIT(0)
+#define TDX_HCALL_ISSUE_STI	BIT(1)
+
 #define TDX_CPUID_LEAF_ID	0x21
 #define TDX_IDENT		"IntelTDX    "
 
+#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
+
+/*
+ * Used in __tdx_hypercall() to pass down and get back registers' values of
+ * the TDCALL instruction when requesting services from the VMM.
+ *
+ * This is a software only structure and not part of the TDX module/VMM ABI.
+ */
+struct tdx_hypercall_args {
+	u64 r10;
+	u64 r11;
+	u64 r12;
+	u64 r13;
+	u64 r14;
+	u64 r15;
+};
+
+/* Used to request services from the VMM */
+u64 __tdx_hypercall(struct tdx_hypercall_args *args, unsigned long flags);
+
+/* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */
+void __tdx_hypercall_failed(void);
+
+#endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_SHARED_TDX_H */
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +0 -27
index ca23adaa6681..1093a5e5f446 100644
@@ -3,16 +3,10 @@
 #ifndef _ASM_X86_TDX_H
 #define _ASM_X86_TDX_H
 
-#include <linux/bits.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <asm/ptrace.h>
 #include <asm/shared/tdx.h>
 
-#define TDX_HYPERCALL_STANDARD  0
-
-#define TDX_HCALL_HAS_OUTPUT	BIT(0)
-#define TDX_HCALL_ISSUE_STI	BIT(1)
-
 /*
  * SW-defined error codes.
  *
@@ -40,21 +34,6 @@ struct tdx_module_output {
 	u64 r11;
 };
 
-/*
- * Used in __tdx_hypercall() to pass down and get back registers' values of
- * the TDCALL instruction when requesting services from the VMM.
- *
- * This is a software only structure and not part of the TDX module/VMM ABI.
- */
-struct tdx_hypercall_args {
-	u64 r10;
-	u64 r11;
-	u64 r12;
-	u64 r13;
-	u64 r14;
-	u64 r15;
-};
-
 /*
  * Used by the #VE exception handler to gather the #VE exception
  * info from the TDX module. This is a software only structure
@@ -79,12 +58,6 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void);
 u64 __tdx_module_call(u64 fn, u64 rcx, u64 rdx, u64 r8, u64 r9,
 		      struct tdx_module_output *out);
 
-/* Used to request services from the VMM */
-u64 __tdx_hypercall(struct tdx_hypercall_args *args, unsigned long flags);
-
-/* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */
-void __tdx_hypercall_failed(void);
-
 void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve);
 
 bool tdx_handle_virt_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#29 lore raw

PATCH v7 17/30 x86/tdx: Port I/O: add runtime hypercalls

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>

TDX hypervisors cannot emulate instructions directly. This includes port I/O which is normally emulated in the hypervisor. All port I/O instructions inside TDX trigger the #VE exception in the guest and would be normally emulated there.

Use a hypercall to emulate port I/O. Extend the tdx_handle_virt_exception() and add support to handle the #VE due to port I/O instructions.

String I/O operations are not supported in TDX. Unroll them by declaring CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO confidential computing attribute.

== Userspace Implications ==

The ioperm() facility allows userspace access to I/O instructions like inb/outb. Among other things, this allows writing userspace device drivers.

This series has no special handling for ioperm(). Users will be able to successfully request I/O permissions but will induce a #VE on their first I/O instruction which leads SIGSEGV. If this is undesirable users can enable kernel lockdown feature with 'lockdown=integrity' kernel command line option. It makes ioperm() fail.

More robust handling of this situation (denying ioperm() in all TDX guests) will be addressed in follow-on work.

---
 arch/x86/coco/core.c    |  7 +++-
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/coco/core.c +6 -1
index 3f3008783e05..df08edc94f9b 100644
@@ -18,7 +18,12 @@ static u64 cc_mask __ro_after_init;
 
 static bool intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
 {
-	return false;
+	switch (attr) {
+	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO:
+		return true;
+	default:
+		return false;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +79 -0

97 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#30 lore raw

PATCH v7 18/30 x86/tdx: Port I/O: add early boot support

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Andi Kleen <[email protected]>

TDX guests cannot do port I/O directly. The TDX module triggers a #VE exception to let the guest kernel emulate port I/O by converting them into TDCALLs to call the host.

But before IDT handlers are set up, port I/O cannot be emulated using normal kernel #VE handlers. To support the #VE-based emulation during this boot window, add a minimal early #VE handler support in early exception handlers. This is similar to what AMD SEV does. This is mainly to support earlyprintk's serial driver, as well as potentially the VGA driver.

The early handler only supports I/O-related #VE exceptions. Unhandled or failed exceptions will be handled via early_fixup_exceptions() (like normal exception failures). At runtime I/O-related #VE exceptions (along with other types) handled by virt_exception_kernel().

---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c    | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c   |  3 +++
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +16 -0
index e47e2ed6b03e..cc14b7c0c157 100644
@@ -418,6 +418,22 @@ static bool handle_io(struct pt_regs *regs, u32 exit_qual)
 		return handle_out(regs, size, port);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Early #VE exception handler. Only handles a subset of port I/O.
+ * Intended only for earlyprintk. If failed, return false.
+ */
+__init bool tdx_early_handle_ve(struct pt_regs *regs)
+{
+	struct ve_info ve;
+
+	tdx_get_ve_info(&ve);
+
+	if (ve.exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION)
+		return false;
+
+	return handle_io(regs, ve.exit_qual);
+}
+
 void tdx_get_ve_info(struct ve_info *ve)
 {
 	struct tdx_module_output out;
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +4 -0
index 1093a5e5f446..c70d9bc74b67 100644
@@ -64,11 +64,15 @@ bool tdx_handle_virt_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, struct ve_info *ve);
 
 void tdx_safe_halt(void);
 
+bool tdx_early_handle_ve(struct pt_regs *regs);
+
 #else
 
 static inline void tdx_early_init(void) { };
 static inline void tdx_safe_halt(void) { };
 
+static inline bool tdx_early_handle_ve(struct pt_regs *regs) { return false; }
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST */
 
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
arch/x86/kernel/head64.c +3 -0
index 6dff50c3edd6..ecbf50e5b8e0 100644
@@ -417,6 +417,9 @@ void __init do_early_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr)
 	    trapnr == X86_TRAP_VC && handle_vc_boot_ghcb(regs))
 		return;
 
+	if (trapnr == X86_TRAP_VE && tdx_early_handle_ve(regs))
+		return;
+
 	early_fixup_exception(regs, trapnr);
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#31 lore raw

PATCH v7 19/30 x86/tdx: Wire up KVM hypercalls

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>

KVM hypercalls use the VMCALL or VMMCALL instructions. Although the ABI is similar, those instructions no longer function for TDX guests.

Make vendor-specific TDVMCALLs instead of VMCALL. This enables TDX guests to run with KVM acting as the hypervisor.

Among other things, KVM hypercall is used to send IPIs.

Since the KVM driver can be built as a kernel module, export tdx_kvm_hypercall() to make the symbols visible to kvm.ko.

---
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c         | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h      | 11 +++++++++++
 3 files changed, 50 insertions(+)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +17 -0
index cc14b7c0c157..f50f530aff5f 100644
@@ -64,6 +64,23 @@ static u64 hcall_func(u64 exit_reason)
 	return exit_reason;
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
+long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1, unsigned long p2,
+		       unsigned long p3, unsigned long p4)
+{
+	struct tdx_hypercall_args args = {
+		.r10 = nr,
+		.r11 = p1,
+		.r12 = p2,
+		.r13 = p3,
+		.r14 = p4,
+	};
+
+	return __tdx_hypercall(&args, 0);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tdx_kvm_hypercall);
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Used for TDX guests to make calls directly to the TD module.  This
  * should only be used for calls that have no legitimate reason to fail
arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_para.h +22 -0
index 56935ebb1dfe..57bc74e112f2 100644
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
 #include <uapi/asm/kvm_para.h>
 
+#include <asm/tdx.h>
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_GUEST
 bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void);
 #else
@@ -32,6 +34,10 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_and_clear_guest_paused(void)
 static inline long kvm_hypercall0(unsigned int nr)
 {
 	long ret;
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST))
+		return tdx_kvm_hypercall(nr, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
 	asm volatile(KVM_HYPERCALL
 		     : "=a"(ret)
 		     : "a"(nr)
@@ -42,6 +48,10 @@ static inline long kvm_hypercall0(unsigned int nr)
 static inline long kvm_hypercall1(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1)
 {
 	long ret;
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST))
+		return tdx_kvm_hypercall(nr, p1, 0, 0, 0);
+
 	asm volatile(KVM_HYPERCALL
 		     : "=a"(ret)
 		     : "a"(nr), "b"(p1)
@@ -53,6 +63,10 @@ static inline long kvm_hypercall2(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
 				  unsigned long p2)
 {
 	long ret;
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST))
+		return tdx_kvm_hypercall(nr, p1, p2, 0, 0);
+
 	asm volatile(KVM_HYPERCALL
 		     : "=a"(ret)
 		     : "a"(nr), "b"(p1), "c"(p2)
@@ -64,6 +78,10 @@ static inline long kvm_hypercall3(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
 				  unsigned long p2, unsigned long p3)
 {
 	long ret;
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST))
+		return tdx_kvm_hypercall(nr, p1, p2, p3, 0);
+
 	asm volatile(KVM_HYPERCALL
 		     : "=a"(ret)
 		     : "a"(nr), "b"(p1), "c"(p2), "d"(p3)
@@ -76,6 +94,10 @@ static inline long kvm_hypercall4(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
 				  unsigned long p4)
 {
 	long ret;
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST))
+		return tdx_kvm_hypercall(nr, p1, p2, p3, p4);
+
 	asm volatile(KVM_HYPERCALL
 		     : "=a"(ret)
 		     : "a"(nr), "b"(p1), "c"(p2), "d"(p3), "S"(p4)
arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +11 -0
index c70d9bc74b67..ea92641dd1f8 100644
@@ -75,5 +75,16 @@ static inline bool tdx_early_handle_ve(struct pt_regs *regs) { return false; }
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST */
 
+#if defined(CONFIG_KVM_GUEST) && defined(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST)
+long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1, unsigned long p2,
+		       unsigned long p3, unsigned long p4);
+#else
+static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,
+				     unsigned long p2, unsigned long p3,
+				     unsigned long p4)
+{
+	return -ENODEV;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST && CONFIG_KVM_GUEST */
 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_TDX_H */
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#32 lore raw

PATCH v7 20/30 x86/boot: Add a trampoline for booting APs via firmware handoff

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

Historically, x86 platforms have booted secondary processors (APs) using INIT followed by the start up IPI (SIPI) messages. In regular VMs, this boot sequence is supported by the VMM emulation. But such a wakeup model is fatal for secure VMs like TDX in which VMM is an untrusted entity. To address this issue, a new wakeup model was added in ACPI v6.4, in which firmware (like TDX virtual BIOS) will help boot the APs. More details about this wakeup model can be found in ACPI specification v6.4, the section titled "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure".

