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x86/speculation, KVM: only IBPB for switch_mm_always_ibpb on vCPU load

PATCH Superseded Jon Kohler 2 participants 3 messages Apr 19, 2022 – Apr 21, 2022

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v2 of 4 Superseded Latest is v4 →

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Jon Kohler

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#0 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/1 x86/speculation, KVM: only IBPB for switch_mm_always_ibpb on vCPU load

On vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs and svm_vcpu_load, respect user controlled configuration for conditional IBPB and only attempt IBPB MSR when switching between different guest vCPUs IFF switch_mm_always_ibpb, which fixes a situation where the kernel will issue IBPB unconditionally even when conditional IBPB is enabled.

If a user has spectre_v2_user mitigation enabled, in any configuration, and the underlying processor supports X86_FEATURE_IBPB, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is set and any calls to indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() will issue IBPB MSR.

Depending on the spectre_v2_user configuration, either switch_mm_always_ibpb key or switch_mm_cond_ibpb key will be set.

Both switch_mm_always_ibpb and switch_mm_cond_ibpb are handled by switch_mm() -> cond_mitigation(), which works well in cases where switching vCPUs (i.e. switching tasks) also switches mm_struct; however, this misses a paranoid case where user space may be running multiple guests in a single process (i.e. single mm_struct).

This paranoid case is already covered by vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs and svm_vcpu_load; however, this is done by calling indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() and thus the kernel unconditionally issues IBPB if X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is set.

Fix by using intermediary call to x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb(), which gates IBPB MSR IFF switch_mm_always_ibpb is true. This is useful for security paranoid VMMs in either single process or multi-process VMM configurations.

switch_mm_always_ibpb key is user controlled via spectre_v2_user and will be true for the following configurations:
spectre_v2_user=on
spectre_v2_user=prctl,ibpb
spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb

Cc Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc Waiman Long <[email protected]>

---
v1 -> v2:
- Addressed comments on approach from Sean.

 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |  6 +++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c           |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +15 -0
index 5393babc0598..1ad140b17ad7 100644
@@ -85,4 +85,19 @@ static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { }
 extern void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif);
 extern void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void);
 
+/*
+ * Issue IBPB when switching guest vCPUs IFF if switch_mm_always_ibpb.
+ * Primarily useful for security paranoid (or naive) user space VMMs
+ * that may run multiple VMs within a single process.
+ * For multi-process VMMs, switching vCPUs, i.e. switching tasks,
+ * will also switch mm_structs and thus do IPBP via cond_mitigation();
+ * however, in the always_ibpb case, take a paranoid approach and issue
+ * IBPB on both switch_mm() and vCPU switch.
+ */
+static inline void x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb(void)
+{
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb))
+		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+}
+
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +5 -1
index 6296e1ebed1d..6aafb0279cbc 100644
@@ -68,8 +68,12 @@ u64 __ro_after_init x86_amd_ls_cfg_ssbd_mask;
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
 /* Control conditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
-/* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
+/* Control unconditional IBPB in both switch_mm() and
+ * x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb().
+ * See notes on x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb() for KVM use case details.
+ */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
 /* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c +1 -1
index bd4c64b362d2..fc08c94df888 100644
@@ -1302,7 +1302,7 @@ static void svm_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
 
 	if (sd->current_vmcb != svm->vmcb) {
 		sd->current_vmcb = svm->vmcb;
-		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+		x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb();
 	}
 	if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
 		__avic_vcpu_load(vcpu, cpu);
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +1 -1
index 04d170c4b61e..a8eed9b8221b 100644
@@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu,
 		 * The L1 VMM can protect itself with retpolines, IBPB or IBRS.
 		 */
 		if (!buddy || WARN_ON_ONCE(buddy->vmcs != prev))
-			indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+			x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb();
 	}
 
 	if (!already_loaded) {

--
2.30.1 (Apple Git-130)

#1 lore raw
Quoted 20 lines · Jon Kohler

On vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs and svm_vcpu_load, respect user controlled configuration for conditional IBPB and only attempt IBPB MSR when switching between different guest vCPUs IFF switch_mm_always_ibpb, which fixes a situation where the kernel will issue IBPB unconditionally even when conditional IBPB is enabled.

