KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing pKVM memory
PATCH 1/1 KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing pKVM memory
Commit a7259df76702 ("memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM hypervisor. However, it seems that memblock_phys_alloc() differs from the original API in terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one excluded the reserved regions from kmemleak scans when the new one doesn't seem to. Unfortunately, when protected KVM is enabled, all kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a fatal exception, which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:
$ echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak [ 34.991354] kvm [304]: nVHE hyp BUG at: [<ffff800008fa3750>] __kvm_nvhe_handle_host_mem_abort+0x270/0x290! [ 34.991580] kvm [304]: Hyp Offset: 0xfffe8be807e00000 [ 34.991813] Kernel panic - not syncing: HYP panic: [ 34.991813] PS:600003c9 PC:0000f418011a3750 ESR:00000000f2000800 [ 34.991813] FAR:ffff000439200000 HPFAR:0000000004792000 PAR:0000000000000000 [ 34.991813] VCPU:0000000000000000 [ 34.993660] CPU: 0 PID: 304 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2 #102 [ 34.994059] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 34.994452] Call trace: [ 34.994641] dump_backtrace.part.0+0xcc/0xe0 [ 34.994932] show_stack+0x18/0x6c [ 34.995094] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 [ 34.995276] dump_stack+0x18/0x34 [ 34.995484] panic+0x16c/0x354 [ 34.995673] __hyp_pgtable_total_pages+0x0/0x60 [ 34.995933] scan_block+0x74/0x12c [ 34.996129] scan_gray_list+0xd8/0x19c [ 34.996332] kmemleak_scan+0x2c8/0x580 [ 34.996535] kmemleak_write+0x340/0x4a0 [ 34.996744] full_proxy_write+0x60/0xbc [ 34.996967] vfs_write+0xc4/0x2b0 [ 34.997136] ksys_write+0x68/0xf4 [ 34.997311] __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x2c [ 34.997532] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 34.997779] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec [ 34.998029] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xc0 [ 34.998205] el0_svc+0x2c/0x84 [ 34.998421] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x100 [ 34.998653] el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 [ 34.999252] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 35.000034] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 35.000261] CPU features: 0x800,00007831,00001086 [ 35.000642] Memory Limit: none [ 35.001329] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: HYP panic: [ 35.001329] PS:600003c9 PC:0000f418011a3750 ESR:00000000f2000800 [ 35.001329] FAR:ffff000439200000 HPFAR:0000000004792000 PAR:0000000000000000 [ 35.001329] VCPU:0000000000000000 ]---
Fix this by explicitly excluding the hypervisor's memory pool from kmemleak like we already do for the hyp BSS.
---
An alternative could be to actually exclude memory allocated using memblock_phys_alloc_range() from kmemleak scans to revert back to the old behaviour. But nobody else has complained about this AFAIK, so I'd be inclined to keep this local to pKVM. No strong opinion.
--- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +3 -3
@@ -2110,11 +2110,11 @@ static int finalize_hyp_mode(void)return 0 ;/* -* Exclude HYP BSS from kmemleak so that it doesn't get peeked -* at, which would end badly once the section is inaccessible. -* None of other sections should ever be introspected. +* Exclude HYP sections from kmemleak so that they don't get peeked +* at, which would end badly once inaccessible. */ kmemleak_free_part (__hyp_bss_start, __hyp_bss_end - __hyp_bss_start); +kmemleak_free_part (__va (hyp_mem_base), hyp_mem_size);return pkvm_drop_host_privileges (); }
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2.36.1.476.g0c4daa206d-goog _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list [email protected] https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
Quoted 51 lines · Quentin Perret
Commit
a7259df76702("memblock: makememblock_find_in_rangemethod private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM hypervisor. However, it seems thatmemblock_phys_alloc()differs from the original API in terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one excluded the reserved regions from kmemleak scans when the new one doesn't seem to. Unfortunately, when protected KVM is enabled, all kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a fatal exception, which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:$ echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak [ 34.991354] kvm [304]: nVHE hyp BUG at: [<ffff800008fa3750>] __kvm_nvhe_handle_host_mem_abort+0x270/0x290! [ 34.991580] kvm [304]: Hyp Offset: 0xfffe8be807e00000 [ 34.991813] Kernel panic - not syncing: HYP panic: [ 34.991813] PS:600003c9 PC:0000f418011a3750 ESR:00000000f2000800 [ 34.991813] FAR:ffff000439200000 HPFAR:0000000004792000 PAR:0000000000000000 [ 34.991813] VCPU:0000000000000000 [ 34.993660] CPU: 0 PID: 304 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2 #102 [ 34.994059] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 34.994452] Call trace: [ 34.994641] dump_backtrace.part.0+0xcc/0xe0 [ 34.994932] show_stack+0x18/0x6c [ 34.995094] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 [ 34.995276] dump_stack+0x18/0x34 [ 34.995484] panic+0x16c/0x354 [ 34.995673] __hyp_pgtable_total_pages+0x0/0x60 [ 34.995933] scan_block+0x74/0x12c [ 34.996129] scan_gray_list+0xd8/0x19c [ 34.996332] kmemleak_scan+0x2c8/0x580 [ 34.996535] kmemleak_write+0x340/0x4a0 [ 34.996744] full_proxy_write+0x60/0xbc [ 34.996967] vfs_write+0xc4/0x2b0 [ 34.997136] ksys_write+0x68/0xf4 [ 34.997311] __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x2c [ 34.997532] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 34.997779] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec [ 34.998029] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xc0 [ 34.998205] el0_svc+0x2c/0x84 [ 34.998421] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x100 [ 34.998653] el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 [ 34.999252] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 35.000034] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 35.000261] CPU features: 0x800,00007831,00001086 [ 35.000642] Memory Limit: none [ 35.001329] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: HYP panic: [ 35.001329] PS:600003c9 PC:0000f418011a3750 ESR:00000000f2000800 [ 35.001329] FAR:ffff000439200000 HPFAR:0000000004792000 PAR:0000000000000000 [ 35.001329] VCPU:0000000000000000 ]---Fix this by explicitly excluding the hypervisor's memory pool from kmemleak like we already do for the hyp BSS.
Quoted 8 lines
Cc Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>Fixes a7259df76702 ("memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private")Signed-off-by Quentin Perret <[email protected]>---
An alternative could be to actually exclude memory allocated usingmemblock_phys_alloc_range()from kmemleak scans to revert back to the old behaviour. But nobody else has complained about this AFAIK, so I'd be inclined to keep this local to pKVM. No strong opinion.
This works for me, I haven't heard anyone else complaining.
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Quoted 6 lines · Quentin Perret
Commit
a7259df76702("memblock: makememblock_find_in_rangemethod private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM hypervisor. However, it seems thatmemblock_phys_alloc()differs from the original API in terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one excluded the reserved regions from kmemleak scans when the new one doesn't seem to. Unfortunately, when protected KVM is enabled, all
I'd rather say that memblock_find_in_range() didn't inform kmemleak about the reserved regions, while memblock_phys_alloc() does.