Since the existing trampoline code requires processors to boot in real mode with 16-bit addressing, it will not work for this wakeup model (because it boots the AP in 64-bit mode). To handle it, extend the trampoline code to support 64-bit mode firmware handoff. Also, extend IDT and GDT pointers to support 64-bit mode hand off.

There is no TDX-specific detection for this new boot method. The kernel will rely on it as the sole boot method whenever the new ACPI structure is present.

The ACPI table parser for the MADT multiprocessor wake up structure and the wakeup method that uses this structure will be added by the following patch in this series.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h              |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h          |  1 +
 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c                | 12 ++++++--
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S            |  1 +
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S     | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_common.S | 12 +++++++-
 6 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h +2 -0
index 48067af94678..35006e151774 100644
@@ -328,6 +328,8 @@ struct apic {
 
 	/* wakeup_secondary_cpu */
 	int	(*wakeup_secondary_cpu)(int apicid, unsigned long start_eip);
+	/* wakeup secondary CPU using 64-bit wakeup point */
+	int	(*wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)(int apicid, unsigned long start_eip);
 
 	void	(*inquire_remote_apic)(int apicid);
 
arch/x86/include/asm/realmode.h +1 -0
index 331474b150f1..fd6f6e5b755a 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct real_mode_header {
 	u32	sev_es_trampoline_start;
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	u32	trampoline_start64;
 	u32	trampoline_pgd;
 #endif
 	/* ACPI S3 wakeup */
arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c +10 -2
index 617012f4619f..6269dd126dba 100644
@@ -1088,6 +1088,11 @@ static int do_boot_cpu(int apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle,
 	unsigned long boot_error = 0;
 	unsigned long timeout;
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	/* If 64-bit wakeup method exists, use the 64-bit mode trampoline IP */
+	if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)
+		start_ip = real_mode_header->trampoline_start64;
+#endif
 	idle->thread.sp = (unsigned long)task_pt_regs(idle);
 	early_gdt_descr.address = (unsigned long)get_cpu_gdt_rw(cpu);
 	initial_code = (unsigned long)start_secondary;
@@ -1129,11 +1134,14 @@ static int do_boot_cpu(int apicid, int cpu, struct task_struct *idle,
 
 	/*
 	 * Wake up a CPU in difference cases:
-	 * - Use the method in the APIC driver if it's defined
+	 * - Use a method from the APIC driver if one defined, with wakeup
+	 *   straight to 64-bit mode preferred over wakeup to RM.
 	 * Otherwise,
 	 * - Use an INIT boot APIC message for APs or NMI for BSP.
 	 */
-	if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu)
+	if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64)
+		boot_error = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64(apicid, start_ip);
+	else if (apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu)
 		boot_error = apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu(apicid, start_ip);
 	else
 		boot_error = wakeup_cpu_via_init_nmi(cpu, start_ip, apicid,
arch/x86/realmode/rm/header.S +1 -0
index 8c1db5bf5d78..2eb62be6d256 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ SYM_DATA_START(real_mode_header)
 	.long	pa_sev_es_trampoline_start
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+	.long	pa_trampoline_start64
 	.long	pa_trampoline_pgd;
 #endif
 	/* ACPI S3 wakeup */
arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S +38 -0
index cc8391f86cdb..ae112a91592f 100644
@@ -161,6 +161,19 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_32)
 	ljmpl	$__KERNEL_CS, $pa_startup_64
 SYM_CODE_END(startup_32)
 
+SYM_CODE_START(pa_trampoline_compat)
+	/*
+	 * In compatibility mode.  Prep ESP and DX for startup_32, then disable
+	 * paging and complete the switch to legacy 32-bit mode.
+	 */
+	movl	$rm_stack_end, %esp
+	movw	$__KERNEL_DS, %dx
+
+	movl	$X86_CR0_PE, %eax
+	movl	%eax, %cr0
+	ljmpl   $__KERNEL32_CS, $pa_startup_32
+SYM_CODE_END(pa_trampoline_compat)
+
 	.section ".text64","ax"
 	.code64
 	.balign 4
@@ -169,6 +182,20 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_64)
 	jmpq	*tr_start(%rip)
 SYM_CODE_END(startup_64)
 
+SYM_CODE_START(trampoline_start64)
+	/*
+	 * APs start here on a direct transfer from 64-bit BIOS with identity
+	 * mapped page tables.  Load the kernel's GDT in order to gear down to
+	 * 32-bit mode (to handle 4-level vs. 5-level paging), and to (re)load
+	 * segment registers.  Load the zero IDT so any fault triggers a
+	 * shutdown instead of jumping back into BIOS.
+	 */
+	lidt	tr_idt(%rip)
+	lgdt	tr_gdt64(%rip)
+
+	ljmpl	*tr_compat(%rip)
+SYM_CODE_END(trampoline_start64)
+
 	.section ".rodata","a"
 	# Duplicate the global descriptor table
 	# so the kernel can live anywhere
@@ -182,6 +209,17 @@ SYM_DATA_START(tr_gdt)
 	.quad	0x00cf93000000ffff	# __KERNEL_DS
 SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(tr_gdt, SYM_L_LOCAL, tr_gdt_end)
 
+SYM_DATA_START(tr_gdt64)
+	.short	tr_gdt_end - tr_gdt - 1	# gdt limit
+	.long	pa_tr_gdt
+	.long	0
+SYM_DATA_END(tr_gdt64)
+
+SYM_DATA_START(tr_compat)
+	.long	pa_trampoline_compat
+	.short	__KERNEL32_CS
+SYM_DATA_END(tr_compat)
+
 	.bss
 	.balign	PAGE_SIZE
 SYM_DATA(trampoline_pgd, .space PAGE_SIZE)
arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_common.S +11 -1
index 5033e640f957..4331c32c47f8 100644
@@ -1,4 +1,14 @@
 /* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
 	.section ".rodata","a"
 	.balign	16
-SYM_DATA_LOCAL(tr_idt, .fill 1, 6, 0)
+
+/*
+ * When a bootloader hands off to the kernel in 32-bit mode an
+ * IDT with a 2-byte limit and 4-byte base is needed. When a boot
+ * loader hands off to a kernel 64-bit mode the base address
+ * extends to 8-bytes. Reserve enough space for either scenario.
+ */
+SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(tr_idt)
+	.short  0
+	.quad   0
+SYM_DATA_END(tr_idt)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#33 lore raw

PATCH v7 21/30 x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>

TDX cannot use INIT/SIPI protocol to bring up secondary CPUs because it requires assistance from untrusted VMM.

For platforms that do not support SIPI/INIT, ACPI defines a wakeup model (using mailbox) via MADT multiprocessor wakeup structure. More details about it can be found in ACPI specification v6.4, the section titled "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure". If a platform firmware produces the multiprocessor wakeup structure, then OS may use this new mailbox-based mechanism to wake up the APs.

Add ACPI MADT wake structure parsing support for x86 platform and if MADT wake table is present, update apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64 with new API which uses MADT wake mailbox to wake-up CPU.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h |   5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c |  10 ++++
 3 files changed, 130 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h +5 -0
index 35006e151774..bd8ae0a7010a 100644
@@ -490,6 +490,11 @@ static inline unsigned int read_apic_id(void)
 	return apic->get_apic_id(reg);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+typedef int (*wakeup_cpu_handler)(int apicid, unsigned long start_eip);
+extern void acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update(wakeup_cpu_handler handler);
+#endif
+
 extern int default_apic_id_valid(u32 apicid);
 extern int default_acpi_madt_oem_check(char *, char *);
 extern void default_setup_apic_routing(void);
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +115 -0

139 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +10 -0
index b70344bf6600..3c8f2c797a98 100644
@@ -2551,6 +2551,16 @@ u32 x86_msi_msg_get_destid(struct msi_msg *msg, bool extid)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_msi_msg_get_destid);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+void __init acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update(wakeup_cpu_handler handler)
+{
+	struct apic **drv;
+
+	for (drv = __apicdrivers; drv < __apicdrivers_end; drv++)
+		(*drv)->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64 = handler;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Override the generic EOI implementation with an optimized version.
  * Only called during early boot when only one CPU is active and with
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Reviewed-by Andi Kleen Reviewed-by Rafael J. Wysocki on v7 21/30
#34 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

Review

Quoted 12 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
(quoted diff) +12 -0
+	/*
+	 * After writing the wakeup command, wait for maximum timeout of 0xFF
+	 * for firmware to reset the command address back zero to indicate
+	 * the successful reception of command.
+	 * NOTE: 0xFF as timeout value is decided based on our experiments.
+	 *
+	 * XXX: Change the timeout once ACPI specification comes up with
+	 *      standard maximum timeout value.
+	 */
+	timeout = 0xFF;
+	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command) && --timeout)
+		cpu_relax();

I don't feel like this was ever actually resolved. This timeout basically boiled down to "this value seems to work for us". There are also *SURELY* timeouts that are going to happen here.

In the end, the host has to choose to run the guest. If it decides for some odd reason not to run the CPU that's being booted, we'll get timeouts.