If a user has spectre_v2_user mitigation enabled, in any configuration, and the underlying processor supports X86_FEATURE_IBPB, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is set and any calls to indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() will issue IBPB MSR.

Depending on the spectre_v2_user configuration, either switch_mm_always_ibpb key or switch_mm_cond_ibpb key will be set.

Both switch_mm_always_ibpb and switch_mm_cond_ibpb are handled by switch_mm() -> cond_mitigation(), which works well in cases where switching vCPUs (i.e. switching tasks) also switches mm_struct; however, this misses a paranoid case where user space may be running multiple guests in a single process (i.e. single mm_struct).

Quoted 4 lines

This paranoid case is already covered by vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs and svm_vcpu_load; however, this is done by calling indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() and thus the kernel unconditionally issues IBPB if X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is set.

The changelog should call out that switch_mm_cond_ibpb is intentionally "ignored" for the virt case, and explain why it's nonsensical to emit IBPB in that scenario.

Quoted 4 lines

Fix by using intermediary call to x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb(), which gates IBPB MSR IFF switch_mm_always_ibpb is true. This is useful for security paranoid VMMs in either single process or multi-process VMM configurations.

Multi-process VMM? KVM doesn't allow "sharing" a VM across processes. Userspace can share guest memory across processes, but that's not relevant to an IBPB on guest switch. I suspect you're loosely referring to all of userspace as a single VMM. That's inaccurate, or at least unnecessarily confusing, from a kernel perspective. I am not aware of a VMM that runs as a monolithic "daemon" and forks a new process for every VM. And even in such a case, I would argue that most people would refer to each process as a separate VMM.

If there's a blurb about the switch_mm_cond_ibpb case being nonsensical, there's probably a good segue into stating the new behavior.

Quoted 27 lines

switch_mm_always_ibpb key is user controlled via spectre_v2_user and will be true for the following configurations:
spectre_v2_user=on
spectre_v2_user=prctl,ibpb
spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb

Cc Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc Waiman Long <[email protected]>

---
v1 -> v2:
- Addressed comments on approach from Sean.

 arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |  6 +++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c           |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +0 -0
index 5393babc0598..1ad140b17ad7 100644

arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { } · line 89

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +2 -0
@@ -85,4 +85,19 @@ static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { }
 extern void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif);
 extern void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void);
 
+/*
+ * Issue IBPB when switching guest vCPUs IFF if switch_mm_always_ibpb.

Extra "if" there.

arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { } · line 92

Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +3 -0
+ * Primarily useful for security paranoid (or naive) user space VMMs
+ * that may run multiple VMs within a single process.
+ * For multi-process VMMs, switching vCPUs, i.e. switching tasks,

As above, "multi-process VMMs" is very confusing, they're really just separate VMMs. Something like this?

* For the more common case of running VMs in their own dedicated process,
* switching vCPUs that belong to different VMs, i.e. switching tasks, will also
* ...

Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +10 -0
+ * will also switch mm_structs and thus do IPBP via cond_mitigation();
+ * however, in the always_ibpb case, take a paranoid approach and issue
+ * IBPB on both switch_mm() and vCPU switch.
+ */
+static inline void x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb(void)
+{
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb))
+		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+}
+
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0 -0
index 6296e1ebed1d..6aafb0279cbc 100644
author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 25 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 20 lines · Jon Kohler

On vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs and svm_vcpu_load, respect user controlled configuration for conditional IBPB and only attempt IBPB MSR when switching between different guest vCPUs IFF switch_mm_always_ibpb, which fixes a situation where the kernel will issue IBPB unconditionally even when conditional IBPB is enabled.