Quoted 45 lines
kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a fatal exception, which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:
$ echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak [ 34.991354] kvm [304]: nVHE hyp BUG at: [<ffff800008fa3750>] __kvm_nvhe_handle_host_mem_abort+0x270/0x290! [ 34.991580] kvm [304]: Hyp Offset: 0xfffe8be807e00000 [ 34.991813] Kernel panic - not syncing: HYP panic: [ 34.991813] PS:600003c9 PC:0000f418011a3750 ESR:00000000f2000800 [ 34.991813] FAR:ffff000439200000 HPFAR:0000000004792000 PAR:0000000000000000 [ 34.991813] VCPU:0000000000000000 [ 34.993660] CPU: 0 PID: 304 Comm: bash Not tainted 5.19.0-rc2 #102 [ 34.994059] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 34.994452] Call trace: [ 34.994641] dump_backtrace.part.0+0xcc/0xe0 [ 34.994932] show_stack+0x18/0x6c [ 34.995094] dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84 [ 34.995276] dump_stack+0x18/0x34 [ 34.995484] panic+0x16c/0x354 [ 34.995673] __hyp_pgtable_total_pages+0x0/0x60 [ 34.995933] scan_block+0x74/0x12c [ 34.996129] scan_gray_list+0xd8/0x19c [ 34.996332] kmemleak_scan+0x2c8/0x580 [ 34.996535] kmemleak_write+0x340/0x4a0 [ 34.996744] full_proxy_write+0x60/0xbc [ 34.996967] vfs_write+0xc4/0x2b0 [ 34.997136] ksys_write+0x68/0xf4 [ 34.997311] __arm64_sys_write+0x20/0x2c [ 34.997532] invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114 [ 34.997779] el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x44/0xec [ 34.998029] do_el0_svc+0x2c/0xc0 [ 34.998205] el0_svc+0x2c/0x84 [ 34.998421] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xf4/0x100 [ 34.998653] el0t_64_sync+0x18c/0x190 [ 34.999252] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs [ 35.000034] Kernel Offset: disabled [ 35.000261] CPU features: 0x800,00007831,00001086 [ 35.000642] Memory Limit: none [ 35.001329] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: HYP panic: [ 35.001329] PS:600003c9 PC:0000f418011a3750 ESR:00000000f2000800 [ 35.001329] FAR:ffff000439200000 HPFAR:0000000004792000 PAR:0000000000000000 [ 35.001329] VCPU:0000000000000000 ]---Fix this by explicitly excluding the hypervisor's memory pool from kmemleak like we already do for the hyp BSS.
Quoted 7 lines
Cc Mike Rapoport <[email protected]>Fixes a7259df76702 ("memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private")Signed-off-by Quentin Perret <[email protected]>---
An alternative could be to actually exclude memory allocated usingmemblock_phys_alloc_range()from kmemleak scans to revert back to the old behaviour.
This would be wrong because memblock_phys_alloc() does allocate memory and unless there is a good reason to exclude it from kmemleak.
Quoted 2 lines
But nobody else has complained about this AFAIK, so I'd be inclined to keep this local to pKVM. No strong opinion.
Yes, please :)
An alternative to excluding this memory from kmemleak is to allocate it using
memblock_phys_alloc_range(size, align, 0, MEMBLOCK_ALLOC_NOLEAKTRACE)
then it won't be added to kmemleak at the first place.
Quoted 26 lines
--- arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 6 +++--- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +3
-3@@ -2110,11 +2110,11 @@ static int finalize_hyp_mode(void)return 0 ;/* -* Exclude HYP BSS from kmemleak so that it doesn't get peeked -* at, which would end badly once the section is inaccessible. -* None of other sections should ever be introspected. +* Exclude HYP sections from kmemleak so that they don't get peeked +* at, which would end badly once inaccessible. */ kmemleak_free_part (__hyp_bss_start, __hyp_bss_end - __hyp_bss_start); +kmemleak_free_part (__va (hyp_mem_base), hyp_mem_size);return pkvm_drop_host_privileges (); }Signature · 1 line
2.36.1.476.g0c4daa206d-goog
Signature · 6 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike. _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list [email protected] https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
Quoted 10 lines · Quentin Perret
Commit
a7259df76702("memblock: makememblock_find_in_rangemethod private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM hypervisor. However, it seems thatmemblock_phys_alloc()differs from the original API in terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one excluded the reserved regions from kmemleak scans when the new one doesn't seem to. Unfortunately, when protected KVM is enabled, all kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a fatal exception, which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:[...]
Applied to fixes, thanks!
[1/1] KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing pKVM memory
commit: 9e5afa8a537f742bccc2cd91bc0bef4b6483ee98
Cheers,
M.
Signature · 6 lines
Marc Zyngier <[email protected]> _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list [email protected] https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
Quoted 10 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 9 lines · Quentin Perret
Commit
a7259df76702("memblock: makememblock_find_in_rangemethod private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM hypervisor. However, it seems thatmemblock_phys_alloc()differs from the original API in terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one excluded the reserved regions from kmemleak scans when the new one doesn't seem to. Unfortunately, when protected KVM is enabled, all kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a fatal exception, which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
[...]