The other thing that baffles me is the re-wakeup bits:

Quoted 9 lines
        /*
         * If the CPU wakeup process is successful, store the
         * status in apic_id_wakemap to prevent re-wakeup
         * requests.
         */
        physid_set(apicid, apic_id_wakemap);

        return 0;
}

If this goes wrong, won't the new wakeup just timeout? Do we really need a dedicated mechanism to stop re-wakeups? How much of a problem is this going to be?

Anyway, see the totally untested hunk I've attached. It fixes a bunch of issues IMNHO.

From 4ea10d7084e58c367724d7e3278a62beef2561d4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 18:30:39 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

* Rewrite changelog
* Fix too-wide ->apic_id vertical alignment
* Remove errant "Virtual address of ..." comment
* Rename timeout=>wake_tries_left
* Make wake_tries_left an int, not a u8
* Actually try to explain the timeout in a comment
* I'd still love to know what the experiment actually did and what the lower bound on the timeout is. Oh well.
* Change smp_wmb()/WRITE_ONCE() back to Peterz's smp_store_release() suggestion.
* Use smp_store_release() for =0 too
* add a pr_warn() for failures
* Add an endif #ifdef comment, and fix up CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC oddity.

--

Secondary CPU startup is currently performed with something called the "INIT/SIPI protocol". This protocol requires assistance from VMMs to boot guests. As should be a familiar story by now, that support can not be provded to TDX guests because TDX VMMs are not trusted by guests.

To remedy this situation a new[1] "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure" has been added to to an existing ACPI table (MADT). This structure provides the physical address of a "mailbox". A write to the mailbox then steers the secondary CPU to the boot code.

Add ACPI MADT wake structure parsing support and wake support. Use this support to wake CPUs whenever it is present instead of INIT/SIPI.

While this structure can theoretically be used on 32-bit kernels, there are no 32-bit TDX guest kernels. It has not been tested and can not practically *be* tested on 32-bit. Make it 64-bit only.

1. Details about the new structure can be found in ACPI v6.4, in the "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure" section.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h |   5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c |  10 ++++
 3 files changed, 130 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h +5 -0
index 48067af94678..3cef7f126876 100644
@@ -488,6 +488,11 @@ static inline unsigned int read_apic_id(void)
 	return apic->get_apic_id(reg);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+typedef int (*wakeup_cpu_handler)(int apicid, unsigned long start_eip);
+extern void acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update(wakeup_cpu_handler handler);
+#endif
+
 extern int default_apic_id_valid(u32 apicid);
 extern int default_acpi_madt_oem_check(char *, char *);
 extern void default_setup_apic_routing(void);
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +115 -0

139 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +10 -0
index b70344bf6600..3c8f2c797a98 100644
@@ -2551,6 +2551,16 @@ u32 x86_msi_msg_get_destid(struct msi_msg *msg, bool extid)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_msi_msg_get_destid);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+void __init acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update(wakeup_cpu_handler handler)
+{
+	struct apic **drv;
+
+	for (drv = __apicdrivers; drv < __apicdrivers_end; drv++)
+		(*drv)->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64 = handler;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Override the generic EOI implementation with an optimized version.
  * Only called during early boot when only one CPU is active and with
Signature · 1 line
2.34.0
Reviewed-by Andi Kleen Reviewed-by Rafael J. Wysocki
#35 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

I'm not sure what I attached to the last one, but it wasn't what I intended to send. Here it is with the actual code changes.

From 09c9c93bce052cc688bdf73f80bf0f805202fc09 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>
Date: Fri, 18 Mar 2022 18:30:39 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

* Rewrite changelog
* Fix too-wide ->apic_id vertical alignment
* Remove errant "Virtual address of ..." comment
* Rename timeout=>wake_tries_left
* Make wake_tries_left an int, not a u8
* Actually try to explain the timeout in a comment
* I'd still love to know what the experiment actually did and what the lower bound on the timeout is. Oh well.
* Change smp_wmb()/WRITE_ONCE() back to Peterz's smp_store_release() suggestion.
* Use smp_store_release() for =0 too
* add a pr_warn() for failures
* Add an endif #ifdef comment, and fix up CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC oddity.

--

Secondary CPU startup is currently performed with something called the "INIT/SIPI protocol". This protocol requires assistance from VMMs to boot guests. As should be a familiar story by now, that support can not be provded to TDX guests because TDX VMMs are not trusted by guests.

To remedy this situation a new[1] "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure" has been added to to an existing ACPI table (MADT). This structure provides the physical address of a "mailbox". A write to the mailbox then steers the secondary CPU to the boot code.

Add ACPI MADT wake structure parsing support and wake support. Use this support to wake CPUs whenever it is present instead of INIT/SIPI.

While this structure can theoretically be used on 32-bit kernels, there are no 32-bit TDX guest kernels. It has not been tested and can not practically *be* tested on 32-bit. Make it 64-bit only.

1. Details about the new structure can be found in ACPI v6.4, in the "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure" section.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h |   5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c |  10 ++++
 3 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h +5 -0
index 48067af94678..3cef7f126876 100644
@@ -488,6 +488,11 @@ static inline unsigned int read_apic_id(void)
 	return apic->get_apic_id(reg);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+typedef int (*wakeup_cpu_handler)(int apicid, unsigned long start_eip);
+extern void acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update(wakeup_cpu_handler handler);
+#endif
+
 extern int default_apic_id_valid(u32 apicid);
 extern int default_acpi_madt_oem_check(char *, char *);
 extern void default_setup_apic_routing(void);
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +114 -1

139 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +10 -0
index b70344bf6600..3c8f2c797a98 100644
@@ -2551,6 +2551,16 @@ u32 x86_msi_msg_get_destid(struct msi_msg *msg, bool extid)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_msi_msg_get_destid);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+void __init acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update(wakeup_cpu_handler handler)
+{
+	struct apic **drv;
+
+	for (drv = __apicdrivers; drv < __apicdrivers_end; drv++)
+		(*drv)->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64 = handler;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Override the generic EOI implementation with an optimized version.
  * Only called during early boot when only one CPU is active and with
Signature · 1 line
2.34.0
author Reviewed-by Andi Kleen Reviewed-by Rafael J. Wysocki
#36 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

In reply to Dave Hansen
Quoted 17 lines · Dave Hansen

Review

Quoted 12 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
(quoted diff) +12 -0
+	/*
+	 * After writing the wakeup command, wait for maximum timeout of 0xFF
+	 * for firmware to reset the command address back zero to indicate
+	 * the successful reception of command.
+	 * NOTE: 0xFF as timeout value is decided based on our experiments.
+	 *
+	 * XXX: Change the timeout once ACPI specification comes up with
+	 *      standard maximum timeout value.
+	 */
+	timeout = 0xFF;
+	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command) && --timeout)
+		cpu_relax();

I don't feel like this was ever actually resolved. This timeout basically boiled down to "this value seems to work for us". There are also *SURELY* timeouts that are going to happen here.

It makes me think if it can be an attack vector: once kernel initiated wake up of a secondary vCPU it has no control on how long it takes.

I worry that malicious VMM can induce timeout intentionally, but then wake up the secondary CPU when kernel doesn't expect it. After quick look I was not able to convince myself that kernel can deal with this without a problem.

Is it legitimate concern?

Patch below drops timeout handling completely. Any opinions?

Other option would be to check in the trampoline code that initiated wake up is legitimate. But it should only be untrue if VMM acting weird (or virtual BIOS is buggy). I don't think it's right side to deal with the problem.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines

/*
* If the CPU wakeup process is successful, store the
* status in apic_id_wakemap to prevent re-wakeup
* requests.
*/
physid_set(apicid, apic_id_wakemap);

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines
        return 0;
}

If this goes wrong, won't the new wakeup just timeout? Do we really need a dedicated mechanism to stop re-wakeups? How much of a problem is this going to be?

Well, it can provide a proper diagnostics and a distinct error code. If you think it is unneeded we can drop it.

From bae59d6e8873a90db5041b6e08e1725d16b57132 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2021 10:31:38 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

Secondary CPU startup is currently performed with something called the "INIT/SIPI protocol". This protocol requires assistance from VMMs to boot guests. As should be a familiar story by now, that support can not be provded to TDX guests because TDX VMMs are not trusted by guests.

To remedy this situation a new[1] "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure" has been added to to an existing ACPI table (MADT). This structure provides the physical address of a "mailbox". A write to the mailbox then steers the secondary CPU to the boot code.

Add ACPI MADT wake structure parsing support and wake support. Use this support to wake CPUs whenever it is present instead of INIT/SIPI.

While this structure can theoretically be used on 32-bit kernels, there are no 32-bit TDX guest kernels. It has not been tested and can not practically *be* tested on 32-bit. Make it 64-bit only.

1. Details about the new structure can be found in ACPI v6.4, in the "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure" section.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h |   5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 114 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c |  10 ++++
 3 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h +5 -0
index 35006e151774..bd8ae0a7010a 100644
@@ -490,6 +490,11 @@ static inline unsigned int read_apic_id(void)
 	return apic->get_apic_id(reg);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+typedef int (*wakeup_cpu_handler)(int apicid, unsigned long start_eip);
+extern void acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update(wakeup_cpu_handler handler);
+#endif
+
 extern int default_apic_id_valid(u32 apicid);
 extern int default_acpi_madt_oem_check(char *, char *);
 extern void default_setup_apic_routing(void);
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +113 -1

138 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +10 -0
index b70344bf6600..3c8f2c797a98 100644
@@ -2551,6 +2551,16 @@ u32 x86_msi_msg_get_destid(struct msi_msg *msg, bool extid)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_msi_msg_get_destid);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+void __init acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update(wakeup_cpu_handler handler)
+{
+	struct apic **drv;
+
+	for (drv = __apicdrivers; drv < __apicdrivers_end; drv++)
+		(*drv)->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64 = handler;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Override the generic EOI implementation with an optimized version.
  * Only called during early boot when only one CPU is active and with
Signature · 1 line
 Kirill A. Shutemov
#37 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

Quoted 19 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 17 lines · Dave Hansen

Review

Quoted 12 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
(quoted diff) +12 -0
+	/*
+	 * After writing the wakeup command, wait for maximum timeout of 0xFF
+	 * for firmware to reset the command address back zero to indicate
+	 * the successful reception of command.
+	 * NOTE: 0xFF as timeout value is decided based on our experiments.
+	 *
+	 * XXX: Change the timeout once ACPI specification comes up with
+	 *      standard maximum timeout value.
+	 */
+	timeout = 0xFF;
+	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command) && --timeout)
+		cpu_relax();

I don't feel like this was ever actually resolved. This timeout basically boiled down to "this value seems to work for us". There are also *SURELY* timeouts that are going to happen here.