If a user has spectre_v2_user mitigation enabled, in any configuration, and the underlying processor supports X86_FEATURE_IBPB, X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is set and any calls to indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() will issue IBPB MSR.

Depending on the spectre_v2_user configuration, either switch_mm_always_ibpb key or switch_mm_cond_ibpb key will be set.

Both switch_mm_always_ibpb and switch_mm_cond_ibpb are handled by switch_mm() -> cond_mitigation(), which works well in cases where switching vCPUs (i.e. switching tasks) also switches mm_struct; however, this misses a paranoid case where user space may be running multiple guests in a single process (i.e. single mm_struct).

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines

This paranoid case is already covered by vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs and svm_vcpu_load; however, this is done by calling indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() and thus the kernel unconditionally issues IBPB if X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB is set.

The changelog should call out that switch_mm_cond_ibpb is intentionally "ignored" for the virt case, and explain why it's nonsensical to emit IBPB in that scenario.

Ok will do, thanks

Quoted 14 lines
Quoted 5 lines

Fix by using intermediary call to x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb(), which gates IBPB MSR IFF switch_mm_always_ibpb is true. This is useful for security paranoid VMMs in either single process or multi-process VMM configurations.

Multi-process VMM? KVM doesn't allow "sharing" a VM across processes. Userspace can share guest memory across processes, but that's not relevant to an IBPB on guest switch. I suspect you're loosely referring to all of userspace as a single VMM. That's inaccurate, or at least unnecessarily confusing, from a kernel perspective. I am not aware of a VMM that runs as a monolithic "daemon" and forks a new process for every VM. And even in such a case, I would argue that most people would refer to each process as a separate VMM.

Quoted 2 lines

If there's a blurb about the switch_mm_cond_ibpb case being nonsensical, there's probably a good segue into stating the new behavior.

Yea, thats what I was getting at but failed to wordsmith it nicely. I’ll sharpen it up and integrate your feedback into a v3

Quoted 60 lines
Quoted 28 lines

switch_mm_always_ibpb key is user controlled via spectre_v2_user and will be true for the following configurations:
spectre_v2_user=on
spectre_v2_user=prctl,ibpb
spectre_v2_user=seccomp,ibpb

Cc Sean Christopherson <[email protected]>
Cc Andrea Arcangeli <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Cc Josh Poimboeuf <[email protected]>
Cc Waiman Long <[email protected]>

---
v1 -> v2:
- Addressed comments on approach from Sean.

arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h | 15 +++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c       |  6 +++++-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c           |  2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c           |  2 +-
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +0 -0
index 5393babc0598..1ad140b17ad7 100644

arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { } · line 89

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +2 -0
@@ -85,4 +85,19 @@ static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { }
 extern void speculation_ctrl_update(unsigned long tif);
 extern void speculation_ctrl_update_current(void);
 
+/*
+ * Issue IBPB when switching guest vCPUs IFF if switch_mm_always_ibpb.

Extra "if" there.

arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h static inline void speculative_store_bypass_ht_init(void) { } · line 92

Quoted 3 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +3 -0
+ * Primarily useful for security paranoid (or naive) user space VMMs
+ * that may run multiple VMs within a single process.
+ * For multi-process VMMs, switching vCPUs, i.e. switching tasks,

As above, "multi-process VMMs" is very confusing, they're really just separate VMMs. Something like this?

* For the more common case of running VMs in their own dedicated process,
* switching vCPUs that belong to different VMs, i.e. switching tasks, will also
* ...

Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/include/asm/spec-ctrl.h +10 -0
+ * will also switch mm_structs and thus do IPBP via cond_mitigation();
+ * however, in the always_ibpb case, take a paranoid approach and issue
+ * IBPB on both switch_mm() and vCPU switch.
+ */
+static inline void x86_virt_guest_switch_ibpb(void)
+{
+	if (static_branch_unlikely(&switch_mm_always_ibpb))
+		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+}
+
 #endif
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +0 -0
index 6296e1ebed1d..6aafb0279cbc 100644