Applied to fixes, thanks!
[1/1] KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing pKVM memory
commit: 9e5afa8a537f742bccc2cd91bc0bef4b6483ee98
I'd really like to update the changelog to this:
Commit a7259df76702 ("memblock: make memblock_find_in_range method private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM hypervisor. However, memblock_phys_alloc() differs from the original API in terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one didn't report the reserved regions to kmemleak while the new one does. Unfortunately, when protected KVM is enabled, all kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a fatal exception, which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:
$ echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak [ 34.991354] kvm [304]: nVHE hyp BUG at: [<ffff800008fa3750>] __kvm_nvhe_handle_host_mem_abort+0x270/0x290! ...
Fix this by explicitly excluding the hypervisor's memory pool from kmemleak like we already do for the hyp BSS.
Quoted 6 lines
Cheers,
M.Signature · 1 line
Marc Zyngier <[email protected]>
Signature · 6 lines
Sincerely yours, Mike. _______________________________________________ kvmarm mailing list [email protected] https://lists.cs.columbia.edu/mailman/listinfo/kvmarm
Quoted 28 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 10 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 9 lines · Quentin Perret
Commit
a7259df76702("memblock: makememblock_find_in_rangemethod private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM hypervisor. However, it seems thatmemblock_phys_alloc()differs from the original API in terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one excluded the reserved regions from kmemleak scans when the new one doesn't seem to. Unfortunately, when protected KVM is enabled, all kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a fatal exception, which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
[...]
Applied to fixes, thanks!
[1/1] KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing pKVM memory
commit: 9e5afa8a537f742bccc2cd91bc0bef4b6483ee98I'd really like to update the changelog to this:
Commit
a7259df76702("memblock: makememblock_find_in_rangemethod private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM hypervisor. However,memblock_phys_alloc()differs from the original API in terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one didn't report the reserved regions to kmemleak while the new one does. Unfortunately, when protected KVM is enabled, all kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a fatal exception, which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:
Quoted 6 lines
$ echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak [ 34.991354] kvm [304]: nVHE hyp BUG at: [<ffff800008fa3750>] __kvm_nvhe_handle_host_mem_abort+0x270/0x290! ...Fix this by explicitly excluding the hypervisor's memory pool from kmemleak like we already do for the hyp BSS.
Looks good to me, thanks.
Quentin
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Marc Zyngier
maintainerQuoted 29 lines · Quentin Perret
Quoted 28 lines · Mike Rapoport
Quoted 10 lines · Marc Zyngier
Quoted 9 lines · Quentin Perret
Commit
a7259df76702("memblock: makememblock_find_in_rangemethod private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM hypervisor. However, it seems thatmemblock_phys_alloc()differs from the original API in terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one excluded the reserved regions from kmemleak scans when the new one doesn't seem to. Unfortunately, when protected KVM is enabled, all kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a fatal exception, which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
[...]
Applied to fixes, thanks!
[1/1] KVM: arm64: Prevent kmemleak from accessing pKVM memory
commit: 9e5afa8a537f742bccc2cd91bc0bef4b6483ee98I'd really like to update the changelog to this:
Commit
a7259df76702("memblock: makememblock_find_in_rangemethod private") changed the API using which memory is reserved for the pKVM hypervisor. However,memblock_phys_alloc()differs from the original API in terms of kmemleak semantics -- the old one didn't report the reserved regions to kmemleak while the new one does. Unfortunately, when protected KVM is enabled, all kernel accesses to pKVM-private memory result in a fatal exception, which can now happen because of kmemleak scans:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
$ echo scan > /sys/kernel/debug/kmemleak [ 34.991354] kvm [304]: nVHE hyp BUG at: [<ffff800008fa3750>] __kvm_nvhe_handle_host_mem_abort+0x270/0x290! ...Fix this by explicitly excluding the hypervisor's memory pool from kmemleak like we already do for the hyp BSS.
Looks good to me, thanks.
Now updated. Thanks,
M.
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Jazz is not dead. It just smells funny...