Quoted 2 lines

It makes me think if it can be an attack vector: once kernel initiated wake up of a secondary vCPU it has no control on how long it takes.

I don't think that's a meaningful attack vector for TDX. Hosts always have a choice to not run the guest. Sure, they can hang the boot CPU forever if they don't run the secondary CPU. But, they can also do that by just not ever running the boot CPU in the first place.

Quoted 6 lines

I worry that malicious VMM can induce timeout intentionally, but then wake up the secondary CPU when kernel doesn't expect it. After quick look I was not able to convince myself that kernel can deal with this without a problem.

Is it legitimate concern?

The only thing I'd be worried about would be a secondary CPU going off and doing things that it's not supposed to because *it* thinks it is in boot code and the other CPUs are off doing normal runtime things.

I don't know the boot code well enough to guess where it would hang or what damage it could do. I suspect it would get hung up on something like 'cpu_callout_mask'.

Is there anything in the trampoline code or start_secondary() that would cause damage if it got run later than the kernel expects?

Quoted 6 lines

Patch below drops timeout handling completely. Any opinions?

Other option would be to check in the trampoline code that initiated wake up is legitimate. But it should only be untrue if VMM acting weird (or virtual BIOS is buggy). I don't think it's right side to deal with the problem.

Yeah, that would just be a band-aid. If we are worried about the secondary CPU doing some damage at a random time, the host can just wait until *after* the wakeup check.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 9 lines
        /*
         * If the CPU wakeup process is successful, store the
         * status in apic_id_wakemap to prevent re-wakeup
         * requests.
         */
        physid_set(apicid, apic_id_wakemap);

        return 0;
}
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines

If this goes wrong, won't the new wakeup just timeout? Do we really need a dedicated mechanism to stop re-wakeups? How much of a problem is this going to be?

Well, it can provide a proper diagnostics and a distinct error code. If you think it is unneeded we can drop it.

It looks like debugging that you add when you're bringing something up.
I'm not sure of its utility going forward. I'd just zap it for now and
bring it back later if it's really needed.

#38 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

Quoted 39 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 19 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 17 lines · Dave Hansen

Review

Quoted 12 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
(quoted diff) +12 -0
+	/*
+	 * After writing the wakeup command, wait for maximum timeout of 0xFF
+	 * for firmware to reset the command address back zero to indicate
+	 * the successful reception of command.
+	 * NOTE: 0xFF as timeout value is decided based on our experiments.
+	 *
+	 * XXX: Change the timeout once ACPI specification comes up with
+	 *      standard maximum timeout value.
+	 */
+	timeout = 0xFF;
+	while (READ_ONCE(acpi_mp_wake_mailbox->command) && --timeout)
+		cpu_relax();

I don't feel like this was ever actually resolved. This timeout basically boiled down to "this value seems to work for us". There are also *SURELY* timeouts that are going to happen here.

Quoted 2 lines

It makes me think if it can be an attack vector: once kernel initiated wake up of a secondary vCPU it has no control on how long it takes.

I don't think that's a meaningful attack vector for TDX. Hosts always have a choice to not run the guest. Sure, they can hang the boot CPU forever if they don't run the secondary CPU. But, they can also do that by just not ever running the boot CPU in the first place.

Quoted 6 lines

I worry that malicious VMM can induce timeout intentionally, but then wake up the secondary CPU when kernel doesn't expect it. After quick look I was not able to convince myself that kernel can deal with this without a problem.

Is it legitimate concern?

The only thing I'd be worried about would be a secondary CPU going off and doing things that it's not supposed to because *it* thinks it is in boot code and the other CPUs are off doing normal runtime things.

Quoted 6 lines

I don't know the boot code well enough to guess where it would hang or what damage it could do. I suspect it would get hung up on something like 'cpu_callout_mask'.

Is there anything in the trampoline code or start_secondary() that would cause damage if it got run later than the kernel expects?

I didn't find anything specific.

But I tried to simulate similar scenario by returning -EIO just after writing wake up command in acpi_wakeup_cpu(). System booted, but there is a warning in the dmesg:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/irq/chip.c:210 irq_startup+0x2a3/0x2b0

System seems recovered fine, but I'm not sure what will happen if wake up is delayed by VMM.

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Patch below drops timeout handling completely. Any opinions?

Other option would be to check in the trampoline code that initiated wake up is legitimate. But it should only be untrue if VMM acting weird (or virtual BIOS is buggy). I don't think it's right side to deal with the problem.

Yeah, that would just be a band-aid. If we are worried about the secondary CPU doing some damage at a random time, the host can just wait until *after* the wakeup check.

VMM cannot wake up secondary CPU on its own. Guest has to initiate it by writing into the mailbox. Reader of the mailbox command is also within trust boundary -- it loops inside virtual BIOS code. But VMM can *postpone* reacting to the command by not scheduling the secondary.

Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 9 lines
        /*
         * If the CPU wakeup process is successful, store the
         * status in apic_id_wakemap to prevent re-wakeup
         * requests.
         */
        physid_set(apicid, apic_id_wakemap);

        return 0;
}

If this goes wrong, won't the new wakeup just timeout? Do we really need a dedicated mechanism to stop re-wakeups? How much of a problem is this going to be?

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Well, it can provide a proper diagnostics and a distinct error code. If you think it is unneeded we can drop it.

It looks like debugging that you add when you're bringing something up.
I'm not sure of its utility going forward. I'd just zap it for now and
bring it back later if it's really needed.

Sathya pointed out that this protection was added based on request[1] by Rafael.

TDX should be safe from re-wakeups as we forbid offlining CPUs, but the wake up method suppose to be generic, not limited to TDX.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAJZ5v0jonk2Pb2HUHMoe69vnCV4+EV9XZpo2LwKrnYPF3CxD_A@mail.gmail.com/

Signature · 1 line
 Kirill A. Shutemov
#39 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

Quoted 6 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 2 lines · Dave Hansen

Is there anything in the trampoline code or start_secondary() that would cause damage if it got run later than the kernel expects?

I didn't find anything specific.

Quoted 8 lines

But I tried to simulate similar scenario by returning -EIO just after writing wake up command in acpi_wakeup_cpu(). System booted, but there is a warning in the dmesg:

WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/irq/chip.c:210 irq_startup+0x2a3/0x2b0

System seems recovered fine, but I'm not sure what will happen if wake up is delayed by VMM.

That shouldn't be too hard to simulate. Just add a spin loop at the beginning of start_secondary() that can spin for grotesque amounts of time and have it get more grotesque with each CPU that boots.

If you're still booting CPUs when userspace comes up, you've done as much damage as possible.

But, I do think there are two relatively discrete problems here:
1. How long do we wait for a secondary CPU to actually ack the MADT wakeup? (the answer might be "don't wait").
2. How do we verify that a woken-up CPU actually booted all the way?

Even if #1 is a loooooong time, it might get stalled before it fully boots.

So, for this patch, let's just remove the timeout. If the boot CPU hangs (spins forever) because the VMM is being naughty, I'm OK with it.
It's hard to do too much damage when you're spinning.

#2 seems like a separate issue to tackle. Maybe it's as simple as waiting for the secondary CPU to mark itself as online.

The only question is whether #2 is a big enough deal that it has to be tackled before starting to merge the TDX guest support.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines

Patch below drops timeout handling completely. Any opinions?

Other option would be to check in the trampoline code that initiated wake up is legitimate. But it should only be untrue if VMM acting weird (or virtual BIOS is buggy). I don't think it's right side to deal with the problem.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 3 lines

Yeah, that would just be a band-aid. If we are worried about the secondary CPU doing some damage at a random time, the host can just wait until *after* the wakeup check.

VMM cannot wake up secondary CPU on its own. Guest has to initiate it by writing into the mailbox. Reader of the mailbox command is also within trust boundary -- it loops inside virtual BIOS code. But VMM can *postpone* reacting to the command by not scheduling the secondary.

Right. I was just pointing out that if we add a check early in the boot code, the VMM can postpone its naughtiness until after the check.

Quoted 21 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 13 lines
Quoted 9 lines
        /*
         * If the CPU wakeup process is successful, store the
         * status in apic_id_wakemap to prevent re-wakeup
         * requests.
         */
        physid_set(apicid, apic_id_wakemap);

        return 0;
}

If this goes wrong, won't the new wakeup just timeout? Do we really need a dedicated mechanism to stop re-wakeups? How much of a problem is this going to be?

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 2 lines

Well, it can provide a proper diagnostics and a distinct error code. If you think it is unneeded we can drop it.

It looks like debugging that you add when you're bringing something up.
I'm not sure of its utility going forward. I'd just zap it for now and
bring it back later if it's really needed.

Quoted 7 lines

Sathya pointed out that this protection was added based on request[1] by Rafael.

TDX should be safe from re-wakeups as we forbid offlining CPUs, but the wake up method suppose to be generic, not limited to TDX.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAJZ5v0jonk2Pb2HUHMoe69vnCV4+EV9XZpo2LwKrnYPF3CxD_A@mail.gmail.com/

Fair enough. Please just add that reasoning somewhere.

author Reviewed-by Andi Kleen Reviewed-by Rafael J. Wysocki
#40 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

Quoted 11 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 10 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 2 lines · Dave Hansen

Is there anything in the trampoline code or start_secondary() that would cause damage if it got run later than the kernel expects?

I didn't find anything specific.

