arm64: Initialize jump labels before setup_machine_fdt()
PATCH 1/1 arm64: Initialize jump labels before setup_machine_fdt()
From: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
commit 73e2d827a501d48dceeb5b9b267a4cd283d6b1ae upstream.
A static key warning splat appears during early boot on arm64 systems that credit randomness from devicetrees that contain an "rng-seed" property. This is because setup_machine_fdt() is called before jump_label_init() during setup_arch(). Let's swap the order of these two calls so that jump labels are initialized before the devicetree is unflattened and the rng seed is credited.
static_key_enable_cpuslocked(): static key '0xffffffe51c6fcfc0' used before call to jump_label_init()
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/jump_label.c:166 static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0+ #224 44b43e377bfc84bc99bb5ab885ff694984ee09ff pstate: 600001c9 (nZCv dAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 lr : static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 sp : ffffffe51c393cf0 x29: ffffffe51c393cf0 x28: 000000008185054c x27: 00000000f1042f10 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000f10302b2 x24: 0000002513200000 x23: 0000002513200000 x22: ffffffe51c1c9000 x21: fffffffdfdc00000 x20: ffffffe51c2f0831 x19: ffffffe51c6fcfc0 x18: 00000000ffff1020 x17: 00000000e1e2ac90 x16: 00000000000000e0 x15: ffffffe51b710708 x14: 0000000000000066 x13: 0000000000000018 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 00000000ffffffff x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 61632065726f6665 x6 : 6220646573752027 x5 : ffffffe51c641d25 x4 : ffffffe51c13142c x3 : ffff0a00ffffff05 x2 : 40000000ffffe003 x1 : 00000000000001c0 x0 : 0000000000000065 Call trace: static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 static_key_enable+0x2c/0x40 crng_set_ready+0x24/0x30 execute_in_process_context+0x80/0x90 _credit_init_bits+0x100/0x154 add_bootloader_randomness+0x64/0x78 early_init_dt_scan_chosen+0x140/0x184 early_init_dt_scan_nodes+0x28/0x4c early_init_dt_scan+0x40/0x44 setup_machine_fdt+0x7c/0x120 setup_arch+0x74/0x1d8 start_kernel+0x84/0x44c __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- random: crng init done Machine model: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTE
---
This got a "Fixes:" tag, but didn't have a corresponding Cc to stable. Presumably AUTOSEL will eventually find this too, but sending it onward proactively anyway.
arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kernel/setup.c +4 -3
@@ -300,13 +300,14 @@ void __init __no_sanitize_address setup_arch(char **cmdline_p)early_fixmap_init ();early_ioremap_init (); -setup_machine_fdt (__fdt_pointer); -/* * Initialise the static keys early as they may be enabled by the -* cpufeature code and early parameters. +* cpufeature code, early parameters, and DT setup. */ jump_label_init (); + +setup_machine_fdt (__fdt_pointer); +parse_early_param ();/*
Signature · 1 line
2.35.1
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 59 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
From: Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>
commit
73e2d827a501d48dceeb5b9b267a4cd283d6b1aeupstream.A static key warning splat appears during early boot on arm64 systems that credit randomness from devicetrees that contain an "rng-seed" property. This is because
setup_machine_fdt()is called beforejump_label_init()duringsetup_arch(). Let's swap the order of these two calls so that jump labels are initialized before the devicetree is unflattened and the rng seed is credited.
static_key_enable_cpuslocked(): static key '0xffffffe51c6fcfc0' used before call tojump_label_init()WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at kernel/jump_label.c:166 static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0+ #224 44b43e377bfc84bc99bb5ab885ff694984ee09ff pstate: 600001c9 (nZCv dAIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) pc : static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 lr : static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 sp : ffffffe51c393cf0 x29: ffffffe51c393cf0 x28: 000000008185054c x27: 00000000f1042f10 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 00000000f10302b2 x24: 0000002513200000 x23: 0000002513200000 x22: ffffffe51c1c9000 x21: fffffffdfdc00000 x20: ffffffe51c2f0831 x19: ffffffe51c6fcfc0 x18: 00000000ffff1020 x17: 00000000e1e2ac90 x16: 00000000000000e0 x15: ffffffe51b710708 x14: 0000000000000066 x13: 0000000000000018 x12: 0000000000000000 x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 00000000ffffffff x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 x7 : 61632065726f6665 x6 : 6220646573752027 x5 : ffffffe51c641d25 x4 : ffffffe51c13142c x3 : ffff0a00ffffff05 x2 : 40000000ffffe003 x1 : 00000000000001c0 x0 : 0000000000000065 Call trace: static_key_enable_cpuslocked+0xb0/0xb8 static_key_enable+0x2c/0x40 crng_set_ready+0x24/0x30 execute_in_process_context+0x80/0x90 _credit_init_bits+0x100/0x154 add_bootloader_randomness+0x64/0x78 early_init_dt_scan_chosen+0x140/0x184 early_init_dt_scan_nodes+0x28/0x4c early_init_dt_scan+0x40/0x44 setup_machine_fdt+0x7c/0x120 setup_arch+0x74/0x1d8 start_kernel+0x84/0x44c __primary_switched+0xc0/0xc8 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- random: crng init done Machine model: Google Lazor (rev1 - 2) with LTECc Hsin-Yi Wang <[email protected]>Cc Douglas Anderson <[email protected]>Cc Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>Cc Steven Rostedt <[email protected]>Cc Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>Cc Dominik Brodowski <[email protected]>Fixes f5bda35fba61 ("random: use static branch for crng_ready()")Signed-off-by Stephen Boyd <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Jason A. Donenfeld <[email protected]>
Quoted 4 lines
---
This got a "Fixes:" tag, but didn't have a corresponding Cc to stable. Presumably AUTOSEL will eventually find this too, but sending it onward proactively anyway.
Now queued up, thanks.
greg k-h
You can actually drop this in favor of
https://lore.kernel.org/stable/[email protected]/
rather than playing whack-a-mole by architectures that may have been broken by it.
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 4 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
You can actually drop this in favor of
https://lore.kernel.org/stable/[email protected]/
rather than playing whack-a-mole by architectures that may have been broken by it.
So I need to drop this as well? Or is it ok to keep for now now that I have queued up the other commit?
confused,
greg k-h
Quoted 9 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 4 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
You can actually drop this in favor of
https://lore.kernel.org/stable/[email protected]/
rather than playing whack-a-mole by architectures that may have been broken by it.So I need to drop this as well? Or is it ok to keep for now now that I have queued up the other commit?
The other commit ("Revert "random: use static branch for crng_ready()"") fixes this problem on all architectures. This commit fixes the problem on arm64. There's probably no harm in keeping this commit, if you want it, but it's also no longer necessary, because "Revert "random: use static branch for crng_ready()"" addresses the issue more comprehensively.
Jason
Greg KH
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
Quoted 9 lines · Greg KH
Quoted 4 lines · Jason A. Donenfeld
You can actually drop this in favor of
https://lore.kernel.org/stable/[email protected]/
rather than playing whack-a-mole by architectures that may have been broken by it.So I need to drop this as well? Or is it ok to keep for now now that I have queued up the other commit?
Quoted 6 lines
The other commit ("Revert "random: use static branch for
crng_ready()"") fixes this problem on all architectures. This commit fixes the problem on arm64. There's probably no harm in keeping this commit, if you want it, but it's also no longer necessary, because "Revert "random: use static branch forcrng_ready()"" addresses the issue more comprehensively.
I'll just leave this as-is for now, that's simpler.
thanks,
greg k-h