But I tried to simulate similar scenario by returning -EIO just after writing wake up command in acpi_wakeup_cpu(). System booted, but there is a warning in the dmesg:

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at kernel/irq/chip.c:210 irq_startup+0x2a3/0x2b0

System seems recovered fine, but I'm not sure what will happen if wake up is delayed by VMM.

That shouldn't be too hard to simulate. Just add a spin loop at the beginning of start_secondary() that can spin for grotesque amounts of time and have it get more grotesque with each CPU that boots.

I tried to play a bit with delay on start_secondary() side, but I failed to find anything new.

Quoted 6 lines

If you're still booting CPUs when userspace comes up, you've done as much damage as possible.

But, I do think there are two relatively discrete problems here:
1. How long do we wait for a secondary CPU to actually ack the MADT wakeup? (the answer might be "don't wait").

"don't wait" actually leads to wait in do_boot_cpu(): successful wake up call leads to 10s wait for sign of life from the secondary CPU.

Quoted 3 lines

2. How do we verify that a woken-up CPU actually booted all the way?

Even if #1 is a loooooong time, it might get stalled before it fully boots.

Right. "booted all the way" hard to define. It can be cut off at any point by VMM.

Quoted 7 lines

So, for this patch, let's just remove the timeout. If the boot CPU hangs (spins forever) because the VMM is being naughty, I'm OK with it.
It's hard to do too much damage when you're spinning.

#2 seems like a separate issue to tackle. Maybe it's as simple as waiting for the secondary CPU to mark itself as online.

As I mentioned above, do_boot_cpu() already does this. I don't think we can anything sensible beyond that.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

It looks like debugging that you add when you're bringing something up.
I'm not sure of its utility going forward. I'd just zap it for now and
bring it back later if it's really needed.

Sathya pointed out that this protection was added based on request[1] by Rafael.

Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 4 lines

TDX should be safe from re-wakeups as we forbid offlining CPUs, but the wake up method suppose to be generic, not limited to TDX.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/CAJZ5v0jonk2Pb2HUHMoe69vnCV4+EV9XZpo2LwKrnYPF3CxD_A@mail.gmail.com/

Fair enough. Please just add that reasoning somewhere.

Looking closer, the protections seems to be provided by caller.

apic->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64() is only called from do_boot_cpu() which is only called from native_cpu_up(). It checks the CPU against cpu_callin_mask before trying to wake it up, so we don't need to do this here.

I'm dropping this protection after all.

Does the patch below look okay?

From ab320371f9ef8d24722394ec2505089e68737527 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2021 10:31:38 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

Secondary CPU startup is currently performed with something called the "INIT/SIPI protocol". This protocol requires assistance from VMMs to boot guests. As should be a familiar story by now, that support can not be provded to TDX guests because TDX VMMs are not trusted by guests.

To remedy this situation a new[1] "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure" has been added to to an existing ACPI table (MADT). This structure provides the physical address of a "mailbox". A write to the mailbox then steers the secondary CPU to the boot code.

Add ACPI MADT wake structure parsing support and wake support. Use this support to wake CPUs whenever it is present instead of INIT/SIPI.

While this structure can theoretically be used on 32-bit kernels, there are no 32-bit TDX guest kernels. It has not been tested and can not practically *be* tested on 32-bit. Make it 64-bit only.

1. Details about the new structure can be found in ACPI v6.4, in the "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure" section.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h |  5 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c | 10 ++++
 3 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h +5 -0
index 35006e151774..bd8ae0a7010a 100644
@@ -490,6 +490,11 @@ static inline unsigned int read_apic_id(void)
 	return apic->get_apic_id(reg);
 }
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+typedef int (*wakeup_cpu_handler)(int apicid, unsigned long start_eip);
+extern void acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update(wakeup_cpu_handler handler);
+#endif
+
 extern int default_apic_id_valid(u32 apicid);
 extern int default_acpi_madt_oem_check(char *, char *);
 extern void default_setup_apic_routing(void);
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +92 -1

117 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c +10 -0
index b70344bf6600..3c8f2c797a98 100644
@@ -2551,6 +2551,16 @@ u32 x86_msi_msg_get_destid(struct msi_msg *msg, bool extid)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_msi_msg_get_destid);
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
+void __init acpi_wake_cpu_handler_update(wakeup_cpu_handler handler)
+{
+	struct apic **drv;
+
+	for (drv = __apicdrivers; drv < __apicdrivers_end; drv++)
+		(*drv)->wakeup_secondary_cpu_64 = handler;
+}
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Override the generic EOI implementation with an optimized version.
  * Only called during early boot when only one CPU is active and with
Signature · 1 line
 Kirill A. Shutemov
Reviewed-by
#41 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 21/30] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

Quoted 27 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 2 lines

From ab320371f9ef8d24722394ec2505089e68737527 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001

From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 2021 10:31:38 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] x86/acpi, x86/boot: Add multiprocessor wake-up support

Secondary CPU startup is currently performed with something called the "INIT/SIPI protocol". This protocol requires assistance from VMMs to boot guests. As should be a familiar story by now, that support can not be provded to TDX guests because TDX VMMs are not trusted by guests.

To remedy this situation a new[1] "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure" has been added to to an existing ACPI table (MADT). This structure provides the physical address of a "mailbox". A write to the mailbox then steers the secondary CPU to the boot code.

Add ACPI MADT wake structure parsing support and wake support. Use this support to wake CPUs whenever it is present instead of INIT/SIPI.

While this structure can theoretically be used on 32-bit kernels, there are no 32-bit TDX guest kernels. It has not been tested and can not practically *be* tested on 32-bit. Make it 64-bit only.

1. Details about the new structure can be found in ACPI v6.4, in the "Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure" section.

Quoted 6 lines

Looks good. I'm glad you were able to get rid of the extra-wakeup checks too.

#42 lore raw

PATCH v7 22/30 x86/boot: Set CR0.NE early and keep it set during the boot

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

TDX guest requires CR0.NE to be set. Clearing the bit triggers #GP(0).

If CR0.NE is 0, the MS-DOS compatibility mode for handling floating-point exceptions is selected. In this mode, the software exception handler for floating-point exceptions is invoked externally using the processor’s FERR#, INTR, and IGNNE# pins.

Using FERR# and IGNNE# to handle floating-point exception is deprecated. CR0.NE=0 also limits newer processors to operate with one logical processor active.

Kernel uses CR0_STATE constant to initialize CR0. It has NE bit set. But during early boot kernel has more ad-hoc approach to setting bit in the register. During some of this ad-hoc manipulation, CR0.NE is cleared. This causes a #GP in TDX guests and makes it die in early boot.

Make CR0 initialization consistent, deriving the initial value of CR0 from CR0_STATE. Since CR0_STATE always has CR0.NE=1, this ensures that CR0.NE is never 0 and avoids the #GP.

---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S   | 7 ++++---
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 8 ++++----
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +4 -3
index fd9441f40457..d0c3d33f3542 100644
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(startup_32)
 	pushl	%eax
 
 	/* Enter paged protected Mode, activating Long Mode */
-	movl	$(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %eax /* Enable Paging and Protected mode */
+	movl	$CR0_STATE, %eax
 	movl	%eax, %cr0
 
 	/* Jump from 32bit compatibility mode into 64bit mode. */
@@ -662,8 +662,9 @@ SYM_CODE_START(trampoline_32bit_src)
 	pushl	$__KERNEL_CS
 	pushl	%eax
 
-	/* Enable paging again */
-	movl	$(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE), %eax
+	/* Enable paging again. */
+	movl	%cr0, %eax
+	btsl	$X86_CR0_PG_BIT, %eax
 	movl	%eax, %cr0
 
 	lret
arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S +4 -4
index ae112a91592f..d380f2d1fd23 100644
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(trampoline_start)
 	movw	$__KERNEL_DS, %dx	# Data segment descriptor
 
 	# Enable protected mode
-	movl	$X86_CR0_PE, %eax	# protected mode (PE) bit
+	movl	$(CR0_STATE & ~X86_CR0_PG), %eax
 	movl	%eax, %cr0		# into protected mode
 
 	# flush prefetch and jump to startup_32
@@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_32)
 	movl	$MSR_EFER, %ecx
 	wrmsr
 
-	# Enable paging and in turn activate Long Mode
-	movl	$(X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_PE), %eax
+	# Enable paging and in turn activate Long Mode.
+	movl	$CR0_STATE, %eax
 	movl	%eax, %cr0
 
 	/*
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(pa_trampoline_compat)
 	movl	$rm_stack_end, %esp
 	movw	$__KERNEL_DS, %dx
 
-	movl	$X86_CR0_PE, %eax
+	movl	$(CR0_STATE & ~X86_CR0_PG), %eax
 	movl	%eax, %cr0
 	ljmpl   $__KERNEL32_CS, $pa_startup_32
 SYM_CODE_END(pa_trampoline_compat)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#43 lore raw

PATCH v7 23/30 x86/boot: Avoid #VE during boot for TDX platforms

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>

There are a few MSRs and control register bits that the kernel normally needs to modify during boot. But, TDX disallows modification of these registers to help provide consistent security guarantees. Fortunately, TDX ensures that these are all in the correct state before the kernel loads, which means the kernel does not need to modify them.

The conditions to avoid are:

* Any writes to the EFER MSR
* Clearing CR4.MCE

This theoretically makes the guest boot more fragile. If, for instance, EFER was set up incorrectly and a WRMSR was performed, it will trigger early exception panic or a triple fault, if it's before early exceptions are set up. However, this is likely to trip up the guest BIOS long before control reaches the kernel. In any case, these kinds of problems are unlikely to occur in production environments, and developers have good debug tools to fix them quickly.

Change the common boot code to work on TDX and non-TDX systems. This should have no functional effect on non-TDX systems.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                     |  1 +
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S   | 20 ++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable.h   |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S            | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S | 13 ++++++++++++-
 5 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -0
index d2f45e58e846..98efb35ed7b1 100644
@@ -886,6 +886,7 @@ config INTEL_TDX_GUEST
 	depends on X86_X2APIC
 	select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
 	select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
+	select X86_MCE
 	help
 	  Support running as a guest under Intel TDX.  Without this support,
 	  the guest kernel can not boot or run under TDX.
arch/x86/boot/compressed/head_64.S +18 -2
index d0c3d33f3542..6d903b2fc544 100644
@@ -643,12 +643,28 @@ SYM_CODE_START(trampoline_32bit_src)
 	movl	$MSR_EFER, %ecx
 	rdmsr
 	btsl	$_EFER_LME, %eax
+	/* Avoid writing EFER if no change was made (for TDX guest) */
+	jc	1f
 	wrmsr
-	popl	%edx
+1:	popl	%edx
 	popl	%ecx
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+	/*
+	 * Preserve CR4.MCE if the kernel will enable #MC support.
+	 * Clearing MCE may fault in some environments (that also force #MC
+	 * support). Any machine check that occurs before #MC support is fully
+	 * configured will crash the system regardless of the CR4.MCE value set
+	 * here.
+	 */
+	movl	%cr4, %eax
+	andl	$X86_CR4_MCE, %eax
+#else
+	movl	$0, %eax
+#endif
+
 	/* Enable PAE and LA57 (if required) paging modes */
-	movl	$X86_CR4_PAE, %eax
+	orl	$X86_CR4_PAE, %eax
 	testl	%edx, %edx
 	jz	1f
 	orl	$X86_CR4_LA57, %eax
arch/x86/boot/compressed/pgtable.h +1 -1
index 6ff7e81b5628..cc9b2529a086 100644
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
 #define TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_PGTABLE_OFFSET	0
 
 #define TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_CODE_OFFSET	PAGE_SIZE
-#define TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_CODE_SIZE	0x70
+#define TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_CODE_SIZE	0x80
 
 #define TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_STACK_END	TRAMPOLINE_32BIT_SIZE
 
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S +26 -2
index 9c63fc5988cd..184b7468ea76 100644
@@ -140,8 +140,22 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	addq	$(init_top_pgt - __START_KERNEL_map), %rax
 1:
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_MCE
+	/*
+	 * Preserve CR4.MCE if the kernel will enable #MC support.
+	 * Clearing MCE may fault in some environments (that also force #MC
+	 * support). Any machine check that occurs before #MC support is fully
+	 * configured will crash the system regardless of the CR4.MCE value set
+	 * here.
+	 */
+	movq	%cr4, %rcx
+	andl	$X86_CR4_MCE, %ecx
+#else
+	movl	$0, %ecx
+#endif
+
 	/* Enable PAE mode, PGE and LA57 */
-	movl	$(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_PGE), %ecx
+	orl	$(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_PGE), %ecx
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL
 	testl	$1, __pgtable_l5_enabled(%rip)
 	jz	1f
@@ -246,13 +260,23 @@ SYM_INNER_LABEL(secondary_startup_64_no_verify, SYM_L_GLOBAL)
 	/* Setup EFER (Extended Feature Enable Register) */
 	movl	$MSR_EFER, %ecx
 	rdmsr
+	/*
+	 * Preserve current value of EFER for comparison and to skip
+	 * EFER writes if no change was made (for TDX guest)
+	 */
+	movl    %eax, %edx
 	btsl	$_EFER_SCE, %eax	/* Enable System Call */
 	btl	$20,%edi		/* No Execute supported? */
 	jnc     1f
 	btsl	$_EFER_NX, %eax
 	btsq	$_PAGE_BIT_NX,early_pmd_flags(%rip)
-1:	wrmsr				/* Make changes effective */
 
+	/* Avoid writing EFER if no change was made (for TDX guest) */
+1:	cmpl	%edx, %eax
+	je	1f
+	xor	%edx, %edx
+	wrmsr				/* Make changes effective */
+1:
 	/* Setup cr0 */
 	movl	$CR0_STATE, %eax
 	/* Make changes effective */
arch/x86/realmode/rm/trampoline_64.S +12 -1
index d380f2d1fd23..e38d61d6562e 100644
@@ -143,11 +143,22 @@ SYM_CODE_START(startup_32)
 	movl	%eax, %cr3
 
 	# Set up EFER
+	movl	$MSR_EFER, %ecx
+	rdmsr
+	/*
+	 * Skip writing to EFER if the register already has desired
+	 * value (to avoid #VE for the TDX guest).
+	 */
+	cmp	pa_tr_efer, %eax
+	jne	.Lwrite_efer
+	cmp	pa_tr_efer + 4, %edx
+	je	.Ldone_efer
+.Lwrite_efer:
 	movl	pa_tr_efer, %eax
 	movl	pa_tr_efer + 4, %edx
-	movl	$MSR_EFER, %ecx
 	wrmsr
 
+.Ldone_efer:
 	# Enable paging and in turn activate Long Mode.
 	movl	$CR0_STATE, %eax
 	movl	%eax, %cr0
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#44 lore raw

PATCH v7 24/30 x86/topology: Disable CPU online/offline control for TDX guests

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>

Unlike regular VMs, TDX guests use the firmware hand-off wakeup method to wake up the APs during the boot process. This wakeup model uses a mailbox to communicate with firmware to bring up the APs. As per the design, this mailbox can only be used once for the given AP, which means after the APs are booted, the same mailbox cannot be used to offline/online the given AP. More details about this requirement can be found in Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide, sec titled "AP initialization in OS" and in sec titled "Hotplug Device".

Since the architecture does not support any method of offlining the CPUs, disable CPU hotplug support in the kernel.

Since this hotplug disable feature can be re-used by other VM guests, add a new CC attribute CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED and use it to disable the hotplug support.

Attempt to offline CPU will fail with -EOPNOTSUPP.

---
 arch/x86/coco/core.c        |  1 +
 include/linux/cc_platform.h | 10 ++++++++++
 kernel/cpu.c                |  7 +++++++
 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
arch/x86/coco/core.c +1 -0
index df08edc94f9b..70956f9d7c7e 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static bool intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
 {
 	switch (attr) {
 	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO:
+	case CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED:
 		return true;
 	default:
 		return false;
include/linux/cc_platform.h +10 -0
index efd8205282da..691494bbaf5a 100644
@@ -72,6 +72,16 @@ enum cc_attr {
 	 * Examples include TDX guest & SEV.
 	 */
 	CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO,
+
+	/**
+	 * @CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED: Hotplug is not supported or disabled.
+	 *
+	 * The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine does not
+	 * support CPU hotplug feature.
+	 *
+	 * Examples include TDX Guest.
+	 */
+	CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED,
 };
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
kernel/cpu.c +7 -0
index f39eb0b52dfe..c94f00fa34d3 100644
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <linux/scs.h>
 #include <linux/percpu-rwsem.h>
 #include <linux/cpuset.h>
+#include <linux/cc_platform.h>
 
 #include <trace/events/power.h>
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -1185,6 +1186,12 @@ static int __ref _cpu_down(unsigned int cpu, int tasks_frozen,
 
 static int cpu_down_maps_locked(unsigned int cpu, enum cpuhp_state target)
 {
+	/*
+	 * If the platform does not support hotplug, report it explicitly to
+	 * differentiate it from a transient offlining failure.
+	 */
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED))
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (cpu_hotplug_disabled)
 		return -EBUSY;
 	return _cpu_down(cpu, 0, target);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#45 lore raw

PATCH v7 25/30 x86/tdx: Make pages shared in ioremap()

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

In TDX guests, guest memory is protected from host access. If a guest performs I/O, it needs to explicitly share the I/O memory with the host.

Make all ioremap()ed pages that are not backed by normal memory (IORES_DESC_NONE or IORES_DESC_RESERVED) mapped as shared.

The permissions in PAGE_KERNEL_IO already work for "decrypted" memory on AMD SEV/SME systems. That means that they have no need to make a pgprot_decrypted() call.

TDX guests, on the other hand, _need_ change to PAGE_KERNEL_IO for "decrypted" mappings. Add a pgprot_decrypted() for TDX.

---
 arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +5 -0
index 026031b3b782..a5d4ec1afca2 100644
@@ -242,10 +242,15 @@ __ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
 	 * If the page being mapped is in memory and SEV is active then
 	 * make sure the memory encryption attribute is enabled in the
 	 * resulting mapping.
+	 * In TDX guests, memory is marked private by default. If encryption
+	 * is not requested (using encrypted), explicitly set decrypt
+	 * attribute in all IOREMAPPED memory.
 	 */
 	prot = PAGE_KERNEL_IO;
 	if ((io_desc.flags & IORES_MAP_ENCRYPTED) || encrypted)
 		prot = pgprot_encrypted(prot);
+	else
+		prot = pgprot_decrypted(prot);
 
 	switch (pcm) {
 	case _PAGE_CACHE_MODE_UC:
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#46 lore raw

PATCH v7 26/30 x86/mm/cpa: Add support for TDX shared memory

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Intel TDX protects guest memory from VMM access. Any memory that is required for communication with the VMM must be explicitly shared.

It is a two-step process: the guest sets the shared bit in the page table entry and notifies VMM about the change. The notification happens using MapGPA hypercall.

Conversion back to private memory requires clearing the shared bit, notifying VMM with MapGPA hypercall following with accepting the memory with AcceptPage hypercall.

Provide a TDX version of x86_platform.guest.* callbacks. It makes __set_memory_enc_pgtable() work right in TDX guest.

---
 arch/x86/coco/core.c    |   1 +
 arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 151 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/traps.c |   2 +-
 3 files changed, 153 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/coco/core.c +1 -0
index 70956f9d7c7e..9f74125c582d 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ static bool intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
 	switch (attr) {
 	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO:
 	case CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED:
+	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
 		return true;
 	default:
 		return false;
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +151 -0

172 lines not on this page · raw message

arch/x86/kernel/traps.c +1 -1
index a77103e541bf..962c7f531bf9 100644
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static void ve_raise_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, long error_code)
  *
  * In the settings that Linux will run in, virtualization exceptions are
  * never generated on accesses to normal, TD-private memory that has been
- * accepted.
+ * accepted (by BIOS or with tdx_enc_status_changed()).
  *
  * Syscall entry code has a critical window where the kernel stack is not
  * yet set up. Any exception in this window leads to hard to debug issues
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#47 lore raw

PATCH v7 27/30 x86/mm: Make DMA memory shared for TD guest

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

Intel TDX doesn't allow VMM to directly access guest private memory. Any memory that is required for communication with the VMM must be shared explicitly. The same rule applies for any DMA to and from the TDX guest. All DMA pages have to be marked as shared pages. A generic way to achieve this without any changes to device drivers is to use the SWIOTLB framework.

In TDX guest, CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT is set. It makes all DMA to be rerouted via SWIOTLB (see pci_swiotlb_detect()). mem_encrypt_init() generalized to cover TDX. It makes SWIOTLB buffer shared.

Stop selecting DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK directly. It will get set indirectly by selcting X86_MEM_ENCRYPT.

mem_encrypt_init() is currently under an AMD-specific #ifdef. Move it to a generic area of the header.

---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                   | 2 +-
 arch/x86/coco/core.c               | 1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c          | 9 ++++++++-
 4 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/Kconfig +1 -1
index 98efb35ed7b1..1312cefb927d 100644
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ config INTEL_TDX_GUEST
 	depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL
 	depends on X86_X2APIC
 	select ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
-	select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
+	select X86_MEM_ENCRYPT
 	select X86_MCE
 	help
 	  Support running as a guest under Intel TDX.  Without this support,
arch/x86/coco/core.c +1 -0
index 9f74125c582d..4320fadae716 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ static bool intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr)
 	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO:
 	case CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED:
 	case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT:
+	case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT:
 		return true;
 	default:
 		return false;
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h +3 -3
index e2c6f433ed10..88ceaf3648b3 100644
@@ -49,9 +49,6 @@ void __init early_set_mem_enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,
 
 void __init mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void);
 
-/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
-void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
-
 void __init sev_es_init_vc_handling(void);
 
 #define __bss_decrypted __section(".bss..decrypted")
@@ -89,6 +86,9 @@ static inline void mem_encrypt_free_decrypted_mem(void) { }
 
 #endif	/* CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
+/* Architecture __weak replacement functions */
+void __init mem_encrypt_init(void);
+
 /*
  * The __sme_pa() and __sme_pa_nodebug() macros are meant for use when
  * writing to or comparing values from the cr3 register.  Having the
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c +8 -1
index 50d209939c66..10ee40b5204b 100644
@@ -42,7 +42,14 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
 
 static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
 {
-	pr_info("AMD Memory Encryption Features active:");
+	pr_info("Memory Encryption Features active:");
+
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST)) {
+		pr_cont(" Intel TDX\n");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	pr_cont("AMD ");
 
 	/* Secure Memory Encryption */
 	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Reviewed-by on v7 27/30
#48 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 27/30] x86/mm: Make DMA memory shared for TD guest

Quoted 10 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov

Intel TDX doesn't allow VMM to directly access guest private memory. Any memory that is required for communication with the VMM must be shared explicitly. The same rule applies for any DMA to and from the TDX guest. All DMA pages have to be marked as shared pages. A generic way to achieve this without any changes to device drivers is to use the SWIOTLB framework.

In TDX guest, CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT is set. It makes all DMA to be rerouted via SWIOTLB (see pci_swiotlb_detect()). mem_encrypt_init() generalized to cover TDX. It makes SWIOTLB buffer shared.

It would be nice to have one transition paragraph to link the last one to this:

The previous patch ("Add support for TDX shared memory") gave TDX guests the _ability_ to make some pages shared, but did not actually make any pages shared. This actually marks SWIOTLB buffers *as* shared.

Start returning true for cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT) in TDX guests. This has several implications:

* Allows the existing mem_encrypt_init() to be used for TDX which sets SWIOTLB buffers shared (aka. "decrypted").
* Ensures that all DMA is routed via the SWIOTLB mechanism (see pci_swiotlb_detect())

Quoted 2 lines

Stop selecting DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK directly. It will get set indirectly by selcting X86_MEM_ENCRYPT.

^ selecting

Quoted 2 lines

mem_encrypt_init() is currently under an AMD-specific #ifdef. Move it to a generic area of the header.

That new paragraph was kinda funky. With the changelog improvements above:

#49 lore raw

PATCH v7 28/30 x86/tdx: ioapic: Add shared bit for IOAPIC base address

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Isaku Yamahata <[email protected]>

The kernel interacts with each bare-metal IOAPIC with a special MMIO page. When running under KVM, the guest's IOAPICs are emulated by KVM.

When running as a TDX guest, the guest needs to mark each IOAPIC mapping as "shared" with the host. This ensures that TDX private protections are not applied to the page, which allows the TDX host emulation to work.

ioremap()-created mappings such as virtio will be marked as shared by default. However, the IOAPIC code does not use ioremap() and instead uses the fixmap mechanism.

Introduce a special fixmap helper just for the IOAPIC code. Ensure that it marks IOAPIC pages as "shared". This replaces set_fixmap_nocache() with __set_fixmap() since __set_fixmap() allows custom 'prot' values.

AMD SEV gets IOAPIC pages shared because FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE has _ENC bit clear. TDX has to set bit to share the page with the host.

---
 arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/apic/io_apic.c +16 -2
index c1bb384935b0..a868b76cd3d4 100644
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
 #include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
 #include <asm/hw_irq.h>
 #include <asm/apic.h>
+#include <asm/pgtable.h>
 
 #define	for_each_ioapic(idx)		\
 	for ((idx) = 0; (idx) < nr_ioapics; (idx)++)
@@ -2677,6 +2678,19 @@ static struct resource * __init ioapic_setup_resources(void)
 	return res;
 }
 
+static void io_apic_set_fixmap(enum fixed_addresses idx, phys_addr_t phys)
+{
+	pgprot_t flags = FIXMAP_PAGE_NOCACHE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure fixmaps for IOAPIC MMIO respect memory encryption pgprot
+	 * bits, just like normal ioremap():
+	 */
+	flags = pgprot_decrypted(flags);
+
+	__set_fixmap(idx, phys, flags);
+}
+
 void __init io_apic_init_mappings(void)
 {
 	unsigned long ioapic_phys, idx = FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_0;
@@ -2709,7 +2723,7 @@ void __init io_apic_init_mappings(void)
 				      __func__, PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SIZE);
 			ioapic_phys = __pa(ioapic_phys);
 		}
-		set_fixmap_nocache(idx, ioapic_phys);
+		io_apic_set_fixmap(idx, ioapic_phys);
 		apic_printk(APIC_VERBOSE, "mapped IOAPIC to %08lx (%08lx)\n",
 			__fix_to_virt(idx) + (ioapic_phys & ~PAGE_MASK),
 			ioapic_phys);
@@ -2838,7 +2852,7 @@ int mp_register_ioapic(int id, u32 address, u32 gsi_base,
 	ioapics[idx].mp_config.flags = MPC_APIC_USABLE;
 	ioapics[idx].mp_config.apicaddr = address;
 
-	set_fixmap_nocache(FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_0 + idx, address);
+	io_apic_set_fixmap(FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_0 + idx, address);
 	if (bad_ioapic_register(idx)) {
 		clear_fixmap(FIX_IO_APIC_BASE_0 + idx);
 		return -ENODEV;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#50 lore raw

PATCH v7 29/30 ACPICA: Avoid cache flush inside virtual machines

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

While running inside virtual machine, the kernel can bypass cache flushing. Changing sleep state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the host system sleep state and cannot lead to data loss.

Before entering sleep states, the ACPI code flushes caches to prevent data loss using the WBINVD instruction. This mechanism is required on bare metal.

But, any use WBINVD inside of a guest is worthless. Changing sleep state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the host system sleep state and cannot lead to data loss, so most hypervisors simply ignore it. Despite this, the ACPI code calls WBINVD unconditionally anyway. It's useless, but also normally harmless.

In TDX guests, though, WBINVD stops being harmless; it triggers a virtualization exception (#VE). If the ACPI cache-flushing WBINVD were left in place, TDX guests would need handling to recover from the exception.

Avoid using WBINVD whenever running under a hypervisor. This both removes the useless WBINVDs and saves TDX from implementing WBINVD handling.

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h | 14 +++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/acenv.h +13 -1
index 9aff97f0de7f..d937c55e717e 100644
@@ -13,7 +13,19 @@
 
 /* Asm macros */
 
-#define ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE()	wbinvd()
+/*
+ * ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE() flushes caches on entering sleep states.
+ * It is required to prevent data loss.
+ *
+ * While running inside virtual machine, the kernel can bypass cache flushing.
+ * Changing sleep state in a virtual machine doesn't affect the host system
+ * sleep state and cannot lead to data loss.
+ */
+#define ACPI_FLUSH_CPU_CACHE()					\
+do {								\
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR))	\
+		wbinvd();					\
+} while (0)
 
 int __acpi_acquire_global_lock(unsigned int *lock);
 int __acpi_release_global_lock(unsigned int *lock);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#51 lore raw

PATCH v7 30/30 Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture

In reply to Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>

Document the TDX guest architecture details like #VE support, shared memory, etc.

---
 Documentation/x86/index.rst |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/tdx.rst   | 214 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 215 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/tdx.rst
Documentation/x86/index.rst +1 -0
index f498f1d36cd3..382e53ca850a 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation
    intel-iommu
    intel_txt
    amd-memory-encryption
+   tdx
    pti
    mds
    microcode
Documentation/x86/tdx.rst new file +214 -0

214 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
#52 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 30/30] Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture

Quoted 45 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov

From: Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan <[email protected]>

Document the TDX guest architecture details like #VE support, shared memory, etc.

---
 Documentation/x86/index.rst |   1 +
 Documentation/x86/tdx.rst   | 214 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 215 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/tdx.rst
Documentation/x86/index.rst +1 -0
index f498f1d36cd3..382e53ca850a 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ x86-specific Documentation
    intel-iommu
    intel_txt
    amd-memory-encryption
+   tdx
    pti
    mds
    microcode
Documentation/x86/tdx.rst new file +13 -0
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8ca60256511b
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+=====================================
+Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)
+=====================================
+
+Intel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protect confidential guest VMs from
+the host and physical attacks by isolating the guest register state and by
+encrypting the guest memory. In TDX, a special TDX module sits between the
+host and the guest, and runs in a special mode and manages the guest/host
+separation.
+
+Since the host cannot directly access guest registers or memory, much

Documentation/x86/tdx.rst line 23

Quoted 10 lines
Documentation/x86/tdx.rst new file +10 -0
+normal functionality of a hypervisor must be moved into the guest. This is
+implemented using a Virtualization Exception (#VE) that is handled by the
+guest kernel. Some #VEs are handled entirely inside the guest kernel, but
+some require the hypervisor to be involved.
+
+TDX includes new hypercall-like mechanisms for communicating from the
+guest to the hypervisor or the TDX module.
+
+New TDX Exceptions
+==================

Hi Kirill, all,

TDX host support also introduces some documentation. Currently a new tdx_host.rst is added for that since there are non-trivial lines of materials there too (subject to change of course). More information here:

https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/T/#m1f51210c0ed72c6dd05abe90453d50740e97ceed

This is not the best way I believe. I think we have two options here:
1) Having dedicated tdx_guest.rst and tdx_host.rst
2) Having a single tdx.rst to cover both TDX guest and host materials.

I don't know which way is better, perhaps 2).

Kirill,

If 2) is better, could we add an additional level of menu to represent "TDX guest support" and make all materials as sub-menu of it, if you need to send out v8?

Quoted 191 lines
Documentation/x86/tdx.rst new file +191 -0
+
+TDX guests behave differently from bare-metal and traditional VMX guests.
+In TDX guests, otherwise normal instructions or memory accesses can cause
+#VE or #GP exceptions.
+
+Instructions marked with an '*' conditionally cause exceptions.  The
+details for these instructions are discussed below.
+
+Instruction-based #VE
+---------------------
+
+- Port I/O (INS, OUTS, IN, OUT)
+- HLT
+- MONITOR, MWAIT
+- WBINVD, INVD
+- VMCALL
+- RDMSR*,WRMSR*
+- CPUID*
+
+Instruction-based #GP
+---------------------
+
+- All VMX instructions: INVEPT, INVVPID, VMCLEAR, VMFUNC, VMLAUNCH,
+  VMPTRLD, VMPTRST, VMREAD, VMRESUME, VMWRITE, VMXOFF, VMXON
+- ENCLS, ENCLU
+- GETSEC
+- RSM
+- ENQCMD
+- RDMSR*,WRMSR*
+
+RDMSR/WRMSR Behavior
+--------------------
+
+MSR access behavior falls into three categories:
+
+- #GP generated
+- #VE generated
+- "Just works"
+
+In general, the #GP MSRs should not be used in guests.  Their use likely
+indicates a bug in the guest.  The guest may try to handle the #GP with a
+hypercall but it is unlikely to succeed.
+
+The #VE MSRs are typically able to be handled by the hypervisor.  Guests
+can make a hypercall to the hypervisor to handle the #VE.
+
+The "just works" MSRs do not need any special guest handling.  They might
+be implemented by directly passing through the MSR to the hardware or by
+trapping and handling in the TDX module.  Other than possibly being slow,
+these MSRs appear to function just as they would on bare metal.
+
+CPUID Behavior
+--------------
+
+For some CPUID leaves and sub-leaves, the virtualized bit fields of CPUID
+return values (in guest EAX/EBX/ECX/EDX) are configurable by the
+hypervisor. For such cases, the Intel TDX module architecture defines two
+virtualization types:
+
+- Bit fields for which the hypervisor configures the value seen by the
+  guest TD.
+
+- Bit fields for which the hypervisor configures the value such that the
+  guest TD either sees their native value or a value of 0
+
+#VE generated for CPUID leaves and sub-leaves that TDX module doesn't know
+how to handle. The guest kernel may ask the hypervisor for the value with
+a hypercall.
+
+#VE on Memory Accesses
+======================
+
+There are essentially two classes of TDX memory: private and shared.
+Private memory receives full TDX protections.  Its content is protected
+against access from the hypervisor.  Shared memory is expected to be
+shared between guest and hypervisor.
+
+A TD guest is in control of whether its memory accesses are treated as
+private or shared.  It selects the behavior with a bit in its page table
+entries.  This helps ensure that a guest does not place sensitive
+information in shared memory, exposing it to the untrusted hypervisor.
+
+#VE on Shared Memory
+--------------------
+
+Access to shared mappings can cause a #VE.  The hypervisor ultimately
+controls whether a shared memory access causes a #VE, so the guest must be
+careful to only reference shared pages it can safely handle a #VE.  For
+instance, the guest should be careful not to access shared memory in the
+#VE handler before it reads the #VE info structure (TDG.VP.VEINFO.GET).
+
+Shared mapping content is entirely controlled by the hypervisor. Shared
+mappings must never be used for sensitive memory content like stacks or
+kernel text, only for I/O buffers and MMIO regions.  A good rule of thumb
+is that hypervisor-shared memory should be treated the same as memory
+mapped to userspace.  Both the hypervisor and userspace are completely
+untrusted.
+
+MMIO for virtual devices is implemented as shared memory.  The guest must
+be careful not to access device MMIO regions unless it is also prepared to
+handle a #VE.
+
+#VE on Private Pages
+--------------------
+
+Accesses to private mappings can also cause #VEs.  Since all kernel memory
+is also private memory, the kernel might theoretically need to handle a
+#VE on arbitrary kernel memory accesses.  This is not feasible, so TDX
+guests ensure that all guest memory has been "accepted" before memory is
+used by the kernel.
+
+A modest amount of memory (typically 512M) is pre-accepted by the firmware
+before the kernel runs to ensure that the kernel can start up without
+being subjected to #VE's.
+
+The hypervisor is permitted to unilaterally move accepted pages to a
+"blocked" state. However, if it does this, page access will not generate a
+#VE.  It will, instead, cause a "TD Exit" where the hypervisor is required
+to handle the exception.
+
+Linux #VE handler
+=================
+
+Just like page faults or #GP's, #VE exceptions can be either handled or be
+fatal.  Typically, unhandled userspace #VE's result in a SIGSEGV.
+Unhandled kernel #VE's result in an oops.
+
+Handling nested exceptions on x86 is typically nasty business.  A #VE
+could be interrupted by an NMI which triggers another #VE and hilarity
+ensues.  TDX #VE's have a novel solution to make it slightly less nasty.
+
+During #VE handling, the TDX module ensures that all interrupts (including
+NMIs) are blocked.  The block remains in place until the guest makes a
+TDG.VP.VEINFO.GET TDCALL.  This allows the guest to choose when interrupts
+or new #VE's can be delivered.
+
+However, the guest kernel must still be careful to avoid potential
+#VE-triggering actions (discussed above) while this block is in place.
+While the block is in place, #VE's are elevated to double faults (#DF)
+which are not recoverable.
+
+MMIO handling
+=============
+
+In non-TDX VMs, MMIO is usually implemented by giving a guest access to
+a mapping which will cause a VMEXIT on access, and then the hypervisor emulates
+the access.  That is not possible in TDX guests because VMEXIT will expose the
+register state to the host. TDX guests don't trust the host and can't have
+their state exposed to the host.
+
+In TDX, the MMIO regions typically trigger a #VE exception in the guest.
+The guest #VE handler then emulates the MMIO instruction inside the guest
+and converts it into a controlled TDCALL to the host, rather than exposing
+guest state to the host.
+
+MMIO addresses on x86 are just special physical addresses. They can
+theoretically be accessed with any instruction that accesses memory.
+However, the kernel instruction decoding method is limited. It is only
+designed to decode instructions like those generated by io.h macros.
+
+MMIO access via other means (like structure overlays) may result in an
+oops.
+
+Shared Memory Conversions
+=========================
+
+All TDX guest memory starts out as private at boot.  This memory can not
+be accessed by the hypervisor.  However some kernel users like device
+drivers might have a need to share data with the hypervisor.  To do this,
+memory must be converted between shared and private.  This can be
+accomplished using some existing memory encryption helpers:
+
+set_memory_decrypted() converts a range of pages to shared.
+set_memory_encrypted() converts memory back to private.
+
+Device drivers are the primary user of shared memory, but there's no need
+to touch every driver. DMA buffers and ioremap()'ed do the conversions
+automatically.
+
+TDX uses SWIOTLB for most DMA allocations. The SWIOTLB buffer is
+converted to shared on boot.
+
+For coherent DMA allocation, the DMA buffer gets converted on the
+allocation. Check force_dma_unencrypted() for details.
+
+References
+==========
+
+TDX reference material is collected here:
+
+https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html
#53 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 30/30] Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture

Quoted 11 lines · Kai Huang

This is not the best way I believe. I think we have two options here:
1) Having dedicated tdx_guest.rst and tdx_host.rst
2) Having a single tdx.rst to cover both TDX guest and host materials.

I don't know which way is better, perhaps 2).

Kirill,

If 2) is better, could we add an additional level of menu to represent "TDX guest support" and make all materials as sub-menu of it, if you need to send out v8?

If the host support means that this needs to be reorganized, then the host support patches can do that. Let's not make this more complicated than it has to be.

#54 lore raw

Re: [PATCHv7 30/30] Documentation/x86: Document TDX kernel architecture

Quoted 9 lines · Dave Hansen
Quoted 8 lines · Kai Huang

This is not the best way I believe. I think we have two options here:
1) Having dedicated tdx_guest.rst and tdx_host.rst
2) Having a single tdx.rst to cover both TDX guest and host materials.

I don't know which way is better, perhaps 2).

Kirill,

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 3 lines

If 2) is better, could we add an additional level of menu to represent "TDX guest support" and make all materials as sub-menu of it, if you need to send out v8?

If the host support means that this needs to be reorganized, then the host support patches can do that. Let's not make this more complicated than it has to be.

Sure. I'll do the change.

Still it would be appreciated if you guys can provide comments on which is better. Thanks.

Signature · 2 lines
Thanks,
-Kai